Great Lakes Ins. SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co.

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 601 U. S. Part 1
Pages 65–86
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
February 21, 2024
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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65
Syllabus
GREAT LAKES INSURANCE SE v. RAIDERS
RETREA
T REALTY CO., LLC
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the third circuit
No. 22–500. Argued October 10, 2023—Decided February 21, 2024
Great Lakes Insurance and Raiders Retreat Realty Co. entered a mari-
time insurance contract. Great Lakes was organized in Germany and
headquartered in the United Kingdom, and Raiders was headquartered
in Pennsylvania. The parties' contract selected New York law to gov-
ern any future disputes. Raiders' boat subsequently ran aground in
Florida. Great Lakes denied coverage for the accident and fled a re-
lated declaratory judgment action in the U. S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Raiders responded by advancing
contract claims against Great Lakes under Pennsylvania law. The Dis-
trict Court enforced the choice-of-law provision in the parties' contract
and rejected Raiders' Pennsylvania-law contract claims. The Third
Circuit recognized the presumptive validity and enforceability of choice-
of-law provisions in maritime contracts, but held that presumption must
yield to a strong public policy of the State where a suit is brought.
The Third Circuit remanded for the District Court to consider whether
applying New York law would violate Pennsylvania's public policy re-
garding insurance.
Held: Choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts are presumptively
enforceable under federal maritime law, with narrow exceptions not ap-
plicable here. Pp. 69–73.
(a) Article III's grant of federal jurisdiction to “all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction,” § 2, cl. 1, contemplates a uniform system of
maritime law across the country, see Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. James
N. Kirby, Pty Ltd., 543 U. S. 14, 28, to promote interests of navigation,
commerce, and diplomatic relations. To maintain uniformity, federal
courts “make decisional law” for maritime cases, id., at 23, based on
sources including “judicial opinions, legislation, treatises, and scholarly
writings,” Air & Liquid Systems Corp. v. DeVries, 586 U. S. 446, 452.
Federal courts follow previously “established” maritime rules, see Wil-
burn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U. S. 310, 314, and may
create uniform maritime rules if no established rule exists. See, e. g.,
Norfolk Southern, 543 U. S., at 23. Pp. 69–76.
(1) Longstanding precedent in both this Court and the Courts of
Appeals establishes a federal maritime rule that choice-of-law provi-

66 GREA
T LAKES INS. SE v. RAIDERS RETREAT REALTY CO.
Syllabus
sions in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable. In an anal-
ogous
context, the Court has pronounced that forum-selection clauses in
maritime contracts are “prima facie valid” under federal maritime law
and “should be enforced unless” doing so would be unreasonable. The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U. S. 1, 10. Like choice-of-law
provisions, forum-selection clauses have “the salutary effect of dispel-
ling any confusion” on the manner for resolving future disputes, thereby
slashing the “time and expense of pretrial motions.” Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U. S. 585, 593–594. The Court's decisions on
the enforceability of forum-selection clauses dictate the same conclusion
for choice-of-law provisions. Pp. 70–73.
(2) This Court's decision in Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund
Insurance Co., 348 U. S. 310, does not hold otherwise. Wilburn Boat
did not involve a choice-of-law provision, and held only that state law
applied as a gap-fller in the absence of a uniform federal maritime rule
on a warranty issue. Id., at 314–316. Where, as here, a uniform fed-
eral rule governs the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime
contracts, no gap exists to be flled by state law. And while Wilburn
Boat referenced States' traditional responsibility for regulating insur-
ance, see id., at 316–319, preserving that responsibility does not speak
to the concern addressed by a choice-of law provision, namely, which
state law applies in a given case. Nothing in Wilburn Boat prevented
this Court in The Bremen and Carnival Cruise from concluding as a
matter of federal maritime law that forum-selection clauses are pre-
sumptively enforceable. And contrary to Raiders' suggestion, nothing
in Wilburn Boat purports to override parties' choice-of-law clauses in
maritime contracts generally, or in the subset of marine insurance con-
tracts specifcally. Pp. 73–76.
(b) Raiders does not claim any recognized exception to the presump-
tive enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime contracts. Raid-
ers seeks an additional exception for situations where enforcing the law
of the State designated by the contract would contravene the public
policy of the State with the greatest interest in the dispute. But Raid-
ers' proposal lacks support in case law, and its application would
undermine the fundamental purpose of choice-of-law clauses. Further,
Raiders' position would merely allow the substitution of one body of
state law (the law of the State with the purported greatest interest in
the matter) for another (the law of the State designated by a choice-
of-law provision), a substitution no federal maritime interest supports.
Finally, the Court rejects the suggestion to adopt the choice-of-law ap-
proach set forth in § 187(2)(b) of the Second Restatement of Confict of
Laws, as that rule arose out of interstate cases and does not deal di-
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67
Opinion of the Court
rectly with federal-state conficts, including those that arise in federal
enclaves
like maritime law. Pp. 76–79.
47 F. 4th 225, reversed.
Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Thomas,
J., fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 79.
Jeffrey B. Wall argued the cause for petitioner. With him
on the briefs were Morgan L. Ratner, Madeline B. Jenks,
and Michael I. Goldman.
Howard J. Bashman argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Adam G. Unikowsky, Michael
Yanoff, and Shawn M. Rodgers.*
Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court.
Maritime contracts often contain choice-of-law provisions
that designate the law of a particular jurisdiction to control
future disputes. The enforceability of those choice-of-law
provisions is governed by federal maritime law. Applying
federal maritime law in this case, we conclude that choice-
of-law provisions in maritime contracts are presumptively
enforceable, with certain narrow exceptions not applicable
here.
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America et al. by Carter G. Phillips,
Jacqueline G. Cooper, and Jonathan D. Urick; and for the New England
Legal Foundation by Benjamin G. Robbins and Daniel B. Winslow.
Briefs of amici curiae urging vacatur were fled for the American Insti-
tute of Marine Underwriters et al. by Joseph G. Grasso and Thomas H.
Belknap, Jr.; and for John F. Coyle et al. by F. Andrew Hessick and Rich-
ard A. Simpson.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of
Louisiana et al. by Jeff Landry, Attorney General of Louisiana, Elizabeth
B. Murrill, Solicitor General, Shae McPhee, Deputy Solicitor General,
Lynn Fitch, Attorney General of Mississippi, and Michelle A. Henry, At-
torney General of Pennsylvania; for the American Association of Justice
by Benjamin C. Hassebrock, Alexander Loy, Michal Meiler, Sean Dom-
nick, and Jeffrey R. White; and for United Policy Holders by Joshua Gold,
Dennis J. Nolan, and Kirk Pasich.
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68 GREA
T LAKES INS. SE v. RAIDERS RETREAT REALTY CO.
Opinion of the Court
I
T
o insure its boat, Raiders Retreat Realty, a Pennsylvania
business, purchased a policy from Great Lakes Insurance, a
company organized in Germany and headquartered in the
United Kingdom. The insurance contract included a choice-
of-law provision that, as relevant here, selected New York
law to govern future disputes between the parties.
Years later, Raiders' boat ran aground near Fort Lauder-
dale, Florida. After Raiders submitted an insurance claim,
Great Lakes denied coverage. Great Lakes asserted that
Raiders breached the insurance contract by failing to main-
tain the boat's fre-suppression system. According to Great
Lakes, the breach voided the insurance contract in its en-
tirety, even though the boat's fre-suppression system did not
contribute to the accident.
Great Lakes sued Raiders for declaratory relief in the U. S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
Great Lakes alleged that Raiders breached the insurance
contract and that the breach allowed Great Lakes to deny
insurance coverage.
In response, Raiders advanced contract claims under
Pennsylvania law. Great Lakes countered that Pennsylva-
nia law did not apply to this dispute; rather, New York law
applied under the choice-of-law provision in the parties' in-
surance contract.
The District Court agreed with Great Lakes. The court
reasoned that federal maritime law regards choice-of-law
provisions as presumptively valid and enforceable. 521
F. Supp. 3d 580, 585–586 (ED Pa. 2021). The court therefore
enforced the parties' choice-of-law provision and rejected
Raiders' Pennsylvania-law contract claims. Id., at 588–589.
The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated
that judgment. 47 F. 4th 225 (2022). The Court of Appeals
held that choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts are
presumptively enforceable as a matter of federal maritime
law, but nonetheless must yield to a strong public policy of
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Opinion of the Court
the State in which suit is brought—here, Pennsylvania's pub-
l
ic policy regarding insurance. Id., at 230, 233. The court
remanded for the District Court to consider whether apply-
ing New York contract law here would violate Pennsylvania's
public policy and whether Pennsylvania law therefore should
apply. Id., at 233.
This Court granted certiorari to resolve a split in the
Courts of Appeals regarding the enforceability of choice-of-
law provisions in maritime contracts. See 598 U. S. –––
(2023). Compare Great Lakes Ins. SE v. Raiders Retreat
Realty Co., LLC, 47 F. 4th, at 233, with Galilea, LLC v.
AGCS Marine Ins. Co., 879 F. 3d 1052, 1060 (CA9 2018);
Stoot v. Fluor Drilling Servs., Inc., 851 F. 2d 1514, 1517
(CA5 1988).
II
Under the Constitution, federal courts possess authority
to create and apply maritime law. Article III of the Consti-
tution extends the federal judicial power to “all Cases of ad-
miralty and maritime Jurisdiction.” U. S. Const., Art. III,
§ 2, cl. 1. That grant of jurisdiction contemplates a system
of maritime law “ `coextensive with, and operating uniformly
in, the whole country.' ” Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. James
N. Kirby, Pty Ltd., 543 U. S. 14, 28 (2004) (quoting American
Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U. S. 443, 451 (1994)). The pur-
poses of that uniform system include promoting “the great
interests of navigation and commerce” and maintaining the
United States' “diplomatic relations.” 3 J. Story, Commen-
taries on the Constitution of the United States § 1666, p. 533
(1st ed. 1833); see also Norfolk Southern, 543 U. S., at 28;
Exxon Corp. v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 500 U. S. 603, 608
(1991).
To maintain that uniform system, federal courts “make de-
cisional law” for maritime cases. Norfolk Southern, 543
U. S., at 23. When a federal court decides a maritime case,
it acts as a “federal common law court, much as state courts
do in state common-law cases.” Air & Liquid Systems
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70 GREA
T LAKES INS. SE v. RAIDERS RETREAT REALTY CO.
Opinion of the Court
Corp. v. DeVries, 586 U. S. 446, 452 (2019) (internal quotation
marks
omitted); see Dutra Group v. Batterton, 588 U. S. 358,
360 (2019). “Subject to direction from Congress,” the fed-
eral courts fashion maritime rules based on, among other
sources, “judicial opinions, legislation, treatises, and schol-
arly writings.” Air & Liquid Systems, 586 U. S., at 452; see
also Exxon Co., U. S. A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U. S. 830, 839
(1996); East River S. S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc.,
476 U. S. 858, 864 (1986).
Exercising that authority, federal courts follow previously
“established” maritime rules. Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fire-
man's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U. S. 310, 314 (1955). No bright
line exists for determining when a federal maritime rule is
“established,” but a body of judicial decisions can suffce.
See Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U. S. 85, 89–90
(1955). In the absence of an established rule, federal courts
may create uniform maritime rules. See, e.g., Norfolk
Southern, 543 U. S., at 23. When no established rule exists,
and when the federal courts decline to create a new rule,
federal courts apply state law. See Wilburn Boat, 348 U. S.,
at 320–321. For purposes of this general overview, we will
stop there, as the “issue of federalism in admiralty and the
scope of application of state law in maritime cases is one of
the most perplexing issues in the law.” 1 T. Schoenbaum,
Admiralty and Maritime Law § 4:4, p. 268 (6th ed. 2018).
A
The initial question here is whether there is an established
federal maritime rule regarding the enforceability of choice-
of-law provisions. The answer is yes. Longstanding prece-
dent establishes a federal maritime rule: Choice-of-law provi-
sions in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable.
As a leading treatise says, it is “well established in admiralty
that choice of law clauses” will “normally be enforced.” 1
Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 5:19, at 427; see
also id., § 4:4, at 275; 2 id., § 19:6, at 431–432 (similar).

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Courts of Appeals have consistently decided that choice-
of-law
provisions in maritime contracts are presumptively
enforceable as a matter of federal maritime law. See Great
Lakes Ins. SE v. Wave Cruiser LLC, 36 F. 4th 1346, 1353–
1354 (CA11 2022); Great Lakes Reins. (UK) PLC v. Durham
Auctions, Inc., 585 F. 3d 236, 242–243 (CA5 2009); Triton
Marine Fuels Ltd., S. A. v. M/V Pacifc Chukotka, 575 F. 3d
409, 413 (CA4 2009); Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc., 123
F. 3d 1287, 1296–1297 (CA9 1997); Milanovich v. Costa Cro-
ciere, S. p. A., 954 F. 2d 763, 768 (CADC 1992).
Although no recent case of this Court has addressed the
issue, the Court has traditionally enforced choice-of-law pro-
visions in maritime contracts. The Court has recognized,
for example, that the parties to a maritime contract may se-
lect the governing law by “clearly manifest[ing]” an intent
to follow that law “when entering into the contract.” Liver-
pool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S.
397, 458 (1889); see also The Kensington, 183 U. S. 263, 269
(1902). The Court has stated that “it is no injustice” to re-
solve disputes under the law that parties have “agreed to be
bound by.” London Assurance v. Companhia de Moagens
do Barreiro, 167 U. S. 149, 161 (1897). As the Court further
opined in 1953: “Except as forbidden by some public policy,
the tendency of the law is to apply in contract matters the
law which the parties intended to apply.” Lauritzen v.
Larsen, 345 U. S. 571, 588–589 (1953).
The Court's traditional enforcement of choice-of-law provi-
sions in maritime contracts corresponds to the Court's prece-
dents in the analogous forum-selection context. The Court
has pronounced that forum-selection clauses in maritime con-
tracts are “prima facie valid” under federal maritime law and
“should be enforced unless” doing so would be “ `unreason-
able' under the circumstances.” The Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co., 407 U. S. 1, 10 (1972); see also Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U. S. 585, 593–594 (1991). Like
choice-of-law provisions, forum-selection clauses respect “an-

72 GREA
T LAKES INS. SE v. RAIDERS RETREAT REALTY CO.
Opinion of the Court
cient concepts of freedom of contract.” The Bremen, 407
U
. S., at 11. And like choice-of-law provisi ons, for um-
selection clauses have “the salutary effect of dispelling any
confusion” on the manner for resolving future disputes,
thereby slashing the “time and expense of pretrial motions.”
Carnival Cruise, 499 U. S., at 593–594.
For those reasons, as Courts of Appeals have explained,
this Court's decisions in The Bremen and Carnival Cruise
on the enforceability of forum-selection clauses dictate the
same conclusion for choice-of-law provisions. See, e.g., Mi-
lanovich, 954 F. 2d, at 768. That is especially true given
that courts historically have expressed more skepticism of
forum-selection clauses than of choice-of-law clauses because
forum-selection clauses can force parties to litigate in incon-
venient places. See The Bremen, 407 U. S., at 9; 6 S. Willis-
ton, Law of Contracts § 1725 (rev. ed. 1938).
As courts and commentators have recognized, the pre-
sumption of enforceability for choice-of-law provisions in
maritime contracts facilitates maritime commerce by reduc-
ing uncertainty and lowering costs for maritime actors.
Maritime commerce traverses interstate and international
boundaries, so when a maritime accident or dispute occurs,
time-consuming and diffcult questions can arise about which
law governs. Choice-of-law provisions “reduce legal uncer-
tainty.” J. Coyle, The Canons of Construction for Choice-of-
Law Clauses, 92 Wash. L. Rev. 631, 633, n. 6 (2017). By
identifying the governing law in advance, choice-of-law pro-
visions allow parties to avoid later disputes—as well as ensu-
ing litigation and its attendant costs. Cf. Carnival Cruise,
499 U. S., at 593–594. Choice-of-law provisions also discour-
age forum shopping, further cutting the costs of litigation.
Moreover, by supplying some advance assurance about the
governing law, choice-of-law provisions help maritime ship-
pers decide on the front end “what precautions to take” on
their boats, American Dredging, 510 U. S., at 454, and enable
marine insurers to better assess risk, see Brief for American
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Institute of Marine Underwriters et al. as Amici Curiae 12–
13.
Choice-of-law provisions therefore can lower the price
and expand the availability of marine insurance. In those
ways, choice-of-law provisions advance a fundamental pur-
pose of federal maritime law: the “ `protection of maritime
commerce.' ” Exxon Corp., 500 U. S., at 608 (quoting Sisson
v. Ruby, 497 U. S. 358, 367 (1990)).
B
Raiders argues that no established federal maritime rule
governs the enforceability of choice-of-law provisions, and it
further contends that federal courts should assess those pro-
visions under state law. Raiders does not specify whether
it thinks that federal maritime law should incorporate state
law on this issue, or instead that state law is not preempted
by federal maritime law and applies of its own force. See
Tr. of Oral Arg. 52–53.
In any event, Raiders argues that this Court s 1955 deci-
sion in Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.,
348 U. S. 310, precludes a uniform federal presumption of
enforceability for choice-of-law provisions in maritime con-
tracts. But that case did not involve a choice-of-law provi-
sion. Rather, the Wilburn Boat Court simply determined
what substantive rule applied when a party breached a war-
ranty in a marine insurance contract. See id., at 311–316.
The Court concluded that no “established federal admiralty
rule” governed the warranty issue. Id., at 314; see also id.,
at 314–316. And the Court declined to create a federal mar-
itime rule on that question, both because States historically
regulated insurance and because federal courts were poorly
positioned to “unify insurance law on a nationwide basis.”
Id., at 319; see also id., at 316–320. The Court therefore
ordered that the warranty issue be tried “under appropriate
state law.” Id., at 321.
Great Lakes contends that Wilburn Boat's reliance on
state law is in tension with the Court's modern maritime
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74 GREA
T LAKES INS. SE v. RAIDERS RETREAT REALTY CO.
Opinion of the Court
jurisprudence, which tends to place greater emphasis on the
need
for uniformity in maritime law. See Norfolk Southern,
543 U. S., at 28; Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U. S. 731,
741–742 (1961); see also American Dredging, 510 U. S., at
452–453 (noting tension between Wilburn Boat and Kos-
sick); Wilburn Boat, 348 U. S., at 322, 324 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in result) (arguing that Wilburn Boat should “not
be found controlling ” in the future beyond the case's “essen-
tially localized” facts).
But here, we need not resolve any such tension because
Wilburn Boat does not control the analysis of choice-of-law
provisions in maritime contracts. To reiterate, Wilburn
Boat did not involve a choice-of-law provision, and the case
therefore affords limited guidance on that distinct issue.
Moreover, Wilburn Boat held only that state law applied as
a gap-fller in the absence of a uniform federal maritime rule
on a warranty issue. 348 U. S., at 314–316. Here, however,
no gap exists because a uniform federal rule governs the
enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime contracts.
In addition, Wilburn Boat rested in part on the diffculty
of creating substantive maritime insurance law from scratch
through case-by-case adjudication. See id., at 319–320.
That concern is absent when the question is whether the
parties may choose the governing law to apply. Wilburn
Boat also cited States' traditional responsibility for regulat-
ing insurance. See id., at 316–319. But preserving that re-
sponsibility does not speak to which state law applies in
a given case, which is what a choice-of-law provision ad-
dresses. Finally, Wilburn Boat did not prevent this Court
in The Bremen and Carnival Cruise from concluding as a
matter of federal maritime law that forum-selection clauses
are presumptively enforceable. For all of those reasons,
Wilburn Boat does not preclude a uniform federal presump-
tion of enforceability for choice-of-law provisions in mari-
time contracts.
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Raiders suggests that even if federal maritime law pre-
s
umes the enforceabil ity of choice-of-law prov isi ons in
maritime contracts, Wilburn Boat recognized a kind of “in-
surance exceptionalism” where this Court will apply state
law in marine insurance cases. Tr. of Oral Arg. 45. We
disagree. Nothing in Wilburn Boat purports to override
parties' choice-of-law clauses in maritime contracts gen-
erally, or in the subset of marine insurance contracts
specifcally.
Moreover, in the forum-selection context, The Bremen and
Carnival Cruise apply to marine insurance contracts as well
as to other maritime contracts. See Carnival Cruise, 499
U. S., at 593–595; The Bremen, 407 U. S., at 10–14. We dis-
cern no good reason for a different rule in the choice-of-law
context. Indeed, the uniformity and predictability resulting
from choice-of-law provisions are especially important for
marine insurance contracts given that marine insurance is
“an integral part of v rtually every maritime transaction,
and maritime commerce is a vital part of the nation's econ-
omy.” M. Sturley, Restating the Law of Marine Insurance:
A Workable Solution to the Wilburn Boat Problem, 29 J.
Mar. L. & Com. 41, 45 (1998).
In applying maritime rules, we also may assess whether
our decision produces an “equitable result.” Norfolk South-
ern, 543 U. S., at 35. In considering Raiders' argument for
applying state law, it bears recalling Wilburn Boat's after-
math in maritime law and the maritime industry. See G.
Gilmore & C. Black, Law of Admiralty §§ 1–17, 2–8 (2d ed.
1975). After Wilburn Boat, maritime actors realized that a
lot would depend on which State's law governed each indi-
vidual maritime dispute—a question that would be unclear in
advance. See 2 Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law
§ 19:9. Choice-of-law provisions soon emerged as a ready
answer to that problem. See W. von Bittner, The Validity
and Effect of Choice of Law Clauses in Marine Insurance
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76 GREA
T LAKES INS. SE v. RAIDERS RETREAT REALTY CO.
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Contracts, 53 Ins. Counsel J. 573, 573, 578–579 (1986). And
par
ticularly since The Bremen resolved the analogous forum-
selection issue in 1972, most maritime actors have justifably
believed that choice-of-law provisions are presumptively en-
forceable as a matter of federal maritime law. See 1 Schoen-
baum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 5:19, at 427. That
widespread understanding is correct, and Raiders' argument
for disrupting that longstanding consensus is essentially a
solution in search of a problem.
The bottom line: As a matter of federal maritime law,
choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts are presump-
tively enforceable.
III
Of course, to say that choice-of-law clauses are presump-
tively enforceable as a matter of federal maritime law means
that there are exceptions when the clauses are not enforce-
able. The parties agree that the exceptions are narrow—
i ndeed, Raiders “freely concede[s] that i n most every
instance, a choice-of-law provision contained in a maritime
insurance contract will be effective.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 54.
In particular, the parties agree that courts should disre-
gard choice-of-law clauses in otherwise valid maritime con-
tracts when the chosen law would contravene a controlling
federal statute, see Knott v. Botany Mills, 179 U. S. 69, 77
(1900), or confict with an established federal maritime policy,
see The Kensington, 183 U. S. 263, 269–271 (1902). For ex-
ample, The Kensington declined to enforce a choice-of-law
clause because the chosen law would have released a carrier
from liability for negligence—a result that federal maritime
law forbids. See ibid.
The parties further agree that, as a matter of federal mari-
time law, courts may disregard choice-of-law clauses when
parties can furnish no reasonable basis for the chosen juris-
diction. Cf. Carnival Cruise, 499 U. S., at 594–595; The
Bremen, 407 U. S., at 10, 16–17. For example, it would be
unreasonable to pick the law of a distant foreign country
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Opinion of the Court
without some rational basis for doing so. That said, the “no
reasonable
basis” exception must be applied with substantial
deference to the contracting parties, recognizing that mari-
time actors may sometimes choose the law of a specifc juris-
diction because, for example, that jurisdiction's law is “well
developed, well known, and well regarded.” Brief for
American Institute of Marine Underwriters et al. as Amici
Curiae 17.
Raiders does not claim that either of those exceptions ap-
plies here. To be specifc, Raiders does not assert that any
federal statute or established federal maritime policy pre-
cludes enforcing the parties' choice-of-law provision. And
Raiders does not claim that the parties' choice of New York's
“well-known and highly elaborated commercial law” was un-
reasonable. Restatement (Second) of Confict of Laws § 187,
Comment f, p. 567 (1969); see also The Bremen, 407 U. S., at
13 (approving the choice of a “neutral forum”).
Unable to successfully invoke those exceptions, Raiders
says that federal maritime law should recognize an addi-
tional exception when enforcing the law of the State desig-
nated by the contract would contravene the fundamental
public policy of the State with the greatest interest in the
dispute. We disagree with that argument. Indeed, Raid-
ers' request for that novel maritime exception is essentially
a repackaged version of its initial argument that the enforce-
ability of choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts
should be determined by state law. The argument fares no
better here, for essentially the same reasons.
A federal presumption of enforceability would not be much
of a presumption if it could be routinely swept aside based
on 50 States' public policy determinations. The ensuing dis-
uniformity and uncertainty caused by such an approach
would undermine the fundamental purpose of choice-of-law
clauses in maritime contracts: uniform and stable rules for
maritime actors. See supra, at 70–73; Carnival Cruise, 499
U. S., at 593–594; The Bremen, 407 U. S., at 13–14.
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78 GREA
T LAKES INS. SE v. RAIDERS RETREAT REALTY CO.
Opinion of the Court
Raiders' proposed exception also lacks historical roots.
Th
is Court has never discarded a choice-of-law provision in
a maritime contract on the ground that enforcement of the
choice-of-law provision would violate state law. On the con-
trary, the Court has enforced those clauses without so much
as mentioning state law. See, e.g., London Assurance, 167
U. S., at 161; see also Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd.,
221 F. 2d 189, 193, 195 (CA2 1955) (Harlan, J.).
Nor has the Court looked to state law in the analogous
forum-selection context. Raiders points to a sentence in
The Bremen stating that a “contractual choice-of-forum
clause should be held unenforceable if enforcement would
contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit
is brought.” 407 U. S., at 15. But that sentence, read in
context, was referring to the possibility of a confict between
federal maritime law and a foreign country's law—there,
England's. See ibid. State law was not relevant to the
case. The Bremen said nothing about the law or public pol-
icy of Florida. See id., at 9–20. Carnival Cruise likewise
said nothing about the law or public policy of Washington.
See 499 U. S., at 590–595.
Raiders' position similarly fnds no footing in the decisions
of the Courts of Appeals. The opinion of the Third Circuit
in this case is the frst by a Federal Court of Appeals to hold
that a State's strong public policy may justify disregarding a
maritime choice-of-law clause.
The lack of case law supporting Raiders' state-law argument
comes as no surprise given that Raiders' position would
merely allow the substitution of one body of state law (the law
of the State with the purported greatest interest in the mat-
ter) for another (the law of the State designated by a choice-
of-law provision). As Raiders seems to acknowledge, federal
maritime law offers no reason to categorically prefer the law
of one State over another State. See Brief for Respondent
41–42. Here, for example, no federal maritime interest sup-
ports applying Pennsylvania law rather than New York law.

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79
Thomas, J., concurring
For the same reasons, we disagree with Raiders' related
suggesti
on that we adopt the choice-of-law approach set
forth in § 187(2)(b) of the Second Restatement of Confict of
Laws. In relevant part, that subsection says that choice-of-
law provisions are enforceable unless they confict with “a
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater
interest than the chosen state in the determination of the
particular issue.” Restatement (Second) of Confict of Laws
§ 187(2)(b). As the commentary to the Restatement care-
fully explains, however, that rule arose out of interstate
cases and does not deal directly with federal-state conficts,
including those that arise in federal enclaves like maritime
law. See id., § 2, Comment c; § 3, Comment d; § 10, Com-
ment a. For reasons already stated, that Restatement rule
is a poor ft for maritime cases. It would operate like a gen-
eral exception for state law that would prevent maritime
actors from prospectively identifying the law to govern fu-
ture disputes. The § 187(2)(b) exception would require par-
ties to litigate which State possesses the “materially greater
interest” in the dispute, and thereby create signifcant uncer-
tainty. As explained above, no federal maritime interest
favors injecting that kind of disuniformity and unpredictabil-
ity into maritime commerce. We therefore decline to adopt
§ 187(2)(b) for federal maritime law.
***
In sum, choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts are
presumptively enforceable as a matter of federal maritime
law, with certain narrow exceptions, and no exception to the
presumption applies in this case. We reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion in full because it correctly con-
cludes that federal maritime law governs the enforceability
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80 GREA
T LAKES INS. SE v. RAIDERS RETREAT REALTY CO.
Thomas, J., concurring
of choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts. In ar-
g
uing that state law should govern, Raiders Retreat Realty
relies principally on this Court's decision in Wilburn Boat
Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U. S. 310 (1955). I write
separately to highlight how Wilburn Boat rests on fawed
premises and, more broadly, how the decision is at odds with
the fundamental precept of admiralty law. This Court has
already retreated from Wilburn Boat's unsound holding, lim-
iting it to local disputes. Litigants and courts applying
Wi lb ur n Bo a t i n the future shou ld not ig nore these
developments.
The Constitution extends the judicial power to “all Cases
of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.” Art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
We have long understood this grant of jurisdiction to estab-
lish a uniform body of substantive law called the general
maritime law. See Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253
U. S. 149, 160–161 (1920); The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 575
(1875). For almost 150 years before Wilburn Boat, it was
well established that marine-insurance disputes fell within
that admiralty jurisdiction. See Insurance Co. v. Dunham,
11 Wall. 1, 35 (1871); DeLovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 444
(No. 3,776) (CC Mass. 1815) (Story, J.). And, it was widely
accepted that courts applied general maritime law in such
disputes as a result. See Watts v. Camors, 115 U. S. 353, 362
(1885). Wilburn Boat upset this understanding by inviting
courts to apply state law in a broad range of marine-
insurance disputes. That break from settled practice was
unwarranted.
Wilburn Boat involved an insurance claim on a small
houseboat that was destroyed by fre while moored in Lake
Texoma, an artifcial inland lake. 348 U. S., at 311. The
houseboat's owner conceded that he breached the marine-
insurance policy's express warranty limiting his use to pri-
vate pleasure by carrying passengers for hire. Ibid. Even
though that breach was unrelated to the fre, the insurer de-
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81
Thomas, J., concurring
clined coverage on breach-of-warranty grounds, arguing
that
federal maritime law requires literal compliance with
express warranties and that any breach thus releases the
insurer from liability. See id., at 311–312. The owner
countered that Texas law—not federal maritime law—should
determine the consequences of a breach of warranty, and
that breaching the private-pleasure warranty would not jus-
tify denying coverage under Texas law. Id., at 312. To re-
solve this choice-of-law dispute, the Court posed two ques-
tions: “(1) Is there a judicially established federal admiralty
rule governing these warranties? (2) If not, should we fash-
ion one?” Id., at 314. Answering both questions in the
negative, this Court concluded that state law governs the
effect of a breach of warranty in a marine-insurance policy.
Id., at 316, 320–321.
Wilburn Boat's rationale is deeply fawed. The Court's
frst conclusion, that there was no established federal admi-
ralty rule requiring literal compliance with express warran-
ties, is indefensible. See id., at 314–316. Treatises from
the early 19th century to the 20th century recognized the
literal compliance rule as part of the general maritime law
governing marine insurance. See, e.g., 2 R. Simey & G.
Mitchison, Arnould on the Law of Marine Insurance and Av-
erage § 635, p. 863 (12th ed. 1939); 2 T. Parsons, Maritime
Law 104–105 (1859); 1 J. Park, A System of the Law of
Marine Insurances 422 (6th ed. 1809); J. Burn, Law of Marine
Insurances 80 (1801). By the time of Wilburn Boat, at least
fve Courts of Appeals had applied that rule in marine-
insurance cases. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Ciconett, 179
F. 2d 892, 894 (CA6 1950); Robinson v. Home Ins. Co., 73
F. 2d 3, 4 (CA5 1934); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Houston Oil &
Transp. Co., 49 F. 2d 121, 124 (CA5 1931); Fidelity-Phenix
Ins. Co. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 12 F. 2d 573, 574 (CA7
1926); Shamrock Towing Co. v. American Ins. Co., 9 F. 2d
57, 60 (CA2 1925); Canton Ins. Offce v. Independent Transp.
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82 GREA
T LAKES INS. SE v. RAIDERS RETREAT REALTY CO.
Thomas, J., concurring
Co., 217 F. 213, 217 (CA9 1914). And, as Justice Reed high-
l
ighted in dissent, “[n]o case h[eld] to the contrary.” Wil-
burn Boat, 348 U. S., at 326.
The Court's only rejoinder was that some Court of Ap-
peals decisions may have drawn the literal compliance rule
from state or general common law, rather than general mari-
time law. Id., at 315. Even so, the Court never explained
why the two decisions that identifed general maritime law
as the source of the literal compliance rule were not enough
to “establish” a federal admiralty rule. See Home Ins. Co.,
179 F. 2d, at 894; Aetna Ins. Co., 49 F. 2d, at 124. Nor did
it grapple with the seemingly universal endorsement of the
rule in marine-insurance treatises. See Air & Liquid Sys-
tems Corp. v. DeVries, 586 U. S. 446, 452 (2019) (“In formu-
lating federal maritime law, the federal courts may examine,
among other sources, judicial opinions, legislation, treatises,
and scholarly writings”). At any rate, that some decisions
were not explicit about the source of the literal compliance
rule is unsurprising given the common understanding that
general maritime law applied in admiralty cases. See
Watts, 115 U. S., at 362. And, it is telling that many of those
decisions rely on the classic marine-insurance treatise, Ar-
nould on Marine Insurance. See Robinson, 73 F. 2d, at 4;
Fidelity-Phenix, 12 F. 2d, at 574; Shamrock Towing, 9 F. 2d,
at 60; Canton, 217 F., at 217. In short, at the time of Wil-
burn Boat, the existence of an established federal maritime
rule addressing the effect of a breach of warranty could not
plausibly be questioned.
The Wilburn Boat Court's justifcation for not creating a
federal admiralty rule is equally problematic. It reasoned
that general insurance regulation is an area that historically
has been left to the States and that courts are ill suited for
crafting marine insurance law on a case-by-case basis. See
348 U. S., at 316–317, 319–320. The fact that States have
traditionally provided rules of decision for general insurance
law is no reason to leave marine insurance law to them.
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as: 601 U. S. 65 (2024)
83
Thomas, J., concurring
States have traditionally provided rules of decision for gen-
era
l contract and tort law, yet federal courts continue to de-
velop maritime law in those areas. See, e.g., Air & Liquid
Systems Corp., 586 U. S., at 453–455; Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Baker, 554 U. S. 471, 506–507 (2008); Norfolk Southern
R. Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd., 543 U. S. 14, 33 (2004);
Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U. S. 85, 90 (1955).
The Wilburn Boat Court's doubts about the ability of judges
to craft marine-insurance rules on a case-by-case basis is
simply a critique of the common-law process. But, federal
courts exercising admiralty jurisdiction act as common-
law courts, Air & Liquid Systems Corp., 586 U. S., at 452,
and the diffculties inherent in that role do not justify aban-
doning it.
A noticeable defciency of Wilburn Boat was its failure
to even acknowledge the uniformity principle—a singularly
important concept in admiralty law. We have long recog-
nized that the Constitution's grant of admiralty jurisdiction
“referred to a system of law coextensive with, and operating
uniformly in, the whole country,” and empowered federal
courts to maintain that national system using a common-law
process. The Lottawanna, 21 Wall., at 575. Only a uniform
system of maritime law, the Court has explained, can ensure
the “consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all sub-
jects of a commercial character affecting ” interstate and for-
eign commerce. Ibid. This need for uniformity has been
the “touchstone” for determining the scope of admiralty ju-
risdiction and the extent to which state law can be given
effect in admiralty cases. Norfolk Southern, 543 U. S., at 28;
see also Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U. S. 731, 741–742
(1961); Southern Pacifc Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 216 (1917);
DeLovio, 7 F. Cas., at 443. Notwithstanding this settled prin-
ciple, however, Wilburn Boat said nothing about uniformity.
It did not so much as consider whether a need for uniformity
required a federal rule on the effect of breaching an express
warranty in a marine-insurance contract. This silence is in-
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84 GREA
T LAKES INS. SE v. RAIDERS RETREAT REALTY CO.
Thomas, J., concurring
explicable given that both Justice Frankfurter's concurrence
and
Justice Reed's dissent discussed uniformity at length.
See 348 U. S., at 322–324 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in re-
sult); id., at 332–334 (Reed, J., dissenting). As Justice Reed
lamented, “the Court's decision strikes deep into the princi-
ple of a uniform admiralty law,” and worse, it did so without
explaining why. Id., at 327.
Unsurprisingly, Wilburn Boat has been met with univer-
sal criticism over the past 70 years. A mere two years after
the decision, the Nation's foremost admiralty scholars wrote
a stinging critique in their treatise. See G. Gilmore & C.
Black, Law of Admiralty 44–45, 62–63 (1957). Wilburn
Boat's rationale, they explained, suggests that state law pro-
vides the rule of decision “when it happens that such cases
have not presented themselves to the federal courts in such
number or with the issues so posed as to result in decision
of the point involved.” Gilmore, Law of Admiralty, at 62
(emphasis deleted). This, they concluded, is “a nightmarish
solution” because “[s]ome of the most important and obvious
propositions in marine insurance law are rarely litigated.”
Id., at 62–63. One exhaustive study of the opinion also con-
cluded that Wilburn Boat “was poorly reasoned and its hold-
ing poorly articulated.” J. Goldstein, The Life and Times of
Wilburn Boat: A Critical Guide (Part I), 28 J. Mar. L. & Com.
395, 396 (1997). It explained that Wilburn Boat did not “ar-
ticulate any convincing theory of the extent to which uni-
formity is a basic characteristic of maritime law,” “showed
little appreciation” for the Judiciary's role in fashioning the
general maritime law, and “failed to produce a decision or
analysis that would provide guidance to the lower courts.”
J. Goldstein, The Life and Times of Wilburn Boat: A Critical
Guide (Part II), 28 J. Mar. L. & Com. 555, 591 (1997). And,
a moder n treatise explai ns that “Wi lb ur n Bo a t has
(1) produced a `crazy-quilt' pattern of federal-state regula-
tion of marine insurance; and (2) bogged the courts down in
complex and confusing choice-of-law questions.” 2 T.
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as: 601 U. S. 65 (2024)
85
Thomas, J., concurring
Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 19:9, p. 438 (6th
ed.
2018).*
It is little wonder that this Court has retreated from Wil-
burn Boat in subsequent decisions, implicitly cabining its
reach to “localized” disputes in accordance with Justice
Frankfurter's concurrence. See 348 U. S., at 322. In Kos-
sick, for example, this Court held that general maritime law,
not a state statute of frauds, governed the validity of a ship-
owner's oral contract with a seaman. 365 U. S., at 732–733,
742. The Court attributed the decision in Wilburn Boat in
part to the inherently local nature of its dispute about “a
contract of insurance on a houseboat established in the wa-
ters of a small artifcial lake.” 365 U. S., at 742. Fifty
years later, we endorsed this narrow reading of Wilburn
Boat in Norfolk Southern, holding that general maritime law
governed a maritime contract for the carriage of goods pri-
marily by sea. 543 U. S., at 18–19, 22–23. We explained
that “[w]hen a contract is a maritime one, and the dispute is
not inherently local, federal law controls the contract interpre-
tation.” Id., at 22–23. Today's decision further erodes Wil-
burn Boat's foundation, and rightly so. See ante, at 73–75.
In light of these decisions, it is not clear what, if anything,
is left of Wilburn Boat's rationale. Yet, Raiders and some
*Critiques of Wilburn Boat are too numerous to list comprehensively.
See, e.g., D. Robertson, S. Friedell, & M. Sturley, Admiralty and Maritime
Law in the United States 465 (4th ed. 2020) (“For many informed observ-
ers, Wilburn Boat is the Supreme Court's most disappointing maritime-
law decision”); H. Watson, A Fifty Year Retrospective on the American
Law of Marine Insurance, 91 Tulane L. Rev. 855, 857 (2017) (“Wilburn
Boat has been the subject of relentless well-deserved criticism”); G. Star-
ing, Wilburn Boat is a Dead Letter: R. I. P., 42 J. Mar. L. & Com. 465, 468
(2011) (“Over a half century the decision has been repeatedly criticized for
its shallow erroneousness”); 1 A. Parks, The Law and Practice of Marine
Insurance and Average 13 (1987) (“Wilburn cast the law of marine insur-
ance into a state of turmoil”); H. Baer, Admiralty Law of the Supreme
Court 389 (3d ed. 1979) (“The Wilburn Boat case has left the admiralty
bar in a state of utter confusion”).

86 GREA
T LAKES INS. SE v. RAIDERS RETREAT REALTY CO.
Thomas, J., concurring
courts continue to understand Wilburn Boat to require ap-
pl
ication of state law in circumstances far different from the
inherently local dispute at issue there. See, e.g., Travelers
Property Casualty Co. of Am. v. Ocean Reef Charters LLC,
996 F. 3d 1161, 1169–1170 (CA11 2021); In re Settoon Towing,
720 F. 3d 268, 282–284 (CA5 2013). But see Lloyd's of Lon-
don v. Págan-Sánchez, 539 F. 3d 19, 24 (CA1 2008) (recogniz-
ing that Wilburn Boat applies only to “inherently local” dis-
putes (internal quotation marks omitted)). Litigants and
courts should heed our instruction that general maritime law
applies in maritime contract disputes unless they “so impli-
cate local interests as to beckon interpretation by state law.”
Norfolk Southern, 543 U. S., at 27. Wilburn Boat reaches
no further.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None