Berger v. North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 597 U. S. Part 1
Pages 179–214
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 23, 2022
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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Syllabus
BERGER et al. v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE
CONFERENCE
OF THE NAACP et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit
No. 21–248. Argued March 21, 2022—Decided June 23, 2022
In 2018, North Carolina amended its Constitution to provide that “[v]oters
offering to vote in person shall present photographic identifcation.”
Art. VI, § 2(4). To implement the constitutional mandate, the General
Assembly approved S. B. 824. The Governor vetoed the bill, the Gen-
eral Assembly overrode the veto, and S. B. 824 went into effect. The
state conference of the NAACP then sued the Governor and members of
the State Board of Elections (collectively, Board), a state agency whose
members are both appointed and removable by the Governor. The
NAACP alleged that S. B. 824 offends the Federal Constitution. The
Board was defended by the State's attorney general, who, like the Gov-
ernor, is an independently elected offcial. The attorney general at the
time was a former state senator who voted against an earlier voter-ID
law and fled a declaration in support of a legal challenge against it.
The speaker of the State House of Representatives and president pro
tempore of the State Senate (hereinafter, legislative leaders) moved to
intervene, arguing that, without their participation, important state in-
terests would not be adequately represented in light of the Governor's
opposition to S. B. 824, the Board's allegiance to the Governor and its
tepid defense of S. B. 824 in parallel state-court proceedings, and the
attorney general's opposition to earlier voter-ID efforts.
The District Court applied a presumption that the legislative leaders'
interests would be adequately represented by the Governor, Board, and
the attorney general and denied their motion to intervene. Unsatisfed
with the Board's defense following the denial of their motion, the legisla-
tive leaders sought to lodge an amicus brief and accompanying materi-
als, but the District Court refused to consider them, struck them from
the record, and granted a preliminary injunction barring enforcement
of S. B. 824. The Fourth Circuit considered both District Court rulings
in separate appeals before separate panels. On the preliminary injunc-
tion ruling, the panel held that the District Court had abused its discre-
tion because the record contained insuffcient evidence to show that S. B.
824 violated the Federal Constitution. On the intervention ruling, a
separate panel agreed with the legislative leaders and held that the
District Court had erred when denying them leave to intervene. Even-

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180 BERGER
v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP
Syllabus
tually, however, the Fourth Circuit decided to rehear the matter en banc
and
ruled that the legislative leaders were not entitled to intervene in
the District Court proceedings. This Court agreed to hear the matter
to resolve disagreements among the courts of appeals on the proper
treatment of motions to intervene in cases like this one.
Held: North Carolina's legislative leaders are entitled to intervene in this
litigation. Pp. 190–200.
(a) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) provides that a “court
must permit anyone to intervene” who, (1) “[o]n timely motion,” (2)
“claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the
subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may
as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect
its interest,” (3) “unless existing parties adequately represent that in-
terest.” No one disputes the timeliness of the motion to intervene here.
The Court thus addresses the Rule's two remaining requirements.
States possess “ `a legitimate interest in the continued enforce[ment]
of [their] own statutes,' ” Cameron v. EMW Women's Surgical Center,
P. S. C., 595 U. S. 267, 277, and States may organize themselves in a
variety of ways. When a State chooses to allocate authority among
different offcials who do not answer to one another, different interests
and perspectives, all important to the administration of state govern-
ment, may emerge. See, e. g., Brnovich v. Democratic National Com-
mittee, 594 U. S. –––. Appropriate respect for these realities suggests
that federal courts should rarely question that a State's interests will
be practically impaired or impeded if its duly authorized representatives
are excluded from participating in federal litigation challenging state
law. Nor are state interests the only interests at stake. Permitting
the participation of lawfully authorized state agents promotes informed
federal-court decisionmaking and avoids the risk of setting aside duly
enacted state law based on an incomplete understanding of relevant
state interests. This Court's teachings on these scores have been many,
clear, and recent. See, e. g., Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-
Hill, 587 U. S. –––; Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U. S. 693.
These precedents and the principles they represent are dispositive
here. North Carolina law explicitly provides that “[t]he Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate,
as agents of the State, by and through counsel of their choice,” “shall
jointly have standing to intervene on behalf of the General Assembly as
a party in any judicial proceeding challenging a North Carolina statute
or provision of the North Carolina Constitution.” N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 1–72.2(b). And the State has made plain that it considers the leaders
of the General Assembly “necessary parties” to suits like this one.
§ 120–32.6(b).

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The Board submits that North Carolina law does not afford the leg-
islative
leaders authority to represent state interests. But that argu-
ment is diffcult to square with the express statutory language. Alter-
natively, the Board argues that the statutes authorizing the legislative
leaders to participate here violate the State Constitution by usurping
power vested in the executive branch alone. That logic is hard to fol-
low, however, given the Board's concession that the legislative leaders
may intervene permissively under Rule 24(b), and likely as a matter
of right under Rule 24(a)(2) if the attorney general ceases to defend
the law.
The NAACP offers a different reply, pointing out that Rule 24(a)(2)
permits intervention only by “new” parties. And, it submits, the legis-
lative leaders are already effectively “existing ” parties to this suit chal-
lenging the enforcement of state law. That argument rests on a prem-
ise that is both formally and functionally mistaken. First, the NAACP
has not sued the State but only certain state offcers, and, so far, the
legislative leaders are not among them. Functionally, however, this
suit implicates North Carolina's sovereign interests regardless of the
named parties. And, where a State chooses to divide its sovereign au-
thority among different offcials and authorize their participation in a
suit challenging state law, a full consideration of the State's practical
interests may require the involvement of different voices with different
perspectives. Pp. 191–195.
(b) Concerning Rule 24(a)(2)'s third requirement, lower courts have
adopted a variety of tests for evaluating whether an existing defendant
already “adequately represent[s]” the same interests a proposed inter-
venor seeks to vindicate. Here, both the District Court and the en banc
Court of Appeals improperly applied a “presumption” that the Board
adequately represented the legislative leaders' interests and held that
the leaders could not overcome this presumption. But Rule 24(a)(2)'s
test in this regard presents proposed intervenors with only a minimal
challenge: It promises intervention to those who bear an interest that
may be practically impaired or impeded “unless existing parties ade-
quately represent that [same] interest.” See, e. g., Trbovich v. Mine
Workers, 404 U. S. 528. Some lower courts have suggested that a pre-
sumption of adequate representation remains appropriate in certain
classes of cases. But even taken on their own terms, none of these
presumptions applies to cases like this one. For instance, some lower
courts have adopted a presumption of adequate representation in cases
where a movant's interests are identical to those of an existing party.
But even the Board concedes that this presumption applies only when
interests fully overlap.

182 BERGER
v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP
Syllabus
This litigation illustrates how divided state governments sometimes
warrant
participation by multiple state offcials in federal court. Here,
the legislative leaders seek to give voice to a perspective different from
the Board's. They assert an unalloyed interest in vindicating state law
from constitutional challenge, without an eye to crosscutting administra-
tive concerns—concerns that have colored the Board's defense thus far.
The NAACP worries that allowing the legislative leaders to intervene
could “make trial management impossible.” While a proliferation of
motions to intervene may be a cause for concern in some cases, this case
is not one. Federal courts routinely handle cases involving multiple
offcials sometimes represented by different attorneys taking different
positions. See, e. g., Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, 595 U. S. 30.
Whatever additional burdens adding the legislative leaders to this case
may pose, those burdens fall well within the bounds of everyday case
management. Pp. 195–200.
999 F. 3d 915, reversed.
Gorsuch, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Thomas, Breyer, Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Bar-
rett, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., fled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 200.
David H. Thompson argued the cause for petitioners.
With him on the briefs was Peter A. Patterson.
Elisabeth S. Theodore argued the cause for NAACP re-
spondents. With her on the brief were Andrew T. Tutt, Ste-
phen K. Wirth, Penda D. Hair, and Irving Joyner.
Sara G. Boyce, Deputy Solicitor General of North Carolina,
argued the cause for state respondents. With her on the
brief were Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General of North Caro-
l i na, Ryan Y. Park, Sol icitor Genera l, James W. Dog-
gett, Deputy Solicitor General, Sripriya Narasimhan, and
Olga E. Vysotskaya de Brito, Terence Steed, Mary Carla
Babb, and L aura M cHenr y, Specia l Deputy Attor neys
General.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Ari-
zona et al. by Mark Brnovich, Attorney General of Arizona, Brunn W.
Roysden III, Solicitor General, Drew C. Ensign and Michael S. Catlett,
Deputy Solicitors General, and Joseph A. Kanefeld, and by the Attorneys
General for their respective States as follows: Steve Marshall of Ala-
bama, Je ff L andr y of Louisiana, L ynn Fi tch of Mississippi, Au st in
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Opinion of the Court
Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court.
A
t the heart of this lawsuit lies a challenge to the constitu-
tionality of a North Carolina election law. But the merits
of that dispute are not before us, only an antecedent question
of civil procedure: Are two leaders of North Carolina's state
legislature entitled to participate in the case under the terms
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2)?
I
A
Within wide constitutional bounds, States are free to
structure themselves as they wish. Often, they choose to
Knudsen of Montana, Douglas J. Peterson of Nebraska, Alan Wilson of
South Carolina, Ken Paxton of Texas, and Sean D. Reyes of Utah; for the
American Legislative Exchange Council by Jason Torchinsky, Phillip M.
Gordon, and Jonathon Paul Hauenschild; for the Honest Elections Proj-
ect by Jonathan P. Lienhard and Dallin B. Holt; for the Lawyers Democ-
racy Fund et al. by Richard B. Raile; for the Republican State Leadership
Committee by Charles R. Spies; for the Wisconsin Legislature by Jeffrey
Matthew Harris and Taylor A. R. Meehan; and for Former North Carolina
Supreme Court Justice Robert F. Orr by Andrew H. Erteschik and John
M. Durnovich.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for Federal Courts
Scholars by Adam S. Gershenson and Kathleen R. Hartnett; and for Re-
tired Federal Judges by Michael J. Gottlieb and Mark T. Stancil.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the State of Minnesota et al. by
Keith Ellison, Attorney General of Minnesota, Liz Kramer, Solicitor Gen-
eral, Jason Marisam, Assistant Attorney General, and Alethea Huyser,
Special Assistant Attorney General, by Joshua L. Kaul, Attorney General
of Wisconsin, and Brian P. Keenan and Anthony Russomanno, Assistant
Attorneys General, by Matthew J. Platkin, Acting Attorney General of
New Jersey, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdic-
tions as follows: William Tong of Connecticut, Kathleen Jennings of Dela-
ware, Karl A. Racine of the District of Columbia, Kwame Raoul of Illi-
nois, Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Brian E. Frosh of Maryland, Dana Nessel
of Michigan, Aaron D. Ford of Nevada, Letitia James of New York, Ellen
F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania, and Thomas J.
Donovan, Jr., of Vermont; for the Liberty Justice Center by Daniel R.
Suhr and Jeffrey D. Jennings; and for the Republican National Committee
by David A. Warrington and Harmeet K. Dhillon.

184 BERGER
v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP
Opinion of the Court
conduct their affairs through a variety of branches, agencies,
a
nd elected and appointed officials. These constituent
pieces sometimes work together to achieve shared goals;
other times they reach very different judgments about im-
portant policy questions and act accordingly. This diffusion
of governmental powers within and across institutions may
be an everyday feature of American life. But it can also
pose its diffculties when a State's laws or policies are chal-
lenged in federal court.
Suppose someone seeks to attack a state law on the ground
that it is inconsistent with the Federal Constitution. Gener-
ally, States themselves are immune from suit in federal
court. See Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U. S. 277, 284 (2011).
So usually a plaintiff will sue the individual state offcials
most responsible for enforcing the law in question and seek
injunctive or declaratory relief against them. See Ex parte
Young, 209 U. S. 123, 159–160 (1908). Despite the artifce,
of course, a State will as a practical matter often retain a
strong interest in this kind of litigation. After all, however
captioned, a suit of this sort can implicate “the continued
enforceability of [the State's] own statutes.” Maine v. Tay-
lor, 477 U. S. 131, 137 (1986). To defend its practical inter-
ests, the State may choose to mount a legal defense of the
named offcial defendants and speak with a “single voice,”
often through an attorney general. Virginia House of Dele-
gates v. Bethune-Hill, 587 U. S. –––, ––– (2019).
Still, not every State has structured itself this way. Some
have chosen to authorize multiple offcials to defend their
practical interests in cases like these. See ibid. North
Carolina falls into this camp. The State's attorney general
wields some authority to represent individual offcial defend-
ants in federal litigation. See Martin v. Thornburg, 320
N. C. 533, 545–546, 359 S. E. 2d 472, 479 (1987); N. C. Const.,
Art. III, §§ 7(1), (2) (establishing the offce of attorney gen-
eral and declaring that his “duties shall be prescribed by
law”). But North Carolina's General Assembly has also em-
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powered the leaders of its two legislative houses to partici-
pate
in litigation on the State's behalf under certain circum-
stances and with counsel of their own choosing. See N. C.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1–72.2 (2021).
The reasons why a State might choose to proceed this way
are understandable enough. Sometimes leaders in different
branches of government may see the State's interests at
stake in litigation differently. Some States may judge that
important public perspectives would be lost without a mech-
anism allowing multiple offcials to respond. It seems North
Carolina has some experience with just these sorts of issues.
More than once a North Carolina attorney general has op-
posed laws enacted by the General Assembly and declined
to defend them fully in federal litigation. See, e. g., North
Carolina v. North Carolina State Conference of NAACP,
581 U. S. 985, 986 (2017) (Roberts, C. J., statement respect-
ing denial of certiorari); App. 79; see also N. Devins & S. Pra-
kash, Fifty States, Fifty Attorneys General, and Fifty Ap-
proaches to the Duty To Defend, 124 Yale L. J. 2100, 2152,
n. 217, 2187 (2015).
B
The facts of this case also illustrate how divided state gov-
ernment can lead to disagreements over the defense of state
law in federal court. In November 2018, the people of North
Carolina amended the State Constitution to provide that
“[v]oters offering to vote in person shall present photo-
graphic identifcation [(photo ID)].” Art. VI, § 2(4). The
people further provided that “[t]he General Assembly shall
enact genera l laws governing the requirements of such
photographic identifcation, which may include exceptions.”
Ibid. Consistent with that directive, the General Assembly
eventually approved Senate Bill 824 (S. B. 824). 2017 Gen.
Assem., 2018 Reg. Sess. Under that law's terms, those
seeking to vote must do one of three things: present an ac-
ceptable photo ID, complete a provisional ballot and later
produce a photo ID, or submit a form explaining why they

186 BERGER
v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP
Opinion of the Court
cannot present a photo ID. See N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§§
163A–1145.1(a), (c), (d), as added by § 1.2(a), 2018 N. C.
Sess. Laws 144, pp. 73–74. Photo ID cards are available free
of charge in each of the State's 100 counties without the need
for corroborating documentation. § 163A–869.1, as added by
§ 1.1(a), id., at 72–73. After the law's passage, the Governor
vetoed the bill, the General Assembly responded by over-
riding that veto, and S. B. 824 went into effect on Decem-
ber 19, 2018.
The next day, the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People (NAACP) sued the Governor and
the members of the State Board of Elections (collectively,
Board). The Governor appoints the Board's members and
may remove them under certain circumstances. See N. C.
Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 143B–16, 163–19, 163–40. In its lawsuit,
the NAACP alleged that S. B. 824 offends the Federal Con-
stitution. The State's attorney general assumed responsi-
bility for defending the Board. See § 114–2. Like the Gov-
ernor, the attorney general is an independently elected
offcial. See N. C. Const., Art. III, § 7(1). Much like the
Governor, too, while serving as a state senator the attorney
general voted against an earlier voter-ID law and fled a dec-
laration in support of a legal challenge against it. See North
Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F.
Supp. 2d 322, 337–338, 357–359 (MDNC 2014).
Soon, the speaker of the State House of Representatives
and president pro tempore of the State Senate (legislative
leaders) moved to intervene. App. 52. They noted that
North Carolina law expressly authorizes them “to intervene
on behalf of the General Assembly as a party in any judicial
proceeding challenging a North Carolina statute or provision
of the North Carolina Constitution.” N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 1–72.2(b). They observed that, in cases of this sort, state
law further provides that “both the General Assembly and
the Governor constitute the State of North Carolina.” § 1–
72.2(a). And the legislative leaders suggested that, without
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their participation, important state interests would not be
adequately
represented in light of the Governor's opposition
to S. B. 824, the Board's allegiance to the Governor, and the
attorney general's opposition to earlier voter-ID efforts.
App. 65–70. Finally, the legislative leaders pointed to paral-
lel state-court proceedings in which they claimed the Board
had offered only a “tepid” defense of S. B. 824. Id., at 127,
n. 1.
The District Court denied the motion to intervene. North
Caro l in a Sta te Co n fe rence o f NA ACP v. Co o pe r, 332
F. R. D. 161 (MDNC 2019). In doing so, the court applied a
“presumption” that the legislative leaders' interests would
be adequately represented by the Governor and Board and
their legal representative, the attorney general. Id., at 168–
170. On the court's view, the legislative leaders might some-
day have an interest suffcient to warrant intervention if the
existing parties refused to offer any defense of S. B. 824.
Id., at 166. But because nothing like that had yet happened,
the District Court denied the motion to intervene without
prejudice to renewal later. Id., at 172–173.
In time, the legislative leaders took up the District Court's
offer to renew their motion. They pointed to this Court's
intervening decision in Bethune-Hill, which “clarifed” that
legislative leaders sometimes may be legally entitled to in-
tervene and represent “the interest of the State in defending
the constitutionality of ” a state law. App. 159. They also
updated the District Court on the Board's conduct in state-
court proceedings. There, the Board had conceded that its
“ `primary objective' ” wasn't defending S. B. 824, but obtain-
ing guidance regarding which law it would need to enforce
in an upcoming election (S. B. 824 or preexisting law). Id.,
at 156. Seizing on this concession, the state-court plaintiffs
argued that even the Board did not think it would ultimately
prevail on the merits. Id., at 157. In the end, however, the
District Court was unmoved by these developments. It de-
nied the legislative leaders' renewed motion and addressed

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v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP
Opinion of the Court
Bethune-Hill only in a footnote stating that the decision did
not
“change the calculus.” North Carolina State Confer-
ence of NAACP v. Cooper, 2019 WL 5840845, *2, n. 3
(MDNC, Nov. 7, 2019).
As the federal litigation proceeded without the legislative
leaders, the NAACP sought a preliminary injunction to pre-
vent the Board from enforcing S. B. 824 in upcoming elec-
tions. By this point, the District Court had dismissed the
Governor from the suit. Only the Board members, repre-
sented by the attorney general, remained as defendants. In
support of its motion for injunctive relief, the NAACP of-
fered fve expert reports. In reply, the Board did not op-
pose the motion on timeliness grounds even though the
NAACP had waited nine months before seeking what it de-
scribed as critical emergency relief. See App. 311–313;
Memorandum of Law in No. 1:18–cv–1034 (MDNC, Sept. 17,
2019), ECF Doc. 73. Nor did the Board produce competing
expert reports. Instead, it supplied a single affdavit from
its executive director and stressed again the need for clarity
about which law to apply. App. 312. Once more unsatisfed
with the vigor of the Board's response, the legislative leaders
sought to lodge an amicus brief, fve expert reports, and
several other declarations. At the end of the day, however,
the District Court refused to consider the amicus brief and
accompanying materials, struck them from the record, and
granted a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of
S. B. 824. North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v.
Cooper, 430 F. Supp. 3d 15, 54 (MDNC 2019).
C
The Fourth Circuit took up the District Court's prelimi-
nary injunction and intervention rulings in separate appeals
before separate panels. While these appeals were pending,
the Board did not seek an interim stay of the District Court's
preliminary injunction. Apparently, it chose not to do so
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election administration. App. 366, n. 8. As a result, S. B.
824
was not enforced during the State's March 2020 pri-
mary election.
In the appeal concerning the District Court's preliminary
injunction ruling, the legislative leaders sought leave to in-
tervene and the Fourth Circuit granted their motion. See
Order in North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v.
Raymond, No. 20–1092 (CA4, Mar. 27, 2020), ECF Doc. 43.
Meanwhile, the Governor fled an amicus brief contending
that the District Court had not gone far enough: “[The] pre-
liminary injunctio[n] should be made permanent, and . . . this
unconstitutional law should never go into effect.” App. 844.
After considering all the submissions before it, a unanimous
panel of the Court of Appeals largely agreed with the legisla-
tive leaders and reversed. North Carolina State Confer-
ence of NAACP v. Raymond, 981 F. 3d 295, 298 (2020). The
panel held that the District Court had abused its discretion
in issuing the preliminary injunction because the record con-
tained insuffcient evidence to show that S. B. 824 violated
the Federal Constitution. In particular, the panel explained
that North Carolina's law “is more protective of the right
to vote than other states' voter ID laws that courts have
approved.” Id., at 310. Later, the Court of Appeals denied
rehearing en banc; no judge noted a dissent. Any further
District Court proceedings were thus left to unfold without
a preliminary injunction in place.
Separately and hoping to participate in those future pro-
ceedings, the legislative leaders asked another panel of the
Fourth Circuit to vacate the District Court's decision deny-
ing their moti on to i ntervene. The leg islative leaders
stressed that state law expressly authorizes them to partici-
pate in cases like this one, and they argued that they satis-
fed all the requirements for intervention as a matter of right
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2). For its part,
the Court of Appeals again agreed with the legislative lead-
ers, this time holding that the District Court had erred when
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190 BERGER
v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE
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Opinion of the Court
denying them leave to intervene. 970 F. 3d 489, 503–504,
506
(2020).
Eventually, however, the Fourth Circuit decided to rehear
the matter en banc and changed course. A nine-judge ma-
jority ruled that the legislative leaders were not entitled to
intervene in District Court proceedings because they could
not overcome a “heightened presumption” that the Board al-
ready “adequately represented” their interests. 999 F. 3d
915, 927, 932–934 (2021). Six judges dissented. Among
other things, the dissenters suggested that the majority had
erred by “ignor[ing] North Carolina's law requesting two
agents in cases challenging the constitutionality of its duly-
enacted statutes” and by “setting the bar for the Intervenors
to clear too high.” Id., at 945 (opinion of Quattlebaum, J.);
see also id., at 939 (opinion of Wilkinson, J.); id., at 941 (opin-
ion of Niemeyer, J.).
The legislative leaders responded by petitioning this Court
to review the Fourth Circuit's en banc ruling. We agreed
to hear the matter in order to resolve disagreements among
the circuits about the proper treatment of motions to inter-
vene in cases like this one. 595 U. S. ––– (2021).
II
Our starting point lies in Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. As relevant here, the Rule pro-
vides that a “court must permit anyone to intervene” who,
(1) “[o]n timely motion,” (2) “claims an interest relating to
the property or transaction that is the subject of the action,
and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practi-
cal matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect
its interest,” (3) “unless existing parties adequately repre-
sent that interest.” Everyone before us agrees that the leg-
islative leaders' motion to intervene was timely. The only
disagreements we face concern the Rule's two remaining
requirements.
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A
W
e focus frst on the question whether the legislative lead-
ers have claimed an interest in the resolution of this lawsuit
that may be practically impaired or impeded without their
participation. No one questions that States possess “ `a le-
gitimate interest in the continued enforce[ment] of [their]
own statutes.' ” Cameron v. EMW Women's Surgical Cen-
ter, P. S. C., 595 U. S. 267, 277 (2022) (quoting Taylor, 477
U. S., at 137). No one questions that States may organize
themselves in a variety of ways. After all, the separation
of government powers has long been recognized as vital to
the preservation of liberty, and it is through the power to
“structure . . . its government, and the character of those
who exercise government authority, [that] a State defnes it-
self as a sovereign.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 460
(1991). Nor does anyone question that, when a State
chooses to allocate authority among different offcials who do
not answer to one another, different interests and perspec-
tives, all important to the administration of state govern-
ment, may emerge. See, e. g., Brnovich v. Democratic Na-
tional Committee, 594 U. S. ––– (2021) (Arizona's secretary
of state and attorney general took opposite sides).
Appropriate respect for these realities suggests that fed-
eral courts should rarely question that a State's interests
will be practically impaired or impeded if its duly authorized
representatives are excluded from participating in federal
litigation challenging state law. To hold otherwise would
not only evince disrespect for a State's chosen means of dif-
fusing its sovereign powers among various branches and of-
fcials. It would not only risk turning a deaf federal ear to
voices the State has deemed crucial to understanding the full
range of its interests. It would encourage plaintiffs to make
strategic choices to control which state agents they will face
across the aisle in federal court. It would tempt litigants to
select as their defendants those individual offcials they
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Opinion of the Court
consider most sympathetic to their cause or most inclined to
settle
favorably and quickly. All of which would risk a hob-
bled litigation rather than a full and fair adversarial testing
of the State's interests and arguments.
Nor are state interests the only interests at stake. Re-
specting the States' “plan[s] for the distribution of govern-
mental powers” also serves important national interests.
Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415
U. S. 605, 615, n. 13 (1974). It better enables the States to
serve as a “balance” to federal authority. Bond v. United
States, 564 U. S. 211, 221 (2011). It permits States to accom-
modate government to local conditions and circumstances.
See ibid. And it allows States to serve as laboratories of
“innovation and experimentation” from which the federal
government itself may learn and from which a “mobile citi-
zenry” benefts. Gregory, 501 U. S., at 458. Finally, a fed-
eral court tasked with testing the constitutionality of state
law wields weighty “authority over a State's most fundamen-
tal political processes.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 751
(1999). Permitting the participation of lawfully authorized
state agents promotes informed federa l-cour t decision-
making and avoids the risk of setting aside duly enacted
state law based on an incomplete understanding of relevant
state interests.
This Court's teachings on these scores have been many,
clear, and recent. Earlier this Term in Cameron, we ex-
plained that a State is free to “empowe[r] multiple offcials
to defend its sovereign interests in federal court.” 595
U. S., at 277. Three Terms ago in Bethune-Hill, we ob-
served that “ `a State must be able to designate agents to
represent it in federal court' ” and may authorize its legisla-
ture “to litigate on the State's behalf, either generally or in
a defned class of cases.” 587 U. S., at ––– – –––. “[T]he
choice belongs to” the sovereign State. Id., at –––. In Hol-
lingsworth v. Perry, this Court stressed that “state law may
provide for other offcials,” besides an attorney general, “to
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speak for the State in federal court” as some States have
done
for their “presiding legislative offcers.” 570 U. S. 693,
710 (2013). And in Karcher v. May, this Court held that
two state legislative leaders “authori[zed] under state law to
represent the State's interests” in federal court could defend
state laws there as parties. 484 U. S. 72, 75, 81–82 (1987).
These principles and precedents are dispositive here.
North Carolina has expressly authorized the legislative lead-
ers to defend the State's practical interests in litigation of
this sort. State law provides that “[t]he Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of
the Senate, as agents of the State, by and through counsel of
their choice,” “shall jointly have standing to intervene on
behalf of the General Assembly as a party in any judicial
proceeding challenging a North Carolina statute or provision
of the North Carolina Constitution.” N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 1–72.2(b). Even beyond these instructions, the State has
made plain that it considers the leaders of the General
Assembly “necessary parties” to suits like this one. § 120–
32.6(b).
Tellingly, the Board seems to agree that, if North Carolina
law authorizes participation by the legislative leaders on be-
half of the State, a federal court should fnd the interest
requirement of Rule 24(a)(2) satisfed. Brief for State Re-
spondents 20, 28. The Board submits only that, in fact,
North Carolina law does not afford the legislative leaders
that authority. Id., at 49–50. But while we are hardly the
fnal arbiters of North Carolina law, the Board's argument
seems more than a little diffcult to square with the express
statutory language above. One of these provisions is even
entitled, “General Assembly Acting on Behalf of the State of
North Carolina in Certain Actions.” § 120–32.6(b). It pro-
vides that the legislative leaders may defend state laws “as
agents of the State.” Ibid.
Retreating, the Board argues alternatively that the stat-
utes authorizing the legislative leaders to participate here
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Opinion of the Court
violate the State Constitution by usurping authority vested
i
n the executive branch. Brief for State Respondents 50–
55; N. C. Const., Art. I, § 6. But the Board's logic is hard to
follow given its concession that the legislative leaders may
intervene permissively under Rule 24(b), and likely as a mat-
ter of right under Rule 24(a)(2) if the attorney general ceases
to represent the Board. Brief for State Respondents 2, 48,
55. Nor, for that matter, does the Board identify anything
to support its suggestion that the State's executive branch
holds a constitutional monopoly on representing North Caro-
lina's practical interests in court. Instead, the parties direct
us to a provision stating that the General Assembly may
determine the scope of the attorney general's powers. See
N. C. Const., Art. III, § 7(2); Bailey v. State, 353 N. C. 142,
152–153, 540 S. E. 2d 313, 320 (2000). And, as we have seen,
while the General Assembly has afforded the attorney gen-
eral considerable authority, it has also reserved to itself some
authority to defend state law on behalf of the State. See
N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 120–32.6(b). In fact, it seems the
General Assembly has sometimes even entrusted the defense
of state interests to private persons. See § 1–608(b) (per-
mitting private citizens to bring false-claims actions “for
the State”).
The NAACP offers a different reply. It points out that
Rule 24(a)(2) permits intervention only by “new” parties.
And, it submits, the legislative leaders are already effec-
tively “existing ” parties to this suit challenging the enforce-
ment of state law. Brief for NAACP Respondents 12–14.
But whatever other problems may attend this argument, it
rests on a premise that is both formally and functionally mis-
taken. As a formal matter and consistent with principles of
sovereign immunity, the NAACP has not sued the State.
Only state offcers are or may be “parties” here—and, so far,
the legislative leaders are not among them. See Young, 209
U. S., at 159–160. Functionally, of course, this suit impli-
cates North Carolina's sovereign interests regardless of the
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named parties. See Part I–A, supra. Yet, contrary to the
premise
implicit in the NAACP's argument, a plaintiff who
chooses to name this or that offcial defendant does not neces-
sarily and always capture all relevant state interests. In-
stead and as we have seen, where a State chooses to divide
its sovereign authority among different offcials and author-
ize their participation in a suit challenging state law, a full
consideration of the State's practical interests may require
the involvement of different voices with different perspec-
tives. To hold otherwise would risk allowing a private
plaintiff to pick its preferred defendants and potentially si-
lence those whom the State deems essential to a fair under-
standing of its interests.
B
The only remaining question we face concerns adequacy
of representation. Interpreting Rule 24(a)(2), lower courts
have adopted a variety of tests for evaluating whether an
existing defendant already “adequately represent[s]” the
same interests a proposed intervenor seeks to vindicate. In
this case, both the District Court and the en banc Court of
Appeals applied a “presumption” that the Board adequately
represented the legislative leaders' interests and held that
the leaders could not overcome this presumption. 999 F. 3d,
at 934; Cooper, 332 F. R. D., at 171.
Once more, we cannot agree. As an initial matter, Rule
24(a)(2) promises intervention to those who bear an interest
that may be practically impaired or impeded “unless existing
parties adequately represent that interest.” In some cases,
too, this Court has described the Rule's test as presenting
proposed intervenors with only a minimal challenge.
Take Trbovich v. Mine Workers, in which this Court ad-
dressed a request to intervene by a private party who as-
serted a related interest to that of an existing government
party. 404 U. S. 528 (1972). There, the Secretary of Labor
sued to set aside a union election. The same union member
who fled the administrative complaint that triggered the
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Secretary's suit sought to intervene under Rule 24(a). Id.,
at
529–530. At a high level of abstraction, the union mem-
ber's interest and the Secretary's might have seemed closely
aligned. Even so, this Court rejected the Secretary's sug-
gestion that he should be presumed an adequate representa-
tive of the union member's interests “unless the court . . .
fnd[s] that the Secretary has failed to perform his statutory
duty.” Id., at 538. The Court acknowledged that the Sec-
retary's and the union member's interests were “related,”
but it emphasized that the interests were not “identical”—
the union member sought relief against his union, full stop;
meanwhile, the Secretary also had to bear in mind broader
public-policy implications. Id., at 538–539. Rather than
endorse a presumption of adequacy, the Court held that a
movant's burden in circumstances like these “should be
treated as minimal.” Id., at 538, n. 10.
To be sure, some lower courts have suggested that a pre-
sumption of adequate representation remains appropriate in
certain classes of cases. But even taken on their own terms,
none of these presumptions applies to cases like ours. For
example, the Fourth Circuit has endorsed a presumption of
adequate representation where a member of the public seeks
to intervene to defend a law alongside the government. See
999 F. 3d, at 932–933. There, the Fourth Circuit has rea-
soned, a court may presume that legally authorized govern-
ment agents will adequately represent the public's interest
in its chosen laws. Here, by contrast, the legislative leaders
are among those North Carolina has expressly authorized to
participate in litigation to protect the State's interests in its
duly enacted laws. Id., at 951 (Quattlebaum, J., dissenting).
Similarly, some lower courts have adopted a presumption
of adequate representation in cases where a movant's inter-
ests are identical to those of an existing party. See 7C
C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Proce-
dure § 1909 (3d ed. Supp. 2022) (Wright & Miller). But even
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the Board concedes that this presumption applies only when
i
nterests “overla[p] fully.” Brief for State Respondents 26.
Where “the absentee's interest is similar to, but not identical
with, that of one of the parties,” that normally is not enough
to trigger a presumption of adequate representation. 7C
Wright & Miller § 1909. And again, a presumption like that
holds no purchase here. North Carolina has authorized dif-
ferent agents to defend its practical interests precisely be-
cause, thanks to how it has structured its government, each
may be expected to vindicate different points of view on the
State's behalf. For a federal court to presume a full overlap
of interests when state law more nearly presumes the oppo-
site would make little sense and do much violence to our
system of cooperative federalism. In cases like ours, state
agents may pursue “related” state interests, but they cannot
be fairly presumed to bear “identical” ones. Trbovich, 404
U. S., at 538.
In the end, to resolve this case we need not decide whether
a presumption of adequate representation might sometimes
be appropriate when a private litigant seeks to defend a law
alongside the government or in any other circumstance. We
need only acknowledge that a presumption of adequate rep-
resentation is inappropriate when a duly authorized state
agent seeks to intervene to defend a state law. In its en
banc decision, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that “a proposed
intervenor's governmental status makes a heightened pre-
sumption of adequacy more appropriate, not less.” 999
F. 3d, at 933; accord, Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v.
Kaul, 942 F. 3d 793, 801 (CA7 2019). But, respectfully, that
gets things backward. Any presumption against interven-
tion is especially inappropriate when wielded to displace a
State's prerogative to select which agents may defend its
laws and protect its interests. Normally, a State's chosen
representatives should be greeted in federal court with
respect, not adverse presumptions. If the intervenor in
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v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP
Opinion of the Court
Trbovich faced only a “minimal” burden, it cannot be that
du
ly designated state agents seeking to vindicate state law
should have to clear some higher hurdle.
Setting aside the lower courts' erroneous presumptions,
the proper resolution of today's case follows quickly. Cast-
ing aspersions on no one, this litigation illustrates how di-
vided state governments sometimes warrant participation
by multiple state offcials in federal court. See 999 F. 3d, at
939–941 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). Recall just some of the
facts of this case. See Parts I–B and I–C, supra. When
confronted with a motion for a preliminary injunction, the
Board declined to offer expert-witness affdavits in support
of S. B. 824, even though its opponent offered many and the
legislative leaders sought to supplement the record with
their own. After the District Court issued its (ultimately
overturned) injunction, the Board declined to seek a stay.
That tactical choice, motivated by the Board's overriding
concern for stability and certainty, meant that the State
could not enforce its new law during a statewide election.
Throughout, Board members have been appointed and poten-
tially removable by a Governor who vetoed S. B. 824 and
who fled his own briefs in this litigation calling the law “un-
constitutional” and arguing that it “should never go into ef-
fect.” See supra, at 189. And at all times, the Board has
been represented by an attorney general who, though no
doubt a vigorous advocate for his clients' interests, is also an
elected offcial who may feel allegiance to the voting public
or share the Board's administrative concerns.
The legislative leaders seek to give voice to a different
perspective. Their “primary objective” is not clarifying
which law applies. See supra, at 187. They are not bur-
dened by misgivings about the law's wisdom. If allowed to
intervene, the legislative leaders say, they will focus on de-
fending the law vigorously on the merits without an eye to
crosscutting administrative concerns. And, they add, the
differences between their interest and the Board's in this
case demonstrate why state law empowers them to partici-

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pate in litigation over the validity of state legislation—alive
as
it is to the possibility that different branches of govern-
ment may seek to vindicate different and valuable state in-
terests. Perhaps recognizing all this, the Fourth Circuit it-
self allowed the legislative leaders to intervene in the appeal
from the District Court's preliminary injunction ruling.
The same result should follow here.
By way of reply, the NAACP—but not the Board—worries
that a llow ing the leg islative leaders to intervene cou ld
“make trial management impossible.” Brief for NAACP
Respondents 26; but see Tr. of Oral Arg. 64 (noting that the
Board has “no problem litigating alongside” the legislative
leaders). We are not insensitive to the concern. In some
other case, a proliferation of motions to intervene may be a
cause for caution. At some point, too, it may be that the
interests of existing parties will come to overlap fully with
the interests of any remaining proposed intervenor.
But that case is not this case. Not only do the legislative
leaders bring a distinct state interest to bear on this litiga-
tion. No one has suggested that a cascade of motions lies
on the hor izon here. Reca l l that the NA ACP i nitia l ly
named the Governor as a defendant. Absent his eventual
dismissal from this litigation, the Governor might have been
able to hire his own outside counsel while the attorney gen-
eral continued to represent the Board. See Martin, 320
N. C., at 547–548, 359 S. E. 2d, at 480. Introducing the legis-
lative leaders and their counsel after the Governor's de-
parture may not represent a neat one-for-one swap. But
litigation on this scale is hardly inconsistent with what the
Board and the NAACP originally anticipated.
Nor is it unusual. In matters ranging from civil-rights
actions to suits testing the constitutionality of state or fed-
eral legislation, federal courts routinely handle cases involv-
ing multiple offcials sometimes represented by different
attorneys taking different positions. See, e. g., Whole Wom-
an's Health v. Jackson, 595 U. S. 30 (2021); Brnovich, 594
U. S. –––; United States v. Windsor, 570 U. S. 744 (2013);

200 BERGER
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CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U. S. 547 (1990); Buck-
l
ey v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). This Court
even hears cases in which offcials from a single State have
sued each other in federal court. See, e. g., Virginia Offce
for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U. S. 247 (2011).
Whatever additional burdens adding the legislative leaders
to this case may pose, those burdens fall well within the
bounds of everyday case management.*
*
Through the General Assembly, the people of North Caro-
lina have authorized the leaders of their legislature to defend
duly enacted state statutes against constitutional challenge.
Ordinarily, a federal court must respect that kind of sover-
eign choice, not assemble presumptions against it. Having
satisfied the ter ms of Federa l Ru le of Civi l Procedure
24(a)(2), North Carolina's legislative leaders are entitled to
intervene in this litigation. The judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is
Reversed.
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting.
When an individual or entity moves to intervene in a pend-
ing lawsuit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), a
federal court is not authorized to grant the motion if an ex-
*The parties disagree whether our review of this case should be gov-
erned by a de novo or abuse-of-discretion standard. We fnd it unneces-
sary to resolve that question because, even under the latter and more
forgiving standard, a misunderstanding of applicable law generally consti-
tutes reversible error. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U. S.
384, 405 (1990). And here the lower courts erred as a matter of law at
both relevant steps of the Rule 24(a)(2) analysis, frst by failing to afford
due respect to North Carolina's law designating the legislative leaders as
its agents in litigation of this sort, and then by “setting the [intervention]
bar . . . too high.” 999 F. 3d 915, 945 (CA4 2021) (Quattlebaum, J., dissent-
ing). Likewise, because we hold that the legislative leaders are entitled
to intervene as a matter of right under Rule 24(a)(2), we need not decide
their alternative request for permissive intervention under Rule 24(b).
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isting party to the case adequately represents the movant's
i
nterests. Today, however, the Court holds that two leaders
of the North Carolina General Assembly are entitled to in-
tervene as a matter of right to represent the State's interest
in defending the constitutionality of North Carolina law, even
though that interest is already being ably pursued on the
State's behalf by an existing state party to the litigation.
The Court's decision is wrong for two reasons. First, the
Court goes astray by creating a presumption that a State is
inadequately represented in federal court unless whomever
state law designates as a State's representative is allowed to
intervene, even where the interests that the intervenors
seek to represent are identical to those of an existing party.
That presumption of inadequacy improperly permits state
law, as opposed to federal law, to determine whether an ex-
isting party adequately represents a particular interest.
Second, the Court errs by implying that the attorney gener-
al's defense of the constitutionality of the voting law at issue
here fell below a minimal standard of adequacy. I respect-
fully dissent.
I
The underlying dispute in this case concerns the constitu-
tionality of North Carolina's voter-identifcation law, Senate
Bill 824 (S. B. 824), enacted in 2018. The North Carolina
State Conference of the NAACP (NAACP respondents) sued
members of the North Carolina State Board of Elections
(state respondents) and the Governor in Federal District
Court, alleging that the law violated the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments and § 2 of the Voting Rights Act by,
among other things, discriminating against Black and Latino
voters. The state attorney general appeared as counsel to
represent the Governor and state respondents. See N. C.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 114–2 (2021) (providing that the attorney
general has a “duty” “to appear for the State” in any matter
“in which the State may be a party or interested” and to
“represent all State departments, agencies, institutions, com-
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
missions, bureaus or other organized activities of the State”).
N
AACP respondents also fled a parallel challenge to S. B.
824 in state court. See Holmes v. Moore, No. 18–CV–15292
(Super. Ct. Wake Cty., N. C.).
Shortly after the federal suit was fled, Philip E. Berger,
the president pro tempore of the North Carolina Senate, and
Timothy K. Moore, the speaker of the North Carolina House
of Representatives (petitioners here), fled a motion to inter-
vene “on behalf of the General Assembly.” App. 55. They
sought to intervene as of right under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(a)(2), claiming a “signifcantly protectable in-
terest in the validity of S.B. 824.” App. 61. Petitioners
cited, among other things, a state statute conferring upon
them standing to intervene on behalf of the General Assem-
bly in cases challenging state law. Id., at 61–62 (citing N. C.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1–72.2). In the alternative, petitioners
sought permissive intervention under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(b).
The District Court denied the motion without prejudice,
explaining that petitioners lacked “a signifcantly protectable
interest in . . . defending the constitutionality of S.B. 824
sufficient to warrant a r ight to i ntervene under Ru le
24(a)(2)” because the Governor and state respondents re-
mained in the suit and were adequately defending the chal-
lenged law. App. to Pet. for Cert. 168. The court also rea-
soned that allowing petitioners to intervene would “ `hinder,
rather than enhance, judicial economy' ” and would “ `unnec-
essarily complicate and delay' the various stages of this
case,” including discovery, dispositive motions, and trial.
Id., at 180. The court granted petitioners' motion to partici-
pate in the suit as amici, however, and assured petitioners
that they could renew their motion to intervene if the attor-
ney general, as counsel for the existing state parties, “de-
clined to defend the lawsuit.” Id., at 157.
1
Petitioners did
1
Petitioners submitted an amicus brief supporting state respondents'
opposition to NAACP respondents' motion for a preliminary injunction.
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
not appeal. Shortly thereafter, the District Court granted
the
Governor's motion to dismiss him from the suit. The
attorney general continued representing state respondents
in the litigation.
Six weeks after the District Court denied their original
intervention motion, petitioners fled a renewed motion,
again seeking both to intervene as a matter of right and per-
missively. Petitioners primarily reiterated arguments made
in their frst motion for intervention, adding that this Court's
decision in Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 587
U. S. ––– (2019), “clarifed” the interests they sought to rep-
resent. App. 159. They also asserted that the attorney
general's conduct in the parallel state-court litigation, in
which petitioners were codefendants, supported petitioners'
argument for intervention. Specifcally, petitioners argued
that the attorney general moved to dismiss fve of six claims
in the state-court litigation, but not the sixth; failed to de-
fend against NAACP respondents' motion for a preliminary
injunction; and “did not seriously engage” in discovery. Id.,
at 164.
The District Court again denied the motion, explaining
that it was “abundantly clear that [state respondents are]
actively and adequately defending this lawsuit.” App. to
Pet. for Cert. 189. The court recounted that state respond-
ents had “consistently `denied all substantive allegations of
unconstitutionality' in this case” and had fled an “expansive”
brief opposing NAACP respondents' motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction on the merits. Ibid. The court also re-
jected petitioners' argument that the attorney general's con-
duct in the pending state-court litigation was inadequate.
The court explained that the attorney general's decision not
to move to dismiss the sixth state-court claim in that sepa-
rate litigation “fell well within the range of reasonable litiga-
tion strategies”; that the attorney general secured reversal
of the state-court preliminary injunction on appeal; and that
the attorney general “ `participated in extensive fact discov-
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
ery' ” in the state-court litigation. Id., at 191, 192. The
cour
t therefore found “no sound basis on which to speculate
. . . that [state respondents] and [the] Attorney General
w[ould] abandon their duty to defend S.B. 824 in this case,”
given that, by all appearances, they had fully executed that
duty in both the federal- and state-court litigation thus far.
Id., at 193.
The District Court also rejected petitioners' request for
permissive intervention. In the court's view, petitioners'
contentions in the federal litigation, including their repeated
skepticism of state respondents' ability to defend state law
vigorously, demonstrated that intervention “would only dis-
tract from the pressing issues in this case.” Id., at 193–194.
Over a dissent by Judge Harris, the Court of Appeals va-
cated the District Court's order and remanded for reconsid-
eration of petitioners' request to intervene. The Court of
Appeals voted to take the case en banc, however, and af-
frmed the District Court's denial of intervention.
The en banc court began by stressing that its jurisdiction
was limited to reviewing the order from which petitioners
had chosen to appeal. Because petitioners had not appealed
the District Court's denial of their frst intervention motion
seeking to “represen[t] the General Assembly's `institutional
interest' in enforcement of S.B. 824,” the Court of Appeals
determined it could not review petitioners' claim that they
were representing that particular institutional interest. 999
F. 3d 915, 926 (CA4 2021). The en banc court instead ad-
dressed petitioners' argument that they were mandatorily
entitled to represent the interest of the State in defending
the constitutionality of S. B. 824.
In its merits analysis, the en banc court observed that
Rule 24(a)(2) contains several requirements, including that a
proposed intervenor demonstrate both “ `an interest in the
subject matter of the action' ” and “ `that the [proposed inter-
venor's] interest is not adequately represented by exist-
ing parties to the litigation.' ” Id., at 927 (citing Fed. Rule
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Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2)). The court noted that petitioners had
not
asked the District Court and the Court of Appeals to
consider whether state law was relevant to Rule 24(a)(2)'s
adequacy requirement, as opposed to its interest require-
ment. See 999 F. 3d, at 930, n. 3. The court concluded that
N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1–72.2, the state statute authorizing
petitioners to intervene in cases challenging state law, bore
on only the interest requirement. The court explained that
“[a] state's policy judgment about the value of legislative in-
tervention may bestow a protectable interest in certain court
cases, but it does not override [a federal court's] normal
standards for evaluating the adequacy of existing represen-
tation in those cases.” 999 F. 3d, at 929, n. 3 (emphasis
added).
The court assumed (as to the former requirement) that
petitioners had established a protectable interest in the sub-
ject matter of the litigation, but held (as to the latter require-
ment) that this “purported interest in defending S.B. 824 on
behalf of the State of North Carolina” was “adequately rep-
resented by existing parties to the litigation.” Id., at 927.
Accordingly, the court concluded that petitioners had “no right
to intervene in federal court under Rule 24(a)(2).” Ibid.
This Court granted certiorari. 595 U. S. ––– (2021).
II
At the heart of this case is Rule 24(a)(2), which governs
intervention as of right. As relevant here, Rule 24(a)(2)
provides that a court “must permit anyone to intervene”
who, (1) “[o]n timely motion,” (2) “claims an interest relating
to the property or transaction that is the subject of the ac-
tion, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to
protect its interest,” (3) “unless existing parties adequately
represent that interest.” This case requires the Court to
address how state laws affect mandatory intervention under
Rule 24(a)(2).
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206 BERGER
v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
I begin with points of agreement: The Court and I agree
that
“States may organize themselves in a variety of ways.”
Ante, at 191; see Bethune-Hill, 587 U. S., at ––– – ––– (con-
trasting Virginia's choice to vest “[a]uthority and responsibil-
ity for representing the State's interests in civil litigation . . .
exclusively with the State's Attorney General” with other
States' decisions to authorize other agents “to litigate on the
State's behalf ”). We agree that a State is free to designate
who will represent it in federal court. See Hollingsworth
v. Perry, 570 U. S. 693, 710 (2013) (observing that although
“ [t]hat agent is typica lly the State's attor ney general, ”
States may make a different choice); see also Planned Par-
enthood of Wis., Inc. v. Kaul, 942 F. 3d 793, 802 (CA7 2019)
(“[W]e can see no reason why a federal court would bat an
eye if a state required its attorney general to withdraw from
his representation and allow another entity, including a legis-
lature, to take over a case”). We also agree that state law
can create a protectable interest in the resolution of a federal
lawsuit. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131, 137 (1986) (“[A]
State clearly has a legitimate interest in the continued en-
forceability of its own statutes”).
2
I part ways with the Court because it is clear that Rule
24(a)(2) does not give a State the right to have multiple par-
ties represent the same interest. Rather, Rule 24(a)(2) ex-
plicitly authorizes additional parties to intervene in pending
litigation only if their interests are not adequately repre-
sented by an existing party.
The Court instead concludes that the undisputed principles
discussed above establish a presumption that a State's inter-
ests are not adequately represented “if [any of] its duly au-
thorized representatives are excluded from participating in
2
We also agree that there is no need to decide whether a presumption
of adequate representation is sometimes appropriate, ante, at 197, or what
standard of review governs our analysis, ante, at 200, n. I disagree, how-
ever, with the Court's conclusion that the courts below erred under any
standard and that reversal is required.
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207
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
federal litigation challenging state law.” Ante, at 191 (stat-
i
ng that “federal courts should rarely question that a State's
interests will be practically impaired or impeded” in these
circumstances). In the Court's view, because North Caro-
lina law provides that “[t]he Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate”
“shall jointly have standing to intervene on behalf of the
General Assembly as a party in any judicial proceeding chal-
lenging a North Carolina statute or provision of the North
Carolina Constitution,” N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1–72.2(b), “a
federal court should fnd the interest requirement of Rule
24(a)(2) satisfed,” ante, at 193. The Court so holds despite
the fact that state respondents already represent the State's
interests in this litigation in a manner that the District Court
found adequate, and where the attorney general's defense of
the constitutionality of the voter-identifcation law has thus
far proved successful.
The Court's presumption of inadequacy is novel. Neither
petitioners nor the Court identify a single precedent in
which a state actor was entitled to intervene as of right to
defend a statute that another state actor already was defend-
ing. Rather, the issue in all cases the Court cites was
whether any state offcial would be allowed to defend a
State's interest when an offcial charged with doing so de-
clined to do so. Cf. Cameron v. EMW Women's Surgical
Center, P. S. C., 595 U. S. 267, 279, n. 5 (2022) (allowing Ken-
tucky attorney general to intervene in federal appellate pro-
ceeding “to defend Kentucky's interests” once “no other of-
fcial [was] willing to do so”); Karcher v. May, 484 U. S. 72,
75, 81–82 (1987) (holding that two state legislators could in-
tervene to defend the constitutionality of state law after the
attorney general declined to do so); Bethune-Hill, 587 U. S.,
at ––– (rejecting argument that the Virginia House of Dele-
gates and its Speaker, who intervened specifcally to repre-
sent their “own” interests rather than those of the State as
a whole, could displace the attorney general as representa-
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208 BERGER
v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
tive of the State); see also Hollingsworth, 570 U. S., at 707,
713
(holding that proponents of a ballot initiative who “ha[d]
no role . . . in the enforcement of ” the initiative and were not
“agents of the State” lacked standing to defend it on appeal).
None of these precedents establish that state law can re-
quire a federal court to allow additional state actors to in-
tervene when another state actor is already ably and fully
representing the State's interests in the litigation. To the
contrary, it is well settled that the question whether an in-
terest is being “adequately represented” is one of federal
law, not state law. See 7C C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1905 (3d ed. Supp. 2022)
(Wright, Miller, & Kane) (citing cases and observing that
“[i]t is wholly clear that the right to intervene in a civil
action pending in a United States District Court is gov-
erned by Rule 24 and not by state law”). Petitioners them-
selves, until they arrived at this Court, never adopted the
view that state law can supplant a federal court's responsibil-
ity to decide adequacy of representation in an individual
case.
The Court's conclusion that state law can dictate what
counts as “adequate” representation also suffers from practi-
cal infrmities. If state law can require a federal court to
allow a second state actor to intervene to represent a differ-
ent “perspective,” ante, at 198, what is to stop a State from
designating 3, 4, or 10 or more offcials as necessary parties
to suits challenging state law? The Court acknowledges
this concern but offers no limiting principle grounded in Rule
24(a)(2). Ante, at 199. That is because it cannot: Under the
Court's logic, a federal court would have no choice but to
allow all 10 or more state offcials to intervene.
This result contravenes Rule 24(a)(2) and the practical re-
alities of litigation that it refects. Federal law gives dis-
trict courts responsibility to assess, in the frst instance, the
adequacy of a party's representation because those courts
are most familiar with that representation and are responsi-
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209
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
ble for managing their dockets and streamlining proceedings.
Ru
le 24(a)(2) thus does not require district courts to allow
intervention where interests are adequately represented be-
cause such intervention would be duplicative and ineffcient.
This Rule accounts for the fact that mandatory intervention
imposes costs on the original parties, on the court, and on all
others whose interests depend on timely resolution of a
given case. Forcing federal courts “to accommodate [a] ca-
cophony of parties,” 999 F. 3d, at 934, as the Court's logic
today requires, will result in an “intractable procedural
mess,” leaving district courts with “no basis for divining the
true position of the [State] on issues like the meaning of state
law, or even for purposes of doctrines like judicial estoppel.”
Kaul, 942 F. 3d, at 801–802; see New Jersey v. New York, 345
U. S. 369, 373 (1953) (per curiam) (declining to be drawn into
“intramural dispute” within a State).
It is diffcult to overstate the burden the Court's holding
will foist on district courts. Each intervenor will be entitled
to fle its own brief concerning every motion and will be enti-
tled to its own discovery. Even when state agents' positions
align, this multitude of parties will clog federal courts and
delay the administration of justice.
3
When state agents' po-
sitions diverge, courts will also be put in the unenviable posi-
tion of determining “which of [a State's] representatives . . .
better represents it.” 999 F. 3d, at 934. Out of respect for
federalism, if nothing else, we should not interpret state law
to hijack federal courts' ability to manage litigation involving
States. See Virginia Offce for Protection and Advocacy v.
Stewart, 563 U. S. 247, 272 (2011) (Roberts, C. J., dissenting)
3
This case is the perfect example. The District Court scheduled trial
for January 2021, but postponed it to January 2022 pending resolution of
petitioners' appeal of their second motion for intervention. See 999 F. 3d,
at 923. After certiorari was granted, the District Court stayed trial
pending this Court's disposition of the case. Now that the District Court
will be obligated to allow petitioners to intervene, trial inevitably will be
delayed much further.

210 BERGER
v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
(noting the “indignity” suffered by a State when “a federal
judge
. . . decide[s] an internal state dispute”).
III
Aided by its new presumption of inadequacy, the Court
concludes that state respondents inadequately represented
petitioners' stated interests. The Court states that in so
holding, it “[c]ast[s] aspersions on no one.” Ante, at 198. In
the Court's view, however, petitioners (unlike state respond-
ents and their counsel, the attorney general) “are not bur-
dened by misgivings about the law's wisdom,” and therefore
should be allowed to intervene to “give voice to a different
perspective.” Ibid. The implication of the Court's holding
is clear: The attorney general's performance fell short of rep-
resenting adequately the State's interests in the constitu-
tionality of its law, and for that reason, petitioners should be
allowed to intervene.
This is simply wrong. As a preliminary matter, petition-
ers and state respondents share the same interest: ensuring
the validity and enforcement of S. B. 824. Cf. Trbovich v.
Mine Workers, 404 U. S. 528, 538–539 (1972) (allowing inter-
vention as of right where an intervenor's interests as an indi-
vidual union member were “not identical” to those of the
existing party in the suit, the Secretary of Labor, who sought
to represent the public interest). Here, state respondents
explain that they “represen[t] . . . the State's interest in de-
fending its laws.” Brief for State Respondents 18. Their
counsel, the attorney general, is required to do the same
under Nor th Carol i na law. See N. C. Gen. St at. Ann.
§ 114–2. Identically, petitioners represent that they seek to
defend “the State's vital interest in defending the constitu-
tionality of North Carolina's election laws.” Brief for Peti-
tioners 15–16. Indeed, petitioners cannot now seek to repre-
sent any unique interest of the General Assembly in the
litigation because they abandoned that argument by failing to
appeal the District Court's original order denying interven-
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211
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
tion on that basis. By their own admission, then, petitioners
seek
only to represent the State's interest in defending state
law, an interest that state respondents already represent.
The Court insists that petitioners' “perspective” neverthe-
less differs from that of state respondents, by focusing on
“defending the law vigorously on the merits without an eye
to crosscutting administrative concerns” such as obtaining
g uidance for the admi nistrati on of upcomi ng elec ti ons.
Ante, at 198; see Brief for Petitioners 48 (“The differing per-
spectives of Petitioners and State Board Respondents are a
product of their different relationships to the State”). The
Court's position rests in part on the assumption that leaders
of the General Assembly have a unique interest that should
be represented in the litigation. As noted, however, the
case's procedural posture forecloses that argument because
petitioners forfeited it.
4
In any event, the difference in perspective the Court per-
ceives boils down only to a disagreement over trial strategy.
As the Court rightly concedes, the State has a strong inter-
est in the orderly administration of its elections. See ante,
at 198 (acknowledging state respondents' interest in “stabil-
ity and certainty” in an upcoming election). That is not,
however, the only state interest that state respondents, rep-
resented by the attorney general, sought to defend. The
attorney general has insisted all along that the interests he
seeks to represent, and indeed is required to represent under
state law, include defending the constitutionality of North
Carolina laws like the voter-identifcation law at issue here.
See N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 114–2. These state interests are
not mutually exclusive. The attorney general's choice to
4
The argument that petitioners may intervene to represent a different
“perspective” might have been a better ft for permissive intervention
under Rule 24(b), rather than intervention as a matter of right under Rule
24(a)(2). Petitioners, however, did not ask this Court to review the Dis-
tr ic t Cour t's conclusi on that they were not entitled to per missive
intervention.

212 BERGER
v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
emphasize the State's interest in election administration at
a
particular stage of the litigation, while simultaneously
maintaining a frm position on the constitutionality of S. B.
824, was merely a choice about litigation strategy. It is a
choice with which petitioners might disagree, but it does not
render state respondents' representation inadequate. See
7C Wright, Miller, & Kane § 1909 (“A mere difference of opin-
ion concerning the tactics with which the litigation should be
handled does not make inadequate the representation of
those whose interests are identical with that of an existing
party”); accord, Kaul, 942 F. 3d, at 810–811 (Sykes, J., concur-
ring); Daggett v. Commission on Governmental Ethics and
Election Practices, 172 F. 3d 104, 112 (CA1 1999).
Properly understood, the attorney general's representa-
tion of state respondents satisfes any standard of adequacy.
As the District Court explained, the attorney general “ac-
tively and adequately defend[ed] this lawsuit.” App. to Pet.
for Cert. 189. He “consistently denied all substantive alle-
gations of unconstitutionality in this case.” Ibid. (internal
quotation marks omitted). And he moved to dismiss the
suit on federalism grounds, fled an “expansive brief ” oppos-
ing NAACP respondents' motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion on the merits, and has moved for summary judgment on
all claims. Ibid.
The Court faults the attorney general for emphasizing “ad-
ministrative concerns” in his brief on the merits and for not
offering expert reports to support his opposition to a prelim-
inary injunction. See ante, at 198. Petitioners also take
issue with the attorney general's decision not to seek a stay
of the District Court's preliminary injunction pending ap-
peal. Brief for Petitioners 12, 50. But these are precisely
the sort of strategic decisions that government attorneys
make every day; in fact, petitioners themselves declined to
seek a stay in the parallel litigation in state court. The
Court's retrospective criticism of the attorney general's liti-
gation strategy is insuffcient to establish that state respond-
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213
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
ents inadequately represented the State's interests. See
Sa
ldano v. Roach, 363 F. 3d 545, 555 (CA5 2004) (“Simply
because the [intervenor] would have made a different deci-
sion does not mean that the Attorney General is inade-
quately representing the State's interest—and hence, the [in-
tervenor 's] claimed interest —especia lly since state law
specifcally gives the Attorney General the discretion to
make these kinds of decisions”).
If any doubt remains, the results delivered by the attorney
general's representation should eliminate it. The attorney
general sought and secured on appeal a reversal of the Dis-
trict Court's preliminary injunction. He also won the Gov-
ernor's dismissal from the suit. It is hardly persuasive to
fyspeck the attorney general's litigation approach when that
very approach has vindicated the State's interests.
Finally, the Court alludes to petitioners' argument that
state respondents' representation of petitioners' interests
was inadequate because the Governor (who vetoed S. B. 824
and personally opposed the law) exercised appointment au-
thority over state respondents. Ante, at 198. The Court is
right not to fully embrace this argument, which implies that
the attorney general and the career professionals in his offce
are incapable of executing their statutory duty to represent
North Carolina in litigation and defend its interests. See
N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 114–2. Petitioners' “startling ac-
cusation” fies in the face of the presumption that public off-
cials can be trusted to exercise their offcial duties and over-
looks the attorney general's vigorous advocacy to date. 999
F. 3d, at 937; see United States v. Chemical Foundation,
Inc., 272 U. S. 1, 15 (1926) (courts should “presume that [pub-
lic offcials] have properly discharged their offcial duties”).
As the Court of Appeals explained, that the Governor or the
attorney general “may have expressed policy views at odds
with S.B. 824 in the past is no ground for a federal court to
infer that [the attorney general] would abdicate his offcial
duty to the State by subterfuge, mounting a sham defense of
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214 BERGER
v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
the statute.” 999 F. 3d, at 937. To suggest otherwise does
a
grave “disservice to the dignifed work of government law-
yers who each day put aside their own policy and political
preferences to advocate dutifully on behalf of their govern-
ments and the general public.” Ibid.
In short, the Court's conclusion that state respondents in-
adequately represented petitioners' interests is a fction that
the record does not support. In addition, the Court's arm-
chair hypothesizing improperly displaces the District Court's
frsthand experience in managing this litigation.
***
States are entitled to structure themselves as they wish
and to decide who should represent their interests in federal
litigation. State law may not, however, override the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure by requiring federal courts to
allow intervention by multiple state representatives who all
seek to represent the same state interest that an existing
state party is already capably defending. Because the
Court concludes otherwise, I respectfully dissent.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
p. 192, line 4 from bottom: “set” is replaced with “class”