Woodward v. California

1 Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025)
Statement of S
OTOMAYOR, J.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
JOHN KEVIN WOODWARD v. CALIFORNIA, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA
, SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
No. 24–227. Decided February 24, 2025
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Statement of J
USTICE SOTOMAYOR respecting the denial
of certiorari.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” “[A]ny
ruling that the prosecution’s proof is insufficient to estab-
lish criminal liability for an offense” is therefore “a bar to a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense.” McElrath v.
Georgia, 601 U. S. 87, 94 (2024) (internal quotation marks
omitted). This case raises an important question about
whether California’s approach to construing trial court dis-
missals under Cal. Penal Code Ann. §1385(a) (Cum. Supp.
2025) as acquittals comports with the Double Jeopardy
Clause. I nevertheless concur in the Court’s denial of certi-
orari today because the California Supreme Court should
first address this question in light of this Court’s more re-
cent double jeopardy precedent.
I
In 1992, California charged Kevin Woodward with the
murder of Laurie Houts. At the time, Woodward lived with
Houts’s boyfriend, Brent Fulmer. In support of the murder
charge, the State alleged that Woodward displayed posses-
sive behavior toward his roommate and that he became
jealous when Fulmer began spending time with Houts. The
State’s physical evidence tying Woodward to the crime in-
cluded two latent fingerprints on the outside of Houts’s car
and fibers resembling Woodward’s sweatpants, collected

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Statement of S
OTOMAYOR, J.
from the rope used to strangle Houts.
The State tried Woodward twice for Houts’s murder.
Each time, a majority of jurors (8 of 12 in the first trial, and
7 of 12 in the second) voted to acquit. After discharging the
second deadlocked jury in August 1996, the trial court dis-
missed in open court the murder charge pursuant to Cal.
Penal Code Ann. §1385(a). That provision allows a trial
judge, “of his or her own motion or upon the application of
the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice,” to
“order an action to be dismissed.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 72a
(quoting Cal. Penal Code Ann. §1385(a) (West 1996)).* The
minute order memorializing the hearing states that, “‘[i]n
open court at 9:49 [a.m.] with above-named counsel and de-
fendant present,’” “‘the court rea[d] the written decision
into the record dismissing this case pursuant to Penal Code
[s]ection 1385 based on insufficient evidence.’” People v.
Superior Ct. of Santa Clara Cty., 100 Cal. App. 5th 679, 688,
319 Cal. Rptr. 3d 488, 494 (2024) (alterations in original).
The trial court’s written decision, filed that same day, re-
counted that “the prosecution has been given two opportu-
nities to convict the defendant and serve the public inter-
est,” but “[b]oth trials have resulted in hung juries, with the
majority of jurors voting for acquittal.” App. to Pet. for
Cert. 74a. The court observed, moreover, that “the vast ma-
jority of the evidence does not point to the defendant’s guilt”
and concluded that, “absent new evidence,” the prosecution
would be “unable” to meet its burden of proof “in subse-
quent trials.” Id., at 75a–76a. Dismissing the charge at
this point would further the interests of justice, the court
explained, because “[r]epeated prosecution would create a
risk of conviction through sheer government perseverance”
and “risk convicting an innocent citizen by wearing down
the defendant through repeated trials while it perfects its
——————
*California Penal Code Ann. §1385(a) (Cum. Supp. 2025) has since
been amended, but the quoted language remains the same.

3 Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025)
Statement of S
OTOMAYOR, J.
case.” Id., at 76a (citing Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U. S. 31, 41–
42 (1982)).
In the end, the court summarized its ruling as follows:
“A dismissal of this case is not meant to criticize the
work done by the prosecution or deprive the victim’s
family of an opportunity to see their daughter’s killer
brought to justice. There is simply a lack of evidence
on which to convict the defendant. Without new evi-
dence, the result of this case will be the same at each
successive trial. Due to the lack of evidence in this
case, a jury will never be able to reach a unanimous
verdict of guilty. It appears that justice would best be
served if the charges were dismissed.” App. to Pet. for
Cert. 76a–77a.
Twenty-six years later, the State filed another indictment
against Woodward, alleging that newly tested DNA evi-
dence supported a finding of Woodward’s guilt. Woodward
moved to dismiss, arguing that the 1996 dismissal func-
tioned as an acquittal and that the Double Jeopardy Clause
therefore barred his retrial.
The trial court agreed and dismissed the charge. The
court recognized that, under the California Supreme
Court’s decision in People v. Hatch, 22 Cal. 4th 260, 991
P. 2d 165 (2000), “‘Section 1385 dismissals should not be
construed as an acquittal for legal insufficiency unless the
record clearly indicates the trial court applied the substan-
tial evidence standard.’” App. to Pet. for Cert. 59a. The
trial court reasoned that the earlier dismissal satisfied the
requirements of Hatch because it was “due to the ‘insuffi-
ciency of the evidence,’” and “‘[i]nsufficient evidence’ is a
term of art” that, absent contrary indication, “ ‘means the
evidence was insufficient to support a conviction as a mat-
ter of law.’” Id., at 61a. “Further,” the court observed, “the
trial court’s written order repeatedly referred to the lack of
evidence to convict” Woodward. Id., at 65a.

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Statement of S
OTOMAYOR, J.
The California Court of Appeal vacated the trial court’s
dismissal, reasoning that, under Hatch, a dismissal does
not meet the standard for acquittal merely because it cites
“ ‘insufficiency of the evidence’” as the basis for dismissal.
100 Cal. App. 5th, at 704, 319 Cal. Rptr. 3d, at 507. Instead,
the Court of Appeal held that Hatch requires courts to as-
sume a dismissal is not an acquittal unless the dismissing
court clearly applies the substantial evidence standard.
Ibid. (citing Hatch, 22 Cal. 4th, at 273, 991 P. 2d, at 174).
The dismissal here did not qualify, the Court of Appeal ex-
plained, because the record did not “‘clearly indicate[]’ ”
that the trial court had “conclude[d] the evidence was insuf-
ficient as a matter of law to support a conviction” or that it
had “‘viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution.’” 100 Cal. App. 5th, at 704, 319 Cal. Rptr. 3d,
at 508.
Justice Lie concurred to explain her concern that deci-
sions of this Court “have eroded the analytical foundations
of the rule announced in Hatch” and to urge the California
Supreme Court to reexamine that rule’s continuing vitality.
Id., at 710, 715, 319 Cal. Rptr. 3d, at 513, 517. In her view,
the Court of Appeal’s application of Hatch was “a determi-
nation that the trial court’s dismissal[,] expressly based on
the ‘insufficiency of the evidence[,]’ failed to conform to a
state-law standard even though it is an acquittal as defined
by the United States Supreme Court.” 100 Cal. App. 5th,
at 716, 319 Cal. Rptr. 3d, at 516. The California Supreme
Court declined review. App. to Pet. for Cert. 1a.
II
This Court has “defined an acquittal” for purposes of dou-
ble jeopardy to include not only “‘a ruling by the court that
the evidence is insufficient to convict,’” but also a “‘factual
finding [that] necessarily establish[es] the criminal defend-
ant’s lack of criminal culpability,’ and any other ‘rulin[g]

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OTOMAYOR, J.
which relate[s] to the ultimate question of guilt or inno-
cence.’” Evans v. Michigan, 568 U. S. 313, 318–319 (2013)
(quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82, 91, 98, and n.
11 (1978); alterations in original). “[W]hether an acquittal
has occurred for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause is
a question of federal, not state, law.” McElrath, 601 U. S.,
at 96. Thus, state-law labels “‘do not control’” the double
jeopardy analysis, nor is it “dispositive whether a factfinder
‘incanted the word “acquit.”’ ” Ibid. (quoting Evans, 568
U. S., at 322, 325). Instead, “an acquittal has occurred if
the factfinder ‘acted on its view that the prosecution had
failed to prove its case,’” regardless of how it characterizes
that ruling. McElrath, 601 U. S., at 96 (quoting Evans, 568
U. S., at 325); see also Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U. S.
140, 144, n. 5 (1986).
There is reason to think that California’s Hatch rule, at
least as applied in this case, conflicts with this Court’s dou-
ble jeopardy precedents. In the 1996 dismissal order, the
trial court stated that the dismissal was “for insufficiency
of the evidence” and that “[t]here is simply a lack of evi-
dence on which to convict the defendant.” App. to Pet. for
Cert. 76a–77a. Yet, under Hatch, California courts appar-
ently must assume that dismissals like this one are not ac-
quittals unless the trial court makes unmistakably clear, in
its order, that it has drawn all inferences in favor of the
prosecution and concluded that no reasonable trier of fact
could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See 22 Cal. 4th,
at 273, 991 P. 2d, at 174. This Court has not defined an
acquittal in this way. See Evans, 568 U. S., at 318–319.
Nor has this Court demanded, in evaluating whether a
dismissal constituted an acquittal, proof that the acquitting
court applied the sufficiency of the evidence standard by
construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution. To the contrary, this Court has stated that the
Double Jeopardy Clause “bars retrial following a court-de-

6 WOODWARD v. CALIFORNIA
Statement of S
OTOMAYOR, J.
creed acquittal, even if the acquittal is ‘based upon an egre-
giously erroneous foundation.’” Id., at 318 (quoting Fong
Foo v. United States, 369 U. S. 141, 143 (1962) (per cu-
riam)).
The State defends Hatch as no more than the California
Supreme Court’s approach to “interpreting ambiguous Sec-
tion 1385 dismissals,” Brief in Opposition 18, emphasizing
that “‘the meaning attached to an ambiguous prior reversal
is a matter of state law,’” id., at 17–18 (quoting Tibbs, 457
U. S., at 47, n. 24). That may well be the case. There is a
fine line, however, between a rule of judicial interpretation
designed to help courts ascertain whether a dismissal re-
lates to guilt or innocence and the state court’s imposition
of a different standard for acquittals under the Double
Jeopardy Clause. The latter is impermissible: “[W]hether
an acquittal has occurred for purposes of the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause is a question of federal, not state, law.”
McElrath, 601 U. S., at 96. To the extent the California Su-
preme Court adopted a different standard in order to
“properly balanc[e] the competing interests embodied in the
constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy,”
Hatch, 22 Cal. 4th, at 273, 991 P. 2d, at 174, it had no dis-
cretion to do so.
The Court of Appeal’s application of Hatch to Woodward’s
1996 dismissal order suggests that the Hatch rule is, at
least as applied here, more than an instruction to trial
courts to “make their [§1385] rulings clear” so that review-
ing courts may later determine whether such dismissals
were, in fact, related to guilt or innocence. Ibid. The trial
court’s 1996 dismissal predated Hatch by four years, so to
the extent that Hatch imposed such a clear-statement rule,
the trial court would not have been aware of it.
All that said, Woodward’s assertion that Hatch conflicts
with this Court’s double jeopardy precedents was not pre-
sented to the Court of Appeal before it issued the opinion
on review. It was not until he filed his petition for review

7 Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025)
Statement of S
OTOMAYOR, J.
in the California Supreme Court that Woodward pressed
this point. Woodward is hardly to blame for that litigation
choice, as Hatch itself left open the question whether a dis-
missal order that (like his) included the phrase “insufficient
evidence” sufficed to establish “that the dismissal was
equivalent to an acquittal.” Id., at 276, 991 P. 2d, at 176.
The California Supreme Court should assess, in the first in-
stance, how to reconcile Hatch with this Court’s intervening
decisions in McElrath and Evans, among others. For that
reason, I concur in the Court’s denial of certiorari and en-
courage the California Supreme Court to address this ques-
tion.