Hittle v. City of Stockton

1 Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
RONALD HITTLE v. CITY OF STOCKTON,
CALIFORNIA,
ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 24–427. Decided March 10, 2025
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
J
USTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins,
dissenting from the denial of certiorari.
To prevail on a Title VII disparate-treatment claim, a
plaintiff must prove that the defendant intentionally dis-
criminated against him because of a protected trait. See 42
U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1). In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), this Court announced a three-
part burden-shifting framework to help “bring the litigants
and the court expeditiously and fairly to this ultimate ques-
tion” when the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence.
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248,
253 (1981). Despite seemingly good intentions, this “judge-
created doctrine has been widely criticized for its ineffi-
ciency and unfairness.” Nall v. BNSF R. Co., 917 F. 3d 335,
351 (CA5 2019) (Costa, J., specially concurring). The doc-
trine has “spawn[ed] enormous confusion” in the lower
courts. Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F. 3d 490,
494 (CADC 2008) (majority opinion of Kavanaugh, J.). And,
at least some of its applications at summary judgment
strike me as difficult to square with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56. See Tynes v. Florida Dept. of Juvenile Jus-
tice, 88 F. 4th 939, 952–954 (CA11 2023) (Newsom, J., con-
curring) (describing the problem). I would have taken this
opportunity to revisit McDonnell Douglas and clarify what
role—if any—it ought to play in Title VII litigation. Be-
cause the Court declines to do so, I respectfully dissent.

2 HITTLE v. CITY OF STOCKTON
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HOMAS, J., dissenting
I
The plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas had worked as a me-
chanic and laboratory technician for the McDonnell Doug-
las Corporation before being laid off as part of a general re-
duction in force. 411 U. S., at 794. After the layoff, the
plaintiff participated in civil rights protests against McDon-
nell Douglas’s employment practices. Id., at 794–795.
When McDonnell Douglas posted an opening for a new me-
chanic position, the plaintiff applied but was not hired. Id.,
at 796.
The plaintiff sued his former employer, alleging that it
had refused to rehire him because of his race. Id., at 797.
The employer responded that its refusal was not because of
the plaintiff ’s race, but because he had engaged in illegal
demonstrations. See ibid. The District Court initially dis-
missed the plaintiff ’s suit, but the Eighth Circuit reversed
and remanded for a bench trial. Id., at 797–798. To guide
the District Court on remand, the Eighth Circuit “at-
tempted to set forth standards to govern the consideration”
of the claim. Id., at 798. This Court granted certiorari to
clarify the controlling standards. Ibid.
The Court explained that “the issue at the trial” would be
whether the employer refused to hire the plaintiff because
of his race or because of his participation in unlawful con-
duct. Id., at 801. To help the trial court make that ultimate
determination, this Court offered a three-part framework
for analyzing the circumstantial evidence to determine the
real reason for the employer’s actions. First, the Court ex-
plained, the plaintiff “must carry the initial burden” of “es-
tablishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination.” Id.,
at 802. A plaintiff can make this showing with evidence
that (1) “he belongs to a racial minority,” (2) “he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants,” (3) “despite his qualifications, he was rejected,”
and (4) “after his rejection, the position remained open and
the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of

3 Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
complainant’s qualifications.” Ibid. If the plaintiff succeeds
in establishing a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to
the defendant “to articulate some legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason for the employee’s rejection.” Ibid. If the de-
fendant carries that burden, then the plaintiff must have
an “opportunity to show that [the employer’s] stated reason
for [rejecting him] was in fact pretext.” Id., at 804.
This framework was designed to help the trial court eval-
uate the circumstantial evidence offered by both sides and
make an ultimate finding as to liability. See id., at 807. In
other words, the framework was intended to offer “‘a sensi-
ble, orderly way to evaluate the evidence’” that “‘bears on
the critical question of discrimination.’” Postal Service Bd.
of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711, 715 (1983).
The Court made no attempt to ground its new evidentiary
framework in the text of Title VII or any other source of law.
The Court appears to have made it out of whole cloth.
In the years since McDonnell Douglas, the doctrine has
“taken on a life of its own.” Tynes, 88 F. 4th, at 952 (New-
som, J., concurring). Although initially developed for use in
a bench trial,
1
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework has since become “the presumptive means of re-
solving Title VII cases at summary judgment.” 88 F. 4th,
at 952; see also Jackson v. VHS Detroit Receiving Hospital,
Inc., 814 F. 3d 769, 776 (CA6 2016) (“[C]ourts typically ap-
ply the three-part burden-shifting framework developed” in
McDonnell Douglas “to determine whether the plaintiff has
proffered sufficient evidence to survive summary judg-
ment”).
II
The application of McDonnell Douglas in the summary-
judgment context has caused significant confusion.
——————
1
Title VII did not provide for jury trials until 1991. See Civil Rights
Act of 1991, §102, 105 Stat. 1073 (establishing jury trial right).

4 HITTLE v. CITY OF STOCKTON
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HOMAS, J., dissenting
Some confusion likely arises from the fact that the frame-
work was not designed with summary judgment in mind. It
was created as a tool for resolving the “ultimate question”
in a Title VII case—that is, whether the defendant inten-
tionally discriminated against the plaintiff. Burdine, 450
U. S., at 253. But, when a defendant moves for summary
judgment, the question for the court is not whether the de-
fendant has in fact engaged in unlawful discrimination. In-
stead, the question is whether the plaintiff has proffered
enough evidence to allow a reasonable factfinder to find a
Title VII violation. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(a).
Because the McDonnell Douglas framework was de-
signed for use in a bench trial, the language this Court has
used to describe the framework does not neatly track the
plaintiff ’s summary-judgment task.
2
For example, the first
step requires a plaintiff to “establis[h] a prima facie case.”
411 U. S., at 802. And, the third step requires the plaintiff
to show, “by a preponderance of the evidence,” Burdine, 450
U. S., at 253, that the employer’s stated reason “was in fact
pretext” for discrimination, McDonnell Douglas, 411 U. S.,
at 804. But, a plaintiff need not establish or prove any ele-
ments—by a preponderance or otherwise—to survive sum-
mary judgment. At that stage, he need only offer enough
evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact. See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. 317, 322 (1986). At least
a few courts have suggested that this Court’s language
“likely bears some responsibility for the continuing confu-
sion” regarding McDonnell Douglas. See, e.g., Tynes, 88
F. 4th, at 945.
Whatever the origins of the confusion, it is producing
troubling outcomes on the ground. Lower court decisions
reflect “widespread misunderstandings about the limits of
——————
2
As far as I can tell, this Court has never applied McDonnell Douglas
in a Title VII case in the summary-judgment context. See Tynes v. Flor-
ida Dept. of Juvenile Justice, 88 F. 4th, 939, 952 (CA11 2023) (New-
som, J., concurring).

5 Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025)
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HOMAS, J., dissenting
McDonnell Douglas.” Id., at 946. Our precedent makes
clear that the framework is, at most, a “procedural device,
designed only to establish an order of proof and production”
when evaluating circumstantial evidence. St. Mary’s Honor
Center v. Hicks, 509 U. S. 502, 521 (1993). Put another way,
it is “‘merely’” a “‘way to evaluate the evidence’” that bears
on the ultimate finding of liability. Aikens, 460 U. S., at
715. Yet, some courts treat McDonnell Douglas as a sub-
stantive legal standard that a plaintiff must establish to
survive summary judgment or to ultimately prove a claim.
See Tynes, 88 F. 4th, at 945 (observing that some parties
and courts “wrongly treat the prima facie case as a substan-
tive standard of liability”).
Some courts also fail to appreciate that McDonnell Doug-
las is necessarily underinclusive. The framework sets forth
criteria that, if satisfied, will allow a plaintiff to prove a Ti-
tle VII violation. But, satisfying McDonnell Douglas is not
the only way or even the best way to prove a claim. The
McDonnell Douglas Court itself explained that “[t]he facts
necessarily will vary in Title VII cases” and the prima facie
proof required in one case “is not necessarily applicable in
every respect to differing factual situations.” 411 U. S., at
802, n. 13; see also Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438
U. S. 567, 575 (1978) (explaining that McDonnell Douglas
“was not intended to be an inflexible rule”). Yet, some
courts treat the McDonnell Douglas framework as the ex-
clusive method for evaluating evidence at summary judg-
ment. As Judge Newsom has ably explained, this practice
very likely runs afoul of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
See Tynes, 88 F. 4th, at 952–953 (concurring opinion). Rule
56 requires that a claim survive summary judgment so long
as the plaintiff proffers enough evidence to allow a reason-
able factfinder to decide the case in his favor. Analyzing
evidence exclusively under McDonnell Douglas may lead a
court to overlook the other ways that a plaintiff can prove
his claim.

6 HITTLE v. CITY OF STOCKTON
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
Adding to the confusion, judges appear to have different
views on how best to apply the framework at summary
judgment. Some courts require a plaintiff to establish a
prima facie case at the Rule 56 stage. See, e.g., Everett v.
Cook Cty., 655 F. 3d 723, 730 (CA7 2011) (“To move past
summary judgment under the indirect method, a plaintiff
must establish a prima facie case of discrimination”). Other
courts have held that, at the summary judgment stage,
when an employee has suffered an adverse employment ac-
tion and the employer has asserted a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the decision, “the district court need
not—and should not—decide whether the plaintiff actually
made out a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas.”
Brady, 520 F. 3d, at 494.
A remarkable number of lower court judges have gone out
of their way to describe the chaos sown by McDonnell Doug-
las. See, e.g., Walton v. Powell, 821 F. 3d 1204, 1210 (CA10
2016) (majority opinion of Gorsuch, J.) (McDonnell Douglas
“has proven of limited value” and invites “confusion and
complexities”); Brady, 520 F. 3d, at 494 (majority opinion of
Kavanaugh, J.) (describing the first step of McDonnell
Douglas as “a largely unnecessary sideshow” that has
“spawn[ed] enormous confusion and wast[ed] litigant and
judicial resources”); Tynes, 88 F. 4th, at 945 (explaining
that McDonnell Douglas has caused “continuing confu-
sion”); 88 F. 4th, at 951 (Newsom, J., concurring) (explain-
ing that McDonnell Douglas is a “judge-concocted doctrine
that obfuscates the critical inquiry” at summary judgment);
Nall, 917 F. 3d, at 351 (Costa, J., specially concurring) (ex-
plaining that McDonnell Douglas is a “judge-created doc-
trine [that] has been widely criticized for its inefficiency and
unfairness”); Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F. 3d 835, 863 (CA7
2012) (Wood, J., concurring) (asserting that McDonnell
Douglas has “lost [its] utility” and has “inflicted” “snarls
and knots” “on courts and litigants alike”); Provenzano v.
LCI Holdings, Inc., 663 F. 3d 806, 813 (CA6 2011) (arguing

7 Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025)
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HOMAS, J., dissenting
that McDonnell Douglas “often fails to fulfill its purpose”
and that this failure “is particularly pronounced in the con-
text of summary judgment”); Griffith v. Des Moines, 387
F. 3d 733, 746 (CA8 2004) (Magnuson, J., concurring spe-
cially) (explaining that McDonnell Douglas “has befuddled”
the lower courts “[s]ince its inception”); Wells v. Colorado
Dept. of Transp., 325 F. 3d 1205, 1221 (CA10 2003) (Hartz,
J., writing separately) (explaining that “[t]he McDonnell
Douglas framework only creates confusion and distracts
courts from ‘the ultimate question’” and that the doctrine
“should be abandoned”); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F. 2d
1003, 1016 (CA1 1979) (explaining that “the subtleties of
McDonnell Douglas are confusing” and “have caused con-
siderable difficulty for judges of all levels”); Brockbank v.
U. S. Bancorp, 506 Fed. Appx. 604, 611 (CA9 2013) (Rip-
ple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explain-
ing that McDonnell Douglas causes confusion for courts);
Paup v. Gear Prods., Inc., 327 Fed. Appx. 100, 113 (CA10
2009) (per curiam) (joined by Gorsuch, J.) (explaining that
McDonnell Douglas has been criticized for “improperly di-
verting attention away from the real question”); see also T.
Tymkovich, The Problem With Pretext, 85 Denver U. L.
Rev. 503, 519–529 (2008) (describing the ways in which
McDonnell Douglas has caused confusion).
I am not aware of many precedents that have caused
more confusion than this one. By my best lights, a Title VII
claim should survive summary judgment so long as the
plaintiff establishes a genuine dispute of material fact
about each element of his claim. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
56(a). I am confident that lower courts know how to apply
Rule 56 and make the familiar summary-judgment deter-
mination. I am skeptical that McDonnell Douglas is help-
ing anyone perform that task.
3
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3
McDonnell Douglas causes confusion beyond the summary-judgment
context too. For example, the framework is so confusing that some courts

8 HITTLE v. CITY OF STOCKTON
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
III
This case squarely presents the question whether
McDonnell Douglas should be overruled. Given the wide-
spread confusion caused by McDonnell Douglas, and given
the frequency with which courts encounter Title VII cases,
it behooves us to revisit McDonnell Douglas and offer clear
guidance on how to determine whether a Title VII claim
survives summary judgment.
This petition provides an opportunity to do so. Petitioner
Ronald Hittle, a devout Christian, served as fire chief for
the city of Stockton, California, from 2005 to 2011. While
employed by the city, Hittle’s supervisor directed him to at-
tend a leadership training program. After Hittle did so, his
supervisor chastised him for selecting a religious program.
The city then hired an outside investigator to investigate,
among other things, Hittle’s attendance at this religious
leadership training. The investigator “interrogated Hittle
at length” regarding his Christian faith and ultimately
found that Hittle had committed misconduct. 101 F. 4th
1000, 1008–1009 (CA9 2024). According to the investigator,
two of the four “most serious acts of misconduct” were:
“[i]nappropriate use of City time and a City vehicle to at-
tend a religious event,” and “[f]avoritism . . . regarding cer-
tain employees of the department in approving their inap-
propriate attendance on City time of a religious event.” 2
Excerpts of Record in No. 22–15485 (CA9), ECF Doc. 26–3,
p. 225. After reviewing the investigator’s findings, the city
sent Hittle a “notice of its intent to remove him from City
service . . . for the reasons stated” in the investigator’s re-
——————
do not allow any discussion of it in jury instructions. See, e.g., Whitting-
ton v. Nordam Group Inc., 429 F. 3d 986, 993 (CA10 2005) (“We have
repeatedly stated that juries are not to apply the McDonnell Douglas
framework”); see also Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U. S. 421, 444–445,
and n. 13 (2013) (emphasizing the confusion caused by McDonnell Doug-
las in the jury-instruction context).

9 Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025)
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HOMAS, J., dissenting
port. 101 F. 4th, at 1010. Hittle sued the city and its lead-
ership, alleging that his termination was the result of un-
lawful religious discrimination in violation of Title VII.
The District Court analyzed Hittle’s claims under the
McDonnell Douglas framework and entered summary judg-
ment for the City on the ground that Hittle had “not shown
sufficient evidence of pretext to survive summary judg-
ment.” 2022 WL 616722, *8 (ED Cal., Mar. 2, 2022). The
Ninth Circuit affirmed for the same reason—that Hittle
had failed to “demonstrate that Defendants’ legitimate non-
discriminatory reasons for firing him were mere pretext for
religious discrimination.” 101 F. 4th, at 1017. Both deci-
sions below rested on a purported failure to satisfy a com-
ponent of McDonnell Douglas. Accordingly, this case pre-
sents us with an opportunity to revisit McDonnell Douglas
and decide whether its use at summary judgment comports
with Rule 56.
This case highlights how McDonnell Douglas may distort
a lower court’s analysis. Hittle presented “ample” evidence
of discriminatory intent on the part of those who decided to
terminate him. 101 F. 4th, at 1022 (VanDyke, J., dissent-
ing from denial of rehearing en banc). That evidence is
more than likely sufficient for Hittle to establish a genuine
dispute of material fact as required by Rule 56. See id., at
1018–1019 (Callahan, J., dissenting from denial of rehear-
ing en banc); id., at 1019 (Ikuta, J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc); id., at 1026 (opinion of VanDyke, J.).
Yet, after applying McDonnell Douglas, the District Court
and the Ninth Circuit ruled for the city.
* * *
I would have taken this opportunity to revisit McDonnell
Douglas and decide whether its burden-shifting framework
remains a workable and useful evidentiary tool. I respect-
fully dissent from the denial of certiorari.