Bouarfa v. Mayorkas

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 604 U. S. Part 1
Pages 6–19
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
December 10, 2024
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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Syllabus
BOUARFA v. MAYORKAS, SECRETARY OF
H
OMELAND SECURITY, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 23–583. Argued October 15, 2024—Decided December 10, 2024
Amina Bouarfa, a U. S. citizen, began the process of obtaining permanent
legal residence for Ala'a Hamayel, her noncitizen spouse, by fling a visa
petition with the U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).
Relevant here, USCIS “shall . . . approve” a visa petition if it “deter-
mines that the facts stated in the petition are true” and that the nonciti-
zen is the petitioner's spouse. 8 U. S. C. § 1154(b) (emphasis added).
But if the noncitizen has previously sought or received an immigration
beneft “by reason of a marriage determined by the Attorney General
to have been entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration
laws”—known as the sham-marriage bar—the agency must deny the
petition. § 1154(c). USCIS initially approved Bouarfa's visa petition.
Two years later, the agency sent Bouarfa a Notice of Intent to Revoke
its approval based on evidence suggesting that her husband had pre-
viously entered into a marriage for the purpose of evading immigration
laws. Although Bouarfa vigorously denied the evidence, the agency re-
voked its prior approval based on the Secretary of Homeland Security's
statutory authority under § 1155 to “revoke the approval of any petition”
“for good and suffcient cause.” The Board of Immigration Appeals af-
frmed the revocation, fnding that USCIS's determination that Hamayel
had entered into a prior sham marriage that would have prevented ini-
tial approval of the petition under § 1154(c) constituted “good and suff-
cient cause” for revocation under § 1155.
Bouarfa challenged the agency's revocation in federal court. The
District Court dismissed the suit, holding that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)—a pro-
vision that strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review certain discre-
tionary agency decisions—barred judicial review of the agency's revoca-
tion. The Eleventh Circuit affrmed.
Held: Revocation of an approved visa petition under § 1155 based on a
sham-marriage determination by the Secretary is the kind of discretion-
ary decision that falls within the purview of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which
strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review certain actions “in the
discretion of ” the agency. Pp. 13–19.
(a) Section 1155 is a quintessential grant of discretion: The Secretary
“may” revoke a previously approved visa petition “at any time” for what
the Secretary deems “good and suffcient cause.” Such a broad grant

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7
Syllabus
of authority “fairly exudes deference” to the Secretary and is similar to
other
statutes held to “ `commi[t]' ” a decision “ `to agency discretion.' ”
Webster v. Doe, 486 U. S. 592, 600. Congress did not impose specifc
criteria or conditions limiting this authority, nor did it prescribe how or
when the Secretary must act. Context reinforces the discretion-
ary nature of § 1155. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)'s neighboring provision,
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), bars judicial review under specifc provisions, each of
which contains language indicating that the decisions involved are en-
trusted to the discretion of the Attorney General. Section 1155 con-
tains similar language. Pp. 13–15.
(b) Bouarfa argues that although some revocations are discretionary,
the revocation here was not, so § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not apply to pre-
clude judicial review. Bouarfa contends that once the Secretary ap-
proves a petition and later determines that the benefciary had pre-
viously entered into a sham marriage, the Secretary has no choice but
to revoke the agency's approval. Neither the statutory text nor its con-
text limits the Secretary's discretion in this way. Pp. 15–19.
(1) Contrary to Bouarfa's argument, § 1154(c)'s text nowhere cre-
ates an ongoing duty for the agency to continually confrm that its initial
approval was sound. Instead, § 1154(c)'s command to the agency ex-
tends only to the point of approval. Turning to § 1154(c)'s context, Bou-
arfa argues that because a noncitizen may use an approved visa petition
to continue along the path toward permanent residency, Congress im-
plicitly required the agency to continually reassess its prior approval.
But nothing in the statutory scheme requires revisiting past decisions of
approval; rather, each stage of the process comes with its own criteria.
Indeed, the specifc grant of discretion in § 1155 to revoke prior approval
of a visa petition forecloses the argument that Congress silently man-
dated revocation in certain situations. Pp. 16–17.
(2) Bouarfa's assertion that the Secretary always revokes the
agency's approval of a visa petition if the agency later makes a sham-
marriage determination makes no difference because Congress did not
make the availability of judicial review dependent on agency practice.
Rather, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars judicial review of decisions “made discre-
tionary by legislation.” Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233, 246–247 (em-
phasis added). Nor is it unreasonable to suggest that Congress created
a system in which a sham-marriage determination is subject to judicial
review when an agency denies a visa petition but not when the agency
revokes a prior approval. That distinction “refects Congress' choice to
provide reduced procedural protection for discretionary relief.” Patel
v. Garland, 596 U. S. 328, 345. Pp. 17–18.
(3) Precedent, likewise, does not mandate Bouarfa's interpretation.
Unlike the discretionary determination at issue in Patel v. Garland,
§ 1155's revocation authorization has no “threshold requirements” to ac-

8 BOU
ARFA v. MAYORKAS
Opinion of the Court
cess the relevant discretion, 596 U. S., at 332, 347, so Patel does not help
Bouar
fa. Finally, because the presumption that administrative action
is subject to judicial review may be overcome by “ `clear and convincing
evidence' of congressional intent to preclude judicial review,” Guerrero-
Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221, 229, there is no need to resort to the
presumption of reviewability where, as here, “the statute is clear,”
Patel, 596 U. S., at 347. Pp. 18–19.
75 F. 4th 1157, affrmed.
Jackson, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Samir Deger-Sen argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Peter Trombly, Margaret A. Upshaw,
Peter E. Davis, and David Stoller.
Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak argued the cause for respondents.
With her on the brief were Solicitor General Prelogar, Prin-
cipal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Boynton, Deputy
Solicitor General Gannon, and Samuel P. Go.*
Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court.
A common feature of our Nation's complex system of law-
ful immigration is mandatory statutory rules paired with
discretionary exceptions. Executive Branch agencies im-
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for Administrative
and Immigration Law Professors by Andrew J. Pincus and Daniel E.
Jones; for the American Immigrant Investor Alliance et al. by Ira J. Kurz-
ban and Edward F. Ramos; for Former Executive Offce for Immigration
Review Judges by Richard W. Mark and Amer S. Ahmed; for the National
Immigrant Justice Center et al. by Victoria Dorfman, Nicole Henning,
Charles Roth, and Julius Kairey; and for the Northwest Immigrant
Rights Project et al. by Matt Adams, Leila Kang, Glenda M. Aldana
Madrid, Aaron Korthuis, Mary Kenney, Marc Van Der Hout, and
Johnny Sinodis.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the Immigration
Reform Law Institute by Christopher J. Hajec; and for Thomas Fuller
Ogden, pro se.
Cody Wofsy, Cecillia D. Wang, Lee Gelernt, David D. Cole, and Daniel
B. Tilley fled a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as
amici curiae.
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Opinion of the Court
plement both. Whether any given agency decision
is
mandatory or discretionary matters, because Congress has
limited judicial review of many discretionary determinations.
See 66 Stat. 208, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). This
case involves the Secretary of Homeland Security's decision
to revoke initial approval of a visa petition that Amina Bou-
ar fa, a U. S. citi zen, fi led on beha lf of her nonciti zen
spouse.
The Secretary points to 8 U. S. C. § 1155 as the source of
the agency's revocation authority; that provision states that
the Secretary “may, at any time,” revoke approval of a visa
petition “for what he deems to be good and suffcient cause.”
The issue we address today is whether revocation under
§ 1155 qualifes as a decision “in the discretion of ” the Secre-
tary such that it falls within the purview of a separate
statute—§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)—that strips federal courts of ju-
risdiction to review certain discretionary actions. We hold
that it does.
I
A
The agency decision at issue in this case occurs along the
pathway to permanent legal status for a noncitizen spouse of
a U. S. citizen. There is no dispute about the steps involved.
A U. S. citizen kicks off the process by fling an immigrant
visa petition on behalf of her spouse with the U. S. Citizen-
ship and Immigration Services (USCIS), which exercises au-
thority delegated by the Attorney General and Secretary of
Homeland Security. § 1154(a). If USCIS approves the pe-
tition, the noncitizen may then apply for an immigrant visa to
enter the country as a lawful permanent resident, §§ 1201(a),
1202(a), or, if he is already in the country, for adjustment of
status, § 1255.
USCIS's decision to approve or deny a visa petition fled
on behalf of a noncitizen spouse involves a number of manda-
tory determinations. For instance, if the agency “deter-
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10 BOU
ARFA v. MAYORKAS
Opinion of the Court
mines that the facts stated in the petition are true” and that
the
noncitizen is the petitioner's spouse, it “shall . . . approve
the petition.” § 1154(b) (emphasis added). However, as rel-
evant here, there is also a mandatory exception: If the non-
citizen “has previously been accorded” or “sought to be ac-
corded” an immigration beneft “by reason of a marriage
determined by the Attorney General to have been entered
into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws,” the
agency must deny the petition. § 1154(c). This is known as
the sham-marriage bar, and, although we have never held
as much, the parties agree that judicial review under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 701 et seq.,
is available to challenge the agency's invocation of it. See,
e. g., Mendoza v. Secretary, Dept. of Homeland Security, 851
F. 3d 1348, 1352, 1354–1356 (CA11 2017) (per curiam); Ruiz
v. Mukasey, 552 F. 3d 269, 275–276 (CA2 2009).
The visa-petition-approval process for noncitizen spouses
of U. S. citizens can also involve certain non-mandatory de-
terminations that Congress has authorized agency offcials
to make. One such statutory provision is at issue here: It
broadly states that the Secretary “may, at any time, for what
he deems to be good and suffcient cause, revoke the approval
of any petition.” § 1155.
1
We took this case to determine whether the Secretary's
decision under § 1155 to revoke the agency's approval of
a visa petition based on a sham-marriage determination is
the k i nd of discreti onary decisi on that fa l ls w ith i n
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)—a jurisdiction-stripping provision. As
noted above, in the immigration realm, properly identifying
the mandatory or discretionary nature of a particular agency
decision can be critical, precisely because that status has im-
1
In a separate provision, Congress has limited the reasons why the Sec-
retary may revoke the approval of a visa petition for some petitioners.
See 8 U. S. C. § 1154(h). That provision does not limit the Secretary's dis-
cretion to revoke based on a sham-marriage determination and is therefore
not relevant here.
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Opinion of the Court
plications for whether the agency's decision can be chal-
lenged
in court. Through § 1252(a)(2)(B), Congress stripped
federal courts of jurisdiction to review two categories of dis-
cretionary agency decisions. First, Congress precluded re-
view of “any judgment regarding the granting of relief
under” fve listed statutory provisions that empower the At-
torney General to grant certain relief to noncitizens.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Second, in the provision at issue here,
Congress barred review of “any other decision or action of
the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security
the authority for which is specifed under this subchapter to
be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secre-
tary.”
2
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).
B
Amina Bouarfa is a U. S. citizen who married Ala'a Ha-
mayel, a noncitizen and Palestinian national. They have
three young children, all of whom are U. S. citizens. A few
years after they married, Bouarfa fled a visa petition on
Hamayel's behalf.
USCIS initially approved the petition. But two years
later, the agency sent Bouarfa a Notice of Intent to Revoke
its approval. The agency informed Bouarfa that it had
uncovered evidence suggesting that, nearly a decade earlier,
her husband had entered into a marriage for the purpose
of evading immigration laws. According to the agency,
during an interrogation, Hamayel's ex-wife had stated that
her marriage with Hamayel had been “fraudulent” and that
she had asked him for $5,000 before fling a visa petition
on his behalf. App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a. The agency
told Bouarfa that, had it been aware of this evidence at the
time it reviewed her visa petition, it never would have ap-
proved it.
2
In certain contexts, Congress has restored judicial review over “consti-
tutional claims or questions of law.” § 1252(a)(2)(D). The parties agree
that this case does not implicate that provision.
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ARFA v. MAYORKAS
Opinion of the Court
Bouarfa vigorously denied these characterizations. She
poi
nted out that her husband's ex-wife had later recanted her
statements, claiming that she had made them under duress.
Nonetheless, USCIS concluded that there was “substantial
and probative evidence to support a fnding that” Hamayel's
prior marriage “was for the purpose of conveying im-
migration benefts.” Addendum to Brief for Petitioner
12a. Recognizing that the Secretary was permitted to “re-
voke the approval of any petition” “for good and suffcient
cause,” id., at 9a, the agency decided to revoke approval of
the visa petition that Bouarfa had fled on her husband's
behalf.
Bouarfa appealed that revocation to the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals, which affrmed. The Board explained that
USCIS had revoked its approval because it determined that
the “visa petition was approved in error” in light of
§ 1154(c)'s sham-marriage bar. App. 12. On de novo review,
the Board concluded that the evidence supported USCIS's
determination that Hamayel had entered into a sham mar-
riage. The fact that such a determination would have pre-
vented the agency from approving the petition in the frst
instance, the Board found, constituted “good and suffcient
cause” for revocation. Id., at 15.
Having struck out before the agency, Bouarfa turned to
the courts. She fled an APA action in Federal District
Court, arguing that the agency's revocation was “ `arbitrary
and capricious, an abuse of discretion and not in accordance
with law' ” because the agency lacked suffcient evidence to
support its sham-marriage determination. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 25a. The District Court granted the Government's
moti on to dismiss, holdi ng that § 1252(a)(2)(B)( i i), a
jurisdiction-stripping provision, barred judicial review of the
agency's revocation.
In Bouarfa v. Secretary, Dept. of Homeland Security, 75
F. 4th 1157 (2023), the Eleventh Circuit affrmed. It con-
cluded that the text of § 1155 “makes clear that the Secre-
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13
Opinion of the Court
tary's authority to revoke the approval of a petition is discre-
ti
onary.” Id., at 1162. In the court's view, it made no
difference that the agency rested its revocation on a determi-
nation that would have required the agency to deny the peti-
tion in the frst instance. “[N]othing in the statute,” the
court reasoned, “requires the Secretary to revoke the ap-
proval of a petition in any circumstance, even when the De-
partment later determines that the approval was in error.”
Ibid.
We granted certiorari to resolve a question that has split
the courts of appeals: Whether federal courts have jurisdic-
tion to review the Secretary's revocation of the agency's
prior approval of a visa petition. 601 U. S. 1166 (2024).
3
Bouarfa challenges the Secretary's revocation on the as-
sumption that the fact that her husband is not in removal
proceedings does not affect the jurisdictional analysis.
4
II
A
It is clear on the face of § 1155 that the revocation provi-
sion is a quintessential grant of discretion to the Secretary.
Once again, that provision provides that the Secretary “may,
at any time, for what he deems to be good and suffcient
cause, revoke the approval of any [visa] petition.” § 1155.
As “[t]his Court has `repeatedly observed,' ” “ `the word
“may” clearly connotes discretion.' ” Biden v. Texas, 597
3
Two Circuits have held that federal courts may review challenges to
the Secretary's revocations, at least in some situations. See Jomaa v.
United States, 940 F. 3d 291, 294–296 (CA6 2019); ANA Int'l, Inc. v. Way,
393 F. 3d 886, 894 (CA9 2004). A number of other Circuits have come out
the other way. See Nouritajer v. Jaddou, 18 F. 4th 85, 88 (CA2 2021) (per
curiam); Jilin Pharmaceutical USA, Inc. v. Chertoff, 447 F. 3d 196, 205
(CA3 2006); El-Khader v. Monica, 366 F. 3d 562, 568 (CA7 2004).
4
We therefore assume—without deciding—that § 1252(a)(2)(B) applies
when, as here, a noncitizen is neither in removal proceedings nor seeking
review of a fnal order of removal.
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14 BOU
ARFA v. MAYORKAS
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U. S. 785, 802 (2022) (quoting Opati v. Republic of Sudan,
590
U. S. 418, 428 (2020)). Moreover, here, Congress has in
no way prescribed how that discretion must be exercised.
There are no conditions that the Secretary must satisfy be-
fore he can revoke the agency's approval; he may do so “at
any time,” for whatever reason “he deems to be good and
suffcient cause.” That broad grant of authority “fairly ex-
udes deference” to the Secretary and is similar to other stat-
utes that we have held “ `commi[t]' ” a decision “ `to agency
discretion.' ” Webster v. Doe, 486 U. S. 592, 600 (1988) (hold-
ing that a statute permitting the agency to terminate an em-
ployee whenever it “ `deem[s] such termination necessary or
advisable in the interests of the United States' ” was
discretionary).
Context reinforces what the text makes plain. Section
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)'s neighboring provision, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i),
bars judicial review of determinations under fve statutory
provisions that address “different form[s] of discretionary
relief from removal.” Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233,
246 (2010). Each of those provisions “contains language
indicating that the decision is entrusted to the Attorney
General's discretion.” Ibid.; see, e. g., § 1229b(a) (“The At-
torney General may cancel removal . . . ”); § 1229c(a)(1) (“The
Attor ney Genera l may per mit an a l ien volunt ar i ly to
depart the United States . . . ”). Section 1155 contains simi-
lar language.
Indeed, many of the undoubtedly discretionary provisions
listed in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) vest less discretion in the Attorney
General than § 1155 vests in the Secretary. The Attorney
General may, for instance, cancel removal for a permanent
resident only if he determines that the noncitizen has been
a lawful permanent resident for at least fve years, has con-
tinually resided in the United States for at least seven years,
and has not been conv ic ted of an aggravated felony.
§ 1229b(a). He may exercise his discretion to waive the con-
sequences of a fraud determination that would otherwise bar
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Opinion of the Court
relief only if failing to do so “would result in extreme hard-
sh
ip” to the noncitizen's family members or, in certain situa-
tions, the noncitizen. § 1182(i)(1). And he has discretion to
adjust a noncitizen's status only if he frst confrms that cer-
tain preconditions have been satisfed. § 1255(a). When it
comes to the Secretary's discretion to revoke the agency's
approval of a visa petition, though, Congress imposed no
such threshold requirements. If the provisions listed in
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) pertain to discretionary agency determina-
tions, surely § 1155 does too.
That discretion is a two-way street. By granting the Sec-
retary discretion to revoke the agency's approval of visa peti-
tions, Congress has also vested the Secretary with discretion
to decline to revoke an approval the agency previously gave.
So, if the Secretary determines that the agency's approval of
a visa petition was erroneous, he can revoke that approval—
or he can let the error stand. As a general matter, then,
this discretion may work to the beneft of visa-petition bene-
fciaries, since rather than tying the agency's hands by forc-
ing revocation, Congress created “room for mercy.” Patel
v. Garland, 596 U. S. 328, 331 (2022).
In any event, when the Secretary opts to revoke a petition
that he determines should not have been approved in the
frst place, the petitioner is not out of options. As the Gov-
ernment concedes, nothing prohibits a citizen from fling an-
other petition on behalf of the same relative. Brief for Re-
spondents 3. Indeed, Bouarfa has already taken advantage
of that alternative here. After the Secretary revoked the
agency's approval of her petition, Bouarfa fled another one.
That petition is still pending, and if it is denied due to the
agency's sham-marriage determination, Bouarfa can seek ju-
dicial review of that determination.
B
Bouarfa disputes hardly any of this. She concedes that
some revocations are discretionary for purposes of § 1252(a)

16 BOU
ARFA v. MAYORKAS
Opinion of the Court
(2)(B)(ii). But she argues that this particular revocation
was
not. In Bouarfa's view, if the Secretary approves a visa
petition and later determines that the benefciary had pre-
viously entered into a sham marriage, the Secretary has no
choice but to revoke the agency's approval. We cannot
agree. Nothing in the statute's text or context limits the
Secretary's discretion in this way.
1
Bouarfa's textual argument rests on § 1154(c), which
she argues creates an ongoing duty for the agency to contin-
ually confrm that its prior approval was sound. Section
1154(c) commands that “no petition shall be approved” if the
Attorney General makes a sham-marriage determina-
tion. According to Bouarfa, we should interpret this provi-
sion as directing that “no petition shall be approved or
remain approved” if a sham-marriage determination is
made.
The problem for Bouarfa's argument is that § 1154(c) no-
where suggests that its command extends beyond the point
of approval. Nothing in the provision mentions revocation.
And we need not guess in what situations Congress wanted
the Secretary to revoke the agency's approval, because Con-
gress answered that question directly: The Secretary “may”
do so whenever he “deems” there to be “good and suffcient
cause.” § 1155. This specifc grant of discretion to revoke
forecloses the argument that Congress silently mandated
revocation in certain situations.
Turning to context, Bouarfa argues that, because a nonciti-
zen may use an approved visa petition to continue along the
path toward lawful permanent residency, Congress implicitly
required the agency to continually reassess whether its prior
approval was in error. But nothing about the statutory
scheme requires the agency to revisit its past decisions. In-
stead, each stage of the process comes with its own criteria.
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See, e. g., § 1255 (adjustment of status); § 1182 (visa eligibil-
ity).
Of course, if the Secretary determines at any point
along the way that the agency's prior approval of a visa peti-
tion was erroneous, he can exercise his discretion to revoke
it. Under Bouarfa's interpretation, the Secretary would be
required to do so any time he determined that the agency
made a mistake—no matter the circumstance. Congress,
however, left that decision to the Secretary. The agency's
mea culpa may—but need not—result in the noncitizen los-
ing his ability to gain permanent residency.
2
With text and context against her, Bouarfa turns to agency
practice. She contends that, as a practical matter, the
Secretary always revokes the agency's approval of a visa pe-
tition if the agency later makes a sham-marriage determina-
tion. That may be true. At oral argument, the Govern-
ment was unable to identify a single instance in which the
agency declined to revoke its approval after determining
that the benefciary had entered into a sham marriage. Tr.
of Oral Arg. 38. But Congress did not make the availability
of judicial review dependent on agency practice. Rather,
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars judicial review of decisions “made dis-
cretionary by legislation.” Kucana, 558 U. S., at 246–247
(emphasis added). Furthermore, the fact that the agency
appears to be exercising its revocation discretion consist-
ently is a virtue, not a vice. Bouarfa's use-it-or-lose-it the-
ory of agency discretion creates perverse incentives, encour-
aging an agency to act arbitrarily (by revoking some
approvals after a sham-marriage fnding while maintaining
others) or risk losing congressionally granted insulation from
judicial review.
Nor is it unreasonable, as Bouarfa protests, to suppose that
Congress created a system in which a sham-marriage deter-
mination is reviewable if it is the reason for the agency's
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18 BOU
ARFA v. MAYORKAS
Opinion of the Court
denial of a petition, but not if it is the reason for the agency's
re
vocation. That distinction “refects Congress' choice to
provide reduced procedural protection for discretionary re-
lief.” Patel, 596 U. S., at 345. In the interest of fnality,
Congress vested the Secretary with the discretion to allow
the agency's mistakes to inure to the beneft of the nonciti-
zen. At the same time, Congress did not want this discre-
tion to open up a new source of litigation. Cf. Guerrero-
Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221, 230 (2020) (observing
Congress's goal of “ `consolidat[ing] judicial review of immi-
gration proceedings into one action' ” (quoting INS v. St. Cyr,
533 U. S. 289, 313 (2001)). “[T]he context in which” the
agency makes the sham-marriage determination thus “ex-
plains the difference in protection afforded.” Patel, 596
U. S., at 345.
5
3
Finally, our precedent does not mandate Bouarfa's inter-
pretation. In Patel, we held that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) precludes
judicial review of factual fndings that underlie a denial of
discretionary relief—including when those fndings are
“threshold requirements established by Congress” to access
the relevant discretion. Id., at 332, 347. In concluding that
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) reaches those threshold determinations, we
relied on the fact that the provision prohibits judicial review
of “any judgment regarding the granting of relief ” under the
enumerated provisions. Id., at 338. Bouarfa argues that,
because the jurisdiction-stripping provision at issue here
5
Bouarfa protests that this creates a loophole through which the agency
can insulate itself from judicial review by granting petitions it is supposed
to deny and then subsequently revoking its approval. But she points to
no evidence suggesting that the agency has done so in this case or
any other. Nor has she alleged that the agency violated constitutional
or procedural requirements when it revoked her petition. We express
no view as to whether a lawsuit with such allegations would be
reviewable.
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Opinion of the Court
lacks similar language, its scope must be narrower. But
e
ven assuming that is true, that does not help Bouarfa here,
because unlike the discretionary determination at issue in
Patel, § 1155's revocation authorization has no threshold
requirements. We therefore need not resolve whether
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) strips courts of jurisdiction to review
threshold determinations that the agency must make before
exercising discretion.
Bouarfa also leans on the general “presumption” that
administrative action is subject to judicial review. See
Guerrero-Lasprilla, 589 U. S., at 229. But that presump-
tion may be overcome by “ `clear and convincing evidence'
of congressional intent to preclude judicial review.” Ibid.
(quoting Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U. S. 43,
64 (1993)). Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)—“which is, after all, a
jurisdiction-stripping statute,” Patel, 596 U. S., at 347—
clearly expresses Congress's desire to preclude judicial re-
view of the Secretary's discretionary revocation of an ap-
proved visa petition. “Because the statute is clear, we have
no reason to resort to the presumption of reviewability.”
Ibid.
***
In § 1155, Congress granted the Secretary broad authority
to revoke an approved visa petition “at any time, for
what he deems to be good and suffcient cause.” Such a rev-
ocation is thus “in the discretion of ” the agency.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Where § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies, then, it
bars judicial review of the Secretary's revocation under
§ 1155. Therefore, we affrm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
It is so ordered.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None