TROXEL et vir v. GRANVILLE

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
57 OCTOBER TERM, 1999
Syllabus
TROXEL et vir v. GRANVILLE
certiorari to the supreme court of washington
No. 99–138. Argued January 12, 2000—Decided June 5, 2000
Washington Rev. Code § 26.10.160(3) permits “[a]ny person” to petition for
visitation rights “at any time” and authorizes state superior courts to
grant such rights whenever visitation may serve a child’s best interest.
Petitioners Troxel petitioned for the right to visit their deceased son’s
daughters. Respondent Granville, the girls’ mother, did not oppose all
visitation, but objected to the amount sought by the Troxels. The Su-
perior Court ordered more visitation than Granville desired, and she
appealed. The State Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the
Troxels’ petition. In affirming, the State Supreme Court held, inter
alia, that § 26.10.160(3) unconstitutionally infringes on parents’ funda-
mental right to rear their children. Reasoning that the Federal Consti-
tution permits a State to interfere with this right only to prevent harm
or potential harm to the child, it found that § 26.10.160(3) does not re-
quire a threshold showing of harm and sweeps too broadly by permitting
any person to petition at any time with the only requirement being that
the visitation serve the best interest of the child.
Held: The judgment is affirmed.
137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P. 2d 21, affirmed.
Justice O’Connor, joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Gins-
burg, and Justice Breyer, concluded that § 26.10.160(3), as applied
to Granville and her family, violates her due process right to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her daughters.
Pp. 63–75.
(a) The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause has a substan-
tive component that “provides heightened protection against govern-
ment interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty inter-
ests,” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 720, including parents’
fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of their children, see, e. g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645,
651. Pp. 63–66.
(b) Washington’s breathtakingly broad statute effectively permits a
court to disregard and overturn any decision by a fit custodial parent
concerning visitation whenever a third party affected by the decision
files a visitation petition, based solely on the judge’s determination of
the child’s best interest. A parent’s estimation of the child’s best inter-
est is accorded no deference. The State Supreme Court had the oppor-

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
58 TROXEL v. GRANVILLE
Syllabus
tunity, but declined, to give § 26.10.160(3) a narrower reading. A combi-
nation of several factors compels the conclusion that § 26.10.160(3), as
applied here, exceeded the bounds of the Due Process Clause. First,
the Troxels did not allege, and no court has found, that Granville was
an unfit parent. There is a presumption that fit parents act in their
children’s best interests, Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 602; there is
normally no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm
of the family to further question fit parents’ ability to make the best
decisions regarding their children, see, e. g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S.
292, 304. The problem here is not that the Superior Court intervened,
but that when it did so, it gave no special weight to Granville’s determi-
nation of her daughters’ best interests. More importantly, that court
appears to have applied the opposite presumption, favoring grandparent
visitation. In effect, it placed on Granville the burden of disproving
that visitation would be in her daughters’ best interest and thus failed
to provide any protection for her fundamental right. The court also
gave no weight to Granville’s having assented to visitation even before
the filing of the petition or subsequent court intervention. These fac-
tors, when considered with the Superior Court’s slender findings, show
that this case involves nothing more than a simple disagreement be-
tween the court and Granville concerning her children’s best interests,
and that the visitation order was an unconstitutional infringement on
Granville’s right to make decisions regarding the rearing of her chil-
dren. Pp. 67–73.
(c) Because the instant decision rests on § 26.10.160(3)’s sweeping
breadth and its application here, there is no need to consider the ques-
tion whether the Due Process Clause requires all nonparental visitation
statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as
a condition precedent to granting visitation or to decide the precise
scope of the parental due process right in the visitation context. There
is also no reason to remand this case for further proceedings. The visi-
tation order clearly violated the Constitution, and the parties should not
be forced into additional litigation that would further burden Granville’s
parental right. Pp. 73–75.
Justice Souter concluded that the Washington Supreme Court’s
second reason for invalidating its own state statute—that it sweeps too
broadly in authorizing any person at any time to request (and a judge
to award) visitation rights, subject only to the State’s particular best-
interests standard—is consistent with this Court’s prior cases. This
ends the case, and there is no need to decide whether harm is required
or to consider the precise scope of a parent’s right or its necessary pro-
tections. Pp. 75–79.

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
59 Cite as: 530 U. S. 57 (2000)
Syllabus
Justice Thomas agreed that this Court’s recognition of a fundamen-
tal right of parents to direct their children’s upbringing resolves this
case, but concluded that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of
review to apply to infringements of fundamental rights. Here, the
State lacks a compelling interest in second-guessing a fit parent’s deci-
sion regarding visitation with third parties. P. 80.
O’Connor, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an
opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.,
joined. Souter, J., post, p. 75, and Thomas, J., post, p. 80, filed opinions
concurring in the judgment. Stevens, J., post, p. 80, Scalia, J., post,
p. 91, and Kennedy, J., post, p. 93, filed dissenting opinions.
Mark D. Olson argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs was Eric Schnapper.
Catherine W. Smith argued the cause for respondent.
With her on the brief was Howard M. Goodfriend.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Wash-
ington et al. by Christine O. Gregoire, Attorney General of Washington,
and Maureen A. Hart, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and by the At-
torneys General for their respective States as follows: Mark Pryor of Ar-
kansas, Bill Lockyer of California, Ken Salazar of Colorado, Earl I. Anzai
of Hawaii, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Mis-
souri, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, John J. Farmer, Jr., of New Jersey,
Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, and Paul
G. Summers of Tennessee; for AARP et al. by Rochelle Bobroff, Bruce
Vignery, and Michael Schuster; for Grandparents United for Children’s
Rights, Inc., by Judith Sperling Newton and Carol M. Gapen; for the
National Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Richard Ruda and
James I. Crowley; and for the Grandparent Caregiver Law Center of the
Brookdale Center on Aging.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers by Barbara Ellen Handschu and San-
ford K. Ain; for the American Center for Law and Justice by Jay Alan
Sekulow, Colby May, Vincent McCarthy, and John P. Tuskey; for the
American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Matthew A. Coles, Michael P.
Adams, Catherine Weiss, and Steven R. Shapiro; for the Coalition for the
Restoration of Parental Rights by Karen A. Wyle; for the Institute for
Justice et al. by William H. Mellor, Clint Bolick, and Scott G. Bullock;
for the Center for the Original Intent of the Constitution by Michael P.
Farris; for the Christian Legal Society et al. by Kimberlee Wood Colby,
Gregory S. Baylor, and Carl H. Esbeck; for the Lambda Legal Defense

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
60 TROXEL v. GRANVILLE
Opinion of O’Connor, J.
Justice O’Connor announced the judgment of the Court
and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice, Jus-
tice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join.
Section 26.10.160(3) of the Revised Code of Washington
permits “[a]ny person” to petition a superior court for visi-
tation rights “at any time,” and authorizes that court to
grant such visitation rights whenever “visitation may serve
the best interest of the child.” Petitioners Jenifer and
Gary Troxel petitioned a Washington Superior Court for
the right to visit their grandchildren, Isabelle and Natalie
Troxel. Respondent Tommie Granville, the mother of Isa-
belle and Natalie, opposed the petition. The case ultimately
reached the Washington Supreme Court, which held that
§ 26.10.160(3) unconstitutionally interferes with the funda-
mental right of parents to rear their children.
I
Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel shared a relationship
that ended in June 1991. The two never married, but they
had two daughters, Isabelle and Natalie. Jenifer and Gary
Troxel are Brad’s parents, and thus the paternal grandpar-
ents of Isabelle and Natalie. After Tommie and Brad sepa-
rated in 1991, Brad lived with his parents and regularly
brought his daughters to his parents’ home for weekend visi-
tation. Brad committed suicide in May 1993. Although the
Troxels at first continued to see Isabelle and Natalie on a
regular basis after their son’s death, Tommie Granville in-
and Education Fund et al. by Patricia M. Logue, Ruth E. Harlow, and
Beatrice Dohrn; for the Society of Catholic Social Scientists by Stephen M.
Krason and Richard W. Garnett; and for Debra Hein by Stuart M. Wilder.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Center for Children’s Policy
Practice & Research at the University of Pennsylvania by Barbara Ben-
nett Woodhouse; for the Domestic Violence Project, Inc. /Safe House (Mich-
igan) et al. by Anne L. Argiroff and Ann L. Routt; for the National Associ-
ation of Counsel for Children by Robert C. Fellmeth and Joan Hollinger;
and for the Northwest Women’s Law Center et al. by Cathy J. Zavis.

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
61 Cite as: 530 U. S. 57 (2000)
Opinion of O’Connor, J.
formed the Troxels in October 1993 that she wished to limit
their visitation with her daughters to one short visit per
month. In re Smith, 137 Wash. 2d 1, 6, 969 P. 2d 21, 23–24
(1998); In re Troxel, 87 Wash. App. 131, 133, 940 P. 2d 698,
698–699 (1997).
In December 1993, the Troxels commenced the present ac-
tion by filing, in the Washington Superior Court for Skagit
County, a petition to obtain visitation rights with Isabelle
and Natalie. The Troxels filed their petition under two
Washington statutes, Wash. Rev. Code §§ 26.09.240 and
26.10.160(3) (1994). Only the latter statute is at issue in this
case. Section 26.10.160(3) provides: “Any person may peti-
tion the court for visitation rights at any time including, but
not limited to, custody proceedings. The court may order
visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve
the best interest of the child whether or not there has been
any change of circumstances.” At trial, the Troxels re-
quested two weekends of overnight visitation per month and
two weeks of visitation each summer. Granville did not op-
pose visitation altogether, but instead asked the court to
order one day of visitation per month with no overnight stay.
87 Wash. App., at 133–134, 940 P. 2d, at 699. In 1995, the
Superior Court issued an oral ruling and entered a visitation
decree ordering visitation one weekend per month, one week
during the summer, and four hours on both of the petitioning
grandparents’ birthdays. 137 Wash. 2d, at 6, 969 P. 2d, at
23; App. to Pet. for Cert. 76a–78a.
Granville appealed, during which time she married Kelly
Wynn. Before addressing the merits of Granville’s appeal,
the Washington Court of Appeals remanded the case to the
Superior Court for entry of written findings of fact and con-
clusions of law. 137 Wash. 2d, at 6, 969 P. 2d, at 23. On
remand, the Superior Court found that visitation was in
Isabelle’s and Natalie’s best interests:
“The Petitioners [the Troxels] are part of a large, cen-
tral, loving family, all located in this area, and the Peti-

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
62 TROXEL v. GRANVILLE
Opinion of O’Connor, J.
tioners can provide opportunities for the children in the
areas of cousins and music.
“. . . The court took into consideration all factors regard-
ing the best interest of the children and considered all
the testimony before it. The children would be bene-
fitted from spending quality time with the Petitioners,
provided that that time is balanced with time with the
childrens’ [sic] nuclear family. The court finds that the
childrens’ [sic] best interests are served by spending
time with their mother and stepfather’s other six chil-
dren.” App. 70a.
Approximately nine months after the Superior Court en-
tered its order on remand, Granville’s husband formally
adopted Isabelle and Natalie. Id., at 60a–67a.
The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court’s visitation order and dismissed the Troxels’ petition
for visitation, holding that nonparents lack standing to seek
visitation under § 26.10.160(3) unless a custody action is
pending. In the Court of Appeals’ view, that limitation on
nonparental visitation actions was “consistent with the con-
stitutional restrictions on state interference with parents’
fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and man-
agement of their children.” 87 Wash. App., at 135, 940 P. 2d,
at 700 (internal quotation marks omitted). Having resolved
the case on the statutory ground, however, the Court of Ap-
peals did not expressly pass on Granville’s constitutional
challenge to the visitation statute. Id., at 138, 940 P. 2d,
at 701.
The Washington Supreme Court granted the Troxels’ peti-
tion for review and, after consolidating their case with two
other visitation cases, affirmed. The court disagreed with
the Court of Appeals’ decision on the statutory issue and
found that the plain language of § 26.10.160(3) gave the Trox-
els standing to seek visitation, irrespective of whether a
custody action was pending. 137 Wash. 2d, at 12, 969 P.

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
63 Cite as: 530 U. S. 57 (2000)
Opinion of O’Connor, J.
2d, at 26–27. The Washington Supreme Court nevertheless
agreed with the Court of Appeals’ ultimate conclusion that
the Troxels could not obtain visitation of Isabelle and Nata-
lie pursuant to § 26.10.160(3). The court rested its decision
on the Federal Constitution, holding that § 26.10.160(3) un-
constitutionally infringes on the fundamental right of par-
ents to rear their children. In the court’s view, there were
at least two problems with the nonparental visitation stat-
ute. First, according to the Washington Supreme Court, the
Constitution permits a State to interfere with the right of
parents to rear their children only to prevent harm or poten-
tial harm to a child. Section 26.10.160(3) fails that standard
because it requires no threshold showing of harm. Id., at
15–20, 969 P. 2d, at 28–30. Second, by allowing “ ‘any per-
son’ to petition for forced visitation of a child at ‘any time’
with the only requirement being that the visitation serve the
best interest of the child,” the Washington visitation statute
sweeps too broadly. Id., at 20, 969 P. 2d, at 30. “It is not
within the province of the state to make significant decisions
concerning the custody of children merely because it could
make a ‘better’ decision.” Ibid., 969 P. 2d, at 31. The
Washington Supreme Court held that “[p]arents have a right
to limit visitation of their children with third persons,” and
that between parents and judges, “the parents should be the
ones to choose whether to expose their children to certain
people or ideas.” Id., at 21, 969 P. 2d, at 31. Four justices
dissented from the Washington Supreme Court’s holding on
the constitutionality of the statute. Id., at 23–43, 969 P. 2d,
at 32–42.
We granted certiorari, 527 U. S. 1069 (1999), and now
affirm the judgment.
II
The demographic changes of the past century make it dif-
ficult to speak of an average American family. The composi-
tion of families varies greatly from household to household.
While many children may have two married parents and

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
64 TROXEL v. GRANVILLE
Opinion of O’Connor, J.
grandparents who visit regularly, many other children are
raised in single-parent households. In 1996, children living
with only one parent accounted for 28 percent of all children
under age 18 in the United States. U. S. Dept. of Com-
merce, Bureau of Census, Current Population Reports, 1997
Population Profile of the United States 27 (1998). Under-
standably, in these single-parent households, persons outside
the nuclear family are called upon with increasing frequency
to assist in the everyday tasks of child rearing. In many
cases, grandparents play an important role. For example,
in 1998, approximately 4 million children—or 5.6 percent of
all children under age 18—lived in the household of their
grandparents. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census,
Current Population Reports, Marital Status and Living Ar-
rangements: March 1998 (Update), p. i (1998).
The nationwide enactment of nonparental visitation stat-
utes is assuredly due, in some part, to the States’ recognition
of these changing realities of the American family. Because
grandparents and other relatives undertake duties of a pa-
rental nature in many households, States have sought to en-
sure the welfare of the children therein by protecting the
relationships those children form with such third parties.
The States’ nonparental visitation statutes are further sup-
ported by a recognition, which varies from State to State,
that children should have the opportunity to benefit from
relationships with statutorily specified persons—for exam-
ple, their grandparents. The extension of statutory rights
in this area to persons other than a child’s parents, however,
comes with an obvious cost. For example, the State’s recog-
nition of an independent third-party interest in a child can
place a substantial burden on the traditional parent-child re-
lationship. Contrary to Justice Stevens’ accusation, our
description of state nonparental visitation statutes in these
terms, of course, is not meant to suggest that “children are
so much chattel.” Post, at 89 (dissenting opinion). Rather,
our terminology is intended to highlight the fact that these

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
65 Cite as: 530 U. S. 57 (2000)
Opinion of O’Connor, J.
statutes can present questions of constitutional import. In
this case, we are presented with just such a question. Spe-
cifically, we are asked to decide whether § 26.10.160(3), as
applied to Tommie Granville and her family, violates the Fed-
eral Constitution.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.” We have long recognized that the Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause, like its Fifth Amendment coun-
terpart, “guarantees more than fair process.” Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 719 (1997). The Clause also in-
cludes a substantive component that “provides heightened
protection against government interference with certain fun-
damental rights and liberty interests.” Id., at 720; see also
Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 301–302 (1993).
The liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—
is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by this Court. More than 75 years ago, in Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399, 401 (1923), we held that the
“liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause includes the
right of parents to “establish a home and bring up children”
and “to control the education of their own.” Two years
later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534–535
(1925), we again held that the “liberty of parents and guard-
ians” includes the right “to direct the upbringing and educa-
tion of children under their control.” We explained in
Pierce that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State;
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him
for additional obligations.” Id., at 535. We returned to the
subject in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944), and
again confirmed that there is a constitutional dimension to
the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their chil-
dren. “It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nur-
ture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
66 TROXEL v. GRANVILLE
Opinion of O’Connor, J.
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder.” Id., at 166.
In subsequent cases also, we have recognized the funda-
mental right of parents to make decisions concerning the
care, custody, and control of their children. See, e. g., Stan-
ley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651 (1972) (“It is plain that the
interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and
management of his or her children ‘come[s] to this Court with
a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to lib-
erties which derive merely from shifting economic arrange-
ments’ ” (citation omitted)); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205,
232 (1972) (“The history and culture of Western civilization
reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture
and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the
parents in the upbringing of their children is now established
beyond debate as an enduring American tradition”); Quil-
loin v. Walcott, 434 U. S. 246, 255 (1978) (“We have recog-
nized on numerous occasions that the relationship between
parent and child is constitutionally protected”); Parham v.
J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 602 (1979) (“Our jurisprudence histori-
cally has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family
as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children.
Our cases have consistently followed that course”); Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 753 (1982) (discussing “[t]he funda-
mental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, cus-
tody, and management of their child”); Glucksberg, supra, at
720 (“In a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition
to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the
‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause in-
cludes the righ[t] . . . to direct the education and upbringing
of one’s children” (citing Meyer and Pierce)). In light of this
extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the
fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning
the care, custody, and control of their children.

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
67 Cite as: 530 U. S. 57 (2000)
Opinion of O’Connor, J.
Section 26.10.160(3), as applied to Granville and her family
in this case, unconstitutionally infringes on that fundamen-
tal parental right. The Washington nonparental visitation
statute is breathtakingly broad. According to the statute’s
text, “[a]ny person may petition the court for visitation
rights at any time,” and the court may grant such visitation
rights whenever “visitation may serve the best interest of
the child.” § 26.10.160(3) (emphases added). That language
effectively permits any third party seeking visitation to sub-
ject any decision by a parent concerning visitation of the
parent’s children to state-court review. Once the visitation
petition has been filed in court and the matter is placed be-
fore a judge, a parent’s decision that visitation would not be
in the child’s best interest is accorded no deference. Section
26.10.160(3) contains no requirement that a court accord the
parent’s decision any presumption of validity or any weight
whatsoever. Instead, the Washington statute places the
best-interest determination solely in the hands of the judge.
Should the judge disagree with the parent’s estimation of the
child’s best interests, the judge’s view necessarily prevails.
Thus, in practical effect, in the State of Washington a court
can disregard and overturn any decision by a fit custodial
parent concerning visitation whenever a third party affected
by the decision files a visitation petition, based solely on the
judge’s determination of the child’s best interests. The
Washington Supreme Court had the opportunity to give
§ 26.10.160(3) a narrower reading, but it declined to do so.
See, e. g., 137 Wash. 2d, at 5, 969 P. 2d, at 23 (“[The statute]
allow[s] any person, at any time, to petition for visitation
without regard to relationship to the child, without regard
to changed circumstances, and without regard to harm”); id.,
at 20, 969 P. 2d, at 30 (“[The statute] allow[s] ‘any person’ to
petition for forced visitation of a child at ‘any time’ with the
only requirement being that the visitation serve the best in-
terest of the child”).

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
68 TROXEL v. GRANVILLE
Opinion of O’Connor, J.
Turning to the facts of this case, the record reveals that
the Superior Court’s order was based on precisely the type
of mere disagreement we have just described and nothing
more. The Superior Court’s order was not founded on any
special factors that might justify the State’s interference
with Granville’s fundamental right to make decisions con-
cerning the rearing of her two daughters. To be sure, this
case involves a visitation petition filed by grandparents soon
after the death of their son—the father of Isabelle and Nata-
lie—but the combination of several factors here compels our
conclusion that § 26.10.160(3), as applied, exceeded the
bounds of the Due Process Clause.
First, the Troxels did not allege, and no court has found,
that Granville was an unfit parent. That aspect of the case
is important, for there is a presumption that fit parents act
in the best interests of their children. As this Court ex-
plained in Parham:
“[O]ur constitutional system long ago rejected any no-
tion that a child is the mere creature of the State and,
on the contrary, asserted that parents generally have
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare [their children] for additional obligations. . . .
The law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption
that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, ex-
perience, and capacity for judgment required for making
life’s difficult decisions. More important, historically it
has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead par-
ents to act in the best interests of their children.” 442
U. S., at 602 (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
Accordingly, so long as a parent adequately cares for his or
her children (i. e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for
the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family
to further question the ability of that parent to make the

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
69 Cite as: 530 U. S. 57 (2000)
Opinion of O’Connor, J.
best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s chil-
dren. See, e. g., Flores, 507 U. S., at 304.
The problem here is not that the Washington Superior
Court intervened, but that when it did so, it gave no special
weight at all to Granville’s determination of her daughters’
best interests. More importantly, it appears that the Su-
perior Court applied exactly the opposite presumption. In
reciting its oral ruling after the conclusion of closing
arguments, the Superior Court judge explained:
“The burden is to show that it is in the best interest of
the children to have some visitation and some quality
time with their grandparents. I think in most situa-
tions a commonsensical approach [is that] it is normally
in the best interest of the children to spend quality time
with the grandparent, unless the grandparent, [sic]
there are some issues or problems involved wherein the
grandparents, their lifestyles are going to impact ad-
versely upon the children. That certainly isn’t the
case here from what I can tell.” Verbatim Report of
Proceedings in In re Troxel, No. 93–3–00650–7 (Wash.
Super. Ct., Dec. 14, 19, 1994), p. 213 (hereinafter Verba-
tim Report).
The judge’s comments suggest that he presumed the grand-
parents’ request should be granted unless the children would
be “impact[ed] adversely.” In effect, the judge placed on
Granville, the fit custodial parent, the burden of disproving
that visitation would be in the best interest of her daughters.
The judge reiterated moments later: “I think [visitation with
the Troxels] would be in the best interest of the children and
I haven’t been shown it is not in [the] best interest of the
children.” Id., at 214.
The decisional framework employed by the Superior Court
directly contravened the traditional presumption that a fit
parent will act in the best interest of his or her child. See
Parham, supra, at 602. In that respect, the court’s pre-

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
70 TROXEL v. GRANVILLE
Opinion of O’Connor, J.
sumption failed to provide any protection for Granville’s fun-
damental constitutional right to make decisions concerning
the rearing of her own daughters. Cf., e. g., Cal. Fam. Code
Ann. § 3104(e) (West 1994) (rebuttable presumption that
grandparent visitation is not in child’s best interest if par-
ents agree that visitation rights should not be granted); Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 19A, § 1803(3) (1998) (court may award
grandparent visitation if in best interest of child and “would
not significantly interfere with any parent-child relationship
or with the parent’s rightful authority over the child”); Minn.
Stat. § 257.022(2)(a)(2) (1998) (court may award grandparent
visitation if in best interest of child and “such visitation
would not interfere with the parent-child relationship”); Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 43–1802(2) (1998) (court must find “by clear and
convincing evidence” that grandparent visitation “will not
adversely interfere with the parent-child relationship”); R. I.
Gen. Laws § 15–5–24.3(a)(2)(v) (Supp. 1999) (grandparent
must rebut, by clear and convincing evidence, presumption
that parent’s decision to refuse grandparent visitation was
reasonable); Utah Code Ann. § 30–5–2(2)(e) (1998) (same);
Hoff v. Berg, 595 N. W. 2d 285, 291–292 (N. D. 1999) (holding
North Dakota grandparent visitation statute unconstitu-
tional because State has no “compelling interest in presum-
ing visitation rights of grandparents to an unmarried minor
are in the child’s best interests and forcing parents to accede
to court-ordered grandparental visitation unless the parents
are first able to prove such visitation is not in the best inter-
ests of their minor child”). In an ideal world, parents might
always seek to cultivate the bonds between grandparents
and their grandchildren. Needless to say, however, our
world is far from perfect, and in it the decision whether such
an intergenerational relationship would be beneficial in any
specific case is for the parent to make in the first instance.
And, if a fit parent’s decision of the kind at issue here be-
comes subject to judicial review, the court must accord at
least some special weight to the parent’s own determination.

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
71 Cite as: 530 U. S. 57 (2000)
Opinion of O’Connor, J.
Finally, we note that there is no allegation that Granville
ever sought to cut off visitation entirely. Rather, the pres-
ent dispute originated when Granville informed the Troxels
that she would prefer to restrict their visitation with Isa-
belle and Natalie to one short visit per month and special
holidays. See 87 Wash. App., at 133, 940 P. 2d, at 699; Ver-
batim Report 12. In the Superior Court proceedings Gran-
ville did not oppose visitation but instead asked that the du-
ration of any visitation order be shorter than that requested
by the Troxels. While the Troxels requested two weekends
per month and two full weeks in the summer, Granville asked
the Superior Court to order only one day of visitation per
month (with no overnight stay) and participation in the Gran-
ville family’s holiday celebrations. See 87 Wash. App., at
133, 940 P. 2d, at 699; Verbatim Report 9 (“Right off the bat
we’d like to say that our position is that grandparent visita-
tion is in the best interest of the children. It is a matter of
how much and how it is going to be structured”) (opening
statement by Granville’s attorney). The Superior Court
gave no weight to Granville’s having assented to visitation
even before the filing of any visitation petition or subsequent
court intervention. The court instead rejected Granville’s
proposal and settled on a middle ground, ordering one week-
end of visitation per month, one week in the summer, and
time on both of the petitioning grandparents’ birthdays.
See 87 Wash. App., at 133–134, 940 P. 2d, at 699; Verbatim
Report 216–221. Significantly, many other States expressly
provide by statute that courts may not award visitation un-
less a parent has denied (or unreasonably denied) visitation
to the concerned third party. See, e. g., Miss. Code Ann.
§ 93–16–3(2)(a) (1994) (court must find that “the parent or
custodian of the child unreasonably denied the grandpar-
ent visitation rights with the child”); Ore. Rev. Stat.
§ 109.121(1)(a)(B) (1997) (court may award visitation if the
“custodian of the child has denied the grandparent reason-
able opportunity to visit the child”); R. I. Gen. Laws §§ 15–5–

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
72 TROXEL v. GRANVILLE
Opinion of O’Connor, J.
24.3(a)(2)(iii)–(iv) (Supp. 1999) (court must find that parents
prevented grandparent from visiting grandchild and that
“there is no other way the petitioner is able to visit his or
her grandchild without court intervention”).
Considered together with the Superior Court’s reasons for
awarding visitation to the Troxels, the combination of these
factors demonstrates that the visitation order in this case
was an unconstitutional infringement on Granville’s funda-
mental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody,
and control of her two daughters. The Washington Superior
Court failed to accord the determination of Granville, a fit
custodial parent, any material weight. In fact, the Superior
Court made only two formal findings in support of its visita-
tion order. First, the Troxels “are part of a large, central,
loving family, all located in this area, and the [Troxels] can
provide opportunities for the children in the areas of cousins
and music.” App. 70a. Second, “[t]he children would be
benefitted from spending quality time with the [Troxels],
provided that that time is balanced with time with the chil-
drens’ [sic] nuclear family.” Ibid. These slender findings,
in combination with the court’s announced presumption in
favor of grandparent visitation and its failure to accord sig-
nificant weight to Granville’s already having offered mean-
ingful visitation to the Troxels, show that this case involves
nothing more than a simple disagreement between the Wash-
ington Superior Court and Granville concerning her chil-
dren’s best interests. The Superior Court’s announced rea-
son for ordering one week of visitation in the summer
demonstrates our conclusion well: “I look back on some per-
sonal experiences . . . . We always spen[t] as kids a week
with one set of grandparents and another set of grandpar-
ents, [and] it happened to work out in our family that [it]
turned out to be an enjoyable experience. Maybe that can,
in this family, if that is how it works out.” Verbatim Report
220–221. As we have explained, the Due Process Clause
does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
73 Cite as: 530 U. S. 57 (2000)
Opinion of O’Connor, J.
of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a
state judge believes a “better” decision could be made. Nei-
ther the Washington nonparental visitation statute gener-
ally—which places no limits on either the persons who may
petition for visitation or the circumstances in which such a
petition may be granted—nor the Superior Court in this
specific case required anything more. Accordingly, we hold
that § 26.10.160(3), as applied in this case, is unconstitutional.
Because we rest our decision on the sweeping breadth of
§ 26.10.160(3) and the application of that broad, unlimited
power in this case, we do not consider the primary consti-
tutional question passed on by the Washington Supreme
Court—whether the Due Process Clause requires all nonpa-
rental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or
potential harm to the child as a condition precedent to grant-
ing visitation. We do not, and need not, define today the
precise scope of the parental due process right in the visita-
tion context. In this respect, we agree with Justice Ken-
nedy that the constitutionality of any standard for awarding
visitation turns on the specific manner in which that stand-
ard is applied and that the constitutional protections in this
area are best “elaborated with care.” Post, at 101 (dissent-
ing opinion). Because much state-court adjudication in this
context occurs on a case-by-case basis, we would be hesitant
to hold that specific nonparental visitation statutes violate
the Due Process Clause as a per se matter.* See, e. g., Fair-
*All 50 States have statutes that provide for grandparent visitation in
some form. See Ala. Code § 30–3–4.1 (1989); Alaska Stat. Ann. § 25.20.065
(1998); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25–409 (1994); Ark. Code Ann. § 9–13–103
(1998); Cal. Fam. Code Ann. § 3104 (West 1994); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19–1–117
(1999); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b–59 (1995); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 10, § 1031(7)
(1999); Fla. Stat. § 752.01 (1997); Ga. Code Ann. § 19–7–3 (1991); Haw. Rev.
Stat. § 571–46.3 (1999); Idaho Code § 32–719 (1999); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch.
750, § 5/607 (1998); Ind. Code § 31–17–5–1 (1999); Iowa Code § 598.35 (1999);
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38–129 (1993); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 405.021 (Baldwin
1990); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:344 (West Supp. 2000); La. Civ. Code Ann.,
Art. 136 (West Supp. 2000); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 19A, § 1803 (1998);

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
74 TROXEL v. GRANVILLE
Opinion of O’Connor, J.
banks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 49–50, 622 A. 2d 121, 126–127
(1993) (interpreting best-interest standard in grandparent
visitation statute normally to require court’s consideration
of certain factors); Williams v. Williams, 256 Va. 19, 501
S. E. 2d 417, 418 (1998) (interpreting Virginia nonparental
visitation statute to require finding of harm as condition
precedent to awarding visitation).
Justice Stevens criticizes our reliance on what he char-
acterizes as merely “a guess” about the Washington courts’
interpretation of § 26.10.160(3). Post, at 82 (dissenting opin-
ion). Justice Kennedy likewise states that “[m]ore spe-
cific guidance should await a case in which a State’s highest
court has considered all of the facts in the course of elaborat-
ing the protection afforded to parents by the laws of the
State and by the Constitution itself.” Post, at 102 (dissent-
ing opinion). We respectfully disagree. There is no need to
hypothesize about how the Washington courts might apply
§ 26.10.160(3) because the Washington Superior Court did
apply the statute in this very case. Like the Washington
Supreme Court, then, we are presented with an actual visita-
tion order and the reasons why the Superior Court believed
Md. Fam. Law Code Ann. § 9–102 (1999); Mass. Gen. Laws § 119:39D
(1996); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 722.27b (West Supp. 1999); Minn. Stat.
§ 257.022 (1998); Miss. Code Ann. § 93–16–3 (1994); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.402
(Supp. 1999); Mont. Code Ann. § 40–9–102 (1997); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43–1802
(1998); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125C.050 (Supp. 1999); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 458:17–d (1992); N. J. Stat. Ann. § 9:2–7.1 (West Supp. 1999–2000); N. M.
Stat. Ann. § 40–9–2 (1999); N. Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 72 (McKinney 1999);
N. C. Gen. Stat. §§ 50–13.2, 50–13.2A (1999); N. D. Cent. Code § 14–09–05.1
(1997); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3109.051, 3109.11 (Supp. 1999); Okla. Stat.,
Tit. 10, § 5 (Supp. 1999); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 109.121 (1997); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§§ 5311–5313 (1991); R. I. Gen. Laws §§ 15–5–24 to 15–5–24.3 (Supp. 1999);
S. C. Code Ann. § 20–7–420(33) (Supp. 1999); S. D. Codified Laws § 25–4–52
(1999); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36–6–306, 36–6–307 (Supp. 1999); Tex. Fam.
Code Ann. § 153.433 (Supp. 2000); Utah Code Ann. § 30–5–2 (1998); Vt.
Stat. Ann., Tit. 15, §§ 1011–1013 (1989); Va. Code Ann. § 20–124.2 (1995);
W. Va. Code §§ 48–2B–1 to 48–2B–7 (1999); Wis. Stat. §§ 767.245, 880.155
(1993–1994); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20–7–101 (1999).

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
75 Cite as: 530 U. S. 57 (2000)
Souter, J., concurring in judgment
entry of the order was appropriate in this case. Faced with
the Superior Court’s application of § 26.10.160(3) to Granville
and her family, the Washington Supreme Court chose not to
give the statute a narrower construction. Rather, that
court gave § 26.10.160(3) a literal and expansive interpreta-
tion. As we have explained, that broad construction plainly
encompassed the Superior Court’s application of the statute.
See supra, at 67.
There is thus no reason to remand the case for further
proceedings in the Washington Supreme Court. As Jus-
tice Kennedy recognizes, the burden of litigating a domes-
tic relations proceeding can itself be “so disruptive of the
parent-child relationship that the constitutional right of a
custodial parent to make certain basic determinations for the
child’s welfare becomes implicated.” Post, at 101. In this
case, the litigation costs incurred by Granville on her trip
through the Washington court system and to this Court are
without a doubt already substantial. As we have explained,
it is apparent that the entry of the visitation order in this
case violated the Constitution. We should say so now, with-
out forcing the parties into additional litigation that would
further burden Granville’s parental right. We therefore
hold that the application of § 26.10.160(3) to Granville and
her family violated her due process right to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of her daughters.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Washington Supreme
Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Souter, concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment affirming the decision of the Su-
preme Court of Washington, whose facial invalidation of its
own state statute is consistent with this Court’s prior cases
addressing the substantive interests at stake. I would say
no more. The issues that might well be presented by re-
viewing a decision addressing the specific application of the

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
76 TROXEL v. GRANVILLE
Souter, J., concurring in judgment
state statute by the trial court, ante, at 68–73, are not before
us and do not call for turning any fresh furrows in the
“treacherous field” of substantive due process. Moore v.
East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 502 (1977) (opinion of Powell,
J.).
The Supreme Court of Washington invalidated its state
statute based on the text of the statute alone, not its applica-
tion to any particular case.1 Its ruling rested on two inde-
pendently sufficient grounds: the failure of the statute to re-
quire harm to the child to justify a disputed visitation order,
In re Smith, 137 Wash. 2d 1, 17, 969 P. 2d 21, 29 (1998), and
the statute’s authorization of “any person” at “any time”
to petition for and to receive visitation rights subject only
to a free-ranging best-interests-of-the-child standard, id., at
20–21, 969 P. 2d, at 30–31. Ante, at 63. I see no error in
the second reason, that because the state statute authorizes
any person at any time to request (and a judge to award)
visitation rights, subject only to the State’s particular best-
1 The Supreme Court of Washington made its ruling in an action where
three separate cases, including the Troxels’, had been consolidated. In re
Smith, 137 Wash. 2d 1, 6–7, 969 P. 2d 21, 23–24 (1998). The court also
addressed two statutes, Wash. Rev. Code § 26.10.160(3) (Supp. 1996) and
former Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.240 (1994), 137 Wash. 2d, at 7, 969 P. 2d,
at 24, the latter of which is not even at issue in this case. See Brief for
Petitioners 6, n. 9; see also ante, at 61. Its constitutional analysis dis-
cussed only the statutory language and neither mentioned the facts of any
of the three cases nor reviewed the records of their trial court proceedings
below. 137 Wash. 2d, at 13–21, 969 P. 2d, at 27–31. The decision invali-
dated both statutes without addressing their application to particular
facts: “We conclude petitioners have standing but, as written, the statutes
violate the parents’ constitutionally protected interests. These statutes
allow any person, at any time, to petition for visitation without regard to
relationship to the child, without regard to changed circumstances, and
without regard to harm.” Id., at 5, 969 P. 2d, at 23 (emphasis added); see
also id., at 21, 969 P. 2d, at 31 (“RCW 26.10.160(3) and former RCW
26.09.240 impermissibly interfere with a parent’s fundamental interest in
the care, custody and companionship of the child” (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted)).

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
77 Cite as: 530 U. S. 57 (2000)
Souter, J., concurring in judgment
interests standard, the state statute sweeps too broadly
and is unconstitutional on its face. Consequently, there is
no need to decide whether harm is required or to consider
the precise scope of the parent’s right or its necessary
protections.
We have long recognized that a parent’s interests in the
nurture, upbringing, companionship, care, and custody of
children are generally protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. g., Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U. S. 390, 399, 401 (1923); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535 (1925); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S.
645, 651 (1972); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 232 (1972);
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U. S. 246, 255 (1978); Parham v.
J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 602 (1979); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S.
745, 753 (1982); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 720
(1997). As we first acknowledged in Meyer, the right of par-
ents to “bring up children,” 262 U. S., at 399, and “to control
the education of their own” is protected by the Constitution,
id., at 401. See also Glucksberg, supra, at 761 (Souter, J.,
concurring in judgment).
On the basis of this settled principle, the Supreme Court
of Washington invalidated its statute because it authorized a
contested visitation order at the intrusive behest of any per-
son at any time subject only to a best-interests-of-the-child
standard. In construing the statute, the state court ex-
plained that the “any person” at “any time” language was to
be read literally, 137 Wash. 2d, at 10–11, 969 P. 2d, at 25–27,
and that “[m]ost notably the statut[e] do[es] not require the
petitioner to establish that he or she has a substantial rela-
tionship with the child,” id., at 20–21, 969 P. 2d, at 31. Al-
though the statute speaks of granting visitation rights when-
ever “visitation may serve the best interest of the child,”
Wash. Rev. Code § 26.10.160(3) (1994), the state court author-
itatively read this provision as placing hardly any limit on a
court’s discretion to award visitation rights. As the court
understood it, the specific best-interests provision in the

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
78 TROXEL v. GRANVILLE
Souter, J., concurring in judgment
statute would allow a court to award visitation whenever it
thought it could make a better decision than a child’s parent
had done. See 137 Wash. 2d, at 20, 969 P. 2d, at 31 (“It is not
within the province of the state to make significant decisions
concerning the custody of children merely because it could
make a ‘better’ decision”).2 On that basis in part, the Su-
preme Court of Washington invalidated the State’s own stat-
ute: “Parents have a right to limit visitation of their children
with third persons.” Id., at 21, 969 P. 2d, at 31.
Our cases, it is true, have not set out exact metes and
bounds to the protected interest of a parent in the relation-
ship with his child, but Meyer’s repeatedly recognized right
of upbringing would be a sham if it failed to encompass the
right to be free of judicially compelled visitation by “any
party” at “any time” a judge believed he “could make a ‘bet-
ter’ decision” 3 than the objecting parent had done. The
strength of a parent’s interest in controlling a child’s associ-
ates is as obvious as the influence of personal associations on
the development of the child’s social and moral character.
Whether for good or for ill, adults not only influence but may
indoctrinate children, and a choice about a child’s social com-
panions is not essentially different from the designation of
the adults who will influence the child in school. Even a
State’s considered judgment about the preferable politi-
cal and religious character of schoolteachers is not entitled
2 As Justice O’Connor points out, the best-interests provision “con-
tains no requirement that a court accord the parent’s decision any pre-
sumption of validity or any weight whatsoever. Instead, the Washington
statute places the best-interest determination solely in the hands of the
judge.” Ante, at 67.
3 Cf. Chicago v. Morales, 527 U. S. 41, 71 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment) (“The ordinance is unconstitutional,
not because a policeman applied this discretion wisely or poorly in a partic-
ular case, but rather because the policeman enjoys too much discretion
in every case. And if every application of the ordinance represents an
exercise of unlimited discretion, then the ordinance is invalid in all its
applications”).

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
79 Cite as: 530 U. S. 57 (2000)
Souter, J., concurring in judgment
to prevail over a parent’s choice of private school. Pierce,
supra, at 535 (“The fundamental theory of liberty upon
which all governments in this Union repose excludes any
general power of the State to standardize its children by
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.
The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for addi-
tional obligations”). It would be anomalous, then, to subject
a parent to any individual judge’s choice of a child’s associ-
ates from out of the general population merely because the
judge might think himself more enlightened than the child’s
parent.4 To say the least (and as the Court implied in
Pierce), parental choice in such matters is not merely a de-
fault rule in the absence of either governmental choice or
the government’s designation of an official with the power to
choose for whatever reason and in whatever circumstances.
Since I do not question the power of a State’s highest court
to construe its domestic statute and to apply a demanding
standard when ruling on its facial constitutionality,5 see Chi-
cago v. Morales, 527 U. S. 41, 55, n. 22 (1999) (opinion of Ste-
vens, J.), this for me is the end of the case. I would simply
affirm the decision of the Supreme Court of Washington that
its statute, authorizing courts to grant visitation rights to
any person at any time, is unconstitutional. I therefore
respectfully concur in the judgment.
4 The Supreme Court of Washington invalidated the broadly sweeping
statute at issue on similarly limited reasoning: “Some parents and judges
will not care if their child is physically disciplined by a third person; some
parents and judges will not care if a third person teaches the child a reli-
gion inconsistent with the parents’ religion; and some judges and parents
will not care if the child is exposed to or taught racist or sexist beliefs.
But many parents and judges will care, and, between the two, the parents
should be the ones to choose whether to expose their children to certain
people or ideas.” 137 Wash. 2d, at 21, 969 P. 2d, at 31 (citation omitted).
5 This is the pivot between Justice Kennedy’s approach and mine.

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
80 TROXEL v. GRANVILLE
Stevens, J., dissenting
Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment.
I write separately to note that neither party has argued
that our substantive due process cases were wrongly decided
and that the original understanding of the Due Process
Clause precludes judicial enforcement of unenumerated
rights under that constitutional provision. As a result, I ex-
press no view on the merits of this matter, and I understand
the plurality as well to leave the resolution of that issue for
another day.*
Consequently, I agree with the plurality that this Court’s
recognition of a fundamental right of parents to direct the
upbringing of their children resolves this case. Our decision
in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), holds that
parents have a fundamental constitutional right to rear their
children, including the right to determine who shall educate
and socialize them. The opinions of the plurality, Justice
Kennedy, and Justice Souter recognize such a right, but
curiously none of them articulates the appropriate standard
of review. I would apply strict scrutiny to infringements of
fundamental rights. Here, the State of Washington lacks
even a legitimate governmental interest—to say nothing of
a compelling one—in second-guessing a fit parent’s decision
regarding visitation with third parties. On this basis,
I would affirm the judgment below.
Justice Stevens, dissenting.
The Court today wisely declines to endorse either the
holding or the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton. In my opinion, the Court would have been even wiser
to deny certiorari. Given the problematic character of the
trial court’s decision and the uniqueness of the Washington
statute, there was no pressing need to review a State Su-
*This case also does not involve a challenge based upon the Privileges
and Immunities Clause and thus does not present an opportunity to reeval-
uate the meaning of that Clause. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U. S. 489, 527–528
(1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
81 Cite as: 530 U. S. 57 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
preme Court decision that merely requires the state legisla-
ture to draft a better statute.
Having decided to address the merits, however, the Court
should begin by recognizing that the State Supreme Court
rendered a federal constitutional judgment holding a state
law invalid on its face. In light of that judgment, I believe
that we should confront the federal questions presented di-
rectly. For the Washington statute is not made facially in-
valid either because it may be invoked by too many hypo-
thetical plaintiffs, or because it leaves open the possibility
that someone may be permitted to sustain a relationship
with a child without having to prove that serious harm to
the child would otherwise result.
I
In response to Tommie Granville’s federal constitutional
challenge, the State Supreme Court broadly held that Wash.
Rev. Code § 26.10.160(3) (Supp. 1996) was invalid on its face
under the Federal Constitution.1 Despite the nature of this
judgment, Justice O’Connor would hold that the Washing-
ton visitation statute violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment only as applied. Ante, at 65, 67, 73
(plurality opinion). I agree with Justice Souter, ante, at
75–76, and n. 1 (opinion concurring in judgment), that this
approach is untenable.
The task of reviewing a trial court’s application of a state
statute to the particular facts of a case is one that should be
performed in the first instance by the state appellate courts.
In this case, because of their views of the Federal Constitu-
tion, the Washington state appeals courts have yet to decide
whether the trial court’s findings were adequate under the
1 The State Supreme Court held that, “as written, the statutes violate
the parents’ constitutionally protected interests.” In re Smith, 137 Wash.
2d 1, 5, 969 P. 2d 21, 23 (1998).

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
82 TROXEL v. GRANVILLE
Stevens, J., dissenting
statute.2 Any as-applied critique of the trial court’s judg-
ment that this Court might offer could only be based upon a
guess about the state courts’ application of that State’s stat-
ute, and an independent assessment of the facts in this
case—both judgments that we are ill-suited and ill-advised
to make.3
2 As the dissenting judge on the state appeals court noted, “[t]he trial
court here was not presented with any guidance as to the proper test to
be applied in a case such as this.” In re Troxel, 87 Wash. App. 131, 143,
940 P. 2d 698, 703 (1997) (opinion of Ellington, J.). While disagreeing with
the appeals court majority’s conclusion that the state statute was constitu-
tionally infirm, Judge Ellington recognized that despite this disagreement,
the appropriate result would not be simply to affirm. Rather, because
there had been no definitive guidance as to the proper construction of the
statute, “[t]he findings necessary to order visitation over the objections
of a parent are thus not in the record, and I would remand for further
proceedings.” Ibid.
3 Unlike Justice O’Connor, ante, at 69–70, I find no suggestion in the
trial court’s decision in this case that the court was applying any presump-
tions at all in its analysis, much less one in favor of the grandparents.
The first excerpt Justice O’Connor quotes from the trial court’s ruling,
ante, at 69, says nothing one way or another about who bears the burden
under the statute of demonstrating “best interests.” There is certainly
no indication of a presumption against the parents’ judgment, only a
“ ‘commonsensical’ ” estimation that, usually but not always, visiting with
grandparents can be good for children. Ibid. The second quotation, “ ‘I
think [visitation] would be in the best interest of the children and I haven’t
been shown it is not in [the] best interest of the children,’ ” ibid., sounds
as though the judge has simply concluded, based on the evidence before
him, that visitation in this case would be in the best interests of both
girls. Verbatim Report of Proceedings in In re Troxel, No. 93–3–00650–7
(Wash. Super. Ct., Dec. 14, 1994), p. 214. These statements do not pro-
vide us with a definitive assessment of the law the court applied regarding
a “presumption” either way. Indeed, a different impression is conveyed
by the judge’s very next comment: “That has to be balanced, of course,
with Mr. and Mrs. Wynn [a.k.a. Tommie Granville], who are trying to
put together a family that includes eight children, . . . trying to get all
those children together at the same time and put together some sort of
functional unit wherein the children can be raised as brothers and sisters
and spend lots of quality time together.” Ibid. The judge then went on
to reject the Troxels’ efforts to attain the same level of visitation that

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
83 Cite as: 530 U. S. 57 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
While I thus agree with Justice Souter in this respect,
I do not agree with his conclusion that the State Supreme
Court made a definitive construction of the visitation statute
that necessitates the constitutional conclusion he would
draw.4 As I read the State Supreme Court’s opinion, In re
Smith, 137 Wash. 2d 1, 19–20, 969 P. 2d 21, 30–31 (1998), its
interpretation of the Federal Constitution made it unneces-
sary to adopt a definitive construction of the statutory text,
or, critically, to decide whether the statute had been cor-
rectly applied in this case. In particular, the state court
gave no content to the phrase, “best interest of the child,”
Wash. Rev. Code § 26.10.160(3) (Supp. 1996)—content that
might well be gleaned from that State’s own statutes or deci-
sional law employing the same phrase in different contexts,
their son, the girls’ biological father, would have had, had he been alive.
“[T]he fact that Mr. Troxel is deceased and he was the natural parent and
as much as the grandparents would maybe like to step into the shoes of
Brad, under our law that is not what we can do. The grandparents cannot
step into the shoes of a deceased parent, per say [sic], as far as whole
gamut of visitation rights are concerned.” Id., at 215. Rather, as the
judge put it, “I understand your desire to do that as loving grandparents.
Unfortunately that would impact too dramatically on the children and
their ability to be integrated into the nuclear unit with the mother.” Id.,
at 222–223.
However one understands the trial court’s decision—and my point is
merely to demonstrate that it is surely open to interpretation—its validity
under the state statute as written is a judgment for the state appellate
courts to make in the first instance.
4 Justice Souter would conclude from the state court’s statement that
the statute “do[es] not require the petitioner to establish that he or she
has a substantial relationship with the child,” 137 Wash. 2d, at 21, 969
P. 2d, at 31, that the state court has “authoritatively read [the ‘best inter-
ests’] provision as placing hardly any limit on a court’s discretion to award
visitation rights,” ante, at 77 (opinion concurring in judgment). Apart
from the question whether one can deem this description of the statute an
“authoritative” construction, it seems to me exceedingly unlikely that the
state court held the statute unconstitutional because it believed that the
“best interests” standard imposes “hardly any limit” on courts’ discretion.
See n. 5, infra.

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
84 TROXEL v. GRANVILLE
Stevens, J., dissenting
and from the myriad other state statutes and court decisions
at least nominally applying the same standard.5 Thus,
I believe that Justice Souter’s conclusion that the statute
unconstitutionally imbues state trial court judges with “ ‘too
much discretion in every case,’ ” ante, at 78, n. 3 (opinion
concurring in judgment) (quoting Chicago v. Morales, 527
U. S. 41, 71 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring)), is premature.
We are thus presented with the unconstrued terms of a
state statute and a State Supreme Court opinion that, in my
view, significantly misstates the effect of the Federal Consti-
tution upon any construction of that statute. Given that
posture, I believe the Court should identify and correct the
two flaws in the reasoning of the state court’s majority opin-
5 The phrase “best interests of the child” appears in no less than 10
current Washington state statutory provisions governing determinations
from guardianship to termination to custody to adoption. See, e. g., Wash.
Rev. Code § 26.09.240(6) (Supp. 1996) (amended version of visitation stat-
ute enumerating eight factors courts may consider in evaluating a child’s
best interests); § 26.09.002 (in cases of parental separation or divorce “best
interests of the child are served by a parenting arrangement that best
maintains a child’s emotional growth, health and stability, and physical
care”; “best interest of the child is ordinarily served when the existing
pattern of interaction between a parent and child is altered only to the
extent necessitated by the changed relationship of the parents or as re-
quired to protect the child from physical, mental, or emotional harm”);
§ 26.10.100 (“The court shall determine custody in accordance with the
best interests of the child”). Indeed, the Washington state courts have
invoked the standard on numerous occasions in applying these statutory
provisions—just as if the phrase had quite specific and apparent meaning.
See, e. g., In re McDoyle, 122 Wash. 2d 604, 859 P. 2d 1239 (1993) (uphold-
ing trial court “best interest” assessment in custody dispute); McDaniels
v. Carlson, 108 Wash. 2d 299, 310, 738 P. 2d 254, 261 (1987) (elucidating
“best interests” standard in paternity suit context). More broadly, a
search of current state custody and visitation laws reveals fully 698 sepa-
rate references to the “best interest of the child” standard, a number that,
at a minimum, should give the Court some pause before it upholds a deci-
sion implying that those words, on their face, may be too boundless to pass
muster under the Federal Constitution.

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
85 Cite as: 530 U. S. 57 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
ion, and remand for further review of the trial court’s dispo-
sition of this specific case.
II
In my view, the State Supreme Court erred in its federal
constitutional analysis because neither the provision grant-
ing “any person” the right to petition the court for visitation,
137 Wash. 2d, at 20, 969 P. 2d, at 30, nor the absence of a
provision requiring a “threshold . . . finding of harm to the
child,” ibid., provides a sufficient basis for holding that the
statute is invalid in all its applications. I believe that a fa-
cial challenge should fail whenever a statute has “a ‘plainly
legitimate sweep,’ ” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702,
739–740, and n. 7 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring in judg-
ment).6 Under the Washington statute, there are plainly
any number of cases—indeed, one suspects, the most com-
mon to arise—in which the “person” among “any” seeking
visitation is a once-custodial caregiver, an intimate relation,
or even a genetic parent. Even the Court would seem to
agree that in many circumstances, it would be constitution-
ally permissible for a court to award some visitation of a
child to a parent or previous caregiver in cases of parental
separation or divorce, cases of disputed custody, cases involv-
ing temporary foster care or guardianship, and so forth. As
the statute plainly sweeps in a great deal of the permissible,
the State Supreme Court majority incorrectly concluded that
a statute authorizing “any person” to file a petition seeking
visitation privileges would invariably run afoul of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
The second key aspect of the Washington Supreme Court’s
holding—that the Federal Constitution requires a showing
of actual or potential “harm” to the child before a court may
6 It necessarily follows that under the far more stringent demands sug-
gested by the majority in United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745
(1987) (plaintiff seeking facial invalidation “must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid”), respondent’s
facial challenge must fail.

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
86 TROXEL v. GRANVILLE
Stevens, J., dissenting
order visitation continued over a parent’s objections—finds
no support in this Court’s case law. While, as the Court
recognizes, the Federal Constitution certainly protects the
parent-child relationship from arbitrary impairment by the
State, see infra this page and 87–88, we have never held that
the parent’s liberty interest in this relationship is so inflexi-
ble as to establish a rigid constitutional shield, protecting
every arbitrary parental decision from any challenge absent
a threshold finding of harm.7 The presumption that paren-
tal decisions generally serve the best interests of their chil-
dren is sound, and clearly in the normal case the parent’s
interest is paramount. But even a fit parent is capable of
treating a child like a mere possession.
Cases like this do not present a bipolar struggle between
the parents and the State over who has final authority to
determine what is in a child’s best interests. There is at a
minimum a third individual, whose interests are implicated
in every case to which the statute applies—the child.
It has become standard practice in our substantive due
process jurisprudence to begin our analysis with an identifi-
cation of the “fundamental” liberty interests implicated by
the challenged state action. See, e. g., ante, at 65–66 (opin-
ion of O’Connor, J.); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S.
702 (1997); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U. S. 833 (1992). My colleagues are of course cor-
rect to recognize that the right of a parent to maintain a
relationship with his or her child is among the interests in-
7 The suggestion by Justice Thomas that this case may be resolved
solely with reference to our decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U. S. 510, 535 (1925), is unpersuasive. Pierce involved a parent’s choice
whether to send a child to public or private school. While that case is a
source of broad language about the scope of parents’ due process rights
with respect to their children, the constitutional principles and interests
involved in the schooling context do not necessarily have parallel implica-
tions in this family law visitation context, in which multiple overlapping
and competing prerogatives of various plausibly interested parties are at
stake.

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
87 Cite as: 530 U. S. 57 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
cluded most often in the constellation of liberties protected
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Ante, at 65–66 (opin-
ion of O’Connor, J.). Our cases leave no doubt that parents
have a fundamental liberty interest in caring for and guiding
their children, and a corresponding privacy interest—absent
exceptional circumstances—in doing so without the undue
interference of strangers to them and to their child. More-
over, and critical in this case, our cases applying this princi-
ple have explained that with this constitutional liberty comes
a presumption (albeit a rebuttable one) that “natural bonds
of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their
children.” Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 602 (1979); see
also Casey, 505 U. S., at 895; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S.
745, 759 (1982) (State may not presume, at factfinding stage
of parental rights termination proceeding, that interests of
parent and child diverge); see also ante, at 68–69 (opinion of
O’Connor, J.).
Despite this Court’s repeated recognition of these signifi-
cant parental liberty interests, these interests have never
been seen to be without limits. In Lehr v. Robertson, 463
U. S. 248 (1983), for example, this Court held that a putative
biological father who had never established an actual rela-
tionship with his child did not have a constitutional right to
notice of his child’s adoption by the man who had married
the child’s mother. As this Court had recognized in an ear-
lier case, a parent’s liberty interests “ ‘do not spring full-
blown from the biological connection between parent and
child. They require relationships more enduring.’ ” Id., at
260 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380, 397 (1979)).
Conversely, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U. S. 110
(1989), this Court concluded that despite both biological par-
enthood and an established relationship with a young child,
a father’s due process liberty interest in maintaining some
connection with that child was not sufficiently powerful to
overcome a state statutory presumption that the husband of
the child’s mother was the child’s parent. As a result of the

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
88 TROXEL v. GRANVILLE
Stevens, J., dissenting
presumption, the biological father could be denied even visi-
tation with the child because, as a matter of state law, he
was not a “parent.” A plurality of this Court there recog-
nized that the parental liberty interest was a function, not
simply of “isolated factors” such as biology and intimate
connection, but of the broader and apparently independent
interest in family. See, e. g., id., at 123; see also Lehr, 463
U. S., at 261; Smith v. Organization of Foster Families For
Equality & Reform, 431 U. S. 816, 842–847 (1977); Moore v.
East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 498–504 (1977).
A parent’s rights with respect to her child have thus never
been regarded as absolute, but rather are limited by the ex-
istence of an actual, developed relationship with a child, and
are tied to the presence or absence of some embodiment of
family. These limitations have arisen, not simply out of the
definition of parenthood itself, but because of this Court’s
assumption that a parent’s interests in a child must be bal-
anced against the State’s long-recognized interests as parens
patriae, see, e. g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 303–304
(1993); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S., at 766; Parham, 442
U. S., at 605; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166
(1944), and, critically, the child’s own complementary interest
in preserving relationships that serve her welfare and pro-
tection, Santosky, 455 U. S., at 760.
While this Court has not yet had occasion to elucidate the
nature of a child’s liberty interests in preserving established
familial or family-like bonds, 491 U. S., at 130 (reserving the
question), it seems to me extremely likely that, to the extent
parents and families have fundamental liberty interests in
preserving such intimate relationships, so, too, do children
have these interests, and so, too, must their interests be bal-
anced in the equation.8 At a minimum, our prior cases rec-
8 This Court has on numerous occasions acknowledged that children are
in many circumstances possessed of constitutionally protected rights and
liberties. See Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 600 (1979) (liberty inter-
est in avoiding involuntary confinement); Planned Parenthood of Central

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
89 Cite as: 530 U. S. 57 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
ognizing that children are, generally speaking, constitution-
ally protected actors require that this Court reject any
suggestion that when it comes to parental rights, children
are so much chattel. See ante, at 64–65 (opinion of O’Con-
nor, J.) (describing States’ recognition of “an independent
third-party interest in a child”). The constitutional protec-
tion against arbitrary state interference with parental rights
should not be extended to prevent the States from protecting
children against the arbitrary exercise of parental authority
that is not in fact motivated by an interest in the welfare of
the child.9
This is not, of course, to suggest that a child’s liberty inter-
est in maintaining contact with a particular individual is to
be treated invariably as on a par with that child’s parents’
contrary interests. Because our substantive due process
case law includes a strong presumption that a parent will act
Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 74 (1976) (“Constitutional rights do not ma-
ture and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined
age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitu-
tion and possess constitutional rights”); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 506–507 (1969) (First Amendment
right to political speech); In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 13 (1967) (due process
rights in criminal proceedings).
9 Cf., e. g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 244–246 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (“While the parents, absent dissent, normally speak for the
entire family, the education of the child is a matter on which the child will
often have decided views. He may want to be a pianist or an astronaut
or an oceanographer. To do so he will have to break from the Amish
tradition. It is the future of the student, not the future of the parents,
that is imperiled by today’s decision. If a parent keeps his child out of
school beyond the grade school, then the child will be forever barred from
entry into the new and amazing world of diversity that we have today. . . .
It is the student’s judgment, not his parents’, that is essential if we are to
give full meaning to what we have said about the Bill of Rights and of the
right of students to be masters of their own destiny”). The majority’s
disagreement with Justice Douglas in that case turned not on any contrary
view of children’s interest in their own education, but on the impact of the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment on its analysis of school-
related decisions by the Amish community.

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
90 TROXEL v. GRANVILLE
Stevens, J., dissenting
in the best interest of her child, it would be necessary, were
the state appellate courts actually to confront a challenge to
the statute as applied, to consider whether the trial court’s
assessment of the “best interest of the child” incorporated
that presumption. Neither would I decide whether the trial
court applied Washington’s statute in a constitutional way in
this case, although, as I have explained, n. 3, supra, I think
the outcome of this determination is far from clear. For the
purpose of a facial challenge like this, I think it safe to
assume that trial judges usually give great deference to
parents’ wishes, and I am not persuaded otherwise here.
But presumptions notwithstanding, we should recognize
that there may be circumstances in which a child has a
stronger interest at stake than mere protection from serious
harm caused by the termination of visitation by a “person”
other than a parent. The almost infinite variety of fam-
ily relationships that pervade our ever-changing society
strongly counsel against the creation by this Court of a con-
stitutional rule that treats a biological parent’s liberty inter-
est in the care and supervision of her child as an isolated
right that may be exercised arbitrarily. It is indisputably
the business of the States, rather than a federal court em-
ploying a national standard, to assess in the first instance
the relative importance of the conflicting interests that give
rise to disputes such as this.10 Far from guaranteeing that
10 See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U. S. 429, 431 (1984) (“The judgment of a
state court determining or reviewing a child custody decision is not ordi-
narily a likely candidate for review by this Court”); cf. Collins v. Harker
Heights, 503 U. S. 115, 128 (1992) (matters involving competing and multi-
faceted social and policy decisions best left to local decisionmaking); Re-
gents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U. S. 214, 226 (1985) (emphasizing
our “reluctance to trench on the prerogatives of state and local educational
institutions” as federal courts are ill-suited to “evaluate the substance of
the multitude of academic decisions that are made daily by” experts in
the field evaluating cumulative information). That caution is never more
essential than in the realm of family and intimate relations. In part, this
principle is based on long-established, if somewhat arbitrary, tradition in

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
91 Cite as: 530 U. S. 57 (2000)
Scalia, J., dissenting
parents’ interests will be trammeled in the sweep of cases
arising under the statute, the Washington law merely gives
an individual—with whom a child may have an established
relationship—the procedural right to ask the State to act
as arbiter, through the entirely well-known best-interests
standard, between the parent’s protected interests and the
child’s. It seems clear to me that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment leaves room for States to con-
sider the impact on a child of possibly arbitrary parental
decisions that neither serve nor are motivated by the best
interests of the child.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Justice Scalia, dissenting.
In my view, a right of parents to direct the upbringing of
their children is among the “unalienable Rights” with which
the Declaration of Independence proclaims “all men . . . are
endowed by their Creator.” And in my view that right is
also among the “othe[r] [rights] retained by the people”
which the Ninth Amendment says the Constitution’s enu-
meration of rights “shall not be construed to deny or dispar-
age.” The Declaration of Independence, however, is not a
legal prescription conferring powers upon the courts; and the
Constitution’s refusal to “deny or disparage” other rights is
far removed from affirming any one of them, and even fur-
ther removed from authorizing judges to identify what they
might be, and to enforce the judges’ list against laws duly
enacted by the people. Consequently, while I would think
it entirely compatible with the commitment to representative
allocating responsibility for resolving disputes of various kinds in our fed-
eral system. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U. S. 689 (1992). But the
instinct against overregularizing decisions about personal relations is sus-
tained on firmer ground than mere tradition. It flows in equal part from
the premise that people and their intimate associations are complex and
particular, and imposing a rigid template upon them all risks severing
bonds our society would do well to preserve.

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
92 TROXEL v. GRANVILLE
Scalia, J., dissenting
democracy set forth in the founding documents to argue, in
legislative chambers or in electoral campaigns, that the State
has no power to interfere with parents’ authority over the
rearing of their children, I do not believe that the power
which the Constitution confers upon me as a judge entitles
me to deny legal effect to laws that (in my view) infringe
upon what is (in my view) that unenumerated right.
Only three holdings of this Court rest in whole or in part
upon a substantive constitutional right of parents to direct
the upbringing of their children 1 —two of them from an era
rich in substantive due process holdings that have since been
repudiated. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399, 401
(1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534–535
(1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 232–233 (1972).
Cf. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937)
(overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of D. C., 261 U. S.
525 (1923)). The sheer diversity of today’s opinions per-
suades me that the theory of unenumerated parental rights
underlying these three cases has small claim to stare decisis
protection. A legal principle that can be thought to produce
such diverse outcomes in the relatively simple case before us
here is not a legal principle that has induced substantial reli-
ance. While I would not now overrule those earlier cases
(that has not been urged), neither would I extend the theory
upon which they rested to this new context.
Judicial vindication of “parental rights” under a Constitu-
tion that does not even mention them requires (as Justice
Kennedy’s opinion rightly points out) not only a judicially
crafted definition of parents, but also—unless, as no one be-
1 Whether parental rights constitute a “liberty” interest for purposes of
procedural due process is a somewhat different question not implicated
here. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972), purports to rest in part
upon that proposition, see id., at 651–652; but see Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 491 U. S. 110, 120–121 (1989) (plurality opinion), though the holding is
independently supported on equal protection grounds, see Stanley, supra,
at 658.

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
93 Cite as: 530 U. S. 57 (2000)
Kennedy, J., dissenting
lieves, the parental rights are to be absolute—judicially ap-
proved assessments of “harm to the child” and judicially de-
fined gradations of other persons (grandparents, extended
family, adoptive family in an adoption later found to be in-
valid, long-term guardians, etc.) who may have some claim
against the wishes of the parents. If we embrace this un-
enumerated right, I think it obvious—whether we affirm or
reverse the judgment here, or remand as Justice Stevens
or Justice Kennedy would do—that we will be ushering in
a new regime of judicially prescribed, and federally pre-
scribed, family law. I have no reason to believe that federal
judges will be better at this than state legislatures; and state
legislatures have the great advantages of doing harm in a
more circumscribed area, of being able to correct their mis-
takes in a flash, and of being removable by the people.2
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment below.
Justice Kennedy, dissenting.
The Supreme Court of Washington has determined that
petitioners Jenifer and Gary Troxel have standing under
state law to seek court-ordered visitation with their grand-
children, notwithstanding the objections of the children’s
parent, respondent Tommie Granville. The statute relied
upon provides:
“Any person may petition the court for visitation
rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody
proceedings. The court may order visitation rights for
any person when visitation may serve the best interest
of the child whether or not there has been any change of
circumstances.” Wash. Rev. Code § 26.10.160(3) (1994).
2 I note that respondent is asserting only, on her own behalf, a substan-
tive due process right to direct the upbringing of her own children, and is
not asserting, on behalf of her children, their First Amendment rights of
association or free exercise. I therefore do not have occasion to consider
whether, and under what circumstances, the parent could assert the latter
enumerated rights.

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
94 TROXEL v. GRANVILLE
Kennedy, J., dissenting
After acknowledging this statutory right to sue for visita-
tion, the State Supreme Court invalidated the statute as vio-
lative of the United States Constitution, because it inter-
fered with a parent’s right to raise his or her child free from
unwarranted interference. In re Smith, 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969
P. 2d 21 (1998). Although parts of the court’s decision may
be open to differing interpretations, it seems to be agreed
that the court invalidated the statute on its face, ruling it
a nullity.
The first flaw the State Supreme Court found in the stat-
ute is that it allows an award of visitation to a nonparent
without a finding that harm to the child would result if visi-
tation were withheld; and the second is that the statute
allows any person to seek visitation at any time. In my
view the first theory is too broad to be correct, as it appears
to contemplate that the best interests of the child standard
may not be applied in any visitation case. I acknowledge
the distinct possibility that visitation cases may arise where,
considering the absence of other protection for the parent
under state laws and procedures, the best interests of the
child standard would give insufficient protection to the par-
ent’s constitutional right to raise the child without undue
intervention by the State; but it is quite a different matter
to say, as I understand the Supreme Court of Washington to
have said, that a harm to the child standard is required in
every instance.
Given the error I see in the State Supreme Court’s central
conclusion that the best interests of the child standard is
never appropriate in third-party visitation cases, that court
should have the first opportunity to reconsider this case. I
would remand the case to the state court for further proceed-
ings. If it then found the statute has been applied in an
unconstitutional manner because the best interests of the
child standard gives insufficient protection to a parent under
the circumstances of this case, or if it again declared the stat-
ute a nullity because the statute seems to allow any person

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
95 Cite as: 530 U. S. 57 (2000)
Kennedy, J., dissenting
at all to seek visitation at any time, the decision would pre-
sent other issues which may or may not warrant further re-
view in this Court. These include not only the protection
the Constitution gives parents against state-ordered visita-
tion but also the extent to which federal rules for facial chal-
lenges to statutes control in state courts. These matters,
however, should await some further case. The judgment
now under review should be vacated and remanded on the
sole ground that the harm ruling that was so central to the
Supreme Court of Washington’s decision was error, given its
broad formulation.
Turning to the question whether harm to the child must
be the controlling standard in every visitation proceeding,
there is a beginning point that commands general, perhaps
unanimous, agreement in our separate opinions: As our case
law has developed, the custodial parent has a constitutional
right to determine, without undue interference by the State,
how best to raise, nurture, and educate the child. The pa-
rental right stems from the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. g.,
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399, 401 (1923); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534–535 (1925); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166 (1944); Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U. S. 645, 651–652 (1972); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S.
205, 232–233 (1972); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 753–
754 (1982). Pierce and Meyer, had they been decided in re-
cent times, may well have been grounded upon First Amend-
ment principles protecting freedom of speech, belief, and
religion. Their formulation and subsequent interpretation
have been quite different, of course; and they long have been
interpreted to have found in Fourteenth Amendment con-
cepts of liberty an independent right of the parent in the
“custody, care and nurture of the child,” free from state in-
tervention. Prince, supra, at 166. The principle exists,
then, in broad formulation; yet courts must use considerable
restraint, including careful adherence to the incremental in-

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
96 TROXEL v. GRANVILLE
Kennedy, J., dissenting
struction given by the precise facts of particular cases, as
they seek to give further and more precise definition to the
right.
The State Supreme Court sought to give content to the
parent’s right by announcing a categorical rule that third
parties who seek visitation must always prove the denial of
visitation would harm the child. After reviewing some of
the relevant precedents, the Supreme Court of Washington
concluded “ ‘[t]he requirement of harm is the sole protection
that parents have against pervasive state interference in the
parenting process.’ ” 137 Wash. 2d, at 19–20, 969 P. 2d, at
30 (quoting Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S. W. 2d 573, 580 (Tenn.
1993)). For that reason, “[s]hort of preventing harm to the
child,” the court considered the best interests of the child to
be “insufficient to serve as a compelling state interest over-
ruling a parent’s fundamental rights.” 137 Wash. 2d, at 20,
969 P. 2d, at 30.
While it might be argued as an abstract matter that in
some sense the child is always harmed if his or her best
interests are not considered, the law of domestic relations,
as it has evolved to this point, treats as distinct the two
standards, one harm to the child and the other the best inter-
ests of the child. The judgment of the Supreme Court of
Washington rests on that assumption, and I, too, shall as-
sume that there are real and consequential differences be-
tween the two standards.
On the question whether one standard must always take
precedence over the other in order to protect the right of
the parent or parents, “[o]ur Nation’s history, legal tradi-
tions, and practices” do not give us clear or definitive an-
swers. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721 (1997).
The consensus among courts and commentators is that at
least through the 19th century there was no legal right of
visitation; court-ordered visitation appears to be a 20th-
century phenomenon. See, e. g., 1 D. Kramer, Legal Rights
of Children 124, 136 (2d ed. 1994); 2 J. Atkinson, Modern

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
97 Cite as: 530 U. S. 57 (2000)
Kennedy, J., dissenting
Child Custody Practice § 8.10 (1986). A case often cited as
one of the earliest visitation decisions, Succession of Reiss,
46 La. Ann. 347, 353, 15 So. 151, 152 (1894), explained that
“the obligation ordinarily to visit grandparents is moral and
not legal”—a conclusion which appears consistent with that
of American common-law jurisdictions of the time. Early
20th-century exceptions did occur, often in cases where
a relative had acted in a parental capacity, or where one
of a child’s parents had died. See Douglass v. Merriman,
163 S. C. 210, 161 S. E. 452 (1931) (maternal grandparent
awarded visitation with child when custody was awarded to
father; mother had died); Solomon v. Solomon, 319 Ill. App.
618, 49 N. E. 2d 807 (1943) (paternal grandparents could be
given visitation with child in custody of his mother when
their son was stationed abroad; case remanded for fitness
hearing); Consaul v. Consaul, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 688 (Sup. Ct.
Jefferson Cty. 1946) (paternal grandparents awarded visita-
tion with child in custody of his mother; father had become
incompetent). As a general matter, however, contemporary
state-court decisions acknowledge that “[h]istorically, grand-
parents had no legal right of visitation,” Campbell v. Camp-
bell, 896 P. 2d 635, 642, n. 15 (Utah App. 1995), and it is safe
to assume other third parties would have fared no better
in court.
To say that third parties have had no historical right to
petition for visitation does not necessarily imply, as the Su-
preme Court of Washington concluded, that a parent has a
constitutional right to prevent visitation in all cases not
involving harm. True, this Court has acknowledged that
States have the authority to intervene to prevent harm to
children, see, e. g., Prince, supra, at 168–169; Yoder, supra,
at 233–234, but that is not the same as saying that a height-
ened harm to the child standard must be satisfied in every
case in which a third party seeks a visitation order. It is
also true that the law’s traditional presumption has been
“that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
98 TROXEL v. GRANVILLE
Kennedy, J., dissenting
best interests of their children,” Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S.
584, 602 (1979); and “[s]imply because the decision of a parent
is not agreeable to a child or because it involves risks does
not automatically transfer the power to make that decision
from the parents to some agency or officer of the state,” id.,
at 603. The State Supreme Court’s conclusion that the Con-
stitution forbids the application of the best interests of the
child standard in any visitation proceeding, however, appears
to rest upon assumptions the Constitution does not require.
My principal concern is that the holding seems to proceed
from the assumption that the parent or parents who resist
visitation have always been the child’s primary caregivers
and that the third parties who seek visitation have no legiti-
mate and established relationship with the child. That idea,
in turn, appears influenced by the concept that the conven-
tional nuclear family ought to establish the visitation stand-
ard for every domestic relations case. As we all know, this
is simply not the structure or prevailing condition in many
households. See, e. g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S.
494 (1977). For many boys and girls a traditional family
with two or even one permanent and caring parent is simply
not the reality of their childhood. This may be so whether
their childhood has been marked by tragedy or filled with
considerable happiness and fulfillment.
Cases are sure to arise—perhaps a substantial number of
cases—in which a third party, by acting in a caregiving role
over a significant period of time, has developed a relationship
with a child which is not necessarily subject to absolute
parental veto. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U. S. 110
(1989) (putative natural father not entitled to rebut state-law
presumption that child born in a marriage is a child of the
marriage); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U. S. 246 (1978) (best in-
terests standard sufficient in adoption proceeding to protect
interests of natural father who had not legitimated the child);
see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U. S. 248, 261 (1983) (“ ‘[T]he
importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals in-

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
99 Cite as: 530 U. S. 57 (2000)
Kennedy, J., dissenting
volved and to the society, stems from the emotional attach-
ments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and
from the role it plays in “promot[ing] a way of life” through
the instruction of children . . . as well as from the fact of
blood relationship’ ” (quoting Smith v. Organization of Fos-
ter Families For Equality & Reform, 431 U. S. 816, 844
(1977), in turn quoting Yoder, 406 U. S., at 231–233)). Some
pre-existing relationships, then, serve to identify persons
who have a strong attachment to the child with the concomi-
tant motivation to act in a responsible way to ensure the
child’s welfare. As the State Supreme Court was correct to
acknowledge, those relationships can be so enduring that “in
certain circumstances where a child has enjoyed a substan-
tial relationship with a third person, arbitrarily depriving
the child of the relationship could cause severe psychological
harm to the child,” 137 Wash. 2d, at 20, 969 P. 2d, at 30;
and harm to the adult may also ensue. In the design and
elaboration of their visitation laws, States may be entitled to
consider that certain relationships are such that to avoid the
risk of harm, a best interests standard can be employed by
their domestic relations courts in some circumstances.
Indeed, contemporary practice should give us some pause
before rejecting the best interests of the child standard in
all third-party visitation cases, as the Washington court has
done. The standard has been recognized for many years as
a basic tool of domestic relations law in visitation proceed-
ings. Since 1965 all 50 States have enacted a third-party
visitation statute of some sort. See ante, at 73–74, n. (plu-
rality opinion). Each of these statutes, save one, permits a
court order to issue in certain cases if visitation is found to
be in the best interests of the child. While it is unnecessary
for us to consider the constitutionality of any particular pro-
vision in the case now before us, it can be noted that the
statutes also include a variety of methods for limiting par-
ents’ exposure to third-party visitation petitions and for en-
suring parental decisions are given respect. Many States

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
100 TROXEL v. GRANVILLE
Kennedy, J., dissenting
limit the identity of permissible petitioners by restricting
visitation petitions to grandparents, or by requiring petition-
ers to show a substantial relationship with a child, or both.
See, e. g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38–129 (1993 and Supp. 1998)
(grandparent visitation authorized under certain circum-
stances if a substantial relationship exists); N. C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 50–13.2, 50–13.2A, 50–13.5 (1999) (same); Iowa Code
§ 598.35 (Supp. 1999) (same; visitation also authorized for
great-grandparents); Wis. Stat. § 767.245 (Supp. 1999) (visita-
tion authorized under certain circumstances for “a grandpar-
ent, greatgrandparent, stepparent or person who has main-
tained a relationship similar to a parent-child relationship
with the child”). The statutes vary in other respects—for
instance, some permit visitation petitions when there has
been a change in circumstances such as divorce or death of
a parent, see, e. g., N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:17–d (1992),
and some apply a presumption that parental decisions should
control, see, e. g., Cal. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 3104(e)–(f) (West
1994); R. I. Gen. Laws § 15–5–24.3(a)(2)(v) (Supp. 1999).
Georgia’s is the sole state legislature to have adopted a gen-
eral harm to the child standard, see Ga. Code Ann. § 19–7–
3(c) (1999), and it did so only after the Georgia Supreme
Court held the State’s prior visitation statute invalid under
the Federal and Georgia Constitutions, see Brooks v. Parker-
son, 265 Ga. 189, 454 S. E. 2d 769, cert. denied, 516 U. S.
942 (1995).
In light of the inconclusive historical record and case law,
as well as the almost universal adoption of the best interests
standard for visitation disputes, I would be hard pressed to
conclude the right to be free of such review in all cases is
itself “ ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ ” Glucks-
berg, 521 U. S., at 721 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U. S. 319, 325 (1937)). In my view, it would be more appro-
priate to conclude that the constitutionality of the applica-
tion of the best interests standard depends on more specific
factors. In short, a fit parent’s right vis-a` -vis a complete

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
101 Cite as: 530 U. S. 57 (2000)
Kennedy, J., dissenting
stranger is one thing; her right vis-a` -vis another parent or a
de facto parent may be another. The protection the Consti-
tution requires, then, must be elaborated with care, using
the discipline and instruction of the case law system. We
must keep in mind that family courts in the 50 States con-
front these factual variations each day, and are best situated
to consider the unpredictable, yet inevitable, issues that
arise. Cf. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U. S. 689, 703–704
(1992).
It must be recognized, of course, that a domestic relations
proceeding in and of itself can constitute state intervention
that is so disruptive of the parent-child relationship that the
constitutional right of a custodial parent to make certain
basic determinations for the child’s welfare becomes impli-
cated. The best interests of the child standard has at times
been criticized as indeterminate, leading to unpredictable re-
sults. See, e. g., American Law Institute, Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution 2, and n. 2 (Tent. Draft No. 3,
Mar. 20, 1998). If a single parent who is struggling to raise
a child is faced with visitation demands from a third party,
the attorney’s fees alone might destroy her hopes and plans
for the child’s future. Our system must confront more often
the reality that litigation can itself be so disruptive that
constitutional protection may be required; and I do not dis-
count the possibility that in some instances the best interests
of the child standard may provide insufficient protection
to the parent-child relationship. We owe it to the Nation’s
domestic relations legal structure, however, to proceed with
caution.
It should suffice in this case to reverse the holding of the
State Supreme Court that the application of the best inter-
ests of the child standard is always unconstitutional in third-
party visitation cases. Whether, under the circumstances of
this case, the order requiring visitation over the objection of
this fit parent violated the Constitution ought to be reserved
for further proceedings. Because of its sweeping ruling re-

530US1 Unit: $U66 [10-22-01 17:41:36] PAGES PGT: OPIN
102 TROXEL v. GRANVILLE
Kennedy, J., dissenting
quiring the harm to the child standard, the Supreme Court of
Washington did not have the occasion to address the specific
visitation order the Troxels obtained. More specific guid-
ance should await a case in which a State’s highest court has
considered all of the facts in the course of elaborating the
protection afforded to parents by the laws of the State and
by the Constitution itself. Furthermore, in my view, we
need not address whether, under the correct constitutional
standards, the Washington statute can be invalidated on its
face. This question, too, ought to be addressed by the state
court in the first instance.
In my view the judgment under review should be vacated
and the case remanded for further proceedings.