Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Davis

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 605 U. S. Part 1
Pages 327–334
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 5, 2025
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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OCTOBER
TERM, 2024
327
Syllabus
LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA
H
OLDINGS, dba LABCORP v. DAVIS et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 24–304. Argued April 29, 2025—Decided June 5, 2025
Certiorari dismissed. Reported below: 2024 WL 489288 (Feb. 8, 2024)
Noel J. Francisco argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs was Madeline W. Clark.
Sopan Joshi argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae in support of neither party. With him on the
brief were Acting Solicitor General Harris, Deputy Assist-
ant Attorney General McArthur, Deputy Solicitor General
Kneedler, Charles W. Scarborough, and Jeffrey E. Sandberg.
Deepak Gupta argued the cause for respondents. With
him on the brief were Matthew W. H. Wessler, Jonathan E.
Taylor, Gregory A. Beck, and Jennifer D. Bennett.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Atlantic Legal
Foundation by Lawrence S. Ebner, Felix Shafr, and John F. Querio; for
the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by Brian
D. Schmalzbach, James C. Stansel, Melissa B. Kimmel, Jennifer B.
Dickey, and Jonathan D. Urick; for the Mortgage Bankers Association
et al. by William M. Jay, Keith Levenberg, and Matthew S. Sheldon; for
the National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal
Center, Inc., by Aram A. Gavoor; for the Product Liability Advisory
Council by Andrew J. Pincus, Archis A. Parasharami, Daniel E. Jones,
and Carmen N. Longoria-Green; for TechNet by Theodore J. Boutrous,
Jr., Theane D. Evangelis, Bradley J. Hamburger, Patrick J. Fuster, Matt
Aidan Getz, Prerak Shah, and Drew Hudson; and for the Washington
Legal Foundation by Cory L. Andrews. Briefs of amici curiae urging
affrmance were fled for AARP et al. by John Paul Schnapper-Casteras,
William A. Rivera, Louis Lopez, Rebecca Rodgers, and Jeffrey R. White;
for Civil Procedure Law Professors et al. by Hyland Hunt, Dana Kaers-
vang, Ruthanne M. Deutsch, and Steve W. Berman; and for Joseph Stiglitz
et al. by David C. Frederick and Derek C. Reinbold.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the City of Beverly Hills et al. by
Jeremy B. Rosen, Sheridan L. Caldwell, Justin R. Sarno, Shaun Dabby
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328 LABORA
TORY CORP. OF AMERICA HOLDINGS v. DAVIS
Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
Per Curiam.
T
he wr it of cer ti orar i is dismissed as i mprov idently
granted.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kavanaugh, dissenting.
The Court dismisses the case as improvidently granted
and therefore does not decide the questi on presented:
Whether a federal court may certify a damages class pursu-
ant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 when the class
includes both injured and uninjured class members.
The Court presumably dismisses the case because the
Court does not want to tackle the threshold mootness ques-
tion that plaintiffs have raised. In my view, however, plain-
tiffs' mootness argument is insubstantial. I would rule that
the case is not moot and wou ld decide the questi on
presented.
On the question presented, I would hold that a federal
court may not certify a damages class that includes both in-
jured and uninjured members. Rule 23 requires that com-
mon questions predominate in damages class actions. And
when a damages class includes both injured and uninjured
members, common questions do not predominate.
I
The facts are fairly straightforward. Labcorp provides
diagnostic laboratory services. In 2017, Labcorp introduced
self-service kiosks for patients to check in for their appoint-
Jacobs, and Kathleen A. Kenealy; for the American Antitrust Institute by
Randy Stutz; for Claims Administrators by Peter K. Stris, John Stokes,
and Tillman J. Breckenridge; for Federal Jurisdiction Scholars by Joseph
M. Sellers and Benjamin D. Brown; for Legal Historians and Scholars of
Representative Litigation by Daniel Woofter and Kevin K. Russell; for
the National Community Pharmacists Association by Joshua P. Davis; for
Lionel Harper et al. by Jamin S. Soderstrom; and for William B. Ruben-
stein et al. by William B. Rubenstein, pro se.
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Cite
as: 605 U. S. 303 (2025)
329
Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
ments. Although the touchscreen kiosks are accessible to
most
patients, blind and visually impaired patients require
assistance. To accommodate those patients who cannot use
a kiosk without assistance, or who prefer not to use one,
Labcorp maintained and bolstered its front-desk services at
patient service centers.
Despite those accommodations, legally blind plaintiffs sued
Labcorp in the U. S. District Court for the Central District
of California. As relevant here, they claimed that Labcorp's
new kiosks violated the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) and California's Unruh Civil Rights Act, which pro-
vides for a minimum of $4,000 in state-law statutory damages
per violation. See Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §§ 51(f ), 52(a) (West
2020). Plaintiffs sought to certify a class with potential
damages of up to about $500 million per year.
In May 2022, the District Court certifed a damages class
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The class con-
sisted of “[a]ll legally blind individuals in California who vis-
ited a LabCorp patient service center in California during
the applicable limitations period and were denied full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations due to LabCorp's failure to
make its e-check-in kiosks accessible to legally blind individ-
uals.” No. 2:20–cv–893 (CD Cal., May 23, 2022), ECF Doc.
97, p. 24.
Labcorp petitioned for an immediate interlocutory appeal
under the special interlocutory appellate procedure author-
ized by Rule 23(f ). Labcorp contended that plaintiffs' class
defnition was overbroad and would sweep in many unin-
jured members, including blind patients who would not
use kiosks anyway because they dislike kiosks or prefer to
speak with a front-desk employee when checking in for
appointments.
In August 2022, while Labcorp's petition for interlocutory
appeal was still pending in the Ninth Circuit, the District
Court clarified plaintiffs' class definition. The District
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330 LABORA
TORY CORP. OF AMERICA HOLDINGS v. DAVIS
Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
Court explained that the class included “[a]ll legally blind
i
ndividuals who . . . , due to their disability, were unable to
use” Labcorp kiosks in California. App. 387. Importantly,
the court stated that, “in refning the class defnition, this
Order does not materially alter the composition of the class
or materially change in any manner” the original May class
certifcation order. Id., at 386, n. 10.
In September 2022, the Ninth Circuit granted Labcorp's
Rule 23(f ) petition and authorized an interlocutory appeal of
the May order. After receiving briefng and hearing oral
argument, the Court of Appeals ultimately approved the
May 2022 class certifcation. Applying Ninth Circuit prece-
dent, the court reasoned that Rule 23 permits certifcation
of a class even when the class “ `potentially includes more
than a de minimis number of uninjured class members.' ”
Id., at 397, n. 1 (quoting Olean Wholesale Grocery Coopera-
tive, Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 31 F. 4th 651, 669 (2022)
(en banc)).
After the Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc, Labcorp
sought review in this Court. We granted certiorari to de-
cide whether federal courts may certify a Rule 23 damages
class that includes both injured and uninjured members.
604 U. S. 1101 (2025).
II
Instead of resolving that important merits question, the
Court dismisses this case as improvidently granted. That is
presumably because the Court does not want to deal with
plaintiffs' threshold mootness argument. To be clear, the
Court does not hold that the case is moot. Rather, the
Court simply declines to decide either the threshold moot-
ness question or the important class-action question on
which we granted certiorari. Unlike the Court, I would re-
solve those questions.
In arguing that the case is moot, plaintiffs contend that
Labcorp appealed the wrong class-certifcation order. That
is incorrect. Recall the sequence of events. In May 2022,
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Cite
as: 605 U. S. 303 (2025)
331
Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
the District Court certifed plaintiffs' damages class, and
Labcor
p then fled a Rule 23(f ) petition in order to challenge
that certifcation order in the Ninth Circuit. In August
2022, the District Court clarifed the class defnition. But in
the August order, the District Court stated that the order
did “not materially alter the composition of the class or mate-
rially change in any manner” the original May class certif-
cation order. App. 386, n. 10. The August order did not
purport to certify a new class.
The Ninth Circuit subsequently reviewed and ruled on the
May certifcation order. The Ninth Circuit did not treat
Labcorp's appeal of the May order as moot. In September
2022, after the District Court had issued the August order,
the Ninth Circuit authorized Labcorp's Rule 23(f ) interlocu-
tory appeal of the May order. The Ninth Circuit later
addressed the merits of Labcorp's appeal with respect to
the May order and ruled in plaintiffs' favor. In doing so,
the Ninth Circuit issued a judgment adverse to Labcorp,
and Labcorp properly sought certiorari to reverse that
judgment.
Still, plaintiffs seem to think that the May order was no
longer in effect and was superseded by the August order.
According to plaintiffs, Labcorp should have somehow ap-
pealed the August order. Under Ninth Circuit precedent,
however, Labcorp could not have appealed the August order
because only orders “that materially change the original
certifcation order” qualify as “appealable under Rule 23(f ).”
Walker v. Life Ins. Co. of Southwest, 953 F. 3d 624, 636 (2020)
(emphasis added). And the District Court had explicitly
stated that the August order did not make any material
changes. Moreover, under the text of Rule 23(f ), a party
may appeal only “an order granting or denying class-action
certifcation.” The August order did not grant or deny class
certifcation, as the District Court indicated.
So to challenge the class defnition under Ninth Circuit
law, Labcorp could appeal only the May 2022 certifcation
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332 LABORA
TORY CORP. OF AMERICA HOLDINGS v. DAVIS
Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
order. Labcorp did so. Labcorp has proceeded reasonably
i
n the District Court, the Court of Appeals, and this Court.
There is no barrier to this Court's deciding the class-action
question presented in the context of reviewing the Ninth
Circuit's judgment.
III
On the merits, I agree with Labcorp and the United States
as amicus curiae: Federal courts may not certify a damages
class under Rule 23 when, as here, the proposed class
includes both injured and uninjured class members.
Rule 23 and this Court's precedents make this a straight-
forward case. Rule 23 authorizes damages class certifca-
tion only when common questions of law and fact predomi-
nate. A damages class consisting of both injured and
uninjured members does not meet that requirement. As the
Government succinctly and correctly stated at oral argu-
ment, “if there are members of a class that aren't even in-
jured, they can't share the same injury with the other class
members.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 83; see generally Comcast Corp.
v. Behrend, 569 U. S. 27 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 564 U. S. 338 (2011); Amchem Products, Inc. v. Wind-
sor, 521 U. S. 591 (1997); General Telephone Co. of Southwest
v. Falcon, 457 U. S. 147 (1982).
The Ninth Circuit nonetheless approved plaintiffs' class.
Relying on Circuit precedent, the court concluded that Rule
23 permits certifcation even when the class “ `potentially in-
cludes more than a de minimis number of uninjured class
members.' ” App. 397, n. 1 (quoting Olean Wholesale Gro-
cery Cooperative, Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 31 F. 4th
651, 669 (2022) (en banc)).
1
1
Some courts have suggested that a “de minimis exception” might exist
when there is a de minimis number of uninjured class members, at least
so long as some identifed mechanism exists to manageably remove those
uninjured members from the class. In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge
Antitrust Litigation–MDL No. 1869, 934 F. 3d 619, 624 (CADC 2019); see
id., at 625–626; In re Asacol Antitrust Litigation, 907 F. 3d 42, 53–54
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as: 605 U. S. 303 (2025)
333
Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
The Ninth Circuit's decision is incorrect under Rule 23 and
th
is Court's precedents, and it will generate serious real-
world consequences. Classes that are overinfated with un-
injured members raise the stakes for businesses that are the
targets of class actions. Overbroad and incorrectly certifed
classes threaten massive liability—here, with potential dam-
ages up to about $500 million per year. That reality in turn
can coerce businesses into costly settlements that they some-
times must reluctantly swallow rather than betting the com-
pany on the uncertainties of trial. Indeed, the Advisory
Committee Notes to Rule 23(f ) warn: “An order granting cer-
tifcation . . . may force a defendant to settle rather than
incur the costs of defending a class action and run the risk
of potentially ruinous liability. ” Advisory Committee's
Notes on 1998 Amendments to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23, 28
U. S. C. App., p. 815 (1994 ed.); cf. Nutraceutical Corp. v.
Lambert, 586 U. S. 188, 196 (2019). That is one reason why
Rule 23(f )'s interlocutory appeal procedure was established
in 1998.
Importantly, the coerced settlements substantially raise
the costs of doing business. And companies in turn pass
on those costs to consumers in the form of higher prices; to
retirement account holders in the form of lower returns; and
to workers in the form of lower salaries and lesser benefts.
So overbroad and incorrectly certifed classes can ultimately
harm consumers, retirees, and workers, among others. Sim-
ply put, the consequences of overbroad and incorrectly certi-
fed damages class actions can be widespread and signifcant.
***
I would resolve the question presented and reverse the
judgment of the Ninth Circuit. I would hold that federal
(CA1 2018). This case does not raise that question because the Ninth
Circuit ruled that a class may be certifed even when the class “ `poten-
tially includes more than a de minimis number of uninjured class mem-
bers.' ” App. 397, n. 1 (emphasis added).
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334 LABORA
TORY CORP. OF AMERICA HOLDINGS v. DAVIS
Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
courts may not certify a damages class pursuant to Rule 23
when
the class includes both injured and uninjured class
members. I respectfully dissent from the Court's order dis-
missing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
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for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None