Bowe v. United States

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Syllabus
BOWE v. UNITED STATES
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 24–5438. Argued October 14, 2025—Decided January 9, 2026
Petitioner Michael S. Bowe is serving a 24-year sentence in federal cus-
tody after pleading guilty in 2008 to three offenses: (1) conspiracy to
commit Hobbs Act robbery; (2) attempted Hobbs Act robbery; and (3)
using a frearm in relation to a “crime of violence” as defned in
18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Bowe's § 924(c) conviction carried a manda-
tory 10-year sentence to be served consecutively to his sentence for the
robbery offenses. To have been properly convicted under § 924(c), at
least one of Bowe's other offenses must qualify as a “crime of violence”
under one of two defnitional clauses in § 924(c): the “elements clause,”
§ 924(c)(3)(A), or the “residual clause,” § 924(c)(3)(B). But decisions is-
sued years after Bowe's conviction call into question whether either
clause can support his § 924(c) conviction. See United States v. Davis,
588 U. S. 445, 470 (residual clause void for vagueness); United States v.
Taylor, 596 U. S. 845, 860 (attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime
of violence under the elements clause).
This case concerns Bowe's efforts to obtain postconviction relief from
the mandatory consecutive 10-year sentence imposed under § 924(c). A
comprehensive statutory scheme governs when and how state and fed-
eral prisoners can seek postconviction relief in federal court. See 28
U. S. C. § 2254 (state prisoners); § 2255 (federal prisoners). Particularly
relevant here, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (AEDPA), second or subsequent efforts at obtaining postconvic-
tion relief require the prisoner frst to seek certifcation from a court of
appeals that the fling meets threshold conditions before a prisoner can
proceed in a district court. See § 2244 (authorization requests by state
prisoners); § 2255(h) (successive-motion requests by federal prisoners).
While §§ 2244 and 2255(h) have distinct requirements, § 2255(h) cross-
references some of the procedures in § 2244 for how a “panel of the
appropriate court of appeals” “certife[s]” a second or successive fling.
Bowe frst sought § 2255 relief in 2016, arguing that § 924(c)'s residual
clause was unconstitutional. The District Court denied the motion, rea-
soning that—regardless of the residual clause's constitutionality—
Bowe's § 924(c) conviction was proper because attempted Hobbs Act rob-
bery qualifed as a “crime of violence” under the elements clause. In
2019, after Davis, Bowe sought permission from the Eleventh Circuit

14 BOWE
v. UNITED STATES
Syllabus
under § 2255(h) to fle a second or successive motion. A three-judge
panel
found that Bowe had not met § 2255(h)'s threshold conditions. Al-
though the panel acknowledged that Davis announced a new, retroactive
constitutional rule (one of the two statutory gateways for successive
motions under § 2255(h)(2)), it held that Bowe could not make a prima
facie showing that his § 924(c) conviction was unconstitutional because
then-binding Circuit precedent still treated attempted Hobbs Act rob-
bery as a “crime of violence” under the elements clause. After Taylor
was decided in 2022, Bowe once again sought authorization under
§ 2255(h), arguing that Davis and Taylor leave none of his convictions
as a valid predicate “crime of violence” under § 924(c). A panel dis-
missed the part of Bowe's request resting on Davis, reasoning that the
claim had been “presented in a prior application” and that the panel
lacked jurisdiction over such old claims under § 2244(b)(1). The panel
also denied the part of Bowe's request that rested on Taylor, concluding
that Taylor did not announce a new constitutional rule within the mean-
ing of § 2255(h)(2). Bowe returned to the Eleventh Circuit several
times, seeking authorization to pursue postconviction relief, initial hear-
ing en banc, and reversal of Circuit precedent applying § 2244(b)(1)'s
old-claim bar to federal prisoners' successive § 2255 motions. He also
requested certifcation of the question whether § 2244(b)(1) applies
to federal prisoners. See § 1254(2). Bowe's requests were denied.
Bowe eventually fled this petition for certiorari, pointing out a Circuit
split: Six Circuits apply § 2244(b)(1)'s old-claim bar to federal prisoners,
while three do not. The Court granted review.
Held:
1. The Court has jurisdiction because § 2244(b)(3)(E) does not bar this
Court's review of a federal prisoner's request to fle a second or succes-
sive § 2255 motion. Pp. 22–36.
(a) Section 2244(b)(3)(E) provides that the denial of authorization
“to fle a second or successive application” shall not be the subject of a
certiorari petition. That provision does not apply to federal prisoners.
It is housed within § 2244, which imposes several strict requirements
that apply only to state prisoners. It also speaks only to a “second or
successive application,” § 2244(b)(3)(E), but unlike state prisoners who
fle such “applications,” federal prisoners fle “motions,” see § 2255(e).
Pp. 22–24.
(b) The Government contends that § 2255(h)'s cross-reference to
§ 2244—providing that a successive motion must be “certifed as pro-
vided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals
to contain” the content requirements in § 2255(h)—also imports § 2244's
certiorari bar. But § 2255(h)'s cross-reference, coupled with its context,
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15
Syllabus
does not provide the clear indication needed to strip this Court of juris-
dic
tion. Given the broad grant of certiorari jurisdiction to the Court,
see § 1254(1), Congress must speak clearly if it seeks to impose excep-
tions to that jurisdiction. In Castro v. United States, 540 U. S. 375,
a case also brought by a federal prisoner, the Court held that
§ 2244(b)(3)(E) posed no bar to its review, explaining that the Govern-
ment's reading would close the Court's doors to a class of habeas peti-
tioners “without any clear indication” that Congress intended such a
result. Id., at 381. The same “clear indication” necessary in Castro to
strip the Court of jurisdiction is required here: The § 2244(b)(3)(E) issue
arises in the same context and the Government argues that the very
same provision bars the Court's review in this case. This clear indica-
tion is not a “magic words” requirement; it simply asks whether text
and structure unambiguously show that Congress intended to prevent
the Court's exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction. A provision that can
reasonably be read more than one way in context is not suffciently clear.
Section 2255(h)'s cross-reference does not provide the clear indication
of intent required to strip the Court of jurisdiction. The language of
the cross-reference is both narrow and specifc. It says that a second
or successive § 2255 motion “must be certifed as provided in section
2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain” one of two
threshold content requirements. It incorporates only the provisions in
§ 2244 that “provid[e]” for how a “panel of the appropriate court of ap-
peals” “certife[s]” a second or successive fling and directs that those
procedures be used to evaluate whether the fling “contain[s]” the con-
tent requirements listed in § 2255(h). Section 2244(b)(3)(E) is not one
of those provisions, and it has nothing to do with the content require-
ments in § 2255(h).
For these reasons and others, whether § 2244(b)(3)(E)'s certiorari bar
falls within the scope of § 2255(h)'s cross-reference is at most ambiguous.
Ambiguous language cannot provide the required clear indication, and
the Government's remaining arguments do not supply the necessary
clarity that the text lacks. The Government also suggests that it would
make little sense to bar certiorari review of authorization decisions con-
cerning state prisoners but not federal ones. That argument carries
little weight when the governing standard requires Congress to speak
clearly. Moreover, Congress treated state and federal prisoners differ-
ently across AEDPA, with state prisoners often facing far higher hur-
dles to relief. Allowing further review in this Court is thus consistent
with both AEDPA's purposes and practical considerations. Pp. 25–36.
2. Section 2244(b)(1) does not apply to second or successive motions
fled under § 2255(h) by federal prisoners challenging their convictions
or sentences. Pp. 36–42.
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16 BOWE
v. UNITED STATES
Syllabus
(a) The text of § 2244(b)(1)'s old-claim bar states that “[a] claim pre-
sented
in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section
2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.”
State prisoners alone fle habeas corpus applications under § 2254. That
specifc reference to § 2254 was deliberate: Elsewhere in this very sec-
tion, Congress expressly distinguishes § 2254 “applications” from § 2255
“motions.” § 2266(a); see also §§ 2253(c)(1)(A)–(B) (distinguishing state
habeas proceedings from proceedings under § 2255). When interpret-
ing statutes, the Court presumes that “differences in language like this
convey differences in meaning.” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA
Inc., 582 U. S. 79, 86. By its plain terms, § 2244(b)(1)'s old-claim bar
applies only to state prisoners. Pp. 36–37.
(b) Section 2255(h)'s cross-reference to § 2244 does not make
§ 2244(b)(1) applicable to federal prisoners' successive § 2255 motions.
Amicus contends that § 2255(h) incorporates § 2244, including § 2244(b)
(3)(C), which requires a panel to determine that “the application makes
a prima facie showing that [it] satisfes the requirements of this subsec-
tion.” From here, one of the “requirements of . . . subsection” (b) is
§ 2244(b)(1). Accordingly, amicus argues, following this chain of cross-
references leads to the conclusion that § 2244(b)(1) must apply to federal
prisoners. But that position is erroneous under the same reasoning
that explains why the Court has jurisdiction. Section 2255(h)'s cross-
reference incorporates the procedures in § 2244 only as they relate to
how a panel certifes a second or successive fling. At bottom, the best
textual reading of both § 2255(h) and § 2244(b) is that, when a federal
prisoner moves for authorization, a panel can authorize the fling if the
fling makes a prima facie showing that it satisfes one of the two
grounds in § 2255(h), the “two—and only two—conditions in which a
second or successive § 2255 motion may proceed.” Jones v. Hendrix,
599 U. S. 465, 477.
The argument that Congress meant for AEDPA to treat second or
successive flings by federal and state prisoners the same fails.
AEDPA is replete with examples of Congress treating state and federal
prisoners differently—including in the context of limitations on second
or successive flings. Any concern associated with Congress allowing
old-claim litigation for federal prisoners is overstated given that all
claims, even the repeat ones, must meet the “strictly limited” threshold
requirements of § 2255(h), Jones, 599 U. S., at 476, and should they sur-
vive that review, they must still conform with the demanding statute of
limitations contained in § 2255(f ), Dodd v. United States, 545 U. S. 353,
359. Very few claims will satisfy either, let alone both. The Court
leaves it to the Eleventh Circuit to determine in the frst instance

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Opinion of the Court
whether Bowe should receive authorization to fle a second or successive
moti
on under the correct standard. Pp. 36–41.
Vacated and remanded.
Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Jackson, J.,
fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 42. Gorsuch, J., fled a dissenting opin-
ion, in which Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined, and in which Barrett, J.,
joined as to Part I, post, p. 47.
Andrew L. Adler argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Janice L. Bergmann and Gregory
Cui.
Anthony A. Yang argued the cause for the United States.
On the briefs were Solicitor General Sauer, Deputy Solici-
tor General Feigin, Acting Assistant Attorney General Ga-
leotti, and Ann O'Connell Adams.
Kasdin M. Mitchell, by appointment of the Court, 604
U. S. 1117, argued the cause as amicus curiae in support of
judgment below as to Question 1. With her on the brief was
Philip M. Cooper.*
Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court.
Congress has created a comprehensive scheme to address
when and how state and federal prisoners can seek postcon-
viction relief in federal courts. A state prisoner can fle an
application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254. A federal prisoner, by contrast, can fle a motion to
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for Habeas Scholars
by Kwaku A. Akowuah and Christopher A. Eiswerth; for the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Daniel S. Volchok, Gary M.
Fox, Conrad Kahn, and David Oscar Markus; for the National Association
of Federal Defenders by Jennifer Niles Coffn, Keith M. Donoghue, Shel-
ley M. Fite, Judith H. Mizner, Paresh Patel, and Cathi Adinaro Shusky;
and for the University of Virginia School of Law's Civil Rights Clinic et al.
by Juan O. Perla, Danny Zemel, T. Barry Kingham, and Robert García.
Jeffrey W. Chen, Matthew R. Sellers, and Stephen I. Vladeck, pro se,
fled a brief for Federal Courts Scholars as amici curiae.
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v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence under § 2255. Each
prov
ision contains its own procedural and substantive re-
quirements that an individual must satisfy.
This case concerns the more complicated situation when a
prisoner returns to federal court after a prior attempt for
relief has failed. In this situation, Congress has enlisted the
courts of appeals to play a gatekeeping role in the consider-
ation of second or successive flings brought by federal and
state prisoners. Under this system, before a prisoner can
bring such a fling in a district court, a court of appeals must
certify that the fling meets certain threshold conditions.
Section 2244 governs authorization requests made by state
prisoners, and § 2255(h), in turn, governs requests made by
federal prisoners. The two have distinct requirements, but
through a limited cross-reference in § 2255(h) to § 2244 for
how a fling is “certifed” by a “panel,” Congress has bor-
rowed certain of the procedures that apply to state prisoners
and applies them to federal prisoners too.
This case presents two questions regarding which aspects
of § 2244 fall within the scope of § 2255(h)'s cross-reference.
The frst is whether § 2244(b)(3)(E), which prohibits the “de-
nial of an authorization by a court of appeals to fle a second
or successive application” from being the “subject of a peti-
tion for . . . a writ of certiorari,” bars this Court's review
of authorization decisions concerning the motions of federal
prisoners. If it does, this Court would lack jurisdiction to
hear this case. The Court holds that it does not. In the
narrow cross-reference to the procedures in § 2244, Congress
has not clearly indicated that it intended to incorporate
§ 2244(b)(3)(E)'s certiorari bar.
The second question is whether § 2244(b)(1), which directs
courts to dismiss a claim “presented in a second or successive
habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was pre-
sented in a prior application,” applies to motions fled by
federal prisoners. It does not: Section 2244(b)(1), by its ex-
press terms, applies only to state prisoners' habeas applica-
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Opinion of the Court
tions under § 2254, not to federal prisoners' motions under
§
2255.
I
Petitioner Michael S. Bowe is in federal custody. In 2008,
he pleaded guilty to three offenses: (1) conspiracy to commit
Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U. S. C. § 1951(a); (2) attempt to com-
mit Hobbs Act robbery, ibid.; and (3) the use, carrying, bran-
dishing, or discharge of a frearm in relation to a crime of
violence, § 924(c)(1)(A). Bowe received a 24-year sentence;
10 of those years were imposed because of the § 924(c) convic-
tion, which carried a mandatory 10-year sentence consecu-
tive to the sentence for the predicate robbery offenses. See
§ 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). Bowe did not appeal.
In the decade since, this Court has issued several decisions
that have called Bowe's § 924(c) conviction into question. To
appreciate the implications of those decisions, it is important
frst to understand how § 924(c) operates.
Section 924(c) applies if, as relevant here, an individual
commits a qualifying “crime of violence” with a frearm. A
“crime of violence,” in turn, is defned in two ways. Under
the “elements clause,” it is a “felony” that “has as an element
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person or property of another.” § 924(c)(3)(A).
Under the “residual clause,” it is a felony “that by its nature,
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the
person or property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense.” § 924(c)(3)(B). For Bowe to have
been properly convicted under § 924(c)—and thus to have re-
ceived the accompanying 10-year consecutive sentence—his
conviction for either conspiracy or attempt to commit Hobbs
Act robbery must qualify as a crime of violence under either
the elements or residual clause.
Today, it is likely that neither clause would permissibly
support Bowe's § 924(c) conviction. In United States v.
Davis, 588 U. S. 445 (2019), this Court held that the residual
clause is unconstitutionally vague. Id., at 470. In United
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20 BOWE
v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
States v. Taylor, 596 U. S. 845 (2022), the Court held that
attempted
Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of
violence under the elements clause. Id., at 860. Eleventh
Circuit precedent is also clear that conspiracy to commit
Hobbs Act robbery does not satisfy the elements clause.
See Brown v. United States, 942 F. 3d 1069, 1075 (2019)
(per curiam). If sentenced today, therefore, Bowe likely
would not be subject to the 10-year mandatory consecutive
sentence that he is now serving.
Nevertheless, the timing of this Court's decisions, coupled
with the timing of Bowe's efforts to take advantage of them,
have produced procedural complications that have so far pre-
vented relief, leading to this appeal.
Bowe, acting pro se, initially sought postconviction relief
under § 2255 in 2016, before the Court decided Davis, ar-
guing that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague.
A District Court rejected Bowe's claim, in part, because re-
gardless of the residual clause's constitutionality, attempted
Hobbs Act robbery qualifed as a crime of violence under
§ 924(c)'s elements clause. App. 43.
After Davis was decided in 2019, Bowe sought permission
from the Eleventh Circuit to fle a second or successive mo-
tion. See § 2255(h). A three-judge panel declined to au-
thorize Bowe's motion. Although the panel acknowledged
that Davis had announced a new, retroactive rule of constitu-
tional law, which is one of two grounds on which a second or
successive motion can proceed, see § 2255(h)(2), it held that
Bowe could not “make a prima facie showing that his § 924(c)
conviction and sentence [were] unconstitutional” because
under then-prevailing Eleventh Circuit precedent, “at-
tempted Hobbs Act robbery” still qualifed as a crime of vio-
lence under the elements clause, App. 52–54.
Then, after Taylor was decided in 2022, Bowe once again
sought permission from the Eleventh Circuit to fle a second
or successive motion. This time, Bowe argued that under
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Opinion of the Court
Davis and Taylor, none of his convictions qualifed as a pred-
icate
“crime of violence.” A three-judge panel dismissed the
part of Bowe's request that rested on Davis, reasoning that
because the claim was “presented in a prior application” to
fle a second or successive motion, the panel lacked jurisdic-
tion over it under § 2244(b)(1). App. 59–60. The panel also
denied the part of Bowe's request that rested on Taylor, con-
cluding that Taylor did not announce a new constitutional
rule as needed to secure relief under § 2255(h)(2). App.
59–60.
Bowe did not stop there. A few months later, he again
sought authorization to fle a second or successive motion,
again relying on Davis and Taylor. This time, Bowe also
moved for initial hearing en banc. As relevant, he asked
the Eleventh Circuit to overturn its precedent holding that
§ 2244(b)(1)'s old-claim bar applies to federal prisoners' suc-
cessive § 2255 motions. In Bowe's view, that bar applies
only to state prisoners, not federal prisoners like him. A
three-judge panel dismissed Bowe's request for authoriza-
tion, citing § 2244(b)(1), and the Eleventh Circuit denied
Bowe's motion for initial hearing en banc.
Bowe then moved for an original writ of habeas corpus in
this Court. It was denied. In re Bowe, 601 U. S. 1015
(2024). Bowe returned to the Eleventh Circuit, seeking au-
thorization, initial hearing en banc, and certifcation of the
question whether § 2244(b)(1) applies to federal prisoners.
See § 1254(2) (allowing courts of appeals to certify questions
of law to the Supreme Court). As before, a three-judge
panel dismissed Bowe's request for authorization, relying on
§ 2244(b)(1). The panel also declined to certify the question
Bowe requested, and the full Eleventh Circuit denied his mo-
tion for initial hearing en banc.
Finally, Bowe fled a petition for a writ of certiorari. The
Eleventh Circuit is one of six Circuits that apply
§ 2244(b)(1)'s old-claim bar to federal prisoners. Three Cir-
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22 BOWE
v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
cuits do not.
1
The
Court granted certiorari to resolve the
issue. See 604 U. S. 1096 (2025).
II
As a threshold matter, the Government argues that the
Court cannot resolve the Circuit split concerning § 2244(b)
(1)'s old-claim bar because the Court lacks jurisdiction to
hear the case under § 2244(b)(3)(E). That provision states
that the “denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to
fle a second or successive application . . . shall not be the
subject of a petition for . . . a writ of certiorari.” See
Hawaii v. Offce of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U. S. 163, 171
(2009) (“Before turning to the merits, we frst must address
our jurisdiction”). If Bowe were in state custody, then the
Government would be correct. See Stewart v. Martinez-
Villareal, 523 U. S. 637, 641 (1998). He is not. Section
2244(b)(3)(E) does not prevent the Court's review because
the certiorari bar does not clearly apply to motions fled by
federal prisoners like Bowe.
A
In the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA), “Congress established a `gatekeeping ' mech-
anism for the consideration of `second or successive' ” flings
“in the federal courts.” Id., at 641 (quoting Felker v. Tur-
pin, 518 U. S. 651, 657 (1996)). The associated procedural
and substantive requirements are “stringent.” Burton v.
Stewart, 549 U. S. 147, 152 (2007) (per curiam).
1
Compare Winarske v. United States, 913 F. 3d 765 (CA8 2019); In re
Bourgeois, 902 F. 3d 446 (CA5 2018); In re Baptiste, 828 F. 3d 1337 (CA11
2016); United States v. Winkelman, 746 F. 3d 134 (CA3 2014); Gallagher
v. United States, 711 F. 3d 315 (CA2 2013) (per curiam); and Brannigan
v. United States, 249 F. 3d 584 (CA7 2001), with In re Graham, 61 F. 4th
433 (CA4 2023); Jones v. United States, 36 F. 4th 974 (CA9 2022); and
Williams v. United States, 927 F. 3d 427 (CA6 2019).

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23
Opinion of the Court
State prisoners looking to fle a second or successive appli-
cati
on must comply with § 2244(b), which provides in rele-
vant part:
“(3)(A) Before a second or successive application per-
mitted by this section is fled in the district court, the
applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals
for an order authorizing the district court to consider
the application.
“(B) A motion in the court of appeals for an order
authorizing the district court to consider a second or
successive application shall be determined by a three-
judge panel of the court of appeals.
“(C) The court of appeals may authorize the fling of
a second or successive application only if it determines
that the application makes a prima facie showing that the
application satisfes the requirements of this subsection.
“(D) The court of appeals shall grant or deny the au-
thorization to fle a second or successive application not
later than 30 days after the fling of the motion.
“(E) The grant or denial of an authorization by a court
of appeals to fle a second or successive application shall
not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a peti-
tion for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.
“(4) A district court shall dismiss any claim presented
in a second or successive application that the court of
appeals has authorized to be fled unless the applicant
shows that the claim satisfes the requirements of this
section.”
By comparison, a federal prisoner seeking to fle a second
or successive motion must satisfy § 2255(h). Jones v. Hen-
drix, 599 U. S. 465, 477–478 (2023). That provision states
in full:
“A second or successive motion must be certifed as
provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate
court of appeals to contain—
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24 BOWE
v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
“(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and
v
iewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be
suffcient to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that no reasonable factfnder would have found the mov-
ant guilty of the offense; or
“(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive
to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that
was previously unavailable.”
Unlike the provisions governing authorization decisions
for state prisoners, § 2255(h) does not mention this Court's
certiorari jurisdiction, let alone purport to limit it. Nor
does § 2244(b)(3)(E) readily apply to federal prisoners on its
face: Section 2244, overall, imposes several strict require-
ments that apply only to state prisoners with the aim of facil-
itating fnality,
2
and the certiorari bar in particular speaks
to “second or successive applications,” which federal prison-
ers do not fle, see § 2255(e) (federal prisoners must fle “mo-
tions” for habeas relief, not applications). Whether the
Court has jurisdiction therefore turns on the scope of
§ 2255(h)'s cross-reference to § 2244.
In the Government's view, the cross-reference captures all
of §§ 2244(b)(3) and (b)(4), including the certiorari bar in
§ 2244(b)(3)(E). Although the Government is correct that
the cross-reference incorporates some of the provisions it
identifes, the Government is wrong that it also incorporates
the certiorari bar. That is because the cross-reference, cou-
pled with its context, does not provide the clear indication
needed to strip this Court of jurisdiction.
2
See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b)(1) (“[a] claim presented in a second or
successive habeas corpus application under section 2254”); § 2244(b)(2)
(same); § 2244(c) (“[i]n a habeas corpus proceeding brought in behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court”); § 2244(d)(1)
(“application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court”); see also § 2244(d)(2) (“application for
State post-conviction or other collateral review”).

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Opinion of the Court
B
1
Th
is Court has certiorari jurisdiction over any “[c]as[e] in
the courts of appeals . . . upon the petition of any party to
any civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judg-
ment or decree.” § 1254(1). Given that broad grant of ju-
risdiction, Congress must speak clearly if it seeks to impose
exceptions to that jurisdiction.
In Castro v. United States, 540 U. S. 375 (2003), Castro (a
federal prisoner) fled a motion for postconviction relief in
Federal District Court. He had previously fled a motion,
pro se, attacking his conviction, but he had not specifcally
labeled it as a § 2255 motion. The District Court construed
Castro's previous fling as his frst § 2255 motion and the sec-
ond fling before it as a second § 2255 motion. Because Cas-
tro did not receive authorization from the Court of Appeals
before fling the second motion, the court dismissed it. The
court, however, granted Castro a certifcate of appealability
as to its determination that the motion was his second one.
See § 2253(c). The Court of Appeals later affrmed the
dismissal.
This Court granted certiorari to address the recharacter-
ization of Castro's frst fling. The Court also asked the par-
ties whether § 2244(b)(3)(E) barred its review. Like here,
the Government argued that it did. In the Government's
view, the Court of Appeals had denied Castro authorization
when it affrmed the District Court's dismissal, making that
“denial” the “subject” of his “petition for . . . certiorari” for
the purposes of § 2244(b)(3)(E). The Court accepted that
characterization of the proceedings below for the sake of
argument, yet disagreed that § 2244(b)(3)(E) posed a bar
to its review. Castro, 540 U. S., at 380. That was because
the “subject” of Castro's petition was not the denial of au-
thorization, but rather “the lower courts' refusal to recognize
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26 BOWE
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Opinion of the Court
that [the] § 2255 motion [was] his frst, not his second.”
Ib
id.
3
As relevant here, the Court stressed a fatal faw with the
Government's argument. As it explained, “reading the stat-
ute as the Government suggest[ed]” to bar jurisdiction in
that case “would close our doors to a class of habeas petition-
ers seeking review without any clear indication that such
was Congress' intent.” Id., at 380–381; cf. Hertz Corp. v.
Friend, 559 U. S. 77, 83–84 (2010) (declining to read “silence
or ambiguous language as modifying or limiting [the Court's]
pre-existing [certiorari] jurisdiction”). That conclusion was
also “diffcult to reconcile with the basic principle that we
`read limitations on our jurisdiction to review narrowly.' ”
Castro, 540 U. S., at 381 (quoting Utah v. Evans, 536 U. S.
452, 463 (2002)).
4
3
The Government stresses, and the dissent echoes, that the Castro
Court “took as a given” that § 2244(b)(3)(E) applies to federal prisoners by
concluding that it had jurisdiction because the subject of the certiorari
petition fell outside of the provision's scope, not because the provision
applied to state prisoners alone. Brief for United States 18, 30–31. As
the Government elsewhere acknowledges, however, the Court did not ad-
dress the threshold question whether § 2244(b)(3)(E) applies to federal
prisoners. Id., at 31 (observing that Castro “did not even comment on the
issue”). Thus, at most, the Court assumed for the sake of its analysis that
§ 2244(b)(3)(E) applied. That assumption is not a holding to which the
Court is now bound.
4
The dissent's rendition of Castro is mistaken. It suggests that the
clear-indication requirement was tied to the “troublesome resul[t]” that,
under the Government's interpretation, a prisoner could not appeal a panel
decision characterizing a fling as his frst, not his second, even though the
Court had previously allowed the Government to appeal a decision reach-
ing the opposite result. See Castro, 540 U. S., at 380; Stewart v. Martinez-
Villareal, 523 U. S. 637, 641–642 (1998); see also post, at 52–53, 60–61 (opin-
ion of Gorsuch, J.). That was one troubling result of the Government's
position, but Castro also listed two more troubling results: the “clos[ing of]
our doors to a class of habeas petitioners seeking review without any clear
indication that such was Congress' intent,” and the diffculty in “reconcil-
[ing]” that outcome “with the basic principle that we `read limitations on
our jurisdiction to review narrowly.' ” 540 U. S., at 380–381. The latter

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27
Opinion of the Court
Because a “clear indication” was necessary in Castro to
str
ip the Court of jurisdiction, a “clear indication” is required
here: The issue arises in the same context and the Govern-
ment argues that the very same provision bars the Court's
review in this case. This clear indication, importantly, is not
a so-called “magic words” requirement. It simply asks
whether the text and structure support the unambiguous un-
derstanding that Congress intended to prevent this Court's
exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction. If a provision can rea-
sonably be read multiple ways given its content and context,
it is not suffciently clear.
The dissent contends that this clear-indication require-
ment comes from “thin air.” Post, at 57–62 (opinion of Gor-
such, J.). As just explained, however, it comes from Castro
itself. It also draws support from this Court's historical
practice of declining to read ambiguous statutes to limit its
certiorari jurisdiction, which even the dissent acknowledges.
See post, at 61–62.
The dissent also argues that this clear-indication require-
ment must be mistaken because it is not derived from princi-
ples of constitutional avoidance. Constitutional avoidance,
however, is not the only possible source of a rule like Cas-
tro's. This Court also has required Congress to speak
clearly in other contexts when Congress wishes to do some-
thing that the Constitution allows. For example, the Court
will interpret a “procedural requirement as jurisdictional
only if Congress `clearly states' that it is.” Boechler v. Com-
missioner, 596 U. S. 199, 203 (2022). In that context, “Con-
gress need not `incant magic words,' but the `traditional tools
of statutory construction must plainly show that Congress
imbued a procedural bar with jurisdictional consequences.' ”
Ibid. (citation omitted). Requiring this showing is driven
by the harsh consequences of fnding a procedural require-
two concerns arise here, and thus Castro requires a clear indication before
we will “close our doors” to this distinct class of prisoners seeking ha-
beas relief.
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28 BOWE
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Opinion of the Court
ment jurisdictional, even though Congress, of course, main-
t
ains the power to impose such consequences. See Arbaugh
v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 514–516 (2006); Henderson v.
Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 434–435 (2011). A similar logic
drives the clarity required here, when reading § 2255(h) as
the Government and the dissent do would “close our doors
to a class of habeas petitioners.” Castro, 540 U. S., at 381.
5
2
Section 2255(h)'s cross-reference does not provide the clear
indication required to bar this Court's review. The lan-
guage of the cross-reference is both narrow and specifc. It
says that a second or successive § 2255 motion “must be certi-
fed as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate
court of appeals to contain” one of two threshold content re-
quirements. (The text of the cross-reference does not end
at “ `certifed as provided in section 2244,' ” as the dissent
would have it. See post, at 51, 54, 56.) The cross-reference
thus appears to incorporate only the provisions in § 2244 that
“provid[e]” for how a “panel of the appropriate court of ap-
peals” “certife[s]” a second or successive fling and directs
that those procedures be used to evaluate whether the fling
“contain[s]” the content requirements listed in § 2255(h).
Section 2244(b)(3)(E) is not one of those provisions, and it
has nothing to do with the content requirements in § 2255(h).
5
No one contends that Boechler controls this case. But see post, at
59–60. The Boechler line of cases simply demonstrates that this Court
requires clarity in some contexts even absent constitutional concerns, un-
dermining any suggestion that constitutional avoidance is the only permis-
sible source of Castro's rule or other interpretative rules like it. Nor does
this line of cases stand alone. See, e. g., Morrison v. National Australia
Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. 247, 255 (2010) (describing the presumption against
extraterritoriality, which requires a “clear indication of an extraterritorial
application” for a statute to reach beyond domestic affairs, as refecting
“a canon of construction, . . . rather than a limit upon Congress's power
to legislate”).
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29
Opinion of the Court
First, the cross-reference speaks to how a “panel” of the
cour
t of appeals certifes a fling. But this Court is not “a
panel of the appropriate court of appeals,” § 2255(h), so the
cross-reference does not speak to this Court's jurisdiction.
Second, this Court's review (or lack thereof ) is not part of
how a panel certifes a second or successive fling. Section
2244(b)(3)(A) identifes that the fling must be certifed in the
court of appeals before an individual can proceed in the dis-
trict court. Section 2244(b)(3)(B) requires that a three-
judge panel make the cer ti ficati on decisi on. Sec ti on
2244(b)(3)(C) tells the panel that the fling must make a
prima facie showing that it satisfes the relevant gatekeeping
requirements. Finally, § 2244(b)(3)(D) instructs the panel to
decide whether to certify a fling within 30 days of receiving
the request. These provisions all describe the procedures
that a panel must follow in certifying a second or successive
fling, and are therefore incorporated by § 2255(h)'s cross-
reference.
In stark contrast, the certiorari bar in § 2244(b)(3)(E) says
nothing about how the § 2255 motion must be certifed. It
instead speaks to what happens after a panel has acted on a
certifcation request: specifcally, whether an individual can
appeal the panel's certifcation decision. If the certiorari
bar did not exist, no aspect of how the panel certifes a fling
would change.
6
Put simply, “the certiorari bar addresses an
entirely different act (fling a certiorari petition, not certify-
ing a successive motion) by an entirely different actor (the
prisoner, not the panel) in an entirely different court (this
Court, not the court of appeals).” Brief for Petitioner 33.
If Congress intended § 2255(h) to incorporate this postcerti-
fcation orange alongside all the panel-certifcation apples in
§ 2244(b)(3), it did not say so clearly.
6
The dissent asks “[w]hat would be the point” of subparagraph (B) with-
out the certiorari bar in subparagraph (E). Post, at 55. The point of (B)
is still apparent. It identifes who makes the authorization determination
in the frst instance: a “three-judge panel of the court of appeals.”
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Of course, as the Government and the dissent point out,
barr
ing appeals of certifcation decisions has an effect on the
panel's decision by making it conclusive. Brief for United
States 47; post, at 55–56. That effect, however, has little to
do with how the “motion [is] certifed . . . by a panel.”
§ 2255(h). Section 2255(h)'s reference to how the “motion
must be certifed” under § 2244 thus does not incorporate
§ 2244(b)(3)(E)'s postcertifcation bar in the clear manner that
Castro requires.
Contrary to the dissent's framing, Hohn v. United States,
524 U. S. 236 (1998), does not support a different conclusion.
That case concerned whether the Court had jurisdiction over
a decision by a three-judge panel to deny a prisoner a cer-
tifcate of appealability under § 2253(c), and held that the
Court does have such jurisdiction. Id., at 253. Section
2253(c) applies to federal and state prisoners and dictates
that, before an individual can appeal from a district court's
denial of a habeas petition, he must secure permission from
“a circuit justice or judge.”
Court-appointed amicus in Hohn argued that the decision
denying permission was not a “case” in the Court of Appeals
for the purposes of this Court's jurisdiction under § 1254(1).
The Court rejected that construction, however, in part be-
cause it would have rendered § 2244(b)(3)(E) (which the
Court suggested was a requirement for “state prisoners fl-
ing second or successive habeas applications under § 2254”)
as superfuous. See id., at 249. That was because all the
reasons amicus gave for why a decision denying a certif-
cate of appealability did not constitute a “case” for the pur-
poses of § 1254(1) would equally have applied to a decision
denying authorization to bring a second or successive fling.
Ibid. The Court nowhere held that § 2244(b)(3)(E) applied
to federal prisoners. (That is not surprising because the
case did not present that question.) Nor does the Court's
holding today render § 2244(b)(3)(E) superfuous: As all
agree, it bars this Court's review of panel authorization deci-
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31
Opinion of the Court
sions concerning motions to fle second or successive applica-
ti
ons by state prisoners.
The dissent also relies on Hohn to argue that it already
stands for the proposition that § 2244(B)(3)(E) imposes “a
`clear limit' on our jurisdiction” in this case. Post, at 53, 57–
58; see also post, at 61. Not so. No one disputes that the
certiorari bar clearly deprives the Court of jurisdiction over
classes of cases to which it applies. See Hohn, 524 U. S.,
at 250. What is not clear is whether, through the cross-
reference in § 2255(h), Congress intended for that bar to ex-
tend to federal prisoners—a point Hohn simply did not
address.
C
For these reasons, whether § 2244(b)(3)(E)'s certiorari bar
falls within the scope of § 2255(h)'s cross-reference is at most
ambiguous. Ambiguous language, however, cannot provide
the required clear indication, and the Government's and the
dissent's remaining arguments do not supply the necessary
clarity that the text lacks.
To begin, the Government contends that there is textual
support in § 2244(b)(3)(E) for the understanding that the cer-
tiorari bar applies to federal prisoners through the cross-
reference. On this score, the Government points to how
§§ 2244(b)(3)(A)–(E) each use the term “second or successive
application” instead of referring to § 2254 specifcally or state
prisoners more generally. This stands in contrast to nearly
all the other provisions in § 2244. In the Government's view,
this textual variation means that Congress intended for
§ 2255(h)'s cross-reference to incorporate any provision in
§ 2244 that uses the term “second or successive application”
and the breadth of the cross-reference therefore must be un-
derstood on those terms.
If that were so, § 2255(h)'s cross-reference would also in-
corporate § 2244(b)(4). That provision directs district courts
to review and “dismiss any claim presented in a second or
successive application that the court of appeals has author-
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32 BOWE
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Opinion of the Court
ized . . . unless the applicant shows that the claim satisfes
the
requirements of ” § 2244. Put differently, once a second
or successive application is certifed, § 2244(b)(4) tells a dis-
trict court to doublecheck that the application satisfes
§ 2244, including its gatekeeping requirements. Section
2244(b)(4), however, plainly falls outside the scope of
§ 2255(h)'s cross-reference because § 2244(b)(4) has nothing to
do with how a fling is “certifed as provided in section 2244
by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals.” § 2255(h).
Thus, accepting the Government's argument that § 2255(h)'s
cross-reference should be understood to incorporate any pro-
vision in § 2244 that uses “second or successive application”
would essentially require interpreting § 2255(h) to mean a
federal prisoner's second or successive motion “must con-
form to all provisions in section 2244 that are not expressly
limited to state prisoners.” That, of course, is not what
§ 2255(h) says.
The Government also points to part of § 2244(b)(3)(E) that
does speak to a “panel” of “a court of appeals.” Specifcally,
§ 2244(b)(3)(E) says that an authorization decision “shall not
be the subject of a petition for rehearing,” thereby barring
panel rehearing. According to the Government, because
§ 2244(b)(3)(E) speaks to the panel in some regard, § 2255(h)
must have intended to incorporate that provision in its en-
tirety. The Government is wrong, however, that the certio-
rari bar is incorporated in this way. Whether § 2244(b)
(3)(E)'s panel-rehearing bar applies to federal prisoners says
little, and certainly nothing clear, about whether Congress
intended § 2244(b)(3)(E)'s separate certiorari bar to extend to
authorization decisions concerning federal prisoners. Using
the former to incorporate the latter is the kind of jurisdiction
stripping by implication that cannot suffce. Cf. Felker, 518
U. S., at 660 (“Repeals [of jurisdiction] by implication are
not favored”).
Next, the Gover nment arg ues that a l low i ng appea ls
from a panel's cer ti ficati on decisi on to th is Cour t is
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33
Opinion of the Court
inconsistent with § 2244(b)(3)(D). Brief for United States
27
–28; see also post, at 55–56. That provision, which all
agree is covered by § 2255(h)'s cross-reference, imposes a 30-
day clock on a panel's certifcation decision after a litigant
seeks authorization (though most Courts of Appeals view
that requirement as advisory, see In re Williams, 898 F. 3d
1098, 1102, n. 5 (CA11 2018) (Wilson, J., specially concurring)
(collecting cases); see also infra, at 39–40, and n. 8). When
an individual seeks certiorari, on the other hand, he has 90
days from the date of decision to fle a petition in this Court.
This Court's Rule 13.1. The Government suggests that the
30-day limit for panel review indicates that Congress wanted
the certifcation decision to occur quickly, and that allowing
prisoners to seek certiorari for an additional 90 days after
the panel review concludes would thwart that intention.
The Gover nment's arg ument is misg uided. Noth i ng
about the Court's decision today undermines § 2244(b)(3)(D)'s
timeline for the panel's authorization decision. Nor is this
inference so compelling as to provide the needed clarity to
cut off the Court's jurisdiction: It is entirely plausible that
Congress intended to require panels to move quickly, while
still preserving the prisoner's ability to seek further review
in the rare case that warrants this Court's attention. See
§ 2266 (placing time limits on the initial review of capital
cases in the lower courts but placing no limits on this Court's
review). Panels will still have the tools needed, moreover,
to facilitate that quick review under the Court's interpreta-
tion of § 2255(h)'s cross-reference. See infra, at 39–40, and
n. 8.
7
7
Nor does the Court's decision today risk unduly opening the foodgates
to frivolous appeals from authorization decisions concerning federal pris-
oners. Such appeals will be governed by the ordinary rules that prevent
abuses of the Court's certiorari docket in every other circumstance. See,
e. g., this Court's Rules 39.8, 42.2. If Congress thought it best to strip the
Court of jurisdiction to keep these appeals away from the Court's docket
nonetheless, it failed to convey that intent suffciently.
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Opinion of the Court
From here, the Government resorts to another structural
arg
ument. The certiorari bar is found in § 2244(b)(3)'s ffth
subparagraph. Everyone agrees that § 2255(h)'s cross-
reference incorporates the preceding four subparagraphs.
The Government maintains that it would be odd that Con-
gress intended to incorporate four of those subparagraphs
and not all fve. Brief for United States 17, 23. If Congress
had intended for all fve to travel together, however, it did
not say so explicitly. That would have been easy to do: Con-
gress simply could have referenced § 2244(b)(3) specifcally,
rather than broadly referencing § 2244 with a narrow cross-
reference only specifying how a second or successive fling is
“certifed” by a “panel.” Congress did not. The language
it used instead supports the understanding that the provi-
sions the cross-reference incorporates turn on their sub-
stance, not where they sit in a list. As explained, supra, at
28–31, the certiorari bar does not clearly fall within the
scope of the cross-reference on its own terms.
Finally, the Government invokes a practical concern. The
Government suggests that it would make little sense to bar
certiorari review of authorization decisions concerning state
prisoners but not federal ones. That argument carries little
weight when the governing standard requires Congress to
speak clearly. It also misses the mark. Congress treated
state and federal prisoners differently across AEDPA, with
state prisoners often facing far higher hurdles to relief. To
name a few examples: The statutory requirements for second
or successive flings for federal and state prisoners are “not
identical.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. 524, 529, n. 3
(2005); compare §§ 2244(b)(1)–(2) with §§ 2255(h)(1)–(2). In-
deed, the requirements for federal prisoners are more le-
nient, as explained in detail below. See infra, at 37–38.
Further, for state prisoners alone, Congress requires ex-
haustion, §§ 2254(b)–(c), and then, once in federal court, man-
dates deference to both the state court's application of fed-
eral law and its factual determinations, § 2254(d).
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35
Opinion of the Court
This differential treatment exists for good reason. Con-
gress
enacted AEDPA “to further the principles of comity,
fnality, and federalism.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 420,
436 (2000). The Act “recognizes a foundational principle of
our federal system: State courts are adequate forums for the
vindication of federal rights.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U. S. 12,
19 (2013). Out of respect for state courts and their ability
“to adjudicate claims of constitutional wrong, AEDPA
erect[ed] a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for
[state] prisoners.” Ibid. Federal courts “will not lightly
conclude that a State's criminal justice system has experi-
enced the `extreme malfunctio[n]' for which federal habeas
relief is the remedy.” Id., at 20; see also Greene v. Fisher,
565 U. S. 34, 38 (2011) (observing that “the purpose of
AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas” review of state-
court proceedings does not function as a “means of error
correction”).
Comity and federalism, however, fall away when a federal
court reviews a federal judgment. By the time a federal
prisoner looks to fle a second or successive motion, more-
over, he will have had fewer bites at the apple, and fewer
courts reviewing his case, than most state prisoners in the
same position. See § 2254(b)(1)(A); In re Graham, 61 F. 4th
433, 441 (CA4 2023). Although the Federal Government has
an interest in fnality too, Mayle v. Felix, 545 U. S. 644, 662
(2005), “ `[n]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs,' ”
Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 566 U. S. 449, 460 (2012).
Allowing further review in this Court is thus consistent with
both AEDPA's purposes and practical considerations.
At bottom, the Government's arguments suggest that
§ 2255(h)'s cross-reference might include § 2244(b)(3)(E)'s cer-
tiorari bar. They do not, however, provide the necessary
“clear indication” that Congress intended to “close our doors
to a class of habeas petitioners seeking review.” Castro,
540 U. S., at 381. Absent such clear indication, federal pris-
oners are not prohibited from seeking certiorari from a pan-
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36 BOWE
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Opinion of the Court
el's denial of authorization to fle a second or successive
moti
on.
III
Turning now to the merits upon which the Court granted
certiorari, Bowe and the Government agree that the Elev-
enth Circuit erred by applying § 2244(b)(1) to Bowe's request
for authorization to fle a second or successive motion to
vacate under § 2255(h). The Court appointed Kasdin M.
Mitchell as amicus curiae to argue in support of the Elev-
enth Circuit's position. 604 U. S. 1117 (2025). She has ably
discharged her responsibilities. The Court nevertheless
agrees with the parties and holds that § 2244(b)(1) does not
apply to motions fled by federal prisoners under § 2255(h).
The contrary decision of the Eleventh Circuit is vacated.
A
Begin with the text. Section 2244(b)(1) states that “[a]
claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus ap-
plication under section 2254 that was presented in a prior
application shall be dismissed.” State prisoners alone fle
habeas corpus applications under § 2254. See § 2254(a) (not-
ing that § 2254 is limited to “a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court”); see also Magwood v. Patter-
son, 561 U. S. 320, 333 (2010) (“The requirement of custody
pursuant to a state-court judgment distinguishes § 2254 from
other statutory provisions authorizing relief from constitu-
tional violations—such as § 2255, which allows challenges to
the judgments of federal courts”).
This specifc reference to § 2254 was deliberate: Elsewhere
i n th is very sec ti on, § 2244 acknowledges § 2255. See
§ 2244(a) (referencing § 2255); see also §§ 2253(c)(1)(A)–(B)
(distinguishing a “fnal order” in a “habeas corpus proceeding
in which the detention complained of arises out of process
issued by a State court” from one “in a proceeding under
section 2255”); § 2266(a) (distinguishing an “application under
section 2254” from a “motion under section 2255”). A cardi-
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37
Opinion of the Court
nal rule of statutory interpretation teaches that “when we're
engaged
in the business of interpreting statutes[,] we pre-
sume differences in language like this convey differences in
meaning.” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582
U. S. 79, 86 (2017). Thus, by its plain terms, § 2244(b)(1)'s
old-claim bar applies only to state prisoners.
Nor does § 2255(h)'s cross-reference to § 2244 otherwise
make § 2244(b)(1) applicable to second or successive motions
fled by federal prisoners. Amicus, as well as the dissent,
however, argues that it does. As they see it, § 2255(h) incor-
porates § 2244, including § 2244(b)(3)(C). Section 2244(b)
(3)(C), in turn, requires a panel to determine that “the appli-
cation makes a prima facie showing that [it] satisfes the re-
quirements of this subsection.” From here, one of the “re-
quirements of . . . subsection” (b) is § 2244(b)(1). Following
this chain of cross-references where it leads, amicus and the
dissent say, § 2244(b)(1) must apply to federal prisoners.
The reasoning why this Court has jurisdiction also shows
the error in this position. See supra, at 28–31. Section
2255(h)'s cross-reference incorporates the procedures in
§ 2244 only as they relate to how a panel certifes a second
or successive fling. It then tells the panel to use those pro-
cedures to evaluate whether the federal prisoner's second or
successive motion “contain[s]” either newly discovered evi-
dence, § 2255(h)(1), or a new rule of constitutional law,
§ 2255(h)(2). Nothing in § 2255(h) suggests that it incorpo-
rates § 2244 for any other purposes. Thus, by its terms,
§ 2255(h)'s cross-reference does not incorporate the content
requirements contained in § 2244, like § 2244(b)(1)'s old-
claim bar.
Amicus and the dissent's broad reading of § 2244(b)(3)(C)
would also put § 2255 on a collision course with § 2244. Sec-
tion 2244(b) imposes two limitations on the content of a sec-
ond or successive habeas application: § 2244(b)(1), which bars
old claims; and § 2244(b)(2), which prescribes “two grounds”
in which a claim “not previously raised” can proceed in a

38 BOWE
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Opinion of the Court
“second or successive application.” Burton, 549 U. S., at
153.
Section 2244(b)(3)(C), on which amicus relies, requires
individuals to satisfy all the “requirements of this subsec-
tion,” including both §§ 2244(b)(1) and (b)(2). The upshot of
amicus's argument would therefore be that § 2255(h) incor-
porates not only § 2244( b)(1)'s old-clai m bar, but a lso
§ 2244(b)(2)'s substantive gatekeeping requirements for new
claims. Section 2255(h), however, contains its own substan-
tive requirements that are irreconcilable with those in
§ 2244(b).
In particular, § 2255(h)(1) permits a second or successive
§ 2255 motion if the petitioner identifes “newly discovered
evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence
as a whole, would be suffcient to establish by clear and con-
vincing evidence that no reasonable factfnder would have
found the movant g ui lty of the offense. ” Sec ti on
2244(b)(2)(B) also concerns claims based on new facts, but it
is more limited than § 2255's in two ways. First, it confnes
the new-facts exception to scenarios in which the new facts
“could not have been discovered previously through the ex-
ercise of due diligence.” § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i). Second, it re-
quires that the movant show “by clear and convincing evi-
dence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable
factfnder would have found the applicant guilty of the un-
derlying offense.” § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).
If Congress had incorporated § 2244(b)(2)(B)'s more strin-
gent exception into § 2255(h), then § 2255(h)(1)'s more lenient
exception would become a dead letter. Because “ `Congress
presumably does not enact useless laws,' ” Garland v. Car-
gill, 602 U. S. 406, 427 (2024), it makes no sense to read
§ 2255(h)'s cross-reference in this way.
Recognizing the problem with this position, amicus and
the dissent attempt to limit the scope of “requirements of
this subsection” in § 2244(B)(3)(C) to capture only those con-
tent requirements in §§ 2244(b)(1) and (b)(2) that do not con-
fict with § 2255(h). In their view, Congress intended for the
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39
Opinion of the Court
substantive gatekeeping requirements in § 2244(b) to apply
to
federal prisoners by default, unless they deviated from
those requirements in § 2255(h). To amicus, the new-facts
exception illustrates this approach. This argument, how-
ever, is undercut by the fact that in § 2244(b)(2)(A) and
§ 2255(h)(2), Congress repeated verbatim the standard for
when a second or successive fling can proceed based on a
new, retroactive rule of constitutional law. If § 2244(b)(2)(A)
already provided the default rule, there would have been no
need for Congress to repeat it in § 2255(h)(2), rendering its
inclusion mere surplusage. Hohn, 524 U. S., at 249 (declin-
ing “to adopt a construction making another statutory provi-
sion superfuous”).
At bottom, the best textual reading of both § 2255(h) and
§ 2244(b) is that, when a federal prisoner moves for authori-
zation, a panel can authorize the fling if it satisfes one of
the two grounds in § 2255(h), the “two—and only two—condi-
tions in which a second or successive § 2255 motion may pro-
ceed.” Jones, 599 U. S., at 477.
B
Amicus's remaining nontextual arguments do not change
this conclusion. She contends that § 2244(b)(1) is a neces-
sary tool, indeed “central,” for panels to meet § 2244(b)(3)
(D)'s 30-day deadline, and that Congress therefore must have
intended for it to apply in all cases in which authorization is
needed. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 12, 23–
26. That logical leap lacks suffcient foundation.
For one, it is not clear why searching through case fles to
see if the litigant has raised a claim before is any easier than
determining whether the litigant has identifed new evidence
or a new rule of constitutional law that is retroactive. As
the parties explain, it seems just as likely that the panel's
obligation to assess only whether a fling has made a prima
facie showing that it satisfes § 2255(h)'s content require-
ments, and not to undertake a more searching inquiry on the
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v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
merits, is what facilitates the 30-day deadline. See Reply
Br
ief for Petitioner 9–10; Reply Brief for United States 9;
see also Tyler v. Cain, 533 U. S. 656, 664, 661, n. 3 (2001).
Amicus certainly provides no evidence to suggest that her
hypothesis is the more plausible one.
8
Regardless, amicus's
“speculation as to Congress' intent” in enacting the old-claim
bar and 30-day deadline “cannot replace the actual text” Con-
gress enacted. Magwood, 561 U. S., at 334.
Amicus further argues that Congress meant for AEDPA
to treat second or successive flings by federal and state pris-
oners the same. As already explained, however, AEDPA is
replete with examples of Congress treating state and federal
prisoners differently—including in the context of limitations
on second or successive flings. Supra, at 34–35.
9
Some courts, including the Eleventh Circuit below, have
relied on this policy justifcation and others like it in applying
§ 2244(b)(1) to bar second or successive motions fled by fed-
eral prisoners under § 2255(h). See, e. g., In re Baptiste, 828
F. 3d 1337, 1339 (2016) (“[I]t would be odd indeed if Congress
8
For support, amicus relies on the fact that the three Circuits that do
not apply § 2244(b)(1) to federal prisoners do not consider the 30-day dead-
line binding, suggesting that the failure to apply § 2244(b)(1)'s old-claim
bar is the reason for their failure to comply with the 30-day deadline in all
cases. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 24–25. Amicus over-
looks, however, that three out of the six Circuits that apply § 2244(b)(1) to
federal prisoners also do not treat that deadline as binding. Compare In
re Williams, 898 F. 3d 1098, 1102, n. 5 (CA11 2018) (Wilson, J., specially
concurring) (noting that the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits do not
treat the 30-day deadline as binding, and that the Eighth Circuit has not
yet “opined on the issue”), with n. 1, supra (collecting those Circuits on
the side of the Circuit split applying § 2244(b)(1) to federal prisoners).
9
This is not the only way in which Congress has treated old claims
fled by federal and state prisoners differently. Section 2244(c) bars state
prisoners from raising a claim or challenging facts in the federal postcon-
viction setting that were adjudicated by this Court on direct review. This
bar does not apply to federal prisoners, even though this Court can also
exercise jurisdiction over appeals on direct review of federal convictions.
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41
Opinion of the Court
had intended to allow federal prisoners to refle precisely
the
same non-meritorious motions over and over again while
denying that right to state prisoners”). Those courts erred:
“[P]urposive argument simply cannot overcome the force of
the plain text.” Mohamad, 566 U. S., at 460. Any concern
associated with Congress allowing old-claim repeat litigation
for federal prisoners, moreover, is overstated: All claims,
even the repeat ones, must meet the “strictly limited”
threshold requirements of § 2255(h), Jones, 599 U. S., at 476,
and should they survive that review, they must still conform
with the demanding statute of limitations contained in
§ 2255(f ), Dodd v. United States, 545 U. S. 353, 359 (2005).
Very few claims will satisfy either, let alone both. Ulti-
mately, there is “no reason to doubt” that “Congress said
what it meant and meant what it said” in § 2244(b)(1) and
§ 2255(h). Loughrin v. United States, 573 U. S. 351, 360
(2014).
10
* * *
For these reasons, § 2244(b)(1) does not apply to second or
successive motions fled by federal prisoners challenging
their convictions or sentences under § 2255(h). The Court
leaves it to the Eleventh Circuit to determine in the frst
instance whether Bowe should receive authorization to fle a
10
Although the common law did not apply traditional res judicata princi-
ples to habeas petitions, courts developed different equitable doctrines to
address abuses of the writ. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 479–
489 (1991). Congress can displace those doctrines, but in the absence of
evidence of that intent, federal courts can continue to use those common-
law tools. Cf. Banister v. Davis, 590 U. S. 504, 515 (2020) (concluding that
AEDPA did not displace the historical practice of applying Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 59(e) in habeas). Section 2244(b) codifed a “modifed
res judicata rule” for second or successive petitions. Felker v. Turpin,
518 U. S. 651, 664 (1996). As the Government argues here, AEDPA may
not have displaced other practices that courts can still use to address re-
petitive flings made by federal prisoners in the absence of § 2244(b)(1).
See Brief for United States 48–50.
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v. UNITED STATES
Jackson, J., concurring
second or successive motion under the correct standard.
The
judgment below is vacated, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Jackson, concurring.
I agree with the Court that, under our precedents, Con-
gress was required to say more if it wanted 28 U. S. C.
§ 2244(b)(3)(E) to strip our jurisdiction over federal prison-
ers' requests for review of panel-certifcation decisions. See
ante, at 27. I likewise agree with the Court's conclusion
that § 2244(b)(1)'s bar on do-over claims in second or succes-
sive applications applies only to state prisoners. See ante,
at 36–37. I write separately to offer my view of what Con-
gress likely sought to accomplish with § 2244(b)(3)(E): insu-
lating a three-judge panel's properly made (even if errone-
ous) gatekeeping determination from further review. The
provision's language, our decision in Castro v. United States,
540 U. S. 375, 381 (2003), and the broader statute's detailed
gatekeeping scheme all support this interpretation. Be-
cause the three-judge panel here did not deny Bowe's peti-
tion pursuant to the statutorily prescribed procedures, I
think it did not make the sort of determination Congress
intended to insulate.
I
Section 2244(b)(3)(E) provides that “[t]he grant or denial
of an authorization by a court of appeals to fle a second or
successive application shall not be appealable and shall not
be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of
certiorari.” This provision thus prevents our Court from
reviewing a certiorari petition whose “subject” is the “grant”
or “denial” of a request for “authorization . . . to fle a second
or successive application.” That proscription does not cover
Bowe's petition.
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43
Jackson, J., concurring
In its decision below, the Court of Appeals did not grant or
deny
Bowe authorization to proceed on his successive claim.
Rather, it “dismissed” his proposed claim “for lack of juris-
diction.” In re Bowe, Civ. No. 24–11704 (CA11, June 27,
2024), App. 79. True, “the label attached to an order” does
not erase its “practical effect.” Abbott v. Perez, 585 U. S.
579, 594 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
post, at 62–63, n. 4 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). But, in this
case, the distinction between a denial and a dismissal is prac-
tical, not semantic.
As I read § 2244(b)(3)(E), a “grant or denial” occurs when
a three-judge panel goes through the screening procedures
Congress has prescribed and applies the appropriate criteria
for second or successive claims.
1
Here, the three-judge
panel never actually applied the relevant criteria to Bowe's
motion—that is, the criteria for federal prisoners under
§§ 2255(h)(1) and (h)(2). Instead, the panel refexively dis-
missed Bowe's author i zati on request, holdi ng that
§ 2244(b)(1)'s bar on do-over claims deprived it of jurisdiction,
even though § 2244(b)(1) applies only to state prisoners, for
the reasons the Court explains. Ante, at 39.
As a result, a three-judge panel never undertook the re-
quired process for evaluating—i. e., for granting or deny-
ing—Bowe's authorization request. Put differently, because
the panel dismissed Bowe's petition, there was no “grant or
denial” of his “authorization” request that could be chal-
lenged in a petition for certiorari, as § 2244(b)(3)(E) requires.
1
Today's dispute encompasses a disagreement about which set of statu-
tory criteria applies to federal prisoners: § 2244(b)(1) or § 2255(h). Ac-
cording to Justice Gorsuch, “[e]veryone agrees” that § 2244(b)(3)(E)
“precludes us from exercising certiorari jurisdiction to review an appellate
panel's decision granting or denying certifcation to state prisoners.”
Post, at 49 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added). I agree with that asser-
tion, but, as I will explain, only insofar as it refers to appellate-panel deci-
sions that actually apply the statutory criteria and specifed procedures
for granting or denying state prisoners' authorization requests.
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Jackson, J., concurring
This reading of § 2244(b)(3)(E) fnds support in Castro.
That
case, like this one, came to us in a distinct posture.
Castro, a federal prisoner, fled a motion in the District
Court to vacate his sentence under § 2255. See 540 U. S., at
378. Because Castro did not understand his motion to be
second or successive, he did not frst seek authorization from
a three-judge panel in the Court of Appeals. See id., at 378–
379; see also 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (“Before a second or
successive application . . . is fled in the district court, the
applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for
an order authorizing the district court to consider the appli-
cation”). Taking a different view than Castro, the District
Court “dismissed the motion for failure to comply with” the
statutory restrictions on second or successive claims. 540
U. S., at 379. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with
the District Court's analysis and affrmed without evaluating
Castro's motion on the merits. Castro subsequently fled a
petition for a writ of certiorari, seeking to challenge the
Eleventh Circuit's second or successive determination. But
the Government contended that we lacked jurisdiction under
§ 2244(b)(3)(E). See id., at 379–380.
We ultimately held that § 2244(b)(3)(E) did not bar our re-
view of Castro's petition. In so holding, we emphasized that
Castro had not “asked the Court of Appeals to grant, and it
nowhere denied, any `authorization . . . to fle a second or
successive application.' ” Id., at 380 (quoting § 2244(b)
(3)(E)). Instead, the case came to the Eleventh Circuit on
appeal, after the District Court had already made its own
determination about the viability of Castro's motion. In
that posture, we explained, the Eleventh Circuit had not
made a “statutorily relevant `denial' of a request” for au-
thorization—even though the court's conclusion “had the ef-
fect of denying `authorization' ” to Castro. Id., at 380.
Against that procedural background, the “ `subject' ” of Cas-
tro's certiorari petition was “not the Court of Appeals' `de-
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45
Jackson, J., concurring
nial of an authorization,' ” so we retained our jurisdiction de-
spite
§ 2244(b)(3)(E). Ibid.
So too here. To be sure, unlike Castro, Bowe's case has
moved through the initial procedure for second or successive
motions—that is, Bowe comes to us after frst requesting
authorization from a three-judge panel in the Court of Ap-
peals. But, just like Castro, the three-judge panel never
made a “statutorily relevant” denial of Bowe's authorization
request. To do so, the panel would have had to go through
the applicable statutory criteria and determine whether
Bowe's successive moti on satisfied the conditi ons of
§§ 2255(h)(1) and (h)(2). Because the panel never made such
a determination, it neither granted nor denied Bowe's au-
thorization request, as required to bar our review under
§ 2244(b)(3)(E).
2
II
One might reasonably question why Congress would have
crafted § 2244(b)(3)(E) to achieve such a technical distinction:
barring further review of denials on the merits while permit-
2
Because Castro's analysis calls for a “statutorily relevant” denial, 540
U. S., at 380, it lays bare Justice Gorsuch’s mistaken contention that “[a]
denial is a denial” for § 2244(b)(3)(E) purposes, post, at 63, n. 4. Reading
the statute as I do also resolves the purported tension in the Court's opin-
ion that Justice Gorsuch elsewhere identifes: Why would the Court
“take the trouble to show” that Castro, a federal prisoner, “wasn't pursu-
ing a second or successive attack subject to subparagraph (E)” if that
provision had “no bearing whatsoever on federal prisoners in the frst
place?” Post, at 53. The answer, of course, is that the Court had no need
to resolve subparagraph (E)'s application to all federal prisoners when the
provision so clearly did not apply to Castro. In other words, the Court
left open the question whether subparagraph (E) prevented our review of
a certiorari petition whose “ `subject' ” actually is a “statutorily relevant
`denial' of a request” for authorization to fle a successive claim under 28
U. S. C. § 2255. 540 U. S., at 380. I agree with today's conclusion that
subparagraph (E) does not prevent our review under those circumstances.
This separate writing observes only that Castro's logic likewise authorizes
our review of Bowe's petition.
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Jackson, J., concurring
ting further review of the panel's use of the wrong criteria
or
procedures. As Justice Gorsuch points out, the effect
is the same; either way, the prisoner may not fle his second
or successive motion. Post, at 62–63, n. 4. But in my view,
the distinction is not a technical (or meaningless) one. In-
stead, it fts neatly within, and advances, the gatekeeping
scheme Congress established.
For evidence, look no further than § 2244(b)(3)'s other sub-
paragraphs, which set forth a multipart gatekeeping process
for second or successive claims. First, a prisoner “move[s]
in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing ”
a second or successive claim. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Second, “a
three-judge panel” considers the request for authorization.
§ 2244( b)(3)(B). Third, the panel “determines” whether
the prisoner has made “a prima facie showing ” of satisfying
the relevant statutory “requirements.” § 2244(b)(3)(C).
Fourth, the panel issues its determination in no more than
“30 days.” § 2244(b)(3)(D).
With § 2244(b)(3), Congress plainly erected a specifc
screening process for second or successive petitions. And
with subparagraph (E), in particular, Congress afforded that
process fnality—but only if the prescribed procedures have
been properly followed.
By contrast, consider a panel that completely ignores the
statute's specifed gatekeeping requirements when making
the authorization determination. Maybe the panel consists
of fve judges instead of three. Or maybe the panel auto-
matically and arbitrarily denies all requests for authoriza-
tion, refusing to evaluate whether the prisoner has satisfed
the relevant statutory criteria. It would be exceedingly
strange for us to conclude that Congress meant to insulate a
rogue panel's actions from further review. Indeed, why
would Congress devise such a detailed gatekeeping scheme
while foreclosing review of its evasion?
At bottom, then, § 2244(b)(3)(E) rationally operates as a
fnality provision, designed to give a three-judge panel the
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47
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
last say when the panel properly performs its gatekeeping
func
tion. But when the panel goes through the wrong pro-
cedures (as it did in Castro) or applies the wrong criteria (as
it did here), it has not made the requisite “grant or denial of
an authorization” that § 2244(b)(3)(E) insulates from further
review.
For that reason, in my view, even if Congress had spoken
more clearly about § 2244(b)(3)(E)'s application to federal
prisoners, the panel's mistaken dismissal—instead of de-
nial—of Bowe's petition makes § 2244(b)(3)(E) patently
inapplicable.
Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Thomas and Jus-
tice Alito join, and with whom Justice Barrett joins as
to Part I, dissenting.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (AEDPA), courts of appeals serve an important gate-
keeping function. When a state prisoner seeks to challenge
his conviction or sentence in federal court for the frst time,
he normally proceeds directly to district court under 28
U. S. C. § 2254. But before a state prisoner may bring a sec-
ond or successive attack in district court, AEDPA requires
him to obtain a certifcate from a panel of the relevant fed-
eral court of appeals. And under § 2244, an appellate panel
may certify a case to proceed only subject to certain demand-
ing rules.
Two are relevant here. First, an appellate panel may not
authorize do-over claims—claims the prisoner already “pre-
sented in a prior” federal challenge. § 2244(b)(1). Second,
neither a state prisoner nor state authorities may fle a peti-
tion for rehearing or seek “a writ of certiorari” to contest an
appellate panel's decision granting or denying certifcation.
§ 2244(b)(3)(E).
AEDPA contains parallel directions for federal prisoners.
When a federal prisoner seeks to challenge his conviction or
sentence collaterally for the frst time, he usually proceeds
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48 BOWE
v. UNITED STATES
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
directly to district court under § 2255. But before he can
pursue
a second or successive challenge, it “must be certifed
as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate
court of appeals.” § 2255(h). Through that cross-reference,
then, federal prisoners seeking to bring second or successive
collateral attacks are generally subject to the same rules as
their state counterparts.
That brings us to Michael Bowe. After shooting two
guards while trying to rob an armored vehicle in 2008, he
pleaded guilty to three federal crimes. Since then, he has
pursued fve nearly identical postconviction challenges. In
each, Mr. Bowe has asserted that one of the statutes under
which he was convicted, 18 U. S. C. § 924(c), is unconstitu-
tional under our void-for-vagueness doctrine. And in all but
the frst of his challenges, Mr. Bowe has centered his argu-
ment around the same case: United States v. Davis, 588 U. S.
445 (2019).
When Mr. Bowe sought permission to bring his latest col-
lateral attack, the Eleventh Circuit demurred. Because he
had pursued his Davis claim three times before, the court
held that his latest fling represented an impermissible do-
over claim barred by § 2244(b)(1). Now, Mr. Bowe asks us
to reverse the Eleventh Circuit's decision. Yes, he concedes,
AEDPA bars state prisoners from pursuing do-over claims.
But, he insists, federal prisoners are different. They (and
they alone) are free to bring the same claim in district court
over and over again.
Before we can take up that question, however, we must
answer another. Under § 2244(b)(3)(E), Mr. Bowe acknowl-
edges, this Court lacks certiorari jurisdiction to review an
appellate panel's decision denying a state prisoner leave
to fle a second or successive collateral challenge. But
here again, Mr. Bowe argues federal prisoners are different.
He submits that they (and, once more, they alone) are free
to challenge adverse certifcation decisions on writ of
certiorari.
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49
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
Because I do not believe that either of Mr. Bowe's pleas
for
federal-prisoner exceptionalism can be squared with
AEDPA's text, I respectfully dissent.
I
I understand my colleagues' eagerness to reach the merits
of this case. As they observe, the courts of appeals are di-
vided on the question whether federal prisoners like
Mr. Bowe may pursue do-over claims. Ante, at 21–22.
Doubtless, too, it is often this Court's job to resolve circuit
splits and bring nationwide uniformity to the application of
federal law.
But it is also one of our paramount responsibilities to re-
spect the limits on our jurisdiction. And, to my eyes,
AEDPA precludes us from exercising certiorari jurisdiction
here. Section 2244 instructs that “the grant or denial of an
authorization by a court of appeals to fle a second or succes-
sive” collateral attack “shall not be the subject of a petition . . .
for a writ of certiorari.” § 2244(b)(3)(E). Everyone agrees
this provision precludes us from exercising certiorari jurisdic-
tion to review an appellate panel's decision granting or deny-
ing certifcation to state prisoners. And because § 2255(h)
tells us that the same rules apply to federal prisoners, exactly
the same outcome follows for federal prisoners like Mr. Bowe.
Importantly, though, that does not mean we lack for ways
to resolve the circuit split my colleagues worry over.
AEDPA may prevent us from exercising certiorari jurisdic-
tion under § 1254(1). But AEDPA not only leaves un-
touched our power to entertain original habeas petitions fled
directly in this Court. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U. S. 651, 660–
661 (1996). AEDPA also leaves untouched our power to ac-
cept certifed “question[s] of law” from the federal courts of
appeals and provide them with “binding instructions” on
how to answer those questions under § 1254(2), a provision
found right next door to the one governing our certiorari
jurisdiction.
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v. UNITED STATES
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
Accustomed as we are to proceeding by way of certiorari
under
§ 1254(1), it's true that we have rarely accepted certi-
fed questions under § 1254(2). But a rare procedure befts
rare circumstances. And this case involves a rare circum-
stance indeed—a circuit split that would otherwise stagger
on forever. Rather than ignore § 2244's express constraint
on our certiorari jurisdiction, then, we might have simply
signaled to the courts of appeals our willingness to accept
certifcation in this or a similar case. Cf. United States v.
Rice, 327 U. S. 742, 746–747 (1946) (accepting certifcation in
the uncommon situation of a “circuit court of appeals . . .
equally divided on” questions of law).
A
To appreciate why we lack certiorari jurisdiction, it helps
to start with a bird's eye view of how AEDPA addresses
second or successive collateral attacks.
AEDPA seeks “to advance the fnality of criminal convic-
tions.” Mayle v. Felix, 545 U. S. 644, 662 (2005). It does
so, in part, by imposing “stric[t] limit[s]” on the ability
of federal and state prisoners to bring multiple postconvic-
tion attacks in federal court. See Jones v. Hendrix, 599
U. S. 465, 476 (2023). So, for example, a federal prisoner's
second or successive collateral attack “must be certifed . . .
to contain” a showing of either new facts or new law.
§ 2255(h). The new-facts route requires the prisoner to show
that he possesses newly discovered evidence that, if proved,
would establish his innocence clearly and convincingly. See
§ 2255(h)(1). The new-law route requires him to argue that
his conviction or sentence is unlawful in light of a new rule of
constitutional law that this Court has made retroactively ap-
plicable to cases on collateral review. See § 2255(h)(2).
Similar rules apply to state prisoners under § 2244(b)(2).
1
1
Put aside for the moment AEDPA's additional instructions about do-
over claims—they become relevant only when we come to the merits. See
Part II, in fra.
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51
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
Even beyond those constraints, AEDPA imposes others.
A
federal prisoner's second or successive § 2255 attack not
only must “contain” either new facts or new law; it also
“must be certifed as provided in section 2244.” § 2255(h).
Everyone agrees th is cross-reference direc ts us to
§ 2244(b)(3). That paragraph provides these instructions:
“(A) Before a second or successive application permit-
ted by this section is fled in the district court, the appli-
cant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for
an order authorizing the district court to consider the
application.
“(B) A motion in the court of appeals . . . shall be
determined by a three-judge panel of the court of
appeals.
“(C) The court of appeals may authorize the fling of
a second or successive application only if it determines
that the application makes a prima facie showing that
the appl icati on satisfies the requirements of th is
subsection.
“(D) The court of appeals shall grant or deny the au-
thorization . . . not later than 30 days after the fling of
the motion.
“(E) The grant or denial of an authorization . . . shall
not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a peti-
tion for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.”
With this overview in hand, our lack of certiorari jurisdic-
tion quickly becomes clear. Section 2244(b)(3)(E) prohibits
a state prisoner from invoking our certiorari jurisdiction to
challenge an order denying him leave to fle a second or suc-
cessive collateral attack. Indeed, this Court has already
held as much. Felker, 518 U. S., at 658–659. And § 2255(h)
tells us that a federal prisoner seeking to pursue a second
or successive collateral attack must obtain certifcation “as
provided in section 2244” for state prisoners. Accordingly,
the same bar on certiorari applies.
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52 BOWE
v. UNITED STATES
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
That commonsense conclusion fnds unanimous support in
the
courts of appeals. Just as § 2244(b)(3)(E) bars certiorari
petitions, it also bars petitions for panel or en banc rehear-
ing. Since AEDPA's adoption in 1996, a great many federal
prisoners have sought rehearing on the theory that this rule
applies only to state prisoners, not them. Yet every circuit
to consider that approach has rejected it, recognizing instead
that subparagraph (E) applies to federal prisoners no less
than their state counterparts, and thus prohibits them from
petitioning for panel or en banc rehearing. See, e. g., In re
Clark, 837 F. 3d 1080, 1082–1083 (CA10 2016) (collecting
cases); In re Baptiste, 828 F. 3d 1337, 1340 (CA11 2016);
Págan-San Miguel v. United States, 736 F. 3d 44, 46, n. 1
(CA1 2013) (per curiam); In re Sonshine, 132 F. 3d 1133,
1134 (CA6 1997).
Our own precedent carries the same message. In Castro
v. United States, 540 U. S. 375 (2003), the government argued
that subparagraph (E) precluded this Court from considering
a federal prisoner's challenge to an appellate panel decision
denying him leave to fle a second or successive attack. At
the same time, the government contended, the terms of sub-
paragraph (E) leave it free to challenge many appellate panel
decisions granting a federal prisoner permission to proceed.
Id., at 380–381. The Court rejected both submissions.
First, after conducting a painstakingly detailed analysis of
the fling history of the particular prisoner before it, the
Court concluded that his challenge was not in fact second
or successive. So subparagraph (E)—which applies only to
second or successive challenges—simply was not implicated
in the case at hand. See id., at 379–380. Second, the Court
rejected the government's “anomal[ou]s” suggestion that
subparagraph (E) might allow it, but not a prisoner, to chal-
lenge an adverse appellate panel decision regarding a second
or successive fling. Id., at 380–381.
Neither holding makes sense unless subparagraph (E) ap-
plies to federal prisoners pursuing second or successive col-
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Gorsuch, J., dissenting
lateral attacks. Why take the trouble to show this federal
pr
isoner wasn't pursuing a second or successive attack sub-
ject to subparagraph (E)—and why bother rejecting the gov-
ernment's lopsided argument about how subparagraph (E)
works—if subparagraph (E) has no bearing whatsoever on
federal prisoners in the frst place? While Castro may not
have announced a “holding ” that subparagraph (E) applies
to federal prisoners pursuing second or successive collateral
attacks, ante, at 26, n. 3, all of its work was surely grounded
on that premise.
Our decision in Hohn v. United States, 524 U. S. 236 (1998),
is equally telling. That case concerned 28 U. S. C. § 2253(c),
which requires a federal prisoner to obtain a certifcate of
appealability (COA) before he may appeal a district court's
adverse decision in a § 2255 proceeding. The jurisdictional
question before the Court was whether a court of appeals'
denial of a COA is a “case” within the meaning of § 1254(1)
and thus reviewable on certiorari. 524 U. S., at 241. Con-
cluding that it is, the Court leaned heavily on a comparison
between § 2253(c) and § 2244(b)(3)(E). The latter provision,
the Court said, imposes a “clear limit” on our jurisdiction.
Id., at 250. And, the Court reasoned, the existence of that
“clear limit,” coupled with the absence of comparable lan-
guage in § 2253(c), suggested that federal prisoners may seek
certiorari to challenge an adverse COA decision. See id., at
249–250. Much as in Castro, the Court in Hohn may not
have expressly reached a holding about § 2244(b)(3)(E)'s
meaning. But its work only makes sense if that provision
“clear[ ly] ” precludes cer ti orar i jur isdic ti on for federa l
prisoners.
Really, the idea that § 2244(b)(3)(E) applies to federal pris-
oners and bars them from seeking certiorari has been uncon-
troversial since AEDPA's adoption three decades ago. So
much so that, until recently, even the author of today's major-
ity opinion accepted it. In another case involving Mr. Bowe
(yes, the same Mr. Bowe), our colleague urged the Court to
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consider accepting an original habeas petition to resolve the
very
same do-over circuit split now before us. In re Bowe,
601 U. S. 1015 (2024) (Sotomayor, J., statement respecting
denial of habeas corpus). Invoking that unusual procedure,
our colleague insisted, was necessary precisely because
“§ 2244(b)(3)(E)'s bar on petitioning for review” would pre-
clude Mr. Bowe from invoking our certiorari jurisdiction.
Id., at 1016. That was right then, and it is right still.
B
How does Mr. Bowe respond? He does not dispute that
all the rules laid out in §§ 2244(b)(3)(A) through (E) apply to
state prisoners. As a result, he acknowledges, neither state
prisoners nor state offcials may challenge an appellate pan-
el's certifcation decision on certiorari. Accordingly, there
are only two ways to resolve circuit splits about § 2244 in
the state-prisoner context: original habeas writs and certif-
cation under § 1254(2).
Even when it comes to federal prisoners, Mr. Bowe cedes
much ground. He admits that § 2255(h) subjects federal
prisoners to the same rules that apply to state prisoners in
§§ 2244(b)(3)(A), (B), (C), and (D). Brief for Petitioner 32.
He concedes, too, that every court of appeals to consider the
issue has held that subparagraph (E) also applies to federal
prisoners. Tr. of Oral Arg. 15. Still, Mr. Bowe insists, he's
discovered something all those courts (and this one) have
missed for the past 30 years: Subparagraph (E)—and it
alone—doesn't apply to federal prisoners.
His theory runs this way. Section 2255(h) instructs that
a federal prisoner's second or successive attack “must be
certifed as provided in section 2244.” That language,
Mr. Bowe submits, sweeps in only those parts of § 2244 that
address how an appellate panel goes about certifying a sec-
ond or successive fling. And it does not sweep in subpara-
graph (E) because—unlike all of § 2244(b)(3)'s other subpara-
graphs—it does not “provide” for certifcation.
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It may be a wonderfully convenient theory for Mr. Bowe,
but
no court has adopted it for good reason. Just look again
at the block quotation of statutory text above. Each and
every one of § 2244(b)(3)'s subparagraphs “provide[s]” for
how a second or successive collateral attack “must be certi-
fed” by a “panel of the appropriate court of appeals.”
§ 2255(h). Subparagraph (A) routes the certifcation deci-
sion to a court of appeals. Subparagraph (B) directs that
the decision must be made by a three-judge panel. Subpara-
graph (C) sets forth the standard the panel must use when
deciding whether to certify. Subparagraph (D) specifes the
timing for a decision. And subparagraph (E) provides that
panel certifcation is the exclusive avenue for certifcation
decisions (without foreclosing the panel from asking this
Court, via § 1254(2), for “instructions” on “question[s] of law”
along the way). What begins with an application to a three-
judge panel under subparagraph (A) ends with its disposition
by that same panel under subparagraph (E).
Notice, too, the hash Mr. Bowe's interpretation makes of
the rest of the statute. Subparagraph (B) mandates that a
certifcation motion “shall be determined by a three-judge
panel of the court of appeals.” What would be the point of
that direction if, as Mr. Bowe suggests, a prisoner could peti-
tion a court of appeals (en banc) or this Court (on certiorari)
to certify a second or successive collateral attack instead?
Plainly, subparagraph (E) works in tandem with subpara-
graph (B) to ensure that the certifcation decision comes
from, and only from, a three-judge panel. Ignoring (E) un-
dermines (B).
Ignoring (E) also makes a nonsense of subparagraph (D)'s
instruction requiring a panel to grant or deny certifcation
within 30 days. That mandate is perfectly sensible if, as
subparagraph (E) provides, the decision of a three-judge
panel is fnal. But it is wholly insensible if, as Mr. Bowe
supposes, any prisoner can seek panel rehearing, then en
banc rehearing, and certiorari too. The entire point of
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AEDPA and its certifcation process was to “reduce delays,”
Rh
ines v. Weber, 544 U. S. 269, 276 (2005) (internal quotation
marks omitted), and “advance the fnality of criminal convic-
tions,” Mayle, 545 U. S., at 662. Yet on Mr. Bowe's reading,
the certifcation process alone would typically take not 30
days but many multiples of that.
2
C
Mr. Bowe's line of argument, understandably, causes my
colleagues some discomfort. Thankfully, they are unwilling
to say—as Mr. Bowe does—that every court of appeals to
have reached the issue has erred in holding that subpara-
graph (E) bars federal prisoners from seeking panel or en
banc rehearing. Ante, at 32. To avoid calling those sound
decisions into question, the majority pivots in a different di-
rection. On its theory, even if subparagraph (E) bars fed-
eral prisoners from pursuing petitions for panel and en banc
rehearing, the statute does not bar them from seeking
certiorari.
There is an obvious reason Mr. Bowe did not press that
eccentric theory before us: It cannot be squared with the
statutory text. Section 2255 instructs that a federal prison-
er's second or successive attack “must be certifed as pro-
vided in section 2244.” And what subparagraph (E) “pro-
vide[s]” is a package deal. The statute bars rehearing
petitions and certiorari petitions in a single breath: It pro-
vides that a panel's certifcation decision “shall not be the
subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.”
2
Mr. Bowe suggests this is no problem because subparagraph (E) allows
courts of appeals to order rehearing sua sponte. And having discovered
porosity in this otherwise solid subparagraph, Mr. Bowe wonders why we
need to worry about fnality at all. But even if AEDPA tolerates
sua sponte rehearing, that is no threat to fnality because sua sponte re-
hearing is rare, and judges do not call for it needlessly. The same is true
of certifcation under § 1254(2), for that matter. These modest, rarely em-
ployed, and judicially initiated procedures are hardly camels' noses poking
under AEDPA's tent.
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§ 2244(b)(3)(E). The notion that all of subparagraph (E)
might
apply to federal prisoners minus the six words “or for
a writ of certiorari” is utterly implausible as a textual
matter.
One might think this problem would cause the majority to
hesitate. Instead, my colleagues plow on, conjuring up a
clear-statement rule to support their course. Yes, the ma-
jority admits, a fair reading of § 2255(h)'s cross-reference to
§ 2244 “might include” § 2244(b)(3)(E)'s certiorari bar. Ante,
at 35. But, my colleagues insist, Congress “must speak
clearly” when it wishes to withdraw our certiorari jurisdic-
tion, ante, at 25, and the language Congress employed here
is not “clear” enough to be worth following, ante, at 28–31.
There's no avoiding the odd contours of the majority's
clear-statement rule. Apparently, Congress may restrict
and channel collateral review in the lower courts, as it has
done in subparagraphs (A) through (D). Congress may also
bar petitions for panel or en banc rehearing, as it has done
in subparagraph (E), cutting off the usual method by which
a court of appeals “reconcile[s] its internal diffculties.”
Wisniewski v. United States, 353 U. S. 901, 902 (1957)
(per curiam). Seemingly, Congress can do all that without
having to satisfy any clear-statement rule. The only work
the majority's rule performs concerns certiorari petitions—
and the only effect that rule has is to pencil out subpara-
graph (E)'s six words “or for a writ of certiorari” in cases
involving federal prisoners. All while leaving those same
six words in force when it comes to state prisoners.
That gerrymandered rule may suit Mr. Bowe's present
needs and appeal to our vanity. But it is pointless. Even
if a clear statement were required here, Congress gave us
one. For all the reasons explored above, AEDPA's certio-
rari bar imposes, in Hohn's words, a “clear limit” on our ju-
risdiction. See Part I–A, supra. Nor, again, is there any
need to pretend otherwise just to address the circuit split
Mr. Bowe identifes, for we can just as easily reach it through
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certifcation under § 1254(2) as we can through certiorari
under
§ 1254(1). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit refused to in-
voke § 1254(2) only because it believed we would deny certi-
fcation—a belief we could easily dispel in this case simply
by saying it isn't so. See App. 78–79.
Worse still, the majority's bespoke certiorari-for-federal-
prisoners-clear-statement rule lacks any grounding in law.
Just ask yourself: If not from thin air, where could such a
rule possibly come from?
Perhaps the most obvious candidate would be the Consti-
tution. Sometimes, after all, when faced with two compet-
ing statutory interpretations this Court invokes the canon of
constitutional avoidance to choose the one that avoids, rather
than implicates, a constitutional problem. See, e. g., Clark
v. Martinez, 543 U. S. 371, 381–382 (2005). But the majority
does not rest its clear-statement rule on that doctrine. Nor
could it. This Court has already expressly rejected the no-
tion that § 2244(b)(3)'s limitations violate the Suspension
Clause or the Exceptions Clause, the two constitutional pro-
visions most obviously relevant to cases like this one. See
Felker, 518 U. S., at 661–664.
That should come as no surprise either. The writ of ha-
beas corpus traditionally addressed cases of executive deten-
tion without trial. Accordingly, a federal prisoner was ineli-
gible for habeas corpus if he had been convicted by a court
of competent jurisdiction. See id., at 663; Brown v. Daven-
port, 596 U. S. 118, 128–129 (2022). It was not until the 20th
century that this Court began allowing federal prisoners to
mount collateral attacks on jurisdictionally sound convic-
tions. Cf. Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U. S. 420, 429 (1912) (“The
principle of the cases is the simple one that if a court has
jurisdiction of the case the writ of habeas corpus cannot be
employed to re-try the issues, whether of law, constitutional
or other, or of fact”). Put simply, for much of our Nation's
history, there was no collateral review of the vast majority
of convictions, much less a right to certiorari in such cases.
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With constitutional avoidance off the table, the majority
advances
an unbriefed theory to prop up its novel clear-
statement rule. Citing Boechler v. Commissioner, 596 U. S.
199 (2022), the majority observes that this Court generally
reads statutorily prescribed procedural requirements as
forfeitable claim-processing rules rather than unwavering
jurisdictional mandates unless Congress “clearly” indicates
otherwise. Ante, at 27. And, the majority insists, it is doing
something similar here. See ante, at 27–28. Hardly. No
one disputes that AEDPA's certiorari bar at issue here is juris-
dictional. So Boechler not only does not “contro[l] this case,”
ante, at 28, n. 5, it has nothing to say about this case at all.
The majority's invocation of Boechler is not just inapt, it
is unfortunate. Two years ago, in an obscure administrative
law case, this Court expressly refused to treat Boechler as a
permission slip for creating any manner of new interpretive
presumptions that may happen to suit our tastes but that
do not “approximat[e] rea[l]” statutory meaning. Compare
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U. S. 369, 455,
n. 1 (2024) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that, in light of
cases like Boechler, we may as well accept other interpretive
fctions like Chevron), with 603 U. S., at 399 (majority opin-
ion) (holding otherwise). Yet that is exactly how the major-
ity treats Boechler today.
The picture does not improve from there. The Boechler
clear-statement rule operates only in a particular context
and exists only for particular reasons. Treating too many
rules as jurisdictional rather than as claim-processing rules,
this Court has said, would “result in the waste of judicial
resources and may unfairly prejudice litigants.” Henderson
v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 434 (2011). Yet neither of those
rationales applies here. If anything, it is the majority's new
rule that promises to waste judicial resources by undermin-
ing fnality. And there is no colorable argument that Con-
gress acts unfairly by preventing both prisoners and govern-
ments from appealing adverse certifcation decisions. Far
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from respecting Boechler, then, the majority more nearly de-
fes
it.
With Boechler a dry hole, the majority fnds itself forced
to prospect elsewhere for legal authority. Its next stop is
Castro. Ante, at 25–27. But the majority's quote mining of
that decision only winds up highlighting just how unprece-
dented its course today really is.
In Castro, remember, the government advocated for a lop-
sided construction of § 2244(b)(3)(E). On the government's
view, the statute permitted it to seek certiorari to challenge
a circuit decision granting certifcation, but precluded a fed-
eral prisoner from seeking certiorari to challenge a circuit
decision denying certifcation. 540 U. S., at 380. As we
have seen, the Court rejected that submission for two rea-
sons. First, the prisoner there did not seek to pursue a sec-
ond or successive attack subject to subparagraph (E). Sec-
ond, the government's reading would have “close[d] our
doors to a class of habeas petitioners seeking review” while
leaving those same doors open to the government. Id., at
381. Expanding on the second rationale, the Court said it
would not endorse such an “anomal[ous]” reading of subpara-
graph (E) “without any clear indication that such was Con-
gress' intent.” Id., at 380–381. Doubtless, this commen-
tary refected an intuition that Congress would not lightly
treat similarly situated litigants differently. But none of
that speaks to the situation before us, where the construction
of subparagraph (E) at issue is fair and square: no certiorari
review of certifcation decisions, no matter who won below.
If anything, and as we have seen, Castro does more to
hurt than help the majority's cause. See Part I–A, supra.
Throughout that decision, the Court took as given that sub-
paragraph (E) does bar federal prisoners from seeking cer-
tiorari to challenge adverse certifcation decisions regarding
their second or successive flings. Why (again) would Cas-
tro take the trouble to explain that the challenge there
wasn't a second or successive one if subparagraph (E) doesn't
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apply to federal prisoners anyway? And why would Castro
worry
about the anomalous possibility that only the govern-
ment may seek certiorari when, in fact, federal prisoners
can too?
The majority offers no colorable answers to these ques-
tions because none can be had. Just like Hohn and our col-
league's opinion two years ago in In re Bowe, Castro fully
appreciated that subparagraph (E) imposes a “clear limit”
on our certiorari jurisdiction, one applicable to federal and
state prisoners alike. Hohn, 524 U. S., at 250 (emphasis
added); see also In re Bowe, 601 U. S., at 1016 (acknowledg-
ing that “§ 2244(b)(3)(E)'s bar on petitioning for review”
would preclude Mr. Bowe himself from seeking certiorari).
3
Unable to identify any plausible authority in existing law
for its clear-statement rule, the majority is ultimately left to
summon it from the ether. To be sure, my colleagues begin
by pointing to the (unremarkable) principle that this Court
does not read “statutory silence as implicitly modifying or
limiting . . . jurisdiction that another statute specifcally
grants.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U. S. 77, 83 (2010);
Felker, 518 U. S., at 660–661. But from there, the majority
engages in pure invention, devising a broad new legal rule
that even express limitations on our certiorari jurisdiction
are unenforceable absent a clear statement. See ante,
at 25.
3
Attempting to wring more yet from Castro, the majority points to its
citation of Utah v. Evans, 536 U. S. 452 (2002), for the “principle that
we read limitations on our jurisdiction to review narrowly.” Ante, at 26
(internal quotation marks omitted). But Evans simply applied the ano-
dyne presumption that federal agency action is amenable to some form of
judicial review. See 536 U. S., at 463 (citing Webster v. Doe, 486 U. S. 592
(1988), and Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S.
667 (1986)). That presumption speaks not at all to the postconviction set-
ting, let alone second or successive collateral attacks like this one. In this
context, a litigant has already enjoyed extensive judicial review, including
at least two opportunities to seek certiorari from us—frst on direct re-
view, and again in a frst postconviction challenge.
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What a leap that is. This case is nothing like those in
wh
ich we have historically declined to infer limitations on
our certiorari jurisdiction based on statutory silence. All
agree that § 2255(h) expressly incorporates portions of
§ 2244(b)(3). All agree that § 2244(b)(3)(E) expressly bars
“petition[s] for . . . writ[s] of certiorari.” The only point of
disagreement concerns how those explicit provisions ft to-
gether. I believe they ft together in a way that deprives
us of jurisdiction. But even if I am wrong about that, this
is hardly a case of “silen[t] or ambiguous” text, Hertz, 559
U. S., at 83–84, nor one involving provisions that “mak[e] no
mention of our authority,” Felker, 518 U. S., at 661. Truly,
the majority's clear-statement rule comes from nowhere at
all.
In the end, neither Mr. Bowe's textual arguments nor the
majority's atextual theory can obscure AEDPA's message,
one every court of appeals (and this Court) has understood
since 1996. A litigant like Mr. Bowe may seek to pursue an
original habeas petition in this Court. A court of appeals
may certify questions to us. But § 2244 bars state prisoners
(and governments) from invoking our certiorari jurisdiction
to challenge adverse certifcation decisions. Section 2255
extends that bar to federal prisoners. And because that bar
applies here, we lack jurisdiction to decide this case. The
majority's conclusion otherwise is as improbable as it is
novel.
4
4
In a fnal foray, Mr. Bowe and Justice Jackson contend that, even if
subparagraph (E)'s certiorari bar generally applies to federal prisoners, it
still does not apply in this particular case. Mr. Bowe's version of the
argument goes like this. Subparagraph (E) bars certiorari petitions from
appellate orders that “grant or den[y]” certifcation to pursue a second or
successive attack. And, Mr. Bowe submits, that language doesn't apply
to him because the Eleventh Circuit “dismissed” rather than “denied” his
certifcation request. See App. 79. This argument fails, though, because
“the label attached to an order is not dispositive”; its “ `practical effect' ”
is. Abbott v. Perez, 585 U. S. 579, 594 (2018). And here, the practical
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Gorsuch, J., dissenting
II
Because
the majority concludes that we have jurisdiction
to reach the merits, I offer my views too. The question
here, recall, concerns the Eleventh Circuit's refusal to certify
Mr. Bowe's latest collateral attack. Like most other circuits,
the Eleventh Circuit has held that § 2244(b)(1) bars do-over
claims by both state and federal prisoners. And that provi-
sion, the court reasoned, barred Mr. Bowe's present chal-
lenge because he has already pursued the same challenge
many times before.
In reversing the Eleventh Circuit, my colleagues do not
question that § 2244(b)(1) prohibits state prisoners' do-over
claims. Nor do my colleagues question that Mr. Bowe seeks
to pursue a do-over claim in this case. Instead, they hold
that federal prisoners like him are free to fle in district court
as many do-over claims as they please. Once more, I dis-
agree because I see nothing in AEDPA's text that supports
that kind of special treatment for federal prisoners.
A
Begin by walking through the relevant statutory provi-
sions. Section 2255 requires a federal prisoner to satisfy
two essential requirements before he can pursue a second or
effect of the Eleventh Circuit's “dismissal” order was to deny Mr. Bowe
permission to pursue his second or successive attack.
Justice Jackson's version of the argument proceeds differently. She
admits that a dismissal may have the practical effect of a denial. Ante,
at 43 (concurring opinion). But, she insists, that doesn't hold true here
because, by applying § 2244(b)(1)'s do-over bar, the Eleventh Circuit ap-
plied the wrong “statutory criteria” to Mr. Bowe. Ante, at 45. There is
just one problem. The statute bars review of any “grant or denial,” not
any “grant or denial made after applying the correct statutory criteria.”
Justice Jackson identifes nothing in the statute's terms that might allow
us to turn the Eleventh Circuit's (supposed) merits error into a jurisdic-
tionally decisive event. A denial is a denial. Recognizing the faws of
both versions of the argument, the majority rightly adopts neither.
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successive challenge. First, his fling must “contain” either
new
facts or new law suffcient to satisfy § 2255(h)(1) or
(h)(2). Second, his fling “must be certifed” by a court of
appeals under the rules outlined in § 2244. And to win certi-
fcation under § 2244, everyone accepts, a federal prisoner
must satisfy at least §§ 2244(b)(3)(A), (B), (C), and (D).
Ante, at 29. (With jurisdiction now out of the picture, we
can set aside the dispute over (E).)
From there the right answer lies only a few steps away.
Section 2244(b)(3)(C) states that “[t]he court of appeals may
authorize the fling of a second or successive application only
if it determines that the application makes a prima facie
showing that the application satisfes the requirements of
this subsection.” (Emphasis added.) No one questions
that this provision applies to state and federal prisoners
equally. Brief for Petitioner 32; Brief for United States 25–
26; ante, at 29. So by its terms, this provision means a fed-
eral prisoner must make “a prima facie showing ” in a court
of appeals that his second or successive fling satisfes the
requirements of “this subsection”—namely, subsection (b)
of § 2244.
That tells us all we need to know. The very frst provision
of subsection (b) prohibits do-over claims. In the words of
§ 2244(b)(1), any claim presented in a prior application “shall
be dismissed.” As a result, AEDPA no more tolerates re-
petitive litigation by federal prisoners than it does by state
prisoners. And the Eleventh Circuit was right to deny
Mr. Bowe leave to fle again the same claim he had already
pursued many times before.
What the statutory language teaches on this point, context
confrms. Next to subsection (b)(1) sits subsection (b)(2).
There, Congress addressed second or successive flings pre-
senting new (as opposed to do-over) claims. As laid out in
the margin, subsection (b)(2)'s rules for state prisoners' new
claims are similar to, but different from, § 2255(h)'s rules for
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federal prisoners' new claims.
5
And
because § 2255(h) ap-
plies particularly to federal prisoners, its specifc require-
ments displace § 2244(b)(2)'s more generally applicable ones.
See Baltimore Nat. Bank v. State Tax Comm'n of Md., 297
U. S. 209, 215 (1936). So when a court of appeals asks
whether a federal prisoner has made a “prima facie showing ”
that his proposed fling “satisfes the requirements of this
subsec ti on” under § 2244( b)(3)(C), the requirements of
§§ 2255(h)(1)–(2) step into the shoes that § 2244(b)(2) would
otherwise fll. Tellingly, however, § 2255(h) contains no such
federal-prisoner-specifc language when it comes to do-over
claims. Instead, it leaves § 2244(b)(1)'s generally applicable
language in place. All of which suggests that § 2244(b)(1)
applies no less to federal prisoners than to state prisoners—
just as the text says.
6
5
Section 2244(b)(2)(B)'s new-facts provision requires that
“(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered
previously through the exercise of due diligence; and
“(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the
evidence as a whole, would be suffcient to establish by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfnder
would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.”
In contrast, § 2255(h)(1)'s new-facts provision requires
“newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the
evidence as a whole, would be suffcient to establish by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that no reasonable factfnder would have found the movant
guilty of the offense.”
6
The majority claims my understanding of how § 2244(b)(2) and § 2255(h)
interact renders § 2255(h)(2) “mere surplusage.” Ante, at 39. But that
claim is easily falsifed. If § 2255(h)(2) really were “mere surplusage,”
then it could be struck out of the statute with no change. So, then, imag-
ine a version of § 2255(h) without subsection (h)(2). That imaginary provi-
sion would require every “second or successive motion . . . to contain . . .
newly discovered evidence” capable of satisfying subsection (h)(1)'s new-
facts requirement. That is very different from the real § 2255(h), which
allows a prisoner to show either new facts, § 2255(h)(1), or new law,
§ 2255(h)(2).

66 BOWE
v. UNITED STATES
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
Another contextual clue comes from the 30-day clock.
J
ust as with § 2244(b)(3)(C), no one questions that
§ 2244(b)(3)(D) applies to both federal and state prisoners.
Under that provision, a federal court of appeals has just 30
days to issue a certifcation decision. Complying with that
tight deadline is possible if courts of appeals can dispose of
do-over claims without further inquiry. But complying is a
good deal harder if panels must ask whether each and every
proposed collateral attack involves new evidence of inno-
cence or a retroactively applicable rule of constitutional law.
In this case, for example, it took me fve minutes to appreci-
ate that Mr. Bowe has already advanced, many times before,
the same claim he proposes to pursue here. I do not know,
nor would it be so easy to determine, whether Mr. Bowe's
latest fling makes a compelling showing of new facts or new
law. Contra, ante, at 39 (majority erroneously suggesting
that determining whether a litigant “has raised a claim be-
fore” is no easier than determining whether he has identifed
compelling new facts or law).
Statutory structure and history, too, have something to
say. Before AEDPA, separate provisions addressed do-over
claims by state prisoners and federal prisoners. Back then,
§ 2244 permitted (but did not require) a court to deny relief
to a state prisoner who “present[ed] no new ground not here-
tofore presented and determined” in a prior application. 28
U. S. C. § 2244(a) (1988 ed.); 62 Stat. 965–966. Similarly,
§ 2255 said that a court “shall not be required to entertain a
second or successive motion for similar relief ” by a federal
prisoner. See 28 U. S. C. § 2255 (1988 ed.). In AEDPA,
Congress amended both provisions. Now, § 2255(h) channels
second or successive § 2255 motions through the § 2244 rules
applicable to state prisoners. And AEDPA added to § 2244
a new mandatory (no longer permissive) bar against do-over
claims, fatly directing that they “shall be dismissed.”
§ 2244(b)(1); 110 Stat. 1220–1221.
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67
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
Exactly nothing in this history or AEDPA's structure sug-
gests
Congress sought to loosen do-over restrictions for any-
one—let alone completely do away with those restrictions
for federal prisoners. To the contrary, the statute's history
and structure suggest, as we have long observed, that
AEDPA imposed new and “strict[er] limit[s]” on postconvic-
tion relief. Jones, 599 U. S., at 476. All of which indicates,
once again, that Congress meant what it said in
§ 2244(b)(3)(C): The “requirements of this subsection” apply
to federal and state prisoners alike—and those requirements
include subsection (b)(1)'s bar on do-over claims.
B
Seeking some way to justify a rule prohibiting state pris-
oners from pursuing do-over claims—but also allowing fed-
eral prisoners to do just that—Mr. Bowe and the majority
offer a grab bag of unpersuasive theories.
First, the majority observes that § 2244(a) specifcally ref-
erences “section 2255,” the provision governing federal pris-
oners' collateral attacks, while § 2244(b)(1) contains no such
reference. Because “we presume differences in language . . .
convey differences in meaning,” the majority submits, it
must follow that § 2244(b)(1)'s bar on do-over claims “applies
only to state prisoners.” Ante, at 37 (internal quotation
marks omitted). But that cannot be right. Section 2244
mentions “section 2255” only one time, in § 2244(a). If its
absence elsewhere mattered, then none of the rules in
§§ 2244(b)(3)(A) through (D) would apply to federal prison-
ers. Yet not even the majority or Mr. Bowe thinks that.
To the contrary, both concede that the whole point of
§ 2255(h)'s cross-reference to § 2244 is to ensure federal pris-
oners, just like their state counterparts, must follow each of
those provisions. Ante, at 28–29; Brief for Petitioner 32.
Second, and in a similar vein, Mr. Bowe stresses that sub-
section (b)(1) prohibits do-over claims “in a second or succes-
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68 BOWE
v. UNITED STATES
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
sive habeas corpus application under section 2254.” (Em-
phasis
added.) Seeking to capitalize on the italicized lan-
guage, Mr. Bowe notes that § 2254 governs postconviction
“applications” by state prisoners, while federal prisoners
proceed by way of § 2255 “motions.” Given that difference
in nomenclature, Mr. Bowe contends, subsection (b)(1) must
apply only to state prisoners because that provision ad-
dresses “applications” and not “motions.” The majority
briefy nods in the same direction. See ante, at 36.
This argument fails for much the same reason as its prede-
cessor. If the absence of the word “motion” in § 2244 made
all the difference, then none of §§ 2244(b)(3)(A) through (D)'s
rules would apply to federal prisoners because each of those
provisions speaks only of “applications.” Yet, no one be-
lieves that. Instead, everyone appreciates, § 2255 routes
federal prisoners' “motions” through all those provisions.
In each, then, the word “applications” is best read as inter-
changeable with “motions,” just as most circuits have under-
stood. Cf. Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U. S. 320, 324, n. 1
(2010) (“Although 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b) refers to a habeas `ap-
plication,' we use the word `petition' interchangeably”).
Third, Mr. Bowe replies that there's something else special
about subsection (b)(1). Unlike §§ 2244(b)(3)(A) through (D),
he says, subsection (b)(1) doesn't just speak of “applications,”
but “application[s] under section 2254.” (Emphasis added.)
And that more specifc reference, Mr. Bowe insists, means
subsection (b)(1) cannot apply to federal prisoners proceed-
ing under § 2255. But this argument doesn't move the nee-
dle either. If (as it must be and as no one seriously disputes)
the term “application” in § 2244 is best read as embracing a
federal § 2255 “motion,” then the phrase “application under
section 2254” in § 2244 should likewise be understood to em-
brace a “motion under section 2255.”
7
7
That is not to say that subsection (b)(1)'s specifc reference to § 2254
applications, rather than to applications simpliciter, is superfuous. It
has considerable work to do—just not the work Mr. Bowe supposes. By
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as: 607 U. S. 13 (2026)
69
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
Fourth, the majority suggests that § 2255(h)'s cross-
reference
to § 2244 captures only the latter's “procedures”
governing “how a panel certifes a second or successive fl-
ing.” Ante, at 37. And, the argument goes, § 2244(b)(1)'s
bar on do-over claims is no mere “procedure” but instead a
substantive rule about what a fling may “contai[n].” Ibid.
This theory fails too. Section 2255's cross-reference does
not speak of a procedure/substance distinction. Instead,
§ 2255(h) directs courts to “certif[y]” motions “as provided
in” § 2244. Even the majority acknowledges that this lan-
guage makes § 2244(b)(3)(C) applicable to federal prisoners.
Ante, at 29. And subparagraph (C) explicitly says “the re-
quirements of this subsection”—which include § 2244(b)(1)—
must be satisfed before certifcation. It's more than a little
telling that the majority fnds itself forced both to rewrite
§ 2255(h)'s terms and to ignore § 2244(b)(3)(C)'s directions.
Finally, Mr. Bowe retreats to the position that federal pris-
oners must be exempt from subsection (b)(1) because
AEDPA was designed to treat state prisoners more harshly
than federal prisoners. But, in fact, AEDPA often treats
the two groups the same, and not just when it comes to sec-
ond or successive flings. To take just one example, § 2253(c)
requires a prisoner to secure a “certifcate of appealability”
before appealing from a habeas or § 2255 loss in federal dis-
trict court. State and federal prisoners alike thus must sat-
isfy that provision's demands. See § 2253(c); cf. § 2266(a)
(requiring identical treatment for certain state- and federal-
referencing § 2254, the statute makes plain that the do-over bar applies
only to applications (or motions, as the case may be) by prisoners seeking
postconviction relief. That renders it inapplicable to habeas applications
from state prisoners in preconviction executive detention, because those
applications are fled under § 2241 rather than § 2254. And that distinc-
tion (unlike the one Mr. Bowe proposes between state and federal prison-
ers) makes sense. Convicted prisoners, by defnition, have already re-
ceived a great deal of judicial process, so a do-over bar makes sense as to
them. Prisoners who haven't been convicted, meanwhile, stand in very
different shoes, so Congress decided to exempt them.
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70 BOWE
v. UNITED STATES
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
prisoner flings). And it should shock no one that Congress
might
proceed similarly here and exhibit an intolerance for
do-over claims no matter who seeks to pursue them.
8
*
The majority today commits two serious mistakes. First,
in its zeal to resolve a circuit split, the majority asserts juris-
diction where we have none. With statutory text and 30
years of case law in this Court and lower courts aligned
against it, the majority bases its claim of jurisdiction on a
new and curiously contoured clear-statement rule that is as
needless as it is unprecedented. Second, and compounding
its jurisdictional overreach, the majority adopts an implausi-
ble view on the merits. AEDPA didn't suddenly free fed-
eral prisoners from pre-existing restrictions on do-over
claims. Just the opposite: It imposed additional “carefully
crafted limits” on collateral attacks by federal and state pris-
oners alike. Jones, 599 U. S., at 482. And, quite unsurpris-
ingly, one of those limits includes an unmistakable and ab-
solute bar on do-over claims. Because neither of the
majority's innovations are compatible with Congress's direc-
tions in AEDPA, I respectfully dissent.
8
The government offers two additional theories for Mr. Bowe on the
merits. But the majority pursues neither theory, and rightly so. For
one, the government appears to suggest that subsection (b)(1) never ap-
plies during a court of appeals' certifcation proceeding for any prisoner—
state or federal. Only after certifcation, on this view, may a district
court weed out do-over claims under subsection (b)(1). See Brief for
United States 44–45. But, among other defects, the government's view
would imply that not only (b)(1) but also (b)(2) is inapplicable during certi-
fcation. And, of course, that would render the whole certifcation process
pointless. For another, the government suggests that, even if
§ 2244(b)(1)'s do-over bar applies to federal prisoners, that rule does not
apply in this particular case because Mr. Bowe never actually fled a previ-
ous collateral attack containing a Davis claim; he only sought leave to do
so. Reply Brief 10–11. But we did not take this case to address that
case-specifc argument, nor did Mr. Bowe himself clearly advance it be-
fore us.

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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
p. 32, line 2 from bottom: “and the dissent” is deleted
p. 32, line 2 from bottom: “argue” is changed to “argues”
p. 36, line 15: “reversed” is changed to “vacated”