Davenport v. United States

1 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2025)
Statement of S
OTOMAYOR, J.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
ANTONIO NATHANIEL DAVENPORT, JR. v.
UNITED STATES
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24–7435. Decided December 8, 2025
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Statement of J
USTICE SOTOMAYOR respecting the denial
of certiorari.
I concur in the denial of certiorari because the petition is
untimely and petitioner’s counsel gave no explanation for
the delay. See this Court’s Rule 13.1; Schacht v. United
States, 398 U. S. 58, 64 (1970) (the deadline to file a petition
in a criminal case may be “relaxed by the Court in the exer-
cise of its discretion when the ends of justice so require”). I
write separately to address a statement made by the Dis-
trict Court when declining to give a jury instruction re-
quested by petitioner.
Petitioner was charged with, as relevant, murder in aid
of racketeering. See 18 U. S. C. §1959(a)(1). To make its
case, the Government had to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that petitioner committed murder under North Car-
olina state law. At trial, the proposed jury instructions at
no point defined what it means to prove an element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Petitioner asked the
District Court to give a jury instruction defining reasonable
doubt for the underlying murder charge drawn from a
North Carolina template jury instruction: “‘For these ele-
ments of murder, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof
that fully satisfies or entirely convinces you of the Defend-
ant’s guilt of murder.’” App. in No. 22–4660 (CA4), p. 1579
(CA4 App.).

2 DAVENPORT v. UNITED STATES
Statement of S
OTOMAYOR, J.
The District Court demurred, stating that federal courts
are “specifically prohibited from giving a definition of rea-
sonable doubt.” Id., at 1493. After further consideration,
the District Court denied the request and explained that
“the federal rule . . . prohibits a court from defining reason-
able doubt over and above what’s included in the instruc-
tions already.” Id., at 1661. As a result, the jury did not
receive an instruction on what reasonable doubt means.
The District Court was mistaken. Federal courts are not
prohibited from defining reasonable doubt for the jury. In
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U. S. 1 (1994), this Court held that
“the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defin-
ing reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter
of course.” Id., at 5. Almost all the Courts of Appeals abide
by this understanding. See, e.g., United States v. Walton,
207 F. 3d 694, 696–697 (CA4 2000) (en banc) (“[T]he well-
established rule of this Circuit is that although the district
court may define reasonable doubt to a jury upon request,
the district court is not required to do so”); see also United
States v. Alt, 58 F. 4th 910, 921, and n. 1 (CA7 2023)
(Kirsch, J., concurring) (explaining that “all” circuits “but
[the Seventh Circuit] give district judges at least some dis-
cretion to” define reasonable doubt). Here, the District
Court should have recognized that it had discretion over
whether to grant petitioner’s request and define reasonable
doubt for the jury.
To be sure, in some cases, it may be wise not to define
reasonable doubt. See Holland v. United States, 348 U. S.
121, 140 (1954) (“‘Attempts to explain the term “reasonable
doubt” do not usually result in making it any clearer to the
minds of the jury’”). In this case, for example, the District
Court expressed concern that giving petitioner’s requested
instruction as to the state-law murder charges, but no other
aspects of the federal offense, might confuse the jury by sug-
gesting they should apply different reasonable-doubt stand-
ards to different elements. CA4 App., 1662–1663.

3 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2025)
Statement of S
OTOMAYOR, J.
Still, there are cases where defining reasonable doubt
may be appropriate. “While judges and lawyers are famil-
iar with the reasonable doubt standard, the words ‘beyond
a reasonable doubt’ are not self-defining for jurors.” Victor,
511 U. S., at 26 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in judgment). “Several studies of juror behavior
have concluded that ‘jurors are often confused about the
meaning of reasonable doubt’ when that term is left unde-
fined.” Ibid. (quoting Note, Defining Reasonable Doubt, 90
Colum. L. Rev. 1716, 1723 (1990)).
In view of the central importance of the reasonable-doubt
standard to criminal procedure, balanced against the poten-
tial for confusion from a reasonable-doubt instruction, dis-
trict courts should weigh the circumstances of each individ-
ual case to decide whether to provide a definition to the
jury. For example, a judge may choose to give an explana-
tion to clear up potential confusion caused by a party’s mis-
statement of the standard. Or a judge may give one if the
jury asks for it. This careful consideration will ensure that
the reasonable-doubt standard retains its “indispensable”
role in “command[ing] the respect and confidence of the
community in applications of the criminal law.” In re Win-
ship, 397 U. S. 358, 364 (1970).