Mullin v. Doe

1
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
MULLIN, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY,
ET AL. v. DOE ET AL.
CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
No. 25–1083. Argued April 29, 2026—Decided June 25, 2026*
The question presented is whether respondents, who challenge the ter-
mination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for aliens from Syria
and Haiti, are entitled to orders postponing the terminations during
litigation. Congress created TPS in 1990 to provide short-term hu-
manitarian relief for aliens who cannot safely return to their home
countries. Although designed to afford temporary relief, TPS designa-
tions in practice have often lasted for decades.
Syria received a TPS designation in 2012 because of “extraordinary
and temporary conditions” related to the repressive regime of Bashar
al-Assad, 77 Fed. Reg. 19027, and in September 2025, the Secretary of
Homeland Security provided public notice that Syria’s TPS designa-
tion would terminate, 90 Fed. Reg. 45402. Seven Syrian nationals
sued in the Southern District of New York asserting claims under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to stop the termination. The Dis-
trict Court concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to interim relief
under 5 U. S. C. §705. The Second Circuit denied the Government’s
request for a stay.
Haiti received a TPS designation in 2010 after a devastating earth-
quake, 75 Fed. Reg. 3477, and in November 2025, the Secretary pro-
vided public notice that Haiti’s TPS designation would terminate, 90
Fed. Reg. 54739. Five Haitian nationals sued in the District Court for
the District of Columbia asserting claims under the APA and charging
——————
*Together with No. 25–1084, Trump, President of the United States,
et al. v. Miot et al., on certiorari before judgment to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

2 MULLIN v. DOE
Syllabus
that the termination of Haiti’s TPS designation violated the constitu-
tional right to equal protection because it was motivated by race. The
District Court granted interim relief, and a divided D. C. Circuit panel
declined to issue a stay. The Government sought a stay and a writ of
certiorari before judgment in both cases. This Court granted review,
consolidated the cases, and deferred ruling on the stay applications.
Held:
1. The TPS statute bars judicial review of non-constitutional claims.
Pp. 12–18.
(a) Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) provides that “[t]here is no judicial review
of any determination of the [Secretary of Homeland Security] with re-
spect to the designation, or termination or extension of a designation,
of a foreign state.” The term “determination” may mean either an in-
dividual decision or the process leading to a decision. Under either
understanding, §1254a(b)(5)(A) bars all of respondents’ non-constitu-
tional claims. Further, the phrase “with respect to” “generally has a
broadening effect, ensuring that the scope of a provision covers not
only its subject but also matters relating to that subject.” Patel v. Gar-
land, 596 U. S. 328, 339 (internal quotation marks omitted). Pp. 12–
13.
(b) Respondents and the courts below offer no sound theories to over-
come the plain meaning of the judicial-review bar. Pp. 13–18.
(1) Respondents’ argument that §1254a(b)(5)(A) applies only to
substantive claims, not those based on alleged procedural errors, finds
no support in the statutory language because a “determination” may
concern procedural or substantive questions. Respondents’ reliance on
McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U. S. 479, and Bowen v.
Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, is misplaced
because those decisions turned on the specific wording of different pro-
visions and did not adopt the broad principle that the term “determi-
nation” applies only to substantive matters. Pp. 13–15.
(2) Doe respondents’ argument that “determination” refers only to
an assessment of country conditions finds no support in the statute’s
text or context and contravenes the principle that we give common
terms their ordinary meaning. See Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of
Chehalis Reservation, 594 U. S. 338, 353. Pp. 15–17.
(3) Respondents’ attempt to limit the judicial-review bar to the
Secretary’s ultimate “determination”—not any subsidiary decision—is
inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statutory text and contra-
dicts the administrative-law principle that subsidiary decisions merge
into final agency action. See Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co.,
578 U. S. 590, 597–598. Pp. 17–18.
2. Miot respondents’ equal protection claim—that Haiti’s TPS desig-
nation was terminated because of race—is unlikely to succeed.

3 Cite as: 609 U. S. ___ (2026)
Syllabus
Ironically, respondents themselves offer a race-neutral explanation for
the Government’s action: namely, that the current administration,
which has terminated every TPS designation that has come up for re-
newal, simply opposes the TPS program as it has been implemented in
the past.
The Court assumes for the sake of argument that heightened scru-
tiny applies and that it must determine whether a “discriminatory pur-
pose [was] a motivating factor in the decision” to terminate Haiti’s TPS
designation, Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 265–266. Because application of that standard
calls for consideration of the context in which a challenged statement
was made, id., at 267–268, the immigration context is an important
factor.
None of the cited statements by either the President or the Secretary
was overtly racial, and in substance all expressed policy views that
could rest on race-neutral justifications. Viewing all the relevant evi-
dence, Miot respondents are unlikely to prove that race was a motivat-
ing factor in the decision to terminate Haiti’s TPS designation, and it
follows that they are not entitled to interim relief on their equal pro-
tection claim. Pp. 20–24.
Reversed and remanded.
A
LITO, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opin-
ion of the Court except as to Part III–A. R
OBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS and
KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined that opinion in full, and GORSUCH and BARRETT,
JJ., joined except for Part III–A. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion.
K
AGAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and JACKSON,
JJ., joined.

_________________
_________________
1 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 25–1083 and 25–1084
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
ET AL., PETITIONERS
25–1083 v.
DAHLIA DOE,
ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES,
ET AL., PETITIONERS
25–1084 v.
FRITZ EMMANUEL LESLY MIOT,
ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[June 25, 2026]
JUSTICE ALITO announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to all but
Part III–A, and an opinion with respect to Part III–A, in
which T
HE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE THOMAS, and JUSTICE
KAVANAUGH join.
In these cases, we consider whether respondents, who
challenge the termination of Temporary Protected Status
(TPS) for aliens from Syria and Haiti, are entitled to orders
postponing the terminations during litigation. We hold
that they are not.
The TPS statute plainly bars consideration of respond-
ents’ non-constitutional claims. It allows “no judicial re-
view of any determination . . . with respect to the . . . termi-
nation” of a TPS designation. 8 U. S. C. §1254a(b)(5)(A).
The term “determination” can be used to describe either an

2 MULLIN v. DOE
Opinion of the Court
individual decision or the whole process leading to a final
decision, and under either understanding of the term,
§1254a(b)(5)(A) squarely bars all of respondents’ non-con-
stitutional claims.
The sole constitutional claim before us will likely fail.
Citing statements made by President Trump and former
Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem, one set of re-
spondents advances an equal protection claim that Haiti’s
TPS designation was terminated because of the racial
makeup of that country’s population. But, ironically, one of
respondents’ other arguments undermines the equal pro-
tection claim by offering a strong, race-neutral explanation
for Haiti’s termination: namely, that the current admin-
istration, which has terminated every TPS designation that
has come up for renewal, simply opposes the TPS program,
at least as it has been implemented in the past.
For these reasons, the District Courts erred in granting
interim relief.
I
A
Congress created TPS in 1990 to provide short-term hu-
manitarian relief for aliens who cannot safely return to
their home countries due to events such as armed conflict
or natural disaster. Before then, the Executive Branch
sometimes provided similar relief as a matter of discretion
without any express statutory authorization. Then, as now,
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) permitted the
Executive to defer the removal of an alien who agrees to
leave this country voluntarily. See 8 U. S. C. §1229c(a)(1);
§1252(b) (1958 ed.). Before Congress created TPS, aliens
had 30 days to depart voluntarily, but the Government
claimed discretionary authority to extend that deadline

3 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
indefinitely.
1
Beginning in 1960, the Government used this
mechanism to provide humanitarian relief similar to that
now furnished by TPS. Under a program that came to be
known as “Extended Voluntary Departure” (EVD), the Gov-
ernment authorized deferred departure for nationals from
countries where living conditions had become unsafe. EVD
allowed aliens from those countries to remain in the United
States until the Government concluded that conditions had
improved. The Government granted EVD to nationals of at
least 14 countries. H. R. Rep. No. 98–1142, p. 4 (1984).
Under this regime, the grant and termination of human-
itarian relief was purely a matter of executive discretion,
and judges on the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit concluded that the Executive’s decision to
withhold such relief was an unreviewable exercise of prose-
cutorial discretion. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union,
Local 25 v. Smith, 846 F. 2d 1499, 1519–1520 (CADC 1988)
(opinion of Silberman, J.); see also id., at 1510 (opinion of
Mikva, J.) (“[T]he court has no meaningful standard against
which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion to deny
EVD status in this case”). Judge Silberman, joined by three
other judges, observed that review of an EVD decision
would raise separation-of-powers concerns because “[c]on-
trol of the country’s policy toward aliens is ‘inherent in the
executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation,’”
id., at 1520 (quoting United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaugh-
nessy, 338 U. S. 537, 542 (1950)), and “‘[m]atters relating
“to the conduct of foreign relations . . . are so exclusively en-
trusted to the political branches of government as to be
largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference,”’ ” Ho-
tel & Restaurant Employees Union, 846 F. 3d, at 1520.
Judge Silberman therefore concluded that judicial review
——————
1
See H. R. Rep. No. 98–1142, p. 4 (1984); L. Oswald, Note, Extended
Voluntary Departure: Limiting the Attorney General’s Discretion in Im-
migration Matters, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 152, 155–156 (1986).

4 MULLIN v. DOE
Opinion of the Court
would be impermissible “in the absence of an extraordinar-
ily precise statutory standard against which to measure the
conduct in question.” Ibid.
B
After critics objected that the Extended Voluntary Depar-
ture program lacked “‘proper guidelines or standards,’”
2
Congress created TPS. This new regime provided stand-
ards to govern the grant and termination of TPS but main-
tained core features of the old EVD program. Three aspects
of the new regime are noteworthy.
First, as with EVD, the Executive Branch retains discre-
tion over whether to designate a country for TPS. Respon-
sibility for TPS decisions rests with the Secretary of Home-
land Security, 6 U. S. C. §§552(d), 557, and the statute
provides that the Secretary “may designate” a country for
TPS “after consultation with appropriate agencies of the
Government” if certain conditions are met. 8 U. S. C.
§1254a(b)(1) (emphasis added). These are:
1. “[T]here is an ongoing armed conflict within the state
and, due to such conflict, requiring the return of al-
iens who are nationals of that state to that state (or
to the part of the state) would pose a serious threat
to their personal safety;”
2. “[T]here has been an earthquake, flood, drought, ep-
idemic, or other environmental disaster in the state
resulting in a substantial, but temporary, disruption
of living conditions,” “the foreign state is unable,
temporarily, to handle adequately” the return of its
nationals, and the state requests TPS designation;
or
3. “[T]here exist extraordinary and temporary condi-
tions in the foreign state that prevent aliens who are
——————
2
Congressional Research Service, J. Wilson, Temporary Protected Sta-
tus and Deferred Enforced Departure 4 (2025).

5 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
nationals of the state from returning to the state in
safety, unless the [Secretary] finds that permitting
the aliens to remain temporarily is contrary to the
national interest.” Ibid.
Once a country receives a TPS designation, certain na-
tionals of that country living in the United States without
another lawful immigration status qualify for work author-
ization and immunity from removal. See §§1254a(a)(1), (c).
The second notable feature of TPS is that the statute re-
quires the Government to terminate a country’s TPS desig-
nation if the Secretary determines that the country “no
longer continues to meet the conditions for designation.”
§1254a(b)(3)(B). The Secretary generally makes such de-
terminations as part of an ongoing review of all TPS desig-
nations. The Secretary is instructed to review each TPS
designation at least every 18 months. §§1254a(b)(2)–(3).
During this review, the Secretary must “consul[t] with ap-
propriate agencies of the Government” and “determine
whether the conditions for such designation under this sub-
section continue to be met.” §1254a(b)(3)(A). If the Secre-
tary takes no action, a TPS designation automatically ex-
tends for another six months. See §§1254a(b)(2)(B), (3)(C).
These extensions continue until the Secretary publishes a
termination notice. Ibid. Terminations take effect at least
60 days after the notice appears in the Federal Register.
§1254a(b)(3)(B).
Finally, the Secretary’s TPS designation decisions are not
subject to judicial review. The relevant provision bars “ju-
dicial review of any determination of the [Secretary of
Homeland Security] with respect to the designation, or ter-
mination or extension of a designation, of a foreign state.”
§1254a(b)(5)(A).
C
Although designed to afford “temporary” relief, TPS des-
ignations in practice have often lasted for decades. For

6 MULLIN v. DOE
Opinion of the Court
example, the Secretary designated Somalia in 1991, and
that designation remains in effect 35 years later. See 56
Fed. Reg. 46805 (1991); African Communities Together v.
Noem, No. 26–cv–11201, 2026 WL 710666 (D Mass., Mar.
13, 2026). Three other countries retain designations that
are more than 25 years old. See 64 Fed. Reg. 526 (1999)
(Nicaragua); id., at 524 (Honduras); 66 Fed. Reg. 14214
(2001) (El Salvador).
3
The current administration objects to lengthy TPS desig-
nations and adopted a new, restricted approach shortly af-
ter the beginning of President Trump’s second term in of-
fice. In Executive Order 14159, titled “Protecting the
American People Against Invasion,” the President directed
Cabinet officers to “ensur[e] that designations of Tempo-
rary Protected Status are consistent with the provisions of ”
the TPS statute and that such designations “are appropri-
ately limited in scope and made for only so long as may be
necessary to fulfill the textual requirements of that stat-
ute.” 90 Fed. Reg. 8446 (2025). Under this approach, the
Secretary of Homeland Security has terminated every TPS
designation that has come up for renewal, 13 in all. See
infra, at 22–23.
Legal challenges to these decisions began almost imme-
diately. In opposing those challenges, the Government’s
front line of defense has been the judicial-review bar in
§1254a(b)(5)(A), but the lower courts have consistently re-
buffed that argument. The Government once again led with
that jurisdictional argument in asking us to stay two
——————
3
Not all TPS designations have lasted so long. Presidents Clinton,
George W. Bush, and Obama terminated some TPS designations much
more promptly. See, e.g., 58 Fed. Reg. 7582 (1993) (Lebanon, terminated
two years after initial designation); 62 Fed. Reg. 33442 (1997) (Rwanda,
terminated three years after initial designation); 69 Fed. Reg. 40643
(2004) (Montserrat, terminated less than eight years after initial desig-
nation); 81 Fed. Reg. 66064 (2016) (Guinea, terminated less than three
years after initial designation). None of these terminations were chal-
lenged in court.

7 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
District Court orders that postponed the termination of
Venezuela’s TPS designation, and we granted those re-
quests. Noem v. National TPS Alliance, 605 U. S. 909
(2025) (NTPSA I); Noem v. National TPS Alliance, 606
U. S. 1062 (2025) (NTPSA II). Nevertheless, lower courts,
including those in the cases now before us, have continued
to block the Secretary’s attempted terminations of other
TPS designations. E.g., 1 App. 33 (Syria); id., at 40 (Syria);
818 F. Supp. 3d 126, 186 (DC 2026) (Haiti); 2 App. 719
(Haiti); Doe v. Noem, 822 F. Supp. 3d 893, 901 (ND Ill. 2026)
(Burma); African Communities Together v. Noem, ___
F. Supp. 3d ___, 2026 WL 948591, *16 (D Mass., Apr. 8,
2026) (Ethiopia).
1
The Secretary designated Syria for TPS in 2012 because
of “extraordinary and temporary conditions” related to the
repressive regime of Bashar al-Assad. 77 Fed. Reg. 19027
(2012). The initial designation notice recounted horrific
conditions in that country, including use of “excessive force
against civilians, arbitrary executions, killing and persecu-
tion of protestors and members of the media, arbitrary de-
tention, disappearances, torture, and ill-treatment.” Ibid.
The notice recounted that Syrian military units and merce-
naries had “terrorized the population, targeting and killing
small children, women, and other unarmed civilians.” Ibid.
These actions led military defectors and members of the
population into armed resistance and, eventually, civil war.
Ibid. For these reasons, the Secretary concluded that “Syr-
ian nationals cannot return to Syria in safety due to ex-
traordinary and temporary conditions.” Id., at 19028. The
Secretary designated Syria for TPS for an initial period of
18 months. Ibid. In the 14 years since then, Syria has
maintained its TPS designation through a series of exten-
sions and re-designations. See 90 Fed. Reg. 45399 (2025).

8 MULLIN v. DOE
Opinion of the Court
In September 2025—several months after we stayed the
District Court order in NTPSA I, the first case involving
Venezuela—the Secretary provided public notice that
Syria’s TPS designation would terminate in 60 days. 90
Fed. Reg. 45402. She stated that she had “consult[ed] with
appropriate U. S. Government agencies” and had “reviewed
country conditions in Syria.” Id., at 45399. She recognized
that between 2011 and 2024 the Syrian civil war had
caused more than 500,000 deaths, the displacement of mil-
lions, and extensive damage to infrastructure. Id., at
45400. But in 2024, the Assad regime fell, and a transi-
tional government took its place. Ibid. The notice re-
counted that the United States had normalized relations
with Syria’s new government and had revoked sanctions.
Ibid.
Even so, the termination notice acknowledged that seri-
ous problems remained. It noted that localized violence had
replaced “nationwide hostilities” and that “insurgent flare-
ups” continued. Ibid. The Secretary also recognized that
“most Syrians require some form of humanitarian assis-
tance,” but she found that “this does not prevent nationals
from returning in safety, as evidenced by the U. N. High
Commissioner for Refugees’ estimate that ‘since 2024, over
1.2 million Syrians have returned to Syria.’” Ibid. In short,
the termination notice described improved conditions in
Syria but by no means painted a rosy picture. Based on her
review, the Secretary determined that “termination of the
Syria Temporary Protected Status designation [was] re-
quired.” Ibid.
Asserting claims under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), seven Syrian nationals who benefit from TPS sued
in the Southern District of New York to stop the termina-
tion of Syria’s TPS designation. The District Court con-
cluded that these plaintiffs (respondents in No. 25–1083)
were entitled to interim relief under 5 U. S. C. §705, which
authorizes a reviewing court in appropriate circumstances

9 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
to postpone the effective date of agency action. See 1 App.
6. The court rejected the Government’s jurisdictional argu-
ment because of the “restrictive manner in which jurisdic-
tion-stripping provisions are construed.” Id., at 9. It then
held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their APA
claims that the termination of Syria’s TPS designation was
contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious. See §706.
The court claimed not to “opin[e] on the substance of the
Secretary’s termination decision or on her authority to
make such a decision,” but it proceeded to criticize the Sec-
retary for “taking a hatchet to the TPS system.” Id., at 15–
16. The court found that the Secretary’s decision to termi-
nate Syria’s TPS designation constituted one aspect of the
current administration’s “anti-immigrant agenda.” Id., at
25. The court then indefinitely postponed the effective date
of the termination of Syria’s TPS designation and declined
to stay its own order.
The Second Circuit also denied the Government’s request
for a stay. It concluded that it likely had jurisdiction, that
the challengers had at least one strong APA claim (namely,
that the Secretary acted contrary to law by failing to engage
in adequate consultation with other agencies before termi-
nating TPS), and that the other stay factors were not met.
Id., at 38–40.
Following the Second Circuit’s ruling, the Government
turned to this Court for relief. We granted certiorari before
judgment and deferred ruling on the Government’s request
for a stay. 607 U. S. ___ (2026).
2
Haiti received a TPS designation in 2010 after a devas-
tating earthquake killed or injured hundreds of thousands
of residents, caused massive property damage, and severely
worsened living conditions. 75 Fed. Reg. 3477 (2010). The
Government re-designated Haiti for TPS and extended that
designation several times. See 90 Fed. Reg. 54734 (2025).

10 MULLIN v. DOE
Opinion of the Court
In 2018, the Government attempted to terminate Haiti’s
TPS designation, but court orders prevented that termina-
tion from taking effect. 86 Fed. Reg. 41864 (2021). In 2021,
following a change in administration, the Government re-
designated Haiti for TPS, citing gang-related violence, hu-
man-rights abuses, poverty, inadequate healthcare, and
food insecurity. Id., at 41864–41867. Relying on these
same grounds, the Government continued to extend Haiti’s
TPS designation. 90 Fed. Reg. 54734. The net effect was to
allow Haitians who benefit from TPS to retain that status
for 16 years.
In November 2025, the Secretary provided public notice
that Haiti’s TPS designation would terminate on February
3, 2026—the last day of the most recent extension. Id., at
54739. Stating that she had “consult[ed] with appropriate
U. S. Government agencies,” id., at 54735, she explained
her assessment of the current situation in Haiti. “Certain
conditions,” she acknowledged, “remain[ed] concerning,” es-
pecially gang violence and its “spillover effects.” Ibid. But
she asserted that certain areas “of the country [were] suit-
able to return to” and that the situation would further im-
prove with the deployment of a multinational gang-sup-
pression force. Ibid. Separately, she concluded that the
ongoing designation of Haiti contravened the United States’
national interests. She noted, among other things, that
many Haitians in the United States had entered illegally,
that Haitians who came here legally overstayed their visas
at an exceptionally high rate, and that the Haitian Govern-
ment was often unable to provide the information needed to
identify its own nationals’ criminal records or gang affilia-
tions. Id., at 54736–54737. The notice concluded by noting
that the United States’ “immigration policy must align with
our foreign policy vision of a secure, sovereign, and self-re-
liant Haiti and not a country that Haitian citizens continue
to leave in large numbers to seek opportunities in the
United States.” Id., at 54738.

11 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
Before the termination took effect, a group of five Haitian
nationals with TPS sued in the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia to stop the termination of Haiti’s designa-
tion. They asserted claims under the APA and charged that
the termination of Haiti’s designation violated the constitu-
tional right to equal protection because it was motivated by
race. The District Court granted interim relief. See Miot,
818 F. Supp. 3d, at 186. It found that the TPS judicial-re-
view bar did not apply because plaintiffs challenged “how
the Secretary went about making her determination,” not
the ultimate TPS termination decision itself. Id., at 148
(emphasis in original). On the merits, the court ruled that
several of the challengers’ APA claims were likely to suc-
ceed, including the claim that the Secretary had not
properly consulted other Government agencies and the
claim that she had acted arbitrarily and capriciously by ig-
noring evidence of Haiti’s true country conditions. The
court also ruled that the challengers would likely succeed
on the merits of their equal protection claim because both
President Trump and Secretary Noem made statements
that suggested racial animus against “Haitians and other
nonwhite foreigners.” Id., at 177, 180. The court did not
stay its order.
A divided D. C. Circuit panel likewise declined to issue a
stay. It noted that many other courts had held that they
had jurisdiction to consider similar claims, and it found that
the Government had failed to show that it would suffer ir-
reparable harm. According to the majority, the Govern-
ment’s assertion that the District Court had intruded on the
Executive Branch’s foreign-policy prerogatives was a mere
“ ‘generalized assertio[n] of injury’” and insufficient to sup-
port a stay. 2 App. 720.
Judge Walker dissented. In his view, the court lacked
jurisdiction, and the Government was irreparably harmed
by “‘an improper intrusion by a federal court into the work-
ings of a coordinate branch of the Government.’” Id., at 726.

12 MULLIN v. DOE
Opinion of the Court
After this decision, the Government sought a stay and a
writ of certiorari before judgment. We granted review, con-
solidated this case with Doe, and deferred ruling on the stay
application. 607 U. S. ___ (2026).
II
A
We first consider respondents’ non-constitutional claims
and conclude that we are barred from reviewing them. A
provision of the TPS statute, 8 U. S. C. §1254a(b)(5)(A), pro-
vides: “There is no judicial review of any determination of
the [Secretary of Homeland Security] with respect to the
designation, or termination or extension of a designation, of
a foreign state under this subsection.” This text is clear,
and its plain meaning is very broad.
We start with the key term “determination,” which may
mean several different things. It may be used as a synonym
for “decision.” See, e.g., 4 Oxford English Dictionary 548
(def. 2.b) (2d ed. 1989) (a “decision arrived at or promul-
gated”); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 616
(def. 4a) (1986) (“the act of deciding definitely and firmly”).
The term may also be used to describe the chain of events
leading up to a decision. See, e.g., American Heritage Dic-
tionary 359 (def. 1.a) (1981) (the “act of making or arriving
at a decision” (emphasis added)); Random House Dictionary
of the English Language 541 (def. 1) (2d ed. 1987) (the “act
of coming to a decision or of fixing or settling a purpose”
(emphasis added)).
Not only is it common to use the term “determination” in
this broad sense, but other terms in the judicial-review
bar—particularly the phrase “with respect to”—support
this broad understanding. That phrase “generally has a
broadening effect, ensuring that the scope of a provision co-
vers not only its subject but also matters relating to that
subject.” Patel v. Garland, 596 U. S. 328, 339 (2022) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).

13 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
Under either of these definitions, §1254a(b)(5)(A) bars re-
spondents’ non-constitutional claims. Each claim concerns
a discrete decision made by the Secretary—for example, her
decision to consult the State Department in a particular
manner and her decision that country conditions in Syria
and Haiti justified termination of their TPS designations.
And all those steps were part of the process that led to her
final decision to terminate these countries’ TPS designa-
tions. Indeed, the same result would follow if “determina-
tion” referred only to that final decision. In that event, all
the preceding decisions would be “with respect to” that de-
cision. So, under any dictionary definition of “determina-
tion,” the judicial-review bar applies to respondents’ non-
constitutional claims.
We recognize that “when a statutory provision ‘is reason-
ably susceptible to divergent interpretation, we adopt the
reading that accords with’” the traditional and basic prin-
ciple that “ ‘executive determinations generally are subject
to judicial review.’ ” Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S.
221, 229 (2020). But here, the text of the TPS judicial-re-
view bar very clearly overcomes the general presumption in
favor of judicial review.
B
Respondents and the courts below offer several theories
to overcome the plain meaning of the judicial-review bar,
but none is sound.
1
The most prominent theory is that §1254a(b)(5)(A) ap-
plies only to substantive claims, not those based on alleged
procedural errors. 1 App. 10–11; 818 F. Supp. 3d, at 148;
Brief for Respondents in No. 25–1083, pp. 30–31; Brief for
Respondents in No. 25–1084, pp. 15–16. This argument
finds no support in the language of §1254a(b)(5)(A) because
a “determination” may concern procedural or substantive

14 MULLIN v. DOE
Opinion of the Court
questions. Take Doe respondents’ argument that the Sec-
retary inadequately consulted the State Department about
conditions in Syria. In proceeding as she did, the Secretary,
either personally or through her subordinates, made a se-
ries of procedural determinations: to communicate with the
State Department by email, to send a terse and unspecific
email, and to proceed to terminate Syria’s TPS designation
after receiving a laconic answer.
In attempting to limit §1254a(b)(5)(A) to substantive de-
terminations, respondents and lower courts have relied not
on the statutory text but on several of our decisions, chiefly
McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U. S. 479
(1991), and Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physi-
cians, 476 U. S. 667 (1986). But they read far too much into
those decisions.
McNary concerned the Special Agricultural Farmworker
amnesty program. A provision of the governing statute
barred “review of a determination respecting an application
for adjustment of status under” that program except in re-
moval proceedings. §1160(e)(1) (1988 ed.) (emphasis
added). Because this provision referred to “a single act,”
i.e., a ruling on an individual application, the Court held
that alien farmworkers’ broad claims about the procedures
used in implementing the program could proceed. McNary,
498 U. S., at 492. Thus, the decision turned on the specific
wording of the provision at issue. It did not adopt the broad
principle that the term “determination” applies only to sub-
stantive matters.
Nor does Bowen support respondents’ position. There,
the Court held that two statutory provisions did not bar ju-
dicial review of a regulation that provided disparate Medi-
care Part B payments to allopathic and other physicians.
The first provision did not bar review at all. Instead, it au-
thorized judicial review of benefits awarded in hearings
conducted by private insurance carriers. 42 U. S. C.
§1395ff(b) (1982 ed.). The Government asked the Court to

15 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
infer that this grant of a particular type of review implicitly
barred review of the challenged regulation. Bowen, 476
U. S., at 673. But based on the language of this provision
and its legislative history, the Court rejected that request.
Id., at 674–678. The Bowen Court’s refusal to find an im-
plicit preclusion of review in the specific language and leg-
islative history of a differently worded provision in a partic-
ular statutory scheme hardly means that the term
“determination” in 8 U. S. C. §1254a(b)(5)(A) is limited in
the way respondents contend and lower courts have ruled.
The second statutory provision at issue in Bowen is no
more helpful to respondents than the first provision. This
provision in the Medicare Act incorporated a list of sections
of the Social Security Act, and one of those sections prohib-
ited certain actions against the Government or its officers.
See 42 U. S. C. §13955ii (1982 ed., Supp. II) (referencing 42
U. S. C. §405(h) (1982 ed., Supp. II)). The Court held that
this provision did not bar review of the challenged Medicare
regulation because it was “incorporated mutatis mutandis,”
i.e., with necessary and appropriate modifications, and be-
cause legislative history showed that the Medicare Act pro-
vision was not meant to bar review of important questions
like the one at issue. Bowen, 476 U. S., at 680.
By contrast, the TPS judicial-review bar expressly re-
stricts review; it is not a string cite that incorporates an-
other provision to a limited degree. And even if we were
disposed to consult legislative history to determine the
meaning of 8 U. S. C. §1254a(b)(5)(A), the proponents of the
substance-only interpretation cite no legislative history
that supports their position.
2
Doe respondents, while agreeing that §1254a(b)(5)(A) ap-
plies to only substantive determinations, advance another
argument that would reduce the reach of that provision
even further. In their view, the statutory term

16 MULLIN v. DOE
Opinion of the Court
“determination” in the judicial-review bar applies only to
determinations about conditions in the country designated
for TPS.
This argument, which gives the commonly used term “de-
termination” a special meaning, runs headlong into our
statutory-interpretation precedents. We are wary of giving
common terms technical meanings. See Yellen v. Confeder-
ated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation, 594 U. S. 338, 353
(2021). Statutory interpretation proceeds on the assump-
tion that those who draft and enact a provision generally
intend its terms to mean what they mean in ordinary usage.
Without that assumption, the entire endeavor would break
down. Ordinary people could not understand what the law
requires of them, and every word in a statute could be an
unfathomable puzzle. Of course, a statute may provide ex-
pressly, or may signal in some other clear way, that it em-
ploys a common term in a way that departs from its ordi-
nary meaning, but without strong proof of such a departure,
commonly used terms should be given their common mean-
ing. Feliciano v. Department of Transp., 605 U. S. 38, 45
(2025).
Here, “determination” is a commonly used term, and
therefore Doe respondents bear the burden of showing that,
as used in §1254a(b)(5)(A), it carries a technical, TPS-
specific meaning. But their effort to show that “statutory
context” dictates adoption of their interpretation, Yellen,
594 U. S., at 351, falls short because the TPS statute uses
“determination” in multiple ways that that have nothing to
do with the assessment of country conditions. For example,
the very first use of “determination” in the TPS statute re-
fers to a “determination with respect to the alien’s eligibil-
ity for . . . benefits.” §1254a(a)(4)(B). In another provision,
the statute refers to the “determination of an alien’s admis-
sibility.” §1254a(c)(2)(A). Still another provision describes
the effect of TPS on discretionary immigration benefits if
the Secretary “determines that extreme hardship exists.”

17 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
§1254a(e). These uses of “determination” or “determines”
are plainly not references to country conditions.
Doe respondents counter that we need not look to how the
TPS statute as a whole uses the term “determination” but
can instead limit our examination to the use of the term in
subsection (b), which contains the judicial-review bar. And
there, they point out, the term refers only to the Secretary’s
evaluation of country conditions. Brief for Respondents in
No. 25–1083, pp. 18–22.
This argument rests on a cramped view of statutory con-
text. When we consider statutory context, we evaluate the
provision at issue “with a view to [its] place in the overall
statutory scheme,” not just in a single subsection. Utility
Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U. S. 302, 320 (2014) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added). While
the use of a term in nearby or closely related provisions may
be entitled to more weight, there is no justification for lim-
iting our examination as closely as Doe respondents urge.
Once we expand our aperture, we see that the TPS statute
uses “determination” in its ordinary sense, not to denote an
assessment of country conditions.
3
Taking a different tack, respondents argue that only the
Secretary’s ultimate “determination”—not any subsidiary
decision, such as whether to consult other agencies—is un-
reviewable. The dissent makes a similar argument. Post,
at 4–6 (opinion of K
AGAN, J.). For reasons already ex-
plained, this argument is inconsistent with the plain mean-
ing of the statutory text. And that is true whether the term
“determination” is understood to mean a discrete decision
or a process leading up to a final decision.
This argument also contradicts general administrative-
law principles. In APA cases, an agency’s subsidiary deci-
sions merge into the final agency action, which is then sub-
ject to review. See Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co.,

18 MULLIN v. DOE
Opinion of the Court
578 U. S. 590, 597–598 (2016). If the final agency action is
unreviewable, then so too are subsidiary determinations.
See Amgen, Inc. v. Smith, 357 F. 3d 103, 113 (CADC 2004);
DCH Regional Medical Center v. Azar, 925 F. 3d 503, 506
(CADC 2019). This important principle ensures that chal-
lengers cannot avoid a judicial-review bar by creative plead-
ing or clever lawyering.
Moving beyond the text and precedent, respondents con-
tend that our interpretation of the judicial-review bar could
protect many shocking abuses of TPS. For example, a rogue
Secretary in one fell swoop could issue a 50-year TPS des-
ignation, contrary to the 18-month statutory cap. Or a Sec-
retary could terminate a TPS designation based on a coin-
flip. The Government responds to each of respondents’ far-
fetched hypotheticals and concludes that some but not all
could in fact be redressed by the courts. See Reply Brief 9–
10. But whether or not that assessment is correct, the fact
remains that if a Secretary engaged in the sort of conduct
that respondents imagine, Congress would have ample
means to stop that abuse, including, for example, through
the annual appropriations process. “Sometimes Congress
decides that the political process is the proper forum for
remedying improper conduct.” National TPS Alliance v.
Noem, 169 F. 4th 796, 807 (CA9 2026) (Bumatay, J., dis-
senting from denial of reh’g en banc).
***
In sum, we hold that the TPS statute’s judicial-review bar
applies to all non-constitutional claims.
III
We continue with Miot respondents’ equal protection
claim.
4
——————
4
Doe respondents brought a similar claim, but the District Court held
that it was not likely to succeed. So that claim is not before us.

19 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of A
LITO, J.
A
We have held that “where Congress intends to preclude
judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so
must be clear.” Webster v. Doe, 486 U. S. 592, 603 (1988).
In this case, we need not resolve whether the TPS statute
meets that clear-statement rule because we conclude that
Miot respondents’ constitutional claim is unlikely to suc-
ceed on the merits.
Before proceeding further, we briefly explain why we may
address the substance of Miot respondents’ equal protection
claim without deciding whether the District Court had ju-
risdiction to entertain it. It is a cardinal rule that a federal
court may not consider the merits of a claim without first
making a firm determination that it has jurisdiction. Steel
Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 93–94
(1998).
When interim relief is sought, however, a court does not
make a final decision on any matter necessary to the ulti-
mate judgment. Instead, the court makes only a predic-
tive—not a final—decision about the outcome of the case.
And the likelihood that the court has jurisdiction over a
claim and the likelihood that the claim is meritorious both
bear on the claim’s ultimate prospects. See Arizona v.
Biden, 31 F. 4th 469, 479 (CA6 2022) (Sutton, C. J.). So in
evaluating the likelihood-of-success question for the pur-
pose of ruling on a request for interim relief, courts may
consider both the likelihood that they have jurisdiction and
the likelihood that the claim will succeed on the merits. If
they conclude that a claim fails on either ground, they must
deny interim relief. Similarly, a court with appellate juris-
diction may reverse on either jurisdictional or merits
grounds a lower court order that granted interim relief. But
courts need not always start with the jurisdictional ground
if the claim for interim relief would also fail on the merits.
Here, we review the District Court’s award of interim re-
lief. Thus, in evaluating Miot respondents’ likelihood of

20 MULLIN v. DOE
Opinion of the Court
success on their equal protection claim, we may reverse the
District Court’s grant of interim relief on either jurisdic-
tional or merits grounds.
B
We turn now to the merits of Miot respondents’ equal pro-
tection claim. The parties dispute the proper standard for
assessing this claim. The Government contends that we
should apply the deferential test we used in Trump v. Ha-
waii, 585 U. S. 667 (2018), and it claims that many of the
factors that informed the Court’s identification of the
proper standard of review in that case are also present here.
Brief for Petitioners 46–47. These factors include the Exec-
utive’s broad authority over the admission and exclusion of
foreign nationals and the connection between immigration
policy and foreign relations. Ibid. Miot respondents, on the
other hand, urge us to apply heightened scrutiny under Ar-
lington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977). In their view, the Hawaii
standard applies only to the exclusion of aliens seeking to
enter the country, not to those who are already here. Brief
for Respondents in No. 25–1084, p. 42.
We need not resolve this debate. We will assume for the
sake of argument that the Arlington Heights standard ap-
plies and that we must therefore determine whether a “dis-
criminatory purpose [was] a motivating factor in the deci-
sion” to terminate Haiti’s TPS designation. 429 U. S., at
265–266. But because application of that standard calls for
consideration of the context in which a challenged state-
ment was made, id., at 267–268, the immigration context is
an important factor.
In support of their claim that the termination of Haiti’s
TPS designation was based on race, respondents cite state-
ments made by the President and former Secretary Noem.
The President’s comments fall into four main categories.
First, many express strong objections to the immigration

21 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
that this country has experienced in recent decades and to
many of the immigrants who have come here, particularly
those who have come to or stayed in the United States ille-
gally. These statements associate these immigrants with
crime and other social ills. Second, some statements ex-
press great displeasure with TPS. They note, among other
things, that TPS designations have often been far from tem-
porary and that aliens who are allowed to stay in the United
States under the program are not vetted like other aliens
who seek admission. Third, some statements broadly den-
igrate the countries for which TPS designations have been
granted—including Haiti—portraying them as hellish
places in which to live. And fourth, some statements ma-
lign Haitians who have come to the United States.
Miot respondents also cite statements by former Secre-
tary Noem that fall into three categories. Some expressed
antipathy toward travelers from countries covered by a re-
newed travel ban, much like the one that was before us in
Hawaii, 585 U. S, at 679–680. Others were derogatory com-
ments about immigration and its effects. And still some
others promised changes and criticized past implementa-
tion of TPS.
None of the cited statements by either the President or
the Secretary was overtly racial, and in substance all ex-
pressed policy views that could rest on race-neutral justifi-
cations. For example, one may oppose TPS and favor
tighter restrictions on immigration for economic or other
reasons that have nothing to do with race. And a person
without racial bias can provide a harshly unfavorable de-
scription of living conditions in some of the countries with
TPS designations. The criteria for TPS designations guar-
antee that many, if not most, designated countries have
such characteristics.
Haiti is no exception. It is a very poor country, and living
conditions there are unquestionably difficult. Many Amer-
icans of all races would surely find those conditions

22 MULLIN v. DOE
Opinion of the Court
intolerable. But poverty and deprivation are no reflection
on character, and there is no justification for denigrating
the character of Haitians who suffer from and bear no re-
sponsibility for their country’s ills.
Due in large part to the difficult conditions at home,
many Haitians have come to this country throughout our
history. And beginning with the more than 500 Haitians
who fought to support American independence at the Battle
of Savannah in 1779,
5
Haitians have made many positive
contributions to the United States from the very beginning,
and they continue to do so today.
In offering the cited statements as proof that the termi-
nation of Haiti’s TPS termination was motivated by race,
Miot respondents seek to capitalize on the statements’
heated language. Political discourse by prominent public
figures is increasingly couched in terms that would have
scandalized the public just a short time ago, and the state-
ments cited by Miot respondents—especially those concern-
ing Haiti and Haitian immigrants to this country—exem-
plify this development.
But whatever one may think of the cited statements, they
are insufficient to show that the termination of Haiti’s TPS
designation was based on the race of the Haitian people.
Ironically, both Doe and Miot respondents identify a strong,
race-neutral explanation of these officials’ statements: the
present administration’s general stance on immigration
and its obvious antipathy toward past administrations’ TPS
policies. Respondents argue that the Secretary made a
“preordained decision” to end TPS for all countries, Brief for
Respondents in No. 25–1083, p. 49, and they stress that she
terminated the TPS designations for every country that
came up for review, 13 in all. Id., at 9–10; Brief for Re-
spondents in No. 25–1084, p. 10. Included are nations in
——————
5
See G. Clark, The Role of the Haitian Volunteers at Savannah in
1779: An Attempt at an Objective View, 41 Phylon 356 (1980).

23 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
East Asia (Nepal and Burma), Central Asia (Afghanistan),
the Middle East (Syria and Yemen), Africa (Somalia, Ethi-
opia, South Sudan, and Cameroon), Central America (Nic-
aragua and Honduras), South America (Venezuela), and
the Caribbean (Haiti).
Most would regard this as a racially diverse group of
countries, but Miot respondents see them all as “non-white”
nations. Ibid. They claim that TPS has not been termi-
nated for any predominantly white nation, and they there-
fore infer that the reason for the termination of the TPS
designation for Haiti was having a predominantly non-
white population.
Respondents’ definition of a predominantly non-white na-
tion is broad, apparently encompassing major European
countries. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 106–108. It may be that only
the termination of a TPS designation for a Nordic or Ger-
manic country would be sufficient in their judgment to show
that the Secretary’s unbroken record of TPS terminations
was race-neutral. However, no such test case has come up
during the present administration. Only one European na-
tion—Ukraine—had a TPS designation when the President
began his second term, and that country’s TPS designation
has not yet come up for review. See 90 Fed. Reg. 5936
(2025) (extending Ukraine TPS designation through Octo-
ber 19, 2026). The only other European states ever desig-
nated for TPS were the war-torn provinces of Kosovo and
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
6
The great majority of countries
granted TPS have ranked among the poorest nations of the
world, and no European nation falls into that category.
Viewing all the relevant evidence, we conclude that Miot
respondents are unlikely to prove that race was a motivat-
ing factor in the decision to terminate Haiti’s TPS
——————
6
63 Fed. Reg. 31527 (1998) (designating Kosovo for TPS); 65 Fed. Reg.
33356 (2000) (terminating Kosovo’s TPS designation); 57 Fed. Reg. 35604
(1992) (designating Bosnia-Herzegovina for TPS); 65 Fed. Reg. 52789–
52790 (2000) (terminating Bosnia-Herzegovina’s TPS designation).

24 MULLIN v. DOE
Opinion of the Court
designation. It follows that they are not entitled to interim
relief on their equal protection claim.
7
***
The judgments of the United States District Courts for
the Southern District of New York and the District of Co-
lumbia are reversed. The cases are remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
——————
7
On June 16, Miot respondents filed a motion to dismiss the writ of
certiorari as improvidently granted. They claim that newly discovered
evidence provides further support for their equal protection claim. This
evidence is cumulative of other evidence in the record, and the motion is
denied.

_________________
_________________
1 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 25–1083 and 25–1084
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
ET AL., PETITIONERS
25–1083 v.
DAHLIA DOE,
ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES,
ET AL., PETITIONERS
25–1084 v.
FRITZ EMMANUEL LESLY MIOT,
ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[June 25, 2026]
JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court in full. I write separately
to address two more fundamental problems with the Miot
respondents’ suit. First, their equal protection claim, while
meritless under the Court’s precedents, was also beyond the
District Court’s jurisdiction. Second, even assuming juris-
diction, the equal protection claim fails for the additional
reason that aliens have no equal protection rights against
the Federal Government.
I
Title 8 U. S. C. §1254a(b)(5)(A) precludes district courts
from reviewing terminations of Temporary Protected Sta-
tus (TPS) designations. It provides that “[t]here is no

2 MULLIN v. DOE
T
HOMAS, J., concurring
judicial review of any determination of ” the Secretary of
Homeland Security “with respect to the . . . termination” of
a designation of a foreign country for purposes of Tempo-
rary Protected Status. See ante, at 12. As the Court ex-
plains, this bar precludes the statutory claims challenging
the Secretary’s “determination” that the TPS designations
for Syria and Haiti should be terminated because they chal-
lenge “the process that led to [the Secretary’s] final deci-
sion.” Ante, at 13. The Court does not decide whether the
Miot respondents’ equal protection claim is barred as well.
In my view, this equal protection claim is barred by the
statute. It falls within the plain text of §1254a(b)(5)(A)’s
judicial-review bar. Respondents asked a federal court to
“[s]et aside the termination of Haiti’s . . . designation as . . .
unconstitutional” because it “was, at least in part, improp-
erly motivated by animus and discriminatory intent based
on race and ethnicity.” Amended Complaint in No. 25–cv–
2471 (D DC), ECF Doc. 74, pp. 84–86. By asking for a court
order invalidating the Secretary’s decision to terminate
Haiti’s designation, respondents sought precisely what
Congress barred: “judicial review of ” the Secretary’s deter-
mination “with respect to the . . . termination . . . of a des-
ignation . . . of a foreign state.” §1254a(b)(5)(A). The stat-
utory text does not distinguish statutory and constitutional
claims; it bars all “judicial review.” Judicial review, of
course, means “a court’s power to review the actions of other
branches or levels of government,” and it “esp[ecially]” re-
fers to the “power to invalidate legislative and executive ac-
tions as being unconstitutional.” Black’s Law Dictionary
1011 (12th ed. 2024). Therefore, for the same reasons that
their statutory claims are barred, their constitutional claim
is also barred: It challenges “the process that led to” the “de-
cision to terminate [Haiti’s] TPS designatio[n]” at a mini-
mum, and it likely is barred even under respondents’ nar-
rower view that the bar applies “only to substantive claims”
respecting a termination. Ante, at 13.

3 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., concurring
Respondents suggest that the plain language of the stat-
ute should not apply. Brief for Respondents in No. 25–1084,
p. 15. According to this Court’s modern precedent, consti-
tutional avoidance requires a clear statement to bar judicial
review of constitutional claims. See Webster v. Doe, 486
U. S. 592, 603 (1988). Barring all judicial consideration of
a constitutional challenge to the Secretary’s TPS determi-
nation could, these precedents say, “rais[e] a serious consti-
tutional question of the validity of the statute as so con-
strued.” Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 762 (1975).
Accordingly, the argument goes, courts should avoid inter-
preting the statute to have barred such review unless its
intent to do so was clear, which respondents appear to
doubt. Ibid.
I am unconvinced for two reasons.
A
First, the statute makes Congress’s intent to preclude ju-
dicial review clear. The canon of constitutional avoidance
applies only if the statute is ambiguous. Coney Island Auto
Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton Tr. for Vista-Pro Automo-
tive, LLC, 607 U. S. 155, 161 (2026). Congress’s language—
“no judicial review”—is not ambiguous. See ante, at 12–13.
There is no indication in the text that reviewability may
turn on the source of law for the underlying claim. It fol-
lows that constitutional avoidance has no role.
B
Second, even if §1254a(b)(5)(A) were ambiguous, a judi-
cial-review bar would raise no “serious constitutional ques-
tion” in the first place. Weinberger, 422 U. S., at 762. Be-
cause inferior federal courts are creatures of statute, U. S.
Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 9, they “possess no jurisdiction but
what is given them by the power that creates them,” United
States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 33 (1812); accord, Trainmen
v. Toledo, P. & W. R. Co., 321 U. S. 50, 63–64 (1944)

4 MULLIN v. DOE
T
HOMAS, J., concurring
(explaining that Congress has “plenary control over the ju-
risdiction of the federal courts”). So, Congress has the au-
thority to deprive district courts of jurisdiction to decide
particular kinds of claims.
It makes no difference that the Miot respondents alleged
a violation of the Constitution. As Justice Scalia put it,
“What could possibly be the basis for” doubting Congress’s
authority to bar judicial review of constitutional claims?
Webster, 486 U. S., at 612 (dissenting opinion). “The very
text of the Constitution refutes th[e] principle” that “all con-
stitutional violations must be remediable in the courts.”
Ibid. In some cases, a question of constitutional law is “tex-
tually committed” to adjudication solely by another branch.
Nixon v. United States, 506 U. S. 224, 228 (1993); see, e.g.,
Art. I, §2, cl. 2 (setting the qualifications for House Mem-
bers); §3, cl. 3 (setting qualifications for Senators); §5, cl. 1
(establishing that “[e]ach House shall be the Judge of the
. . . Qualifications of its own Members,” not any court). In
other contexts, the “lack of judicially discoverable and man-
ageable standards” has been taken to show that a claim of
a constitutional violation cannot be addressed on the merits
by federal courts. Nixon, 506 U. S., at 228.
Other familiar principles likewise bar judicial review of
constitutional claims. An obvious one is sovereign immun-
ity, “a monument to the principle that some constitutional
claims can go unheard.” Webster, 486 U. S., at 613 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). Because of sovereign immunity, no one can
sue the Federal Government for damages without a waiver,
even if he brings a constitutional claim and even if damages
are his only possible remedy. Likewise, “courts cannot ex-
amine” “the President’s actions on subjects within his ‘con-
clusive and preclusive’ constitutional authority,” regardless
of whether he violates the Constitution in exercising that
authority. Trump v. United States, 603 U. S. 593, 609
(2024). The Constitution thus does not require that courts
be able to hear all constitutional claims.

5 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., concurring
***
Congress barred all judicial review of TPS termination
decisions, including constitutional claims. Since nothing in
the Constitution prohibits Congress from doing so, courts
are obliged to simply “giv[e] effect to [§1254a’s] ordinary
meaning.” Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221, 244
(2020) (T
HOMAS, J., dissenting).
1
II
Respondents’ equal protection claim also has no basis in
the Constitution. The Constitution has only one Equal Pro-
tection Clause, and it applies only to the “State[s],” not the
Federal Government. Amdt. 14, §1. Respondents, of
course, sued the Federal Government. When asked at ar-
gument how the Equal Protection Clause could have any-
thing to do with a suit against the Federal Government, re-
spondents’ counsel, drawing on precedents of this Court,
stated that the claim “arises under . . . the Fifth Amend-
ment’s equal protection guarantee” because “the Fifth
Amendment constrains the federal government in the same
way that the Fourteenth Amendment constrains states.”
Tr. of Oral Arg. 118. Because the Fifth Amendment has no
Equal Protection Clause, this Court was wrong to read
equal protection into it in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497
(1954). And, even if the Due Process Clause does prohibit
some discrimination, it would not do so in a case about im-
migration status.
A
There is little evidence for the Court’s modern assump-
tion that “the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
contains an equal protection component whose substance is
——————
1
Although I would rule against respondents based on the judicial-re-
view bar, I also agree with the Court that they are unlikely to succeed on
the merits. Cf. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S. 281, 314 (2018)
(T
HOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

6 MULLIN v. DOE
T
HOMAS, J., concurring
‘precisely the same’ as the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” United States v. Vaello Madero,
596 U. S. 159, 166–167 (2022) (T
HOMAS, J., concurring)
(quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636, 638, n. 2
(1975)). The Clause says nothing about equal protection or
discrimination. Reading an implicit “equal protection com-
ponent” into the Fifth Amendment’s language renders in-
comprehensible the Fourteenth Amendment’s inclusion of
both an identical Due Process Clause and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Vaello Madero, 596 U. S., at 170–171 (opinion
of T
HOMAS, J.). History provides no basis for this atextual
reading, either.
2
See id., at 167–171.
Even if the Due Process Clause did include some nondis-
crimination principle, it would have no application here.
The Due Process Clause restricts the Federal Government’s
ability to “depriv[e]” people of “life, liberty, or property.”
U. S. Const., Amdt. 5. “The Due Process Clause protects
rights, not privileges.” Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump,
607 U. S. 229, 323 (2026) (T
HOMAS, J., dissenting) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “The founding generation un-
derstood the phrase ‘life, liberty, or property’ to refer to a
relatively narrow set of core private rights that did not de-
pend on the will of the government.” Sessions v. Dimaya,
584 U. S. 148, 213 (2018) (T
HOMAS, J., dissenting).
The termination of Haiti’s TPS designation does not de-
prive respondents of “life, liberty, or property,” so they have
no claim even if the words “due process” implicitly forbid
discriminatory animus. The discretionary and limited sta-
tus that a TPS designation provides, like any immigration
status for aliens, is a government-created privilege, not a
core private right. See United States ex rel. Knauff v.
——————
2
As I have explained, there is “substantial support for the proposition
that . . . the Citizenship Clause guarantees citizens equal treatment by
the Federal Government with respect to civil rights.” Vaello Madero, 596
U. S., at 179 (T
HOMAS, J., concurring). But, respondents are not citizens,
so the Citizenship Clause cannot guarantee them any rights.

7 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., concurring
Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 537, 542 (1950) (“Admission of al-
iens to the United States is a privilege granted by the sov-
ereign United States Government”); Harisiades v. Shaugh-
nessy, 342 U. S. 580, 586–587 (1952) (explaining that even
permanent residence is not a “right” but “a matter of per-
mission and tolerance”); United States ex rel. Turner v. Wil-
liams, 194 U. S. 279, 290 (1904) (“[T]he deportation of an
alien who is found to be here in violation of law is not a
deprivation of liberty without due process of law”). So, a
TPS determination does not implicate the Due Process
Clause even if a discriminatory motive is inconsistent with
“due process” in other contexts.
B
Perhaps for these reasons, this Court has never subjected
even express racial classifications in immigration laws to
scrutiny under the Due Process Clause. While foreigners
have long been able to claim constitutional protection from
racial discrimination by States, see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U. S. 356, 368–369 (1886), they have never been guaran-
teed a right to immigration status or citizenship based on
equal protection principles, even when these laws were
openly discriminatory, see Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22
Stat. 58–59 (severely restricting Chinese immigration); Ta-
kao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U. S. 178, 192–193 (1922)
(“In all of the Naturalization acts from 1790 to 1906 the
privilege of naturalization was confined to white persons
(with the addition in 1870 of those of African nativity and
descent),” and legislation up to 1922 had not changed that
restriction). Congress only amended these laws to elimi-
nate such discrimination in the middle of the 20th century,
3
——————
3
The racial restrictions for naturalization were gradually removed
from 1940 onward. See Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633, 635, n. 3
(1948). The last restrictions, however, were not removed until 1952. See
ibid. (explaining that persons of Japanese descent were still ineligible in
1948); Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, §311, 66 Stat. 239.

8 MULLIN v. DOE
T
HOMAS, J., concurring
but not because the meaning of the Fifth Amendment has
changed. See 8 U. S. C. §1427(a) (present naturalization
statute).
If equal protection principles applied to immigration de-
cisions, much of even our current immigration law would
conflict with this Court’s modern equal protection doctrine.
This Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to
bar discrimination based on “country of origin.” Oyama v.
California, 332 U. S. 633, 640 (1948). But, our immigration
laws have distinguished among aliens based on their na-
tional origin from the beginning. See, e.g., Act of July 6,
1798, §1, 1 Stat. 577 (authorizing deportation of those who
are subjects of hostile nations). Today, applicants for im-
migration are treated differently based on their nationality
as a matter of course. 8 U. S. C. §1152(a)(2). And, respond-
ents themselves seek a protection from deportation for peo-
ple from Haiti, but not the neighboring Dominican Repub-
lic. If they are correct that the Court should apply equal
protection precedents to immigration decisions, then the
program that they benefit from may, ironically, be uncon-
stitutional.

_________________
_________________
1 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
K
AGAN, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 25–1083 and 25–1084
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
ET AL., PETITIONERS
25–1083 v.
DAHLIA DOE,
ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES,
ET AL., PETITIONERS
25–1084 v.
FRITZ EMMANUEL LESLY MIOT,
ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[June 25, 2026]
JUSTICE KAGAN, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and
J
USTICE JACKSON join, dissenting.
For over a decade, the Government has provided human-
itarian relief to Haitian and Syrian nationals in the United
States through the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) pro-
gram. The Secretary of Homeland Security first designated
Haiti for the program in 2010 after an earthquake devas-
tated the country; the Secretary designated Syria in 2012
because of the government and military’s brutal repression
of the country’s civilian population. Since those initial des-
ignations, Secretaries have repeatedly examined the condi-
tions in the two countries, and have repeatedly determined
that they remain too dangerous to permit safe return. As a
result, those countries’ TPS designations have been

2 MULLIN v. DOE
K
AGAN, J., dissenting
extended year after year, and hundreds of thousands of
Haitians and Syrians have been able to live and work here.
But that is no longer so, and the suits before us challenge
that change. Last year, then-Secretary Kristi Noem, at the
instigation of President Trump, terminated Haiti’s and
Syria’s TPS designations, declaring the countries now safe.
Haitian and Syrian TPS holders brought these cases, and
sought interim relief allowing them to stay here while the
litigation progressed. The District Courts granted that re-
lief, finding (among other things) that the terminations
were likely unlawful. Both courts concluded that the Sec-
retary probably violated the TPS statute by ordering the
terminations without first consulting with other agencies
about current country conditions. And the District Court in
the Haiti litigation found as well that the plaintiffs had a
likely successful equal protection claim, in part because
statements made by the President showed that a racially
discriminatory purpose had entered into the TPS termina-
tion.
Today the Court undoes that preliminary relief—insist-
ing that the terminations take effect now—based on two
mistakes about the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success. First,
the majority asserts that the Secretary’s compliance with
the TPS statute is in every respect unreviewable by the
courts. But in fact the statute allows judicial review of
whether the Secretary adhered to the procedures it man-
dates—which is what the plaintiffs dispute here. Second,
the majority claims to see no evidence that race played any
role in the Haiti decision. But the evidence is there, plain
to see, in the President’s statements, which the majority
(and for that matter, his own lawyers) cannot even bear to
repeat. Once that much is established, the case for interim
relief is made: There is no dispute that the plaintiffs will
suffer irreparable harm absent postponement of the TPS
decisions. So the plaintiffs are entitled to stay in this coun-
try while these suits go forward. Respectfully, I dissent

Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 3
K
AGAN, J., dissenting
from the Court’s decision that they may instead be put on
the next plane.
I
Start with how the TPS program works—or, at least, is
supposed to. The governing statute authorizes the Secre-
tary to “designate” a country for the program if it is suffer-
ing from specified dangerous or harmful conditions, such as
may arise from armed conflicts or natural disasters. 8
U. S. C. §1254a(b)(1). When the Secretary makes a desig-
nation, she also announces how long it will last—anywhere
from six to eighteen months. At the end of that period, the
designation does not just go away; nor is its fate left to the
Secretary’s unfettered discretion. Rather, the statute man-
dates a “[p]eriodic review” process: “At least 60 days before
[the] end” of the chosen period, the Secretary, “after consul-
tation with appropriate agencies of the Government, shall
review the conditions in the foreign state” and “shall deter-
mine whether the conditions for such designation under
this subsection continue to be met.” §1254a(b)(3)(A). If the
Secretary determines the statutory criteria are no longer
met, she “shall” terminate the designation; otherwise, the
designation “is extended.” §§1254a(b)(3)(B), (C). Either
way, “[t]he [Secretary] shall provide on a timely basis for
the publication of notice” in the Federal Register.
§1254a(b)(3)(A). So in all, the statute tells the Secretary to
complete four steps to terminate a TPS designation: (1) con-
sult with appropriate agencies about the country’s condi-
tions, (2) review those conditions, (3) determine whether
those conditions are still bad enough to meet the statutory
criteria, and (4) publish a notice in the Federal Register. All
agree those steps are mandatory. See ante, at 5.
The first question in these cases is whether a federal
court can review a claim that the Secretary failed to take
one of the four mandated steps—here, that before terminat-
ing TPS for Haiti and Syria, she failed to consult with

4 MULLIN v. DOE
K
AGAN, J., dissenting
appropriate agencies about country conditions. The plain-
tiffs’ failure-to-consult claims are brought under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, which means judicial review is
available unless “a relevant statute precludes it” or the
challenged “action is committed to agency discretion by
law.” Department of Commerce v. New York, 588 U. S. 752,
771 (2019); see 5 U. S. C. §701(a). Neither the Government
nor the majority contends that the actions in dispute are
committed to the agency’s discretion, so the issue here is
whether the TPS statute prevents courts from reviewing
the Secretary’s compliance with its mandatory procedures.
The statute does no such thing. Its judicial-review bar
applies not to everything the Secretary does under the law,
but only to her “determination” “with respect to the desig-
nation, or termination or extension of a designation, of a
foreign state.” 8 U. S. C. §1254a(b)(5)(A). To preclude re-
view of those determinations is of course to insulate critical
matters from judicial scrutiny. Suppose the Secretary de-
termines that a country no longer qualifies for a TPS desig-
nation even though the record shows the opposite—that
country conditions are as dire as ever. Under the statute,
no court may second-guess that determination. But still,
the review bar has limits. It does nothing to stop courts
from reviewing things other than the Secretary’s “determi-
nation[s]” concerning TPS designations. Ibid. And those
other things include the procedural steps the Secretary
must undertake prior to making any determination about
country conditions.
For that reason, the judicial-review bar does not preclude
the plaintiffs’ failure-to-consult claims. Those claims are
narrow. They do not assert that the Secretary made the
wrong call when she determined that Haiti and Syria no
longer meet the criteria for TPS (although the plaintiffs
surely think that too). Instead, the claims are that the Sec-
retary failed to comply with a pre-determination procedural
mandate—more specifically, that she failed to consult with

5 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
K
AGAN, J., dissenting
appropriate agencies about country conditions. A court can
adjudicate those claims without reviewing—or even think-
ing about—the Secretary’s later “determination[s]” con-
cerning (i.e., “with respect to”) the “termination” of Haiti’s
and Syria’s TPS “designation[s].” Ibid. That is because the
claims concern a distinct matter—whether the Secretary
did what the statute demands before she made her unre-
viewable decision.
The majority’s contrary conclusion rests on what it self-
describes as a “very broad” view of the term “determina-
tion.” Ante, at 12. According to the majority, that term can
“be used as a synonym for ‘decision’” or “to describe the
chain of events leading up to a decision.” Ibid. So when the
judicial-review bar refers to a “determination,” the majority
posits, it means not only the actual determination of
whether a country still qualifies for TPS, but also the “chain
of events leading up to” that decision. Ibid. And the latter
includes, the majority says, the statutorily required consul-
tations—which (voila!) brings them within the judicial-re-
view bar.
“[V]ery broad” might be one description for that reading
of the term “determination”; very strange is another. Just
last Term, this Court observed that the word “determina-
tion” is a “term[] of everyday usage,” and then said what it
means: the “settling and ending of a controversy”; “the re-
solving of a question by argument or reasoning”; “[t]he de-
cision arrived at or promulgated”; or “a determinate sen-
tence, conclusion, or opinion.” EPA v. Calumet Shreveport
Refining, L.L.C., 605 U. S. 627, 643 (2025). Missing from
those definitions (or any other you, as an English speaker,
would naturally come up with) is any suggestion that
events preceding a determination—including required pro-
cedural steps—are properly referred to as the “determina-
tion” itself. See McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498
U. S. 479, 492 (1991) (construing the word “determination”
in another judicial-review bar as “describ[ing] a single act,”

6 MULLIN v. DOE
K
AGAN, J., dissenting
rather than the “procedure employed in making decisions”).
In ordinary English, a “determination” means, well, a de-
termination—not a determination plus anything and eve-
rything the decisionmaker does or is required to do before-
hand. And then, so too in this statute—which even the
majority does not think uses the word “determination” as
some special term of art. See ante, at 16.
1
And even if the matter is less certain than I think, the
“strong presumption” in favor of judicial review should de-
cide it the plaintiffs’ way. Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575
U. S. 480, 486 (2015). That presumption applies even when
we interpret the scope, rather than the existence, of a judi-
cial-review bar. See Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v.
Lee, 579 U. S. 261, 273 (2016). In that context, as in all
others, we “presume that Congress intends the executive to
obey its statutory commands and, accordingly, that it ex-
pects the courts to grant relief when an executive agency
violates such a command.” Bowen v. Michigan Academy of
Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, 681 (1986). The majority
concedes as much, mouthing all the right words: “[W]hen a
statutory provision is reasonably susceptible to divergent
interpretation, we adopt the reading that accords with the
traditional and basic principle that executive determina-
tions generally are subject to judicial review.” Ante, at 13
——————
1
The majority briefly states that it would reach the same conclusion if
“determination” means only the “final decision” to terminate TPS be-
cause (it says) all the prior consultative steps—which, somewhat confus-
ingly, it also labels “decisions”—would be “with respect to” that ultimate
TPS determination. Ante, at 12–13. The problem with that argument is
that it jumbles the order of the words in the statute. The statute does
not speak of decisions (or steps) “with respect to” a determination—what-
ever that would mean. Instead, the statute speaks of a determination
“with respect to” “the designation, or termination or extension of a des-
ignation, of a foreign state.” 8 U. S. C. §1254a(b)(5)(A). So if a “determi-
nation” is indeed only the Secretary’s “final decision,” as the majority
here accepts, then the phrase “with respect to,” however broad, does it
no good.

7 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
K
AGAN, J., dissenting
(quoting Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221, 229
(2020)). And then the principle gets ignored. If the mean-
ing of “determination” is not “reasonably susceptible to di-
vergent interpretations,” it is only because, as I maintain,
a “determination” is a determination. But the majority’s
view that a “determination” includes as well all the steps
and processes and actions in “the chain” leading up to the
determination? Ante, at 12. That is reasonably contestable
by any measure.
Indeed, the consequences of today’s holding could be Ex-
hibit A in the case for why we have adopted a presumption
favoring judicial review. The TPS statute makes plain that
Congress insulated the Secretary’s designation determina-
tions from review—that it did not want judges overriding
secretarial decisions (made with proper consultation) about
conditions in foreign countries. But the majority’s holding
makes everything in the statute precatory, including proce-
dural requisites whose enforcement would seem to fall
smack in the middle of the judicial wheelhouse. After to-
day, a Secretary can announce to the world that she didn’t
consult with anyone—more, that she didn’t evaluate coun-
try conditions at all—before making, extending, or termi-
nating a TPS designation. And the courts will be powerless
to intervene, even though Congress loaded up the TPS stat-
ute with requirements about the (altogether different) way
the Secretary is supposed to make her decision. If it means
anything to “presume that Congress intends the executive
to obey its statutory commands,” Bowen, 476 U. S., at 681—
to think that Congress does not want all its work to go for
naught—then the majority has gone wrong.
And the claims that the majority refuses to review are in
fact meritorious, because the Secretary did not consult (as
the statute demands) with “appropriate agencies of the
Government” about “the conditions” in Haiti and Syria.
§1254a(b)(3)(A). As everyone agrees, the only relevant com-
munications here were brief email exchanges between an

8 MULLIN v. DOE
K
AGAN, J., dissenting
aide to the Secretary and an official at the State Depart-
ment (a clearly “appropriate” agency). The aide stated (in
two separate emails) that Haiti’s and Syria’s TPS designa-
tions were up for review; the official then replied as to each
that the State Department had “no foreign policy concerns”
with a termination of TPS. 2 App. 763; Administrative Rec-
ord in No. 25–cv–8686 (SDNY), ECF Doc. 72–2, p. 156. The
problem with those exchanges is that they were not about
the right thing. The statute insists on consultations about
whether country conditions are safe, not about whether
ending TPS raises “foreign policy concerns.” While there
might be overlap between the two subjects, they are hardly
coextensive. It could well be that terminating TPS for even
an unsafe country raises no foreign policy concerns because
it does not threaten U. S. relations with any significant for-
eign nation. Of course, the State Department is free to
opine on that matter, as part of its job of overseeing foreign
affairs. But the TPS statute mandates that it also advise
on something else: whether, since an earlier TPS designa-
tion, the conditions in a country (here, Haiti and Syria)
have become safe. The State Department did not do that
here, so the Secretary did not fulfill her consultation re-
quirement.
2
The Government’s opposing argument—that the re-
quired consultation occurs whenever the Secretary asks
about country conditions—is underwhelming. According to
——————
2
One might wonder why a State Department official asked about TPS
would weigh in on “foreign policy concerns” when the statute insists on
consultations about country conditions. Perhaps it was just a miscom-
munication or mistake. But perhaps it was purposeful avoidance of an
inconvenient topic. At the relevant time, the Department’s travel advi-
sories stated that Haiti was unsafe due to “kidnapping, crime, terrorist
activity, civil unrest, and limited health care,” and that “[n]o part of Syria
[was] safe from violence” due to “terrorism, civil unrest, kidnapping, hos-
tage taking, and armed conflict.” 2 App. 771; 1 id., at 447. So it would
have been hard for a State Department official to provide the Secretary
with the relevant country-condition assurances.

9 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
K
AGAN, J., dissenting
the Government, “consultation” just means “[t]o seek advice
or input,” not to receive it. Tr. of Oral Arg. 41; see id., at 38
(“[I]f you’ve asked, you’ve consulted”). So once the Secre-
tary reaches out to an appropriate agency, the statute is
satisfied, even if a response never comes back, or if the one
that does is “completely unresponsive” like “wasn’t that
baseball game tonight great?” Id., at 38–39. But sorry, that
is not what “consultation” means. See, e.g., Black’s Law
Dictionary 316 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “[c]onsultation” as
“[d]eliberation of persons on some subject”). If your doctor
tells you, “After consulting with a specialist, I’ve deter-
mined that you should have this procedure,” you would
think he had an exchange with an expert about your condi-
tion. If it turned out the doctor emailed a specialist but
never heard back, or the specialist’s reply was about a base-
ball game, you would think the doctor had lied. The emails
here are in the same vein. The consultation required by law
never took place because there was no two-way communi-
cation about the right subject.
II
The Haiti plaintiffs have yet another claim that is likely
to succeed: that race entered into the decision to terminate
Haiti’s TPS designation, in violation of equal protection.
Our decision in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977), supplies the
standard for assessing that claim. The Haiti plaintiffs must
show (here, must show as a likelihood) that a racially “dis-
criminatory purpose” was “a motivating factor” in the ter-
mination of Haiti’s TPS designation.
3
Id., at 265–266.
——————
3
The majority assumes without deciding that Arlington Heights pro-
vides the right framework. See ante, at 20. But of course it does. Ar-
lington Heights is the framework we have always used to examine dis-
criminatory purpose in equal-protection cases—including six years ago
in another lawsuit involving a challenge to immigration policy. See De-
partment of Homeland Security v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 591 U. S. 1,
34 (2020) (plurality opinion). The Government’s argument that we

10 MULLIN v. DOE
K
AGAN, J., dissenting
Critically, “a motivating factor” does not mean the sole fac-
tor, or even “the dominant or primary one.” Id., at 265. One
factor among many is enough when the factor is racial to
presumptively establish an equal protection violation. See
ibid. And in determining whether such a factor exists, a
court must undertake a “sensitive inquiry” into whatever
“circumstantial and direct evidence of intent” is available.
Id., at 266. It should consider “[t]he historical background
of the decision”; the “sequence of events leading up” to it;
and, most relevant here, “contemporary statements” by de-
cisionmakers. Id., at 267–268.
This Court must also take account of a deferential stand-
ard of appellate review. The discriminatory-purpose in-
quiry is predominantly factual, so a lower court’s conclusion
must stand unless clearly erroneous. See Anderson v. Bes-
semer City, 470 U. S. 564, 573 (1985). Here, the District
Court found that the existing record (which future discov-
ery could supplement) “strongly suggests that [the] decision
to terminate Haiti’s TPS designation was motivated, at
least in part, by racial animus.” 2 App. 703; see id., at 698
(observing that the President’s statements “repeatedly in-
voked racist tropes of national purity,” and evinced “anti-
black” animus). Under clear-error review, that finding gov-
erns so long as it is “plausible.” Anderson, 470 U. S., at 574.
It is more than plausible: Even putting the clear-error
standard aside, the Haiti plaintiffs have carried their bur-
den. The evidence they have offered includes statements
by the President so repellent and racially inflected that the
majority declines to put them in print. (Indeed, one meas-
ure of the President’s way of speaking about Haitians is to
compare it with the majority’s, which is unfailingly
——————
should apply the deferential test the Court used in Trump v. Hawaii, 585
U. S. 667 (2018), seeks both a significant extension of Hawaii and a mas-
sive change in equal-protection law—neither of which is warranted.

11 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
K
AGAN, J., dissenting
respectful.
4
) So here are some of those statements. Hai-
tians are “eating the dogs . . . . They’re eating the cats.
They’re eating—they’re eating the pets of the people that
live [in Springfield, Ohio].” 2 App. 802; see id., at 644. And:
Haitians are also eating “other things too that they’re not
supposed to be.” Id., at 698–699. And: Haitians in the
United States “probably have AIDS.” Id., at 698. And:
Haiti is a “shithole country,” which is “filthy, dirty, [and]
disgusting.” Id., at 698–699. And: Haitian immigration is
“like a death wish for our country.” Id., at 698. And: Hai-
tians, along with some others, are “poisoning the blood” of
our country. Id., at 698. And: “Why is it we only take people
from shithole countries” like “Haiti [and] Somalia”? “Why
cannot we have some people from Norway [and] Sweden?”
Id., at 699. The majority briefly replies that those remarks
are not “overtly racial,” ante, at 21, but it is hard to know
what that means. Haitians are Black. (Norwegians and
Swedes not so much.) The references—of filth, disease, and
primitiveness—are shot through with racial stereotypes
and tropes. It is hard to imagine the statements being
made today of any White community. No very “sensitive
inquiry,” of the kind Arlington Heights compels, is needed
to see them for what they are, 429 U. S., at 266; judges, as
we often say, are “not required to exhibit a naiveté from
which ordinary citizens are free,” Department of Commerce,
588 U. S., at 785. The statements fairly shout, in their ra-
cial undertones and overtones alike, that race entered into
the President’s resolve to remove Haitians from this coun-
try.
The majority’s opposing argument is at odds with the Ar-
lington Heights standard. On the majority’s view, there is
a more plausible “race-neutral explanation[]” of the
——————
4
For example: “[P]overty and deprivation are no reflection on charac-
ter, and there is no justification for denigrating the character of Haitians
who suffer from and bear no responsibility for their country’s ills.” Ante,
at 22.

12 MULLIN v. DOE
K
AGAN, J., dissenting
termination of Haiti’s TPS designation: “the present admin-
istration’s general stance on immigration and its obvious
antipathy toward past administrations’ TPS policies.”
Ante, at 22; see ante, at 2. But the Arlington Heights test is
not in the nature of an “either/or” inquiry. It does not ask
a court to identify which is the single cause, or even the pri-
mary cause, of an official action. To the contrary, that test
recognizes a “both/and” world: that causes are usually mul-
tiple (and often intertwined). I have no doubt that, as the
majority says, the current administration is generally hos-
tile toward immigration and prior TPS policies. I also have
no doubt, again with the majority, that those views may be
held for reasons “hav[ing] nothing to do with race.” Ante,
at 21. But under Arlington Heights, that is not the end of
the matter. If in addition to race-neutral reasons, race en-
tered into the picture—even as a subsidiary factor—the
Haiti TPS decision is irretrievably tainted. And here, the
President’s own statements show that race did enter in—
that, within what was surely a multi-cause decision, it was
a motivating factor. Because that is all the Haiti plaintiffs
need to show on their equal protection claim, the District
Court was right to find that it is likely to succeed.
III
Once the merits are thus established, the requested in-
terim relief must follow, given the harm the plaintiffs will
otherwise suffer. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 426
(2009) (considering “whether the applicant will be irrepara-
bly injured”). Indeed, neither the Government, in its brief-
ing here, nor the majority contests the point. Without a
postponement of the TPS terminations, hundreds of thou-
sands of Haitians and Syrians living in this country will
lose their legal status and work authorization. Most will
have no legal option except to leave the country, even at the
price of leaving family behind; otherwise, they will likely be
detained or removed. Some may be eligible to apply for

13 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
K
AGAN, J., dissenting
asylum, but they will not be able to work here, so as a prac-
tical matter may also have to relocate. And where will any
of those individuals go? Haiti and Syria are countries that
the State Department continues to list as too dangerous for
travel; they may be yet more perilous for a former inhabit-
ant. Nor would there be much hope for an eventual return
to this country, given statutory bars on reentry and TPS
requirements of continuous presence. Hundreds of thou-
sands of lives will be uprooted, most permanently, while
this litigation to annul the Secretary’s (likely illegal) termi-
nation orders proceeds.
Take as examples two of the individual plaintiffs here.
Fritz Emmanuel Lesly Miot is a Haitian national who has
held TPS for fifteen years. He lives in California where he
works in a laboratory researching Alzheimer’s, a job he can
hold only because of his TPS work authorization. Miot suf-
fers from Type 1 diabetes, which is easily treated in the
United States. But in Haiti, the same disease can be a
death sentence, given that country’s collapsed health-care
infrastructure (attributable to both natural disasters and
political conditions). And beyond those health issues, Miot
believes his long-term residency in the United States would
make him a prime target in Haiti for a kidnapping. Or con-
sider Laila Doe, who fled Syria with her daughter in 2013
after her neighborhood was bombed. Today, Doe lives in
Illinois where she works as a behavioral technician for in-
dividuals with disabilities and cares for her elderly mother,
a U. S. citizen. Without TPS, she will have to leave her
mother and return to a still ravaged, violent, and dangerous
country. Doe fears that as a single woman living alone, she
will be robbed or even killed there. And she is afraid that
her now 17-year-old daughter, who has lived in this country
almost all her life, will have no future in Syria because she
speaks little Arabic.
Miot, Doe, and the other plaintiffs before us deserve bet-
ter than today’s decision. True enough that TPS is a

14 MULLIN v. DOE
K
AGAN, J., dissenting
temporary program, and that it did not promise the plain-
tiffs never-ending humanitarian protection. But the law
prevents the program from ending as it likely did here—
without the required consultations about country condi-
tions and, as to Haiti, with impermissible race-based con-
siderations tainting the decision. At this juncture, both sets
of plaintiffs ask for only one thing: that they may stay in
this country while they continue to litigate their claims.
For all the reasons given, they are entitled to that relief,
and should not instead be consigned to devastating, and in-
deed life-threatening, injury.