Beck v. United States

1 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2025)
Statement of S
OTOMAYOR, J.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
KARI BECK, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE
OF CAMERON GAYLE BECK,
ET AL. v.
UNITED STATES
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 24–1078. Decided November 24, 2025
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. JUSTICE
GORSUCH would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari.
Statement of J
USTICE SOTOMAYOR respecting the denial
of certiorari.
As my colleague rightly explains, Feres v. United States,
340 U. S. 135 (1950), is a difficult decision to justify. See
post, at 3–5 (T
HOMAS, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari). Since it was decided 75 years ago, Feres’s atextual
expansion of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28
U. S. C. §2671 et seq., has garnered near-universal criti-
cism; has caused significant confusion; and has deprived
servicemembers and their families of redress for serious
harms they have suffered during service to this country.
Post, at 3–5, 7–8. Like in this case, Feres has worked such
harms even in circumstances far removed from the ex-
pected risks of military service. It has, for example, barred
recovery for claims arising from medical malpractice, sex-
ual assault, and (as here) car accidents, even when those
harms occur on U. S. soil, bear little relation to the military
itself, and just as easily could have befallen any American
civilian. See Feres, 340 U. S., at 137; post, at 7–8.
Even so, out of respect for the Court’s rules of stare deci-
sis, and in recognition of the reliance interests that Feres
has generated, I vote to deny this petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari. Beyond the “special justification” that is needed to
overrule any of our precedents, stare decisis has “enhanced

2 BECK v. UNITED STATES
Statement of S
OTOMAYOR, J.
force” on questions of statutory interpretation. Kimble v.
Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 456 (2015).
That is because, unlike with decisions of constitutional di-
mension, “Congress exercises primary authority” over stat-
utory questions “and ‘remains free to alter what we have
done.’” Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U. S.
782, 799 (2014); see Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB
S. A., 563 U. S. 754, 765 (2011) (explaining the “‘ “special
force”’ . . . of stare decisis with regard to questions of statu-
tory interpretation”). This “respect for Congress’s decision
not to intervene promotes the separation of powers by re-
quiring interested parties to resort to the legislative rather
than the judicial process to achieve their policy goals.”
Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U. S. 447, 474–475 (2023) (S
OTOMAYOR,
J., concurring). Moreover, the “justification for statutory
stare decisis is especially strong” when Congress has con-
sidered but “spurned multiple opportunities to reverse” the
Court’s interpretation of a statute. Id., at 475.
That is the case here. Congress has often considered leg-
islation that would overrule or limit the Feres doctrine. See,
e.g., H. R. 1517, 112th Cong., 1st Sess., §4 (2011); S. 1347,
111th Cong., 1st Sess., §2 (2009); H. R. 2684, 107th Cong.,
1st Sess., §1 (2001); S. 347, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
Indeed, Congress most recently did so in 2019, see S. 1790,
116th Cong., 1st Sess., §729 (amendment as passed in the
House), but ultimately decided to provide payments for cer-
tain service-related medical-malpractice claims under the
Military Claims Act rather than the FTCA, see National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, §731, 133
Stat. 1457–1460, 10 U. S. C. §2733a.
Congress, therefore, is “undoubtedly aware of ” the prob-
lems posed by Feres and “can change [Feres] if it likes.” Al-
len v. Milligan, 599 U. S. 1, 39 (2023). “[U]ntil and unless
it does, statutory stare decisis counsels our staying the
course.” Ibid. I write, however, to underscore that this im-
portant issue deserves further congressional attention,

3 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2025)
Statement of S
OTOMAYOR, J.
without which Feres will continue to produce deeply unfair
results like the one in this case and the others discussed in
J
USTICE THOMAS’s dissenting opinion. See post, at 7–8.

1 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2025)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
KARI BECK, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE
OF CAMERON GAYLE BECK,
ET AL. v.
UNITED STATES
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 24–1078. Decided November 24, 2025
JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting from denial of certiorari.
Air Force Staff Sergeant Cameron Beck was struck and
killed by a civilian Government employee driving a Govern-
ment vehicle. His surviving wife sued the Government un-
der the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §2671 et seq.,
which waives the Government’s immunity for certain tort
claims. The lower courts dismissed her claim based on an
expansive reading of the Feres doctrine, a “judicially cre-
ated” FTCA exception for injuries incident to military ser-
vice. Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431
U. S. 666, 674 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Feres
v. United States, 340 U. S. 135 (1950)). I have long called
for overruling Feres, which lacks any basis in the FTCA’s
text. But we did not need to overrule Feres to get this case
right because Staff Sergeant Beck was not killed incident
to military service at all. He was killed in Missouri while
off duty and going home to eat lunch with his family.
We should have granted certiorari. Doing so would have
provided clarity about Feres to lower courts that have long
asked for it. It would have resolved a Circuit split over
whether, in applying Feres, courts should give special con-
sideration to circumstances that implicate sensitive mili-
tary affairs. And it would have allowed Staff Sergeant
Beck’s widow to recover for her husband’s wrongful death
consistent with both the FTCA and our precedent. I re-
spectfully dissent from the denial of certiorari.

2 BECK v. UNITED STATES
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
I
On April 15, 2021, Air Force Staff Sergeant Cameron
Beck was off duty at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri
and riding his motorcycle home for lunch with his family.
A civilian federal employee driving a Government-issued
van was distracted on her phone and turned in front of
Beck. They collided, and Beck died at the scene. She was
charged with criminal negligence. The driver pleaded
guilty and later said that the accident was “‘100 percent’”
her fault. Record in No. 4:23–cv–00255 (WD Mo.), ECF Doc.
23–1, p. 2.
Kari Beck, for herself and her son, sued the driver’s em-
ployer for the wrongful death of her husband in what ordi-
narily would have been an open-and-shut wrongful-death
case. But in this case, the employer was the United States,
which generally enjoys sovereign immunity from suit.
Eighty years ago, Congress recognized this problem and ex-
pressly waived sovereign immunity in cases like this. The
FTCA provides that the “United States shall be liable” for
tort claims “in the same manner and to the same extent as
a private individual under like circumstances,” including in
cases where “death was caused.” 28 U. S. C. §2674.
The Government moved to dismiss Mrs. Beck’s wrongful-
death suit on the ground that the United States nonetheless
was entitled to sovereign immunity. The District Court
granted the Government’s motion, and the Eighth Circuit
affirmed. 125 F. 4th 887, 889 (2025). The dismissal relied
on this Court’s decision in Feres, which interpreted the
FTCA to immunize the Government for injuries “incident to
military service.” 340 U. S., at 144. Mrs. Beck petitioned
for review in this Court. Today, the Court denies her peti-
tion, so Mrs. Beck will recover nothing in tort for her hus-
band’s wrongful death.

3 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2025)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
II
A
The FTCA’s text does not compel the denial of relief to
Mrs. Beck. The FTCA makes the United States liable in
tort “in the same manner and to the same extent as a pri-
vate individual under like circumstances.” §2674. The
FTCA includes a military exception, but it applies only to
claims arising out of “combatant activities . . . during time
of war.” §2680(j). It is inconceivable that driving home for
lunch with one’s family while off duty can be characterized
as a wartime combatant activity. So, the exception does not
apply in this case.
Instead, the lower courts dismissed Mrs. Beck’s suit be-
cause of a broader exception that this Court created in
Feres. According to Feres, the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign
immunity does not apply in any cases “where the injuries
arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to [mili-
tary] service,” regardless of whether they arise out of war-
time combatant activities. 340 U. S., at 146.
Feres did not base this doctrine on the text of the FTCA.
It acknowledged that the FTCA’s “exceptions might . . . im-
ply inclusion of claims” involving servicemen, id., at 138,
because it excepts claims arising out of “combatant activi-
ties . . . during time of war,” but not peacetime, §2680(j). It
noted that earlier proposed versions of the FTCA almost in-
variably “expressly denied recovery to members of the
armed forces; but the [FTCA] made no exception.” Id., at
139. And it admitted that the FTCA “contemplate[s] that
the Government will sometimes respond for negligence of
military personnel,” id., at 138, because it contemplates
suits premised on the actions of “members of the military
or naval forces” who “ac[t] in [the] line of duty,” §2671.
The Government also recognized that the text posed a
problem for its view. Shortly before Feres, it “conceded”
that the FTCA’s “language is sufficiently broad to cover”
“claims arising out of the injury or death of members of the

4 BECK v. UNITED STATES
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
armed forces . . . , and would doubtless do so in the absence
of ” extratextual considerations. Brief for United States in
Brooks v. United States, O. T. 1948, No. 388 etc., p. 10 (em-
phasis added). And in Feres itself, the Government urged
the Court to overlook the FTCA’s “broad language” and in-
stead base its decision on “consequences.” Brief for United
States in United States v. Griggs, O. T. 1950, No. 31, p. 19;
see Feres, 340 U. S., at 136–138. In other words, if the en-
acted text controlled, there would be no Feres doctrine ex-
cepting injuries incident to service.
Over time, the Court has offered shifting policy rationales
for the Feres doctrine. See Carter v. United States, 604 U. S.
___, ___ (2025) (T
HOMAS, J., dissenting from denial of certi-
orari) (slip op., at 3–4). In its last word on Feres more than
38 years ago, the Court settled on three. See United States
v. Johnson, 481 U. S. 681, 688–691 (1987). First, “[t]he re-
lationship between the Government and members of its
armed forces is distinctively federal in character.” Id., at
689 (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in origi-
nal). Second, the availability of “statutory disability and
death benefits” counsels against tort relief. Ibid. And third,
suits falling within the exception “are the type[s] of claims
that, if generally permitted, would involve the judiciary in
sensitive military affairs at the expense of military disci-
pline and effectiveness.” Id., at 690 (internal quotation
marks omitted; alteration in original). The Government
took the position that this third rationale is “the primary
basis for the Feres doctrine.” Brief for United States in
United States v. Johnson, O. T. 1986, No. 85–2039, p. 6
(Johnson Brief ).
The Feres doctrine has been “almost universally con-
demned by judges and scholars.” Carter, 604 U. S., at ___
(opinion of T
HOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 5). Its three policy ra-
tionales do not make sense even on their own terms. Id., at
___ (slip op., at 5–8). I have therefore long called for us to
revisit Feres. See Clendening v. United States, 598 U. S.

5 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2025)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
___ (2022) (THOMAS, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari); Doe v. United States, 593 U. S. ___ (2021) (same);
Daniel v. United States, 587 U. S. 1020 (2019) (same);
Lanus v. United States, 570 U. S. 932 (2013) (same). I con-
tinue to believe that we should.
B
But we did not have to overrule Feres to grant certiorari
and reverse here. Applying the doctrine’s existing limits,
Staff Sergeant Beck’s death did not “arise out of . . . ac-
tivit[ies] incident to” his military service, so Feres did not
bar Mrs. Beck’s suit. 340 U. S., at 146. The Court of Ap-
peals acknowledged that Staff Sergeant Beck was “killed
during off-duty hours” and that his death “arose out of non-
military activities.” 125 F. 4th, at 891. Feres itself distin-
guished cases in which the injured serviceman was “under
compulsion of no orders or duty” and was “on no military
mission.” 340 U. S., at 146. Beck was not ordered on a mil-
itary mission to go home for lunch with his family. So Mrs.
Beck should have prevailed under Feres.
If Feres itself were not enough, the Court of Appeals’ con-
clusion also conflicts with another of this Court’s prece-
dents. In Brooks v. United States, 337 U. S. 49, 50 (1949),
decided a year before Feres, an off-duty serviceman driving
with his family was struck and killed by a civilian Govern-
ment employee driving a Government truck. This Court
held that the suit could proceed under the FTCA. Id., at 51.
Feres did not overrule Brooks. On the contrary, they both
asked whether the injury was “incident” to military service.
See Brooks, 337 U. S., at 52; Feres, 340 U. S., at 146. If the
Court does not want to overrule its precedents in this area,
it should at least be willing to enforce them.*
——————
*Therefore, although I agree with J
USTICE SOTOMAYOR that Feres “is a
difficult decision to justify,” I respectfully disagree that “respect for the
Court’s rules of stare decisis” is a reason to deny the petition. See supra,

6 BECK v. UNITED STATES
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
Feres’s policy rationales and this Court’s later Feres prec-
edents do not support immunizing the Government in this
case either. This case does not implicate “the primary basis
for the Feres doctrine”: “bar[ring] suits that ‘would involve
the judiciary in sensitive military affairs.’” Johnson Brief
6. This Court has said that Feres is “best explained by the
peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his supe-
riors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on disci-
pline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits . . .
were allowed for . . . negligent acts committed in the course
of military duty.” United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S. 52, 57
(1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). For that reason,
“[t]he rule enunciated in Feres allows suit in most cases
having no likely effect on military discipline and effective-
ness.” Johnson Brief 20. This is one such case: Mrs. Beck’s
allegation that a civilian governmental employee acci-
dentally crashed into her husband does not “cal[l] into ques-
tion basic choices about the discipline, supervision, and con-
trol of a serviceman.” Shearer, 473 U. S., at 58.
The Court of Appeals placed significant emphasis on facts
that should not establish immunity. It “pu[t] no special
weight on whether resolution would involve the judiciary in
sensitive military affairs” or scrutinize “military decision-
making.” 125 F. 4th, at 891. Instead, it emphasized that
Staff Sergeant “Beck was injured on-Base, while on active
duty, and subject to immediate recall.” Ibid. But this Court
has explained that “the situs of the [injury] is not nearly as
important as whether the suit requires the civilian court to
second-guess military decisions, and whether the suit
might impair essential military discipline.” Shearer, 473
U. S., at 57 (citation omitted). And, on that point, the Court
of Appeals did not deny that “resolution of this ordinary
negligent-driving action would not require a court to
——————
at __ (statement of Sotomayor, J.). The Court could have reversed here
without overruling Feres or any other decision of this Court.

7 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2025)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
scrutinize or second guess military decision-making.” 125
F. 4th, at 891. Further, the Court of Appeals emphasized
that “Plaintiffs were entitled to military benefits.” Ibid.
But this Court has long held that “[p]rovisions in other stat-
utes for disability payments to servicemen, and gratuity
payments to their survivors, indicate no purpose to forbid
tort actions under the Tort Claims Act” when it is otherwise
evident that the injuries were not “incident to . . . service.”
Brooks, 337 U. S., at 52–53 (citation omitted).
C
Lower courts are asking us for guidance on the Feres doc-
trine. They “have reached the unhappy conclusion that the
cases applying the Feres doctrine are irreconcilable.” Costo
v. United States, 248 F. 3d 863, 867 (CA9 2001). They have
told us that the Feres doctrine is now “an extremely con-
fused and confusing area of law.” Taber v. Maine, 67 F. 3d
1029, 1038 (CA2 1995); see also Ortiz v. United States, 786
F. 3d 817, 822 (CA10 2015) (Tymkovich, J.) (“With all of this
confusion and lack of uniform standards, it comes as no sur-
prise that the Feres doctrine . . . has received steady disap-
proval from the Supreme Court on down”). And they have
called its outcomes “counter-intuitive,” Richards v. United
States, 176 F. 3d 652, 657 (CA3 1999), “unjust[,] and unwar-
ranted,” Cutshall v. United States, 75 F. 3d 426, 429 (CA8
1996). As I have explained, it is unsurprising that, with its
atextual roots and vague rationales, “[t]he Feres doctrine
cannot be reduced to a few bright-line rules” and has thus
left courts in disarray. Shearer, 473 U. S., at 57; see also
Carter, 604 U. S., at ___ (opinion of T
HOMAS, J.) (slip op., at
9) (collecting decisions).
The confusion in the lower courts has created a “split on
whether and how to take into account the three policy jus-
tifications . . . that this Court [has] articulated” for the
Feres doctrine. Carter, 604 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 11); see
Ortiz, 786 F. 3d, at 820–823. The Fourth and Ninth

8 BECK v. UNITED STATES
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
Circuits “focus primarily” on whether the suit “would call
into question military discipline and decisionmaking.”
Carter, 604 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 11) (citing Clendening,
19 F. 4th, at 427; Ritchie v. United States, 733 F. 3d 871,
874–875 (CA9 2013); internal quotation marks omitted)).
By contrast, the Eighth Circuit in Mrs. Beck’s case put “no
special weight on whether resolution would involve the ju-
diciary in sensitive military affairs.” 125 F. 4th, at 891.
Other circuits, meanwhile, “do not consider ‘the presence or
absence of the [three] Feres rationales’ at all.” Carter, 604
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 11) (alteration in original) (citing
Tootle v. USDB Commandant, 390 F. 3d 1280, 1282 (CA10
2004)).
“These differing approaches have led to divergent out-
comes in factually similar cases.” 604 U. S., at ___ (slip op.,
at 12). The Circuits have split on whether “sexual assault
by another soldier” falls within the Feres doctrine. Ibid.
(citing Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F. 3d 36, 49–50 (CA2 2017)
(yes); Spletstoser v. Hyten, 44 F. 4th 938, 958–959 (CA9
2022) (no)). They have split on whether “injuries arising
during recreational activities with military-owned equip-
ment” fall within the Feres doctrine. 604 U. S., at ___ (slip
op., at 12) (citing Costo, 248 F. 3d, at 864 (yes); Regan v.
Starcraft Marine, LLC, 524 F. 3d 627, 645–646 (CA5 2008)
(no)). And, after the Eighth Circuit’s application of Feres
here, they have split on whether a plaintiff who is injured
in an off-duty, on-base car crash may sue. See Schoenfeld
v. Quamme, 492 F. 3d 1016, 1017–1018, 1023–1026 (CA9
2007) (yes); 125 F. 4th, at 890–891 (no).
For more than 38 years, this Court has given no clarity to
a doctrine it created. “The principal purpose of this Court’s
exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction is to clarify the law.”
Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U. S. 868, 902 (2009)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). In other contexts, when lower
courts report confusion and are in disarray, this Court
grants certiorari to “resolve the circuits’ disagreement and

Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2025) 9
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
address our lower court colleagues’ calls for clarification.”
Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, 606 U. S.
357, 367 (2025). We should have done so in this case. I
respectfully dissent from the denial of certiorari.