Muldrow v. City of St. Louis

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 601 U. S. Part 2
Pages 346–365
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
April 17, 2024
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
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pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

346 OCTOBER
TERM, 2023
Syllabus
MULDROW v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, et al.
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the eighth circuit
No. 22–193. Argued December 6, 2023—Decided April 17, 2024
Sergeant Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow maintains that her employer, the
St. Louis Police Department, transferred her from one job to another
because she is a woman. From 2008 through 2017, Muldrow worked as
a plainclothes offcer in the Department's specialized Intelligence Divi-
sion. In 2017, the new Intelligence Division commander asked to trans-
fer Muldrow out of the unit so he could replace her with a male police
offcer. Against Muldrow's wishes, the Department approved the re-
quest and reassigned Muldrow to a uniformed job elsewhere in the De-
partment. While Muldrow's rank and pay remained the same in the
new position, her responsibilities, perks, and schedule did not. After
the transfer, Muldrow no longer worked with high-ranking offcials on
the departmental priorities lodged in the Intelligence Division, instead
supervising the day-to-day activities of neighborhood patrol offcers.
She also lost access to an unmarked take-home vehicle and had a less
regular schedule involving weekend shifts.
Muldrow brought this Title VII suit to challenge the transfer. She
alleged that the City, in ousting her from the Intelligence Division,
had “discriminate[d] against” her based on sex “with respect to” the
“terms [or] conditions” of her employment. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).
The District Court granted the City summary judgment. The Eighth
Circuit affrmed, holding that Muldrow had to—but could not—show
that the transfer caused her a “materially signifcant disadvantage.”
30 F. 4th 680, 688. Muldrow's lawsuit could not proceed, the court said,
because the transfer “did not result in a diminution to her title, salary,
or benefits” and had caused “only mi nor changes i n work i ng
conditions.” Id., at 688–689.
Held: An employee challenging a job transfer under Title VII must show
that the transfer brought about some harm with respect to an identif-
able term or condition of employment, but that harm need not be sig-
nifcant. Pp. 354–360.
(a) Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex.”
§ 2000e–2(a)(1). Both parties agree that Muldrow's transfer implicated
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347
Syllabus
“terms” and “conditions” of Muldrow's employment. The applicable
st
atutory language thus prohibits “discriminat[ing] against” an individ-
ual “with respect to” the “terms [or] conditions” of employment because
of that individual's sex.
That language requires Muldrow to show that her transfer brought
about some “disadvantageous” change in an employment term or condi-
tion. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U. S. 75, 80.
The words “discriminate against,” the Court has explained, refer to “dif-
ferences in treatment that injure” employees. Bostock v. Clayton
County, 590 U. S. 644, 681. In the typical transfer case, that worse
treatment must be “with respect to” employment “terms [or] condi-
tions.” § 2000e–2(a)(1). The “terms [or] conditions” phrase is not used
“in the narrow contractual sense”; it covers more than the “economic or
tangible.” Oncale, 523 U. S., at 78; Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vin-
son, 477 U. S. 57, 64. Still, the phrase circumscribes the injuries that
can give rise to a suit like this one. To make out a Title VII discrimina-
tion claim, a transferee must show some harm respecting an identifable
term or condition of employment.
What the transferee does not have to show is that the harm incurred
was “signifcant” or otherwise exceeded some heightened bar. “Dis-
criminate against” means treat worse, here based on sex. See, e. g.,
Bostock, 590 U. S., at 657. Neither that phrase nor any other estab-
lishes an elevated threshold of harm. To demand “signifcance” is to
add words to the statute Congress enacted. It is to impose a new re-
quirement on a Title VII claimant, so that the law as applied demands
something more than the law as written. That difference can make a
real difference for complaining transferees. By asking whether the
harm to the transferee is signifcant, appellate courts have disregarded
varied kinds of disadvantage. Pp. 354–356.
(b) The City's three main arguments—based on statutory text, prece-
dent, and policy—do not justify the use of a “signifcance” standard.
The Court rejects the City's textual claim, which invokes the ejusdem
generis canon—the idea that a general phrase following an enumeration
of things should be read to encompass only things of the same basic
kind. Applying that canon to the text of Title VII's anti-discrimination
provision, the City claims that because refusing to hire or discharging a
person causes a signifcant disadvantage, the “otherwise to discriminate
against” phrase can apply only to things causing an equal level of harm.
But the statutory text itself provides a different shared trait: Each kind
of prohibited discrimination occurs by way of an employment action—
whether pertaining to hiring, or fring, or compensating, or (as here)
altering terms or conditions through a transfer. That is a more than

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348 MULDROW
v. ST. LOUIS
Syllabus
suffcient basis to unite the provision's several parts and avoid ejusdem
gene
ris problems.
Contrary to the City's view, there is also no reason to import a
signifcant-harm requirement from this Court's decision in Burlington
N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White, 548 U. S. 53. The Court there held that
Title VII's anti-retaliation provision—which prohibits an employer from
taking action against an employee for bringing or aiding a Title VII
charge—applies only when the retaliatory action is “materially ad-
verse,” meaning that it causes “signifcant” harm. Id., at 68. White
adopted that standard for reasons peculiar to the retaliation context.
The test was meant to capture those employer actions serious enough
to “dissuade[ ] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge
of discrimination.” Ibid. An action causing less serious harm will
not deter Title VII enforcement and so falls outside the purposes of
the ban on retaliation. But that reasoning does not apply to the anti-
discrimination provision, which fatly “prevent[s] injury to individuals
based on” protected status, id., at 63, without distinguishing between
signifcant and less signifcant harms.
Finally, there is reason to doubt the City's prediction that employees
will food courts with litigation in the absence of a signifcant-injury
requirement. Courts retain multiple ways to dispose of meritless Title
VII claims challenging transfer decisions. But even supposing the
City's worst predictions come true, that would be the result of the stat-
ute Congress drafted. This Court will not add words to the statute to
achieve what the City thinks a desirable result. Pp. 356–358.
(c) The courts below applied the wrong standard to Muldrow's suit.
Muldrow need show only some injury respecting her employment terms
or conditions. Her allegations, if properly preserved and supported,
meet that test with room to spare. The Court recognizes, however,
that the decisions below may have rested in part on issues of forfeiture
and proof. The Court leaves such matters for the courts below to ad-
dress on remand under the proper Title VII standard. Pp. 359–360.
30 F. 4th 680, vacated and remanded.
Kagan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Thomas,
J., post, p. 360, Alito, J., post, p. 362, and Kavanaugh, J., post, p. 363, each
fled an opinion concurring in the judgment.
Brian Wolfman argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Regina Wang and Madeline Meth.

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349
Counsel
Aimee W. Brown argued the cause for the United States
as
amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief
were So l i c i t o r Gene ra l Prel ogar, Assistan t At t o r ney
General Clarke, Deputy Solicitor General Fletcher, Tovah
R. Calderon, Gwendolyn Young Reams, Jennifer S. Gold-
stein, Anne Noel Occhialino, and Georgina Yeomans.
Robert M. Loeb argued the cause for respondents. With
h i m on the br ief were Sh een a Hami l t o n, Tho m as M.
Bo ndy, Robb i e Manhas, and James Angl in Flynn.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Constitutional
Accountability Center et al. by Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod,
and David D. Cole; for the Legal Aid Society et al. by Jim Davy; for the
National Employment Lawyers Association et al. by Carolyn L. Wheeler,
Stephen B. Pershing, Janai Nelson, Samuel Spital, Rachel Kleinman,
Emily Martin, and Rachel Smith; for the National Treasury Employees
Union by Julie M. Wilson and Paras N. Shah; and for Suja A. Thomas
et al. by Suja A. Thomas and Amy J. Wildermuth, both pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of
Arkansas et al. by Tim Griffn, Attorney General of Arkansas, Nicholas
J. Bronni, Solicitor General, Dylan L. Jacobs, Deputy Solicitor General,
and Asher L. Steinberg, Senior Assistant Solicitor General, and by the
Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Steve Marshall
of Alabama, Ashley Moody of Florida, Raúl Labrador of Idaho, Theodore
E. Rokita of Indiana, Brenna Bird of Iowa, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi,
Austin Knudsen of Montana, Michael T. Hilgers of Nebraska, Drew Wrig-
ley of North Dakota, Gentner F. Drummond of Oklahoma, Alan Wilson
of South Carolina, Marty Jackley of South Dakota, Jonathan Skrmetti of
Tennessee, Ken Paxton of Texas, and Sean D. Reyes of Utah; for the Local
Government Legal Center et al. by Amanda Kellar Karras and Erich
Eiselt; for the National School Boards Association et al. by Francisco M.
Negrón, Jr., Sonja H. Trainor, Jason P. Renzelmann, Charles B. Galvin,
and W. Joseph Scholler III; and for the Society for Human Resource Man-
agement by Richard B. Lapp and Camille A. Olson.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the District of Columbia et al. by
Brian L. Schwalb, Attorney General of the District of Columbia, Caroline
S. Van Zile, Solicitor General, Ashwin P. Phatak, Principal Deputy Solici-
tor General, and Holly M. Johnson, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Wil-
liam Tong of Connecticut, Anne E. Lopez of Hawaii, Aaron M. Frey of

350 MULDROW
v. ST. LOUIS
Opinion of the Court
Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court.
Sergeant
Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow maintains that her
employer, the St. Louis Police Department, transferred her
from one job to another because she is a woman. She sued
the City of St. Louis under Title VII, alleging that she had
suffered sex discrimination with respect to the “terms [or]
conditions” of her employment. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).
The courts below rejected the claim on the ground that the
transfer did not cause Muldrow a “signifcant” employment
disadvantage. Other courts have used similar standards in
addressing Title VII suits arising from job transfers.
Today, we disapprove that approach. Although an em-
ployee must show some harm from a forced transfer to pre-
vail in a Title VII suit, she need not show that the injury
satisfes a signifcance test. Title VII's text nowhere estab-
lishes that high bar.
I
From 2008 through 2017, Sergeant Muldrow worked as a
plainclothes offcer in the St. Louis Police Department's spe-
cialized Intelligence Division. During her tenure there, she
investigated public corruption and human traffcking cases,
oversaw the Gang Unit, and served as head of the Gun
Crimes Unit. By virtue of her Division position, Muldrow
was also deputized as a Task Force Offcer with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation—a status granting her, among other
things, FBI credentials, an unmarked take-home vehicle, and
the authority to pursue investigations outside St. Louis. In
2017, the outgoing commander of the Intelligence Division
told her newly appointed successor that Muldrow was a
Maine, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Mi-
chelle A. Henry of Pennsylvania, and Charity R. Clark of Vermont; and
for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by
Jason C. Schwartz, Lucas C. Townsend, Angelo I. Amador, Stephanie A.
Maloney, and Elizabeth Gaudio Milito.
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“workhorse”—still more, that “if there was one sergeant he
cou
ld count on in the Division,” it was Muldrow. 2020 WL
5505113, *1 (ED Mo., Sept. 11, 2020).
But the new Intelligence Division commander, Captain
Michael Deeba, instead asked the Department to transfer
Mu ldrow out of the unit. Deeba wanted to replace
Muldrow—whom he sometimes called “Mrs.” rather than the
customary “Sergeant”—with a male police offcer. See id.,
at *1–*2. That offcer, Deeba later testifed, seemed a better
ft for the Division's “very dangerous” work. Id., at *2; App.
139. The Department approved the transfer against Mul-
drow's wishes. It reassigned her to a uniformed job in the
Department's Fifth District.
While Muldrow's rank and pay remained the same in the
new position, her responsibilities, perks, and schedule did
not. Instead of working with high-ranking offcials on the
departmental priorities lodged in the Intelligence Division,
Muldrow now supervised the day-to-day activities of neigh-
borhood patrol offcers. Her new duties included approving
their arrests, reviewing their reports, and handling other ad-
ministrative matters; she also did some patrol work herself.
Because she no longer served in the Intelligence Division,
she lost her FBI status and the car that came with it. And
the change of jobs made Muldrow's workweek less regular.
She had worked a traditional Monday-through-Friday week
in the Intelligence Division. Now she was placed on a “ro-
tating schedule” that often involved weekend shifts. 2020
WL 5505113, *2.
Muldrow brought this Title VII suit to challenge the trans-
fer. Her complaint alleged that the City, in ousting her from
the Intelligence Division, had “discriminate[d] against” her
based on sex “with respect to” the “terms [or] conditions” of
her employment. § 2000e–2(a)(1). In later deposition testi-
mony, Muldrow set out her view of what the transfer had
cost her. She had been moved out of a “premier position [in]
the Police Department” into a less “prestigious” and more
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352 MULDROW
v. ST. LOUIS
Opinion of the Court
“administrative” uniformed role. App. 105, 114, 120. She
had
fewer “opportunities” to work on “important investiga-
tions,” as well as to “network” with commanding offcers.
Id., at 104. And she lost material benefts—her weekday
work schedule and take-home car. Or as she summarized
the situation: “I went from straight days, weekends off with
a take-home car and more visibility and responsibility within
the Department to a rotating schedule with few weekends
off, assigned to . . . uniformed patrol,” with “responsibilities
being limited to that of administrative work” and “supervis-
ing offcers on patrol.” Id., at 120. Title VII, Muldrow as-
serted in her suit, prevented the City from making those
changes to her employment because of her sex.
The D istr ic t Cour t, v iew i ng the matter di fferently,
granted the City summary judgment. Under Circuit prece-
dent, the court explained, Muldrow needed to show that her
transfer effected a “signifcant” change in working conditions
producing “material employment disadvantage.” 2020 WL
5505113, *8–*9. And Muldrow, the court held, could not
meet that heightened-injury standard. “[S]he experienced
no change in salary or rank.” Id., at *9. Her loss of “the
networking [opportunities] available in Intelligence” was im-
material because she had not provided evidence that it had
harmed her “career prospects.” Id., at *8. And given her
continued “supervisory role,” she had not “suffered a signif-
cant alteration to her work responsibilities.” Id., at *9.
Finally, the District Court concluded that the switch to a
rotating schedule (including weekend work) and the loss of
a take-home vehicle could not fll the gap. Although men-
tioning those changes “in her statement of facts,” Muldrow
had not relied on them in “her argument against summary
judgment.” Ibid., n. 20. And anyway, the court stated,
they “appear to be minor alterations of employment, rather
than material harms.” Ibid.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affrmed. It
agreed that Muldrow had to—but could not—show that the
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transfer caused a “materially signifcant disadvantage.” 30
F
. 4th 680, 688 (2022). Like the District Court, the Eighth
Circuit emphasized that the transfer “did not result in a dim-
inution to her title, salary, or benefts.” Id., at 688–689.
And the Circuit, too, maintained that the change in her job
responsibilities was “insuffcient” to support a Title VII
claim. Id., at 689. In the Fifth District, the court rea-
soned, Muldrow still had a “supervisory role” and partici-
pated in investigating serious crimes. Id., at 688. So the
court thought Muldrow's view of the new job—“more admin-
istrative and less prestigious”—was unsupported by record
evidence and not “persuasive.” Ibid. The court did not ad-
dress Muldrow's new schedule or her loss of a car, apparently
thinking those matters either forfeited or too slight to men-
tion. Overall, the court held, Muldrow's claim could not pro-
ceed because she had experienced “only minor changes in
working conditions.” Ibid.
We granted certiorari, 600 U. S. ––– (2023), to resolve a
Circuit split over whether an employee challenging a trans-
fer under Title VII must meet a heightened threshold of
harm—be it dubbed signifcant, serious, or something simi-
lar.
1
We now vacate the judgment below because the text
of Title VII imposes no such requirement.
1
Compare, e.g., 30 F. 4th 680, 688 (CA8 2022) (case below) (“materially
signifcant disadvantage”); Caraballo-Caraballo v. Correctional Admin.,
892 F. 3d 53, 61 (CA1 2018) (“materially changes” employment conditions
in a manner “more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration
of job responsibilities”); Williams v. R. H. Donnelley, Corp., 368 F. 3d
123, 128 (CA2 2004) (“materially signifcant disadvantage”); James v. Booz-
Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 368 F. 3d 371, 376 (CA4 2004) (“signifcant detri-
mental effect”); O'Neal v. Chicago, 392 F. 3d 909, 911 (CA7 2004) (“materi-
ally adverse”); Sanchez v. Denver Pub. Schools, 164 F. 3d 527, 532 (CA10
1998) (“signifcant change”); and Webb-Edwards v. Orange Cty. Sheriff 's
Offce, 525 F. 3d 1013, 1033 (CA11 2008) (“serious and material change”),
with Chambers v. District of Columbia, 35 F. 4th 870, 872, 876–877 (CADC
2022) (en banc) (overruling precedent that demanded an “objectively tangi-
ble harm” and rejecting a “material adversity” requirement).
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II
A
T
itle VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.” § 2000e–2(a)(1). Muldrow's suit, as de-
scribed above, alleges that she was transferred to a lesser
position because she is a woman. That transfer, as both par-
ties agree, implicated “terms” and “conditions” of Muldrow's
employment, changing nothing less than the what, where,
and when of her police work. See Brief for Muldrow 19;
Brief for City 1, 45–46. So the statutory language applica-
ble to this case prohibits “discriminat[ing] against” an indi-
vidual “with respect to” the “terms [or] conditions” of em-
ployment because of that individual's sex.
That language requires Muldrow to show that the transfer
brought about some “disadvantageous” change in an employ-
ment term or condition. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc., 523 U. S. 75, 80 (1998). The words “discrimi-
nate against,” we have explained, refer to “differences in
treatment that injure” employees. Bostock v. Clayton
County, 590 U. S. 644, 681 (2020). Or otherwise said, the
statute targets practices that “treat[ ] a person worse” be-
cause of sex or other protected trait. Id., at 658. And in
the typical transfer case, that “worse” treatment must per-
tain to—must be “with respect to”—employment “terms [or]
conditions.” § 2000e–2(a)(1). The “terms [or] conditions”
phrase, we have made clear, is not used “in the narrow con-
tractual sense”; it covers more than the “economic or tangi-
ble.” Oncale, 523 U. S., at 78; Meritor Savings Bank, FSB
v. Vinson, 477 U. S. 57, 64 (1986). Still, the phrase circum-
scribes the injuries that can give rise to a suit like this one.
To make out a Title VII discrimination claim, a transferee
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355
Opinion of the Court
must show some harm respecting an identifable term or con-
diti
on of employment.
What the transferee does not have to show, according to
the relevant text, is that the harm incurred was “signifcant.”
30 F. 4th, at 688. Or serious, or substantial, or any similar
adjective suggesting that the disadvantage to the employee
must exceed a heightened bar. See supra, at 353, and n. 1.
“Discriminate against” means treat worse, here based on
sex. See, e. g., Bostock, 590 U. S., at 657–658, 681. But nei-
ther that phrase nor any other says anything about how
much worse. There is nothing in the provision to dis-
tinguish, as the courts below did, between transfers caus-
ing signifcant disadvantages and transfers causing not-so-
signifcant ones. And there is nothing to otherwise
establish an elevated threshold of harm. To demand “sig-
nifcance” is to add words—and signifcant words, as it
were—to the statute Congress enacted. It is to impose a
new requirement on a Title VII claimant, so that the law as
applied demands something more of her than the law as
written.
And that difference can make a real difference for com-
plaining transferees. Many forced transfers leave workers
worse off respec ti ng employment ter ms or conditi ons.
(After all, a transfer is not usually forced when it leaves
the employee better off.) But now add another question—
whether the harm is signifcant. As appellate decisions re-
veal, the answers can lie in the eye of the beholder—and
can disregard varied kinds of disadvantage. Take just a few
examples from the caselaw. An engineering technician is
assigned to work at a new job site—specifcally, a 14-by-22-
foot wind tunnel; a court rules that the transfer does not
have a “signifcant detrimental effect.” Boone v. Goldin,
178 F. 3d 253, 256 (CA4 1999). A shipping worker is re-
quired to take a position involving only nighttime work; a
court decides that the assignment does not “constitute a sig-
nifcant change in employment.” Daniels v. United Parcel
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356 MULDROW
v. ST. LOUIS
Opinion of the Court
Serv., Inc., 701 F. 3d 620, 635 (CA10 2012). And a school
pr
incipal is forced into a non-school-based administrative
role supervising fewer employees; a court again fnds the
change in job duties not “signifcant.” Cole v. Wake Cty. Bd.
of Educ., 834 Fed. Appx. 820, 821 (CA4 2021) (per curiam).
All those employees suffered some injury in employment
terms or conditions (allegedly because of race or sex). Their
claims were rejected solely because courts rewrote Title VII,
compelling workers to make a showing that the statutory
text does not require.
2
B
The City, in defense of that added requirement, makes
three main arguments—one about the text, one about our
precedent, and one about policy. None justifes the use of a
“signifcance” standard.
The textual claim invokes the ejusdem generis canon—the
idea that a general phrase following an enumeration of
things should be read to encompass only things of the same
basic kind. Recall the prohibition at issue here: An em-
ployer may not, based on sex, “fail or refuse to hire” or “dis-
charge” any person or “otherwise . . . discriminate against
[her] with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions,
2
Justice Thomas's concurring opinion appears to disagree in two re-
spects. He initially disputes that courts have applied a heightened-harm
requirement in demanding that a plaintiff show something like “materially
signifcant disadvantage.” See post, at 360 (opinion concurring in judg-
ment). And as a corollary, he denies that courts will have to change their
treatment of Title VII claims once they start to apply the simple injury
standard set out in this opinion. See post, at 361–362. In light of those
views, we underscore two points. First, this decision changes the legal
standard used in any circuit that has previously required “signifcant,”
“material,” or “serious” injury. It lowers the bar Title VII plaintiffs must
meet. Second, because it does so, many cases will come out differently.
The decisions described above are examples, intended to illustrate how
claims that failed under a signifcance standard should now succeed. And
as we will discuss, the decision below is another such example, putting to one
side case-specifc issues of forfeiture and proof. See in fra, at 359–360.
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357
Opinion of the Court
or privileges of employment.” § 2000e–2(a)(1); see supra, at
354.
Refusing to hire or discharging a person, the City
notes, causes a signifcant disadvantage; so the subsequent
“otherwise” phrase, the City claims, can apply only to things
causing an equal level of harm. See Brief for City 16, 25–27.
But the City fails to explain why the presence of signifcant
disadvantage must be part of the list's common denominator.
The text itself provides a different shared trait. Each kind
of prohibited discrimination occurs by way of an employment
action—whether pertaining to hiring, or fring, or compen-
sating, or (as here) altering terms or conditions through a
transfer. That is a more than suffcient basis to unite the
provision's several parts and avoid ejusdem generis prob-
lems. There is no need for courts to introduce a signifcant-
harm requirement.
The City's argument from precedent fares no better. It
relies on Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v.
White, 548 U. S. 53 (2006), which addressed Title VII's sepa-
rate anti-retaliation provision. Under that section, an em-
ployer may not take action against an employee for bringing
or aiding a Title VII charge. See § 2000e–3(a). The Court
held that the provision applies only when the retaliatory ac-
tion is “materially adverse,” meaning that it causes “signif-
cant” harm. Id., at 68. The City thinks we should import
the same standard into the anti-discrimination provision at
issue. See Brief for City 18–19. But that would create a
mismatch. White adopted the standard for reasons peculiar
to the retaliation context. The test was meant to capture
those (and only those) employer actions serious enough to
“dissuade[ ] a reasonable worker from making or supporting
a charge of discrimination.” 548 U. S., at 68. If an action
causes less serious harm, the Court reasoned, it will not
deter Title VII enforcement; and if it will not deter Title
VII enforcement, it falls outside the purposes of the ban on
retaliation. See id., at 63, 68. But no such (frankly extra-
textual) reasoning is applicable to the discrimination bar.
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Whether an action causes signifcant enough harm to deter
any
employee conduct is there beside the point. White itself
noted the difference: The anti-discrimination provision, we
explained, simply “seeks a workplace where individuals are
not discriminated against” because of traits like race and sex.
Id., at 63. The provision thus fatly “prevent[s] injury to
individuals based on” status, ibid., without distinguishing be-
tween signifcant and less signifcant harms.
Finally, the City's policy objections cannot override Title
VII's text. In the City's view, a signifcant-injury require-
ment is needed to prevent transferred employees from
“swamp[ing] courts and employers” with insubstantial law-
suits requiring “burdensome discovery and trials.” Brief
for City 45, 49 (capitalization and boldface omitted). But
there is reason to doubt that the foodgates will open in the
way feared. As we have explained, the anti-discrimination
provision at issue requires that the employee show some in-
jury. See supra, at 354–355. It requires that the injury
asserted concern the terms or conditions of her employment.
See ibid. Perhaps most notably, it requires that the em-
ployer have acted for discriminatory reasons—“because of ”
sex or race or other protected trait. § 2000e–2(a)(1). And
in addressing that issue, a court may consider whether a less
harmful act is, in a given context, less suggestive of inten-
tional discrimination. So courts retain multiple ways to dis-
pose of meritless Title VII claims challenging transfer deci-
sions. But even supposing the City's worst predictions
come true, that would be the result of the statute Congress
drafted. As we noted in another Title VII decision, we will
not “add words to the law” to achieve what some employers
might think “a desirable result.” EEOC v. Abercrombie &
Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U. S. 768, 774 (2015). Had Congress
wanted to limit liability for job transfers to those causing a
signifcant disadvantage, it could have done so. By contrast,
this Court does not get to make that judgment.
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359
Opinion of the Court
III
In
light of everything said above, the Court of Appeals'
treatment of Muldrow's suit cannot survive. The court re-
quired Muldrow to show that the allegedly discriminatory
transfer out of the Intelligence Division produced a signif-
cant employment disadvantage. See supra, at 352–353. As
we have explained, that is the wrong standard. Muldrow
need show only some injury respecting her employment
terms or conditions. The transfer must have left her worse
off, but need not have left her signifcantly so. And Mul-
drow's allegations, if properly preserved and supported,
meet that test with room to spare. Recall her principal alle-
gations. She was moved from a plainclothes job in a presti-
gious specialized division giving her substantial responsibil-
ity over priority investigations and frequent opportunity to
work with police commanders. She was moved to a uni-
formed job supervising one district's patrol offcers, in which
she was less involved in high-visibility matters and primarily
performed administrative work. Her schedule became less
regular, often requiring her to work weekends; and she lost
her take-home car. If those allegations are proved, she was
left worse off several times over. It does not matter, as the
courts below thought (and Justice Thomas echoes), that her
rank and pay remained the same, or that she still could ad-
vance to other jobs. See ibid.; post, at 361. Title VII pro-
hibits making a transfer, based on sex, with the conse-
quences Muldrow described.
We recognize, however, that the decisions below may have
rested in part on issues of forfeiture and proof. The District
Court noted, for example, that Muldrow had failed to discuss
in her argument against summary judgment the changes in
her work schedule and vehicle access; and perhaps following
that lead, the Court of Appeals did not address those harms.
See supra, at 352–353. In addition, both courts suggested
that some of the allegations Muldrow made about the nature
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360 MULDROW
v. ST. LOUIS
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
of the work she did in her old and new jobs lacked adequate
e
videntiary support. See ibid. We leave such matters for
the courts below to address. All we require is that they use
the proper Title VII standard, and not demand that Muldrow
demonstrate her transfer caused “signifcant” harm.
We accordingly vacate the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and remand the case for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with Justice Alito that the Courts of Appeals
all appear to articulate the same principle, but with slightly
varying verbal formulations: A plaintiff bringing a claim
under 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) must show harm that is
more than trifing. Post, at 362–363 (opinion concurring in
judgment). And, there is little practical difference between
that principle and the Court's holding. Ante, at 350 (holding
that an employee “must show some harm”).
I am not convinced, however, that the Court accurately
characterizes the Eighth Circuit's decision. I do not read
the Eighth Circuit to have necessarily imposed a heightened-
harm requirement in the form of a “signifcance” test. The
Eighth Circuit defned an adverse employment action as “a
tangible change in working conditions that produces a mate-
rial employment disadvantage.” 30 F. 4th 680, 688 (2022)
(internal quotation marks omitted). It further explained
that “minor changes in duties or working conditions, even
unpalatable or unwelcome ones, which cause no materially
signifcant disadvantage, do not rise to the level of an ad-
verse employment action.” Ibid. (alteration and internal
quotation marks omitted). In other words, a plaintiff must
have suffered an actual disadvantage as compared to minor
changes—i. e., more than a trifing harm. That standard
aligns with the Court's observation that a plaintiff must
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361
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
show “some `disadvantageous' change in an employment
ter
m or condition.” Ante, at 354 (quoting Oncale v. Sun-
downer Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U. S. 75, 80 (1998)).
The Court insists that the Eighth Circuit must have de-
manded more given the weight of Muldrow's allegations.
Specifcally, the Court underscores Muldrow's claims that the
City of St. Louis “moved [her] from a plainclothes job in a
prestigious specialized division” with a take-home car and a
regular schedule, to a “uniformed job supervising one dis-
trict's patrol offcers,” with no take-home car and an irregu-
lar schedule. Ante, at 359. But, most of those allegations
are forfeited or attributable to a nonparty, the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation. See 2020 WL 5505113, *9, n. 20 (ED
Mo., Sept. 11, 2020) (observing that Muldrow did not raise
arguments based on “having to return her take-home [car],”
“changes to her schedule, including having to work week-
ends,” or “having to work in plain clothes”); 30 F. 4th, at 689
(concluding that “the FBI had the sole authority to revoke”
Muldrow's plainclothes and take-home car privileges). Be-
fore the Eighth Circuit, Muldrow argued only that the City
moved her to a job that was “more administrative and less
prestigious.” Id., at 688. Her “only evidence” in support
of that argument was “her own deposition testimony,” which
neither the District Court nor the Eighth Circuit found per-
suasive. Ibid. And, Muldrow's testimony certainly did not
establish any “proof of harm resulting from [her] reassign-
ment.” Ibid. After the transfer, Muldrow's “pay and rank
remained the same, she was given a supervisory role, and
she was responsible for investigating violent crimes, such as
homicides and robberies.” Ibid. Muldrow even conceded
that the transfer “did not harm her future career prospects.”
Ibid. At most, then, Muldrow “expresse[d] a mere prefer-
ence for one position over the other.” Id., at 689.
Muldrow failed to prove that there was any nontrifing
change in her job's prestige—which was her lone theory of
harm. Id., at 688–689. The Eighth Circuit rejected Mul-
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362 MULDROW
v. ST. LOUIS
Alito, J., concurring in judgment
drow's adverse employment action claim accordingly. I fail
to
see how the Eighth Circuit's reasoning—that a plaintiff
must offer colorable evidence of harm—is equivalent to the
heightened-har m requirement the Cour t concludes the
Eighth Circuit applied. Ante, at 359 (agreeing that “[t]he
transfer must have left [Muldrow] worse off ”).
All that said, I recognize that the terms “material” and
“signifcant” can (but do not always) imply a heightened-
harm requirement. Although I fnd it unlikely, it is possible
that the Eighth Circuit had such a stringent test in mind
when it stated that a plaintiff must show a “ `materially
signifcant disadvantage.' ” 30 F. 4th, at 688. I thus agree
to vacate and remand to the extent the Eighth Circuit's
ana lysis is inconsistent w ith a more-than-trifling-harm
requirement.
Justice Alito, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the judgment in this case. Assuming with-
out deciding that all the facts mentioned by the Court are
relevant and properly presented, petitioner's transfer al-
tered the “terms” or “conditions” of her employment, 42
U. S. C. § 2000e–2(a)(1), and therefore she can prevail if she
can prove that she was transferred because of her sex.
I do not join the Court's unhelpful opinion. For decades,
dozens of lower court judges, with a wealth of experience
handling Title VII cases, have held that not every unwanted
employment experience affects an employee's “terms” or
“conditions” of employment. The lower courts have used
various verbal formulations to express this point, and the
Court, dubious about the words they had selected, granted
review to provide guidance. Now, after briefng and argu-
ment, that guidance is as follows: Title VII plaintiffs must
show that the event they challenge constituted a “harm” or
“injury,” but that the event need not be “signifcant” or “sub-
stantial.” See ante, at 354–355, 358.
I have no idea what this means, and I can just imagine
how this guidance will be greeted by lower court judges.

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as: 601 U. S. ––– (2024)
363
Kavanaugh, J., concurring in judgment
The primary defnition of “harm” is “physical or mental dam-
age
,” and an “injury” is defned as “an act that damages,
harms, or hurts: an unjust or undeserved infiction of suffer-
ing or harm.” Webster's Third International Dictionary
1034, 1164 (1976). These defnitions incorporate at least
some degree of signifcance or substantiality. We do not
typically say that we were harmed or injured by every un-
wanted experience. What would we think if a friend said,
“I was harmed because the supermarket had run out of my
favorite brand of peanut butter,” or, “I was injured because
I ran into three rather than the usual two red lights on the
way home from work”?
I see little if any substantive difference between the termi-
nology the Court approves and the terminology it doesn't
like. The predictable result of today's decision is that care-
ful lower court judges will mind the words they use but will
continue to do pretty much just what they have done for
years.
Justice Kavanaugh, concurring in the judgment.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful
for an employer “to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).
The question presented in this case is whether transferring
an employee—for example, changing an employee's job re-
sponsibilities or job location—on the basis of race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin violates Title VII. The answer
is yes.
I therefore agree with the straightforward opinion jointly
authored by Judge Tatel and Judge Ginsburg for the en banc
D. C. Circuit. See Chambers v. District of Columbia, 35
F. 4th 870 (2022). As that court explained, even when a
transfer does not change an employee's compensation, a
transfer does change the employee's terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment. See id., at 874–879. Therefore,
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Kavanaugh, J., concurring in judgment
a transfer made on the basis of the employee's race, color,
rel
igion, sex, or national origin violates Title VII. See id.,
at 874–875.
As I see it and as the D. C. Circuit saw it, the issue here
is not complicated. Suppose that an employer says to an
employee in the Columbus offce: “We are transferring you
to the Cincinnati offce because you are black. But your
compensation will not change.” Does that violate Title VII?
Of course it does. To begin with, the employer has treated
the employee differently because of race. To be sure, the
fact that a transfer may not involve a change in compensation
can affect the amount of any damages, as Muldrow's attorney
acknowledged. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 41–42. But a transfer
changes the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.
Therefore, a discriminatory transfer violates the statute.
“The plain text of Title VII requires no more.” Chambers,
35 F. 4th, at 875.
1
Unlike the D. C. Circuit, some Courts of Appeals have held
that discriminatory transfers are not prohibited by Title VII
unless the transfer also causes signifcant employment disad-
vantage. Ante, at 353, n. 1. Today, this Court defnitively
rejects those rulings. Ante, at 355–356, and n. 2. I fully
agree with the Court on that point.
But the Court's opinion then goes on to require that a
plaintiff in a discriminatory-transfer case show at least “some
harm” beyond the harm of being transferred on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Ante, at 355.
I disagree with the Court's new some-harm requirement.
No court has adopted a some-harm requirement, and no
1
To be sure, the employment action in a transfer case must actually be
a transfer (or denied transfer), which requires a change (or denied change)
in the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. See
Brief for District of Columbia et al. as Amici Curiae 17–18. There may
be edge cases about what qualifes as a transfer. But as the Solicitor
General notes, a change in an employee's job location or job responsibilities
readily qualifes. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11, 22.
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365
Kavanaugh, J., concurring in judgment
party or amicus advocated that requirement to this Court.
More
to the point, the text of Title VII does not require a
separate showing of some harm. The discrimination is
harm. The only question then is whether the relevant em-
ployment action changes the compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment. A transfer does so.
Therefore, as the D. C. Circuit explained, a transfer on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin is action-
able under Title VII. Chambers, 35 F. 4th, at 874–879.
All of that said, the Court's new some-harm requirement
appears to be a relatively low bar. Importantly, the Court
emphasizes that “some harm” is less than signifcant harm,
serious harm, or substantial harm. Ante, at 355. There-
fore, anyone who has been transferred because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin should easily be able to show
some additional harm—whether in money, time, satisfaction,
schedule, convenience, commuting costs or time, prestige,
status, career prospects, interest level, perks, professional
relationships, networking opportunities, effects on family ob-
ligations, or the like. So even though I respectfully disagree
with the Court's new some-harm requirement, I expect that
the Court's approach and my preferred approach will land in
the same place and lead to the same result in 99 out of 100
discriminatory-transfer cases, if not in all 100.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None