REEVES v. SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC.

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133 OCTOBER TERM, 1999
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REEVES v. SANDERSON PLUMBING
PRODUCTS, INC.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fifth circuit
No. 99–536. Argued March 21, 2000—Decided June 12, 2000
Petitioner Reeves, 57, and Joe Oswalt, in his mid-thirties, were the super-
visors in one of respondent’s departments known as the “Hinge Room,”
which was managed by Russell Caldwell, 45. Reeves’ responsibilities
included recording the attendance and hours worked by employees
under his supervision. In 1995, Caldwell informed Powe Chesnut, the
company’s director of manufacturing, that Hinge Room production was
down because employees were often absent, coming in late, and leav-
ing early. Because the monthly attendance reports did not indicate a
problem, Chesnut ordered an audit, which, according to his testimony,
revealed numerous timekeeping errors and misrepresentations by Cald-
well, Reeves, and Oswalt. Chesnut and other company officials recom-
mended to the company president, Sandra Sanderson, that Reeves and
Caldwell be fired, and she complied. Reeves filed this suit, contending
that he had been terminated because of his age in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). At trial, respond-
ent contended Reeves had been fired due to his failure to maintain ac-
curate attendance records. Reeves attempted to demonstrate that this
explanation was pretext for age discrimination, introducing evidence
that he had accurately recorded the attendance and hours of the em-
ployees he supervised, and that Chesnut, whom Oswalt described as
wielding “absolute power” within the company, had demonstrated age-
based animus in his dealings with him. The District Court denied re-
spondent’s motions for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 50, and the case went to the jury, which returned a
verdict for Reeves. The Fifth Circuit reversed. Although recognizing
that Reeves may well have offered sufficient evidence for the jury to
have found that respondent’s explanation was pretextual, the court ex-
plained that this did not mean that Reeves had presented sufficient
evidence to show that he had been fired because of his age. In finding
the evidence insufficient, the court weighed the additional evidence of
discrimination introduced by Reeves against other circumstances sur-
rounding his discharge, including that Chesnut’s age-based comments
were not made in the direct context of Reeves’ termination; there was
no allegation that the other individuals who recommended his firing

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134 REEVES v. SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC.
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were motivated by age; two of those officials were over 50; all three
Hinge Room supervisors were accused of inaccurate recordkeeping; and
several of respondent’s managers were over 50 when Reeves was fired.
Held:
1. A plaintiff ’s prima facie case of discrimination (as defined in Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802, and subsequent de-
cisions), combined with sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to
reject the employer’s nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision,
may be adequate to sustain a finding of liability for intentional discrimi-
nation under the ADEA. In this case, Reeves established a prima facie
case and made a substantial showing that respondent’s legitimate, non-
discriminatory explanation, i. e., his shoddy recordkeeping, was false.
He offered evidence showing that he had properly maintained the at-
tendance records in question and that cast doubt on whether he was
responsible for any failure to discipline late and absent employees. In
holding that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s ver-
dict, the Fifth Circuit ignored this evidence, as well as the evidence
supporting Reeves’ prima facie case, and instead confined its review
of the evidence favoring Reeves to that showing that Chesnut had di-
rected derogatory, age-based comments at Reeves, and that Chesnut
had singled him out for harsher treatment than younger employees.
It is therefore apparent that the court believed that only this additional
evidence of discrimination was relevant to whether the jury’s verdict
should stand. In so reasoning, the court misconceived the evidentiary
burden borne by plaintiffs who attempt to prove intentional discrimina-
tion through indirect evidence. In St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,
509 U. S. 502, 511, the Court stated that, because the factfinder’s dis-
belief of the reasons put forward by the defendant, together with the
elements of the prima facie case, may suffice to show intentional discrim-
ination, rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons will permit the
trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination.
Proof that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence is simply
one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional dis-
crimination, and it can be quite persuasive. See id., at 517. In appro-
priate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the
falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up
a discriminatory purpose. See, e. g., Wright v. West, 505 U. S. 277, 296.
Moreover, once the employer’s justification has been eliminated, dis-
crimination may well be the most likely alternative explanation, espe-
cially since the employer is in the best position to put forth the actual
reason for its decision. Cf. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S.
567, 577. Such a showing by the plaintiff will not always be adequate
to sustain a jury’s liability finding. Certainly there will be instances
where, although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and

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135 Cite as: 530 U. S. 133 (2000)
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introduced sufficient evidence to reject the employer’s explanation,
no rational factfinder could conclude that discrimination had occurred.
This Court need not—and could not—resolve all such circumstances
here. In this case, it suffices to say that a plaintiff ’s prima facie case,
combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted
justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the
employer unlawfully discriminated. Pp. 141–149.
2. Respondent was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law under
the particular circumstances presented here. Pp. 149–154.
(a) Rule 50 requires a court to render judgment as a matter of law
when a party has been fully heard on an issue, and there is no legally
sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party
on that issue. The standard for judgment as a matter of law under
Rule 50 mirrors the standard for summary judgment under Rule 56.
Thus, the court must review all of the evidence in the record, cf., e. g.,
Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574,
587, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,
but making no credibility determinations or weighing any evidence, e. g.,
Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U. S. 545, 554–555. The latter func-
tions, along with the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts,
are for the jury, not the court. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U. S. 242, 255. Thus, although the court should review the record as a
whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that
the jury is not required to believe. Pp. 149–151.
(b) In holding that the record contained insufficient evidence to
sustain the jury’s verdict, the Fifth Circuit misapplied the standard of
review dictated by Rule 50. The court disregarded evidence favorable
to Reeves—the evidence supporting his prima facie case and under-
mining respondent’s nondiscriminatory explanation—and failed to draw
all reasonable inferences in his favor. For instance, while acknowl-
edging the potentially damning nature of Chesnut’s age-related com-
ments, the court discounted them on the ground that they were not
made in the direct context of Reeves’ termination. And the court dis-
credited Reeves’ evidence that Chesnut was the actual decisionmaker
by giving weight to the fact that there was no evidence suggesting the
other decisionmakers were motivated by age. Moreover, the other
evidence on which the court relied—that Caldwell and Oswalt were
also cited for poor recordkeeping, and that respondent employed many
managers over age 50—although relevant, is certainly not dispositive.
See Furnco, supra, at 580. The ultimate question in every disparate
treatment case is whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional
discrimination. Here, the District Court informed the jury that Reeves
was required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that his age
was a determining and motivating factor in the decision to terminate

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136 REEVES v. SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC.
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him. It instructed the jury that, to show respondent’s explanation was
pretextual, Reeves had to demonstrate that age discrimination, not re-
spondent’s explanation, was the real reason for his discharge. Given
that Reeves established a prima facie case, introduced enough evidence
for the jury to reject respondent’s explanation, and produced additional
evidence that Chesnut was motivated by age-based animus and was
principally responsible for Reeves’ firing, there was sufficient evidence
for the jury to conclude that respondent had intentionally discrimi-
nated. Pp. 151–154.
197 F. 3d 688, reversed.
O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Gins-
burg, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 154.
Jim Waide argued the cause for petitioner. With him on
the briefs were David A. Chandler, Victor I. Fleitas, Eric
Schnapper, and Alan B. Morrison.
Patricia A. Millett argued the cause for the United States
et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. On the brief
were Solicitor General Waxman, Deputy Solicitor General
Underwood, Matthew D. Roberts, C. Gregory Stewart, and
Philip B. Sklover.
Taylor B. Smith argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief was Berkley N. Huskison.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the AARP by
Thomas W. Osborne, Laurie A. McCann, Sally Dunaway, and Melvin
Radowitz; for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Jeffrey Rob-
ert White; for the Hispanic National Bar Association by Seth J. Benezra,
Luis Perez, and Gilbert M. Roman; for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law et al. by Daniel F. Kolb, Norman Redlich, Barbara R.
Arnwine, Thomas J. Henderson, Richard T. Seymour, Teresa A. Ferrante,
Elainy R. Jones, Theodore M. Shaw, Norman J. Chachkin, Charles Ste-
phen Ralston, Dennis C. Hayes, Antonia Hernandez, Judith L. Lichtman,
Donna R. Lenhoff, Marcia D. Greenberger, Judith C. Appelbaum, Martha
F. Davis, Sara L. Mandelbaum, and Steven R. Shapiro; and for the Na-
tional Employment Lawyers Association by Paul W. Mollica and Paula
A. Brantner.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Alabama
Retail Association by John J. Coleman III and Marcel L. Debruge; for the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Marshall B. Babson, Stan-

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Opinion of the Court
Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the kind and amount of evidence neces-
sary to sustain a jury’s verdict that an employer unlawfully
discriminated on the basis of age. Specifically, we must
resolve whether a defendant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law when the plaintiff ’s case consists exclusively
of a prima facie case of discrimination and sufficient evidence
for the trier of fact to disbelieve the defendant’s legitimate,
nondiscriminatory explanation for its action. We must also
decide whether the employer was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law under the particular circumstances presented
here.
I
In October 1995, petitioner Roger Reeves was 57 years
old and had spent 40 years in the employ of respondent,
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., a manufacturer of toilet
seats and covers. 197 F. 3d 688, 690 (CA5 1999). Petitioner
worked in a department known as the “Hinge Room,” where
he supervised the “regular line.” Ibid. Joe Oswalt, in his
mid-thirties, supervised the Hinge Room’s “special line,”
and Russell Caldwell, the manager of the Hinge Room and
age 45, supervised both petitioner and Oswalt. Ibid. Peti-
tioner’s responsibilities included recording the attendance
and hours of those under his supervision, and reviewing a
weekly report that listed the hours worked by each em-
ployee. 3 Record 38–40.
In the summer of 1995, Caldwell informed Powe Chesnut,
the director of manufacturing and the husband of company
president Sandra Sanderson, that “production was down” in
ley Strauss, Stephen A. Bokat, and Robin S. Conrad; for the Equal Em-
ployment Advisory Council by Ann Elizabeth Reesman; for the Product
Liability Advisory Council, Inc., by Andrew L. Frey, Charles Rothfeld,
and Stephen M. Shapiro; for the Society for Human Resource Management
by Peter J. Petesch, Thomas J. Walsh, Jr., Timothy S. Bland, and John E.
Duvall; and for the Texas Association of Business and Chamber of Com-
merce by Dean J. Schaner and Scott M. Nelson.

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the Hinge Room because employees were often absent and
were “coming in late and leaving early.” 4 id., at 203–204.
Because the monthly attendance reports did not indicate a
problem, Chesnut ordered an audit of the Hinge Room’s
timesheets for July, August, and September of that year.
197 F. 3d, at 690. According to Chesnut’s testimony, that
investigation revealed “numerous timekeeping errors and
misrepresentations on the part of Caldwell, Reeves, and Os-
walt.” Ibid. Following the audit, Chesnut, along with
Dana Jester, vice president of human resources, and Tom
Whitaker, vice president of operations, recommended to
company president Sanderson that petitioner and Caldwell
be fired. Id., at 690–691. In October 1995, Sanderson fol-
lowed the recommendation and discharged both petitioner
and Caldwell. Id., at 691.
In June 1996, petitioner filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, con-
tending that he had been fired because of his age in viola-
tion of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq.
At trial, respondent contended that it had fired petitioner
due to his failure to maintain accurate attendance records,
while petitioner attempted to demonstrate that respondent’s
explanation was pretext for age discrimination. 197 F. 3d,
at 692–693. Petitioner introduced evidence that he had ac-
curately recorded the attendance and hours of the employees
under his supervision, and that Chesnut, whom Oswalt de-
scribed as wielding “absolute power” within the company, 3
Record 80, had demonstrated age-based animus in his deal-
ings with petitioner. 197 F. 3d, at 693.
During the trial, the District Court twice denied oral mo-
tions by respondent for judgment as a matter of law under
Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the case
went to the jury. 3 Record 183; 4 id., at 354. The court
instructed the jury that “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prove age
was a determinative or motivating factor in the decision to

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terminate him, then your verdict shall be for the defendant.”
Tr. 7 (Jury Charge) (Sept. 12, 1997). So charged, the jury
returned a verdict in favor of petitioner, awarding him
$35,000 in compensatory damages, and found that respond-
ent’s age discrimination had been “willfu[l].” 197 F. 3d, at
691. The District Court accordingly entered judgment for
petitioner in the amount of $70,000, which included $35,000
in liquidated damages based on the jury’s finding of will-
fulness. Ibid. Respondent then renewed its motion for
judgment as a matter of law and alternatively moved for a
new trial, while petitioner moved for front pay. 2 Record,
Doc. Nos. 36, 38. The District Court denied respondent’s
motions and granted petitioner’s, awarding him $28,490.80 in
front pay for two years’ lost income. 2 id., Doc. Nos. 40, 41.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, hold-
ing that petitioner had not introduced sufficient evidence to
sustain the jury’s finding of unlawful discrimination. 197 F.
3d, at 694. After noting respondent’s proffered justification
for petitioner’s discharge, the court acknowledged that peti-
tioner “very well may” have offered sufficient evidence for
“a reasonable jury [to] have found that [respondent’s] expla-
nation for its employment decision was pretextual.” Id., at
693. The court explained, however, that this was “not dis-
positive” of the ultimate issue—namely, “whether Reeves
presented sufficient evidence that his age motivated [re-
spondent’s] employment decision.” Ibid. Addressing this
question, the court weighed petitioner’s additional evidence
of discrimination against other circumstances surrounding
his discharge. See id., at 693–694. Specifically, the court
noted that Chesnut’s age-based comments “were not made
in the direct context of Reeves’s termination”; there was no
allegation that the two other individuals who had recom-
mended that petitioner be fired (Jester and Whitaker) were
motivated by age; two of the decisionmakers involved in
petitioner’s discharge (Jester and Sanderson) were over the
age of 50; all three of the Hinge Room supervisors were

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accused of inaccurate recordkeeping; and several of re-
spondent’s management positions were filled by persons over
age 50 when petitioner was fired. Ibid. On this basis, the
court concluded that petitioner had not introduced sufficient
evidence for a rational jury to conclude that he had been
discharged because of his age. Id., at 694.
We granted certiorari, 528 U. S. 985 (1999), to resolve a
conflict among the Courts of Appeals as to whether a plain-
tiff ’s prima facie case of discrimination (as defined in McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802 (1973)), com-
bined with sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to
reject the employer’s nondiscriminatory explanation for its
decision, is adequate to sustain a finding of liability for inten-
tional discrimination. Compare Kline v. TVA, 128 F. 3d 337
(CA6 1997) (prima facie case combined with sufficient evi-
dence to disbelieve employer’s explanation always creates
jury issue of whether employer intentionally discriminated);
Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F. 3d 1519 (CA11 1997)
(same), cert. denied, 522 U. S. 1045 (1998); Sheridan v. E. I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F. 3d 1061 (CA3 1996) (same)
(en banc), cert. denied, 521 U. S. 1129 (1997); Gaworski v. ITT
Commercial Finance Corp., 17 F. 3d 1104 (CA8) (same), cert.
denied, 513 U. S. 946 (1994); Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 13 F. 3d 1120 (CA7 1994) (same); Washington v. Gar-
rett, 10 F. 3d 1421 (CA9 1993) (same), with Aka v. Washing-
ton Hospital Center, 156 F. 3d 1284 (CADC 1998) (en banc)
(plaintiff ’s discrediting of employer’s explanation is entitled
to considerable weight, such that plaintiff should not be
routinely required to submit evidence over and above proof
of pretext), and with Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F. 3d
1332 (CA2 1997) (en banc) (plaintiff must introduce sufficient
evidence for jury to find both that employer’s reason was
false and that real reason was discrimination), cert. denied,
522 U. S. 1075 (1998); Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75
F. 3d 989 (CA5 1996) (same); Theard v. Glaxo, Inc., 47 F. 3d

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676 (CA4 1995) (same); Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc.,
30 F. 3d 255 (CA1 1994) (same).
II
Under the ADEA, it is “unlawful for an employer . . . to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s age.” 29 U. S. C. § 623(a)(1).
When a plaintiff alleges disparate treatment, “liability de-
pends on whether the protected trait (under the ADEA, age)
actually motivated the employer’s decision.” Hazen Paper
Co. v. Biggins, 507 U. S. 604, 610 (1993). That is, the plain-
tiff ’s age must have “actually played a role in [the employer’s
decisionmaking] process and had a determinative influence
on the outcome.” Ibid. Recognizing that “the question
facing triers of fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive
and difficult,” and that “[t]here will seldom be ‘eyewitness’
testimony as to the employer’s mental processes,” Postal
Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711, 716 (1983),
the Courts of Appeals, including the Fifth Circuit in this
case, have employed some variant of the framework articu-
lated in McDonnell Douglas to analyze ADEA claims that
are based principally on circumstantial evidence. See, e. g.,
Stokes v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 206 F. 3d 420,
429 (CA4 2000); Galabya v. New York City Bd. of Ed., 202
F. 3d 636, 639 (CA2 2000); Hall v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F. 3d
1074, 1077–1078 (CADC 1999); Beaird v. Seagate Technology
Inc., 145 F. 3d 1159, 1165 (CA10), cert. denied, 525 U. S. 1054
(1998); Hindman v. Transkrit Corp., 145 F. 3d 986, 990–991
(CA8 1998); Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F. 3d
1428, 1432 (CA11), cert. denied, 525 U. S. 962 (1998); Keller
v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F. 3d 1101, 1108 (CA3 1997)
(en banc); Kaniff v. Allstate Ins. Co., 121 F. 3d 258, 263 (CA7
1997); Ritter v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 58 F. 3d 454, 456–457
(CA9 1995); Bodenheimer v. PPG Industries, Inc., 5 F. 3d

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955, 957 (CA5 1993); Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F. 2d
816, 823 (CA1 1991), cert. denied, 504 U. S. 985 (1992); Acker-
man v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F. 2d 66, 69 (CA6
1982). This Court has not squarely addressed whether the
McDonnell Douglas framework, developed to assess claims
brought under § 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 78 Stat. 255, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–2(a)(1), also applies
to ADEA actions. Because the parties do not dispute the
issue, we shall assume, arguendo, that the McDonnell Doug-
las framework is fully applicable here. Cf. O’Connor v. Con-
solidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U. S. 308, 311 (1996).
McDonnell Douglas and subsequent decisions have “es-
tablished an allocation of the burden of production and an
order for the presentation of proof in . . . discriminatory-
treatment cases.” St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509
U. S. 502, 506 (1993). First, the plaintiff must establish a
prima facie case of discrimination. Ibid.; Texas Dept. of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 252–253
(1981). It is undisputed that petitioner satisfied this burden
here: (i) at the time he was fired, he was a member of the
class protected by the ADEA (“individuals who are at least
40 years of age,” 29 U. S. C. § 631(a)), (ii) he was otherwise
qualified for the position of Hinge Room supervisor, (iii) he
was discharged by respondent, and (iv) respondent succes-
sively hired three persons in their thirties to fill petitioner’s
position. See 197 F. 3d, at 691–692. The burden therefore
shifted to respondent to “produc[e] evidence that the plaintiff
was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason.” Burdine, supra, at 254.
This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it “can in-
volve no credibility assessment.” St. Mary’s Honor Center,
supra, at 509. Respondent met this burden by offering
admissible evidence sufficient for the trier of fact to con-
clude that petitioner was fired because of his failure to main-
tain accurate attendance records. See 197 F. 3d, at 692.
Accordingly, “the McDonnell Douglas framework—with

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its presumptions and burdens”—disappeared, St. Mary’s
Honor Center, supra, at 510, and the sole remaining issue
was “discrimination vel non,” Aikens, supra, at 714.
Although intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back
and forth under this framework, “[t]he ultimate burden of
persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with
the plaintiff.” Burdine, 450 U. S., at 253. And in attempt-
ing to satisfy this burden, the plaintiff—once the employer
produces sufficient evidence to support a nondiscriminatory
explanation for its decision—must be afforded the “opportu-
nity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true
reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Ibid.; see
also St. Mary’s Honor Center, supra, at 507–508. That is,
the plaintiff may attempt to establish that he was the vic-
tim of intentional discrimination “by showing that the em-
ployer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.”
Burdine, supra, at 256. Moreover, although the presump-
tion of discrimination “drops out of the picture” once the de-
fendant meets its burden of production, St. Mary’s Honor
Center, supra, at 511, the trier of fact may still consider the
evidence establishing the plaintiff ’s prima facie case “and
inferences properly drawn therefrom . . . on the issue of
whether the defendant’s explanation is pretextual,” Burdine,
supra, at 255, n. 10.
In this case, the evidence supporting respondent’s ex-
planation for petitioner’s discharge consisted primarily of
testimony by Chesnut and Sanderson and documentation
of petitioner’s alleged “shoddy record keeping.” 197 F. 3d,
at 692. Chesnut testified that a 1993 audit of Hinge Room
operations revealed “a very lax assembly line” where em-
ployees were not adhering to general work rules. 4 Rec-
ord 197–199. As a result of that audit, petitioner was placed
on 90 days’ probation for unsatisfactory performance. 197
F. 3d, at 690. In 1995, Chesnut ordered another investi-

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144 REEVES v. SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC.
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gation of the Hinge Room, which, according to his testi-
mony, revealed that petitioner was not correctly recording
the absences and hours of employees. 4 Record 204–205.
Respondent introduced summaries of that investigation
documenting several attendance violations by 12 employees
under petitioner’s supervision, and noting that each should
have been disciplined in some manner. See App. 21–24,
30–37; 4 Record 206–208. Chesnut testified that this failure
to discipline absent and late employees is “extremely im-
portant when you are dealing with a union” because uneven
enforcement across departments would keep the company
“in grievance and arbitration cases, which are costly, all
the time.” 4 id., at 206. He and Sanderson also stated
that petitioner’s errors, by failing to adjust for hours not
worked, cost the company overpaid wages. 3 id., at 100,
142, 154; 4 id., at 191–192, 213. Sanderson testified that she
accepted the recommendation to discharge petitioner be-
cause he had “intentionally falsif[ied] company pay records.”
3 id., at 100.
Petitioner, however, made a substantial showing that re-
spondent’s explanation was false. First, petitioner offered
evidence that he had properly maintained the attendance
records. Most of the timekeeping errors cited by respond-
ent involved employees who were not marked late but who
were recorded as having arrived at the plant at 7 a.m. for
the 7 a.m. shift. 3 id., at 118–123; 4 id., at 240–247, 283–285,
291, 293–294. Respondent contended that employees ar-
riving at 7 a.m. could not have been at their workstations by
7 a.m., and therefore must have been late. 3 id., at 119–120;
4 id., at 241, 245. But both petitioner and Oswalt testified
that the company’s automated timeclock often failed to
scan employees’ timecards, so that the timesheets would not
record any time of arrival. 3 id., at 6, 85; 4 id., at 334–335.
On these occasions, petitioner and Oswalt would visually
check the workstations and record whether the employees
were present at the start of the shift. 3 id., at 6, 85–87;

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4 id., at 335. They stated that if an employee arrived
promptly but the timesheet contained no time of arrival,
they would reconcile the two by marking “7 a.m.” as the
employee’s arrival time, even if the employee actually ar-
rived at the plant earlier. Ibid. On cross-examination,
Chesnut acknowledged that the timeclock sometimes mal-
functioned, and that if “people were there at their work
station[s]” at the start of the shift, the supervisor “would
write in seven o’clock.” 4 id., at 244. Petitioner also testi-
fied that when employees arrived before or stayed after their
shifts, he would assign them additional work so they would
not be overpaid. See 197 F. 3d, at 693.
Petitioner similarly cast doubt on whether he was respon-
sible for any failure to discipline late and absent employees.
Petitioner testified that his job only included reviewing the
daily and weekly attendance reports, and that disciplinary
writeups were based on the monthly reports, which were
reviewed by Caldwell. 3 Record 20–22; 4 id., at 335. Sand-
erson admitted that Caldwell, and not petitioner, was respon-
sible for citing employees for violations of the company’s at-
tendance policy. 3 id., at 20–21, 137–138. Further, Chesnut
conceded that there had never been a union grievance or
employee complaint arising from petitioner’s recordkeeping,
and that the company had never calculated the amount of
overpayments allegedly attributable to petitioner’s errors.
4 id., at 267, 301. Petitioner also testified that, on the day
he was fired, Chesnut said that his discharge was due to his
failure to report as absent one employee, Gina Mae Coley, on
two days in September 1995. 3 id., at 23, 70; 4 id., at 335–
336. But petitioner explained that he had spent those days
in the hospital, and that Caldwell was therefore responsible
for any overpayment of Coley. 3 id., at 17, 22. Finally,
petitioner stated that on previous occasions that employees
were paid for hours they had not worked, the company had
simply adjusted those employees’ next paychecks to correct
the errors. 3 id., at 72–73.

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Based on this evidence, the Court of Appeals concluded
that petitioner “very well may be correct” that “a reasonable
jury could have found that [respondent’s] explanation for its
employment decision was pretextual.” 197 F. 3d, at 693.
Nonetheless, the court held that this showing, standing
alone, was insufficient to sustain the jury’s finding of liability:
“We must, as an essential final step, determine whether
Reeves presented sufficient evidence that his age motivated
[respondent’s] employment decision.” Ibid. And in making
this determination, the Court of Appeals ignored the evi-
dence supporting petitioner’s prima facie case and challeng-
ing respondent’s explanation for its decision. See id., at
693–694. The court confined its review of evidence favoring
petitioner to that evidence showing that Chesnut had di-
rected derogatory, age-based comments at petitioner, and
that Chesnut had singled out petitioner for harsher treat-
ment than younger employees. See ibid. It is therefore
apparent that the court believed that only this additional evi-
dence of discrimination was relevant to whether the jury’s
verdict should stand. That is, the Court of Appeals pro-
ceeded from the assumption that a prima facie case of dis-
crimination, combined with sufficient evidence for the trier
of fact to disbelieve the defendant’s legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason for its decision, is insufficient as a matter of
law to sustain a jury’s finding of intentional discrimination.
In so reasoning, the Court of Appeals misconceived the
evidentiary burden borne by plaintiffs who attempt to prove
intentional discrimination through indirect evidence. This
much is evident from our decision in St. Mary’s Honor Cen-
ter. There we held that the factfinder’s rejection of the
employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its ac-
tion does not compel judgment for the plaintiff. 509 U. S.,
at 511. The ultimate question is whether the employer in-
tentionally discriminated, and proof that “the employer’s
proffered reason is unpersuasive, or even obviously con-
trived, does not necessarily establish that the plaintiff ’s prof-

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147 Cite as: 530 U. S. 133 (2000)
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fered reason . . . is correct.” Id., at 524. In other words,
“[i]t is not enough . . . to disbelieve the employer; the fact-
finder must believe the plaintiff ’s explanation of intentional
discrimination.” Id., at 519.
In reaching this conclusion, however, we reasoned that it
is permissible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of
discrimination from the falsity of the employer’s explanation.
Specifically, we stated:
“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by
the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied
by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the ele-
ments of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional
discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant’s prof-
fered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the
ultimate fact of intentional discrimination.” Id., at 511.
Proof that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of cre-
dence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is
probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite
persuasive. See id., at 517 (“[P]roving the employer’s rea-
son false becomes part of (and often considerably assists) the
greater enterprise of proving that the real reason was in-
tentional discrimination”). In appropriate circumstances,
the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the
explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a
discriminatory purpose. Such an inference is consistent
with the general principle of evidence law that the factfinder
is entitled to consider a party’s dishonesty about a material
fact as “affirmative evidence of guilt.” Wright v. West, 505
U. S. 277, 296 (1992); see also Wilson v. United States, 162
U. S. 613, 620–621 (1896); 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 278(2),
p. 133 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1979). Moreover, once the employ-
er’s justification has been eliminated, discrimination may
well be the most likely alternative explanation, especially
since the employer is in the best position to put forth the
actual reason for its decision. Cf. Furnco Constr. Corp. v.

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148 REEVES v. SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC.
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Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577 (1978) (“[W]hen all legitimate
reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as
possible reasons for the employer’s actions, it is more likely
than not the employer, who we generally assume acts with
some reason, based his decision on an impermissible con-
sideration”). Thus, a plaintiff ’s prima facie case, combined
with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted
justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude
that the employer unlawfully discriminated.
This is not to say that such a showing by the plaintiff will
always be adequate to sustain a jury’s finding of liability.
Certainly there will be instances where, although the plain-
tiff has established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient
evidence to reject the defendant’s explanation, no rational
factfinder could conclude that the action was discriminatory.
For instance, an employer would be entitled to judgment as
a matter of law if the record conclusively revealed some
other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer’s decision,
or if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to
whether the employer’s reason was untrue and there was
abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that
no discrimination had occurred. See Aka v. Washington
Hospital Center, 156 F. 3d, at 1291–1292; see also Fisher v.
Vassar College, 114 F. 3d, at 1338 (“[I]f the circumstances
show that the defendant gave the false explanation to con-
ceal something other than discrimination, the inference of
discrimination will be weak or nonexistent”). To hold
otherwise would be effectively to insulate an entire cate-
gory of employment discrimination cases from review under
Rule 50, and we have reiterated that trial courts should not
“ ‘treat discrimination differently from other ultimate ques-
tions of fact.’ ” St. Mary’s Honor Center, supra, at 524
(quoting Aikens, 460 U. S., at 716).
Whether judgment as a matter of law is appropriate in
any particular case will depend on a number of factors.
Those include the strength of the plaintiff ’s prima facie

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149 Cite as: 530 U. S. 133 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
case, the probative value of the proof that the employer’s
explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports
the employer’s case and that properly may be considered on
a motion for judgment as a matter of law. See infra, at
151–152. For purposes of this case, we need not—and could
not—resolve all of the circumstances in which such fac-
tors would entitle an employer to judgment as a matter of
law. It suffices to say that, because a prima facie case and
sufficient evidence to reject the employer’s explanation may
permit a finding of liability, the Court of Appeals erred in
proceeding from the premise that a plaintiff must always in-
troduce additional, independent evidence of discrimination.
III
A
The remaining question is whether, despite the Court of
Appeals’ misconception of petitioner’s evidentiary burden,
respondent was nonetheless entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Under Rule 50, a court should render judgment as
a matter of law when “a party has been fully heard on an
issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a
reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.” Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 50(a); see also Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528
U. S. 440, 447–448 (2000). The Courts of Appeals have artic-
ulated differing formulations as to what evidence a court
is to consider in ruling on a Rule 50 motion. See Venture
Technology, Inc. v. National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp.,
decided with Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of America, 459 U. S.
1007, 1009 (1982) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari). Some decisions have stated that review is limited to
that evidence favorable to the nonmoving party, see, e. g.,
Aparicio v. Norfolk & Western R. Co., 84 F. 3d 803, 807 (CA6
1996); Simpson v. Skelly Oil Co., 371 F. 2d 563, 566 (CA8
1967), while most have held that review extends to the entire
record, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
movant, see, e. g., Tate v. Government Employees Ins. Co.,

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150 REEVES v. SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC.
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997 F. 2d 1433, 1436 (CA11 1993); Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411
F. 2d 365, 374 (CA5 1969) (en banc).
On closer examination, this conflict seems more semantic
than real. Those decisions holding that review under Rule
50 should be limited to evidence favorable to the nonmovant
appear to have their genesis in Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336
U. S. 53 (1949). See 9A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure § 2529, pp. 297–301 (2d ed. 1995) (here-
inafter Wright & Miller). In Wilkerson, we stated that “in
passing upon whether there is sufficient evidence to submit
an issue to the jury we need look only to the evidence and
reasonable inferences which tend to support the case of ” the
nonmoving party. 336 U. S., at 57. But subsequent deci-
sions have clarified that this passage was referring to the
evidence to which the trial court should give credence, not
the evidence that the court should review. In the analogous
context of summary judgment under Rule 56, we have stated
that the court must review the record “taken as a whole.”
Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U. S. 574, 587 (1986). And the standard for granting sum-
mary judgment “mirrors” the standard for judgment as a
matter of law, such that “the inquiry under each is the same.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 250–251
(1986); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. 317, 323
(1986). It therefore follows that, in entertaining a motion
for judgment as a matter of law, the court should review all
of the evidence in the record.
In doing so, however, the court must draw all reason-
able inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may
not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.
Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U. S. 545, 554–555 (1990);
Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, at 254; Continental Ore Co. v.
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U. S. 690, 696, n. 6
(1962). “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the
evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the
facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Liberty

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Lobby, supra, at 255. Thus, although the court should re-
view the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence
favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required
to believe. See Wright & Miller 299. That is, the court
should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant
as well as that “evidence supporting the moving party that
is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent
that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.”
Id., at 300.
B
Applying this standard here, it is apparent that respond-
ent was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In
this case, in addition to establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination and creating a jury issue as to the falsity
of the employer’s explanation, petitioner introduced addi-
tional evidence that Chesnut was motivated by age-based
animus and was principally responsible for petitioner’s firing.
Petitioner testified that Chesnut had told him that he “was
so old [he] must have come over on the Mayflower” and,
on one occasion when petitioner was having difficulty start-
ing a machine, that he “was too damn old to do [his] job.”
3 Record 26. According to petitioner, Chesnut would regu-
larly “cuss at me and shake his finger in my face.” 3 id., at
26–27. Oswalt, roughly 24 years younger than petitioner,
corroborated that there was an “obvious difference” in
how Chesnut treated them. 3 id., at 82. He stated that,
although he and Chesnut “had [their] differences,” “it was
nothing compared to the way [Chesnut] treated Roger.”
Ibid. Oswalt explained that Chesnut “tolerated quite a bit”
from him even though he “defied” Chesnut “quite often,” but
that Chesnut treated petitioner “[i]n a manner, as you
would . . . treat . . . a child when . . . you’re angry with [him].”
3 id., at 82–83. Petitioner also demonstrated that, according
to company records, he and Oswalt had nearly identical rates
of productivity in 1993. 3 id., at 163–167; 4 id., at 225–226.
Yet respondent conducted an efficiency study of only the

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Opinion of the Court
regular line, supervised by petitioner, and placed only peti-
tioner on probation. 3 id., at 166–167; 4 id., at 229. Ches-
nut conducted that efficiency study and, after having testi-
fied to the contrary on direct examination, acknowledged on
cross-examination that he had recommended that petitioner
be placed on probation following the study. 4 id., at 197–
199, 237.
Further, petitioner introduced evidence that Chesnut
was the actual decisionmaker behind his firing. Chesnut
was married to Sanderson, who made the formal decision
to discharge petitioner. 3 id., at 90, 152. Although Sand-
erson testified that she fired petitioner because he had “in-
tentionally falsif[ied] company pay records,” 3 id., at 100,
respondent only introduced evidence concerning the in-
accuracy of the records, not their falsification. A 1994 letter
authored by Chesnut indicated that he berated other com-
pany directors, who were supposedly his coequals, about how
to do their jobs. Pl. Exh. 7, 3 Record 108–112. Moreover,
Oswalt testified that all of respondent’s employees feared
Chesnut, and that Chesnut had exercised “absolute power”
within the company for “[a]s long as [he] can remember.” 3
id., at 80.
In holding that the record contained insufficient evidence
to sustain the jury’s verdict, the Court of Appeals misapplied
the standard of review dictated by Rule 50. Again, the
court disregarded critical evidence favorable to petitioner—
namely, the evidence supporting petitioner’s prima facie
case and undermining respondent’s nondiscriminatory expla-
nation. See 197 F. 3d, at 693–694. The court also failed to
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of petitioner. For
instance, while acknowledging “the potentially damning
nature” of Chesnut’s age-related comments, the court dis-
counted them on the ground that they “were not made in the
direct context of Reeves’s termination.” Id., at 693. And
the court discredited petitioner’s evidence that Chesnut was
the actual decisionmaker by giving weight to the fact that

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there was “no evidence to suggest that any of the other deci-
sion makers were motivated by age.” Id., at 694. More-
over, the other evidence on which the court relied—that
Caldwell and Oswalt were also cited for poor recordkeeping,
and that respondent employed many managers over age 50—
although relevant, is certainly not dispositive. See Furnco,
438 U. S., at 580 (evidence that employer’s work force was
racially balanced, while “not wholly irrelevant,” was not
“sufficient to conclusively demonstrate that [the employer’s]
actions were not discriminatorily motivated”). In conclud-
ing that these circumstances so overwhelmed the evidence
favoring petitioner that no rational trier of fact could have
found that petitioner was fired because of his age, the Court
of Appeals impermissibly substituted its judgment concern-
ing the weight of the evidence for the jury’s.
The ultimate question in every employment discrimination
case involving a claim of disparate treatment is whether the
plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination. Given
the evidence in the record supporting petitioner, we see
no reason to subject the parties to an additional round of
litigation before the Court of Appeals rather than to re-
solve the matter here. The District Court plainly informed
the jury that petitioner was required to show “by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that his age was a determining
and motivating factor in the decision of [respondent] to ter-
minate him.” Tr. 7 (Jury Charge) (Sept. 12, 1997). The
court instructed the jury that, to show that respondent’s
explanation was a pretext for discrimination, petitioner
had to demonstrate “1, that the stated reasons were not the
real reasons for [petitioner’s] discharge; and 2, that age dis-
crimination was the real reason for [petitioner’s] discharge.”
Ibid. (emphasis added). Given that petitioner established a
prima facie case of discrimination, introduced enough evi-
dence for the jury to reject respondent’s explanation, and
produced additional evidence of age-based animus, there was
sufficient evidence for the jury to find that respondent had

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intentionally discriminated. The District Court was there-
fore correct to submit the case to the jury, and the Court
of Appeals erred in overturning its verdict.
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Ginsburg, concurring.
The Court today holds that an employment discrimination
plaintiff may survive judgment as a matter of law by submit-
ting two categories of evidence: first, evidence establishing
a “prima facie case,” as that term is used in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802 (1973); and second,
evidence from which a rational factfinder could conclude that
the employer’s proffered explanation for its actions was false.
Because the Court of Appeals in this case plainly, and errone-
ously, required the plaintiff to offer some evidence beyond
those two categories, no broader holding is necessary to sup-
port reversal.
I write separately to note that it may be incumbent on the
Court, in an appropriate case, to define more precisely the
circumstances in which plaintiffs will be required to submit
evidence beyond these two categories in order to survive a
motion for judgment as a matter of law. I anticipate that
such circumstances will be uncommon. As the Court notes,
it is a principle of evidence law that the jury is entitled to
treat a party’s dishonesty about a material fact as evidence
of culpability. Ante, at 147. Under this commonsense prin-
ciple, evidence suggesting that a defendant accused of illegal
discrimination has chosen to give a false explanation for its
actions gives rise to a rational inference that the defend-
ant could be masking its actual, illegal motivation. Ibid.
Whether the defendant was in fact motivated by discrimi-
nation is of course for the finder of fact to decide; that is the
lesson of St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U. S. 502
(1993). But the inference remains—unless it is conclusively

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Ginsburg, J., concurring
demonstrated, by evidence the district court is required to
credit on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, see
ante, at 151, that discrimination could not have been the de-
fendant’s true motivation. If such conclusive demonstra-
tions are (as I suspect) atypical, it follows that the ultimate
question of liability ordinarily should not be taken from
the jury once the plaintiff has introduced the two categories
of evidence described above. Because the Court’s opinion
leaves room for such further elaboration in an appropriate
case, I join it in full.