FCC v. AT&T

1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL. v.
AT&T, INC.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 25–406. Argued April 21, 2026—Decided June 4, 2026*
The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, authorizes the Federal
Communications Commission to investigate regulated parties for sus-
pected violations of the communications laws and to seek monetary
forfeitures for violations of those laws. 47 U. S. C. §503(b). In these
cases, the Commission investigated cellular service providers AT&T
and Verizon (collectively, the carriers) regarding their treatment of
customer location data. Believing that the carriers had violated laws
and regulations requiring them to take reasonable steps to keep loca-
tion data confidential, the FCC sought forfeitures from the carriers.
The Commission first issued the carriers notices of apparent liability
under §503(b)(4), which specified the factual and legal bases for the
forfeitures the Commission sought. After reviewing the carriers’ re-
sponses, the Commission “determined” that the carriers were liable
and “assessed” penalties of roughly $57 million against AT&T and $47
million against Verizon. §§503(b)(1), (b)(2)(E).
Once the Commission issues an order, the recipient has two options.
First, it may seek review in the court of appeals under the Hobbs Act.
See 28 U. S. C. §2342(1). The court of appeals, sitting without a jury,
then reviews the order on the administrative record under the stand-
ards set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act. 47 U. S. C. §402(a);
——————
*Together with No. 25–567, Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission, et al., on certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

2 FCC v. AT&T, INC.
Syllabus
28 U. S. C. §2347(a); 5 U. S. C. §551 et seq., and §701 et seq. The recip-
ient may also opt to do nothing. In the event of nonpayment of a for-
feiture penalty “determined under [§503(b)(4)],” the penalty “shall be
recoverable . . . in a civil suit in the name of the United States.” 47
U. S. C. §504(a). The Commission may then refer the matter to the
Department of Justice, which in turn may—but need not—bring a civil
suit within five years of the issuance of the order. 28 U. S. C. §2462.
That suit “shall be a trial de novo.” 47 U. S. C. §504(a). The regulated
party may, of course, pay the forfeiture voluntarily. But until it does,
or the court in a §504 enforcement action orders payment, the Com-
mission may not use the “notice of apparent liability . . . to the preju-
dice of” the party in other Commission proceedings. §504(c).
Here, the carriers paid their penalties and filed petitions for review
in their respective Courts of Appeals. They argued that requiring for-
feiture without the opportunity for a jury trial violates the Seventh
Amendment. The Fifth Circuit granted AT&T’s petition for review and
vacated the Commission’s order. The court held that the FCC’s en-
forcement procedures violate the Seventh Amendment because by the
time the Commission issues a forfeiture order, it “has already found
the facts, interpreted the law, adjudged guilt, and levied punish-
ment”—all without the involvement of a jury. 149 F. 4th 491, 503. The
Second Circuit denied Verizon’s petition for review on the ground that
the FCC’s forfeiture order did not itself compel payment; the Depart-
ment of Justice “needs to initiate a collection action” under §504 before
the carrier can be made to pay. 156 F. 4th 86, 106. The court thus
held that the Commission does not violate the Seventh Amendment
when it issues forfeiture orders without a jury. See id., at 107. This
Court granted certiorari as to both decisions to resolve the conflict.
Held: Because forfeiture orders issued under §503(b)(4) do not defini-
tively resolve the parties’ legal obligations, and the FCC’s factual find-
ings in its forfeiture proceedings are not conclusive, it does not violate
the Seventh Amendment for the Commission to issue forfeiture orders
without the involvement of a jury. Pp. 6–14.
(a) The FCC’s forfeiture proceedings fit comfortably within the
Court’s Seventh Amendment precedents. The Seventh Amendment
“preserve[s]” the right to trial by jury in “Suits at common law,” and
applies in all proceedings in which “legal rights” are to be “settle[d],”
Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 447. It does not, however, “prescribe at
what stage” of a legal dispute “a trial by jury must, if demanded, be
had.” Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1, 23. The Amendment
requires only that, before legal rights and obligations are conclusively
“ascertained and determined,” Parsons, 3 Pet., at 447, a party has the
chance to insist that a jury make the “ultimate determination of issues
of fact,” Ex parte Peterson, 253 U. S. 300, 310. Consistent with these

3 Cite as: 608 U. S. ___ (2026)
Syllabus
principles, this Court has upheld nonjury adjudications making initial
findings of fact that are subject to de novo review in a subsequent jury
trial. See, e.g., Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 236 U. S. 412; Peterson,
253 U. S., at 310. Given the similar features of the Commission’s en-
forcement scheme, the Commission may issue forfeiture orders with-
out the involvement of a jury.
The forfeiture orders at issue in these cases did not settle the carri-
ers’ legal obligations because they did not create an obligation to pay.
The statute nowhere gives the Commission the authority to execute on
a forfeiture order; a recipient of a forfeiture order incurs no penalties
for nonpayment; interest does not accrue on the sum; and under
§504(c) the Commission cannot hold “the existence of a notice of liabil-
ity or an order of forfeiture” against a regulated party “unless the for-
feiture has been paid or a court” has ordered payment. Pleasant
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 564 F. 2d 496, 500 (CADC); see also 15 FCC
Rcd. 303, 304. The statute thus prevents the Commission from penal-
izing a party for failing to act in response to the mere existence of a
forfeiture order, which in turn suggests that the party need not comply
in the first place.
The orders also did not reflect the ultimate determination of any
fact. The statute provides that forfeitures under §503(b)(4) “shall be
recoverable,” exclusively, in a “trial de novo.” §504(a). Thus, for the
purpose of a §504 trial—the only means by which the Government can
collect a penalty—it is as if the Commission never found any facts at
all. Before a regulated party can be made to pay, the jury gets the last
word. Pp. 6–9.
(b) The carriers insist that they actually must pay because §503 uses
words that sound mandatory—the Commission “determine[s]”
whether a forfeiture is appropriate, “assesse[s]” the “amount” of such
a penalty, and “impose[s]” that penalty. §§503(b)(1), (b)(2)(E), (b)(4).
But the proper understanding of such statutory terms depends on
“their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Turkiye Halk Bankasi
A.S. v. United States, 598 U. S. 264, 275 (internal quotation marks
omitted). And under the statute at issue here, the Commission is pow-
erless to visit any adverse consequences on a regulated party who re-
ceives a forfeiture order.
SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U. S. 109, proves the point. In Jarkesy, the
Court held that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) could
not impose civil penalties using its in-house administrative process.
Those penalties were immediately enforceable; the SEC could garnish
the recipient’s wages or deduct a portion of the forfeiture from his tax
return. See 17 CFR §§204.50, 204.52, 204.54–204.56, 204.60–204.65.
And if the SEC were required to resort to judicial means of enforce-
ment, no jury was available—at least as to the underlying legal

4 FCC v. AT&T, INC.
Syllabus
violation. See 15 U. S. C. §78u(e); see, e.g., SEC v. Gerasimowicz, 9
F. Supp. 3d 378, 381–382 (SDNY). That means that, unlike here, the
ultimate determination of the facts giving rise to the obligation to pay
rested with the agency alone.
The carriers argue that even if the Commission’s orders do not re-
quire payment, the Seventh Amendment nonetheless applies because
forfeiture orders have legal effect—namely, they enable the Depart-
ment of Justice to initiate a §504 suit. But the Seventh Amendment
“secure[s] a right to the individual,” Parsons v. Armor, 3 Pet. 413, 425,
that attaches when “legal rights” are to be “determined,” Lorillard v.
Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 583. A forfeiture order under 47 U. S. C.
§503(b)(4) does not determine legal rights; it is simply a “prerequi-
site[ ] to suit” that must be met before the Department may bring a
collection action. The Seventh Amendment does not extend to such
“preliminary” procedures. Peterson, 253 U. S., at 310.
Finally, the carriers argue that FCC forfeiture orders cause reputa-
tional and practical harms entitling them to a jury, “even where no
money is at stake.” Brief for AT&T, Inc., et al. 35–36. This argument
is hard to square with the text of the Seventh Amendment, and in any
event proves too much. Reputational harm may befall any party in the
preliminary stage of a legal proceeding, yet this has never been
thought to pose a Seventh Amendment problem. Pp. 9–11.
(c) The Court’s unconstitutional conditions doctrine—which “vindi-
cates the Constitution’s enumerated rights by preventing the govern-
ment from coercing people into giving them up,” Koontz v. St. Johns
River Water Management Dist., 570 U. S. 595, 604—is a poor fit for this
case. The Seventh Amendment applies only to “[s]uits,” and the only
suit in the statutory scheme is a §504 enforcement action. If the car-
riers elect not to pay and await an enforcement action, and the Depart-
ment of Justice decides never to bring one, then the carriers’ jury right
does not attach.
The carriers argue that if they insist upon their jury right and wait
for an enforcement suit, the Commission will use the existence of the
order and the fact of nonpayment against them. But §504(c) prohibits
the Commission from using unresolved forfeiture proceedings to a reg-
ulated party’s prejudice in subsequent Commission proceedings.
While the Commission may consider the facts underlying the unre-
solved forfeiture in a future proceeding, see 12 FCC Rcd. 17087, 17103,
the regulated party will have a chance to contest those facts anew. And
before any asserted fact can be used to support a binding order to pay,
the Government must prove it to a jury. Finally, the carriers contend
that the risk of reputational harm unduly burdens their jury right, but
the uncertain prospect of such harm does not improperly “discourag[e]
the exercise” of that right. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U. S. 17, 30.
Pp. 12–14.

5 Cite as: 608 U. S. ___ (2026)
Syllabus
No. 25–406, 149 F. 4th 491, reversed and remanded; No. 25–567, 156
F. 4th 86, affirmed.
R
OBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ALITO,
S
OTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, BARRETT, and JACKSON, JJ.,
joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

_________________
_________________
1 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 25–406 and 25–567
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
25–406 v.
AT&T, INC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS, INC., PETITIONER
25–567 v.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[June 4, 2026]
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The Communications Act authorizes the Federal Com-
munications Commission to investigate regulated parties
for suspected violations of the communications laws. The
Commission does so in an administrative process in which
no jury is available. But before the Government can collect
a penalty, it must prove its case to a jury in a trial de novo.
We decide whether that enforcement structure violates the
Seventh Amendment, which provides that “[i]n Suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”

2 FCC v. AT&T, INC.
Opinion of the Court
I
A
The Communications Act of 1934 established the Federal
Communications Commission. Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064. The
Act empowers the Commission to regulate “communication
by wire and radio,” and tasks it with making effective “wire
and radio communication service” available nationwide at
reasonable cost. Ibid. Today, the Commission oversees
electronic communications in contexts ranging from satel-
lites to smart phones.
As amended, the Act authorizes the Commission to seek
monetary forfeitures for violations of the communications
laws. An entity which the Commission “determine[s]” has
“willfully or repeatedly failed to comply” with those laws or
the Commission’s rules “shall be liable to the United States
for a forfeiture penalty.” 47 U. S. C. §503(b). The Commis-
sion can choose between two paths to seek forfeitures.
The first path is a formal adjudication. See §503(b)(3); 5
U. S. C. §554. An administrative law judge (or the Commis-
sion itself ) holds a hearing and may impose a penalty, with
limited judicial review in the court of appeals only. 47
U. S. C. §503(b)(3)(A). In practice, the Commission does not
use this process.
The second path—the one relevant here—is a more infor-
mal proceeding. See §503(b)(4). The Commission first is-
sues a “notice of apparent liability.” §503(b)(4)(A). The no-
tice must specify the laws or regulations the Commission
suspects the recipient to have violated, and the factual ba-
sis for those allegations. §503(b)(4). The Commission must
give the recipient the chance to “show, in writing,” “why no
such forfeiture penalty should be imposed.” §503(b)(4)(C).
After reviewing the recipient’s response, the Commission
then issues an order that “determine[s]” whether the recip-
ient is liable and, if so, “assesse[s]” a penalty. §§503(b)(1),
(b)(2)(E).

3 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
Once the Commission issues an order, the recipient has
two options. First, it may seek review in the court of ap-
peals under the Hobbs Act. See 28 U. S. C. §2342(1). The
court of appeals, sitting without a jury, then reviews the
order on the administrative record under the standards set
forth in the Administrative Procedure Act. 47 U. S. C.
§402(a); 28 U. S. C. §2347(a); 5 U. S. C. §551 et seq., and
§701 et seq.
The recipient’s other option is to do nothing. See Action
for Children’s Television v. FCC, 59 F. 3d 1249, 1261
(CADC 1995). In the event of nonpayment of a forfeiture
penalty “determined under [§503(b)(4)],” the penalty “shall
be recoverable . . . in a civil suit in the name of the United
States.” 47 U. S. C. §504(a). The Commission thus may re-
fer the matter to the Department of Justice, which then
may—but need not—bring a civil suit within five years of
the issuance of the order. See ibid.; 28 U. S. C. §2462. That
suit “shall be a trial de novo.” 47 U. S. C. §504(a).
Absent a successful enforcement suit (and resulting court
order), the statute provides no other mechanism for the
Commission to collect the forfeiture. The regulated party
may, of course, pay the forfeiture voluntarily. But until it
does, or the court in a §504 enforcement action orders pay-
ment, the Commission may not use the “notice of apparent
liability . . . to the prejudice of ” the party in other Commis-
sion proceedings. §504(c).
B
AT&T and Verizon (collectively, the carriers) are cellular
service providers. Cellular service allows customers, using
cell phones connected to the carriers’ networks, to talk, text,
and exchange data with one another. To receive cellular
service, the phone must periodically connect to—or “ping”—
the nearest cell site in the carrier’s network. See Carpenter
v. United States, 585 U. S. 296, 300–301 (2018). Every ping
registers the phone’s location. See ibid. Carriers know the

4 FCC v. AT&T, INC.
Opinion of the Court
locations of their cell sites, so they can be reasonably confi-
dent about the location of any given customer’s cell phone
at any given time. See id., at 301. And because cell phones
are generally with their owners—almost as “feature[s] of
human anatomy”—the carriers in turn have a good sense of
where their customers are located. Id., at 311 (quoting Ri-
ley v. California, 573 U. S. 373, 385 (2014)).
Location data, by its nature, implicates serious privacy
concerns. See Carpenter, 585 U. S., at 311, 315. But it can
also provide significant benefits. For example, some com-
panies provide location-based services. These services, like
roadside assistance, require accurate location information;
a tow truck is not much good if it cannot find the broken-
down car. Access to location data thus enhances the quality
of the providers’ service.
Until 2019, the carriers operated location-based services
programs. See 156 F. 4th 86, 92 (CA2 2025); 149 F. 4th 491,
495–496 (CA5 2025). Under those programs, the carriers
sold users’ location data (through intermediaries) to service
providers, who used the data to deliver location-based ser-
vices. See 156 F. 4th, at 92; 149 F. 4th, at 496.
In 2018, however, news reports revealed security
breaches in the carriers’ location-based services programs.
156 F. 4th, at 93; 149 F. 4th, at 496. One high-profile inci-
dent involved a provider called Securus. Securus provided
location-finding services to law enforcement officers, who in
theory were required to upload legal authorization, like a
warrant, to obtain location data. 156 F. 4th, at 93; 149
F. 4th, at 496. According to reports, however, a Missouri
sheriff was able to access location data despite uploading
“utterly irrelevant materials.” 156 F. 4th, at 93; see 149
F. 4th, at 496, n. 2.
The Commission’s Enforcement Bureau launched an in-
vestigation into the carriers’ practices. Believing that the
carriers had violated laws and regulations requiring them
to take reasonable steps to keep location data confidential,

5 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
the FCC issued notices of apparent liability under
§503(b)(4). See In re Verizon Communications, 35 FCC Rcd.
1698, 1712 (2020) (citing 47 U. S. C. §222; 47 CFR
§64.2010(a) (2014)); In re AT&T Inc., 35 FCC Rcd. 1743,
1756 (2020) (same). After reviewing the carriers’ responses,
the Commission reduced the amount of Verizon’s penalty.
In re Verizon Communications, 39 FCC Rcd. 4259, 4260
(2024). But otherwise finding “no reason to cancel” the for-
feitures, the Commission issued orders assessing penalties
of roughly $57 million against AT&T and $47 million
against Verizon. In re AT&T Inc., 39 FCC Rcd. 4216, 4216–
4217 (2024); 39 FCC Rcd., at 4260.
The carriers paid their penalties and filed petitions for
review in their respective Courts of Appeals. The carriers
raised multiple challenges to the Commission’s orders, in-
cluding that requiring forfeiture without the opportunity
for a jury trial violates the Seventh Amendment.
The Fifth Circuit granted AT&T’s petition for review and
vacated the Commission’s order. 149 F. 4th 491. The court
held that the FCC’s enforcement procedures violate the
Seventh Amendment because, when the Commission issues
an order at the end of forfeiture proceedings, it “has already
found the facts, interpreted the law, adjudged guilt, and
levied punishment”—all without the involvement of a jury.
Id., at 503.
The Second Circuit denied Verizon’s petition for review.
156 F. 4th 86. Parting ways with the Fifth Circuit, the
court explained that the “FCC’s forfeiture order . . . does
not, by itself, compel payment.” Id., at 106. Before a carrier
can be made to pay, the Department of Justice “needs to
initiate a collection action” under §504. Ibid. The court
thus held that the Commission does not violate the Seventh
Amendment when it issues forfeiture orders without a jury.
See id., at 107; see also Sprint Corp. v. FCC, 151 F. 4th 347,
359–360 (CADC 2025).

6 FCC v. AT&T, INC.
Opinion of the Court
We granted certiorari as to both decisions to resolve the
conflict. 607 U. S. 1120–1121 (2026).
II
The carriers contend that the FCC’s forfeiture proceed-
ings violate the Seventh Amendment. We disagree. Forfei-
ture orders issued under §503(b)(4) do not definitively re-
solve the parties’ legal obligations. And the Commission’s
factual findings are not conclusive. It thus does not offend
the Constitution for the Commission to issue forfeiture or-
ders without the involvement of a jury.
A
The Seventh Amendment “preserve[s]” the right to trial
by jury in “Suits at common law.” It applies in all proceed-
ings, whatever their “peculiar form,” in which “legal rights”
are to be “settle[d].” Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 447
(1830). It does not, however, “prescribe at what stage” of a
legal dispute “a trial by jury must, if demanded, be had.”
Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1, 23 (1899). The
Amendment requires only that, before legal rights and ob-
ligations are conclusively “ascertained and determined,”
Parsons, 3 Pet., at 447, a party has the chance to insist that
a jury make the “ultimate determination of issues of fact,”
Ex parte Peterson, 253 U. S. 300, 310 (1920).
Consistent with these principles, this Court has upheld
nonjury adjudications making initial findings of fact that
are subject to de novo review in a subsequent jury trial.
In Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 236 U. S. 412 (1915),
the Court considered the Hepburn Act, which authorized
the Interstate Commerce Commission to prepare a report
and “make an order directing” rail carriers “to pay” “dam-
ages” to customers who had been charged unreasonable
rates. 34 Stat. 590. But the shipper could enforce the order
only by succeeding in a subsequent jury trial where the re-
port would serve as prima facie evidence. See ibid. The

7 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
Court rejected a Seventh Amendment challenge to this en-
forcement structure, which “cut[] off no defense,” “inter-
pose[d] no obstacle to a full contestation of all the issues,”
and took “no question of fact from” the “jury.” Meeker, 236
U. S., at 430.
Ex parte Peterson is of a piece. 253 U. S. 300. There, the
District Court (Augustus Hand, J.) appointed an “auditor”
to “make and file a report” “as to the facts” concerning dis-
puted coal deliveries, which would serve as prima facie evi-
dence before the jury. Id., at 304. As in Meeker, we rejected
a Seventh Amendment challenge to this scheme because it
left for the jury the “ultimate determination of issues of
fact.” 253 U. S., at 310.
The FCC’s forfeiture proceedings fit comfortably within
these precedents. The orders at issue did not settle the car-
riers’ legal obligations because, stated simply, they did not
create an obligation to pay. And the orders did not reflect
the ultimate determination of any fact because, before the
carriers could have been made to pay, the Government was
required to prove its case to a jury.
First, several features of the statute demonstrate that
forfeiture orders do not obligate payment. The statute no-
where gives the Commission the authority to execute on a
forfeiture order; it cannot, for example, seize the carriers’
assets or obtain liens on their property. See Federal Elec-
tion Comm’n v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U. S. 289, 301
(2022) (agency “literally has no power to act . . . unless and
until . . . authorize[d] . . . by statute” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). A recipient of a forfeiture order incurs no
penalties for nonpayment, and interest does not accrue on
the sum. In re Amendment, 19 FCC Rcd. 6540, 6542, n. 16
(2004); FCC Directive, FCC INST 1157.5, Forfeiture Track-
ing, Collections and Follow-up Systems 1–3 (May 22, 2023).
And under §504(c) of the Act, the Commission cannot hold
“the existence of a notice of liability or an order of forfeiture”
against a regulated party “unless the forfeiture has been

8 FCC v. AT&T, INC.
Opinion of the Court
paid or a court” has ordered payment. Pleasant Broadcast-
ing Co. v. FCC, 564 F. 2d 496, 500 (CADC 1977); see also 15
FCC Rcd. 303, 304 (1999) (Commission will not hold “the
pendency of a forfeiture action prior to final adjudication”
against a regulated party); Brief for Federal Parties 40–41.
The statute thus prevents the Commission from penalizing
a party for failing to act in response to the mere existence
of a forfeiture order, which in turn suggests that the party
need not comply in the first place. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 77,
89–90.
Second, the Commission’s factual findings have no effect
in a subsequent enforcement suit. The statute provides
that forfeitures under §503(b)(4) “shall be recoverable,” ex-
clusively, in a “trial de novo.” §504(a); see also Pleasant
Broadcasting, 564 F. 2d, at 500 (“Government must bring”
§504 action “if it wishes to collect the fine”). And “trial de
novo” means a proceeding “in which the whole case is gone
into as if no trial whatever had been had” in the initial tri-
bunal. Black’s Law Dictionary 1677 (4th ed. 1951) (empha-
sis added). Thus, for the purpose of a §504 trial—the only
means by which the Government can collect a penalty—it
is as if the Commission never found any facts at all.
1
Before
a regulated party can be made to pay, the jury gets the last
word.
2
——————
1
It bears noting as well that the ordinary meaning of “trial de novo”
includes de novo review of the Commission’s legal conclusions. See
Sprint Corp. v. FCC, 151 F. 4th 347, 360 (CADC 2025) (“all issues of fact
and law are subject to the trial de novo” (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)); 156 F. 4th 86, 107 (CA2 2025) (same). Regulated parties thus may
challenge the Commission’s legal conclusions in a §504 enforcement ac-
tion just as they may contest the Commission’s factual determinations.
See McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 606
U. S. 146, 152 (2025); see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 78.
2
The dissent speculates that, had the carriers declined to pay, the Gov-
ernment might have brought an enforcement action in a jurisdiction
where circuit precedent precluded review of the Commission’s legal con-
clusions. See post, at 5–6 (opinion of T
HOMAS, J.); see, e.g., United States

9 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
Given these features of the Commission’s enforcement
scheme, the Commission may issue forfeiture orders with-
out the involvement of a jury. Like the ICC’s order in
Meeker and the auditor’s report in Peterson, the Commis-
sion’s orders do not “settle” their recipients’ legal obliga-
tions. Parsons, 3 Pet., at 447. Nor do the Commission’s
orders make any “ultimate determination[s]” of fact. Peter-
son, 253 U. S., at 310. The Government cannot collect be-
fore it successfully proves its case to a jury. At day’s end, a
forfeiture order issued under §503(b)(4) is simply the Com-
mission’s own determination. Its only legal effect is to ena-
ble the Department of Justice to file a suit to recover for the
carriers’ suspected violations.
B
Refusing to take yes for an answer, the carriers insist
that they actually must pay. They point out that §503 uses
words that sound in a mandatory register—the Commission
“determine[s]” whether a forfeiture is appropriate, “as-
sesse[s]” the “amount” of such a penalty, and “impose[s]”
that penalty. §§503(b)(1), (b)(2)(E), (b)(4). “[A]lone and in
isolation,” these words tell us little about whether a
§503(b)(4) order truly settles the carriers’ rights and duties.
New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144, 169–170 (1992).
The proper understanding of such statutory terms depends
on “their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Turkiye
Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States, 598 U. S. 264, 275
(2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). And as ex-
plained above, the Commission is powerless to visit any
——————
v. Stevens, 691 F. 3d 620, 622 (CA5 2012). We decline to engage in such
speculation, particularly in service of an argument that the carriers
themselves did not raise. See National Endowment for Arts v. Finley,
524 U. S. 569, 584 (1998); Brief for Federal Parties 44.

10 FCC v. AT&T, INC.
Opinion of the Court
adverse consequences on a regulated party who receives a
forfeiture order.
3
The carriers next insist that this case is SEC v. Jarkesy,
603 U. S. 109 (2024), all over again. But Jarkesy only
proves our point. There, we held that the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) could not impose civil penal-
ties using its in-house administrative process. Those pen-
alties were immediately enforceable; the SEC could garnish
the recipient’s wages or deduct a portion of the forfeiture
from his tax return. See 17 CFR §§204.50, 204.52, 204.54–
204.56, 204.60–204.65 (2024). And if the SEC were re-
quired to resort to judicial means of enforcement, no jury
was available—at least as to the underlying legal violation.
See 15 U. S. C. §78u(e); see, e.g., SEC v. Gerasimowicz, 9
F. Supp. 3d 378, 381–382 (SDNY 2014); SEC v. McCarthy,
322 F. 3d 650, 658 (CA9 2003) (“By the time a [§78u(e)] ap-
plication is filed by the Commission, the time and oppor-
tunity for adjudicating the merits of the claim have been
exhausted; all that is left to do is enforce the order”). That
means that the ultimate determination of the facts giving
rise to the obligation to pay rested not with a jury, but with
the SEC alone. As we held, the Seventh Amendment for-
bids that result. See Jarkesy, 603 U. S., at 117, 120–121.
No matter, the carriers say. Even if the Commission’s
orders do not require payment, they contend, the Seventh
Amendment nonetheless applies because forfeiture orders
——————
3
The carriers relatedly contend that forfeiture orders create an obliga-
tion to pay because their recipients “shall be liable to the United States.”
47 U. S. C. §503(b). This language, however, simply authorizes a law-
suit—it “creat[es] . . . a right of action.” Key Tronic Corp. v. United
States, 511 U. S. 809, 822 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part); accord,
id., at 818, n. 11 (majority opinion). It does not mean that an offender
must immediately pay. Compare, for instance, 42 U. S. C. §1983. That
statute provides that a state actor who violates a person’s constitutional
rights “shall be liable to the party injured.” That means only that the
victim may sue the perpetrator. See also 35 U. S. C. §271(b) (patent in-
fringer “shall be liable” to patent owner). So too here.

11 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
have legal effect—namely, they enable the Department of
Justice to initiate a §504 suit. Reply Brief 14. But the Sev-
enth Amendment “secure[s] a right to the individual,” Par-
sons v. Armor, 3 Pet. 413, 425 (1830), that attaches when
“legal rights” are to be “determined,” Lorillard v. Pons, 434
U. S. 575, 583 (1978). A forfeiture order under 47 U. S. C.
§503(b)(4) does not determine legal rights; it is simply a
“prerequisite[] to suit” that must be met before the Depart-
ment may bring a collection action. Mach Mining, LLC v.
EEOC, 575 U. S. 480, 486–487 (2015). It is thus analogous
to a right-to-sue letter, see, e.g., 42 U. S. C. §2000e–5 (Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission), or an exhaustion
requirement, see, e.g., §1997e(a) (Prison Litigation Reform
Act)—statutory conditions precedent that enable a subse-
quent suit, see Mach Mining, 575 U. S., at 487. The Sev-
enth Amendment does not extend to such “preliminary”
procedures. Peterson, 253 U. S., at 310.
Finally, the carriers argue that FCC forfeiture orders
cause reputational and practical harms entitling them to a
jury. Brief for AT&T, Inc., et al. 35–36 (Brief for the Carri-
ers). They contend that the Seventh Amendment applies to
such harms, “even where no money is at stake.” Id., at 35.
This argument is hard to square with the text of the Sev-
enth Amendment, which applies only to suits “where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars.” See 156
F. 4th, at 106 (“we fail to see how [reputational harm] im-
plicate[s] the Seventh Amendment, which requires a jury
trial only upon an effort to collect payment of monetary
damages” (citing Jarkesy, 603 U. S., at 123)).
Textual implausibility aside, the carriers’ theory proves
too much. Reputational harm may befall any party in the
preliminary stage of a legal proceeding. The filing of a com-
plaint may trigger negative press. So too may the filing of
an indictment against a criminal defendant. And plaintiffs
or prosecutors might dismiss the complaint or indictment
before the case proceeds to a trial. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.

12 FCC v. AT&T, INC.
Opinion of the Court
41(a)(1)(A)(i); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 48(a). Yet this has
never been thought to pose a Seventh Amendment problem.
III
The carriers raise a second challenge based on this
Court’s unconstitutional conditions doctrine. They argue
that the Commission’s forfeiture scheme puts them to an
impermissible choice: waive their jury right by voluntarily
paying the forfeiture in exchange for guaranteed but defer-
ential judicial review in the court of appeals;
4
or decline to
pay, and wait to make their case before a jury in an enforce-
ment suit that may never come. Because the costs of invok-
ing their right under the second option are impermissibly
high, the carriers contend, they are coerced into waiving
their rights and proceeding under the first.
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine “vindicates the
Constitution’s enumerated rights by preventing the govern-
ment from coercing people into giving them up.” Koontz v.
St. Johns River Water Management Dist., 570 U. S. 595, 604
(2013). In other words, the Government may not effectively
deny constitutional rights by making it too costly to exercise
them.
That doctrine is a poor fit for this case. The Seventh
Amendment applies only to “[s]uits,” and §503(b)(4) pro-
ceedings do not fit the bill. The only suit in the statutory
scheme is a §504 enforcement action, which the Depart-
ment of Justice is not required to pursue. So if the carriers
elect not to pay and await an enforcement action, and the
Department decides never to bring one, then the carriers’
jury right does not attach in the first place. See Tr. of Oral
——————
4
The parties have litigated this case on the premise that a regulated
entity must first pay the forfeiture before it may obtain review in the
court of appeals under the Hobbs Act. See Brief for the Carriers 9; Brief
for Federal Parties 5; see also AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 323 F. 3d 1081, 1083–
1085 (CADC 2003). We express no view on whether that premise is a
sound one.

13 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
Arg. 60 (carriers’ counsel acknowledging that their uncon-
stitutional conditions claim is “one degree removed” and
“not a direct penalty” on the right). The carriers’ argument
is thus something like a criminal defendant arguing that
his right to trial by jury is infringed when the prosecutor
decides to dismiss the indictment before trial. A counterin-
tuitive notion, to say the least.
Regardless, the carriers are not impermissibly coerced
into forgoing their right to a jury. They argue that insisting
upon their jury right and awaiting an enforcement suit
poses two distinct harms: first, that the Commission will
use the existence of the order and the fact of nonpayment
against them. Brief for the Carriers 46–48; see id., at 49–
50. And second, that the order will cause reputational harm
while the carriers await an enforcement suit. Id., at 45–46.
With respect to the first harm, as explained above,
§504(c) prohibits the Commission from using unresolved
forfeiture proceedings to a regulated party’s prejudice in
subsequent Commission proceedings. See supra, at 7–8. It
is true, of course, that the Commission may consider the
facts underlying the unresolved forfeiture in a future pro-
ceeding. See 12 FCC Rcd. 17087, 17103 (1997). But in that
future proceeding, as the carriers recognize, the regulated
party will have a chance to contest those facts anew. See
Brief for the Carriers 47 (“a carrier may present evidence
in a future proceeding to dispute an earlier factual find-
ing”). The first proceeding, as the Government acknowl-
edged, has no “preclusive effect” and the previously found
facts are given no “special weight.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 79; see
Brief for Federal Parties 42. There is nothing unconstitu-
tional about the Commission finding a fact in one proceed-
ing and, if it is relevant later, again in a second. And before
any asserted fact can be used to support a binding order to
pay, the Government must prove it to a jury. See 12 FCC
Rcd., at 17103 (regulated parties have “the full opportunity

14 FCC v. AT&T, INC.
Opinion of the Court
to present appropriate evidence” regarding earlier factual
findings “before having to pay any forfeiture”).
Nor does the carrier’s second concern—the risk of reputa-
tional harm—exact an unduly high cost for exercising their
jury right. In the Sixth Amendment context, we have up-
held “the imposition of . . . difficult choices” to forgo a jury
trial by pleading guilty, even where the defendant faces a
“certainty or probability” that the exercise of his trial right
will result in a higher sentence if he is found guilty. Chaffin
v. Stynchcombe, 412 U. S. 17, 30–31 (1973) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). If the “certainty or probability” of an
increased prison term upon conviction does not impermissi-
bly burden the Sixth Amendment right, it is hard to see how
the uncertain prospect of reputational harm unduly bur-
dens the Seventh Amendment right. See id., at 30 (the Con-
stitution does not “forbid[] every government-imposed
choice . . . that has the effect of discouraging the exercise of
constitutional rights”).
5
***
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit in No. 25–406 is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opin-
ion. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in No. 25–567 is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
——————
5
The carriers also argue that the specific forfeiture orders in this case
misled them into paying, and that a refund is therefore appropriate. See
Reply Brief 17–19; Tr. of Oral Arg. 75 (Government acknowledging that
it “cannot mislead someone into waiving his jury trial rights”); see also
post, at 3, 6–7 (opinion of T
HOMAS, J.). We express no view on the merits
of this argument, what relief may be available to the carriers, or in what
proceeding.

_________________
_________________
1 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 25–406 and 25–567
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
25–406 v.
AT&T, INC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS, INC., PETITIONER
25–567 v.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[June 4, 2026]
JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.
The Federal Communications Commission believed that
AT&T and Verizon violated federal law. Rather than pro-
ceeding against them in federal court, the Commission per-
formed its own adjudications. It determined that AT&T
and Verizon were liable, and it ordered them to pay $57 mil-
lion and $47 million, respectively. See ante, at 5. If they
did not pay, the Commission could sue them in a forum
where they would have been denied a constitutionally re-
quired jury trial de novo. AT&T and Verizon believed that
the Commission lacked the authority to force them to pay
penalties without a trial de novo in an Article III court. So,
like most regulated parties challenging Commission orders,
they paid under protest and brought suit to vindicate their
position, set aside the orders, and get their money back.

2 FCC v. AT&T, INC.
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
The Court agrees with AT&T and Verizon that they were
entitled to a jury trial de novo before an Article III court
before they could be forced to pay. It agrees that they did
not in fact receive such a jury trial de novo. But, it rules in
favor of the Commission. The Court does so because the
Commission, after AT&T and Verizon paid it over $100 mil-
lion, took the position that its orders were not really binding
after all. The Commission now agrees that AT&T and Ver-
izon would have been entitled to a jury trial de novo in an
Article III court had they declined to pay. Because its or-
ders were not binding until after that jury trial, the Com-
mission says, AT&T and Verizon in reality paid the Com-
mission voluntarily. The Court accepts that account and
does not grant the carriers any relief. Because I would give
the parties an opportunity to proceed under a correct un-
derstanding of the law, I respectfully dissent.
I
A
When the Federal Government seeks to deprive a person
of property, it must go through an Article III court. SEC v.
Jarkesy, 603 U. S. 109, 151 (2024) (G
ORSUCH, J., concur-
ring). “That means the regular course of trial proceedings
with their usual protections, not the use of ad hoc adjudica-
tion procedures before the same agency responsible for
prosecuting the law, subject only to hands-off judicial re-
view.” Ibid. (citation omitted). Thus, as this Court held in
Jarkesy and reaffirms today, agencies can collect penalties
only after adjudication in court through a trial de novo. See
id., at 120, 134; ante, at 10.
B
The Commission determined that AT&T and Verizon vi-
olated federal law by mishandling user location data. See
ante, at 4–5. The Commission sent them “Notice[s] of Ap-
parent Liability” with its tentative conclusions. App. to Pet.

3 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
for Cert. in No. 25–406, p. 47a; App. to Pet. for Cert. in No.
25–567, p. 43a. AT&T and Verizon responded with various
constitutional, statutory, and factual arguments.
The Commission then issued “order[s]” commanding
AT&T and Verizon to pay $57 million and $47 million, re-
spectively. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 25–406, at 131a;
App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 25–567, at 138a–139. The or-
ders were structured like judicial opinions. They explained
what AT&T and Verizon did, what the law required, and
how the law applied to the facts. The orders imposed liabil-
ity for monetary penalties. In AT&T’s case, the “Ordering
Clauses” said:
“IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to section 503(b) of
the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 503(b), and section 1.80 of the Com-
mission’s rules, 47 CFR §1.80, AT&T, Inc., IS LIABLE
FOR A MONETARY FORFEITURE in the amount
of [$57,265,625] for willfully and repeatedly violating
section 222 of the Act and section 64.2010 of the Com-
mission’s rules.” App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 25–406,
at 131a.
Verizon’s order contained identical language directing it
to pay about $47 million. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 25–
567, at 138a. Although the orders stated that AT&T and
Verizon could receive a jury trial de novo, they also de-
scribed payment of the penalty as mandatory based on the
Commission’s adjudication alone: “Payment of the forfei-
ture shall be made in the manner provided for in section
1.80 of the Commission’s rules within thirty (30) calendar
days after the release of this Forfeiture Order.” Id., at 139a;
App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 25–406, at 131a.
In the orders, the Commission asserted that it could im-
pose these penalties without involving an Article III court.
It informed AT&T and Verizon that, contrary to what the
Court holds today, agency monetary penalties such as these
did not “need to be adjudicated in Article III courts with a

4 FCC v. AT&T, INC.
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
right to trial by jury.” App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 25–406,
at 127a. In the Commission’s view, Congress could put
claims such as these “beyond the ambit of the Seventh
Amendment by assigning their resolution to a forum in
which jury trials are unavailable.” Id., at 127a–128a (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted); contra, ante, at 10 (major-
ity opinion). The Commission also expressly disagreed with
the Fifth Circuit’s then-recent decision in Jarkesy v. SEC,
34 F. 4th 446 (2022), which held such adjudications uncon-
stitutional. See, e.g., App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 25–567,
at 134a. This Court would affirm the Fifth Circuit’s deci-
sion a year later. Jarkesy, 603 U. S., at 124–125, 140–141.
Under protest, AT&T and Verizon both paid the amounts
ordered, which was understood to be a precondition to their
ability to file petitions for review in federal court. See Peti-
tion for Review in No. 24–60223 (CA5), ECF Doc. 1–1, p. 1,
n. 1; Petition for Review in No. 24–1733 (CA2), ECF Doc. 1–
1, p. 1. AT&T filed a petition for review in the Fifth Circuit,
and Verizon filed one in the Second Circuit. At every stage
of their cases, they preserved their position that they should
have received an Article III adjudication before being forced
to pay. The Fifth Circuit agreed with AT&T and set aside
the Commission’s order, and the Second Circuit agreed with
the Commission. We granted certiorari and consolidated
the two cases. 607 U. S. 1120–1121 (2026).
II
A
The Court accepts the Government’s newfound account
that under the Act, the Commission’s self-styled “orders”
were mere nonbinding notices that the regulated parties
were free to ignore. See ante, at 7 (“The orders at issue . . .
did not create an obligation to pay”). The Court also accepts
that the orders would receive no deference in the de novo
enforcement action necessary for the Commission to force
payment. Ante, at 8 (“[F]or the purpose of a §504 trial—the

5 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
only means by which the Government can collect a pen-
alty—it is as if the Commission never found any facts at
all”); accord, ibid., n. 1. The Court’s decision is premised on
those important limitations, which means that the Com-
mission’s orders have no legal import except as precondi-
tions for a future suit. See ante, at 11. I agree with the
Court that this interpretation of the Act should govern fu-
ture proceedings so as to bring the Commission’s enforce-
ment practices into harmony with the Constitution.
B
But as a court, we must resolve the cases before us. Re-
gardless of what the Commission will do in the future, or
what the Court believes it should have done all along, we
granted certiorari in cases arising from two orders that the
Commission addressed to AT&T and Verizon in 2024. At
that time, neither the Commission nor the courts complied
with the limits that the Court describes today.
1
When the Commission issued the orders, AT&T and Ver-
izon could not expect the constitutionally required trial
de novo that the Court envisions today. If AT&T and Veri-
zon ignored the orders and the Government brought an en-
forcement action, the enforcement action would not, in all
probability, have proceeded “as if no trial whatever had
been had” by the Commission. Ante, at 8 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). The Government can bring enforce-
ment actions in any forum in which these nationwide carri-
ers operate. See 47 U. S. C. §504(a). And, courts across the
country denied regulated parties the right to a trial de novo.
See Brief for T-Mobile USA, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 8–9.
Many did not allow challenges to the Commission’s legal
determinations, even on appeal, no matter how erroneous
they were. E.g., United States v. Stevens, 691 F. 3d 620, 622
(CA5 2012) (“[W]e agree with the district court that its

6 FCC v. AT&T, INC.
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
jurisdiction was limited to considering the factual basis for
the agency action”); United States v. Neely, 595 F. Supp. 2d
662, 669 (SC 2009) (“District court jurisdiction over an ac-
tion to recover an unpaid forfeiture pursuant to Section 504
does not include the power to entertain challenges, raised
in defense of a forfeiture recovery action, to the validity of
an underlying FCC regulation”).* Others restricted chal-
lenges to the penalty amount, even though that amount
would be at issue in a constitutional trial de novo. E.g.,
United States v. Hodson Broadcasting, 666 Fed. Appx. 624,
627–628 (CA9 2016) (“Review of a forfeiture amount is lim-
ited to whether it reflects a reasonable application of the
statute”). And, when AT&T and Verizon paid their penal-
ties, no carrier had ever received a jury trial in a §504 en-
forcement action. See Brief for the Carriers 10. AT&T and
Verizon therefore had no way to ensure that they would
proceed in a court that would respect their constitutional
right to an Article III trial de novo.
2
I also do not share the Court’s confidence that AT&T and
Verizon should have known that these orders were non-
binding. The Commission “ORDERED that . . . [the recip-
ient] IS LIABLE FOR A MONETARY FORFEITURE in
the amount[s]” specified in each case. App. to Pet. for Cert.
in No. 25–406, at 131a. The orders stated that “[p]ayment
of the forfeiture shall be made . . . within thirty (30) calen-
dar days after the release of this Forfeiture Order.” Ibid.
In the orders, the Commission took the position that it could
issue the orders not because they were nonbinding, but be-
cause such orders could be imposed, from start to finish,
——————
*See also United States v. TravelCenters of Am., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1222,
1227 (Ore. 2007); United States v. Rhodes, 2022 WL 17484847, *3–*4 (D
Mont., Dec. 7, 2022); United States v. Dudley, 2020 WL 4284052, *3 (ND
Ala., July 27, 2020); United States v. Metzger, 2008 WL 11336647, *2–*3
(MD Fla., July 7, 2008).

7 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
without the involvement of “Article III courts.” Id., at 127a.
It stated that its authority to impose such penalties was
“beyond the ambit of the Seventh Amendment.” Ibid. (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). Beyond the order itself,
the Commission’s regulations say that its orders “requir[e]”
the penalty to “be paid in full” and set a date by which it
“must be paid.” 47 CFR §1.80(g)(4) (2024). If AT&T and
Verizon did not pay, they arguably were subject to immedi-
ate statutory penalties for defying Commission forfeiture
orders. See 47 U. S. C. §503(b)(1)(B). The procedure for ju-
dicial review of the orders that is the basis for this Court’s
jurisdiction treated them not as requests for voluntary pay-
ment, but as “final orders.” 28 U. S. C. §§2342, 2344.
Nor is this a case in which AT&T and Verizon waived
their Article III rights in exchange for a lesser penalty or
without preserving their constitutional objections. Instead,
AT&T and Verizon did what courts ordinarily encourage:
They paid under protest and filed suit to get their payments
back. Today, the Court punishes AT&T and Verizon for
complying with a government order that they in good faith
believed was obligatory, diligently preserving their objec-
tion to that order, and then litigating that objection so ef-
fectively as to cause the Government to change its position
years later.
I respectfully dissent.