BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 605 U. S. Part 1
Pages 204–222
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OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 5, 2025
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
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204 OCTOBER
TERM, 2024
Syllabus
BLOM BANK SAL v. HONICKMAN et al.
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the second circuit
No. 23–1259. Argued March 3, 2025—Decided June 5, 2025
Plaintiffs, who are victims and families of victims of terrorist attacks car-
ried out by Hamas between 2001 and 2003, sued BLOM Bank SAL under
the Anti-Terrorism Act for allegedly aiding and abetting the attacks
by providing fnancial services to Hamas-affliated customers. BLOM
argued that the complaint failed to state a claim, and plaintiffs repeat-
edly affrmed they would not seek to amend their complaint if it were
dismissed. The District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice,
fnding that plaintiffs had not adequately alleged that BLOM had the
requisite general awareness for aiding-and-abetting liability. The court
denied leave to amend because plaintiffs had declined several opportuni-
ties to amend and failed to identify additional facts they could allege.
The Second Circuit affrmed the dismissal, fnding that even though the
District Court had applied too stringent a standard for the general
awareness element, plaintiffs' claims still failed under the correct stand-
ard. Following the affrmance, plaintiffs returned to the District Court
and moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) to vacate the
fnal judgment so that they could fle an amended complaint to meet
the Second Circuit's clarifed standard. The District Court denied the
motion, ruling that the Second Circuit's clarifcation did not constitute
the “extraordinary circumstances” required for Rule 60(b)(6) relief, and
that plaintiffs' prior deliberate choices not to amend counseled against
relief. On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that when a
party seeks Rule 60(b) relief to fle an amended complaint, district
courts must not apply Rule 60(b)(6)'s extraordinary circumstances
standard in isolation but must instead balance Rule 60(b)'s fnality prin-
ciples with Rule 15(a)'s liberal amendment policy.
Held: Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circumstances,
and this standard does not become less demanding when the movant
seeks to reopen a case to amend a complaint. A party must frst satisfy
Rule 60(b) before Rule 15(a)'s liberal amendment standard can apply.
Pp. 210–217.
(a) Rule 60(b)(6) is a catchall provision that provides relief from fnal
judgment for “any other reason that justifes relief ” beyond the specifc
grounds in Rules 60(b)(1)–(5). The text and structure of Rule 60(b)
make clear that this catchall provision is available only in narrow cir-

Cite
as: 605 U. S. 204 (2025)
205
Syllabus
cumstances. It covers grounds not already covered by the preceding
fve
paragraphs, and a broad interpretation would improperly circum-
vent the time limitations of those paragraphs. The Court has consist-
ently held that relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires “extraordinary cir-
cumstances,” as frst established in Klapprott v. United States, 335 U. S.
601, and reaffrmed in numerous subsequent decisions. This strict in-
terpretation is essential to preserve the fnality of judgments. See
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. 524, 535. Pp. 210–213.
(b) The Rule 60(b)(6) standard does not change when a party seeks
to reopen a case to amend a complaint. In that circumstance, satisfac-
tion of Rule 60(b)(6) necessarily precedes any application of Rule 15(a).
Cf. Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., 604 U. S. 305, 311.
Rules 60(b) and 15(a) apply at different stages of litigation and require
separate inquiries. Rule 15(a)(2)'s direction that courts “should freely
give leave when justice so requires” governs pretrial amendments, but
does not apply when a case is closed following fnal judgment. A party
seeking Rule 60(b)(6) relief must demonstrate extraordinary circum-
stances regardless of what they intend to do if the case is reopened.
The Second Circuit's “balancing ” approach is not consonant with Rule
60(b)(6) and this Court's precedents because it improperly dilutes Rule
60(b)(6)'s stringent standard. Pp. 213–214.
(c) Plaintiffs' arguments that the Second Circuit's approach is conso-
nant both with Rule 60(b)(6) and with this Court's precedents are unper-
suasive. Balancing the strict standards of Rule 60(b)(6) against the
more relaxed standards of Rule 15 necessarily weakens the former, and
is thus incompatible with this Court's long line of precedents holding
that Rule 60(b)(6) “should only be applied in `extraordinary circum-
stances.' ” Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U. S.
847, 864. Foman v. Davis, 371 U. S. 178, does not suggest otherwise.
Foman dealt with Rule 59(e), which does not threaten the fnality of
judgments to the same degree that Rule 60(b)(6) does. Thus, a Rule
59(e) movant is not required to show the same “extraordinary circum-
stances” to receive relief. See id., at 181–182. Pp. 215–216.
(d) The Second Circuit's disposition of this case was incorrect. District
courts' Rule 60(b) rulings are reviewed “only for abuse of discretion.”
Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections of Ill., 434 U. S. 257, 263, n. 7.
The District Court's determination that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate
any extraordinary circumstances warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(6)
both applied the correct legal standard and provided “substantial justi-
fcation” for its conclusion. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U. S.
384, 405. The District Court's justifcations for its decision align with
established Rule 60(b) doctrine that intervening legal develop-
ments rarely constitute extraordinary circumstances and that ex-
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206 BLOM
BANK SAL v. HONICKMAN
Opinion of the Court
traordinary circumstances must suggest the movant is faultless in the
delay
. Pp. 216–217.
Reversed and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett,
JJ., joined, and in which Jackson, J., joined as to all but Part III. Jack-
son, J., fled an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment,
post, p. 217.
Michael H. McGinley argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were Steven A. Engel, Tamer Mallat,
Brian A. Kulp, and Christopher J. Merken.
Michael Radine argued the cause for respondents. With
him on the brief were Gary M. Osen, Ari Ungar, and Dina
Gielchinsky.
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) permits a district
court to grant relief from a fnal judgment in limited circum-
stances. The Rule includes fve provisions setting out spe-
cifc grounds upon which parties may seek such relief. See
Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 60(b)(1)–(5). It also includes a catchall
provision that allows a district court to relieve a party from
a fnal judgment for “any other reason that justifes relief.”
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(6). We have consistently held
that only “extraordinary circumstances” can justify relief
under the Rule 60(b)(6) catchall. The question presented is
whether this rigorous standard applies when a Rule 60(b)(6)
movant seeks to reopen a case for the purpose of fling an
amended complaint. We hold that it does.
I
A
Plaintiffs (respondents here) are victims and the families
of victims of terrorist attacks carried out by Hamas between
December 2001 and August 2003. On January 1, 2019, plain-
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as: 605 U. S. 204 (2025)
207
Opinion of the Court
tiffs sued petitioner BLOM Bank SAL (BLOM), an interna-
ti
onal bank, under the Anti-Terrorism Act, as amended by
the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), 18
U. S. C. § 2333(d). They alleged that BLOM aided and abet-
ted Hamas's commission of the terrorist attacks by providing
fnancial services to customers who were allegedly affliated
with Hamas and who had helped further Hamas's goals.
In the District Court, BLOM repeatedly argued that the
facts alleged in plaintiffs' complaint were insuffcient to state
a claim of aiding and abetting under JASTA. Before moving
to dismiss the complaint, BLOM made this argument to the
District Court in a required premotion letter. See 1 App.
142–147. Plaintiffs responded that they would stand on
their allegations as pleaded. See id., at 148–155. At a sub-
sequent, premotion conference, plaintiffs' counsel reaffrmed
their clients' position, telling the District Court that they
were “prepared to brief [their opposition to a motion to dis-
miss] based on the arguments presented in the pre-motion
letter,” and that they “would not seek leave to amend” if
the court dismissed their complaint. App. to Pet. for Cert.
93–94.
BLOM moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 12(b)(6). At a hearing on the motion, the District
Court reminded plaintiffs' counsel that they had not re-
quested an opportunity to replead and specifcally asked
whether this meant that the complaint contained everything
the court would “need to consider in terms of suffciency of
[plaintiffs'] pleading.” Id., at 124. Plaintiffs' counsel con-
frmed that they did not intend to add any additional facts.
Id., at 125.
The District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice
and so denied leave to amend. The court held, as relevant
here, that plaintiffs had not “plausibly allege[d] the general
awareness . . . elemen[t] necessary to plead JASTA aiding-
and-abetting liability.” 432 F. Supp. 3d 253, 257 (EDNY
2020). In the District Court's view, “it [was] not enough for
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208 BLOM
BANK SAL v. HONICKMAN
Opinion of the Court
Plaintiffs to plausibl[y] allege that BLOM was generally
aware
of [its] role in terrorist activities, from which terrorist
attacks were a natural and foreseeable consequence.” Id.,
at 264 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, plain-
tiffs needed to “plausibly alleg[e] that, by providing fnancial
services to [specifc customers], BLOM generally assumed a
role in Hamas' violent or life-endangering activities,” and
plaintiffs had failed to do so. Id., at 265. And, the court
explained, leave to amend was unwarranted because “Plain-
tiffs . . . d[id] not request leave to amend”; “specifcally de-
clined the Court's offer to do so at the pre-motion confer-
ence”; and further failed to “identif[y] any additional facts
they could allege which would address the defciencies in
their complaint.” Id., at 270–271. The District Court thus
made an exception to its usual practice of “grant[ing] plain-
tiffs an opportunity to amend their complaints following dis-
missal.” Id., at 270.
Plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit, arguing that
they had pleaded facts suffcient to support their aiding-and-
abetting claim.* The Second Circuit concluded that the Dis-
trict Court had misinterpreted the general-awareness ele-
ment to impose an unduly high foreseeability requirement.
6 F. 4th 487, 497–498 (2021). But, even applying its less ex-
acting standard, the Second Circuit determined that the
facts alleged in the complaint “d[id] not plausibly support an
inference that [BLOM] had the requisite general awareness
at the time that it provided banking services” to the custom-
ers allegedly affliated with Hamas. Id., at 501. The court
thus affrmed the District Court's judgment of dismissal.
Id., at 503.
B
Plaintiffs returned to the District Court, and moved under
Rule 60(b)(6) to vacate the court's then-affrmed fnal judg-
*Plaintiffs did not appeal the “with prejudice” aspect of the District
Court's dismissal.
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209
Opinion of the Court
ment so that they could fle an amended complaint. They
arg
ued that the District Court should give them an opportu-
nity to meet the standard outlined by the Second Circuit.
2022 WL 1062315, *3 (EDNY, Apr. 8, 2022).
The District Court denied their request. Specifcally, it
rejected plaintiffs' contention that “the Second Circuit's clar-
ifcation of the aiding-and-abetting standard” constituted
“ `extraordinary circumstances' ” suffcient to justify relief
under Rule 60(b)(6). Ibid. That argument, according to
the District Court, ignores the principle that “ `a mere
change in decisional law does not constitute an “extraordi-
nary circumstance.” ' ” Ibid. In any event, the District
Court continued, any amendment would likely be futile be-
cause it was “not clear” that plaintiffs could succeed “[e]ven
under the clarifed standard” laid out by the Second Circuit.
Ibid., n. 3.
The District Court added that plaintiffs' litigation choices
further counseled against relief under Rule 60(b)(6). The
court explained that plaintiffs “had ample opportunity to
pursue all legal avenues available to them for relief,” and
sought postjudgment amendment despite having “declin[ed]
two prior opportunities” to amend their complaint in the
ordinary course, and “after unsuccessfully appealing the
dismissal of that complaint with prejudice.” Id., at *3. The
District Court declined to overlook “Plaintiffs' documented
series of deliberate choices not to cure the defciencies identi-
fed in their pleading.” Id., at *4.
On appeal, the Second Circuit again disagreed with the
District Court. It acknowledged that “[a] plaintiff is ordi-
narily entitled to Rule 60(b)(6) relief ” only under “ `extraor-
dinary circumstances.' ” 2024 WL 852265, *2 (Feb. 29, 2024).
But, it asserted, when a party seeks vacatur under Rule
60(b) “ `to obtain leave to fle an amended complaint, special
considerations come into play.' ” Ibid. In that circum-
stance, the court held, “the district court must give `due re-
gard' to `both [Rule 60(b)'s] philosophy favoring fnality of
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210 BLOM
BANK SAL v. HONICKMAN
Opinion of the Court
judgments . . . and the liberal amendment policy of Rule
15(
a),' ” ibid., which requires courts to “freely give leave” to
amend pleadings before trial “when justice so requires,” Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 15(a)(2). In other words, courts must “bal-
ance” the competing standards by “consider[ing] Rule 60(b)
fnality and Rule 15(a) liberality in tandem.” 2024 WL
852265, *2. The Second Circuit held that the District Court
had abused its discretion by “incorrectly treat[ing] Plaintiffs'
motion to vacate and amend as calling for two distinct analy-
ses, requiring Plaintiffs to successfully navigate Rule 60(b)'s
fnality gauntlet before they could invoke Rule 15(a)'s lib-
eral repleading policy.” Ibid. We granted certiorari. 603
U. S. 949 (2024).
II
Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circum-
stances. That standard does not become less demanding
when a Rule 60(b)(6) movant also hopes to amend his com-
plaint. Rather, a party seeking to reopen his case and re-
plead must frst satisfy Rule 60(b) on its own terms and ob-
tain Rule 60(b) relief before Rule 15(a)'s liberal amendment
standard can apply. Because the Second Circuit's balancing
approach confates this order of operations and dilutes Rule
60(b)(6)'s well-established standard, we must reject it.
A
Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek relief from fnal judgment
and reopen a case based on mistake or excusable neglect,
newly discovered evidence, fraud, or the void or prospec-
tively inequitable status of a judgment. See Rules 60(b)(1)–
(5). Rule 60(b) also includes a “catchall” provision—Rule
60(b)(6)—that allows a district court to reopen a case for
“ `any other reason that justifes relief.' ” Kemp v. United
States, 596 U. S. 528, 533 (2022). A party seeking relief
based on the grounds covered by paragraphs (1) through
(3)—i. e., mistake or excusable neglect, new evidence, or
fraud—faces a 1-year limitations period. See Fed. Rule Civ.
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211
Opinion of the Court
Proc. 60(c)(1). That time bar, however, does not apply to
moti
ons for relief fled under Rule 60(b)'s other paragraphs,
including Rule 60(b)(6). Ibid.
The text and structure of Rule 60 make clear that relief
under Rule 60(b)(6) is available only in narrow circum-
stances. Rule 60(b)(6) is a catchall that follows paragraphs
(1) through (5). It covers “any other reason” that justifes
relief; that is, Rule 60(b)(6) provides only grounds for relief
not already covered by the preceding fve paragraphs.
Were it otherwise, the catchall provision could swallow the
preceding paragraphs and “b[e] used to circumvent” their
time bars. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.,
486 U. S. 847, 863, n. 11 (1988). Such a broad interpretation
of Rule 60(b)(6) would thus violate a “cardinal principle of
statutory construction” by making the preceding paragraphs
and their limitations periods “superfuous.” Duncan v.
Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 174 (2001) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Fischer v. United States, 603 U. S. 480, 493
(2024) (avoiding an “unbounded interpretation” of catchall
provision that would “render superfuous” a “reticulated list”
of provisions). Thus, we have repeatedly held that relief
under Rule 60(b)(6) is available “only when Rules 60(b)(1)
through (b)(5) are inapplicable.” Kemp, 596 U. S., at 533
(citing Liljeberg, 486 U. S., at 863, n. 11).
But, “[e]ven then, ` “extraordinary circumstances” ' must
justify reopening.” Kemp, 596 U. S., at 533. The Court
identifed such circumstances for the frst time in Klapprott
v. United States, 335 U. S. 601 (1949), decided shortly after
Rule 60(b)(6)'s adoption. There, the petitioner sought to set
aside a default judgment entered in denaturalization pro-
ceedings. See id., at 603 (opinion of Black, J.). His “allega-
tions set up an extraordinary situation”: The petitioner was
“in jail . . . , weakened from illness, without a lawyer in the
denaturalization proceedings or funds to hire one,” and “dis-
turbed and fully occupied in efforts to protect himself against
the gravest criminal charges” in separate proceedings. Id.,
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BANK SAL v. HONICKMAN
Opinion of the Court
at 613–614. He was therefore “no more able to defend him-
self
” in the denaturalization proceedings “than he would
have been had he never received notice of the charges.” Id.,
at 614. On these facts, the Court found that relief under
Rule 60(b)(6) was justifed. Id., at 614–616.
The Court underscored the stringency of the “extraordi-
nary circumstances” test a year later in Ackermann v.
United States, 340 U. S. 193 (1950). The petitioner there
had suffered an adverse denaturalization judgment and de-
clined to appeal. Id., at 195. Four years later, he sought
to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b)(6), alleging that it
was erroneous, and that he had declined to appeal due to
expense and the advice of a third party. Id., at 195–197.
The Court held these circumstances insuffcient to satisfy
Rule 60(b)(6)'s strict standard. Id., at 197. Compared to
the situation in Klapprott, the Ackermann petitioner's alle-
gations highlighted “the difference between no choice and
choice; imprisonment and freedom of action; no trial and
trial; no counsel and counsel; no chance for negligence and
inexcusable negligence.” 340 U. S., at 202. The Court em-
phasized the importance of a Rule 60(b)(6) movant's fault-
lessness, explaining that “[t]here must be an end to litigation
someday, and free, calculated, deliberate choices are not to
be relieved from.” Id., at 198; see also, e. g., 12 J. Moore, D.
Coquillette, G. Joseph, G. Vairo, & C. Varner, Moore's Federal
Practice § 60.48[3][b], p. 60–188 (3d ed. 2024) (“In a vast ma-
jority of the cases fnding that extraordinary circumstances
do exist . . . , the movant is completely without fault for his
or her predicament”).
Our more recent cases have consistently reaffrmed that
Rule 60(b)(6) “should only be applied in `extraordinary cir-
cumstances.' ” Liljeberg, 486 U. S., at 864; see Kemp, 596
U. S., at 533; Tharpe v. Sellers, 583 U. S. 33, 35 (2018) (per
curiam); Buck v. Davis, 580 U. S. 100, 123 (2017); Christeson
v. Roper, 574 U. S. 373, 380 (2015) (per curiam); Pioneer In-
vestment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates L. P., 507
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213
Opinion of the Court
U. S. 380, 393 (1993). “ `This very strict interpretation of
Ru
le 60(b) is essential if the fnality of judgments is to
be preserved.' ” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. 524, 535
(2005) (quoting Liljeberg, 486 U. S., at 873 (Rehnquist, C. J.,
dissenting)).
B
The Rule 60(b)(6) standard does not change when a party
seeks to reopen his case to amend his complaint. In that
circumstance, satisfaction of Rule 60(b)(6) necessarily pre-
cedes any application of Rule 15(a). Cf. Waetzig v. Hallibur-
ton Energy Services, Inc., 604 U. S. 305, 311 (2025) (explain-
ing that motion to vacate under Rule 60(b) “must be
addressed before any subsequent jurisdictional questions
[are] considered”). Rule 15(a)'s liberal amendment policy
therefore cannot weaken Rule 60(b)(6)'s “extraordinary cir-
cumstances” standard.
Rules 60(b) and 15(a) apply at different stages of litigation
and demand separate inquiries. Rule 15(a) governs pre-
trial amendments, and sets forth a standard under which
courts “should freely give leave when justice so requires.”
Rule 15(a)(2). The Rule's “purpose is to provide maxi-
mum opportunity for each claim to be decided on its merits
rather than on procedural technicalities.” 6 C. Wright, A.
Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1471,
p. 587 (3d ed. 2010) (Wright & Miller). That standard, how-
ever, does not govern when, following a fnal judgment, the
case is closed and there is no pending pleading to amend.
Accord, e. g., Boyd v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, 114
F. 4th 1232, 1237 (CA11 2024) (“[O]nce the court has entered
fnal judgment, Rule 15(a) no longer applies and no amend-
ment is possible unless the judgment is frst set aside”). A
contrary approach “would enable the liberal amendment pol-
icy of Rule 15(a) to be employed in a way that is contrary to
the philosophy favoring fnality of judgments and the expedi-
tious termination of litigation.” 6 Wright & Miller § 1489,
at 816.
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BANK SAL v. HONICKMAN
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Thus, we disagree with the Second Circuit's holding that
the
District Court should have used a hybrid standard to
“consider Rule 60(b) fnality and Rule 15(a) liberality in tan-
dem.” 2024 WL 852265, *2. It is Rule 60(b)'s standard—
and only Rule 60(b)'s standard—that applies when a party
seeks relief from fnal judgment. A party seeking Rule
60(b)(6) relief must always demonstrate “extraordinary cir-
cumstances” justifying relief, see Kemp, 596 U. S., at 533 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted); what he intends to do if his
case is reopened does not alter that standard, see supra, at
211, 213; cf., e. g., In re Ferro Corp. Derivative Litigation,
511 F. 3d 611, 624 (CA6 2008) (“Plaintiffs must frst meet the
threshold requirement of 60(b)(6)'s extraordinary or excep-
tional circumstances to vacate the judgment before seeking
to conduct discovery”). In other words, the District Court
was correct to “trea[t] Plaintiffs' motion to vacate and amend
as calling for two distinct analyses,” with the question of
vacatur under Rule 60(b)(6) preceding that of repleading
under Rule 15(a). 2024 WL 852265, *2; accord, e. g., Daulat-
zai v. Maryland, 97 F. 4th 166, 179 (CA4 2024) (“[W]hen the
motion to vacate is fled under Rule 60(b), the more restric-
tive standard for granting that motion must be satisfed be-
fore consideration can be given to the motion to amend”).
None of our analysis, however, should be taken to suggest
that a district court contravenes Rule 60(b) merely by con-
sidering a movant's desire to amend his complaint. For ex-
ample, where a party seeks vacatur in order to amend its
pleadings, a district court is free to cite Rule 15 and acknowl-
edge amendment-related considerations, such as whether a
movant has had the opportunity to amend, and the amend-
ment standard that the party will eventually have to meet if
the Rule 60(b) motion is granted. What a district court may
not do is what the Second Circuit demanded here: dilute Rule
60(b)(6)'s stringent standard by “balanc[ing]” it with “Rule
15(a)'s liberal pleading principles.” 2024 WL 852265, *2.
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215
Opinion of the Court
C
Plai
ntiffs insist that the Second Circuit's approach is conso-
nant with Rule 60(b)(6) and our precedents interpreting that
provision, but their arguments are unpersuasive.
Balancing the strict standards of Rule 60(b)(6) against the
more relaxed standards of Rule 15 necessarily weakens the
former, and is thus incompatible with our long line of prece-
dents holding that Rule 60(b)(6) “should only be applied in
`extraordinary circumstances.' ” Liljeberg, 486 U. S., at 864;
accord, 6 Wright & Miller § 1489, at 816. Even the Second
Circuit appeared to acknowledge that its test departed from
the “ordinar[y]” approach to Rule 60(b)(6) under which a
plaintiff may receive relief only by demonstrating “ `extraor-
dinary circumstances' ” and showing that “ `the asserted
grounds for relief are not recognized in clauses (1)–(5) of the
Rule.' ” 2024 WL 852265, *2.
Nor does this Court's decision in Foman v. Davis, 371 U. S.
178 (1962), help plaintiffs. The Foman Court held that the
District Court's denial of the petitioner's motions to vacate
the court's judgment and amend her complaint rested on
“technicalities” that ran contrary to “the spirit of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id., at 181–182. But,
Foman dealt with Rule 59(e), not Rule 60(b), id., at 181, and
“Rule 60(b) differs from Rule 59(e) in just about every way
that matters to the inquiry here,” Banister v. Davis, 590
U. S. 504, 518 (2020). Most relevant, a Rule 60(b) motion
“threaten[s] an already fnal judgment with successive litiga-
tion,” id., at 519, and a motion under Rule 60(b)(6) in particu-
lar may threaten fnal judgments years after they are en-
tered. See Rule 60(c)(1). In contrast, “[t]he fling of a Rule
59(e) motion within the 28-day period `suspends the fnality
of the original judgment,' ” and “[o]nly the disposition of that
motion `restores th[e] fnality' of the original judgment.”
Banister, 590 U. S., at 508. Because Rule 59(e) does not
threaten the fnality of judgments to the same degree that
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216 BLOM
BANK SAL v. HONICKMAN
Opinion of the Court
Rule 60(b)(6) does, we do not require a movant to show the
same
“extraordinary circumstances” to receive relief. See
Foman, 371 U. S., at 181–182.
III
We also disagree with the Second Circuit's disposition of
this case. District courts' Rule 60(b) rulings are reviewed
“only for abuse of discretion.” Browder v. Director, Dept.
of Corrections of Ill., 434 U. S. 257, 263, n. 7 (1978). That
standard is “limited and deferential.” Gonzalez, 545 U. S.,
at 535. To be upheld, a district court's decision need only
“ `appl[y] the correct legal standard and offe[r] substantial
justifcation' ” for its conclusion. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp., 496 U. S. 384, 405 (1990). The District Court's deter-
mination that plaintiffs failed to “demonstrat[e] any extraor-
dinary circumstances warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(6),”
2022 WL 1062315, *3, easily clears that bar.
For the reasons we have explained, the District Court was
correct to “evaluat[e] Plaintiffs' motion under only Rule
60(b)'s standard.” 2024 WL 852265, *2; see supra, at 211–
214. And, the District Court offered persuasive justifca-
tions for fnding that standard unsatisfed—that the Second
Circuit's clarifcation of the test for aiding-and-abetting lia-
bility did not “constitute extraordinary circumstances,” par-
ticularly when plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed under that
standard, and that plaintiffs' “series of deliberate choices not
to cure the defciencies identifed in their pleading ” also cut
against them. 2022 WL 1062315, *3–*4, and n. 3; see supra,
at 209. Those justifcations follow from core tenets of Rule
60(b) doctrine. See, e. g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203,
239 (1997) (“Intervening developments in the law by them-
selves rarely constitute the extraordinary circumstances re-
quired for relief under Rule 60(b)(6)”); Pioneer Investment
Services, 507 U. S., at 393 (“ `extraordinary circumstances' ”
must suggest that the movant is “faultless in the delay”).
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The District Court's decision therefore fell within the
“
`w ide range of choice' ” afforded under the abuse-of-
discretion standard. McLane Co. v. EEOC, 581 U. S. 72, 83
(2017). The Second Circuit erred in holding otherwise.
***
The judgment of the Second Circuit is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Jackson, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
I join all but Part III of the Court's opinion. I agree with
the Court's conclusion that, when a district court considers
“a movant's desire to amend his complaint” in the context of
a motion to reopen a case under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 60(b)(6), the Rule 60(b)(6) standard, rather than the
Rule 15(a) standard, applies. Ante, at 214. Given the def-
erence owed to lower courts with respect to Rule 60(b)(6)
determinations, I also agree that the District Court did not
abuse its discretion in denying reopening here. Ante, at
216–217.
I write separately to emphasize that our affrmance of the
District Court's denial of reopening in this case does not re-
quire accepting all aspects of the District Court's reasoning.
In particular, I think the District Court was wrong to fault
plaintiffs for making a “deliberate choic[e]” to appeal the dis-
missal of their complaint in lieu of accepting various pre-
dismissal opportunities to cure purported pleading def-
ciencies. 2022 WL 1062315, *4 (EDNY, Apr. 8, 2022). The
District Court based that aspect of its reopening determina-
tion on our opinion in Ackermann v. United States, 340 U. S.
193 (1950). But, as I explain below, the “choice” that plain-
tiffs made—declining to amend—does not categorically pre-
clude Rule 60(b)(6) relief under that precedent.
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I
Ru
le 60(b) permits district courts to reopen cases after the
entry of a fnal judgment “under a limited set of circum-
stances including fraud, mistake, and newly discovered evi-
dence.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. 524, 528 (2005). This
Rule “ `attempts to strike a proper balance between the con-
ficting principles that litigation must be brought to an end
and that justice should be done.' ” Waetzig v. Halliburton
Energy Services, Inc., 604 U. S. 305, 309 (2025) (quoting 11
C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Proce-
dure § 2851, p. 286 (3d ed. 2012)).
The sixth paragraph of Rule 60(b) is the provision at issue
here; it is a “catchall” that permits reopening for reasons not
covered in the Rule's preceding fve paragraphs. Kemp v.
United States, 596 U. S. 528, 533 (2022). The opening para-
graphs of subsection (b) specifcally enumerate various bases
for relief: mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud, and the
voiding or satisfaction of a judgment. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.
60(b)(1)–(5). Then, under paragraph (6), a court may, “[o]n
motion and just terms,” reopen a judgment, order, or pro-
ceeding for “any other reason that justifes relief,” Rule
60(b)(6), provided that the motion is fled “within a reason-
able time,” Rule 60(c)(1).
Because of the “mutually exclusive” nature of Rule 60(b)'s
provisions, Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick
Associates L. P., 507 U. S. 380, 393 (1993), this Court has long
held that “relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is available only in narrow
circumstances,” ante, at 211. We have thus required Rule
60(b)(6) movants to demonstrate that “ ` “extraordinary cir-
cumstances” ' ” justify reopening the case. Kemp, 596 U. S.,
at 533. In this Court's frst case applying Rule 60(b)(6), we
concluded that reopening was warranted where a movant al-
leged “an extraordinary situation”—namely, that he had been
stripped of his citizenship by default judgment while he was,
among other things, incarcerated and in ill health. Klap-
prott v. United States, 335 U. S. 601, 613–614 (1949) (opinion
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219
Opinion of Jackson, J.
of Black, J.). The Court considered a similar Rule 60(b)(6)
request
for reopening in the context of a denaturalization
proceeding one year later in Ackermann—and reached a dif-
ferent outcome: We upheld the denial of the Rule 60(b)(6)
motion, expressly distinguishing Klapprott. 340 U. S., at
199–200. Critically, the movant in Ackermann had sought
reopening only after “ma[king] a considered choice not to
appeal” the adverse judgment. Id., at 198. Given the need
for “an end to litigation someday,” we explained that a mov-
ant “cannot be relieved of such a choice because hindsight
seems to indicate to him that his decision not to appeal was
probably wrong.” Ibid.
Under this line of precedent, the Court has concluded that
“due diligence” by the movant is a prerequisite to obtaining
Rule 60(b)(6) relief. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisi-
tion Corp., 486 U. S. 847, 863, n. 11 (1988). For that reason,
we have consistently found reopening inappropriate where,
as in Ackermann, a movant deliberately terminated the un-
derlying litigation. A decade after Ackermann, for exam-
ple, we held that a Rule 60(b)(6) movant who had “aban-
doned” his appeal from a denaturalization judgment due to
its perceived “small likelihood of . . . success” was not enti-
tled to reopening under Rule 60(b)(6) where he could not
otherwise demonstrate extraordinary circumstances. Po-
lites v. United States, 364 U. S. 426, 432–433 (1960). More
recently, we found reopening inappropriate when a movant
had “abandoned any attempt to seek review of ” the decision
in question. Gonzalez, 545 U. S., at 537; cf. Pioneer Invest-
ment Services, 507 U. S., at 393 (explaining that, to obtain
Rule 60(b)(6) relief more than one year after the entry of a
fnal judgment, a party must be “faultless in the delay”).
II
A
Relying on Ackermann, the District Court below sug-
gested that plaintiffs could not demonstrate extraordinary
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BANK SAL v. HONICKMAN
Opinion of Jackson, J.
circumstances because they had made a “documented series
of
deliberate choices not to cure the defciencies identifed in
their pleading.” 2022 WL 1062315, *4 (citing Ackermann,
340 U. S., at 198). The District Court thus faulted plaintiffs
for believing that their complaint alleged suffcient facts and
declining to amend it; they opted instead to seek clarifcation
from the appeals court regarding the suffciency of their
pleading. See 2022 WL 1062315, *3 (“Fundamentally, Plain-
tiffs seek to amend their complaint after declining two prior
opportunities to do so, and after unsuccessfully appealing the
dismissal of that complaint with prejudice”).
In my view, the District Court should not have assumed
that Ackermann's lack-of-due-diligence principle applies
under these circumstances. Plaintiffs did not “abando[n]”
this litigation. Gonzalez, 545 U. S., at 537; Polites, 364 U. S.,
at 433. Instead, they diligently pursued their “ `statutory
right' ” to appeal on the grounds that, in their view, the Dis-
trict Court had mistakenly concluded their complaint was
insuffcient. Waetzig, 604 U. S., at 314.
To be sure, the courts below did ultimately fnd that the
factual allegations in plaintiffs' complaint were defcient.
But that just means that plaintiffs were overconfdent about
the strength of their pleading and their prospect of success
on appeal. A misstep of this nature is not abandonment—
far from it—and the fact that a plaintiff opts to appeal does
not alone preclude Rule 60(b)(6) relief, provided that he can
otherwise demonstrate extraordinary circumstances and has
not exhibited “neglect or lack of due diligence.” Liljeberg,
486 U. S., at 863, n. 11; cf. Buck v. Davis, 580 U. S. 100, 123–
126 (2017) (holding that the use of race-based considerations
at sentencing in a capital case was an extraordinary circum-
stance warranting reopening even though the movant's coun-
sel had introduced the evidence in question).
The bottom line, jurisprudentially, is that courts should
refrain from refexively denying reopening for amendment
purposes when a Rule 60(b)(6) movant's only purported
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“fault” was a prior decision not to amend the complaint.
See
S. Dodson, Rethinking Extraordinary Circumstances,
106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 377, 386 (2012) (arguing that Ackermann
should preclude reopening only with respect to “those mov-
ants who deliberately stop pursuing their claims”).
B
A plaintiff may have good reasons for seeking clarifcation
from the appeals court before taking the signifcant step of
amending his pleading. In this case, for example, plaintiffs
allege that BLOM Bank SAL “aided and abetted Hamas's
commission of ” certain “terrorist attacks by providing f-
nancial services to customers who were allegedly affliated
with Hamas and who had helped further Hamas's goals.”
Ante, at 207. These are serious allegations. One would
reasonably expect plaintiffs to exercise great caution before
making additional factual assertions that further link BLOM
to alleged terrorist activities. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.
11(b)–(c).
Moreover, and importantly, denying reopening after ap-
peal merely because the plaintiff previously declined to
amend the complaint risks undermining the “ `statutory
right' to take an appeal from any `fnal decision' ” of a district
court. Waetzig, 604 U. S., at 314. If a plaintiff is necessar-
ily at fault for Rule 60(b)(6) purposes just because he exer-
cised his right to appeal, then plaintiffs will be disincentiv-
ized to go to the courts of appeals even when they reasonably
believe the allegations in their pleadings are suffcient.
That outcome not only divests them of their right to appel-
late review, but could also leave important legal questions
regarding pleading suffciency unanswered.
It is particularly inappropriate to deny Rule 60(b)(6) re-
opening based on a prior refusal to amend where a clear,
intervening change in the law supplies the necessary “ex-
traordinary circumstances.” Cf. Kemp, 596 U. S., at 540
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (detailing this Court's “settled
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precedents” recognizing “the availability of Rule 60(b)(6) to
reopen
a judgment in extraordinary circumstances, including
a change in controlling law”). To treat the plaintiff 's prior
refusals to amend as dispositive in such a situation would be
manifestly inconsistent with “the preference expressed in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in general . . . for re-
solving disputes on their merits.” Krupski v. Costa Cro-
ciere S. p. A., 560 U. S. 538, 550 (2010).
***
This Court reviews the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion only
for an abuse of discretion, and does not opine here, in the
frst instance, as to whether these plaintiffs have demon-
strated extraordinary circumstances. Ante, at 216. The
District Court's primary justifcation for denying plaintiffs'
motion to reopen was that the Second Circuit's “clarifcation”
of the applicable legal standard did not qualify as an extraor-
dinary circumstance, particularly when plaintiffs were un-
likely to prevail “[e]ven under the clarifed standard.” 2022
WL 1062315, *3, and n. 3. I concur in today's judgment be-
cause I agree that the District Court did not abuse its discre-
tion with respect to denying Rule 60(b)(6) relief on that
basis. But I fnd the District Court's alternative ground for
denying reopening—that plaintiffs were at fault because
they declined prior opportunities to amend their complaint—
neither “persuasive” nor consistent with “core tenets of Rule
60(b) doctrine.” Ante, at 216. Assuming extraordinary cir-
cumstances otherwise exist, a plaintiff should not be faulted
under Rule 60(b)(6) for reasonably having chosen to appeal
rather than amend his complaint.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None