BECK v. PRUPIS et al.

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494 OCTOBER TERM, 1999
Syllabus
BECK v. PRUPIS et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 98–1480. Argued November 3, 1999—Decided April 26, 2000
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) creates
a civil cause of action for “[a]ny person injured in his business or prop-
erty by reason of a violation of section 1962.” 18 U. S. C. § 1964(c).
Subsection (d) of § 1962 forbids “any person to conspire to violate any of
the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of [§ 1962].” Petitioner is a
former president, CEO, director, and shareholder of Southeastern Insur-
ance Group (SIG). Respondents are former senior officers and direc-
tors of SIG who allegedly conspired to, and did, engage in acts of rack-
eteering. Petitioner alleged that after he discovered respondents’
unlawful conduct and contacted regulators, respondents orchestrated a
scheme to remove him from the company. Petitioner sued respondents,
asserting, among other things, a § 1964(c) cause of action for respond-
ents’ alleged conspiracy to violate §§ 1962(a), (b), and (c). Petitioner
alleged that his injury was proximately caused by an overt act—namely,
the termination of his employment—done in furtherance of respondents’
conspiracy, and that § 1964(c) therefore provided a cause of action. The
District Court dismissed his RICO conspiracy claim, agreeing with re-
spondents that employees who are terminated for refusing to participate
in RICO activities, or who threaten to report RICO activities, do not
have standing to sue under RICO for damages from their loss of employ-
ment. In affirming, the Eleventh Circuit held that, because the overt
act causing petitioner’s injury was not an act of racketeering, it could
not support a § 1964(c) cause of action.
Held: Injury caused by an overt act that is not an act of racketeering or
otherwise wrongful under RICO does not give rise to a cause of action
under § 1964(c) for a violation of § 1962(d). To determine what it means
to be “injured . . . by reason of ” a “conspir[acy],” this Court must look
to the common law of civil conspiracy. At common law, it was widely
accepted that a plaintiff could bring suit for civil conspiracy only if he
had been injured by an act that was itself tortious. When Congress
adopted RICO, it incorporated this principle. As at common law, a civil
conspiracy plaintiff cannot bring suit under RICO based on injury
caused by any act in furtherance of a conspiracy that might have caused
the plaintiff injury. Rather, such plaintiff must allege injury from an
act that is analogous to an “ac[t] of a tortious character,” see 4 Restate-

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ment (Second) of Torts, § 876, Comment b, meaning an act that is inde-
pendently wrongful under RICO. The specific type of act that is analo-
gous to an act of a tortious character may depend on the underlying
substantive violation the defendant is alleged to have committed. Be-
cause respondents’ alleged overt act in furtherance of their conspiracy
was not an act of racketeering and is not independently wrongful under
any substantive provision of the statute, petitioner does not have a
cause of action under § 1964(c). Pp. 500–507.
162 F. 3d 1090, affirmed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.,
joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, J.,
joined, post, p. 507.
Jay Starkman argued the cause for petitioner. With him
on the briefs were Jane W. Moscowitz and Joel S. Magolnick.
Michael M. Rosenbaum argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief for respondents Bellezza et al. were
Donald P. Jacobs and Richard M. DeAgazio. Frederick
Mezey, pro se, filed a brief as respondent.*
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), 18 U. S. C. §§ 1961–1968 (1994 ed. and Supp. IV), cre-
ates a civil cause of action for “[a]ny person injured in his
business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962.” 18 U. S. C. § 1964(c) (1994 ed., Supp. IV). Subsec-
tion (d) of § 1962 in turn provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful
for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of
subsection (a), (b), or (c) of [§ 1962].” The question before
us is whether a person injured by an overt act done in fur-
*Stephen M. Kohn, Michael D. Kohn, and David K. Colapinto filed a
brief for the National Whistleblower Center as amicus curiae urging
reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American
Tort Reform Association et al. by Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens,
and Jeffrey L. Gabardi; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al.
by F. Joseph Warin, Daniel J. Popeo, and Paul D. Kamenar.

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therance of a RICO conspiracy has a cause of action under
§ 1964(c), even if the overt act is not an act of racketeering.
We conclude that such a person does not have a cause of
action under § 1964(c).
I
A
Congress enacted RICO as Title IX of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91–452, 84 Stat. 922, for
the purpose of “seek[ing] the eradication of organized crime
in the United States,” id., at 923. Congress found that “or-
ganized crime in the United States [had become] a highly
sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that an-
nually drain[ed] billions of dollars from America’s economy
by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and
corruption.” Id., at 922. The result was to “weaken the
stability of the Nation’s economic system, harm innocent
investors and competing organizations, interfere with free
competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign com-
merce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the
general welfare of the Nation and its citizens.” Id., at 923.
Finding the existing “sanctions and remedies available to
the Government [to be] unnecessarily limited in scope and
impact,” Congress resolved to address the problem of or-
ganized crime “by strengthening the legal tools in the
evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohi-
bitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new reme-
dies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in
organized crime.” Ibid.
RICO attempts to accomplish these goals by providing
severe criminal penalties for violations of § 1962, see § 1963,
and also by means of a civil cause of action for any person
“injured in his business or property by reason of a violation
of section 1962,” 18 U. S. C. § 1964(c) (1994 ed., Supp. IV).1
1 RICO also authorizes the Government to bring civil actions to “prevent
and restrain” violations of § 1962. 18 U. S. C. §§ 1964(a) and (b).

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Section 1962, in turn, consists of four subsections: Subsection
(a) makes it “unlawful for any person who has received any
income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of rack-
eteering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt . . .
to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such in-
come, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enter-
prise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce”; 2 subsection (b) makes it
“unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire
or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control
of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce”; subsection (c)
makes it “unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or partici-
pate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collec-
tion of unlawful debt”; and, finally, subsection (d) makes it
unlawful “for any person to conspire to violate any of the
provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.”
B
Petitioner, Robert A. Beck II, is a former president, CEO,
director, and shareholder of Southeastern Insurance Group
(SIG).3 Respondents, Ronald M. Prupis, Leonard Bellezza,
2 Section 1961(1) contains an exhaustive list of acts of “racketeering,”
commonly referred to as “predicate acts.” This list includes extortion,
mail fraud, and wire fraud, which were among the 50 separate acts of
racketeering alleged by petitioner. Section 1961(4) defines “enterprise”
as “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal en-
tity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not
a legal entity.”
3 On review of the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of summary judgment
for respondents, we accept as true the evidence presented by petitioner.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 255 (1986).

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William Paulus, Jr., Ernest S. Sabato, Harry Olstein, Freder-
ick C. Mezey, and Joseph S. Littenberg, are former senior
officers and directors of SIG. Until 1990, when it declared
bankruptcy, SIG was a Florida insurance holding company
with three operating subsidiaries, each of which was engaged
in the business of writing surety bonds for construction
contractors.
Beginning in or around 1987, certain directors and officers
of SIG, including respondents, began engaging in acts of
racketeering. They created an entity called Construction
Performance Corporation, which demanded fees from con-
tractors in exchange for qualifying them for SIG surety
bonds. Respondents also diverted corporate funds to per-
sonal uses and submitted false financial statements to regula-
tors, shareholders, and creditors. During most of the time
he was employed at SIG, petitioner was unaware of these
activities. In early 1988, however, petitioner discovered re-
spondents’ unlawful conduct and contacted regulators con-
cerning the financial statements. Respondents then orches-
trated a scheme to remove petitioner from the company.
They hired an insurance consultant to write a false report
suggesting that petitioner had failed to perform his material
duties. The day after this report was presented to the SIG
board of directors, the board fired petitioner, relying on a
clause in his contract providing for termination in the event
of an “inability or substantial failure to perform [his] mate-
rial duties.” App. 104. Petitioner sued respondents, as-
serting, among other things, a civil cause of action under
§ 1964(c).4 In particular, petitioner claimed that respond-
ents used or invested income derived from a pattern of rack-
eteering activity to establish and operate an enterprise, in
violation of § 1962(a); acquired and maintained an interest in
4 Petitioner’s lawsuit was originally brought as a cross-claim in a share-
holders’ derivative suit filed against SIG officers and directors, including
petitioner, in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey. The New Jersey District Court severed petitioner’s claims and
transferred them to the Southern District of Florida.

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and control of their enterprise through a pattern of rack-
eteering activity, in violation of § 1962(b); engaged in the
conduct of the enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity, in violation of § 1962(c); and, most
importantly for present purposes, conspired to commit the
aforementioned acts, in violation of § 1962(d). With respect
to this last claim, petitioner’s theory was that his injury was
proximately caused by an overt act—namely, the termina-
tion of his employment—done in furtherance of respondents’
conspiracy, and that § 1964(c) therefore provided a cause of
action. Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment,
arguing that employees who are terminated for refusing to
participate in RICO activities, or who threaten to report
RICO activities, do not have standing to sue under RICO for
damages from their loss of employment. The District Court
agreed and dismissed petitioner’s RICO conspiracy claim.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a cause of action
under § 1964(c) for a violation of § 1962(d) is not available to
a person injured by an overt act in furtherance of a RICO
conspiracy unless the overt act is an act of racketeering.
162 F. 3d 1090, 1098 (CA11 1998). Since the overt act that
allegedly caused petitioner’s injury was not an act of rack-
eteering, see § 1961(1), it could not support a civil cause of
action. The court held, “RICO was enacted with an express
target—racketeering activity—and only those injuries that
are proximately caused by racketeering activity should be
actionable under the statute.” Ibid.5
5 Although petitioner alleged violations of §§ 1962(a), (b), and (c), the
Court of Appeals concluded that he had presented no evidence of viola-
tions of subsections (a) and (b). It therefore treated each of petitioner’s
substantive RICO claims as alleging a violation of § 1962(c). 162 F. 3d,
at 1095, n. 8. The court held that petitioner did not present evidence
regarding elements of his § 1962(c) claims and therefore affirmed the
District Court’s order granting summary judgment for respondents with
respect to those claims. Id., at 1095–1098. Petitioner does not challenge
the Court of Appeals’ conclusion with respect to his claims under
§§ 1962(a)–(c).

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We granted certiorari, 526 U. S. 1158 (1999), to resolve a
conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the question
whether a person injured by an overt act in furtherance of a
conspiracy may assert a civil RICO conspiracy claim under
§ 1964(c) for a violation of § 1962(d) even if the overt act does
not constitute “racketeering activity.” The majority of the
Circuits to consider this question have answered it in the
negative. See, e. g., Bowman v. Western Auto Supply Co.,
985 F. 2d 383, 388 (CA8), cert. denied, 508 U. S. 957 (1993);
Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F. 2d 41, 48 (CA1 1991);
Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F. 2d 291, 294–295 (CA9
1990), cert. denied, 502 U. S. 921 (1991); Hecht v. Commerce
Clearing House, Inc., 897 F. 2d 21, 25 (CA2 1990). Other
Circuits have allowed RICO conspiracy claims where the
overt act was, as in the instant case, merely the termina-
tion of employment, and was not, therefore, racketeering
activity. See, e. g., Khurana v. Innovative Health Care
Systems, Inc., 130 F. 3d 143, 153–154 (CA5 1997), vacated
sub nom. Teel v. Khurana, 525 U. S. 979 (1998); Schiffels
v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 978 F. 2d 344, 348–
349 (CA7 1992); Shearin v. E. F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885
F. 2d 1162, 1168–1169 (CA3 1989).
II
This case turns on the combined effect of two provisions
of RICO that, read in conjunction, provide a civil cause of
action for conspiracy. Section 1964(c) states that a cause of
action is available to anyone “injured . . . by reason of a
violation of section 1962.” Section 1962(d) makes it unlawful
for a person “to conspire to violate any of the provisions of
subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.” To determine what
it means to be “injured . . . by reason of ” a “conspir[acy],”
we turn to the well-established common law of civil conspir-
acy. As we have said, when Congress uses language with a
settled meaning at common law, Congress

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“presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that
were attached to each borrowed word in the body of
learning from which it was taken and the meaning its
use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise
instructed. In such case, absence of contrary direction
may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted defi-
nitions, not as a departure from them.” Morissette v.
United States, 342 U. S. 246, 263 (1952).
See Molzof v. United States, 502 U. S. 301, 307 (1992) (quot-
ing Morissette, supra, at 263); NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453
U. S. 322, 329 (1981).6
By the time of RICO’s enactment in 1970, it was widely
accepted that a plaintiff could bring suit for civil conspiracy
only if he had been injured by an act that was itself tortious.
See, e. g., 4 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876, Comment b
(1977) (“The mere common plan, design or even express
agreement is not enough for liability in itself, and there must
be acts of a tortious character in carrying it into execution”);
W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 46, p. 293 (4th ed. 1971) (“It is
only where means are employed, or purposes are accom-
plished, which are themselves tortious, that the conspirators
who have not acted but have promoted the act will be held
liable” (footnotes omitted)); Satin v. Satin, 69 App. Div. 2d
761, 762, 414 N. Y. S. 2d 570 (1979) (Memorandum Decision)
(“There is no tort of civil conspiracy in and of itself. There
must first be pleaded specific wrongful acts which might con-
6 Petitioner suggests that we should look to criminal, rather than civil,
common-law principles to interpret the statute. We have turned to the
common law of criminal conspiracy to define what constitutes a violation
of § 1962(d), see Salinas v. United States, 522 U. S. 52, 63–65 (1997), a
mere violation being all that is necessary for criminal liability. This case,
however, does not present simply the question of what constitutes a viola-
tion of § 1962(d), but rather the meaning of a civil cause of action for pri-
vate injury by reason of such a violation. In other words, our task is to
interpret §§ 1964(c) and 1962(d) in conjunction, rather than § 1962(d) stand-
ing alone. The obvious source in the common law for the combined mean-
ing of these provisions is the law of civil conspiracy.

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stitute an independent tort”); Cohen v. Bowdoin, 288 A. 2d
106, 110 (Me. 1972) (“ ‘[C]onspiracy’ fails as the basis for the
imposition of civil liability absent the actual commission of
some independently recognized tort; and when such separate
tort has been committed, it is that tort, and not the fact of
combination, which is the foundation of the civil liability”);
Earp v. Detroit, 16 Mich. App. 271, 275, 167 N. W. 2d 841,
845 (1969) (“Recovery may be had from parties on the theory
of concerted action as long as the elements of the separate
and actionable tort are properly proved”); Mills v. Hansell,
378 F. 2d 53 (CA5 1967) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of
conspiracy to defraud claim because no defendant committed
an actionable tort); J. & C. Ornamental Iron Co. v. Watkins,
114 Ga. App. 688, 691, 152 S. E. 2d 613, 615 (1966) (“[The
plaintiff] must allege all the elements of a cause of action
for the tort the same as would be required if there were no
allegation of a conspiracy”); Lesperance v. North American
Aviation, Inc., 217 Cal. App. 2d 336, 345, 31 Cal. Rptr. 873,
878 (1963) (“[C]onspiracy cannot be made the subject of a
civil action unless something is done which without the con-
spiracy would give a right of action” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Middlesex Concrete Products & Excavat-
ing Corp. v. Carteret Indus. Assn., 37 N. J. 507, 516, 181 A. 2d
774, 779 (1962) (“[A] conspiracy cannot be made the subject
of a civil action unless something has been done which, ab-
sent the conspiracy, would give a right of action”); Chapman
v. Pollock, 148 F. Supp. 769, 772 (WD Mo. 1957) (holding that
a plaintiff who charged the defendants with “conspiring to
perpetrate an unlawful purpose” could not recover because
the defendants committed no unlawful act); Olmsted, Inc. v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 218 Iowa 997, 998, 253 N. W. 804
(1934) (“[A] conspiracy cannot be the subject of a civil action
unless something is done pursuant to it which, without the
conspiracy, would give a right of action”); Adler v. Fenton,
24 How. 407, 410 (1861) (“[T]he act must be tortious, and
there must be consequent damage”).

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Consistent with this principle, it was sometimes said that
a conspiracy claim was not an independent cause of action,
but was only the mechanism for subjecting co-conspirators
to liability when one of their member committed a tortious
act. Royster v. Baker, 365 S. W. 2d 496, 499, 500 (Mo. 1963)
(“[A]n alleged conspiracy by or agreement between the de-
fendants is not of itself actionable. Some wrongful act to
the plaintiff ’s damage must have been done by one or more
of the defendants, and the fact of a conspiracy merely bears
on the liability of the various defendants as joint tort-
feasors”). See Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F. 2d 472, 479
(CADC 1983) (“Since liability for civil conspiracy depends on
performance of some underlying tortious act, the conspiracy
is not independently actionable; rather, it is a means for es-
tablishing vicarious liability for the underlying tort”).7
7 Justice Stevens quotes from some of the cases we have cited to
suggest that the common law allowed recovery from harm caused by
any overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. See post, at 510–511, n. 5
(dissenting opinion). However, his quotations omit pertinent language.
When read in context, it is clear that these passages refer to harm, not
from any overt act, but only from overt acts that are themselves tortious.
Compare ibid. with Adler v. Fenton, 24 How. 407, 410 (1861) (“[I]t must
be shown that the defendants have done some wrong, that is, have violated
some right of theirs . . . . [I]n these cases the act must be tortious”);
Royster v. Baker, 365 S. W. 2d 496, 499 (Mo. 1963) (“Strictly speaking,
there has been no distinct form of writ or action of conspiracy; but the
action sounds in tort, and is of the nature of an action on the case upon
the wrong done under the conspiracy alleged. The gist of the action is
not the conspiracy, but the wrong done by acts in furtherance of the con-
spiracy” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Lesperance v.
North American Aviation, Inc., 217 Cal. App. 2d 336, 345, 31 Cal. Rptr.
873, 878 (1963) (“ ‘It is well settled that a conspiracy cannot be made the
subject of a civil action unless something is done which without the con-
spiracy would give a right of action’ ”); Earp v. Detroit, 16 Mich. App. 271,
275, 167 N. W. 2d 841, 845 (1969) (“There is no civil action for conspiracy
alone. It must be coupled with the commission of acts which damaged
the plaintiff. Recovery may be had from parties on the theory of con-
certed action as long as the elements of the separate and actionable tort
are properly proved” (citation omitted)); Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F. 2d

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The principle that a civil conspiracy plaintiff must claim
injury from an act of a tortious character was so widely ac-
cepted at the time of RICO’s adoption as to be incorporated
in the common understanding of “civil conspiracy.” See Bal-
lentine’s Law Dictionary 252 (3d ed. 1969) (“It is the civil
wrong resulting in damage, and not the conspiracy which
constitutes the cause of action”); Black’s Law Dictionary 383
(4th ed. 1968) (“[W]here, in carrying out the design of the
conspirators, overt acts are done causing legal damage, the
person injured has a right of action” (emphasis added)). We
presume, therefore, that when Congress established in RICO
a civil cause of action for a person “injured . . . by reason
of ” a “conspir[acy],” it meant to adopt these well-established
common-law civil conspiracy principles.
Justice Stevens does not challenge our view that Con-
gress meant to incorporate common-law principles when it
adopted RICO. Nor does he attempt to make an affirmative
case from the common law for his reading of the statute by
pointing to a case in which there was (a) an illegal agree-
ment; (b) injury proximately caused to the plaintiff by a
nontortious overt act in furtherance of the agreement; and
(c) recovery by the plaintiff. See post, at 508. Instead, he
argues only that courts, authoritative commentators, and
even dictionaries repeatedly articulated a rule with no mean-
ing or application.8 We find this argument to be implausible
472, 479 (CADC 1983) (stating that civil conspiracy requires “an overt
tortious act in furtherance of the agreement that causes injury. . . . Since
liability for civil conspiracy depends on performance of some underlying
tortious act, the conspiracy is not independently actionable; rather, it is a
means for establishing vicarious liability for the underlying tort”).
8 We disagree, moreover, with Justice Stevens’ interpretation of the
grounds for decision in some of the cases we have cited. For example,
Justice Stevens reads Mills v. Hansell, 378 F. 2d 53 (CA5 1967) (per
curiam), and Chapman v. Pollock, 148 F. Supp. 769, 772 (WD Mo. 1957),
to deny recovery for conspiracy because the defendants had not entered
into an unlawful agreement. See post, at 508–509. We think the opin-
ions, and the language cited from these opinions by Justice Stevens,

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and, accordingly, understand RICO to adopt the common-law
principles we have cited. Interpreting the statute in a way
that is most consistent with these principles, we conclude
that injury caused by an overt act that is not an act of rack-
eteering or otherwise wrongful under RICO, see n. 7, supra,
is not sufficient to give rise to a cause of action under
§ 1964(c) for a violation of § 1962(d). As at common law, a
civil conspiracy plaintiff cannot bring suit under RICO based
on injury caused by any act in furtherance of a conspiracy
that might have caused the plaintiff injury. Rather, consist-
ency with the common law requires that a RICO conspiracy
plaintiff allege injury from an act that is analogous to an
“ac[t] of a tortious character,” see 4 Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 876, Comment b, meaning an act that is independ-
make clear that recovery was denied because the defendants had com-
mitted no actionable tort, regardless of whether they agreed to commit
any such act. See ibid. Likewise, Justice Stevens reads J. & C. Orna-
mental Iron Co. v. Watkins, 114 Ga. App. 688, 691, 152 S. E. 2d 613, 615
(1966), to deny recovery because the plaintiff had suffered no injury.
However, in that case, the plaintiff ’s conspiracy claim was predicated on
several alleged torts including fraud, trespass, and malicious interference.
Ibid. While the court held that the plaintiff could not recover for conspir-
acy to maliciously interfere because he had suffered no injury, the plain-
tiff ’s remaining conspiracy allegations were insufficient because the plain-
tiff did not allege “all the elements of a cause of action for the tort the
same as would be required if there were no allegation of a conspiracy.”
Ibid. Further, Justice Stevens chides us for citing cases in which the
court allowed recovery. But in two of these cases the court explicitly
grounded its decision on the fact that the plaintiff had identified an action-
able independent tort on which the conspiracy claim could be based. See
Cohen v. Bowdoin, 288 A. 2d 106, 110 (Me. 1972) (“[I]f [the plaintiff ’s con-
spiracy claim] is to be upheld as stating a claim upon which relief can be
granted, it must be on the ground that the complaint sufficiently alleges
the actual commission of the separate and independent tort of defamation
against the plaintiff ”); Middlesex Concrete Products & Excavating Corp.
v. Carteret Indus. Assn., 37 N. J. 507, 516, 181 A. 2d 774, 779 (1962) (holding
that the plaintiffs stated a claim for conspiracy because they alleged an
actionable tort). In short, we think that there is ample evidence of the
common-law rule we have cited.

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ently wrongful under RICO. The specific type of act that is
analogous to an act of a tortious character may depend on
the underlying substantive violation the defendant is alleged
to have committed.9 However, respondents’ alleged overt
act in furtherance of their conspiracy is not independently
wrongful under any substantive provision of the statute.
Injury caused by such an act is not, therefore, sufficient to
give rise to a cause of action under § 1964(c).10
Petitioner challenges this view of the statute under the
longstanding canon of statutory construction that terms in a
statute should not be construed so as to render any provision
of that statute meaningless or superfluous. He asserts that
under our view of the statute, any person who had a claim
for a violation of § 1962(d) would necessarily have a claim
for a violation of § 1962(a), (b), or (c). However, contrary to
petitioner’s assertions, our interpretation of § 1962(d) does
not render it mere surplusage. Under our interpretation, a
plaintiff could, through a § 1964(c) suit for a violation of
9 For example, most courts of appeals have adopted the so-called invest-
ment injury rule, which requires that a plaintiff suing for a violation of
§ 1962(a) allege injury from the defendant’s “use or invest[ment]” of income
derived from racketeering activity, see § 1962(a). See, e. g., Crowe v.
Henry, 43 F. 3d 198, 205 (CA5 1995); Vemco, Inc. v. Camardella, 23 F. 3d
129, 132 (CA6) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 513 U. S. 1017 (1994). Al-
though we express no view on this issue, arguably a plaintiff suing for a
violation of § 1962(d) based on an agreement to violate § 1962(a) is required
to allege injury from the “use or invest[ment]” of illicit proceeds.
10 Respondents argue that a § 1962(d) claim must be predicated on an
actionable violation of §§ 1962(a)–(c). However, the merit of this view is
a different (albeit related) issue from the one on which we granted certio-
rari, namely, whether a plaintiff can bring a § 1962(d) claim for injury flow-
ing from an overt act that is not an act of racketeering. Therefore, con-
trary to Justice Stevens’ suggestion, see post, at 511–512, we do not
resolve whether a plaintiff suing under § 1964(c) for a RICO conspiracy
must allege an actionable violation under §§ 1962(a)–(c), or whether it is
sufficient for the plaintiff to allege an agreement to complete a substantive
violation and the commission of at least one act of racketeering that caused
him injury.

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507 Cite as: 529 U. S. 494 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
§ 1962(d), sue co-conspirators who might not themselves have
violated one of the substantive provisions of § 1962.
III
We conclude, therefore, that a person may not bring suit
under § 1964(c) predicated on a violation of § 1962(d) for inju-
ries caused by an overt act that is not an act of racketeering
or otherwise unlawful under the statute.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter joins,
dissenting.
For the purpose of decision, I assume—as I think the
Court does—that petitioner has alleged an injury proxi-
mately caused by an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy
that violated 18 U. S. C. § 1962(d). In my judgment, the
plain language of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act (RICO) makes it clear that petitioner there-
fore has a cause of action under § 1964(c), whether or not the
overt act is a racketeering activity listed in § 1961(1). The
common-law civil conspiracy cases relied upon by the Court
prove nothing to the contrary.
A “conspiracy” is an illegal agreement. There is, of
course, a difference between the question whether an agree-
ment is illegal and the question whether an admittedly illegal
agreement gives rise to a cause of action for damages. Sec-
tion 1962(d), which makes RICO conspiracies unlawful, ad-
dresses the former question; 1 § 1964(c), which imposes civil
1 Those who participate in an illegal agreement to violate the substan-
tive provisions of § 1962(a), (b), or (c) have engaged in a conspiracy in
violation of § 1962(d). See Salinas v. United States, 522 U. S. 52, 63–65
(1997). Although “[t]here is no requirement of some overt act” to violate
§ 1962(d), id., at 63, that, of course, does not mean that an agreement alone
gives rise to civil liability under § 1964(c).

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508 BECK v. PRUPIS
Stevens, J., dissenting
liability, concerns the latter. Section 1964(c) requires a per-
son to be “injured in his business or property” by a violation
before bringing an action for damages. And because that
kind of injury only results from some form of overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy, liability under § 1964(c) natu-
rally requires injury via an overt act.2 But there is nothing
in either § 1962(d) or § 1964(c) requiring the overt act to be a
racketeering activity as defined in § 1961(1).3
The Court’s central premise is that common-law civil con-
spiracy cases support the notion that liability cannot be im-
posed unless the overt act that furthered the conspiracy and
harmed the plaintiff was a particular kind of overt act,
namely, an act of a tortious character. But the cases cited
by the Court do not support that point. First, no case cited
by the majority actually parallels the Court’s premise. That
is, no case involved a situation in which (a) there was an
illegal agreement, (b) there was an injury to the plaintiff
proximately caused by an overt act in furtherance of that
agreement, but (c) there was a refusal to impose civil liability
because the overt act was not itself tortious.
Of the dozen cases cited by the Court, ante, at 501–503,
half of them rejected liability because they did not satisfy
condition (a) above, i. e., there was either no agreement or
nothing illegal about the agreement that was made. See
Satin v. Satin, 69 App. Div. 2d 761, 762, 414 N. Y. S. 2d 570
(1979) (Memorandum Decision) (“Here, the only such wrong-
ful action is pleaded against [one defendant] alone. . . . In any
event, it is doubtful that there could here be a conspiracy
between this individual and his own corporation”); Mills v.
Hansell, 378 F. 2d 53, 54 (CA5 1967) (per curiam) (“[W]e
feel that the able trial judge correctly concluded that . . .
2 Of course, under Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corpora-
tion, 503 U. S. 258, 268 (1992), the overt act must be the proximate cause
of the plaintiff ’s injury.
3 “[R]acketeering activity” is defined in § 1961(1) to include a slew of
state and federal crimes such as murder, bribery, arson, and extortion.

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509 Cite as: 529 U. S. 494 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
there was no misconduct on the part of [the defendants]”);
Lesperance v. North American Aviation, Inc., 217 Cal. App.
2d 336, 346, 31 Cal. Rptr. 873, 878 (1963) (“[E]mployer . . .
had the right (so far as appears) to terminate [plaintiff ’s]
services without committing a civil wrong”); Chapman v.
Pollock, 148 F. Supp. 769, 772 (WD Mo. 1957) (“The fatal
defect in plaintiff ’s action for conspiracy is that the act com-
mitted by defendants . . . was lawful in its nature, . . . and
violated no right of plaintiff ”); Olmsted, Inc. v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 218 Iowa 997, 1003, 253 N. W. 804, 807 (1934)
(“A conspiracy is not established by the record. There is
no direct evidence that such a conspiracy was formed. A
conspiracy cannot be inferred from the record, because noth-
ing was done by the alleged conspirators which was unlaw-
ful”); Royster v. Baker, 365 S. W. 2d 496, 500 (Mo. 1963)
(“[T]he petition does no more than allege that the defendants
agreed, or if the term is preferred, conspired, to accomplish
lawful acts in a lawful manner”).
Three more cases refused to impose liability because con-
dition (b) was missing; that is, because the plaintiff did not
actually suffer any harm. See Earp v. Detroit, 16 Mich.
App. 271, 280–282, 167 N. W. 2d 841, 847–848 (1969) (Plaintiff
waived any cause of action for conspiracy to invade his pri-
vacy by disclosing private information); J. & C. Ornamental
Iron Co. v. Watkins, 114 Ga. App. 688, 691–692, 152 S. E. 2d
613, 615 (1966) (“Plaintiff does not allege that it . . . was
injured in any way. . . . [T]he petition contains no allegations
of fact showing that plaintiff was injured in any way . . . .
Thus the petition fails to state a cause of action upon any
theory”); Adler v. Fenton, 24 How. 407, 411–413 (1861). The
remaining three cases found that the plaintiff did state a
cause of action and therefore the court did not refuse to im-
pose liability on that ground. See Cohen v. Bowdoin, 288
A. 2d 106, 110 (Me. 1972) (“We decide that the complaint
states a claim upon which relief can be granted”); Middlesex
Concrete Products & Excavating Corp. v. Carteret Indus.

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510 BECK v. PRUPIS
Stevens, J., dissenting
Assn., 37 N. J. 507, 516, 181 A. 2d 774, 780 (1962) (“[S]o much
of defendants’ motion as sought a dismissal of the complaint
as being insufficient in law must fail,” but sustaining defend-
ants’ unrelated privilege defense); Halberstam v. Welch, 705
F. 2d 472, 489 (CADC 1983). The cases cited, in short, sim-
ply do not do the work the Court would have them do.4
Furthermore, at least some of the cases cited by the Court
speak generally of harm via any overt act, and not exclu-
sively of tortious acts.5 Indeed, some of the sources cited
4 The Court suggests that three of the cases cited deny recovery because
there was no actionable tort—and not, as I have suggested, because there
was no illegal agreement or because there was no injury. See ante, at
504–505, n. 8. At best, the Court’s reading only demonstrates that in
these cases the question whether the harmful overt act was a tort, on the
one hand, and the question whether there was any illegal agreement or
harm, on the other hand, are questions of overlapping substance. To the
extent that is true, however, the point does not support the Court’s view.
Rather, it only proves that the cases cited do not parse out elements (a),
(b), and (c) as the Court suggests they do. Moreover, as I stated at the
outset, both the Court and I assume that there has been an illegal conspir-
acy in this case. If the cases the Court cites show that there was no
illegal agreement at all because there was no actionable tort, then the
cases cited by the Court simply contradict the central premise of the pres-
ent case, and are therefore inapposite.
5 See Earp v. Detroit, 16 Mich. App. 271, 275, 167 N. W. 2d 841, 845
(1969) (“There is no civil action for conspiracy alone. . . . It must be coupled
with the commission of acts which damaged the plaintiff ”); Lesperance v.
North American Aviation, Inc., 217 Cal. App. 2d 336, 345, 31 Cal. Rptr.
873, 878 (1963) (“ ‘It is the wrong done and the damage suffered pursuant
to . . . the conspiracy itself . . . . [T]he complaint must state facts which
show that a civil wrong was done’ ”); Chapman v. Pollock, 148 F. Supp.
769, 772 (WD Mo. 1957) (“There can be no recovery for the simple exist-
ence of a civil conspiracy. The action is for damages caused by acts com-
mitted pursuant to a formed conspiracy. . . . Unless something is actually
done by the conspirators pursuant to their combination . . . no civil action
lies against anyone”); Adler v. Fenton, 24 How. 407, 410 (1861) (“[I]t must
be shown that the defendants have done some wrong”); Royster v. Baker,
365 S. W. 2d 496, 499 (Mo. 1963) (“The gist of the action is not the conspir-
acy, but the wrong done by acts in furtherance of the conspiracy”); Halber-

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Stevens, J., dissenting
recognize that, at least in certain instances, the agreement
itself can give rise to liability for civil conspiracy.6 And of
the nine cases cited in which liability is rejected for failure
to state a cause of action, four are the opinions of intermedi-
ate state courts and one is the three-page opinion of a Fed-
eral District Court—hardly strong evidence of the “widely
accepted” premise on which the Court relies. Ante, at 501.
Thus, the cases cited by the Court do not at all place its con-
clusion on any firm footing.
Nevertheless, based on its understanding of the common
law, the Court concludes that “a RICO conspiracy plaintiff
[must] allege injury from an act that is analogous to an ‘ac[t]
of a tortious character.’ ” Ante, at 505. Even assuming
that statement is correct, though, it is not at all clear to me
why an overt act that “injure[s]” a person “in his business
or property” (as § 1964(c) requires) would not be “analogous
to an ‘ac[t] of a tortious character’ ” simply because the overt
act is not listed in § 1961(1). Nor do I understand why the
stam v. Welch, 705 F. 2d 472, 487 (CADC 1983) (“[A] conspiracy requires:
an agreement to do an unlawful act or a lawful act in an unlawful manner;
an overt act in furtherance of the agreement by someone participating in
it; and injury caused by the act”).
6 See Cohen v. Bowdoin, 288 A. 2d 106, 110, n. 4 (Me. 1972) (“We are
aware that in particular extraordinary circumstances there has been rec-
ognized the existence of a separate self-sufficient and independent tort of
‘conspiracy,’ as a substantive basis of civil liability”); Halberstam, 705
F. 2d, at 477, n. 7; W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 46, p. 293 (4th ed. 1971) (“[I]t
now seems generally agreed . . . that there are certain types of conduct,
such as boycotts, in which the element of combination adds such a power
of coercion, undue influence or restraint of trade, that it makes unlawful
acts which one man alone might legitimately do. It is perhaps pointless
to debate whether in such a case the combination or conspiracy becomes
itself the tort, or whether it merely gives a tortious character to the acts
done in furtherance of it. On either basis, it is the determining factor in
liability”). See also Snipes v. West Flagler Kennel Club, Inc., 105 So. 2d
164, 165–167, and n. 1 (Fla. 1958), where the court upheld liability exclu-
sively on precisely that premise.

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512 BECK v. PRUPIS
Stevens, J., dissenting
only qualifying “tortious act” must be “an act that is inde-
pendently wrongful under RICO.” Ante, at 505–506 (em-
phasis added).
And if one assumes further that the Court is correct to
say that the only qualifying “ ‘ac[t] of a tortious character’ ”
is “an act that is independently wrongful under RICO,” the
analogy does not actually support what the Court has held.
The majority holds that § 1964(c) liability could be imposed
if the overt acts injuring the plaintiff are among those rack-
eteering activities listed in § 1961(1)—such as murder, brib-
ery, arson, and extortion. Racketeering activities, however,
are not “independently wrongful under RICO.” They are,
of course, independently wrongful under other provisions of
state and federal criminal law, but RICO does not make rack-
eteering activity itself wrongful under the Act. The only
acts that are “independently wrongful under RICO” are vio-
lations of the provisions of § 1962. Thus, even accepting the
Court’s own analogy, if petitioner were harmed by predicate
acts defined in § 1961(1), that still would not, by itself, give
rise to a cause of action under § 1964(c). Only if those rack-
eteering activities also constituted a violation of § 1962(a),
(b), or (c) would petitioner be harmed by “an act that is inde-
pendently wrongful under RICO.” And, of course, if peti-
tioner were already harmed by conduct covered by one of
those provisions, he would hardly need to use § 1962(d)’s con-
spiracy provision to establish a cause of action.
* * *
The plain language of RICO makes it clear that petition-
er’s civil cause of action under § 1964(c) for a violation of
§ 1962(d) does not require that he be injured in his business
or property by any particular kind of overt act in further-
ance of the conspiracy. The Court’s recitation of the com-
mon law of civil conspiracy does not prove otherwise, and,
indeed, contradicts its own holding.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.