Snope v. Brown

1 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
Statement of K
AVANAUGH, J.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
DAVID SNOPE, ET AL. v. ANTHONY G. BROWN, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
MARYLAND,
ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24–203. Decided June 2, 2025
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. JUSTICE
ALITO and JUSTICE GORSUCH would grant the petition for a
writ of certiorari.
Statement of J
USTICE KAVANAUGH respecting the denial
of certiorari.
In District of Columbia v. Heller, this Court ruled that
the Second Amendment must be interpreted in light of
constitutional text, history, and tradition. 554 U. S. 570,
576–628 (2008). The Court further determined that the
Second Amendment protects those weapons that are in
“common use” by law-abiding citizens. Id., at 624, 627.
Because handguns are in common use by law-abiding
citizens, the Court held that the District of Columbia’s ban
on handguns violated the Second Amendment. Id., at 628–
629. The Court’s later Second Amendment decisions in
Bruen and Rahimi did not disturb the historically based
“common use” test with respect to the possession of
particular weapons. See New York State Rifle & Pistol
Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S. 1, 47 (2022); see also United
States v. Rahimi, 602 U. S. 680, 735–736 (2024)
(K
AVANAUGH, J., concurring); post, at 1–6 (THOMAS, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
This case primarily concerns Maryland’s ban on the
AR–15, a semi-automatic rifle. Americans today possess an
estimated 20 to 30 million AR–15s. And AR–15s are legal
in 41 of the 50 States, meaning that the States such as

2 SNOPE v. BROWN
Statement of K
AVANAUGH, J.
Maryland that prohibit AR–15s are something of an outlier.
See Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600, 612 (1994)
(stating that AR–15s “traditionally have been widely
accepted as lawful possessions”).
Given that millions of Americans own AR–15s and that a
significant majority of the States allow possession of those
rifles, petitioners have a strong argument that AR–15s are
in “common use” by law-abiding citizens and therefore are
protected by the Second Amendment under Heller. See
Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F. 3d 1244, 1286–1288
(CADC 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). If so, then the
Fourth Circuit would have erred by holding that
Maryland’s ban on AR–15s complies with the Second
Amendment.
Under this Court’s Second Amendment precedents,
moreover, it can be analytically difficult to distinguish the
AR–15s at issue here from the handguns at issue in Heller.
AR–15s are semi-automatic, but so too are most handguns.
(Semi-automatic handguns and rifles are distinct from
automatic firearms such as the M–16 automatic rifle used
by the military.) Law-abiding citizens use both AR–15s and
handguns for a variety of lawful purposes, including self-
defense in the home. For their part, criminals use both
AR–15s and handguns, as well as a variety of other lawful
weapons and products, in unlawful ways that threaten
public safety. But handguns can be more easily carried and
concealed than rifles, and handguns—not rifles—are used
in the vast majority of murders and other violent crimes
that individuals commit with guns in America.
In short, under this Court’s precedents, the Fourth
Circuit’s decision is questionable. Although the Court
today denies certiorari, a denial of certiorari does not mean
that the Court agrees with a lower-court decision or that
the issue is not worthy of review. The AR–15 issue was
recently decided by the First Circuit and is currently being
considered by several other Courts of Appeals. See Capen

3 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
Statement of K
AVANAUGH, J.
v. Campbell, 134 F. 4th 660 (CA1 2025); see also, e.g.,
National Assn. for Gun Rights v. Lamont, 685 F. Supp. 3d
63 (Conn. 2023), appeal pending, No. 23–1162 (CA2);
Association of N. J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Platkin, 742
F. Supp. 3d 421 (NJ 2024), appeal pending, No. 24–2415
(CA3); Viramontes v. County of Cook, No. 1:21–cv–4595 (ND
Ill., Mar. 1, 2024), appeal pending, No. 24–1437 (CA7);
Miller v. Bonta, 699 F. Supp. 3d 956 (SD Cal. 2023), appeal
pending, No. 23–2979 (CA9). Opinions from other Courts
of Appeals should assist this Court’s ultimate
decisionmaking on the AR–15 issue. Additional petitions
for certiorari will likely be before this Court shortly and, in
my view, this Court should and presumably will address the
AR–15 issue soon, in the next Term or two.

1 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
DAVID SNOPE, ET AL. v. ANTHONY G. BROWN, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
MARYLAND,
ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24–203. Decided June 2, 2025
JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting from the denial of certiorari.
The State of Maryland prohibits ownership of AR–15s,
the most popular civilian rifle in America. Md. Crim. Law
Code Ann. §4–303(a)(2) (2025). This petition presents the
question whether this ban is consistent with the Second
Amendment. The Fourth Circuit held that it is, reasoning
that AR–15s are not “arms” protected by the Second
Amendment. Bianchi v. Brown, 111 F. 4th 438, 448 (2024)
(en banc). I would grant certiorari to review this surprising
conclusion.
I
The Second Amendment guarantees “the right of the peo-
ple to keep and bear Arms.” When raising a Second Amend-
ment challenge, an individual has the initial burden of
showing that “the Second Amendment’s plain text covers
[his] conduct.” New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v.
Bruen, 597 U. S. 1, 17 (2022). Once a challenger makes that
showing, “the Constitution presumptively protects [his]
conduct,” and the burden shifts to the government to
“demonstrate that [its] regulation is consistent with this
Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Ibid. If
the government fails to make that showing, the restriction
must be deemed unconstitutional. Ibid.
It is difficult to see how Maryland’s categorical prohibi-
tion on AR–15s passes muster under this framework. To

2 SNOPE v. BROWN
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
start, AR–15s are clearly “Arms” under the Second Amend-
ment’s plain text. In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U. S. 570 (2008), we held that the term “Arms” in this con-
text covers all “‘[w]eapons of offence, or armour of defence.’ ”
Id., at 581; see also ibid. (explaining that “Arms” include
“ ‘any thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into
his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another’”).
Thus, “the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all
instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that
were not in existence at the time of the founding.” Id., at
582; accord, United States v. Rahimi, 602 U. S. 680, 691
(2024); Bruen, 597 U. S., at 28; Caetano v. Massachusetts,
577 U. S. 411 (2016) (per curiam). AR–15s fall squarely
within this category.
Because AR–15s are “Arms,” the burden shifts to Mary-
land to show that banning AR–15s is “consistent with this
Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Bruen,
597 U. S., at 17. But, I am not aware of any “historical reg-
ulation” that could serve as “a proper analogue” to Mary-
land’s ban. Id., at 28–29.
Maryland invokes the “historical tradition of prohibiting
the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’” Heller,
554 U. S., at 627 (citing 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on
the Laws of England 148–149 (1769)); see Brief in Opposi-
tion 22–23. Under this tradition, however, “[a] weapon may
not be banned unless it is both dangerous and unusual.”
Caetano, 577 U. S., at 417 (A
LITO, J., concurring in judg-
ment). “[W]eapons ‘in common use’ today for self-defense”
and other lawful purposes remain fully protected. Bruen,
597 U. S., at 32 (quoting Heller, 554 U. S., at 627). And,
AR–15s appear to fit neatly within that category of pro-
tected arms. Tens of millions of Americans own AR–15s,
and the “overwhelming majority” of them “do so for lawful
purposes, including self-defense and target shooting.”
Friedman v. Highland Park, 577 U. S. 1039, 1042 (2015)
(T
HOMAS, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of

3 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
certiorari); accord, ante, at 1–2 (KAVANAUGH, J., statement
respecting denial of certiorari); Harrel v. Raoul, 603 U. S.
___, ___ (2024) (T
HOMAS, J., statement respecting denial of
certiorari) (slip op., at 2). “[A] prohibition of an entire class
of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American soci-
ety for th[ese] lawful purpose[s]” falls outside the govern-
ment’s power. Heller, 554 U. S., at 628.
II
Despite the foregoing, the Fourth Circuit upheld Mary-
land’s ban on the ground that AR–15s are not “‘constitu-
tionally protected arms’” under the plain text of the Second
Amendment. 111 F. 4th, at 448. The court acknowledged
that, “[a]t first blush, it may appear that [AR–15s] fit com-
fortably within the term ‘arms.’” Id., at 447. But, the court
insisted, more is required. Because the Second Amendment
“must be interpreted against its historical and legal back-
drop,” the Fourth Circuit held that the challengers also had
to show that “the right to possess” AR–15s falls within “the
historical scope of the right to keep and bear arms.” Id., at
448. The challengers could not make this showing, in the
court’s view, because the Second Amendment does not pro-
tect the right to own “‘dangerous and unusual weapons,’”
including AR–15s. Id., at 450, 454–459.
This reasoning is dubious at least twice over. The Fourth
Circuit placed too high a burden on the challengers to show
that the Second Amendment presumptively protected their
conduct. And, its determination that AR–15s are danger-
ous and unusual does not withstand scrutiny.
A
The Fourth Circuit erred by requiring the challengers to
prove that the Second Amendment protects their right to
own AR–15s—or, in the terms of our Second Amendment
jurisprudence, that their conduct falls outside the historical
exceptions to the right to keep and bear arms. A challenger

4 SNOPE v. BROWN
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
need only show that “the plain text” of the Second Amend-
ment covers his conduct. Bruen, 597 U. S., at 32. This bur-
den is met if the law at issue “regulates” Americans’ “arms-
bearing conduct.” Rahimi, 602 U. S., at 691. Once the chal-
lenger makes this initial showing, it is the government’s
burden to show that a historic limit on the right to bear
arms nevertheless justifies its regulation. The Fourth Cir-
cuit placed the burden of producing historical evidence on
the wrong party.
Our precedents make plain the Fourth Circuit’s error. In
Bruen, we had “little difficulty” determining that “the plain
text of the Second Amendment” encompasses “carrying
handguns publicly for self-defense.” 597 U. S., at 32. We
considered the historical limits on the right to bear arms
only to determine whether the State had met its burden of
proving that its regulation was historically justified. See
id., at 34–70. Likewise, in Rahimi, the Court found it self-
evident that a law prohibiting individuals subject to domes-
tic-violence restraining orders from possessing firearms
“regulates arms-bearing conduct.” 602 U. S., at 691, 693.
The Court again considered historical limits only after
shifting the burden of proof to the Government. See id., at
693–702.
The Fourth Circuit based its contrary approach on an
analogy to the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment,
but that analogy only underscores its error. The court rea-
soned that historical evidence is necessary to prevent an
overbroad understanding of the Second Amendment, just as
the Free Speech Clause excludes historically unprotected
categories of speech such as “libel, incitement, true threats,
fighting words, or falsely shouting fire in a crowded thea-
ter.” 111 F. 4th, at 447. As we explained in Bruen, how-
ever, “‘the Government bears the burden of proving the con-
stitutionality’” of speech restrictions. 597 U. S., at 24
(emphasis added). “[T]hat burden includes showing
whether the expressive conduct falls outside of the category

5 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
of protected speech” by “point[ing] to historical evidence
about the reach of the First Amendment’s protections.” Id.,
at 24–25 (emphasis deleted). Treating the Second Amend-
ment “like . . . other constitutional provisions,” 111 F. 4th,
at 448, we have similarly placed the burden on the govern-
ment to show that a regulation of arms-bearing conduct
falls outside the Second Amendment’s protection.
Under the plain text of the Second Amendment, the chal-
lengers’ only burden is to show that AR–15s are bearable
“Arms”—i.e., “‘[w]eapons of offence.’” Heller, 554 U. S., at
581. By any measure, they are.
B
The Fourth Circuit separately erred in determining that
AR–15s fall within the historic exception for dangerous and
unusual weapons. “A weapon may not be banned” under
this principle “unless it is both dangerous and unusual.”
Caetano, 577 U. S., at 417 (opinion of A
LITO, J.). Weapons
“ ‘in common use’ today for self-defense” are fully protected.
Bruen, 597 U. S., at 32 (quoting Heller, 554 U. S., at 627).
The Fourth Circuit nevertheless eschewed any inquiry into
the commonality of AR–15s and the purposes for which they
are used, which it dismissed as an “ill-conceived popularity
test.” 111 F. 4th, at 460. Instead, the court performed its
own independent investigation of AR–15s’ “utility for self-
defense,” examining their “military origin,” “firepower,”
and “muzzle velocity,” among other features. Id., at 454–
459.
Our Constitution allows the American people—not the
government—to decide which weapons are useful for self-
defense. “A constitutional guarantee subject to future
judges’ assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional
guarantee at all.” Heller, 554 U. S., at 634. In line with
that principle, and with the tradition of prohibiting only
dangerous and unusual weapons, we have never relied on
our own assessment of how useful an arm is for self-defense

6 SNOPE v. BROWN
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
before deeming it protected. In Heller, we found handguns
protected because that “class of ‘arms’ . . . is overwhelm-
ingly chosen by American society for th[e] lawful purpose”
of “self-defense.” Id., at 628. In Caetano, we recognized
that stun guns were protected arms solely because they
were not “‘unusual,’” without addressing the state court’s
holding that stun guns were “‘dangerous per se at common
law.’” 577 U. S., at 412; accord, id., at 417 (opinion of
A
LITO, J.); Bruen, 597 U. S., at 28. And, in Bruen, we again
found “handguns” protected solely because they are “‘in
common use’ today for self-defense,” without inquiring
whether they are in fact useful for that purpose. Id., at 32.
In response, the Fourth Circuit’s “[m]ost importan[t]” ob-
jection to a “common use inquiry” was that it would “lea[d]
to absurd consequences,” such as a constitutional right to
own a “bazooka,” “ricin pellet-firing umbrella gun,” or even
a “W54 nuclear warhead” if such weapons become suffi-
ciently “popular.” 111 F. 4th, at 460 (internal quotation
marks omitted). This reasoning illustrates why the scope
of the right to bear arms cannot turn on judicial speculation
about the American people’s self-defense needs. Even if
some nuclear warheads are small enough for an individual
to carry, no reasonable person would think to use one to de-
fend himself. Still less could nuclear warheads ever become
a common means of self-defense. To fend off the fantastical
threat of Americans lobbing nuclear warheads at one an-
other, the Fourth Circuit has allowed the very real threat
of the government depriving Americans of the rifle that
they most favor for protecting themselves and their fami-
lies. Looking to the standards set “by American society” ra-
ther than our judicial colleagues, Heller, 554 U. S., at 628,
I cannot see how AR–15s fall outside the Second Amend-
ment’s protection.*
——————
* TheFourth Circuit also purported to hold in the alternative that, as-
suming that AR–15s are protected arms, banning them is consistent with

7 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
III
I would not wait to decide whether the government can
ban the most popular rifle in America. That question is of
critical importance to tens of millions of law-abiding AR–15
owners throughout the country. We have avoided deciding
it for a full decade. See Harrel, 603 U. S. ___; Friedman,
577 U. S. 1039. And, further percolation is of little value
when lower courts in the jurisdictions that ban AR–15s ap-
pear bent on distorting this Court’s Second Amendment
precedents. See Harrel, 603 U. S., at ___ (opinion of
T
HOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 2) (discussing the Seventh Circuit’s
parallel conclusion that AR–15s do “not even fall within the
scope of the Arms referred to by the Second Amendment”).
I doubt we would sit idly by if lower courts were to so sub-
vert our precedents involving any other constitutional
right. Until we are vigilant in enforcing it, the right to bear
arms will remain “a second-class right.” McDonald v. Chi-
cago, 561 U. S. 742, 780 (2010) (plurality opinion).
The constitutional status of AR–15s is all the more ur-
gent after this Court’s decision in Bondi v. VanDerStok, 604
U. S. ___ (2025). Recently amended regulations of the Bu-
reau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)
provide that a “firearm” under the Gun Control Act includes
——————
a national tradition of responding to the “threats posed by excessively
harmful arms with responsive and proportional legislation.” 111 F. 4th,
at 464. This holding, however, is not genuinely independent of its mis-
guided common-use analysis. To support the existence of this tradition,
the Fourth Circuit identified several 19th-century laws prohibiting cer-
tain easily concealable weapons like pistols, dirks, sword canes, and
Bowie knives. See id., at 466–467. But, the court nowhere attempted to
explain why these laws were not simply instances of States prohibiting
dangerous and unusual weapons not in common use for self-defense. As
the dissent noted, when these laws were challenged, 19th-century courts
evaluated them based on “whether the regulated weapon was in common
use for lawful purposes.” See id., at 510–513, 533–534 (opinion of Rich-
ardson, J.).

8 SNOPE v. BROWN
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
objects that “may readily be completed, assembled, re-
stored, or otherwise converted to” a working firearm. 27
CFR §478.11 (2023). In VanDerStok, this Court refused to
hold that definition unlawful, reasoning that an “artifact
noun”—that is, a “word for a thing created by humans”—
may “refer to unfinished objects,” and thus that weapon-
parts kits are as regulable as the firearms they might even-
tually become. 604 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10). But,
“ ‘every single AR–15 can be converted to a machinegun us-
ing cheap, flimsy pieces of metal—including coat hangers.’”
Id., at ___ (T
HOMAS, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 13) (quoting
VanDerStok v. Garland, 86 F. 4th 179, 208 (CA5 2023)
(Oldham, J., concurring)). Thus, on the Court’s logic, it
seems that ATF could at any time declare AR–15s to be ma-
chineguns prohibited by federal law. 604 U. S., at ___
(opinion of T
HOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 13) (citing 26 U. S. C.
§§5861, 5871). Until we resolve whether the Second
Amendment forecloses that possibility, law-abiding AR–15
owners must rely on the goodwill of a federal agency to re-
tain their means of self-defense. That is “no constitutional
guarantee at all.” Heller, 554 U. S., at 634. I respectfully
dissent.