BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN SYSTEM v. SOUTHWORTH et al.

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BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
WISCONSIN SYSTEM v. SOUTHWORTH et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the seventh circuit
No. 98–1189. Argued November 9, 1999—Decided March 22, 2000
Petitioner, Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System (here-
inafter University), requires students at the University’s Madison cam-
pus to pay a segregated activity fee. The fee supports various campus
services and extracurricular student activities. In the University’s
view, such fees enhance students’ educational experience by promoting
extracurricular activities, stimulating advocacy and debate on diverse
points of view, enabling participation in campus administrative activity,
and providing opportunities to develop social skills, all consistent with
the University’s broad educational mission. Registered student organi-
zations (RSO’s) engaging in a number of diverse expressive activities
are eligible to receive a portion of the fees, which are administered by
the student government subject to the University’s approval. The par-
ties have stipulated that the process for reviewing and approving RSO
applications for funding is administered in a viewpoint-neutral fashion.
RSO’s may also obtain funding through a student referendum. Re-
spondents, present and former Madison campus students, filed suit
against the University, alleging, inter alia, that the fee violates their
First Amendment rights, and that the University must grant them the
choice not to fund RSO’s that engage in political and ideological expres-
sion offensive to their personal beliefs. In granting respondents sum-
mary judgment, the Federal District Court declared the fee program
invalid under Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209, and Keller v.
State Bar of Cal., 496 U. S. 1, and enjoined the University from using
the fees to fund any RSO engaging in political or ideological speech.
Agreeing with the District Court that this Court’s compelled speech
precedents control, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the program was
not germane to the University’s mission, did not further a vital Univer-
sity policy, and imposed too great a burden on respondents’ free speech
rights. It added that protecting those rights was of heightened concern
following Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S.
819, because if the University could not discriminate in distributing the
funds, students could not be compelled to fund organizations engaging
in political and ideological speech. It extended the District Court’s
order and enjoined the University from requiring students to pay that

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218 BOARD OF REGENTS OF UNIV. OF WIS. SYSTEM
v. SOUTHWORTH
Syllabus
portion of the fee used to fund RSO’s engaged in political or ideologi-
cal expression.
Held:
1. The First Amendment permits a public university to charge its
students an activity fee used to fund a program to facilitate extracurric-
ular student speech, provided that the program is viewpoint neutral.
The University exacts the fee at issue for the sole purpose of facilitating
the free and open exchange of ideas by, and among, its students. Ob-
jecting students, however, may insist upon certain safeguards with re-
spect to the expressive activities they are required to support. The
Court’s public forum cases are instructive here by close analogy. Be-
cause the complaining students must pay fees to subsidize speech they
find objectionable, even offensive, the rights acknowledged in Abood and
Keller are implicated. In those cases, this Court held that a required
service fee paid by nonunion employees to a union, Abood, supra, at 213,
and fees paid by lawyers who were required to join a state bar associa-
tion, Keller, supra, at 13–14, could be used to fund speech germane to
those organizations’ purposes but not to fund the organizations’ own
political expression. While these precedents identify the protesting
students’ interests, their germane speech standard is unworkable in the
context of student speech at a university and gives insufficient protec-
tion both to the objecting students and to the University program itself.
Even in the union context, this Court has encountered difficulties in
deciding what is germane and what is not. The standard becomes all
the more unmanageable in the public university setting, particularly
where, as here, the State undertakes to stimulate the whole universe of
speech and ideas. To insist upon asking what speech is germane would
be contrary to the very goal the University seeks to pursue. The vast
extent of permitted expression also underscores the high potential for
intrusion on the objecting students’ First Amendment rights, for it is
all but inevitable that the fees will subsidize speech that some students
find objectionable or offensive. A university is free to protect those
rights by allowing an optional or refund system, but such a system is
not a constitutional requirement. If a university determines that its
mission is well served if students have the means to engage in dynamic
discussion on a broad range of issues, it may impose a mandatory fee to
sustain such dialogue. It must provide some protection to its students’
First Amendment interests, however. The proper measure, and the
principal standard of protection for objecting students, is the require-
ment of viewpoint neutrality in the allocation of funding support. This
obligation was given substance in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors
of Univ. of Va., supra, which concerned a student’s right to use an extra-
curricular speech program already in place. The instant case considers
the antecedent question whether a public university may require stu-

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219 Cite as: 529 U. S. 217 (2000)
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dents to pay a fee which creates the mechanism for the extracurricular
speech in the first instance. The University may sustain the extracur-
ricular dimensions of its programs by using mandatory student fees with
viewpoint neutrality as the operational principle. There is symmetry
then in the holding here and in Rosenberger. Pp. 229–234.
2. Because the parties have stipulated that the University’s program
respects the principle of viewpoint neutrality, the program in its basic
structure must be found consistent with the First Amendment. This
decision makes no distinction between campus and off-campus activities;
and it ought not be taken to imply that when the University, its agents,
employees, or faculty speak, they are subject to the First Amendment
analysis which controls in this case. Pp. 234–235.
3. While not well developed on the present record, the referendum
aspect of the University’s program appears to permit RSO funding or
defunding by majority vote of the student body. To the extent the ref-
erendum substitutes majority determinations for viewpoint neutrality
it would undermine the constitutional protection the program requires.
Pp. 235–236.
151 F. 3d 717, reversed and remanded.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O’Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Sou-
ter, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Stevens
and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 236.
Susan K. Ullman, Assistant Attorney General of Wiscon-
sin, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs
were James E. Doyle, Attorney General, and Peter C. An-
derson, Assistant Attorney General.
Jordan W. Lorence argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief was Daniel Kelly.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of
New York et al. by Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of New York, Preeta
D. Bansal, Solicitor General, Peter H. Schiff, Deputy Solicitor General,
Laura Etlinger, Assistant Attorney General, and Mark B. Rotenberg, and
by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Mark
Pryor of Arkansas, Ken Salazar of Colorado, Thurbert E. Baker of Geor-
gia, Thomas R. Keller of Hawaii, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Richard P.
Ieyoub of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Thomas F. Reilly
of Massachusetts, Mike Hatch of Minnesota, Joseph P. Mazurek of Mon-
tana, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio,
and Paul G. Summers of Tennessee; for the State of Oregon by Hardy

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220 BOARD OF REGENTS OF UNIV. OF WIS. SYSTEM
v. SOUTHWORTH
Opinion of the Court
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
For the second time in recent years we consider constitu-
tional questions arising from a program designed to facilitate
Myers, Attorney General, David Schuman, Deputy Attorney General, and
Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General; for the American Civil Liberties
Union et al. by Jon G. Furlow, Steven R. Shapiro, Elliot M. Mincberg,
and Judith E. Schaeffer; for the American Council on Education et al. by
Stephen S. Dunham, Leonard M. Niehoff, and Sheldon E. Steinbach; for
the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions by Jonathan P. Hiatt, James B. Coppess, and Laurence Gold; for the
Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law by
Scott D. Makar, Robert Bergen, Michael J. Frevola, and Burt Neuborne;
for the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Campus Center at UW-
Madison et al. by Patricia M. Logue and Ruth E. Harlow; for the National
Legal Aid Defenders Association, Student Legal Services Section, by Ned
R. Jaeckle and Kathleen A. Cushing; for the National Education Associa-
tion by Robert H. Chanin, Andrew D. Roth, and Michael D. Simpson; for
the New York Public Interest Research Group by Alexander R. Sussman;
for the Student Press Law Center et al. by Lucy A. Dalglish; for Student
Rights Law Center, Inc., by Mitchel D. Grotch; for the United States Stu-
dent Association et al. by David C. Vladeck and Alan B. Morrison; for
United Council of University of Wisconsin Students, Inc., by Mark B. Ha-
zelbaker; for the University of California Student Association by Michael
S. Sorgen and Amy R. Levine; and for the Wisconsin Student Public Inter-
est Research Group et al. by Daniel H. Squire, Craig Goldblatt, and Fran-
cisco Medina.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Atlantic
Legal Foundation by Martin S. Kaufman and Edwin L. Lewis III; for the
American Center for Law and Justice by Jay Alan Sekulow, Mark Nathan
Troobnick, and James Matthew Henderson, Sr.; for the Christian Legal
Society by Steven T. McFarland, Samuel B. Casey, and Thomas C. Berg;
for the Family Research Institute by Roy H. Nelson; for Liberty Counsel
by Mathew D. Staver; for the National Legal Foundation by Barry C.
Hodge; for the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc., by
Raymond J. LaJeunesse, Jr.; for the National Smokers Alliance by Renee
Giachino; for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. by Deborah J. La Fetra;
and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel E. Troy, Daniel
J. Popeo, and Paul D. Kamenar.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for Americans United for Separation
of Church and State et al. by Steven K. Green, Steven M. Freeman, and
Ayesha N. Khan; for First Freedoms Foundation by Michael D. Dean; for

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extracurricular student speech at a public university. Re-
spondents are a group of students at the University of
Wisconsin (hereinafter University). They brought a First
Amendment challenge to a mandatory student activity fee
imposed by petitioner Board of Regents of the University of
Wisconsin System and used in part by the University to sup-
port student organizations engaging in political or ideological
speech. Respondents object to the speech and expression
of some of the student organizations. Relying upon our
precedents which protect members of unions and bar associa-
tions from being required to pay fees used for speech the
members find objectionable, both the District Court and the
Court of Appeals invalidated the University’s student fee
program. The University contends that its mandatory stu-
dent activity fee and the speech which it supports are appro-
priate to further its educational mission.
We reverse. The First Amendment permits a public uni-
versity to charge its students an activity fee used to fund a
program to facilitate extracurricular student speech if the
program is viewpoint neutral. We do not sustain, however,
the student referendum mechanism of the University’s pro-
gram, which appears to permit the exaction of fees in viola-
tion of the viewpoint neutrality principle. As to that aspect
of the program, we remand for further proceedings.
I
The University of Wisconsin is a public corporation of the
State of Wisconsin. See Wis. Stat. § 36.07(1) (1993–1994).
State law defines the University’s mission in broad terms:
“to develop human resources, to discover and disseminate
knowledge, to extend knowledge and its application beyond
the boundaries of its campuses and to serve and stimulate
society by developing in students heightened intellectual,
cultural and humane sensitivities . . . and a sense of purpose.”
the Rutherford Institute by John W. Whitehead and Steven H. Aden; and
for Owen Brennan Rounds et al. by Thomas H. Nelson.

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222 BOARD OF REGENTS OF UNIV. OF WIS. SYSTEM
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§ 36.01(2). Some 30,000 undergraduate students and 10,000
graduate and professional students attend the University’s
Madison campus, ranking it among the Nation’s largest insti-
tutions of higher learning. Students come to the renowned
University from all 50 States and from 72 foreign countries.
Last year marked its 150th anniversary; and to celebrate its
distinguished history, the University sponsored a series of
research initiatives, campus forums and workshops, histori-
cal exhibits, and public lectures, all reaffirming its commit-
ment to explore the universe of knowledge and ideas.
The responsibility for governing the University of Wis-
consin System is vested by law with the board of regents.
§ 36.09(1). The same law empowers the students to share in
aspects of the University’s governance. One of those func-
tions is to administer the student activities fee program. By
statute the “[s]tudents in consultation with the chancellor
and subject to the final confirmation of the board [of regents]
shall have the responsibility for the disposition of those stu-
dent fees which constitute substantial support for campus
student activities.” § 36.09(5). The students do so, in large
measure, through their student government, called the As-
sociated Students of Madison (ASM), and various ASM
subcommittees. The program the University maintains to
support the extracurricular activities undertaken by many
of its student organizations is the subject of the present
controversy.
It seems that since its founding the University has re-
quired full-time students enrolled at its Madison campus to
pay a nonrefundable activity fee. App. 154. For the 1995–
1996 academic year, when this suit was commenced, the ac-
tivity fee amounted to $331.50 per year. The fee is segre-
gated from the University’s tuition charge. Once collected,
the activity fees are deposited by the University into the
accounts of the State of Wisconsin. Id., at 9. The fees are
drawn upon by the University to support various campus
services and extracurricular student activities. In the Uni-

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versity’s view, the activity fees “enhance the educational
experience” of its students by “promot[ing] extracurricular
activities,” “stimulating advocacy and debate on diverse
points of view,” enabling “participa[tion] in political activity,”
“promot[ing] student participa[tion] in campus administra-
tive activity,” and providing “opportunities to develop social
skills,” all consistent with the University’s mission. Id., at
154–155.
The board of regents classifies the segregated fee into allo-
cable and nonallocable portions. The nonallocable portion
approximates 80% of the total fee and covers expenses such
as student health services, intramural sports, debt service,
and the upkeep and operations of the student union facilities.
Id., at 13. Respondents did not challenge the purposes to
which the University commits the nonallocable portion of the
segregated fee. Id., at 37.
The allocable portion of the fee supports extracurricular
endeavors pursued by the University’s registered student or-
ganizations or RSO’s. To qualify for RSO status students
must organize as a not-for-profit group, limit membership
primarily to students, and agree to undertake activities re-
lated to student life on campus. Id., at 15. During the
1995–1996 school year, 623 groups had RSO status on the
Madison campus. Id., at 255. To name but a few, RSO’s
included the Future Financial Gurus of America; the Inter-
national Socialist Organization; the College Democrats; the
College Republicans; and the American Civil Liberties Union
Campus Chapter. As one would expect, the expressive ac-
tivities undertaken by RSO’s are diverse in range and con-
tent, from displaying posters and circulating newsletters
throughout the campus, to hosting campus debates and guest
speakers, and to what can best be described as political
lobbying.
RSO’s may obtain a portion of the allocable fees in one
of three ways. Most do so by seeking funding from the
Student Government Activity Fund (SGAF), administered

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224 BOARD OF REGENTS OF UNIV. OF WIS. SYSTEM
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by the ASM. SGAF moneys may be issued to support an
RSO’s operations and events, as well as travel expenses “cen-
tral to the purpose of the organization.” Id., at 18. As an
alternative, an RSO can apply for funding from the General
Student Services Fund (GSSF), administered through the
ASM’s finance committee. During the 1995–1996 academic
year, 15 RSO’s received GSSF funding. These RSO’s in-
cluded a campus tutoring center, the student radio station, a
student environmental group, a gay and bisexual student
center, a community legal office, an AIDS support network,
a campus women’s center, and the Wisconsin Student Public
Interest Research Group (WISPIRG). Id., at 16–17. The
University acknowledges that, in addition to providing cam-
pus services (e. g., tutoring and counseling), the GSSF-funded
RSO’s engage in political and ideological expression. Brief
for Petitioner 10.
The GSSF, as well as the SGAF, consists of moneys origi-
nating in the allocable portion of the mandatory fee. The
parties have stipulated that, with respect to SGAF and
GSSF funding, “[t]he process for reviewing and approving
allocations for funding is administered in a viewpoint-neutral
fashion,” id., at 14–15, and that the University does not use
the fee program for “advocating a particular point of view.”
Id., at 39.
A student referendum provides a third means for an RSO
to obtain funding. Id., at 16. While the record is sparse on
this feature of the University’s program, the parties inform
us that the student body can vote either to approve or to
disapprove an assessment for a particular RSO. One refer-
endum resulted in an allocation of $45,000 to WISPIRG dur-
ing the 1995–1996 academic year. At oral argument, counsel
for the University acknowledged that a referendum could
also operate to defund an RSO or to veto a funding decision
of the ASM. In October 1996, for example, the student body
voted to terminate funding to a national student organization
to which the University belonged. Id., at 215. Both parties

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confirmed at oral argument that their stipulation regarding
the program’s viewpoint neutrality does not extend to the
referendum process. Tr. of Oral Arg. 19, 29.
With respect to GSSF and SGAF funding, the ASM or
its finance committee makes initial funding decisions. App.
14–15. The ASM does so in an open session, and interested
students may attend meetings when RSO funding is dis-
cussed. Id., at 14. It also appears that the ASM must ap-
prove the results of a student referendum. Approval ap-
pears pro forma, however, as counsel for the University
advised us that the student government “voluntarily views
th[e] referendum as binding.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 15. Once
the ASM approves an RSO’s funding application, it forwards
its decision to the chancellor and to the board of regents for
their review and approval. App. 18, 19. Approximately
30% of the University’s RSO’s received funding during the
1995–1996 academic year.
RSO’s, as a general rule, do not receive lump-sum cash
distributions. Rather, RSO’s obtain funding support on a
reimbursement basis by submitting receipts or invoices to
the University. Guidelines identify expenses appropriate
for reimbursement. Permitted expenditures include, in the
main, costs for printing, postage, office supplies, and use of
University facilities and equipment. Materials printed with
student fees must contain a disclaimer that the views ex-
pressed are not those of the ASM. The University also re-
imburses RSO’s for fees arising from membership in “other
related and non-profit organizations.” Id., at 251.
The University’s policy establishes purposes for which fees
may not be expended. RSO’s may not receive reimburse-
ment for “[g]ifts, donations, and contributions,” the costs of
legal services, or for “[a]ctivities which are politically parti-
san or religious in nature.” Id., at 251–252. (The policy
does not give examples of the prohibited expenditures.) A
separate policy statement on GSSF funding states that an
RSO can receive funding if it “does not have a primarily

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political orientation (i. e. is not a registered political group).”
Id., at 238. The same policy adds that an RSO “shall not
use [student fees] for any lobbying purposes.” Ibid. At
one point in their brief respondents suggest that the prohibi-
tion against expenditures for “politically partisan” purposes
renders the program not viewpoint neutral. Brief for Re-
spondents 31. In view of the fact that both parties entered
a stipulation to the contrary at the outset of this litigation,
which was again reiterated during oral argument in this
Court, we do not consider respondents’ challenge to this as-
pect of the University’s program.
The University’s Student Organization Handbook has
guidelines for regulating the conduct and activities of RSO’s.
In addition to obligating RSO’s to adhere to the fee pro-
gram’s rules and regulations, the guidelines establish proce-
dures authorizing any student to complain to the University
that an RSO is in noncompliance. An extensive investiga-
tive process is in place to evaluate and remedy violations.
The University’s policy includes a range of sanctions for non-
compliance, including probation, suspension, or termination
of RSO status.
One RSO that appears to operate in a manner distinct from
others is WISPIRG. For reasons not clear from the record,
WISPIRG receives lump-sum cash distributions from the
University. University counsel informed us that this distri-
bution reduced the GSSF portion of the fee pool. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 15. The full extent of the uses to which WISPIRG puts
its funds is unclear. We do know, however, that WISPIRG
sponsored on-campus events regarding homelessness and en-
vironmental and consumer protection issues. App. 348. It
coordinated community food drives and educational pro-
grams and spent a portion of its activity fees for the lobbying
efforts of its parent organization and for student internships
aimed at influencing legislation. Id., at 344, 347.
In March 1996, respondents, each of whom attended or still
attend the University’s Madison campus, filed suit in the

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United States District Court for the Western District of Wis-
consin against members of the board of regents. Respond-
ents alleged, inter alia, that imposition of the segregated fee
violated their rights of free speech, free association, and free
exercise under the First Amendment. They contended the
University must grant them the choice not to fund those
RSO’s that engage in political and ideological expression of-
fensive to their personal beliefs. Respondents requested
both injunctive and declaratory relief. On cross-motions for
summary judgment, the District Court ruled in their favor,
declaring the University’s segregated fee program invalid
under Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209 (1977), and
Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U. S. 1 (1990). The District
Court decided the fee program compelled students “to sup-
port political and ideological activity with which they dis-
agree” in violation of respondents’ First Amendment rights
to freedom of speech and association. App. to Pet. for Cert.
98a. The court did not reach respondents’ free exercise
claim. The District Court’s order enjoined the board of re-
gents from using segregated fees to fund any RSO engaging
in political or ideological speech.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part.
Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F. 3d 717 (1998). As the District
Court had done, the Court of Appeals found our compelled
speech precedents controlling. After examining the Univer-
sity’s fee program under the three-part test outlined in Lehn-
ert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U. S. 507 (1991), it concluded
that the program was not germane to the University’s mis-
sion, did not further a vital policy of the University, and im-
posed too much of a burden on respondents’ free speech
rights. “[L]ike the objecting union members in Abood,” the
Court of Appeals reasoned, the students here have a First
Amendment interest in not being compelled to contribute to
an organization whose expressive activities conflict with
their own personal beliefs. 151 F. 3d, at 731. It added that

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228 BOARD OF REGENTS OF UNIV. OF WIS. SYSTEM
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protecting the objecting students’ free speech rights was “of
heightened concern” following our decision in Rosenberger v.
Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819 (1995),
because “[i]f the university cannot discriminate in the dis-
bursement of funds, it is imperative that students not be
compelled to fund organizations which engage in political and
ideological activities—that is the only way to protect the in-
dividual’s rights.” 151 F. 3d, at 730, n. 11. The Court of
Appeals extended the District Court’s order and enjoined
the board of regents from requiring objecting students to
pay that portion of the fee used to fund RSO’s engaged in
political or ideological expression. Id., at 735.
Three members of the Court of Appeals dissented from
the denial of the University’s motion for rehearing en banc.
In their view, the panel opinion overlooked the “crucial dif-
ference between a requirement to pay money to an organi-
zation that explicitly aims to subsidize one viewpoint to
the exclusion of other viewpoints, as in Abood and Keller,
and a requirement to pay a fee to a group that creates a
viewpoint-neutral forum, as is true of the student activity
fee here.” Southworth v. Grebe, 157 F. 3d 1124, 1129 (CA7
1998) (D. Wood, J., dissenting).
Other courts addressing First Amendment challenges to
similar student fee programs have reached conflicting re-
sults. Compare Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Ed.,
166 F. 3d 1032, 1038–1040 (CA9 1999); Hays County Guard-
ian v. Supple, 969 F. 2d 111, 123 (CA5 1992), cert. denied,
506 U. S. 1087 (1993); Kania v. Fordham, 702 F. 2d 475, 480
(CA4 1983); Good v. Associated Students of Univ. of Wash.,
86 Wash. 2d 94, 105, 542 P. 2d 762, 769 (1975) (en banc), with
Smith v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 4 Cal. 4th 843, 862–863, 844
P. 2d 500, 513–514, cert. denied, 510 U. S. 863 (1993). These
conflicts, together with the importance of the issue pre-
sented, led us to grant certiorari. 526 U. S. 1038 (1999).
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

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Opinion of the Court
II
It is inevitable that government will adopt and pursue pro-
grams and policies within its constitutional powers but which
nevertheless are contrary to the profound beliefs and sincere
convictions of some of its citizens. The government, as a
general rule, may support valid programs and policies by
taxes or other exactions binding on protesting parties.
Within this broader principle it seems inevitable that funds
raised by the government will be spent for speech and other
expression to advocate and defend its own policies. See,
e. g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. S. 173 (1991); Regan v. Taxa-
tion With Representation of Wash., 461 U. S. 540, 548–549
(1983). The case we decide here, however, does not raise
the issue of the government’s right, or, to be more specific,
the state-controlled University’s right, to use its own funds
to advance a particular message. The University’s whole
justification for fostering the challenged expression is that it
springs from the initiative of the students, who alone give it
purpose and content in the course of their extracurricular
endeavors.
The University having disclaimed that the speech is its
own, we do not reach the question whether traditional politi-
cal controls to ensure responsible government action would
be sufficient to overcome First Amendment objections and
to allow the challenged program under the principle that the
government can speak for itself. If the challenged speech
here were financed by tuition dollars and the University and
its officials were responsible for its content, the case might
be evaluated on the premise that the government itself is the
speaker. That is not the case before us.
The University of Wisconsin exacts the fee at issue for the
sole purpose of facilitating the free and open exchange of
ideas by, and among, its students. We conclude the object-
ing students may insist upon certain safeguards with respect
to the expressive activities which they are required to sup-
port. Our public forum cases are instructive here by close

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230 BOARD OF REGENTS OF UNIV. OF WIS. SYSTEM
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analogy. This is true even though the student activities
fund is not a public forum in the traditional sense of the term
and despite the circumstance that those cases most often in-
volve a demand for access, not a claim to be exempt from
supporting speech. See, e. g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Mo-
riches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384 (1993); Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981). The standard of viewpoint
neutrality found in the public forum cases provides the
standard we find controlling. We decide that the viewpoint
neutrality requirement of the University program is in gen-
eral sufficient to protect the rights of the objecting students.
The student referendum aspect of the program for funding
speech and expressive activities, however, appears to be in-
consistent with the viewpoint neutrality requirement.
We must begin by recognizing that the complaining stu-
dents are being required to pay fees which are subsidies for
speech they find objectionable, even offensive. The Abood
and Keller cases, then, provide the beginning point for our
analysis. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209 (1977);
Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U. S. 1 (1990). While those
precedents identify the interests of the protesting students,
the means of implementing First Amendment protections
adopted in those decisions are neither applicable nor work-
able in the context of extracurricular student speech at a
university.
In Abood, some nonunion public school teachers challenged
an agreement requiring them, as a condition of their employ-
ment, to pay a service fee equal in amount to union dues.
431 U. S., at 211–212. The objecting teachers alleged that
the union’s use of their fees to engage in political speech
violated their freedom of association guaranteed by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. Id., at 213. The Court
agreed and held that any objecting teacher could “prevent
the Union’s spending a part of their required service fees to
contribute to political candidates and to express political
views unrelated to its duties as exclusive bargaining repre-

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sentative.” Id., at 234. The principles outlined in Abood
provided the foundation for our later decision in Keller.
There we held that lawyers admitted to practice in California
could be required to join a state bar association and to fund
activities “germane” to the association’s mission of “regulat-
ing the legal profession and improving the quality of legal
services.” 496 U. S., at 13–14. The lawyers could not, how-
ever, be required to fund the bar association’s own political
expression. Id., at 16.
The proposition that students who attend the University
cannot be required to pay subsidies for the speech of other
students without some First Amendment protection follows
from the Abood and Keller cases. Students enroll in public
universities to seek fulfillment of their personal aspirations
and of their own potential. If the University conditions the
opportunity to receive a college education, an opportunity
comparable in importance to joining a labor union or bar as-
sociation, on an agreement to support objectionable, extra-
curricular expression by other students, the rights acknowl-
edged in Abood and Keller become implicated. It infringes
on the speech and beliefs of the individual to be required, by
this mandatory student activity fee program, to pay subsi-
dies for the objectionable speech of others without any recog-
nition of the State’s corresponding duty to him or her. Yet
recognition must be given as well to the important and sub-
stantial purposes of the University, which seeks to facilitate
a wide range of speech.
In Abood and Keller, the constitutional rule took the form
of limiting the required subsidy to speech germane to the
purposes of the union or bar association. The standard of
germane speech as applied to student speech at a university
is unworkable, however, and gives insufficient protection
both to the objecting students and to the University program
itself. Even in the context of a labor union, whose functions
are, or so we might have thought, well known and under-
stood by the law and the courts after a long history of gov-

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232 BOARD OF REGENTS OF UNIV. OF WIS. SYSTEM
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ernment regulation and judicial involvement, we have en-
countered difficulties in deciding what is germane and what
is not. The difficulty manifested itself in our decision in
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U. S. 507 (1991), where
different Members of the Court reached varying conclusions
regarding what expressive activity was or was not germane
to the mission of the association. If it is difficult to define
germane speech with ease or precision where a union or bar
association is the party, the standard becomes all the more
unmanageable in the public university setting, particularly
where the State undertakes to stimulate the whole universe
of speech and ideas.
The speech the University seeks to encourage in the pro-
gram before us is distinguished not by discernable limits but
by its vast, unexplored bounds. To insist upon asking what
speech is germane would be contrary to the very goal the
University seeks to pursue. It is not for the Court to say
what is or is not germane to the ideas to be pursued in an
institution of higher learning.
Just as the vast extent of permitted expression makes the
test of germane speech inappropriate for intervention, so too
does it underscore the high potential for intrusion on the
First Amendment rights of the objecting students. It is all
but inevitable that the fees will result in subsidies to speech
which some students find objectionable and offensive to their
personal beliefs. If the standard of germane speech is inap-
plicable, then, it might be argued the remedy is to allow each
student to list those causes which he or she will or will not
support. If a university decided that its students’ First
Amendment interests were better protected by some type of
optional or refund system it would be free to do so. We
decline to impose a system of that sort as a constitutional
requirement, however. The restriction could be so disrup-
tive and expensive that the program to support extracurricu-
lar speech would be ineffective. The First Amendment does
not require the University to put the program at risk.

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The University may determine that its mission is well
served if students have the means to engage in dynamic dis-
cussions of philosophical, religious, scientific, social, and po-
litical subjects in their extracurricular campus life outside
the lecture hall. If the University reaches this conclusion,
it is entitled to impose a mandatory fee to sustain an open
dialogue to these ends.
The University must provide some protection to its stu-
dents’ First Amendment interests, however. The proper
measure, and the principal standard of protection for object-
ing students, we conclude, is the requirement of viewpoint
neutrality in the allocation of funding support. Viewpoint
neutrality was the obligation to which we gave substance in
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S.
819 (1995). There the University of Virginia feared that any
association with a student newspaper advancing religious
viewpoints would violate the Establishment Clause. We re-
jected the argument, holding that the school’s adherence to
a rule of viewpoint neutrality in administering its student
fee program would prevent “any mistaken impression that
the student newspapers speak for the University.” Id., at
841. While Rosenberger was concerned with the rights a
student has to use an extracurricular speech program al-
ready in place, today’s case considers the antecedent ques-
tion, acknowledged but unresolved in Rosenberger: whether
a public university may require its students to pay a fee
which creates the mechanism for the extracurricular speech
in the first instance. When a university requires its stu-
dents to pay fees to support the extracurricular speech of
other students, all in the interest of open discussion, it may
not prefer some viewpoints to others. There is symmetry
then in our holding here and in Rosenberger: Viewpoint neu-
trality is the justification for requiring the student to pay
the fee in the first instance and for ensuring the integrity of
the program’s operation once the funds have been collected.
We conclude that the University of Wisconsin may sustain

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234 BOARD OF REGENTS OF UNIV. OF WIS. SYSTEM
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the extracurricular dimensions of its programs by using man-
datory student fees with viewpoint neutrality as the opera-
tional principle.
The parties have stipulated that the program the Uni-
versity has developed to stimulate extracurricular student
expression respects the principle of viewpoint neutrality. If
the stipulation is to continue to control the case, the Univer-
sity’s program in its basic structure must be found consistent
with the First Amendment.
We make no distinction between campus activities and
the off-campus expressive activities of objectionable RSO’s.
Those activities, respondents tell us, often bear no relation-
ship to the University’s reason for imposing the segregated
fee in the first instance, to foster vibrant campus debate
among students. If the University shares those concerns,
it is free to enact viewpoint neutral rules restricting off-
campus travel or other expenditures by RSO’s, for it may
create what is tantamount to a limited public forum if the
principles of viewpoint neutrality are respected. Cf. id., at
829–830. We find no principled way, however, to impose
upon the University, as a constitutional matter, a require-
ment to adopt geographic or spatial restrictions as a condi-
tion for RSOs’ entitlement to reimbursement. Universities
possess significant interests in encouraging students to take
advantage of the social, civic, cultural, and religious opportu-
nities available in surrounding communities and throughout
the country. Universities, like all of society, are finding that
traditional conceptions of territorial boundaries are difficult
to insist upon in an age marked by revolutionary changes
in communications, information transfer, and the means of
discourse. If the rule of viewpoint neutrality is respected,
our holding affords the University latitude to adjust its ex-
tracurricular student speech program to accommodate these
advances and opportunities.
Our decision ought not to be taken to imply that in other
instances the University, its agents or employees, or—of

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particular importance—its faculty, are subject to the First
Amendment analysis which controls in this case. Where the
University speaks, either in its own name through its regents
or officers, or in myriad other ways through its diverse facul-
ties, the analysis likely would be altogether different. See
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. S. 173 (1991); Regan v. Taxation
With Representation of Wash., 461 U. S. 540 (1983). The
Court has not held, or suggested, that when the government
speaks the rules we have discussed come into play.
When the government speaks, for instance to promote its
own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the end,
accountable to the electorate and the political process for its
advocacy. If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials
later could espouse some different or contrary position. In
the instant case, the speech is not that of the University or
its agents. It is not, furthermore, speech by an instructor
or a professor in the academic context, where principles ap-
plicable to government speech would have to be considered.
Cf. Rosenberger, supra, at 833 (discussing the discretion uni-
versities possess in deciding matters relating to their educa-
tional mission).
III
It remains to discuss the referendum aspect of the Univer-
sity’s program. While the record is not well developed on
the point, it appears that by majority vote of the student
body a given RSO may be funded or defunded. It is unclear
to us what protection, if any, there is for viewpoint neutrality
in this part of the process. To the extent the referendum
substitutes majority determinations for viewpoint neutrality
it would undermine the constitutional protection the pro-
gram requires. The whole theory of viewpoint neutrality is
that minority views are treated with the same respect as are
majority views. Access to a public forum, for instance, does
not depend upon majoritarian consent. That principle is
controlling here. A remand is necessary and appropriate to

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Souter, J., concurring in judgment
resolve this point; and the case in all events must be reexam-
ined in light of the principles we have discussed.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. In this Court, the parties shall bear their own
costs.
It is so ordered.
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Stevens and
Justice Breyer join, concurring in the judgment.
The majority today validates the University’s student ac-
tivity fee after recognizing a new category of First Amend-
ment interests and a new standard of viewpoint neutrality
protection. I agree that the University’s scheme is permis-
sible, but do not believe that the Court should take the occa-
sion to impose a cast-iron viewpoint neutrality requirement
to uphold it. See ante, at 233–234. Instead, I would hold
that the First Amendment interest claimed by the student
respondents (hereinafter Southworth) here is simply insuffi-
cient to merit protection by anything more than the view-
point neutrality already accorded by the University, and I
would go no further.1
The parties have stipulated that the grant scheme is ad-
ministered on a viewpoint neutral basis, and like the major-
ity I take the case on that assumption. The question before
us is thus properly cast not as whether viewpoint neutrality
is required, but whether Southworth has a claim to relief
from this specific viewpoint neutral scheme.2 Two sources
of law might be considered in answering this question.
1 I limit my examination of the case solely to the general disbursement
scheme; I agree with the majority that the referendum issue was not ade-
quately addressed in the District Court and the Court of Appeals, see
ante, at 235 and this page, and I would say nothing more on that subject.
2 Under its own reasoning, the majority need not reach the question
whether viewpoint neutrality is required to decide this case. The Univer-
sity program required viewpoint neutrality, and both parties have stipu-
lated that the funds are disbursed accordingly. Stipulation 12, App. 14–

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The first comprises First Amendment and related cases
grouped under the umbrella of academic freedom.3 Such
law might be implicated by the University’s proffered ration-
ale, that the grant scheme funded by the student activity
fee is an integral element in the discharge of its educational
mission. App. 253 (excerpt from Dean of Students Office
Student Organization Handbook noting that the activities
of student groups constitute a “ ‘second curriculum’ ”); id.,
at 41, 42–44 (statement of Associate Dean of Students of
the UW-Madison noting academic importance of funding
scheme); see also ante, at 233. Our understanding of aca-
demic freedom has included not merely liberty from re-
straints on thought, expression, and association in the acad-
emy, but also the idea that universities and schools should
have the freedom to make decisions about how and what to
teach. In Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U. S. 214
(1985), we recognized these related conceptions: “Academic
freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited
exchange of ideas among teachers and students, but also, and
somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decisionmaking by
the academy itself.” Id., at 226, n. 12 (citations omitted).
Some of the opinions in our books emphasize broad concep-
tions of academic freedom that if accepted by the Court
might seem to clothe the University with an immunity to any
challenge to regulations made or obligations imposed in the
discharge of its educational mission. So, in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234 (1957), Justice Frankfurter, concur-
ring in the result and joined by Justice Harlan, explained the
15. If viewpoint neutrality is a sufficient condition, the majority could
uphold the scheme here on that limited ground without deciding whether
it is a necessary one.
3 We have long recognized the constitutional importance of academic
freedom. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 250 (1957)
(plurality opinion); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 487 (1960); Keyishian
v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y., 385 U. S. 589, 603 (1967).

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importance of a university’s ability to define its own mission
by quoting from a statement on the open universities in
South Africa:
“ ‘It is the business of a university to provide that atmos-
phere which is most conducive to speculation, experi-
ment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there
prevail “the four essential freedoms” of a university—to
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach,
what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who
may be admitted to study.’ ” Id., at 263 (citations
omitted).
These broad statements on academic freedom do not dis-
pose of the case here, however. Ewing addressed not the
relationship between academic freedom and First Amend-
ment burdens imposed by a university, but a due process
challenge to a university’s academic decisions, while as to
them the case stopped short of recognizing absolute auton-
omy. Ewing, supra, at 226, and n. 12. And Justice Frank-
furter’s discussion in Sweezy, though not rejected, was not
adopted by the full Court, Sweezy, supra, at 263 (opinion
concurring in result). Our other cases on academic freedom
thus far have dealt with more limited subjects, and do not
compel the conclusion that the objecting university student
is without a First Amendment claim here. 4 While we have
spoken in terms of a wide protection for the academic free-
4 Our university cases have dealt with restrictions imposed from outside
the academy on individual teachers’ speech or associations, id., at 591–592;
Shelton v. Tucker, supra, at 487; Sweezy v. New Hampshire, supra, at 236;
Wieman v. Updegraff, supra, at 184–185, and cases dealing with the right
of teaching institutions to limit expressive freedom of students have been
confined to high schools, Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S.
260, 262 (1988); Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U. S. 675, 677
(1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393
U. S. 503, 504 (1969), whose students and their schools’ relation to them
are different and at least arguably distinguishable from their counterparts
in college education.

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dom and autonomy that bars legislatures (and courts) from
imposing conditions on the spectrum of subjects taught and
viewpoints expressed in college teaching (as the majority
recognizes, ante, at 232), we have never held that universi-
ties lie entirely beyond the reach of students’ First Amend-
ment rights.5 Thus our prior cases do not go so far as to
control the result in this one, and going beyond those cases
would be out of order, simply because the University has
not litigated on grounds of academic freedom. As to that
freedom and university autonomy, then, it is enough to say
that protecting a university’s discretion to shape its educa-
tional mission may prove to be an important consideration
in First Amendment analysis of objections to student fees.
Sweezy, supra, at 262–264 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in re-
sult); Ewing, supra, at 226, n. 12.
The second avenue for addressing Southworth’s claim to a
pro rata refund or the total abolition of the student activity
fee is to see how closely the circumstances here resemble
instances of governmental speech mandates found to require
relief. As a threshold matter, it is plain that this case falls
far afield of those involving compelled or controlled speech,
apart from subsidy schemes. Indirectly transmitting a frac-
tion of a student activity fee to an organization with an offen-
sive message is in no sense equivalent to restricting or modi-
fying the message a student wishes to express. Cf. Hurley
v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Bos-
ton, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, 572–574 (1995). Nor does it require
an individual to bear an offensive statement personally, as in
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 707 (1977), let alone to
affirm a moral or political commitment, as in West Virginia
Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 626–629 (1943). In
each of these cases, the government was imposing far more
directly and offensively on an objecting individual than col-
5 Indeed, acceptance of the most general statement of academic freedom
(as in the South African manifesto quoted by Justice Frankfurter) might
be thought even to sanction student speech codes in public universities.

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lecting the fee that indirectly funds the jumble of other
speakers’ messages in this case.
Next, I agree with the majority that the Abood and Keller
line of cases does not control the remedy here, the situation
of the students being significantly different from that of
union or bar association members. Ante, at 230; see Abood
v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209 (1977); Keller v. State Bar
of Cal., 496 U. S. 1 (1990). First, the relationship between
the fee payer and the ultimately objectionable expression is
far more attenuated. In the union and bar association cases,
an individual was required to join or at least drop money in
the coffers of the very organization promoting messages sub-
ject to objection. Abood, supra, at 211–213, 215; Keller,
supra, at 13–14. The connection between the forced con-
tributor and the ultimate message was as direct as the unme-
diated contribution to the organization doing the speaking.
The student contributor, however, has to fund only a distrib-
uting agency having itself no social, political, or ideological
character and itself engaging (as all parties agree) in no ex-
pression of any distinct message.6 App. 14–15, 34, 39, 41.
Indeed, the disbursements, varying from year to year, are as
likely as not to fund an organization that disputes the very
message an individual student finds exceptionable. Id., at
39. Thus, the clear connection between fee payer and offen-
sive speech that loomed large in our decisions in the union
and bar cases is simply not evident here.
Second, Southworth’s objection has less force than it might
otherwise carry because the challenged fees support a gov-
6 I have noted in other contexts that the act of funding itself may have
a communicative element, see Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ.
of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 892–893, n. 11 (1995) (dissenting opinion); National
Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U. S. 569, 611, n. 6 (1998) (dissenting
opinion), but there is no allegation that such general expression is objec-
tionable here, nor is it clear that such a claim necessarily raises substantial
First Amendment concerns in light of the speech promoting and educa-
tional aspects of this expression. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 92–93
(1976) (per curiam). See also infra this page and 241–243.

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ernment program that aims to broaden public discourse. As
I noted in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
515 U. S. 819, 873–874, and n. 3, 889–891 (1995) (dissenting
opinion), the university fee at issue is a tax.7 The state uni-
versity compels it; it is paid into state accounts; and it is
disbursed under the ultimate authority of the State. Wis.
Stat. § 36.09(5) (1993–1994); App. 9, 18–19. Although the
facts here may not fit neatly under our holdings on govern-
ment speech (and the University has expressly renounced
any such claim),8 ante, at 229, our cases do suggest that
under the First Amendment the government may properly
use its tax revenue to promote general discourse.9 In Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), we rejected
a challenge to a congressional program providing viewpoint
neutral subsidies to all Presidential candidates based in part
on this reasoning:
“[The program] is a congressional effort, not to abridge,
restrict, or censor speech, but rather to use public
money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and
participation in the electoral process, goals vital to a
self-governing people. Thus, [the program] furthers,
not abridges, pertinent First Amendment values.” Id.,
at 92–93 (footnotes omitted).
7 True, one does not have to go to college, but one does not have to own
real estate or receive a dividend.
8 Unlike the majority, I would not hold that the mere fact that the Uni-
versity disclaims speech as its own expression takes it out of the scope of
our jurisprudence on government directed speech. We have never gener-
ally questioned a university’s “spacious discretion” to allocate public funds.
See Rosenberger, supra, at 892 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U. S. 173 (1991), and Regan v. Taxation With Representa-
tion of Wash., 461 U. S. 540 (1983)).
9 Of course, I believe that even a government program that promotes a
broad range of expression is subject to the specific prohibition on govern-
ment funding to promote religion, imposed by the Establishment Clause.
See Rosenberger, supra, at 882 (Souter, J., dissenting).

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And we have recognized the same principle outside of the
sphere of government spending as well. In PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74 (1980), we rejected a
shopping mall owner’s blanket claim that “a private property
owner has a First Amendment right not to be forced by the
State to use his property as a forum for the speech of oth-
ers.” Id., at 85 (footnote omitted). We then upheld the
right of individuals to exercise state-protected rights of ex-
pression on a shopping mall owner’s property, noting among
other things that there was no danger that such a require-
ment would “ ‘dampe[n] the vigor and limi[t] the variety of
public debate.’ ” Id., at 87, 88 (quoting Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241, 257 (1974) (alteration
in original)). The same consideration goes against the fee
payer’s speech objection to the scheme here.
Third, our prior compelled speech and compelled funding
cases are distinguishable on the basis of the legitimacy of
governmental interest. No one disputes the University’s as-
sertion that some educational value is derived from the ac-
tivities supported by the fee, ante, at 232–233; supra, at 237,
whereas there was no governmental interest in mandating
union or bar association support beyond supporting the col-
lective bargaining and professional regulatory functions of
those organizations, see Abood, supra, at 223–224; Keller,
supra, at 13–14. Nor was there any legitimate governmen-
tal interest in requiring the publication or affirmation of
propositions with which the bearer or speaker did not
agree.10 Wooley, 430 U. S., at 716–717; Barnette, 319 U. S.,
at 640–642.
Finally, the weakness of Southworth’s claim is underscored
by its setting within a university, whose students are in-
evitably required to support the expression of personally
10 The legitimacy of the governmental objective here distinguishes the
case in my view from one brought by a university student who objected
to supporting religious evangelism. See Rosenberger, supra, at 868–871
(Souter, J., dissenting).

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offensive viewpoints in ways that cannot be thought consti-
tutionally objectionable unless one is prepared to deny the
University its choice over what to teach. No one disputes
that some fraction of students’ tuition payments may be used
for course offerings that are ideologically offensive to some
students, and for paying professors who say things in the
university forum that are radically at odds with the politics
of particular students. Least of all does anyone claim that
the University is somehow required to offer a spectrum of
courses to satisfy a viewpoint neutrality requirement. See
Rosenberger, supra, at 892–893, and nn. 11–12 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). The University need not provide junior years
abroad in North Korea as well as France, instruct in the
theory of plutocracy as well as democracy, or teach Nietzsche
as well as St. Thomas. Since uses of tuition payments (not
optional for anyone who wishes to stay in college) may fund
offensive speech far more obviously than the student activity
fee does, it is difficult to see how the activity fee could pre-
sent a stronger argument for a refund.
In sum, I see no basis to provide relief from the scheme
being administered, would go no further, and respectfully
concur in the judgment.