Riley v. Bondi

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 606 U. S. Part 1
Pages 259–304
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 26, 2025
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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OCTOBER
TERM, 2024
259
Syllabus
RILEY v. BONDI, ATTORNEY GENERAL
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit
No. 23–1270. Argued March 24, 2025—Decided June 26, 2025
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sought to remove Pierre
Riley, a citizen of Jamaica, from the United States under expedited pro-
cedures for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies. On January 26,
2021, the DHS issued a “fnal administrative review order” (FARO) di-
recting Riley's removal to Jamaica. Under 8 U. S. C. § 1228(b)(3), aliens
may petition courts of appeals for FARO review. While Riley did not
contest his removal from the United States, he sought relief under the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), telling an immigration offcer that he
would likely be killed by a drug kingpin if he returned to Jamaica. The
offcer concluded that Riley did not demonstrate reasonable fear of per-
secution, but an Immigration Judge (IJ) disagreed and concluded that
Riley was entitled to relief under the CAT, which prohibits removal
to countries where torture is likely. The IJ sent Riley's case to a
“withholding-only” proceeding to determine whether he could be re-
moved to Jamaica. At that proceeding, the IJ found Riley credible and
granted deferral of removal to Jamaica under the CAT. The DHS ap-
pealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which vacated the
IJ's order and allowed the FARO's enforcement. Three days later,
Riley fled a petition for review in the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Cir-
cuit dismissed Riley's petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that (1)
aliens cannot obtain review of BIA decisions in “withholding-only” pro-
ceedings by fling within 30 days of that decision, and (2) § 1252(b)(1)'s
30-day fling deadline is jurisdictional, not merely a mandatory claims-
processing rule.
Held:
1. BIA orders denying deferral of removal in “withholding-only” pro-
ceedings are not “fnal order[s] of removal” under § 1252(b)(1).
An “order of removal” includes an “order of deportation,” 110 Stat.
3009–627, which, in turn, is defned as an order “concluding that the
alien is deportable or ordering deportation,” § 1101(a)(47)(A). The
FARO issued by DHS on January 26, 2021, is “the fnal order of re-
moval” under the statute because it held that Riley was deportable and
directed that he be removed from the United States. The order was
also the Executive's fnal determination on the question of removal.
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260 RILEY
v. BONDI
Syllabus
An order of removal becomes fnal at the earlier of two points: (1) “a
deter
mination by the [BIA] affrming such order,” or (2) “the expiration
of the period in which the alien is permitted to” petition the BIA for
review of the order. § 1101(a)(47)(B). Because an alien in streamlined
removal proceedings cannot seek review of his FARO before an IJ or
the BIA, the period to seek review “expire[s]” as soon as the FARO
is issued—meaning that the order becomes fnal immediately upon
issuance.
The Court's decisions in Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. 573, and Johnson
v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U. S. 523, buttress this conclusion. In Nasral-
lah, the Court noted that CAT orders are not fnal removal orders
because they do not conclude that an alien is deportable or order depor-
tation. 590 U. S., at 582. The Court held that CAT orders do not “dis-
turb” or “affect the validity” of fnal removal orders, so they do not
merge into fnal orders because only rulings affecting the validity of a
fnal removal order will merge into the fnal order for purposes of judi-
cial review. Ibid. Guzman Chavez addressed whether aliens could be
released during the pendency of their withholding-only proceedings.
The Court held that the directive that they be removed had become
“administratively fnal” regardless of their pending CAT proceedings,
and “the fnality of [an] order of removal does not depend in any way on
the outcome of the withholding-only proceedings.” 594 U. S., at 533,
539–540.
The Government argues that the question in Guzman Chavez was
whether the removal order in that case was “administratively fnal” for
purposes of detention, not whether a removal order constitutes “the
fnal order of removal” for purposes of fling. But this argument con-
fates when a petition for review must be fled with the issues that may
be adjudicated in that proceeding. The Government then compares the
purposes of fnality in §§ 1252(b)(1) and 1231, arguing that the meaning
differs. Although fnality may serve different purposes under different
statutes, it does not follow that the meaning of fnality necessarily var-
ies. The Government raises legitimate practical concerns about re-
moval orders becoming fnal before withholding-only relief is decided,
but the Court must follow statutory text and precedent. The text and
precedents make clear that the FARO is the fnal order of removal, and
withholding-only proceedings do not disturb the fnality of otherwise
fnal removal orders. Pp. 266–272.
2. The 30-day fling deadline under § 1252(b)(1) is a claims-processing
rule, not a jurisdictional requirement.
Categorizing a rule as jurisdictional has important consequences that
may disrupt the orderly and effcient adjudication of cases in the federal
courts. Court precedent shows reluctance to label r ules “jurisdic-

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261
Syllabus
tional” unless Congress clearly signals that intent. While Congress
need
not use “magic words” to indicate that a rule is jurisdictional, Hen-
derson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 436, the Court's recent decisions re-
quire an exceedingly strong signal for jurisdictional classifcation. That
demanding requirement is not met here.
Section 1252(b)(1) states petitions “must be fled not later than 30
days after the date of the fnal order of removal.” This language tells
aliens what to do to obtain judicial review, but it provides no directives
to courts. It does not reference jurisdiction and lacks any language
“demarcat[ing] a court's power.” Harrow v. Department of Defense,
601 U. S. 480, 484. The placement of the statute also suggests it is not
jurisdictional because neither the particular subsection nor the broader
section in which the deadline is placed concerns jurisdiction.
Precedents extendi ng back near ly 20 years suppor t classi fy i ng
§ 1252(b)(1)'s deadline as a claims-processing rule. Before Arbaugh v.
Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, the Court occasionally classifed “non-
extendable time limit[s]” as jurisdictional. Id., at 510 (citing United
States v. Robinson, 361 U. S. 220, 229). In Arbaugh, however, the
Court made clear that courts should only treat statutory limitations as
jurisdictional if Congress “clearly states” that they have jurisdictional
consequences. 546 U. S., at 515. The Court's cases since Arbaugh
have almost uniformly found that the provisions at issue fail this de-
manding test. The one exception is John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v.
United States, 552 U. S. 130, 138, where the Court would not overturn
a “defnitive earlier interpretation” of a statute as jurisdictional without
clear congressional directive. There, century-old decisions held that
the provision was truly jurisdictional. Id., at 134–135.
While Stone v. INS, 514 U. S. 386, 405, characterized § 1252(b)(1)'s
predecessor provision as “jurisdictional,” it used the term loosely and
did not “atten[d] to the distinction between `jurisdictional' rules (as we
understand them today) and nonjurisdictional but mandatory ones.”
Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U. S. 411, 421. Since Stone, the Court
has repeatedly found that fling deadlines, including mandatory ones,
are not jurisdictional.
Section 1252's 30-day fling rule is not jurisdictional, but because the
Government does not wish to press that ground for dismissal the Court's
holdi ng does not preclude th is case from proceedi ng on remand.
Pp. 272–277.
Vacated and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and
Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined in full, and in which Soto-
mayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson, JJ., joined only as to Part II–B.

262 RILEY
v. BONDI
Syllabus
Thomas, J., fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 277. Sotomayor, J., fled
an
opinion dissenting in part, in which Kagan and Jackson, JJ., joined
in full, and in which Gorsuch, J., joined except as to Part IV, post,
p. 281.
Keith Bradley argued the cause for petitioner. With him
on the briefs were Christopher F. Haas, Jeffrey Walker, and
Samuel Ballingrud.
Ephraim A. McDowell argued the cause for respondent in
support of petitioner. With him on the briefs were Acting
Solicitor General Harris, Solicitor General Prelogar, Prin-
cipal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Boynton, Deputy
Solicitor General Gannon, John W. Blakeley, Melissa L.
Ne im an-Kel t ing, Daw n S. Co nrad, and El i zabe th K.
Ottman.
Stephen J. Hammer, by invitation of the Court, 604 U. S.
1040, argued the cause and fled a brief as amicus curiae
in support of the judgment below. With him on the brief
were Allyson N. Ho, Jonathan C. Bond, Robert A. Batista,
M. Christian Talley, Lavi M. Ben Dor, and Patrick J.
Fuster.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for Administrative
Law Professors by Zachary D. Tripp, Joshua M. Wesneski, and Alan B.
Morrison, pro se; for the American Immigration Lawyers Association
et al. by Sharon K. Hogue; for Civil Procedure and Federal Courts Profes-
sors by Jennifer Bennett; for the Constitutional Accountability Center
et al. by Elizabeth Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, Trina Realmuto, and Kris-
tin Macleod-Ball; for Immigration Legal Service Providers by Tobias S.
Loss-Eaton, Charles Roth, Aimee Mayer-Salins, Melissa Crow, and Rob-
ert Pauw; and for Juan E. Méndez, Former U. N. Special Rapporteur on
Torture, by David M. Gossett.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for Former U. S.
Attorneys General by R. Trent McCotter and Gene P. Hamilton; and for
the Immigration Reform Law Institute by Christopher J. Hajec.
Br iefs of ami c i cur i ae were fi led for the Center for Litigati on
and Courts by Scott Dodson, Leah Spero, and Joshua P. Davis; and
for the Pacifc Legal Foundation by Damien M. Schiff and Allison D.
Daniel.
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Opinion of the Court
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court.
In
this case, we must decide whether the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit erred in dismissing petitioner Pierre
Riley's petition for review on jurisdictional grounds. And in
order to make that decision, we must decide two subsidiary
questions: (1) whether the 30-day fling deadline for judicial
review of a “fnal order of removal,” 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(1), is
a jurisdictional requirement or simply a mandatory claim-
processing rule; and (2) whether an alien can obtain re-
view of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision in a
“withholding-only” proceeding (i. e., one in which removal
from the United States is not at issue) by fling a petition for
review within 30 days of that decision.
The answers to these questions matter in this case because
Riley fled a petition for review within 30 days after a BIA
order in his withholding-only proceeding but long after the
issuance of a “fnal administrative review order” (FARO)
that commanded his removal from the United States. The
Court of Appeals held that Riley's petition was fled too late,
and because it viewed the 30-day deadline as jurisdictional,
it dismissed his petition. We now vacate and remand.
Taking the second question frst, we hold that a BIA order
in a withholding-only proceeding is not a “fnal order of re-
moval,” and therefore the 30-day fling deadline cannot be
satisfed by fling a petition for review within 30 days of the
BIA's withholding-only order. Second, we hold that the 30-
day fling deadline is not jurisdictional. Because the Gov-
ernment has chosen not to seek dismissal of Riley's case on
that ground, we vacate the judgment below and remand for
further proceedings.
I
In 1995, Pierre Riley, a citizen of Jamaica, entered the
United States on a B–2 tourist visa that allowed him to stay
for six months, but he did not depart when that time was up.
2 App. 54. He became a member of “a far-reaching and well-
organized” drug traffcking gang and was convicted in 2008

264 RILEY
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Opinion of the Court
for conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to dis-
tr
ibute more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana, as well as for
possession of a frearm in furtherance of a drug-traffcking
crime. See United States v. Riley, 2008 WL 2662277, *1–*2
(SDNY, July 7, 2008). He was sentenced to 25 years' im-
prisonment but was released in January 2021. Riley v.
Garland, 2024 WL 1826979, *1 (CA4, Apr. 26, 2024) (per
curiam).
Shortly thereafter, immigration authorities took Riley into
custody and sought his removal. Because he had been con-
victed of an aggravated felony, his case proceeded along the
supposedly streamlined track that Congress created in 1996.
See 8 U. S. C. § 1228; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act of 1996, § 440, 110 Stat. 1277–1279. Under this proc-
ess, if an immigration offcer concludes that an alien was con-
victed of an aggravated felony, the offcer issues a “Notice of
Intent” to deport. 8 CFR § 238.1(b)(1) (2024). The alien
may challenge that determination in writing within 10 days
after the notice of intent is issued. § 238.1(c)(1). If the im-
migration offcer fnds that the alien is removable, or if the
alien declines to challenge removability, the offcer issues a
FARO specifying the country to which the alien must be de-
ported. §§ 238.1(d)(1), (f )(2). The alien may then petition a
court of appeals for review. See 8 U. S. C. § 1228(b)(3).
In this case, it was undisputed that Riley had been con-
victed of an aggravated felony, and therefore on January 26,
2021, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a
FARO directing that Riley be sent back to Jamaica.
Riley did not contest his removal from the United States,
but he resisted return to Jamaica under the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (Convention or CAT), Dec. 10,
1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20, 1465 U. N. T. S. 113. Arti-
cle Three of the Convention prohibits a signatory state from
sending a person to another nation if “there are substantial
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
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subjected to torture.” The United States became a full
par
ty to the CAT in 1994, see United Nations, General As-
sembly, Report of the Committee Against Torture, 55 U. N.
GAOR Supp. No. 55, p. 44, U. N. Doc. A /55/44 (2000), and
as subsequently required by legislation, see Foreign Affairs
Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, § 2242(b), 112 Stat.
2681–822, regulations implementing the CAT's requirements
were then adopted. As relevant here, these regulations
prohibit the removal of an alien to a country where torture
is likely. See generally 8 CFR § 208.16.
Seeking relief under the CAT, Riley told an immigration
offcer that a wealthy and powerful Jamaican drug kingpin
had it in for Riley's family, had killed two of his cousins,
was infuential with the police and politicians in Jamaica, and
would likely kill Riley if he was returned to any place in
that country. See 2 App. 66–70. The offcer concluded that
Riley did not demonstrate reasonable fear of persecution, but
an Immigration Judge (IJ) disagreed and therefore sent Ril-
ey's case to what is called a “withholding-only” proceeding—
that is, a proceeding at which the only issue is whether the
alien may be removed to his home country.
At Riley's withholding-only proceeding, the IJ found Riley
credible and granted deferral of removal to Jamaica under
the CAT. 2024 WL 1826979, *1.
The DHS appealed that decision to the BIA, which found
that Riley's claim was “not supported by suffcient objective
evidence.” 1 App. 50. Accordingly, the BIA vacated the
IJ's order and thus allowed the FARO to be enforced. 2024
WL 1826979, *1.
Three days after the issuance of that order, Riley fled a
petition for review in the U. S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, but the court dismissed the petition for lack
of jurisdiction. It held that the fnal order of removal in
Riley's case was the FARO issued on January 26, 2021, not
the later BIA order denying CAT relief. This meant that
Riley's petition had not been fled on time, and because the
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court thought that the 30-day fling deadline in § 1252(b)(1)
is
jurisdictional, it dismissed Riley's petition. Id., at *1–*2.
In holding that the 30-day fling deadline is jurisdictional,
the Fourth Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit, but its holding
conficted with decisions of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits.
Compare Martinez v. Garland, 86 F. 4th 561, 571–572 (CA4
2023); F. J. A. P. v. Garland, 94 F. 4th 620, 626 (CA7 2024),
with Argueta-Hernandez v. Garland, 87 F. 4th 698, 705 (CA5
2023); Alonso-Juarez v. Garland, 80 F. 4th 1039, 1046–1047
(CA9 2023). And in holding that the 30-day fling deadline
begins to run when a FARO is issued, the Fourth Circuit
joined the Second Circuit, see Bhaktibhai-Patel v. Garland,
32 F. 4th 180, 192–194 (CA2 2022), but its decision was at
odds with decisions of numerous other Circuits, most of
which were handed down before our decisions in Nasrallah
v. Barr, 590 U. S. 573 (2020), and Johnson v. Guzman Chavez,
594 U. S. 523 (2021), analyzed related issues. See Jimenez-
Morales v. Attorney Gen., 821 F. 3d 1307, 1308 (CA11 2016);
Garcia v. Sessions, 856 F. 3d 27, 35 (CA1 2017); Bonilla v. Ses-
sions, 891 F. 3d 87, 90, n. 4 (CA3 2018); Argueta-Hernandez, 87
F. 4th, at 706; F. J. A. P., 94 F. 4th, at 635–636; Alonso-
Juarez, 80 F. 4th, at 1046; Arostegui-Maldonado v. Garland,
75 F. 4th 1132, 1142–1143 (CA10 2023); Kolov v. Garland, 78
F. 4th 911, 918–919 (CA6 2023).
We granted certiorari to resolve these two splits. Riley
v. Garland, 604 U. S. 1007 (2024). Because the Government
agreed with Riley's position on both issues, we appointed
Stephen J. Hammer as amicus curiae to defend the judg-
ment below. 604 U. S. 1040 (2024). He has ably discharged
his responsibilities.
II
A
Under 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(1), a petition for review of a
“fnal order of removal” must be fled within 30 days of that
order. Riley and the Government argue that Riley's peti-
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tion was fled on time because it was fled within 30 days of
the
BIA order denying deferral of removal, and we must
therefore decide whether that order is a “fnal order of re-
moval.” We conclude that it is not.
1
The statutory text speaks directly and clearly to this ques-
tion. While the Immigration and Nationality Act does not
defne the term “order of removal,” any statutory reference
to “an order of removal” is “deemed to include a reference
to . . . an order of deportation.” Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, § 309(d)(2), 110
Stat. 3009–627. An “order of deportation,” in turn, is de-
fned as an order “concluding that the alien is deportable
or ordering deportation.” 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(47)(A). So an
“order of removal” must have those same characteristics.
We must therefore identify which order concluded that
Riley is “deportable” and commanded his deportation, and it
is clear that the qualifying order is the FARO issued by DHS
on January 26, 2021. That order held that Riley was deport-
able and directed that he be removed from the United States.
See 1 App. 8.
The order was also the Executive's fnal determination on
the question of removal. An order of removal becomes fnal
at the earlier of two points: (1) “a determination by the [BIA]
affrming such order,” or (2) “the expiration of the period in
which the alien is permitted to” petition the BIA for review
of the order. § 1101(a)(47)(B). This statutory defnition ties
fnality to agency review. Because an alien in streamlined
removal proceedings cannot seek review of his FARO before
an IJ or the BIA, the period to seek review “expir[es]” as
soon as the FARO is issued—meaning that the order be-
comes fnal immediately upon issuance. Therefore, under a
straightforward reading of the statutory text, Riley's FARO
constituted “the fnal order of removal” in this case.
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2
Our
decisions in Nasrallah and Guzman Chavez buttress
this conclusion. Although the ultimate issue in each of those
cases differed from the question now before us, both deci-
sions are instructive.
In Nasrallah, the question was whether the alien could
mount a factual challenge to the denial of relief under the
CAT. Because the alien had been convicted of aggravated
felonies, § 1252(a)(2)(C) prevented him from challenging the
factual fndings on the basis of which his removal had been
ordered. See 590 U. S., at 576–577, 581. But the Govern-
ment argued that § 1252(a)(2)(C), in combination with
§ 1252(b)(9) (the so-called “zipper clause,” see Guerrero-
Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221, 230 (2020)), also barred
the alien from raising a factual challenge to his CAT order.
See Brief for Respondent in Nasrallah v. Barr, O. T. 2019,
No. 18–1432, p. 35. The zipper clause provides that judicial
review of any “questions of law and fact” that arise in re-
moval proceedings may occur “only in judicial review of a
fnal order under this section.” § 1252(b)(9). As the Gov-
ernment saw it, the zipper clause merged the disposition of
the CAT claim into the fnal order of removal, and since the
alien could not challenge the removal decision on factual
grounds, the alien should also be unable to challenge the fac-
tual basis for the denial of CAT relief. See 590 U. S., at
584–585.
We disagreed. See id., at 582–583. We noted that a CAT
order is not a fnal order of removal because “it is not an
order `concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering de-
portation.' ” Id., at 582. And what is more, we held, a CAT
order “does not disturb” or “affect the validity” of a fnal
order of removal. Ibid. We therefore held that the BIA's
CAT order “d[id] not merge into” a fnal order of removal for
purposes of judicial review because only “rulings that affect
the validity of the fnal order of removal” merge into that
order. Ibid.
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Our reasoning in Guzman Chavez was similar. The ques-
ti
on there was whether the aliens in question could be re-
leased during the pendency of their withholding-only pro-
ceedings, and the answer to that question hinged on whether
the aliens were being detained under § 1226(a)(2), which
allows release before an alien is ordered removed, or under
§§ 1231(a)(1)(B) and (a)(2), which make detention mandatory
after removal has become “ `administratively fnal.' ” 594
U. S., at 527–528. In Guzman Chavez, the aliens' removal
had been ordered by DHS, and that determination was
not being challenged, but proceedings in which they were
seeking withholding of removal were still in progress. Id.,
at 532.
We held that the a l iens were det ai ned under
§§ 1231(a)(1)(B) and (a)(2) and, as a result, could not be re-
leased. Id., at 533. We reasoned that the directive that
they be removed had become “administratively fnal” and
that the pendency of the withholding-only proceedings did
not alter that fact. See id., at 540. Withholding-only pro-
ceedings, we said, do not “affec[t]” a removal order's “valid-
ity,” and an alien's initiation of such proceedings “does not
render non-fnal an otherwise `administratively fnal' . . .
order of removal.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). “[T]he fnality of the order of removal,” we explained,
“does not depend in any way on the outcome of the
withholding-only proceedings.” See id., at 539.
For present purposes, the lessons taught by Nasrallah and
Guzman Chavez are clear. An order denying relief under
the CAT is not a fnal order of removal and does not affect
the validity of a previously issued order of removal or render
that order non-fnal. That teaching dooms Riley's argu-
ment here.
3
Riley and the Government struggle to escape the reason-
ing of Nasrallah and Guzman Chavez, but their efforts are
unconvincing. Riley begins by arguing at length that in a
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case like his, an order denying withholding of removal or
CA
T relief should be regarded as marking the point in time
of a fnal order because it occurs last and enables the FARO
to be executed. See Brief for Petitioner 29–34. But as al-
ready explained, this argument runs headlong into Nasral-
lah and Guzman Chavez.
The Government, while agreeing with the court below that
a CAT or withholding-only relief order is not itself a fnal
order of removal, also contends that a previously issued re-
moval order cannot become fnal “until the conclusion of
withholding-only proceedings.” Brief for Respondent in
Support of Petitioner 42–43. But Guzman Chavez makes
clear that “the fnality of [an] order of removal does not de-
pend in any way on the outcome of the withholding-only pro-
ceedings.” See 594 U. S., at 539.
The Government responds that the question in Guzman
Chavez was whether the removal order in that case was “ad-
mi nistratively fi na l” for pur poses of detenti on under
§ 1231(a)(1)(B), not whether, as in this case, a removal order
constitutes “the fnal order of removal” under § 1252(b)(1)'s
30-day fling rule. See Brief for Respondent in Support of
Petitioner 44–45. The Government notes that the language
in these two provisions is not exactly the same, and it argues
that there are two good reasons why the concept of fnal-
ity should be seen as having different meanings under
§§ 1252(b)(1) and 1231.
The frst of these arguments analogizes review under
§ 1252(b)(1) to an appeal from a district court's “fnal deci-
sio[n]” under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. See Brief for Respondent
in Support of Petitioner 46. Since an appeal from a fnal
district court decision provides the vehicle for reviewing all
prior district court rulings, the Government argues that
there should be a single review proceeding in a case like
this. Ibid.
This argument confates two separate issues: (1) when a
petition for review must be fled and (2) the issues that may
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be adjudicated in that proceeding. We agree that there can
be
only one review proceeding in a case like Riley's, and we
also agree with the obvious proposition that review of the
denial of CAT relief cannot take place until the BIA has de-
nied such relief. That does not mean, however, that an
order denying CAT relief is the fnal order of removal in a
case like Riley's or that a previously issued removal order
remains non-fnal until CAT relief is denied. Instead, the
only conclusion that the Government's argument supports is
that review of removability and withholding of removal
should occur in a single appellate proceeding.
The Government's second argument regarding the mean-
ing of fnality in §§ 1252(b)(1) and 1231 rests on its under-
standing of the reasons why fnality is important under those
two provisions. Under § 1252(b)(1), the Government as-
serts, fnality is important because it marks the point at
which judicial review may be sought, whereas under § 1231,
the fnalization of administrative review is an event that
heightens the risk that an alien, if not detained, will simply
disappear. See id., at 47.
We appreciate this difference, but just because fnality
may serve different purposes under different statutes, it
does not follow that the meaning of fnality necessarily var-
ies. Here, Riley's argument does not provide an adequate
reason to disregard the lessons of Nasrallah and Guzman
Chavez.
4
The Government's fnal submission concerns the practical
problems that it fears will arise if a removal order becomes
fnal before the issue of withholding-only relief is decided.
The Government worries that aliens like Riley who wish
only to contest removal to their native country will not fle
a petition for review until their request for withholding of
removal to that destination is denied. And if an alien fles
a petition for review before the question of withholding-
only relief is settled, the Government fears that the proceed-
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Opinion of the Court
ing in the court of appeals may be wrapped up before the
BIA
denies withholding-only relief, and the alien may thus
be deprived of any judicial review of that denial. See Brief
for Respondent in Support of Petitioner 36–38.
These are legitimate practical concerns, but we must nev-
ertheless follow the statutory text and our prior precedents.
And in any event, these problems are not unavoidable. In a
case like this, the Government can inform aliens of the need
to fle a petition within 30 days after the issuance of a FARO,
and it can alert the court of appeals to the pendency of a
withholding-only proceeding so that review there can wait
until that issue is decided. And if requests for withholding
of removal in cases like Riley's are decided expeditiously—
and that was the whole point of the supposedly streamlined
procedure adopted by Congress to effect the quick removal
of dangerous aliens*—petitions for review of removal orders
should not linger long on a court of appeals docket before
the withholding issue is ready for review. Finally, if the
Government makes a general practice of what it has done in
Riley's case, i. e., declining to press for enforcement of the
30-day fling rule, aliens who are mistaken about when a peti-
tion for review must be fled will not be hurt.
In sum, the statutory text and our precedents make clear
that the FARO is the fnal order of removal in this case, and
withholding-only proceedings do not disturb the fnality of
an otherwise fnal order of removal.
B
We turn next to the question whether § 1252(b)(1)'s 30-day
deadline for fling a petition for review is “jurisdictional.”
*The Government reminds us that such proceedings have often lasted
many months and even years. See Brief for Respondent in Support of
Petitioner 37 (citing Martinez v. Garland, 86 F. 4th 561, 574 (CA4 2023)
(Floyd, J., concurring in judgment); Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U. S.
523, 552 (2021) (Breyer, J., dissenting)). That is surely not what Congress
anticipated when it enacted the streamlined procedure.
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Opinion of the Court
This question is important because categorizing a rule as
jur
isdictional has important consequences that may disrupt
the orderly and effcient adjudication of cases in the federal
courts. Courts generally decide only the questions that are
presented by the parties. See Henderson v. Shinseki, 562
U. S. 428, 434 (2011). If a party neglects to raise, concedes,
or waives an issue, a court generally has no obligation to
consider it. See Wilkins v. United States, 598 U. S. 152,
157–158 (2023); see also Union Pacifc R. Co. v. Locomotive
Engineers, 558 U. S. 67, 81–82 (2009) (noting that nonjuris-
dictional matters are “ordinarily forfeited if the party assert-
ing the rule waits too long to raise the point” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
True jurisdictional requirements, however, are different.
A federal court must always satisfy itself that it has jurisdic-
tion. See United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S. 402,
408–409 (2015). Thus, even if the parties fail to spot a juris-
dictional issue or agree that the court has jurisdiction, the
court cannot proceed unless it makes an independent deter-
mination that it has jurisdiction. See Henderson, 562 U. S.,
at 434; see also 33 C. Wright, C. Koch, & R. Murphy, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 8316, p. 50 (2018) (“[A] litigant's fail-
ure to comply with a jurisdictional bar deprives a court of
all authority to hear a case, regardless of waiver or equitable
considerations” (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted)).
Relying on a string of decisions issued during the past 19
years, Riley and the Government argue that the 30-day fling
deadline in § 1252(b)(1) is not a jurisdictional rule but is in-
stead a “quintessential claim-processing rul[e].” Brief for
Petitioner 18 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Brief
for Respondent in Support of Petitioner 18–21. Amicus, on
the other hand, maintains that the 30-day deadline is juris-
dictional, and because Riley did not fle within 30 days of the
fnal order of removal, he agrees with the Fourth Circuit that
Riley's petition had to be dismissed. See Brief for Court-
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Opinion of the Court
Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below
15
–22. Riley and the Government have the better argu-
ment on this issue.
1
Because jurisdictional rules have a unique capacity to dis-
rupt the orderly adjudication of disputes, we are reluctant
to label a rule “jurisdictional” unless Congress has clearly
signaled that the rule is meant to have that status. See
Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S., at 409–410; Henderson, 562 U. S.,
at 435–436. We have said that Congress “need not use
magic words in order to speak clearly” on the question
whether a provision is jurisdictional, id., at 436, but our pat-
tern of recent decisions shows that we will not categorize a
provision as “jurisdictional” unless the signal is exceedingly
strong.
And in this case, that demanding requirement is not met.
We start with the text of the statute. Section 1252(b)(1)
provides that “[t]he petition for review must be fled not later
than 30 days after the date of the fnal order of removal.”
This language tells aliens what they must do if they want
judicial review, but it provides no directives to courts. It
makes no reference to jurisdiction and lacks any language
“demarcat[ing] a court's power.” Harrow v. Department of
Defense, 601 U. S. 480, 484 (2024); see Henderson, 562 U. S.,
at 438; Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S., at 411.
The placement of the 30-day fling rule also weighs against
amicus's argument. Neither the particular subsection nor
the broader section in which the deadline is placed concerns
jurisdiction, but there are other sections in which the dead-
line could have been housed if it had been meant to have
jurisdictional status. One possibility is § 1252(b)(4), which
delineates the bounds of an appellate court's review author-
ity. Another is § 1252(a)(2), which is entitled “Matters not
subject to judicial review.” (Boldface deleted.) But Con-
gress eschewed those logical homes for a true jurisdictional
provision.
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Opinion of the Court
2
Our
precedents extending back nearly 20 years support
classifying § 1252(b)(1)'s fling deadline as a claims-processing
rule. Prior to our decision in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546
U. S. 500 (2006), we had occasionally classifed “nonex-
tendable time limit[s]” as jurisdictional. Id., at 510 (citing
United States v. Robinson, 361 U. S. 220, 229 (1960)). And
in several other cases, we had issued what we have called
“ `drive-by' ” jurisdictional statements—that is, we had
loosely stated that “ `jurisdictio[n]' ” was lacking without con-
sidering whether the defect really concerned a limitation on
the court's capacity to decide as opposed to a threshold re-
quirement that a party had to satisfy in order to go forward.
546 U. S., at 511 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better En-
vironment, 523 U. S. 83, 91 (1998)).
Since Arbaugh, however, we have been more disciplined in
our use of the term “jurisdictional.” In that case, we were
required to decide whether satisfying Title VII's defnition
of a covered “employer,” which turns on the number of em-
ployees in a work force, was a jurisdictional requirement.
546 U. S., at 503. In holding that this coverage requirement
is not jurisdictional, we made clear that courts should treat
a “statutory limitation” as jurisdictional only if Congress
“clearly states” that the provision has jurisdictional conse-
quences. Id., at 515–516. And since Arbaugh, our cases
have almost uniformly found that the provisions at issue
failed to meet this very demanding test. See, e. g., Reed
Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154, 166 (2010); Hender-
son, 562 U. S., at 441–442; Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Med-
ical Center, 568 U. S. 145, 154–155 (2013); Kwai Fun Wong,
575 U. S., at 410–411; Boechler v. Commissioner, 596 U. S.
199, 211 (2022); Wilkins, 598 U. S., at 158–159; Harrow, 601
U. S., at 485.
The one exception to this pattern is John R. Sand &
Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U. S. 130 (2008)—and, not
surprisingly, that decision is the centerpiece of amicus's ar-
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gument. See Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in
Suppor
t of Judgment Below 17–22, 26–30. But the situation
in John R. Sand was quite different from the situation here.
In John R. Sand, decisions going back more than a century
had held that the provision in question and its predecessors
were truly jurisdictional. 552 U. S., at 134–135. They did
not simply use that term but referred to the unique charac-
teristics of jurisdictional provisions. See Kendall v. United
States, 107 U. S. 123, 125–126 (1883); Finn v. United States,
123 U. S. 227, 232–233 (1887). And we held that we will not
overturn a “defnitive earlier interpretation” of a statute as
jurisdictional unless Congress has provided a clear contrary
directive. See John R. Sand, 552 U. S., at 137–138.
Here, amicus argues that Stone v. INS, 514 U. S. 386
(1995), is like the earlier jurisdictional decisions on which we
relied in John R. Sand. In Stone, the Court characterized
§ 1252(b)(1)'s predecessor as “jurisdictional,” 514 U. S., at
405, and amicus argues that this is a “defnitive interpreta-
tion” that should be accepted, see Brief for Court-Appointed
Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below 11. But we
see critical differences between Stone and the established
precedents in John R. Sand.
Stone, to be sure, did describe a predecessor provision's
fling deadline as “jurisdictional.” 514 U. S., at 405; see also
Henderson, 562 U. S., at 437. As we later explained, how-
ever, Stone used the term “jurisdictional” loosely and did not
“atten[d] to the distinction between `jurisdictional' rules (as
we understand them today) and nonjurisdictional but manda-
tory ones.” Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U. S. 411, 421
(2023). Stone suggested that all mandatory fling require-
ments are jurisdictional, see 514 U. S., at 405, but since that
time, we have repeatedly found that fling deadlines, includ-
ing some couched in mandatory terms, are not jurisdictional.
In Hende rso n, we unani mously held that 38 U. S. C.
§ 7266(a)—which provides that “a person adversely affected”
by a decision of the Board of Veterans' Appeals “shall fle a
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Thomas, J., concurring
notice of appeal . . . within 120 days”—is not a jurisdictional
ti
me bar. 562 U. S., at 441–442. We reached the same con-
clusion in Boechler, where the provision at issue, 26 U. S. C.
§ 6330(d)(1), set the deadline for fling a petition for review
in the Tax Court. 596 U. S., at 211. And most recently, in
Harrow, we held that 5 U. S. C. § 7703(b)(1)(A), which pro-
vides that “any petition for review” of an order of the Merit
Systems Protection Board “shall be fled within 60 days after
the Board issues notice of the fnal order or decision,” is non-
jurisdictional. 601 U. S., at 485.
In these cases, like the present case, the statutes imposed
requirements on litigants, not the courts; but even when the
relevant statutory language was not litigant-focused, we
have found that our clear statement rule was not satisfed.
See, e. g., Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S., at 410–411 (holding
that 28 U. S. C. § 2401(b), which provides that “[a] tort claim
against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is
presented . . . within two years after such claim accrues,” is
non-jurisdictional); Wilkins, 598 U. S., at 159 (holding man-
datory time bar non-jurisdictional).
In sum, we hold that § 1252's 30-day fling rule is not juris-
dictional, but because the Government does not wish to press
that ground for dismissal, it does not preclude this case from
proceeding on remand.
***
For these reasons, the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is vacated, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, concurring.
The Court today holds that the Fourth Circuit erred in
treating the 30-day deadline in 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(1) as juris-
dictional. Ante, at 263. I agree and join the Court's opinion
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Thomas, J., concurring
in full. I write separately to note that the Fourth Circuit
may
nevertheless lack jurisdiction over this suit for a differ-
ent reason. Petitioner Pierre Riley sought review of an
“Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals . . . entered
on May 31, 2022.” 1 App. 42 (emphasis deleted). Today's
opinion makes clear that this May 31 order is not a “ `fnal
order of removal.' ” Ante, at 267. Instead, it is an order
denying relief under the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment (CAT). Congress has specifed that federal courts of
appeals lack jurisdiction to review CAT orders “except as
part of the review of a fnal order of removal.” § 2242, 112
Stat. 2681–822, note following 8 U. S. C. § 1231 (emphasis
added). Thus, on remand, the Fourth Circuit should con-
sider whether it has jurisdiction to review a CAT order when
the court is not conducting that review “as part of the review
of a fnal order of removal.” Ibid.
I
Through a series of statutory enactments, Congress has
established a comprehensive framework for “[ j]udicial re-
view of a fnal order of removal.” 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(1).
“[A] `fnal order of removal' is a fnal order `concluding that
the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.' ” Nasral-
lah v. Barr, 590 U. S. 573, 579 (2020) (quoting 8 U. S. C.
§ 1101(a)(47)(A)).
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi-
bility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) grants the federal courts of ap-
peals jurisdiction to review an alien's “fnal order of re-
moval.” § 1252(a)(1). The statute makes the fling of a
“petition for review” in accordance with the procedures out-
lined in IIRIRA the “sole and exclusive means” for an alien
to obtain judicial review of such an order. § 1252(a)(5).
IIRIRA contemplates that an alien facing removal may
bring a “claim” under the CAT. § 1252(a)(4). The CAT is
an international human rights treaty that, as relevant here,
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Thomas, J., concurring
prohibits the removal of an alien to a country where the alien
is
likely to be tortured. CAT claims are addressed in the
frst instance by an immigration judge. The immigration
judge's decision is appealable to the Board of Immigration
Appea ls, an admi nistrative body w ith in the Executive
Branch.
This Court has made clear that “CAT orders are not the
same as fnal orders of removal.” Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at
582 (emphasis deleted). “An order granting CAT relief
means only that, notwithstanding the order of removal, the
[alien] may not be removed to the designated country of re-
moval, at least until conditions change in that country.”
Ibid. “A CAT order is not itself a fnal order of removal
because it is not an order `concluding that the alien is deport-
able or ordering deportation.' ” Ibid.
While IIRIRA acknowledges that an alien may bring a
“claim” under the CAT, see § 1252(a)(4), jurisdiction for judi-
cial review of CAT claims comes from a different statute—
the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998
(FARRA), see § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681–822, note following 8
U. S. C. § 1231. FARRA specifes that no federal court shall
have “jurisdiction to consider or review claims raised under
the [CAT] except as part of the review of a fnal order of
removal pursuant to [8 U. S. C. § 1252].” § 2242(d), 112 Stat.
2681–822; see also 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(4) (stating that the fl-
ing of “a petition for review fled with an appropriate court
of appeals in accordance with [§ 1252]” is the “sole and exclu-
sive means for judicial review” of any CAT claim).
IIRIRA also contains a “zipper clause,” which provides for
consolidation in judicial review. The zipper clause states
that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section,” judicial
review of “all questions of law and fact . . . arising from any
action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien” shall
be “available only in judicial review of a fnal order under
this section.” § 1252(b)(9). The upshot is straightforward:
Federal courts generally lack jurisdiction over all questions
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of law and fact that arise from removal proceedings unless
the
court is reviewing “a fnal order” under § 1252(a)(1) or
exercising jur isdicti on “other w ise provided” in § 1252.
§ 1252(b)(9).
The zipper clause plainly covers CAT claims because CAT
claims “aris[e] from” removal proceedings. Ibid.; see also
Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 585. It follows that federal courts
lack jurisdiction to review CAT claims “unless they are re-
viewing `a fnal order' under § 1252(a)(1) or exercising juris-
diction `otherwise provided' in § 1252.” Jennings v. Rodri-
guez, 583 U. S. 281, 316 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment). Section 1252 does not
contain “a specifc grant of jurisdiction over CAT claims.”
Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 591–592 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
FARRA—not § 1252—“provides for judicial review of CAT
claims.” Id., at 580 (majority opinion). Thus, on my read-
ing of the relevant statutes, courts cannot review CAT claims
unless they are reviewing a fnal order of removal.
II
Riley has never petitioned for judicial review of a fnal
order of removal. See Brief for Petitioner 10–12. He peti-
tioned the Fourth Circuit only for “review of the Order of
the Board of Immigration Appeals . . . entered on May 31,
2022.” 1 App. 42 (emphasis deleted). And, as the Court
today holds, this May 31 order addressing Riley's CAT claim
is not a fnal order of removal. Ante, at 267.
I do not see how the Fourth Circuit has jurisdiction to
review a CAT order in isolation when the petitioner does
not seek review of a fnal order of removal. Congress has
provided that federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to
review an order denying CAT relief “except as part of the
review of a fnal order of removal.” § 2242(d), 112 Stat.
2681–822 (emphasis added). “In other words, a fnal order
of removal is required if a court is to review a CAT order at
all.” Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 592 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting in part
Riley has undoubtedly received a fnal order of removal.
But,
he has never sought judicial review of that order pursu-
ant to the procedures outlined in § 1252. This Court has
held that “CAT orders may be reviewed together with fnal
orders of removal in a court of appeals.” Id., at 581 (empha-
sis added). But, as far as I am aware, we have never held
that judicial review of CAT orders is available when an alien
does not petition for review of a fnal order of removal.
“[W]e can address jurisdictional issues in any order we
choose.” Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer, 601 U. S. 1, 4
(2023); see also Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U. S.
574, 584 (1999) (there is no mandatory “sequencing of juris-
dictional issues”). In this case, we decide only the issue on
which we granted certiorari: the correctness of the Fourth
Circuit's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction based on the
timing of Riley's petition for review. We do not decide
whether Riley's case is otherwise free of jurisdictional
defects.
On remand, the Fourth Circuit must assure itself of its
jurisdiction before it can proceed to the merits of Riley's pe-
tition. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment,
523 U. S. 83, 101–102 (1998). I encourage the Fourth Circuit
to consider whether it has jurisdiction to review a CAT
order—and only a CAT order—when the petitioner does not
seek review of a fnal order of removal.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Kagan and
Justice Jackson join, and with whom Justice Gorsuch
joins as to all but Part IV, dissenting in part.
Sometimes, to ask a question is to answer it. When peti-
tioner Pierre Riley received an order from the Department
of Homeland Security notifying him it would seek to deport
him to Jamaica, he timely sought deferral of that removal on
the ground that he would likely be killed upon his return
there. After initially winning such relief from an Immigra-
tion Judge, Riley lost before the Board of Immigration Ap-
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peals. The question is when Riley should have petitioned
for
judicial review of the Board's order. Was his petition
due 30 days after the Government frst notifed him he would
be deported, well over a year before the Board issued the
order Riley sought to challenge? Or was it instead due 30
days after the order denying his claim for deferral of re-
moval? The answer is clear: One should not be required to
appeal an order before it exists.
Incomprehensibly, the Court disagrees. It acknowledges
that the immigration laws required Riley to appeal the De-
partment's decision that he was “deportable” together with
the Board's (much later) order denying him relief from re-
moval to Jamaica. It admits that the only way to review
both orders is to do so after the latter of the two issues. Yet
it concludes Riley's appeal was due before the Board issued
the second order. Because Congress did not write so inco-
herent a judicial-review provision, I respectfully dissent.*
I
A
Petitioner Pierre Riley grew up in Kingston, Jamaica. In
1995, at age 16, he entered the United States on a visitor's
visa to live with his father, a U. S. citizen. Riley overstayed
his visa, because (he says) he thought his father had ar-
ranged for his naturalization. Eventually, Riley got in-
volved in marijuana traffcking, and in 2008, a federal jury
convicted him of conspiring to distribute marijuana and pos-
sessing a frearm in furtherance of that conspiracy. For
those offenses, a Federal District Court sentenced him to 25
years' imprisonment.
In January of 2021, after serving nearly 15 years of his
sentence, Riley moved for compassionate release, arguing
that his Type 2 diabetes and the COVID–19 pandemic consti-
*The majority correctly holds that the deadlines in this case are not
jurisdictional, ante, at 272–277, so I join Part II–B of its opinion.
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting in part
tuted extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying his re-
lease
. The District Court agreed.
A few days later, the Department of Homeland Security
served Riley with notice that it would seek to remove him
from the United States. Because Riley had been convicted
of an aggravated felony, the Government could pursue his
removal “without a hearing before an immigration judge.”
8 CFR § 238.1(b)(2)(i) (2024); 8 U. S. C. § 1228(c). Instead,
after providing Riley an opportunity to contest his remov-
ability in writing, an immigration offcer simply issued a
“Final Administrative Removal Order,” fnding him “deport-
able” and ordering him “removed from the United States t[o]
Jamaica.” 1 App. 7–8. Riley received this removal order
on January 28, 2021.
B
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), Art. 3,
Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20, 1465 U. N. T. S.
113, categorically prohibits signatory states from returning
any person “to another State where there are substantial
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture.” The United States has been a party
to the Convention since 1994, and federal statutes and regu-
lations implement its requirements. See ante, at 265;
8 CFR § 208.16(c). “A conviction of an aggravated felony
has no effect on CAT eligibility” and “the Attorney General
has no discretion to deny relief to a noncitizen who estab-
lishes his eligibility.” Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U. S. 184,
188, n. 1 (2013). That is why even noncitizens like Riley,
who are statutorily ineligible for administrative hearings on
removability, are nonetheless entitled to a hearing before an
immigration judge if they express a credible fear of torture
in their country of removal. Such hearings are known as
withholding-only or CAT proceedings, and their result can
be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 8 CFR
§ 208.31(e).
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After receiving his removal order, Riley told an asylum
offcer
that a powerful drug dealer affliated with the Jamai-
can Government had been targeting his family and had mur-
dered two of his cousins. 2 App. 66. Riley feared that he,
too, would be killed upon his return to Jamaica. The offcer
found Riley “credible,” but nonetheless concluded he was in-
eligible for CAT relief. Id., at 59.
At a subsequent hearing before an Immigration Judge,
Riley again testifed that he feared removal to Jamaica.
Riley explained that, following his compassionate release, “a
big drug kingpin” who functioned as a major political leader
in his Kingston neighborhood and was “tied in with all facets
of law enforcement” had threatened repeatedly to kill him.
Administrative Record in Riley v. Garland, No. 22–1609
(CA4), p. 194; see id., at 204–207. In 2008, Riley said, the
same kingpin had ordered the killing of his cousin, Oneil
Spencer, after Spencer stopped “donat[ing]” money “to fund
political campaigns and pay off government offcials.” Id.,
at 201. When another cousin, Darrel Scott, was deported
from the United States to Jamaica two years later and urged
the local police to investigate Spencer's murder, he too was
shot and killed. Id., at 203–204.
After Riley's release made the Jamaican news, his mother,
sister, and brother each began receiving a constant stream
of death threats directed at Riley. Id., at 207–209, 280–289.
His mother reported the threats to the police, but (Riley tes-
tifed) she was told that “the reason why your son is getting
threats is because it's payback,” that Riley was a “criminal,”
and that he would have to “pay for protection.” Id., at 208.
Riley also explained that he could not evade these threats
by moving elsewhere in Jamaica. As a deportee with a
criminal record, Riley would be required under Jamaican law
to register his address upon his return, meaning he would
be easily located.
Along with his CAT application for deferral of his removal
to Jamaica, Riley submitted letters from his mother, sister,
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brother, and stepfather corroborating his testimony. See
i
d., at 280–289. Riley also submitted Spencer's death cer-
tifcate, which lists “multiple gunshot wounds” as the cause
of death. Id., at 292.
The Immigration Judge found Riley's testimony credible,
concluded that he was more likely than not to face torture
or death upon his return to Jamaica, and granted CAT defer-
ral of removal.
C
The Department of Homeland Security appealed the Immi-
gration Judge's deferral order to the Board of Immigration
Appeals. The Board discerned “no clear error in the Immi-
grati on Judge's credibility deter minati on. ” 1 App. 47.
Nevertheless, it concluded that Riley's claim was “based on
the stringing together of a series of suppositions.” Id., at
50. Accordingly, the Board once again ordered Riley re-
moved to Jamaica. The Board fled its order on May 31,
2022, 16 months after the frst administrative removal order.
Three days after the Board denied relief, Riley petitioned
the Fourth Circuit for review.
On its own motion, the Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley's
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court recognized that an
order “denying CAT relief is reviewable `as part of the re-
view of a fnal order of removal.' ” Riley v. Garland, 2024
WL 1826979, *2 (Apr. 26, 2024) (per curiam) (quoting Nas-
rallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. 573, 582 (2020)). By statute, noncit-
izens must fle their “petition[s] for review” of such fnal re-
moval orders “not later than 30 days,” 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(1),
a deadline the Fourth Circuit believed to be “ `jurisdictional
and . . . not subject to equitable tolling,' ” 2024 WL 1826979,
*1. The court concluded this 30-day window began to run
on the date the original order of removal issued in January
2021, regardless of whether the associated CAT proceedings
had concluded. By that logic, Riley would have been re-
quired to fle his appeal of both the January 2021 fnal order
of removal and the Board's May 2022 order denying CAT
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relief in February of 2021. Because he did not, the Fourth
Circuit
dismissed the appeal. Ibid.
II
Should Riley have appealed the Board's order denying de-
ferral of removal before the Board issued it? The answer
ought to be easy. Yet the majority today renders the stat-
ute incoherent, holding that Riley should have appealed the
order one year and three months before the Board entered it.
According to the majority, “statutory text and our prior
precedents” require this absurd result. Ante, at 272. Our
Nation's immigration laws may be complex, but the irrational
scheme the Court endorses today is a product entirely of its
own creation. Statutory text and precedent overwhelm-
ingly confrm what common sense tells us: Riley's appeal
was timely.
A
Although the majority purports to be bound by the stat-
ute, its cursory analysis elides all but one of the relevant
provisions. Ante, at 267. Background on the statutory
scheme is accordingly necessary to understanding why the
question in this case arises.
Early versions of the Immigration and Nationality Act
granted the courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to review
“all fnal orders of deportation,” Act of Sept. 26, 1961, § 5(a),
75 Stat. 651, an undefned term this Court interpreted to
include “order[s] denying suspension of deportation,” Foti v.
INS, 375 U. S. 217, 222 (1963). Under that framework, a
noncitizen who received an order denying relief from re-
moval (such as the Board's order denying Riley's CAT claim)
could have appealed it as a standalone order of deportation,
regardless of whether a prior order had resolved the issue
of removability. Cf. Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U. S. 206,
211 (1968) (allowing separate petitions for review of “denials
of discretionary relief ” following an initial removal order).
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A number of amendments intended to streamline the
i
mmigration laws changed that analysis. See Kolov v.
Garland, 78 F. 4th 911, 922–924 (CA6 2023) (Murphy, J.,
concurring) (describing these developments). Specifcally,
Congress “ `consol idate[d] judicia l rev iew of i mmigra-
tion proceedings into one action in the court of appeals.' ”
Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221, 230 (2020) (quot-
ing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 313 (2001)). It did so by
enacting the so-called zipper clause, ibid., which channels ju-
dicial review of all claims “arising from any action taken or
proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United
States” into a single appeal: the appeal of a “fnal order [of
removal],” 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(9); see also § 1252(a)(1). The
zipper clause does not change the substance of what nonciti-
zens may appeal. Monsalvo Velázquez v. Bondi, 604 U. S.
712, 724, and n. 1 (2025). Rather, it ensures that “a nonciti-
zen's various challenges arising from the removal proceed-
ing ” are “ `consolidated in a petition for review and consid-
ered by the courts of appeals.' ” Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at
580.
“Importantly,” the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restruc-
turing Act of 1998 expressly “provides for judicial review of
CAT claims.” Id., at 580. Thus, noncitizens (including
those whose opportunities for judicial review are otherwise
limited on account of criminal convictions) can obtain judicial
review of orders denying CAT relief. Id., at 580–581. Be-
cause such challenges “aris[e]” out of the removal proceed-
i ngs, however, the zipper clause appl ies to them.
§ 1252(b)(9). And the zipper clause would not achieve its
goal, of “[c]onsolidat[ing]” the relevant appeals, ibid., if non-
citizens had to appeal each issue separately. That is why, as
the Act directs, “a petition for review fled with an appro-
priate court of appeals in accordance with” the statute gov-
erning fnal orders of removal “shall be the sole and exclusive
means for judicial review of any cause or claim under the
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[CAT].” § 1252(a)(4). A petition for review under § 1252, in
tur
n, “must be fled not later than 30 days after the date of
the fnal order of removal.” § 1252(b)(1).
All this explains why, though Riley seeks to appeal the
denial of CAT relief and not the fnding that he is removable,
the appellate deadline in his case nonetheless depends on
identifying the “order of removal” and determining when it
became “fnal.” Ibid.
An “order of removal” is the same as an “ `order of depor-
tation.' ” Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 579, 584. Along with the
other 1990s amendments, Congress enacted a statutory
defnition of that term, defning it as the order “conclud-
ing that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.”
§ 1101(a)(47)(A). Subsequently, this Court held that a CAT
order “is not itself a fnal order of removal” as defned in the
statute. Id., at 582. In light of that holding, the majority
correctly identifes the relevant “order of removal” as the
January 2021 administrative order holding Riley removable.
The only question, then, is when that order became fnal
for purposes of the 30-day appeal window.
B
Riley's order of removal did not became fnal, for purposes
of appeal, until the Board issued its order denying CAT
relief. Congress expressly provided for judicial review
of “any cause or claim” under CAT. § 1252(a)(4). Self-
evidently, such review “cannot take place until the [Board]
has denied . . . relief.” Ante, at 271. Meanwhile, Congress
directed that CAT orders must be appealed alongside the
underlying order of removal. The only way to adhere to
both instructions is to hold that removal orders do not be-
come fnal until withholding-only proceedings are complete.
Centuries of precedent on fnality confrm that conclusion.
1
Immigration laws defne fnality, but only with respect to
orders of removal subject to direct Board review. Congress
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provided that orders of removal “shall become fnal upon the
ear
lier of . . . (i) a determination by the Board of Immigration
Appeals affrming such order; or (ii) the expiration of
the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of
such order by the Board of Immigrati on Appea ls. ”
§ 1101(a)(47)(B). Sensibly, then, the statute ties fnality to
the close of the relevant agency proceedings.
In the mine run of cases, an immigration judge hears
claims about removability together with claims about protec-
tion from or deferral of removal (such as CAT claims) in a
single proceeding, which ends in a consolidated appeal to the
Board. The fnality provision makes clear that, in those
cases, the underlying removal order becomes fnal once the
Board has concluded its review.
Expedited removal orders like the one issued in Riley's
case, however, are not subject to Board review at all.
§ 1228(b). Rather, a noncitizen subject to expedited removal
can appeal only a withholding claim to the Board, and not
the removal order itself. By its plain terms, the statute's
fnality provision does not apply to such removal orders.
That is because, in such cases, there will never be “a determi-
nation by the Board” affrming the removal order, nor is
there any “period in which the alien is permitted to seek
review” of it. § 1101(a)(47)(B). Thus, the statutory defni-
tion alone does not resolve this case.
The majority claims the statutory defnition renders the
order of removal fnal immediately upon its issuance. That
is so, the majority says, because when a removal order is not
appealable, “the period to seek review [of it] `expir[es]' as
soon as the [order] is issued.” Ante, at 267. In other
words, the majority treats a nonexistent appeals period as if
it were merely an infnitesimally short period, one so short
as to “expir[e]” instantaneously.
That makes no sense. “Expiration,” after all, means the
“conclusion [or] termination of a limited time.” See Web-
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290 RILEY
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Black's Law Dictionary 579 (6th ed. 1990) (“Cessation; termi-
nati
on from mere lapse of time, as the expiration date of a
lease, insurance policy, statute, and the like”); Black's Law
Dictionary 722 (12th ed. 2024) (“The ending of a fxed period
of time”). A period of time cannot “expire” if it never be-
gins in the frst place. For example, a statute fning those
who apply for a driver's license after “the expiration of the
period” for which they hold the license plainly would not
apply to a frst-time applicant. As to that applicant, there
is no “period” (much less a limited or fxed one) that could
“expir[e].” 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)(ii). So too here.
The majority gives no argument for reaching the opposite
conclusion. It stands alone, moreover, in asserting that a
“straightforward reading of the statutory text” resolves this
case. Ante, at 267. Even the courts of appeals that have
attempted to defend the majority's position admit that “[t]he
defnition of fnality in § 1101(a)(47)(B) does not squarely
apply” to expedited orders of removal because noncitizens
“may not appeal [those] decision[s] to the BIA (or even to an
immigration judge).” Bhaktibhai-Patel v. Garland, 32 F.
4th 180, 192 (CA2 2022); Martinez v. Garland, 86 F. 4th 561,
568 (CA4 2023) (“An alien cannot appeal an immigration off-
cer's reinstatement decision to the Board, so at frst blush
this defnition appears inapposite”).
2
Absent an unambiguous answer in the statute's defnition
of fnality, the Court should turn to tools of statutory con-
struction: the “ `ordinary or natural' meaning ” of the term
“fnal,” Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1, 9 (2004), “ ` “the legal
tradition and meaning of centuries of practice” ' ” associated
with fnality, Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U. S. 192, 200 (2025), and
the relevant provisions' “ `place in the overall statutory
scheme,' ” West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 721 (2022).
Beginning with the ordinary meaning of “fnal,” this Court
has previously recognized that term “clearly denotes some
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kind of terminal event.” Smith v. Berryhill, 587 U. S. 471,
4
79 (2019). Thus, an order becomes “fi na l” when it
“ `leav[es] nothing to be looked for or expected,' ” when it
“ `leav[es] no further chance for action, discussion, or
change.' ” Ibid., and n. 8 (quoting 5 Oxford English Diction-
ary 920 (2d ed. 1989) and Webster's New World College Dic-
tionary 542 (5th ed. 2016)).
Of course, an order can be terminal in one sense and not
another. Consider a conviction. Once a jury delivers, and
the court enters, a guilty verdict, nothing remains “to be
looked for or expected” from that court with respect to the
conviction. In that sense, a conviction is as fnal as its gets.
Nevertheless, “appellate review” is prohibited “until convic-
tion and imposition of sentence.” Flanagan v. United
States, 465 U. S. 259, 263 (1984). So for purposes of appeal,
a conviction remains nonfnal until sentencing is complete as
well. Yet another rule of fnality applies to the availability
of collateral review. See Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U. S.
113, 119 (2009) (noting that, under 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(1)(A),
a state-court conviction is not fnal for purposes of federal
collateral review until the end of direct review or of the time
for seeking such review).
This multiplicity of fnality rules makes clear that it is not
enough to muse about fnality in the abstract. Rather, the
Court must focus on the specifc sense of fnality relevant
here, which (all agree) is fnality for purposes of appeal. Be-
cause “ `[f]inality as a condition of review is an historic char-
acteristic of federal appellate procedure,' ” Flanagan, 465
U. S., at 263, centuries of precedent and practice inform
that analysis.
As a general matter, an order is fnal for purposes of ap-
peal “when the district court disassociates itself from the
case, leaving nothing to be done at the court of frst instance
save execution of the judgment.” Clay v. United States, 537
U. S. 522, 527 (2003). That understanding of fnality serves
one central purpose: preventing piecemeal litigation. As
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this Court put it long ago, “[f]rom the very foundation of our
judicia
l system,” rules of fnality have ensured that “the
whole case and every matter in controversy in it” is “decided
in a single appeal.” McLish v. Roff, 141 U. S. 661, 665–666
(1891). That is why this Court's fnality jurisprudence is
grounded “not in merely technical conceptions of `fnality,' ”
but rather in the policy “against piecemeal litigation.” Cat-
lin v. United States, 324 U. S. 229, 233–234 (1945).
The reason for that focus is simple: The only way to ensure
that orders are appealed together is to have them become
fnal together as well. Otherwise, an expiring deadline on
an earlier order (say, a conviction) would force individuals to
appeal that order before the remaining issues in the case
(say, a criminal sentence) have been resolved. So when two
orders must be consolidated into the same appeal, it follows
i nescapably that they become fi na l together, as wel l.
Whether a ruling is fnal for purposes of appeal therefore
depends principally on whether that ruling can, consistent
with the policy against piecemeal review, be appealed inde-
pendently. See Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379
U. S. 148, 152–153 (1964) (collecting cases).
An example illustrates the point. Sometimes, a dispute
over an award of attorney's fees follows the conclusion of
litigation on the merits. At present, “[t]here is no question
that awards of attorney's fees may be appealed separately as
fnal orders after a fnal determination of liability on the mer-
its.” García-Goyco v. Law Environmental Consultants,
Inc., 428 F. 3d 14, 18 (CA1 2005). Thus, for example, when
a party loses a civil case at trial, it may appeal the jury
verdict before the fee litigation has concluded. See Sprague
v. Ticonic Nat. Bank, 307 U. S. 161, 168–169 (1939). Be-
cause separate appeals are permitted, the fnality of the mer-
its judgment does not depend on the status of the attorney's
fees dispute.
Suppose, now, that Congress passed a law providing that
an appeal from fnal judgment “shall be the sole and exclu-
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sive means for judicial review of ” an order awarding attor-
ney'
s fees. Cf. 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(4). That law should have
the effect of overruling the courts' present assessment that
such orders are best appealed separately. Courts would un-
doubtedly recognize that merits judgments could no longer
become fnal while fee litigation remained pending, because
a statute now directs otherwise. The perceived need for
separate appealability was, after all, the basis for the prior
fnality rule. Keeping the old fnality rule in place in the
face of the hypothetical statute, moreover, would force liti-
gants to choose between appealing the merits judgment on
time, thus forgoing their appeal of any eventual fee award,
or fling their only appeal late. No court would adopt such
a scheme.
Yet that is precisely what the Court does today with re-
spect to appeals from CAT orders. Recall that withholding-
only decisions (which now include CAT orders) once were
independently appealable as orders of deportation. See
supra, at 286. Congress then enacted § 1252(a)(4), which
says that “a petition for review” under the section governing
fnal orders of removal “shall be the sole and exclusive means
for judicial review of any cause or claim under the [CAT].”
In other words, Congress directed that appeals from orders
of removal and CAT orders be “ `consolidated in a [single]
petition for review.' ” Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 580. That
should only mean one thing. Because a statute ties appeals
of the CAT order to appeals of the removal order, their fnal-
ity should be tied together, too. Accordingly, the order of
removal in this case should become fnal, for purposes of ap-
peal, only after the Board issued its order denying CAT
relief.
3
That the majority nonetheless adopts the opposite posi-
tion, contrary to every one of this Court's fnality precedents,
might suggest there is reason to doubt that CAT orders are
appealable at all. Yet statutory text and this Court's prece-
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dent are crystal clear on this point: Congress provided for
judicia
l review of CAT claims.
Section 1252(a)(4) provides that “a petition for review”
under that section “shall be the sole and exclusive means for
judicial review of any cause or claim under the [CAT].” No
“exclusive means” for review would be possible if review
were unavailable. That is why this Court held in Nasrallah
that “a noncitizen may obtain judicial review of . . . CAT
orders,” 590 U. S., at 583, even as the dissent complained that
the Court wrongly “view[ed] § 1252(a)(4) as a specifc grant
of jurisdiction over CAT claims.” Id., at 591 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
Perhaps the idea is that noncitizens may seek judicial re-
view of their CAT claims only if, by luck or happenstance,
they also have a challenge to the underlying order of re-
moval. The majority's fnality rule, however, prevents CAT
appeals even under those circumstances. After all, courts
will likely fnish reviewing the removal order before the
Board ever hears the associated CAT clai m. Sec ti on
1252(a)(4) also does not direct courts to limit review of CAT
claims in this way; it simply requires that review of the two
kinds of orders be consolidated. Nor would this reading
make any sense. Consider its effect on the attorney's fees
hypothetical, where that reading would mean litigants could
appeal a fee award only if, by luck or happenstance, they
also had a meritorious challenge to the unrelated merits
judgment.
Importantly, this Court rejected a nearly identical argu-
ment about § 1252 just months ago. In Monsalvo Velázquez,
the Government argued that noncitizens seeking judicial re-
view of questions arising out of their orders of removal could
do so only by challenging their removability. 604 U. S., at
721–722; see also id., at 760 (Barrett, J., dissenting) (“[J]u-
dicial review is available under § 1252(a)(1) only if there is
a challenge to a `fnal order of removal' ”). This Court
held that, “[i]nstead, § 1252 authorizes courts to review `fnal

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order[s] of removal' and address `questions of law . . . arising
from'
them.” Id., at 722 (quoting §§ 1252(a)(1), (b)(9); em-
phasis added). Nasrallah, the zipper clause, and § 1252(a)(4)
each make clear that questions about one's eligibility for CAT
relief are questions “arising from” the order of removal.
Thus, “§ 1252 authorizes courts to review” such questions.
604 U. S., at 722.
Under the “ `well-settled' and `strong presumption' ” favor-
ing judicial review, “when a statutory provision `is reason-
ably susceptible to divergent interpretation, we adopt the
reading that accords with traditional understandings and
basic principles: that executive determinations generally are
subject to judicial review.' ” Guerrero-Lasprilla, 589 U. S.,
at 229. “The presumption can only be overcome by `clear
and convincing evidence' of congressional intent to preclude
judicial review.” Ibid.; see also Bowen v. Michigan Acad-
emy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, 670 (1986) (“ `[J]u-
dicial review of a fnal agency action by an aggrieved person
will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe
that such was the purpose of Congress' ” (quoting Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140 (1967))). It is
hard to imagine any plausible reading of § 1252(a)(4) on
which it cuts off judicial review of CAT claims (either com-
pletely or in the arbitrary sense rejected in Monsalvo Veláz-
quez), much less a “ `clear and convincing ' ” one. Guerrero-
Lasprilla, 589 U. S., at 229; see also Parrish v. United
States, 605 U. S. 376, 384 (2025) (reiterating this Court's con-
sistent holdings “that `decisions on the merits' ought not be
`avoided on the basis of . . . mere technicalities' ” (quoting
Foman v. Davis, 371 U. S. 178, 181 (1962))).
The majority, perhaps aware of precedent's constrains,
does not dispute any of this. It acknowledges, as it must,
that CAT claims are reviewable. Ante, at 271–272. Yet
once the majority accepts that premise, it is left with no way
to justify its construction of the judicial-review provision as
requiring petitions for review to be fled well before the rele-
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vant CAT orders are issued. If judicial review is available,
then
it must be available after the relevant order is issued
and not before. And if review is available after the relevant
orders issue, then there is no conceivable reason to require
applicants to fle their petitions beforehand.
III
A
Besides its half hearted attempt to invoke the inapplicable
statutory defnition, the majority offers a single thought
about the dispositive issue of fnality. The original order, it
says, “was . . . the Executive's fnal determination on the
question of removal,” so it “constituted `the fnal order of
removal' in this case.” Ante, at 267. The implication is
that, because this order was a “fnal determination,” ibid.,
it became fnal the moment it was issued.
This argument confates two different questions: when the
agency made its fnal decision on the question of removabil-
ity, and when the “order of removal” became fnal for appel-
late purposes. This Court explained just months ago that
“a fnding of `removability' ” is only “one term in a fnal order
of removal.” Monsalvo Velázquez, 604 U. S., at 722. That
the agency's removability fnding is fnal therefore does not
mean that the order containing it is fnal for purposes of
appeal.
The majority's skewed reasoning betrays a fundamental
misunderstanding of the fnal-judgment principle. Every in-
terlocutory order fnally determines the limited question it
decides, but of course that does not mean every order be-
comes instantly fnal for purposes of appeal. When a dis-
trict court declines to certify an expert witness, that is its
fnal word on the matter, yet the order remains nonfnal for
purposes of appeal until the entire case has been litigated
to judgment. When a district court disqualifes a litigant's
counsel, that order is the court's “fnal determination on the
question” of disqualifcation, ante, at 267; counsel could not
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show up to trial again the next day. Yet the order remains
nonf
nal for purposes of appeal until the underlying case is
over. See Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U. S. 424,
430 (1985); Flanagan, 465 U. S., at 263. Few decisions,
moreover, are more fnal than a guilty verdict, yet a convic-
tion remains nonfnal for purposes of appeal until the district
court has pronounced a sentence. See supra, at 291.
In failing to recognize as much, the majority breaks with
basic principles of fnality and appellate review, holding
(seemingly for the frst time) that two orders that statutorily
must be appealed together nonetheless do not become fnal
together. Inexplicably, the majority admits that “review of
removability and withholding of removal should occur in a
single appellate proceeding,” and that “review of the denial
of CAT relief cannot take place until the [Board] has denied
such relief.” Ante, at 271. Yet it refuses to accept the inev-
itable conclusion: If the orders must be reviewed “in a single
appellate proceeding,” ibid., then they become fnal for pur-
poses of appeal together as well. The result: Noncitizens
facing expedited removal will be forced to fle immediate ap-
peals of their removal orders in every case, simply to protect
their right to judicial review in the event they lose their on-
going withholding-only proceedings.
Across a wide variety of statutory contexts, courts have
recognized that protective appeals are “procedural hoops”
that “serve no function.” West Penn Power Co. v. EPA, 860
F. 2d 581, 585, 586 (CA3 1988) (explaining, in Clean Air Act
case, the need “to avoid a de facto requirement of protective
appeals”); Outland v. CAB, 284 F. 2d 224, 227–228 (CADC
1960) (declining to read the Administrative Procedure Act to
require protective appeals while reconsideration is pending);
Newark, New Castle and Seaford, Del. v. FERC, 763 F. 2d
533, 544–545 (CA3 1985) (same, in Federal Power Act case);
Rosler v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 241, 245–246 (1991) (ex-
plaining, in Veterans' Judicial Review Act case, that reading
protective appeal requirement into statute “would . . . pose
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a substantial administrative problem” and cause “many”
clai
mants to “lose their right to judicial review”). Protec-
tive appeal requirements “set a trap for the unwary, who, if
they are not intimately familiar with the intricacies of the
fnality doctrine, may inadvertently lose their right to judi-
cial review.” West Penn Power Co., 860 F. 2d, at 585.
For that reason, too, this Court has rejected statutory
readings that would result in similar protective-appeal re-
quirements, even in the face of seemingly contrary textual
commands. Consider § 704 of the Administrative Procedure
Act, which provides: “Except as otherwise expressly re-
quired by statute, agency action otherwise fnal is fnal for
purposes of this section whether or not there has been pre-
sented or determined an application . . . for any form of re-
consideration.” 5 U. S. C. § 704. Taken literally, “[t]his
would seem to mean that the pendency of reconsideration
motions does not render [agency] orders nonfnal for pur-
poses of triggering the Hobbs Act limitations period.” ICC
v. Locomotive Engineers, 482 U. S. 270, 284 (1987). Yet
“[t]hat language has long been construed by this and other
courts merely to relieve parties from the requirement of pe-
titioning for rehearing before seeking judicial review . . . but
not to prevent petitions for reconsideration that are actually
fled from rendering the orders under reconsideration nonf-
nal.” Id., at 284–285; see also American Farm Lines v.
Black Ball Freight Service, 397 U. S. 532, 541 (1970). By
contrast, in Stone v. INS, 514 U. S. 386 (1995), we held that
motions to reopen orders of removal did not render nonfnal
the underlying removal order, precisely because petitioners
“[c]ould fle a separate petition to review that second fnal
[reconsideration] order.” Id., at 395.
More recently, this Court has twice refused to read a
protective-appea l requirement into § 1252. In San tos-
Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U. S. 411 (2023), the Government
advanced a reading of that section that would “food the
Board with reconsideration motions that noncitizens other-
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wise would not fle” and “food the courts with pointless pre-
mature
petitions,” fled simply to preserve the right to
review. Id., at 429. This Court declined to “render the
statutory scheme incoherent” in that way. Id., at 428. And
earlier this year, the Government argued that, under the zip-
per clause, noncitizens could challenge the terms of their
removal order only if they “press[ed] a challenge to [the]
fnding of `removability.' ” Monsalvo Velázquez, 604 U. S.,
at 722. This Court rejected that argument, too, noting it
would have put noncitizens to the choice of “either adorn-
[ing] their judicial petitions with a pointless challenge . . .
or forfeit[ing] the right to review altogether.” Ibid. Mere
months later the Court seems to have forgotten all these
lessons.
B
The Court overlooks Santos-Zacaria, Monsalvo Veláz-
quez, and the wealth of precedent on fnality, claiming in-
stead that two other cases are “instructive” and require a
different outcome here. Ante, at 268. Neither case sup-
ports the majority's conclusion.
First, the majority points to Nasrallah's holding that “a
CAT order is not a fnal order of removal,” does not disturb
or affect the validity of a fnal order of removal, and does not
merge into such an order. Ante, at 268. The majority does
not explain, however, why this holding supports its conclu-
sion. An order need not “ `affect the validity' ” of a decision
(or merge into it) to impact its fnality for purposes of appeal.
Ibid. As noted, a sentence does not affect the validity of a
conviction (and the two do not “merge”), yet a conviction
cannot be fnal for purposes of appeal until the sentence is
fnal as well. Notably, Nasrallah itself compared the rela-
tionship between removal and CAT orders to that between
a criminal conviction and sentence. 590 U. S., at 583. Nas-
rallah is therefore hardly dispositive here.
In any event, it should be clear by now that the majority's
discussion of Nasrallah misses the point. Whether CAT or-
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300 RILEY
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting in part
ders disturb or affect the substance of removal orders would
cer
tainly be relevant if the Court conducted its fnality anal-
ysis without guidance from Congress, as it did in the case of
fee awards. See Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527, 531
(1882) (fee orders are “so far independent” of the merits “as
to make the decision substantially a fnal decree for the pur-
poses of an appeal”). But here, Congress dictated that the
two orders must be consolidated for purposes of appeal. 8
U. S. C. § 1252(a)(4). The Court is required to respect that
decision and move on.
The majority next points to Johnson v. Guzman Chavez,
594 U. S. 523 (2021), as supporting its conclusion. Ante, at
269. That case concerned the 90-day removal period follow-
ing an order of removal, during which the Government is
required to detain noncitizens. See § 1231(a)(2). The point
of such detention is to provide the Government with a rea-
sonable period of time to “secure [the noncitizen's] removal.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678, 699 (2001). The removal
period does not begin, Congress has specifed, until the re-
moval order is “administratively fnal.” § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i).
The question was whether ongoing withholding-only pro-
ceedings prevented a removal order from being administra-
tively fnal for purposes of the mandatory detention period.
This Court held that the administrative fnality of an order
of removal “does not depend in any way on the outcome of
the withholding-only proceedings.” Guzman Chavez, 594
U. S., at 539. Thus, the detention period begins after the
agency has fnalized its removability fnding, not after fur-
ther proceedings over the specifc country of removal have
concluded. Id., at 534–535. Yet whether an order is “ad-
ministratively fnal” for purposes of detention and whether
it is “fnal” for purposes of appeal are two entirely different
questions. “Finality is variously defned; like many legal
terms, its precise meaning depends on context.” Clay, 537
U. S., at 527. That is why this Court recognized in Guzman

Cite
as: 606 U. S. 259 (2025)
301
Sotomayor, J., dissenting in part
Chavez that § 1252 “uses different language than § 1231 and
relates
to judicial review of removal orders rather than de-
tention.” 594 U. S., at 535, n. 6. The Court thus “ex-
press[ed] no view on” the question of fnality for purposes of
appeal. Ibid.
Nor is it at all surprising that “administratively fnal” in
§ 1231 and “fnal” in § 1252 should have different meanings.
“In a given statute, the same term usually has the same
meaning and different terms usually have different mean-
ings.” Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U. S. 124, 149 (2024).
Because the point of detention is to ensure that a noncitizen
does not fee pending his deportation, moreover, arguably all
that matters for purposes of the detention statute is that the
noncitizen is removable from the United States, not whether
he is removable to any particular country. Guzman Chavez,
594 U. S., at 536, 539. There is “no reason to import the
understanding of fnality that applies” to detention into the
separate “feld” of appellate review. Waetzig v. Halliburton
Energy Services, Inc., 604 U. S. 305, 315 (2025) (majority
opinion of Alito, J.) (discussing the different “role[s]” of f-
nality across contexts). Indeed, precisely the same two
senses of fnality apply to criminal convictions. A conviction
becomes fnal for purposes of presentencing detention once
the jury has delivered its verdict. 18 U. S. C. § 3143(a). Yet
it does not become fnal for purposes of appeal until the dis-
trict court has imposed a sentence.
The majority claims to “appreciate th[e] difference” be-
tween the two sorts of fnality. Ante, at 271. But, the ma-
jority explains, “the meaning of fnality” is not “necessarily”
different, even when Congress uses different words to serve
different purposes. Ibid. That truism hardly helps. The
majority gives up shortly afterward, simply asserting by
ipse dixit that the differences do not matter here. In light
of 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(4) and our fnality precedents, they
clearly should.
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IV
T
oday's holding deals untold damage to basic principles of
fnality and judicial review. Time will tell whether the
Court will extend its illogic beyond politically disfavored
noncitizens. Cf. McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc.
v. McKesson Corp., 604 U. S. 146, 158, n. 5 (2025) (recognizing
“unfairness . . . potentially ris[ing] to the level of a constitu-
tional due process problem,” of rule that would require regu-
lated businesses to seek judicial review before the applicabil-
ity of an agency order to them was “reasonably foreseeable”).
As it stands, the chaos the majority causes to our system
of immigration appeals is considerable. The effects on non-
citizens subject to expedited removal proceedings should by
now be clear enough. The majority suggests a number of
workarounds for that chaos, including by allowing protective
appeals and notice about the need to fle such appeals long
before CAT proceedings have concluded. See ante, at 271–
272. To be clear, the Government is obligated by the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause to provide noncitizens
with adequate notice about the need for an immediate appeal
to preserve the right to judicial review of CAT claims. See
A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 605 U. S. 91, 94 (2025) (per curiam)
(“ `[T]he Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of
law in the context of removal proceedings' ” (quoting Trump
v. J. G. G., 604 U. S. 670, 673 (2025) (per curiam); altera-
tion in original)). That guarantee includes “notice that is
`reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,' ” to
enable “ `interested parties' ” to “pursue appropriate relief.”
A. A. R. P., 605 U. S., at 94–95 (quoting Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314 (1950)). So
too, courts of appeals should not arbitrarily decline to hold
in abeyance any premature appeals of yet-to-be-decided
withholding claims. See ante, at 271–272.
In addition, the courts of appeals should consider applying
standard principles of equitable tolling, which are likely
avai lable now that the Cour t has recog ni zed that
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as: 606 U. S. 259 (2025)
303
Sotomayor, J., dissenting in part
§ 1252(b)(1)'s appeal deadline is not jurisdictional. See ante,
at
272–277.
Today's decision may have consequences beyond expedited
removal proceedings, too. Recall that, in the typical case,
an immigration judge decides all questions related to both
removal and withholding in the same proceeding. See
supra, at 289. The Board of Immigration Appeals then re-
views all aspects of the immigration judge's decision. As
things stand today, the noncitizen may petition for review of
the Board's decision once agency review has completed. See
ibid.; § 1101(a)(47)(B). Yet what if the Board affrms “an im-
migration judge's removability fnding but remand[s] for fur-
ther consideration of withholding claims”? Kolov, 78 F. 4th,
at 927 (Murphy, J., concurring). Would the majority hold as
well that such fndings become fnal before the remand is
concluded, requiring noncitizens to fle premature protective
appeals whenever a CAT claim is remanded? As with so
much else, the majority does not say. To avoid further
chaos, the Board would be well counseled to remand cases in
their entirety.
Finally, lest one think today's decision will at least allow
the Government to conduct its immigration policies more
cheaply or effciently, even that is not the case. It is not by
accident that the Government, across the past and present
administration, stands frmly with Riley here, even as it
rarely fails to press colorable jurisdictional objections. See
D i amo nd Al te r n a t i v e Ene rgy, LLC v. EPA, 606 U. S.
100, 108 (2025). As the Government knows, “[a] whole train
of unnecessary consequences” follows from requiring nonciti-
zens to appeal in every expedited removal case, simply to
protect their eventual right to appeal future withholding-
only decisions. Outland, 284 F. 2d, at 228. In each of these
unnecessary appeals, “the Board and other parties may be
called upon to respond and oppose the motion for review;
when the Board acts, the petition for review must be
amended to bring the petition up to date,” or dismissed if

304 RILEY
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting in part
the Board grants the noncitizen's CAT claim. Ibid. All the
wh
ile, courts must manage countless cases that otherwise
might never have been opened. The Government recog-
nizes all these consequences. Brief for Respondent 36–38.
This Court is blind to them. Today's decision is the rare
holding that benefts no one.
***
Not long ago, this Court described delays in regulatory
approvals of construction projects as “ `borde[ring] on the
Kafkaesque.' ” Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v.
Eagle County, 605 U. S. 168, 184 (2025). In holding that
Riley was required to fle his appeal 16 months before the
order he sought to challenge existed, the Court surely moves
from the border well into the heartland of illogic and absur-
dity. Respectfully, I dissent.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
p. 266, line 8: “Argueta-Herandez” is changed to “Argueta-Hernandez”
p. 272, line 18: “the” is inserted before “Government”
p. 290, line 24: “the” is changed to “this”