JONES v. UNITED STATES

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848 OCTOBER TERM, 1999
Syllabus
JONES v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the seventh circuit
No. 99–5739. Argued March 21, 2000—Decided May 22, 2000
Petitioner Jones tossed a Molotov cocktail into a home owned and occupied
by his cousin as a dwelling place for everyday family living. The ensu-
ing fire severely damaged the home. Jones was convicted in the Dis-
trict Court of violating, inter alia, 18 U. S. C. § 844(i), which makes it a
federal crime to “maliciously damag[e] or destro[y], . . . by means of fire
or an explosive, any building . . . used in interstate or foreign commerce
or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce.” The Sev-
enth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Jones’s contention that § 844(i), when
applied to the arson of a private residence, exceeds the authority vested
in Congress under the Commerce Clause.
Held: Because an owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial
purpose does not qualify as property “used in” commerce or commerce-
affecting activity, arson of such a dwelling is not subject to federal
prosecution under § 844(i). Pp. 852–859.
(a) In support of its argument that § 844(i) reaches the arson of an
owner-occupied private residence, the Government relies principally on
the breadth of the statutory term “affecting . . . commerce,” words that,
when unqualified, signal Congress’ intent to invoke its full Commerce
Clause authority. But § 844(i) contains the qualifying words “used in”
a commerce-affecting activity. The key word is “used.” Congress did
not define the crime as the explosion of a building whose damage or
destruction might affect interstate commerce, but required that the
damaged or destroyed property itself have been used in commerce or in
an activity affecting commerce. The proper inquiry, therefore, is into
the function of the building itself, and then into whether that function
affects interstate commerce. The Court rejects the Government’s ar-
gument that the Indiana residence involved in this case was constantly
“used” in at least three “activit[ies] affecting commerce”: (1) it was
“used” as collateral to obtain and secure a mortgage from an Oklahoma
lender, who, in turn, “used” it as security for the loan; (2) it was “used”
to obtain from a Wisconsin insurer a casualty insurance policy, which
safeguarded the interests of the homeowner and the mortgagee; and (3)
it was “used” to receive natural gas from sources outside Indiana. Sec-
tion 844(i)’s use-in-commerce requirement is most sensibly read to mean
active employment for commercial purposes, and not merely a passive,

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Syllabus
passing, or past connection to commerce. See, e. g., Bailey v. United
States, 516 U. S. 137, 143, 145. It surely is not the common perception
that a private, owner-occupied residence is “used” in the “activity” of
receiving natural gas, a mortgage, or an insurance policy. Cf. id., at
145. The Government does not allege that the residence here served
as a home office or the locus of any commercial undertaking. The
home’s only “active employment,” so far as the record reveals, was for
the everyday living of Jones’s cousin and his family. Russell v. United
States, 471 U. S. 858, 862—in which the Court held that particular prop-
erty was being used in an “activity affecting commerce” under § 844(i)
because its owner was renting it to tenants at the time he attempted to
destroy it by fire—does not warrant a less “use”-centered reading of
§ 844(i) in this case. The Court there observed that “[b]y its terms,”
§ 844(i) applies only to “property that is ‘used’ in an ‘activity’ that affects
commerce,” and ruled that “the rental of real estate” fits that descrip-
tion, ibid. Here, the homeowner did not use his residence in any trade
or business. Were the Court to adopt the Government’s expansive in-
terpretation, hardly a building in the land would fall outside § 844(i)’s
domain, and the statute’s limiting language, “used in,” would have
no office. Judges should hesitate to treat statutory terms in any set-
ting as surplusage, particularly when the words describe an element
of a crime. E. g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U. S. 135, 140–141.
Pp. 852–857.
(b) The foregoing reading is in harmony with the guiding principle
that where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which
grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of
which such questions are avoided, the Court’s duty is to adopt the latter.
See, e. g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building &
Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575. In holding that a statute
making it a federal crime to possess a firearm within 1,000 feet of a
school exceeded Congress’ power to regulate commerce, this Court, in
United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, stressed that the area was one of
traditional state concern, see, e. g., id., at 561, n. 3, and that the legis-
lation aimed at activity in which neither the actors nor their conduct
had a commercial character, e. g., id., at 560–562. Given the concerns
brought to the fore in Lopez, it is appropriate to avoid the constitutional
question that would arise were the Court to read § 844(i) to render the
traditionally local criminal conduct in which Jones engaged a matter for
federal enforcement. United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 350. The
Court’s comprehension of § 844(i) is additionally reinforced by other in-
terpretive guides. Ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal stat-
utes should be resolved in favor of lenity, Rewis v. United States, 401
U. S. 808, 812, and when choice must be made between two readings of

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850 JONES v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before choos-
ing the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken
in language that is clear and definite, United States v. Universal C. I. T.
Credit Corp., 344 U. S. 218, 221–222. Moreover, unless Congress con-
veys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly
changed the federal-state balance in the prosecution of crimes. Bass,
404 U. S., at 349. To read § 844(i) as encompassing the arson of an
owner-occupied private home would effect such a change, for arson is a
paradigmatic common-law state crime. Pp. 857–858.
178 F. 3d 479, reversed and remanded.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Stevens,
J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 859.
Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined, post,
p. 860.
Donald M. Falk argued the cause and filed briefs for
petitioner.
Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben argued the cause for
the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor
General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Robinson,
Malcolm L. Stewart, and David S. Kris.*
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
It is a federal crime under 18 U. S. C. § 844(i) (1994 ed.,
Supp. IV) to damage or destroy, “by means of fire or an ex-
plosive, any . . . property used in interstate or foreign com-
merce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign com-
merce.” This case presents the question whether arson of
an owner-occupied private residence falls within § 844(i)’s
compass. Construing the statute’s text, we hold that an
owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial pur-
pose does not qualify as property “used in” commerce or
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Cato Institute
by Ronald D. Rotunda; for the Center for the Original Intent of the Con-
stitution by Michael P. Farris; for the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers et al. by Jeffrey J. Pokorak and Barbara Bergman; for
the Pacific Legal Foundation by Anne M. Hayes and M. Reed Hopper; and
for Dale Lynn Ryan by John G. Roberts, Jr., and Gregory G. Garre.

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Opinion of the Court
commerce-affecting activity; arson of such a dwelling, there-
fore, is not subject to federal prosecution under § 844(i).
Our construction of § 844(i) is reinforced by the Court’s opin-
ion in United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549 (1995), and the
interpretive rule that constitutionally doubtful constructions
should be avoided where possible, see Edward J. DeBartolo
Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988).
I
On February 23, 1998, petitioner Dewey Jones tossed a
Molotov cocktail through a window into a home in Fort
Wayne, Indiana, owned and occupied by his cousin. No one
was injured in the ensuing fire, but the blaze severely dam-
aged the home. A federal grand jury returned a three-count
indictment charging Jones with arson, 18 U. S. C. § 844(i)
(1994 ed., Supp. IV); using a destructive device during and
in relation to a crime of violence (the arson), 18 U. S. C.
§ 924(c); and making an illegal destructive device, 26 U. S. C.
§ 5861(f). Jones was tried under that indictment in the
Northern District of Indiana and convicted by a jury on all
three counts.1 The District Court sentenced him, pursuant
to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, to a total prison term
of 35 years, to be followed by five years of supervised release.
The court also ordered Jones to pay $77,396.87 to the insurer
of the damaged home as restitution for its loss. Jones ap-
pealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the judgment of the District Court. 178 F. 3d 479
(1999).
Jones unsuccessfully urged, both before the District Court
and on appeal to the Seventh Circuit, that § 844(i), when ap-
plied to the arson of a private residence, exceeds the author-
ity vested in Congress under the Commerce Clause of the
1 The question on which we granted review refers solely to Jones’s
§ 844(i) conviction. See infra, at 852. We therefore do not address his
§ 924(c) and § 5861(f) convictions.

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852 JONES v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Courts of Appeals have di-
vided both on the question whether § 844(i) applies to build-
ings not used for commercial purposes,2 and on the constitu-
tionality of such an application.3 We granted certiorari, 528
U. S. 1002 (1999), and framed as the question presented:
“Whether, in light of United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S.
549 (1995), and the interpretive rule that constitution-
ally doubtful constructions should be avoided, see Ed-
ward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Build-
ing & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988),
18 U. S. C. § 844(i) applies to the arson of a private resi-
dence; and if so, whether its application to the private
residence in the present case is constitutional.”
Satisfied that § 844(i) does not reach an owner-occupied resi-
dence that is not used for any commercial purpose, we re-
verse the Court of Appeals’ judgment.
II
Congress enacted 18 U. S. C. § 844(i) as part of Title XI of
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91–452,
§ 1102, 84 Stat. 952, “because of the need ‘to curb the use,
transportation, and possession of explosives.’ ” Russell v.
2 Compare United States v. Gaydos, 108 F. 3d 505 (CA3 1997) (vacant,
uninhabitable house formerly rented not covered by statute), United
States v. Denalli, 73 F. 3d 328 (CA11) (owner-occupied residence not cov-
ered), modified on other grounds, 90 F. 3d 444 (1996) (per curiam), United
States v. Mennuti, 639 F. 2d 107 (CA2 1981) (same), with United States v.
Ryan, 41 F. 3d 361 (CA8 1994) (en banc) (vacant former commercial prop-
erty covered), cert. denied, 514 U. S. 1082 (1995), United States v. Ramey,
24 F. 3d 602 (CA4 1994) (owner-occupied residence covered), cert. denied,
514 U. S. 1103 (1995), and United States v. Stillwell, 900 F. 2d 1104 (CA7)
(same), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 838 (1990).
3 Compare United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F. 3d 522 (CA9 1995)
(application to owner-occupied residence unconstitutional), with 178 F. 3d
479 (CA7 1999) (decision below), and Ramey, 24 F. 3d, at 602 (application
constitutional).

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United States, 471 U. S. 858, 860, n. 5 (1985) (citation omit-
ted). The word “fire,” which did not appear in § 844(i) as
originally composed, was introduced by statutory amend-
ment in 1982.4 As now worded, § 844(i) (1994 ed., Supp. IV)
reads in relevant part:
“Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts
to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive,
any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property
used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity
affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be impris-
oned for not less than 5 years and not more than 20
years, fined under this title, or both . . . .”
We previously construed § 844(i) in Russell v. United
States, 471 U. S. 858 (1985), and there held that § 844(i)
applies to a building “used as rental property,” ibid. The
petitioner-defendant in Russell had unsuccessfully at-
tempted to set fire to a two-unit apartment building he
owned. He earned rental income from the property and
“treated it as business property for tax purposes.” Id., at
859. Our decision stated as the dispositive fact: “Petitioner
was renting his apartment building to tenants at the time he
attempted to destroy it by fire.” Id., at 862. It followed
from that fact, the Russell opinion concluded, that “[t]he
property was . . . being used in an activity affecting com-
merce within the meaning of § 844(i).” Ibid.5
4 See Pub. L. 97–298, § 2(c), 96 Stat. 1319 (amending § 844(i) to insert
the words “fire or” before the words “an explosive”). The House Report
accompanying the 1982 legislation explained that the original measure,
which was confined to damage caused by “an explosive,” had resulted in
problems of practical application. H. R. Rep. No. 678, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess., 2 (1982). In particular, the Report noted a Circuit conflict on the
question whether the measure covered use of gasoline or other flammable
liquids to ignite a fire. Id., at 2, and nn. 5–6.
5 We noted in Russell that the original version of the bill that became
§ 844(i) applied to destruction, by means of explosives, of property used
“ ‘for business purposes.’ ” 471 U. S., at 860, n. 5. After some House

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854 JONES v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
We now confront a question that was not before the Court
in Russell: Does § 844(i) cover property occupied and used
by its owner not for any commercial venture, but as a private
residence. Is such a dwelling place, in the words of § 844(i),
“used in . . . any activity affecting . . . commerce”?
In support of its argument that § 844(i) reaches the arson
of an owner-occupied private residence, the Government
relies principally on the breadth of the statutory term
“affecting . . . commerce,” see Brief for United States 10,
16–17, words that, when unqualified, signal Congress’ intent
to invoke its full authority under the Commerce Clause.
But § 844(i) contains the qualifying words “used in” a
commerce-affecting activity. The key word is “used.”
“Congress did not define the crime described in § 844(i) as
the explosion of a building whose damage or destruction
might affect interstate commerce . . . .” United States v.
Mennuti, 639 F. 2d 107, 110 (CA2 1981) (Friendly, J.).6 Con-
gress “require[d] that the damaged or destroyed property
must itself have been used in commerce or in an activity
affecting commerce.” Ibid. The proper inquiry, we agree,
“is into the function of the building itself, and then a determi-
nation of whether that function affects interstate commerce.”
members indicated that they thought the provision should apply to the
bombings of schools, police stations, and places of worship, the words
“for business purposes” were omitted. Id., at 860–861. The House
Report accompanying the final bill, we further noted in Russell, described
§ 844(i) as “ ‘a very broad provision covering substantially all business
property.’ ” Id., at 861, and n. 8 (citing H. R. Rep. No. 91–1549, pp. 69–70
(1970)).
6 The defendants in Mennuti destroyed two buildings. One was the
residence of the owner and her family, the other was a rental property.
See 639 F. 2d, at 108–109, n. 1. The Second Circuit affirmed the District
Court’s dismissal of the entire indictment. Our decision in Russell v.
United States, 471 U. S. 858 (1985), supersedes Mennuti with respect to
the building held for rental. Regarding the family residence, we find
Mennuti’s reasoning persuasive.

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United States v. Ryan, 9 F. 3d 660, 675 (CA8 1993) (Arnold,
C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).7
The Government urges that the Fort Wayne, Indiana,
residence into which Jones tossed a Molotov cocktail was
constantly “used” in at least three “activit[ies] affecting
commerce.” First, the homeowner “used” the dwelling as
collateral to obtain and secure a mortgage from an Oklahoma
lender; the lender, in turn, “used” the property as security
for the home loan. Second, the homeowner “used” the resi-
dence to obtain a casualty insurance policy from a Wisconsin
insurer. That policy, the Government points out, safe-
guarded the interests of the homeowner and the mortgagee.
Third, the homeowner “used” the dwelling to receive natural
gas from sources outside Indiana. See Brief for United
States 19–23.
The Government correctly observes that § 844(i) excludes
no particular type of building (it covers “any building”); the
provision does, however, require that the building be “used”
in an activity affecting commerce. That qualification is most
sensibly read to mean active employment for commercial
purposes, and not merely a passive, passing, or past connec-
tion to commerce. Although “variously defined,” the word
“use,” in legislation as in conversation, ordinarily signifies
“active employment.” Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S.
137, 143, 145 (1995); see also Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer,
513 U. S. 179, 187 (1995) (“When terms used in a statute are
undefined, we give them their ordinary meaning.”).
7 In Ryan, Chief Judge Arnold dissented from a panel decision holding
that the arson of a permanently closed fitness center fell within § 844(i)’s
prohibition. The panel majority considered adequate either of two inter-
state commerce connections: the building was owned and leased by out-of-
state parties, and received natural gas from across state borders. The
panel added, however, that it would not extend the decision “to property
which is purely private in nature, such as a privately owned home, used
solely for residential purposes.” 9 F. 3d, at 666–667. Sitting en banc,
the Eighth Circuit affirmed the panel’s judgment. See United States v.
Ryan, 41 F. 3d 361 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U. S. 1082 (1995).

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856 JONES v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
It surely is not the common perception that a private,
owner-occupied residence is “used” in the “activity” of re-
ceiving natural gas, a mortgage, or an insurance policy. Cf.
Bailey, 516 U. S., at 145 (interpreting the word “use,” as it
appears in 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1), to mean active employment
of a firearm and rejecting the Government’s argument that
a gun is “used” whenever its presence “protect[s] drugs” or
“embolden[s]” a drug dealer). The Government does not al-
lege that the Indiana residence involved in this case served
as a home office or the locus of any commercial undertaking.
The home’s only “active employment,” so far as the record
reveals, was for the everyday living of Jones’s cousin and
his family.
Our decision in Russell does not warrant a less
“use”-centered reading of § 844(i). In that case, which in-
volved the arson of property rented out by its owner, see
supra, at 853, the Court referred to the recognized distinc-
tion between legislation limited to activities “in commerce”
and legislation invoking Congress’ full power over activity
substantially “affecting . . . commerce.” 471 U. S., at 859–
860, and n. 4. The Russell opinion went on to observe, how-
ever, that “[b]y its terms,” § 844(i) applies only to “property
that is ‘used’ in an ‘activity’ that affects commerce.” Id., at
862. “The rental of real estate,” the Court then stated, “is
unquestionably such an activity.” Ibid.8 Here, as earlier
emphasized, the owner used the property as his home, the
center of his family life. He did not use the residence in any
trade or business.
8 Notably, the Court in Russell did not rest its holding on the expansive
interpretation advanced by the Government both in Russell and in this
case. Compare Brief for United States in Russell v. United States, O. T.
1984, No. 435, p. 15 (“Petitioner used his building on South Union Street
in an activity affecting interstate commerce by heating it with gas that
moved interstate.”), with Russell, 471 U. S., at 862 (focusing instead on
fact that “[t]he rental of real estate is unquestionably . . . an activity”
affecting commerce).

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Were we to adopt the Government’s expansive interpreta-
tion of § 844(i), hardly a building in the land would fall out-
side the federal statute’s domain. Practically every building
in our cities, towns, and rural areas is constructed with sup-
plies that have moved in interstate commerce, served by util-
ities that have an interstate connection, financed or insured
by enterprises that do business across state lines, or bears
some other trace of interstate commerce. See, e. g., FERC
v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 757 (1982) (observing that elec-
tric energy is consumed “in virtually every home” and that
“[n]o State relies solely on its own resources” to meet its
inhabitants’ demand for the product). If such connections
sufficed to trigger § 844(i), the statute’s limiting language,
“used in” any commerce-affecting activity, would have no of-
fice. See United States v. Monholland, 607 F. 2d 1311, 1316
(CA10 1979) (finding in § 844(i) no indication that Congress
intended to include “everybody and everything”). “Judges
should hesitate . . . to treat statutory terms in any set-
ting [as surplusage], and resistance should be heightened
when the words describe an element of a criminal offense.”
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U. S. 135, 140–141 (1994); ac-
cord, Bailey, 516 U. S., at 145.
III
Our reading of § 844(i) is in harmony with the guiding prin-
ciple that “where a statute is susceptible of two construc-
tions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional
questions arise and by the other of which such questions are
avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.” United States ex
rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S.
366, 408 (1909), quoted in Jones v. United States, 526 U. S.
227, 239 (1999); see also DeBartolo, 485 U. S., at 575; Ash-
wander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring). In Lopez, this Court invalidated the Gun-Free School
Zones Act, former 18 U. S. C. § 922(q) (1988 ed., Supp. V),
which made it a federal crime to possess a firearm within

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858 JONES v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
1,000 feet of a school. The defendant in that case, a 12th-
grade student, had been convicted for knowingly possessing
a concealed handgun and bullets at his San Antonio, Texas,
high school, in violation of the federal Act. Holding that
the Act exceeded Congress’ power to regulate commerce, the
Court stressed that the area was one of traditional state con-
cern, see 514 U. S., at 561, n. 3, 567; id., at 577 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring), and that the legislation aimed at activity in
which “neither the actors nor their conduct has a commercial
character,” id., at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id., at 560–
562 (opinion of the Court).
Given the concerns brought to the fore in Lopez, it is ap-
propriate to avoid the constitutional question that would
arise were we to read § 844(i) to render the “traditionally
local criminal conduct” in which petitioner Jones engaged “a
matter for federal enforcement.” United States v. Bass, 404
U. S. 336, 350 (1971). Our comprehension of § 844(i) is addi-
tionally reinforced by other interpretive guides. We have
instructed that “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal
statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity,” Rewis v.
United States, 401 U. S. 808, 812 (1971), and that “when
choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct
Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we
choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress
should have spoken in language that is clear and definite,”
United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U. S.
218, 221–222 (1952). We have cautioned, as well, that “un-
less Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be
deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state bal-
ance” in the prosecution of crimes. Bass, 404 U. S., at 349.
To read § 844(i) as encompassing the arson of an owner-
occupied private home would effect such a change, for arson
is a paradigmatic common-law state crime. See generally
Poulos, The Metamorphosis of the Law of Arson, 51 Mo.
L. Rev. 295 (1986).

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Stevens, J., concurring
IV
We conclude that § 844(i) is not soundly read to make virtu-
ally every arson in the country a federal offense. We hold
that the provision covers only property currently used in
commerce or in an activity affecting commerce. The home
owned and occupied by petitioner Jones’s cousin was not so
used—it was a dwelling place used for everyday family liv-
ing. As we read § 844(i), Congress left cases of this genre
to the law enforcement authorities of the States.
Our holding that § 844(i) does not cover the arson of an
owner-occupied dwelling means that Jones’s § 844(i) convic-
tion must be vacated. Accordingly, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Thomas joins,
concurring.
Part II of the Court’s opinion convincingly explains why
its construction of 18 U. S. C. § 844(i) better fits the text and
context of the provision than the Government’s expansive
reading. It also seems appropriate, however, to emphasize
the kinship between our well-established presumption
against federal pre-emption of state law, see Ray v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151, 157 (1978), and our reluctance to
“believe Congress intended to authorize federal intervention
in local law enforcement in a marginal case such as this.”
United States v. Altobella, 442 F. 2d 310, 316 (CA7 1971).
The fact that petitioner received a sentence of 35 years in
prison when the maximum penalty for the comparable state
offense was only 10 years, Ind. Code §§ 35–43–1–1, 35–50–
2–5 (1993), illustrates how a criminal law like this may effec-
tively displace a policy choice made by the State. Even
when Congress has undoubted power to pre-empt local law,

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860 JONES v. UNITED STATES
Thomas, J., concurring
we have wisely decided that “unless Congress conveys its
purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly
changed the federal-state balance.” United States v. Bass,
404 U. S. 336, 349 (1971). For this reason, I reiterate my
firm belief that we should interpret narrowly federal crimi-
nal laws that overlap with state authority unless congres-
sional intention to assert its jurisdiction is plain.*
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joins,
concurring.
In joining the Court’s opinion, I express no view on the
question whether the federal arson statute, 18 U. S. C. § 844(i)
(1994 ed., Supp. IV), as there construed, is constitutional in
its application to all buildings used for commercial activities.
*See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U. S. 681, 700, n. 2 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U. S. 632, 654–655,
n. 16 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Garcia v. United States, 469 U. S.
70, 89–90 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Bell v. United States, 462 U. S.
356, 363 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting); McElroy v. United States, 455
U. S. 642, 675 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).