Hutson v. United States

1 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2025)
A
LITO, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
SUSAN HUTSON v. UNITED STATES, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 24–1022. Decided November 17, 2025
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. JUSTICE
GORSUCH would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari.
J
USTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, dis-
senting from the denial of certiorari.
I would have granted certiorari to terminate the
longstanding and unlawful prison-building order at the cen-
ter of this case. In 2019, the District Court ordered New
Orleans to construct a new facility for inmates with mental-
health needs. Yet the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PLRA) specifically states that “[n]othing in this section
shall be construed to authorize the courts, in exercising
their remedial powers, to order the construction of prisons.”
18 U. S. C. §3626(a)(1)(C). If a court issued an injunction
in violation of the PLRA, then a party “shall be entitled to
the immediate termination of any prospective relief.”
§3626(b)(2); see Miller v. French, 530 U. S. 327, 331 (2000).
Thus, because the prison-building injunction was illegal
from the beginning, the courts below should have termi-
nated it.
The lower courts further erred by failing to terminate the
injunction for a second, independent reason. Even if an in-
junction complied with the PLRA when it was issued, the
injunction “shall be terminable . . . 2 years after the date
the court granted or approved the prospective relief.”
§3626(b)(1)(A)(i). Here, the New Orleans sheriff filed a
“ ‘motion to terminate all orders regarding the construction
of the Phase III jail’” four years after the court granted the
injunction. App. to Pet. for Cert. 81a. At that point, the

2 HUTSON v. UNITED STATES
A
LITO, J., dissenting
District Court could maintain the injunction only if it found
the injunction “remains necessary to correct a current and
ongoing violation,” “extends no further than necessary,”
and “is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to
correct the violation.” §3626(b)(3). There is a Circuit split
about which party bears the burden at this stage of the lit-
igation.* But Fifth Circuit precedent places the burden on
the party supporting the injunction—not the party seeking
termination. Guajardo v. Texas Dept. of Crim. Justice, 363
F. 3d 392, 395–396 (2004) (per curiam). Here, the lower
courts did not hold the Government or private plaintiffs to
their burden. Rather, the courts below denied the sheriff ’s
termination motion because it provided no “basis for the
district court to grant it.” Anderson v. Hutson, 114 F. 4th
408, 420 (CA5 2024). That gets the inquiry backwards. It
was not the sheriff ’s burden to provide a basis for termina-
tion; it was the opposing parties’ burden to show a basis for
maintaining the injunction.
In short, the Fifth Circuit erroneously resolved an im-
portant issue of federal law on which there is a Circuit split.
This case cried out for our review. By failing to intervene,
we leave New Orleans to pay for the Fifth Circuit’s serious
errors. I respectfully dissent.
——————
*Compare Balla v. Idaho, 29 F. 4th 1019, 1025 (CA9 2022) (“ ‘[T]he
burden is on the movant to demonstrate that there are no ongoing con-
stitutional violations, that the relief ordered exceeds what is necessary
to correct an ongoing constitutional violation, or both’ ”), with Laaman v.
Warden, N. H. State Prison, 238 F. 3d 14, 20 (CA1 2001) (“[T]he burden
remains on the plaintiffs to show that such violations persist”).