New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 597 U. S. Part 1
Pages 1–133
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 23, 2022
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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N O T I C E : This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
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pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

CASES ADJUDGED
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AT
OCTOBER TERM, 2021
NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSOCIATION,
INC., et al. v. BRUEN, SUPERINTENDENT OF
NEW YORK STATE POLICE, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the second circuit
No. 20–843. Argued November 3, 2021—Decided June 23, 2022
The State of New York makes it a crime to possess a frearm without a
license, whether inside or outside the home. An individual who wants
to carry a frearm outside his home may obtain an unrestricted license
to “have and carry” a concealed “pistol or revolver” if he can prove that
“proper cause exists” for doing so. N. Y. Penal Law Ann. § 400.00(2)(f ).
An applicant satisfes the “proper cause” requirement only if he can
“demonstrate a special need for self-protection distinguishable from that
of the general community.” E. g., In re Klenosky, 75 App. Div. 2d 793,
428 N. Y. S. 2d 256, 257.
Petitioners Brandon Koch and Robert Nash are adult, law-abiding
New York residents who both applied for unrestricted licenses to carry
a handgun in public based on their generalized interest in self-defense.
The State denied both of their applications for unrestricted licenses,
allegedly because Koch and Nash failed to satisfy the “proper cause”
requirement. Petitioners then sued respondents—state offcials who
oversee the processing of licensing applications—for declaratory and in-
junctive relief, alleging that respondents violated their Second and
Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying their unrestricted-license ap-
plications for failure to demonstrate a unique need for self-defense.
1
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YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
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The District Court dismissed petitioners' complaint and the Court of
Appea
ls affrmed. Both courts relied on the Second Circuit's prior deci-
sion in Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F. 3d 81, which had
sustained New York's proper-cause standard, holding that the require-
ment was “substantially related to the achievement of an important gov-
ernmental interest.” Id., at 96.
Held: New York 's proper-cause requirement violates the Fourteenth
Amendment by preventing law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-
defense needs from exercising their Second Amendment right to keep
and bear arms in public for self-defense. Pp. 17–71.
(a) In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, and McDonald v.
Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, the Court held that the Second and Fourteenth
Amendments protect an individual right to keep and bear arms for self-
defense. Under Heller, when the Second Amendment's plain text cov-
ers an individual's conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that
conduct, and to justify a frearm regulation the government must dem-
onstrate that the regulation is consistent with the Nation's historical
tradition of frearm regulation. Pp. 17–31.
(1) Since Heller and McDonald, the Courts of Appeals have devel-
oped a “two-step” framework for analyzing Second Amendment chal-
lenges that combines history with means-end scr utiny. The Court
rejects that two-part approach as having one step too many. Step one
is broadly consistent with Heller, which demands a test rooted in the
Second Amendment's text, as informed by history. But Heller and Mc-
Donald do not support a second step that applies means-end scrutiny
in the Second Amendment context. Heller's methodology centered on
constitutional text and history. It did not invoke any means-end test
such as strict or intermediate scrutiny, and it expressly rejected any
interest-balancing inquiry akin to intermediate scrutiny. Pp. 18–24.
(2) Historical analysis can sometimes be diffcult and nuanced, but
reliance on history to inform the meaning of constitutional text is more
legitimate, and more administrable, than asking judges to “make diff-
cult empirical judgments” about “the costs and benefts of frearms re-
strictions,” especially given their “lack [of] expertise” in the feld. Mc-
Donald, 561 U. S., at 790–791 (plurality opinion). Federal courts tasked
with making diffcult empirical judgments regarding frearm regulations
under the banner of “intermediate scrutiny” often defer to the determi-
nations of legislatures. While judicial deference to legislative interest
balancing is understandable—and, elsewhere, appropriate—it is not def-
erence that the Constitution demands here. The Second Amendment
“is the very product of an interest balancing by the people,” and it
“surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding,

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3
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responsible citizens to use arms” for self-defense. Heller, 554 U. S., at
635.
Pp. 24–26.
(3) The test that the Court set forth in Heller and applies today
requires courts to assess whether modern frearms regulations are con-
sistent with the Second Amendment's text and historical understanding.
Of course, the regulatory challenges posed by frearms today are not
always the same as those that preoccupied the Founders in 1791 or the
Reconstruction generation in 1868. But the Constitution can, and must,
apply to circumstances beyond those the Founders specifcally antici-
pated, even though its meaning is fxed according to the understandings
of those who ratifed it. See, e. g., United States v. Jones, 565 U. S. 400,
404–405. Indeed, the Court recognized in Heller at least one way in
which the Second Amendment's historically fxed meaning applies to
new circumstances: Its reference to “arms” does not apply “only [to]
those arms in existence in the 18th century.” 554 U. S., at 582.
To determine whether a frearm regulation is consistent with the Sec-
ond Amendment, Heller and McDonald point toward at least two rele-
vant metrics: frst, whether modern and historical regulations impose a
comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense, and second,
whether that regulatory burden is comparably justifed. Because “indi-
vidual self-defense is `the central component' of the Second Amendment
right,” these two metrics are “ `central' ” considerations when engaging
in an analogical inquiry. McDonald, 561 U. S., at 767 (quoting Heller,
554 U. S., at 599).
To be clear, even if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for
historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass constitu-
tional muster. For example, courts can use analogies to “longstanding ”
“laws forbidding the carrying of frearms in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings” to determine whether modern regu-
lations are constitutionally permissible. Id., at 626. That said, re-
spondents' attempt to characterize New York's proper-cause require-
ment as a “sensitive-place” law lacks merit because there is no historical
basis for New York to effectively declare the island of Manhattan a “sen-
sitive place” simply because it is crowded and protected generally by
the New York City Police Department. Pp. 26–31.
(b) Having made the constitutional standard endorsed in Heller more
explicit, the Court applies that standard to New York's proper-cause
requirement. Pp. 31–70.
(1) It is undisputed that petitioners Koch and Nash—two ordinary,
law-abiding, adult citizens—are part of “the people” whom the Second
Amendment protects. See Heller, 554 U. S., at 580. And no party dis-
putes that handguns are weapons “in common use” today for self-
defense. See id., at 627. The Court has little diffculty concluding also

4 NEW
YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
Syllabus
that the plain text of the Second Amendment protects Koch's and
Nash'
s proposed course of conduct—carrying handguns publicly for self-
defense. Nothing in the Second Amendment's text draws a home/public
distinction with respect to the right to keep and bear arms, and the
defnition of “bear” naturally encompasses public carry. Moreover, the
Second Amendment guarantees an “individual right to possess and
carry weapons in case of confrontation,” id., at 592, and confrontation
can surely take place outside the home. Pp. 31–33.
(2) The burden then falls on respondents to show that New York's
proper-cause requirement is consistent with this Nation's historical tra-
dition of frearm regulation. To do so, respondents appeal to a variety
of historical sources from the late 1200s to the early 1900s. But when
it comes to interpreting the Constitution, not all history is created equal.
“Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were under-
stood to have when the people adopted them.” Heller, 554 U. S., at
634–635. The Second Amendment was adopted in 1791; the Fourteenth
in 1868. Historical evidence that long predates or postdates either time
may not illuminate the scope of the right. With these principles in
mind, the Court concludes that respondents have failed to meet their
burden to identify an American tradition justifying New York's proper-
cause requirement. Pp. 33–70.
(i) Respondents' substantial reliance on English history and cus-
tom before the founding makes some sense given Heller's statement
that the Second Amendment “codifed a right `inherited from our Eng-
lish ancestors.' ” 554 U. S., at 599. But the Court fnds that history
ambiguous at best and sees little reason to think that the Framers would
have thought it applicable in the New World. The Court cannot con-
clude from this historical record that, by the time of the founding, Eng-
lish law would have justifed restricting the right to publicly bear arms
suited for self-defense only to those who demonstrate some special need
for self-protection. Pp. 39–46.
(ii) Respondents next direct the Court to the history of the Colo-
nies and early Republic, but they identify only three restrictions on
public carry from that time. While the Court doubts that just three
colonial regulations could suffce to show a tradition of public-carry reg-
ulation, even looking at these laws on their own terms, the Court is not
convinced that they regulated public carry akin to the New York law at
issue. The statutes essentially prohibited bearing arms in a way that
spread “fear” or “terror” among the people, including by carrying of
“dangerous and unusual weapons.” See 554 U. S., at 627. Whatever
the likelihood that handguns were considered “dangerous and unusual”
during the colonial period, they are today “the quintessential self-
defense weapon.” Id., at 629. Thus, these colonial laws provide no
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5
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justifcation for laws restricting the public carry of weapons that are
unquesti
onably in common use today. Pp. 46–50.
(iii) Only after the ratifcation of the Second Amendment in 1791
did public-carry restrictions proliferate. Respondents rely heavily on
these restrictions, which generally fell into three categories: common-
law offenses, statutory prohibitions, and “surety” statutes. None of
these restrictions imposed a substantial burden on public carry analo-
gous to that imposed by New York's restrictive licensing regime.
Common-Law Offenses. As during the colonial and founding peri-
ods, the common-law offenses of “affray” or going armed “to the terror
of the people” continued to impose some limits on frearm carry in the
antebellum period. But there is no evidence indicating that these
common-law limitations impaired the right of the general population to
peaceable public carry.
Statutory Prohibitions. In the early to mid-19th century, some
States began enacting laws that proscribed the concealed carry of pistols
and other small weapons. But the antebellum state-court decisions up-
holding them evince a consensus view that States could not altogether
prohibit the public carry of arms protected by the Second Amendment
or state analogues.
Surety Statutes. In the mid-19th century, many jurisdictions began
adopting laws that required certain individuals to post bond before car-
rying weapons in public. Contrary to respondents' position, these
surety statutes in no way represented direct precursors to New York's
proper-cause requirement. While New York presumes that individuals
have no public carry right without a showing of heightened need, the
surety statutes presumed that individuals had a right to public carry
that could be burdened only if another could make out a specifc showing
of “reasonable cause to fear an injury, or breach of the peace.” Mass.
Rev. Stat., ch. 134, § 16 (1836). Thus, unlike New York's regime, a
showing of special need was required only after an individual was rea-
sonably accused of intending to injure another or breach the peace.
And, even then, proving special need simply avoided a fee.
In sum, the historical evidence from antebellum America does demon-
strate that the manner of public carry was subject to reasonable regula-
tion, but none of these limitations on the right to bear arms operated
to prevent law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from
carrying arms in public for that purpose. Pp. 50–60.
(iv) Evidence from around the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment also does not support respondents' position. The “discussion of
the [right to keep and bear arms] in Congress and in public discourse,
as people debated whether and how to secure constitutional rights for
newly free slaves,” Heller, 554 U. S., at 614, generally demonstrates that

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6 NEW
YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
Syllabus
during Reconstruction the right to keep and bear arms had limits that
were
consistent with a right of the public to peaceably carry handguns
for self-defense. The Court acknowledges two Texas cases—English v.
State, 35 Tex. 473 and State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455—that approved a statu-
tory “reasonable grounds” standard for public carry analogous to New
York's proper-cause requirement. But these decisions were outliers
and therefore provide little insight into how postbellum courts viewed
the right to carry protected arms in public. See Heller, 554 U. S., at
632. Pp. 60–66.
(v) Finally, respondents point to the slight uptick in gun regula-
tion during the late-19th century. As the Court suggested in Heller,
however, late-19th-century evidence cannot provide much insight into
the meaning of the Second Amendment when it contradicts earlier evi-
dence. In addition, the vast majority of the statutes that respondents
invoke come from the Western Territories. The bare existence of these
localized restrictions cannot overcome the overwhelming evidence of an
otherwise enduring American tradition permitting public carry. See
Heller, 554 U. S., at 614. Moreover, these territorial laws were rarely
subject to judicial scrutiny, and absent any evidence explaining why
these unprecedented prohibitions on all public carry were understood to
comport with the Second Amendment, they do little to inform “the ori-
gins and continuing signifcance of the Amendment.” Ibid.; see also
The Federalist No. 37, p. 229. Finally, these territorial restrictions de-
serve little weight because they were, consistent with the transitory
nature of territorial government, short lived. Some were held uncon-
stitutional shortly after passage, and others did not survive a Territory's
admission to the Union as a State. Pp. 66–70.
(vi) After reviewing the Anglo-American history of public carry,
the Court concludes that respondents have not met their burden to iden-
tify an American tradition justifying New York's proper-cause require-
ment. Apart from a few late-19th-century outlier jurisdictions, Ameri-
can governments simply have not broadly prohibited the public carry of
commonly used frearms for personal defense. Nor have they generally
required law-abiding, responsible citizens to “demonstrate a special need
for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general community”
to carry arms in public. Klenosky, 75 App. Div. 2d, at 793, 428
N. Y. S. 2d, at 257. P. 70.
(c) The constitutional right to bear arms in public for self-defense is
not “a second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules
than the other Bill of Rights guarantees.” McDonald, 561 U. S., at 780
(plurality opinion). The exercise of other constitutional rights does not
require individuals to demonstrate to government offcers some special
need. The Second Amendment right to carry arms in public for self-

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defense is no different. New York's proper-cause requirement violates
the
Fourteenth Amendment by preventing law-abiding citizens with or-
dinary self-defense needs from exercising their right to keep and bear
arms in public. Pp. 70–71.
818 Fed. Appx. 99, reversed and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Alito, J.,
fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 71. Kavanaugh, J., fled a concurring
opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., joined, post, p. 79. Barrett, J., fled a
concurring opinion, post, p. 81. Breyer, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in
which Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., joined, post, p. 83.
Paul D. Clement argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Erin E. Murphy and Kasdin M.
Mitchell.
Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General of New York,
argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief
were Letitia James, Attorney General, Anisha S. Dasgupta,
Deputy Solicitor General, and Joseph M. Spadola and Eric
Del Pozo, Assistant Solicitors General.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Ari-
zona et al. by Mark Brnovich, Attorney General of Arizona, Joseph A.
Kanefeld, Brunn W. Roysden III, Solicitor General, Drew C. Ensign, Dep-
uty Solicitor General, and Anthony R. Napolitano, Assistant Attorney
General, by Eric S. Schmitt, Attorney General of Missouri, D. John Sauer,
Solicitor General, and Jeff Johnson, Deputy Solicitor General, by Dawn
Cash, Acting Attorney General of Oklahoma, and by the Attorneys Gen-
eral for their respective States as follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama,
Treg Taylor of Alaska, Leslie Rutledge of Arkansas, Ashley Moody of
Florida, Christopher M. Carr of Georgia, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho,
Theodore E. Rokita of Indiana, Derek Schmidt of Kansas, Daniel Cam-
eron of Kentucky, Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi,
Austin Knudsen of Montana, Douglas J. Peterson of Nebraska, John
Formella of New Hampshire, Wayne Steneh jem of North Dakota, Dave
Yost of Ohio, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Jason R. Ravnsborg of South
Dakota, Herbert H. Slatery III of Tennessee, Ken Paxton of Texas, Sean
D. Reyes of Utah, Patrick Morrisey of West Virginia, and Bridget Hill of
Wyoming; for the Alabama Center for Law and Liberty by Matthew J.
Clark; for the American Center for Law and Justice by Jay Alan Sekulow,
Jordan Sekulow, Stuart J. Roth, Andrew J. Ekonomou, Colby M. May,
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8 NEW
YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
Opinion of the Court
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
In
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570 (2008), and
McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742 (2010), we recognized
that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect the
Matthew R. Clark, Benjamin P. Sisney, and Edward L. White III; for the
American Constitutional Rights Union by John J. Park, Jr.; for the Asian
Pacifc American Gun Owners Association by Elbert Lin; for the Associa-
tion of New Jersey Rife & Pistol Clubs, Inc., by Daniel L. Schmutter; for
Bay Colony Weapons Collectors, Inc., by Robert Dowlut and Alice Marie
Beard; for the Black Attorneys of Legal Aid et al. by Avinash Nitin Sa-
marth; for Black Guns Matter et al. by Jonathan S. Goldstein; for the
Buckeye Institute by Larry J. Obhof, Jr., and Robert Alt; for the Califor-
nia Gun Rights Foundation by Erik S. Jaffe; for the California Rife &
Pistol Association, Inc., et al. by C. D. Michel, Sean A. Brady, and Anna
M. Barvir; for the Cato Institute by Ilya Shapiro; for the Center for De-
fense of Free Enterprise et al. by Jerad Wayne Najvar; for the Citizens
Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms by Bradley A. Benbrook
and Stephen M. Duvernay; for the Claremont Institute's Center for Con-
stitutional Jurisprudence by John C. Eastman and Anthony T. Caso; for
the DC Project Foundation et al. by Charles R. Flores and Daniel N.
Nightingale; for the Firearms Policy Coalition et al. by Scott A. Keller
and Matthew H. Frederick; for the FPC American Victory Fund et al. by
David T. Hardy; for the Goldwater Institute by Camden R. Webb, Alexan-
der M. Gormley, and Charles E. James, Jr.; for the Governor of Texas by
Greg Abbott, pro se, James P. Sullivan, and Jeffrey L. Oldham; for Gun
Owners of America, Inc., et al. by William J. Olson, Robert J. Olson, and
Jeremiah L. Morgan; for the Independent Institute by Edward Wenger;
for the Independent Women's Law Center by John M. Reeves; for Law
Enforcement Groups et al. by Dan M. Peterson; for the Madison Society
Foundation, Inc., by Adam J. Kraut; for the Mountain States Legal Foun-
dation's Center to Keep and Bear Arms by Cody J. Wisniewski; for the
National African American Gun Association, Inc., by Stephen P. Halbrook;
for the National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc., by Jonathan F. Mitch-
ell and Lawrence G. Keane; for the NRA Civil Rights Defense Fund by
Taylor A. R. Meehan and Patrick N. Strawbridge; for Professors of Sec-
ond Amendment Law et al. by Joseph G. S. Greenlee, David B. Kopel, and
George A. Mocsary; for The Rutherford Institute by Michael J. Lockerby,
John W. Whitehead, and John Sepehri; for the Second Amendment Foun-
dation et al. by David H. Thompson and Peter A. Patterson; for J. Joel
Alicea by John D. Ohlendorf; for United States Senator Ted Cruz et al.
by Gene C. Schaerr, H. Christopher Bartolomucci, and Riddhi Dasgupta;
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9
Opinion of the Court
right of an ordinary, law-abiding citizen to possess a handgun
i
n the home for self-defense. In this case, petitioners and
respondents agree that ordinary, law-abiding citizens have
a similar right to carry handguns publicly for their self-
for William English et al. by Philip D. Williamson and Edward A. Palt-
zik; for Lambert Henry et al. by Robert J. La Reddola and Steven M.
Lester; for U. S. House of Representative Claudia Tenney et al. by Brian
D. Schmalzbach and Matthew D. Fender; and for George K. Young by Alan
Alexander Beck and Stephen D. Stamboulieh.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of
California et al. by Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California, Thomas S.
Patterson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Anthony Hakl, Supervis-
ing Deputy Attorney General, P. Patty Li, Deputy Attorney General, Mi-
chael J. Mongan, Solicitor General, Samuel P. Siegel and Helen H. Hong,
Deputy Solicitor Generals, and Amari L. Hammonds, Associate Deputy
Solicitor General, by Andrew J. Bruck, Acting Attorney General of New
Jersey, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as
follows: William Tong of Connecticut, Kathleen Jennings of Delaware,
Karl A. Racine of the District of Columbia, Kwame Raoul of Illinois,
Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Brian E. Frosh of Maryland, Maura Healey of
Massachusetts, Dana Nessel of Michigan, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Hec-
tor Balderas of New Mexico, Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Josh Shapiro
of Pennsylvania, Peter F. Neronha of Rhode Island, Thomas J. Donovan,
Jr., of Vermont, Mark R. Herring of Virginia, Robert W. Ferguson of
Washington, and Joshua L. Kaul of Wisconsin; for the City of Chicago,
Illinois, et al. by John J. Korzen, Myriam Zreczny Kasper, Suzanne M.
Loose, Rebecca Hirsch, James L. Shea, Michael N. Feuer, Diana P. Cortes,
Lyndsey M. Olson, Dennis J. Herrera, and Peter S. Holmes; for the City
of New York by Richard Dearing, Claude S. Platton, Ingrid R. Gustaf-
son, and Elina Druker; for the American Bar Association by Reginald M.
Turner and Roberto J. Gonzalez; for the American Civil Liberties Union
et al. by Perry M. Grossman, Christopher T. Dunn, Arthur N. Eisenberg,
David D. Cole, Louise Melling, and Jennesa Calvo-Friedman; for the
American Medical Association et al. by Michael J. Dell and Leonard A.
Nelson; for Americans Against Gun Violence by Anthony Schoenberg and
Patrick Loi; for Brady by Rukesh A. Korde, Alexander Ely, and Jonathan
E. Lowy; for the Citizens Crime Commission of New York City by Harry
Sandick and Richard Aborn; for Corpus Linguistics Professors et al. by
Brian R. Matsui, Seth W. Lloyd, and Jamie A. Levitt; for the Educational
Fund to Stop Gun Violence et al. by Nicole A. Saharsky; for Everytown
for Gun Safety by Jonathan E. Taylor, Eric A. Tirschwell, Janet Carter,
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YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
Opinion of the Court
defense. We too agree, and now hold, consistent with Heller
and
McDonald, that the Second and Fourteenth Amend-
ments protect an individual's right to carry a handgun for
self-defense outside the home.
and William J. Taylor, Jr.; for Former Major City Police Chiefs by Lee S.
Richards, Arthur S. Greenspan, Peter K. Stris, Michael N. Donofrio, and
Bridget C. Asay; for Former National Security Offcials by Mary B. Mc-
Cord and Annie L. Owens; for the Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun
Violence by Sean Hecker, Joshua Matz, Hannah Shearer, and J. Adam
Skaggs; for the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., et al. by
Ana C. Reyes, Omar Gonzalez-Pagan, and Richard Saenz; for the League
of Women Voters by Adam S. Gershenson and Kathleen R. Hartnett; for
Members of the Business Community by Scott A. Edelman, Avi Weitz-
man, and Lee R. Crain; for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc., et al. by Sherrilyn A. Ifll, Janai S. Nelson, Samuel Spital,
Kristen Johnson, Mahogane D. Reed, and Marc H. Morial; for the Na-
tional League of Cities et al. by Lawrence Rosenthal and Lisa Soronen;
for the Partnership for New York City by Julia Tarver Mason Wood and
H. Christopher Boehning; for the Presiding Bishop and President of the
House of Deputies of the Episcopal Church et al. by Jeffrey S. Trachtman
and Jason Moff; for Professors of History and Law by Mark D. Selwyn;
for Social Scientists et al. by Elizabeth Vicens and Samuel Levander; for
the Violence Policy Center by David M. Gossett; for John Elson by Mr.
Elson, pro se; for J. Michael Luttig et al. by Richard D. Bernstein; and for
United States Senators Charles E. Schumer et al. by Stephen B. Kinnaird.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for Amnesty International USA et al.
by Aaron X. Fellmeth and Jonathan Hafetz; for the Crime Prevention
Research Center by Steven W. Dulan; for Criminal Legal Scholars by
Matthew E. Sloan, George P. Flecther, and Boris Bershteyn; for Italo-
American Jurists et al. by Sarah Gervase and Andrew J. Maggio; for the
League for Sportmen, Law Enforcement and Defense by Christopher M.
Day and Earl N. “Trey” Mayfeld III; for the Liberal Gun Club et al. by
David D. Jensen; for the March for Our Lives Action Fund by Ira M.
Feinberg; for the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence et al. by
Douglas A. Winthrop, Michael A. Berta, and R. Reeves Anderson; for the
National Foundation for Gun Rights et al. by David A. Warrington, Har-
meet K. Dhillon, and Karin Sweigart; for the New York County Lawyers
Association by Benjamin G. Shatz and Jacqueline C. Wol ff; for Second
Amendment Law Professors by Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., David H. Fry,
and Justin P. Raphael; for Patrick J. Charles by John M. Gren fell, Thomas
V. Loran III, and Francine T. Radford; for Neal Goldfarb by Mr. Goldfarb,

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Opinion of the Court
The parties nevertheless dispute whether New York's li-
censi
ng regime respects the constitutional right to carry
handguns publicly for self-defense. In 43 States, the gov-
ernment issues licenses to carry based on objective criteria.
But in six States, including New York, the government fur-
ther conditions issuance of a license to carry on a citizen's
showing of some additional special need. Because the State
of New York issues public-carry licenses only when an ap-
plicant demonstrates a special need for self-defense, we
conclude that the State's licensing regime violates the
Constitution.
I
A
New York State has regulated the public carry of hand-
guns at least since the early 20th century. In 1905, New
York made it a misdemeanor for anyone over the age of 16
to “have or carry concealed upon his person in any city or
village of [New York], any pistol, revolver or other frearm
without a written license . . . issued to him by a police magis-
trate.” 1905 N. Y. Laws ch. 92, § 2, pp. 129–130; see also
1908 N. Y. Laws ch. 93, § 1, pp. 242–243 (allowing justices of
the peace to issue licenses). In 1911, New York's “Sullivan
Law” expanded the State's criminal prohibition to the pos-
session of all handguns—concealed or otherwise—without a
government-issued license. See 1911 N. Y. Laws ch. 195, § 1,
p. 443. New York later amended the Sullivan Law to clarify
the licensing standard: Magistrates could “issue to [a] person
a license to have and carry concealed a pistol or revolver
without regard to employment or place of possessing such
weapon” only if that person proved “good moral character”
and “proper cause.” 1913 N. Y. Laws ch. 608, § 1, p. 1629.
Today's licensing scheme largely tracks that of the early
1900s. It is a crime in New York to possess “any frearm”
pro se; and for Robert Leider et al. by Derek DeBrosse and Ronald
James Lemieux.
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Opinion of the Court
without a license, whether inside or outside the home, pun-
ishable
by up to four years in prison or a $5,000 fne for a
felony offense, and one year in prison or a $1,000 fne for a
misdemeanor. See N. Y. Penal Law Ann. §§ 265.01–b (West
2017), 261.01(1) (West Cum. Supp. 2022), 70.00(2)(e) and
(3)(b), 80.00(1)(a) (West 2021), 70.15(1), 80.05(1). Meanwhile,
possessing a loaded frearm outside one's home or place of
business without a license is a felony punishable by up to
15 years in prison. §§ 265.03(3) (West 2017), 70.00(2)(c) and
(3)(b), 80.00(1)(a).
A license applicant who wants to possess a frearm at
home (or in his place of business) must convince a “licensing
offcer”—usually a judge or law enforcement offcer—that,
among other things, he is of good moral character, has no
history of crime or mental illness, and that “no good cause
exists for the denial of the license. ” §§ 400.00(1)(a)–(n)
(West Cum. Supp. 2022). If he wants to carry a frearm out-
side his home or place of business for self-defense, the appli-
cant must obtain an unrestricted license to “have and carry”
a concealed “pistol or revolver.” § 400.00(2)(f ). To secure
that license, the applicant must prove that “proper cause ex-
ists” to issue it. Ibid. If an applicant cannot make that
showing, he can receive only a “restricted” license for public
carry, which allows him to carry a frearm for a limited pur-
pose, such as hunting, target shooting, or employment. See,
e. g., In re O'Brien, 87 N. Y. 2d 436, 438–439, 663 N. E. 2d
316, 316–317 (1996); Babernitz v. Police Dept. of City of New
York, 65 App. Div. 2d 320, 324, 411 N. Y. S. 2d 309, 311 (1978);
In re O'Connor, 154 Misc. 2d 694, 696–698, 585 N. Y. S. 2d
1000, 1003 (Westchester Cty. 1992).
No New York statute defnes “proper cause.” But New
York courts have held that an applicant shows proper cause
only if he can “demonstrate a special need for self-protection
distinguishable from that of the general community.” E. g.,
In re Klenosky, 75 App. Div. 2d 793, 428 N. Y. S. 2d 256, 257
(1980). This “special need” standard is demanding. For ex-
ample, living or working in an area “ `noted for criminal ac-

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Opinion of the Court
tivity' ” does not suffce. In re Bernstein, 85 App. Div. 2d
574,
445 N. Y. S. 2d 716, 717 (1981). Rather, New York
courts generally require evidence “of particular threats, at-
tacks or other extraordinary danger to personal safety.”
In re Martinek, 294 App. Div. 2d 221, 222, 743 N. Y. S. 2d 80,
81 (2002); see also In re Kaplan, 249 App. Div. 2d 199, 201,
673 N. Y. S. 2d 66, 68 (1998) (approving the New York City
Police Department's requirement of “ `extraordinary per-
sonal danger, documented by proof of recurrent threats to
life or safety' ” (quoting 38 N. Y. C. R. R. § 5–03(b))).
When a licensing offcer denies an application, judicial re-
view is limited. New York courts defer to an offcer's appli-
cation of the proper-cause standard unless it is “arbitrary
and capricious.” In re Bando, 290 App. Div. 2d 691, 692, 735
N. Y. S. 2d 660, 661 (2002). In other words, the decision
“must be upheld if the record shows a rational basis for it.”
Kaplan, 249 App. Div. 2d, at 201, 673 N. Y. S. 2d, at 68. The
rule leaves applicants little recourse if their local licensing
offcer denies a permit.
New York is not alone in requiring a permit to carry a
handgun in public. But the vast majority of States—43 by
our count—are “shall issue” jurisdictions, where authorities
must issue concealed-carry licenses whenever applicants sat-
isfy certain threshold requirements, without granting licens-
ing offcials discretion to deny licenses based on a perceived
lack of need or suitability.
1
Meanwhile, only six States and
1
See Ala. Code § 13A–11–75 (Cum. Supp. 2021); Alaska Stat. § 18.65.700
(2020); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13–3112 (Cum. Supp. 2021); Ark. Code Ann.
§ 5–73–309 (Supp. 2021); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18–12–206 (2021); Fla. Stat.
§ 790.06 (2021); Ga. Code Ann. § 16–11–129 (Supp. 2021); Idaho Code Ann.
§ 18–3302K (Cum. Supp. 2021); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 430, § 66/10 (West Cum.
Supp. 2021); Ind. Code § 35–47–2–3 (2021); Iowa Code § 724.7 (2022); Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 75–7c03 (2021); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 237.110 (Lexis Cum.
Supp. 2021); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1379.3 (West Cum. Supp. 2022); Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 25, § 2003 (Cum. Supp. 2022); Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 28.425b (2020); Minn. Stat. § 624.714 (2020); Miss. Code Ann. § 45–9–
101 (2022); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.101 (2016); Mont. Code Ann. § 45–8–321
(2021); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 69–2430 (2019); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 202.3657 (2021);
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Opinion of the Court
the District of Columbia have “may issue” licensing laws,
under
which authorities have discretion to deny concealed-
carry licenses even when the applicant satisfes the statutory
criteria, usually because the applicant has not demonstrated
N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 159:6 (Cum. Supp. 2021); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 29–19–
4 (2018); N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14–415.11 (2021); N. D. Cent. Code Ann.
§ 62.1–04–03 (Supp. 2021); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.125 (2020); Okla.
Stat., Tit. 21, § 1290.12 (2021); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 166.291 (2021); 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 6109 (Cum. Supp. 2016); S. C. Code Ann. § 23–31–215(A) (Cum.
Supp. 2021); S. D. Codifed Laws § 23–7–7 (Cum. Supp. 2021); Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39–17–1366 (Supp. 2021); Tex. Govt. Code Ann. § 411.177 (West
Cum. Supp. 2021); Utah Code § 53–5–704.5 (2022); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2–
308.04 (2021); Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.070 (2021); W. Va. Code Ann. § 61–
7–4 (2021); Wis. Stat. § 175.60 (2021); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–8–104 (2021).
Vermont has no permitting system for the concealed carry of handguns.
Three States—Connecticut, Delaware, and Rhode Island—have discretion-
ary criteria but appear to operate like “shall issue” jurisdictions. See
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29–28(b) (2021); Del. Code, Tit. 11, § 1441 (2022); R. I.
Gen. Laws § 11–47–11 (2002). Although Connecticut offcials have discre-
tion to deny a concealed-carry permit to anyone who is not a “suitable
person,” see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29–28(b), the “suitable person” standard
precludes permits only to those “individuals whose conduct has shown
them to be lacking the essential character of temperament necessary to
be entrusted with a weapon.” Dwyer v. Farrell, 193 Conn. 7, 12, 475
A. 2d 257, 260 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). As for Dela-
ware, the State has thus far processed 5,680 license applications and re-
newals in fscal year 2022 and has denied only 112. See Del. Courts,
Super. Ct., Carrying Concealed Deadly Weapon (June 9, 2022), https://
courts.delaware.gov/forms/download.aspx?ID=125408. Moreover, Dela-
ware appears to have no licensing requirement for open carry. Finally,
Rhode Island has a suitability requirement, see R. I. Gen. Laws § 11–47–
11, but the Rhode Island Supreme Court has fatly denied that the “[d]em-
onstration of a proper showing of need” is a component of that require-
ment. Gadomski v. Tavares, 113 A. 3d 387, 392 (2015). Additionally,
some “shall issue” jurisdictions have so-called “constitutional carry” pro-
tections that allow certain individuals to carry handguns in public within
the State without any permit whatsoever. See, e. g., A. Sherman, More
States Remove Permit Requirement To Carry a Concealed Gun, PolitiFact
(Apr. 12, 2022), https://www.politifact.com/article/2022/apr/12/more-states-
remove-permit-requirement-carry-concea / (“Twenty-fve states now have
permitless concealed carry laws . . . The states that have approved per-

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15
Opinion of the Court
cause or suitability for the relevant license. Aside from
N
ew York, then, only California, the District of Columbia,
Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New Jersey have ana-
logues to the “proper cause” standard.
2
All of these “proper
cause” analogues have been upheld by the Courts of Appeals,
save for the District of Columbia's, which has been perma-
nently enjoined since 2017. Compare Gould v. Morgan, 907
F. 3d 659, 677 (CA1 2018); Kachalsky v. County of Westches-
ter, 701 F. 3d 81, 101 (CA2 2012); Drake v. Filko, 724 F. 3d
426, 440 (CA3 2013); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F. 3d
458, 460 (CA4 2011); Young v. Hawaii, 992 F. 3d 765, 773
(CA9 2021) (en banc), with Wrenn v. District of Columbia,
864 F. 3d 650, 668 (CADC 2017).
B
As set forth in the pleadings below, petitioners Brandon
Koch and Robert Nash are law-abiding, adult citizens of
Rensselaer County, New York. Koch lives in Troy, while
Nash lives in Averill Park. Petitioner New York State
Rife & Pistol Association, Inc., is a public-interest group or-
ganized to defend the Second Amendment rights of New
Yorkers. Both Koch and Nash are members.
In 2014, Nash applied for an unrestricted license to carry
a handgun in public. Nash did not claim any unique danger
to his personal safety; he simply wanted to carry a handgun
for self-defense. In early 2015, the State denied Nash's ap-
mitless carry laws are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Indi-
ana, Iowa, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Mon-
tana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Ten-
nessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming ”).
2
See Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 26150 (West 2021) (“Good cause”); D. C.
Code §§ 7–2509.11(1) (2018), 22–4506(a) (Cum. Supp. 2021) (“proper rea-
son,” i. e., “special need for self-protection”); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 134–2
(Cum. Supp. 2018), 134–9(a) (2011) (“exceptional case”); Md. Pub. Saf. Code
Ann. § 5–306(a)(6)(ii) (2018) (“good and substantial reason”); Mass. Gen.
Laws, ch. 140, § 131(d) (2020) (“good reason”); N. J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58–4(c)
(West Cum. Supp. 2021) (“justifable need”).
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Opinion of the Court
plication for an unrestricted license but granted him a re-
str
icted license for hunting and target shooting only. In late
2016, Nash asked a licensing offcer to remove the restric-
tions, citing a string of recent robberies in his neighborhood.
After an informal hearing, the licensing offcer denied the
request. The offcer reiterated that Nash's existing license
permitted him “to carry concealed for purposes of off road
back country, outdoor activities similar to hunting,” such as
“fshing, hiking & camping etc.” App. 41. But, at the same
time, the offcer emphasized that the restrictions were “in-
tended to prohibit [Nash] from carrying concealed in ANY
LOCATION typically open to and frequented by the general
public.” Ibid.
Between 2008 and 2017, Koch was in the same position as
Nash: He faced no special dangers, wanted a handgun for
general self-defense, and had only a restricted license per-
mitting him to carry a handgun outside the home for hunt-
ing and target shooting. In late 2017, Koch applied to a
licensing offcer to remove the restrictions on his license, cit-
ing his extensive experience in safely handling frearms.
Like Nash's application, Koch's was denied, except that the
offcer permitted Koch to “carry to and from work.” Id.,
at 114.
C
Respondents are the superintendent of the New York
State Police, who oversees the enforcement of the State's
licensing laws, and a New York Supreme Court justice, who
oversees the processing of licensing applications in Rensse-
laer County. Petitioners sued respondents for declaratory
and injunctive relief under Rev. Stat. 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983,
alleging that respondents violated their Second and Four-
teenth Amendment rights by denying their unrestricted-
license applications on the basis that they had failed to show
“proper cause,” i. e., had failed to demonstrate a unique need
for self-defense.
The District Court dismissed petitioners' complaint and
the Court of Appeals affrmed. See 818 Fed. Appx. 99, 100
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17
Opinion of the Court
(CA2 2020). Both courts relied on the Court of Appeals'
pr
ior decision in Kachalsky, 701 F. 3d 81, which had sus-
tained New York's proper-cause standard, holding that the
requirement was “substantially related to the achievement
of an important governmental interest.” Id., at 96.
We granted certiorari to decide whether New York's de-
nial of petitioners' license applications violated the Constitu-
tion. 593 U. S. ––– (2021).
II
In Heller and McDonald, we held that the Second and
Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual right to keep
and bear arms for self-defense. In doing so, we held uncon-
stitutional two laws that prohibited the possession and use
of handguns in the home. In the years since, the Courts of
Appeals have coalesced around a “two-step” framework for
analyzing Second Amendment challenges that combines his-
tory with means-end scrutiny.
Today, we decline to adopt that two-part approach. In
keeping with Heller, we hold that when the Second Amend-
ment's plain text covers an individual's conduct, the Consti-
tution presumptively protects that conduct. To justify its
regulation, the government may not simply posit that the
regulation promotes an important interest. Rather, the
government must demonstrate that the regulation is consist-
ent with this Nation's historical tradition of frearm regula-
tion. Only if a frearm regulation is consistent with this Na-
tion's historical tradition may a court conclude that the
individual's conduct falls outside the Second Amendment's
“unqualifed command.” Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal.,
366 U. S. 36, 50, n. 10 (1961).
3
3
Rather than begin with its view of the governing legal framework, the
dissent chronicles, in painstaking detail, evidence of crimes committed by
individuals with frearms. See post, at 83–91 (opinion of Breyer, J.).
The dissent invokes all of these statistics presumably to justify granting
States greater leeway in restricting frearm ownership and use. But, as
Members of the Court have already explained, “[t]he right to keep and
bear arms . . . is not the only constitutional right that has controversial
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Opinion of the Court
A
Si
nce Heller and McDonald, the two-step test that Courts
of Appeals have developed to assess Second Amendment
claims proceeds as follows. At the frst step, the govern-
ment may justify its regulation by “establish[ing] that the
challenged law regulates activity falling outside the scope of
the right as originally understood.” E. g., Kanter v. Barr,
919 F. 3d 437, 441 (CA7 2019) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). But see United States v. Boyd, 999 F. 3d 171, 185 (CA3
2021) (requiring claimant to show “ `a burden on conduct fall-
ing within the scope of the Second Amendment's guaran-
tee' ”). The Courts of Appeals then ascertain the original
scope of the right based on its historical meaning. E. g.,
United States v. Focia, 869 F. 3d 1269, 1285 (CA11 2017). If
the government can prove that the regulated conduct falls
beyond the Amendment's original scope, “then the analysis
can stop there; the regulated activity is categorically unpro-
tected.” United States v. Greeno, 679 F. 3d 510, 518 (CA6
2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). But if the histori-
cal evidence at this step is “inconclusive or suggests that
the regulated activity is not categorically unprotected,” the
courts generally proceed to step two. Kanter, 919 F. 3d, at
441 (internal quotation marks omitted).
At the second step, courts often analyze “how close the
law comes to the core of the Second Amendment right and
the severity of the law's burden on that right.” Ibid. (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). The Courts of Appeals gen-
erally maintain “that the core Second Amendment right is
limited to self-defense in the home.” Gould, 907 F. 3d, at
671 (emphasis added). But see Wrenn, 864 F. 3d, at 659
(“[T]he Amendment's core generally covers carrying in pub-
lic for self-defense”). If a “core” Second Amendment right
is burdened, courts apply “strict scrutiny” and ask whether
the Government can prove that the law is “narrowly tailored
public safety implications.” McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 783
(2010) (plurality opinion).
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19
Opinion of the Court
to achieve a compelling governmental interest.” Kolbe v.
H
ogan, 849 F. 3d 114, 133 (CA4 2017) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Otherwise, they apply intermediate scru-
tiny and consider whether the Government can show that
the regulation is “substantially related to the achievement of
an important governmental interest.” Kachalsky, 701 F. 3d,
at 96.
4
Both respondents and the United States largely
agree with this consensus, arguing that intermediate scru-
tiny is appropriate when text and history are unclear in at-
tempting to delineate the scope of the right. See Brief for
Respondents 37; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4.
B
Despite the popularity of this two-step approach, it is one
step too many. Step one of the predominant framework is
broadly consistent with Heller, which demands a test rooted
in the Second Amendment's text, as informed by history.
But Heller and McDonald do not support applying means-
end scrutiny in the Second Amendment context. Instead,
the government must affrmatively prove that its frearms
regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the
outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.
1
To show why Heller does not support applying means-end
scrutiny, we frst summarize Heller's methodological ap-
proach to the Second Amendment.
4
See Association of N. J. Rife & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Attorney General
N. J., 910 F. 3d 106, 117 (CA3 2018); accord, Worman v. Healey, 922 F. 3d
26, 33, 36–39 (CA1 2019); Libertarian Party of Erie Cty. v. Cuomo, 970
F. 3d 106, 127–128 (CA2 2020); Harley v. Wilkinson, 988 F. 3d 766, 769
(CA4 2021); National Rife Assn. of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 700 F. 3d 185, 194–195 (CA5 2012);
United States v. Greeno, 679 F. 3d 510, 518 (CA6 2012); Kanter v. Barr,
919 F. 3d 437, 442 (CA7 2019); Young v. Hawaii, 992 F. 3d 765, 783 (CA9
2021) (en banc); United States v. Reese, 627 F. 3d 792, 800–801 (CA10 2010);
GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F. 3d 1244, 1260, n. 34 (CA11 2012);
United States v. Class, 930 F. 3d 460, 463 (CADC 2019).
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Opinion of the Court
In Heller, we began with a “textual analysis” focused on
the
“ `normal and ordinary' ” meaning of the Second Amend-
ment's language. 554 U. S., at 576–577, 578. That analysis
suggested that the Amendment's operative clause—“ the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms . . . shall not be
infringed”—“guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and
carry weapons in case of confrontation” that does not depend
on service in the militia. Id., at 592.
From there, we assessed whether our initial conclusion
was “confrmed by the historical background of the Second
Amendment.” Ibid. We looked to history because “it has
always been widely understood that the Second Amendment
. . . codifed a pre-existing right.” Ibid. The Amendment
“was not intended to lay down a novel principle but rather
codifed a right inherited from our English ancestors.” Id.,
at 599 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
After surveying English history dating from the late 1600s,
along with American colonial views leading up to the found-
ing, we found “no doubt, on the basis of both text and history,
that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to
keep and bear arms.” Id., at 595.
We then canvassed the historical record and found yet
further confrmation. That history included the “analogous
arms-bearing rights in state constitutions that preceded and
immediately followed adoption of the Second Amendment,”
id., at 600–601, and “how the Second Amendment was inter-
preted from immediately after its ratifcation through the
end of the 19th century,” id., at 605. When the principal
dissent charged that the latter category of sources was ille-
gitimate “postenactment legislative history,” id., at 662, n. 28
(opinion of Stevens, J.), we clarifed that “examination of a
variety of legal and other sources to determine the public
understanding of a legal text in the period after its enact-
ment or ratifcation” was “a critical tool of constitutional in-
terpretation,” id., at 605 (majority opinion).

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Opinion of the Court
In assessing the postratifcation history, we looked to four
di
fferent types of sources. First, we reviewed “[t]hree im-
portant founding-era legal scholars [who] interpreted the
Second Amendment in published writings.” Ibid. Second,
we looked to “19th-century cases that interpreted the Second
Amendment” and found that they “universally support an
individual right” to keep and bear arms. Id., at 610. Third,
we examined the “discussion of the Second Amendment in
Congress and in public discourse” after the Civil War, “as
people debated whether and how to secure constitutional
rights for newly free slaves.” Id., at 614. Fourth, we con-
sidered how post-Civil War commentators understood the
right. See id., at 616–619.
After holding that the Second Amendment protected an
individual right to armed self-defense, we also relied on the
historical understanding of the Amendment to demark the
limits on the exercise of that right. We noted that, “[l]ike
most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment
is not unlimited.” Id., at 626. “From Blackstone through
the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely
explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry
any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and
for whatever purpose.” Ibid. For example, we found it
“fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibit-
ing the carrying of `dangerous and unusual weapons' ”
that the Second Amendment protects the possession and
use of weapons that are “ `in common use at the time.' ” Id.,
at 627 (first citi ng 4 W. Blackstone, Comment ar ies on
the Laws of England 148–149 (1769); then quoting United
States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, 179 (1939)). That said,
we cautioned that we were not “undertak[ing] an exhaustive
historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second
Amendment” and moved on to considering the constitution-
ality of the District of Columbia's handgun ban. 554 U. S.,
at 626–627.
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Opinion of the Court
We assessed the lawfulness of that handgun ban by scruti-
ni
zing whether it comported with history and tradition. Al-
though we noted that the ban “would fail constitutional mus-
ter” “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have
applied to enumerated constitutional rights,” id., at 628–629,
we did not engage in means-end scrutiny when resolving the
constitutional question. Instead, we focused on the histori-
cally unprecedented nature of the District's ban, observing
that “[f]ew laws in the history of our Nation have come close
to [that] severe restriction.” Id., at 629. Likewise, when
one of the dissents attempted to justify the District's prohibi-
tion with “founding-era historical precedent,” including “var-
ious restrictive laws in the colonial period,” we addressed
each purpor ted ana log ue and concluded that they were
either irrelevant or “d[id] not remotely burden the right of
self-defense as much as an absolute ban on handguns.” Id.,
at 631–632; see id., at 631–634. Thus, our earlier historical
analysis suffced to show that the Second Amendment did
not countenance a “complete prohibition” on the use of “the
most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense
in the home.” Id., at 629.
2
As the foregoing shows, Heller's methodology centered on
constitutional text and history. Whether it came to defning
the character of the right (individual or militia dependent),
suggesting the outer limits of the right, or assessing the con-
stitutionality of a particular regulation, Heller relied on text
and history. It did not invoke any means-end test such as
strict or intermediate scrutiny.
Moreover, Heller and McDonald expressly rejected the
application of any “judge-empowering `interest-balancing in-
quiry' that `asks whether the statute burdens a protected
interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to
the statute's salutary effects upon other important govern-
mental interests.' ” Heller, 554 U. S., at 634 (quoting id., at
689–690 (Breyer, J., dissenting)); see also McDonald, 561
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Opinion of the Court
U. S., at 790–791 (plurality opinion) (the Second Amendment
does
not permit—let alone require—“judges to assess the
costs and benefts of frearms restrictions” under means-end
scrutiny). We declined to engage in means-end scrutiny be-
cause “[t]he very enumeration of the right takes out of the
hands of government—even the Third Branch of Govern-
ment—the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether
the right is really worth insisting upon.” Heller, 554 U. S.,
at 634. We then concluded: “A constitutional guarantee
subject to future judges' assessments of its usefulness is no
constitutional guarantee at all.” Ibid.
Not only did Heller decline to engage in means-end scrutiny
generally, but it also specifcally ruled out the intermediate-
scrutiny test that respondents and the United States now
urge us to adopt. Dissenting in Heller, Justice Breyer's
proposed standard—“ask[ing] whether [a] statute burdens a
protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out of
proportion to the statute's salutary effects upon other im-
portant governmental interests,” id., at 689–690—simply
expressed a classic formulation of intermediate scrutiny in
a slightly different way, see Clark v. Jeter, 486 U. S. 456, 461
(1988) (asking whether the challenged law is “substantial-
ly related to an important government objective”). In fact,
Justice Breyer all but admitted that his Heller dissent
advocated for intermediate scrutiny by repeatedly invoking
a quintessential intermediate-scrutiny precedent. See
Heller, 554 U. S., at 690, 696, 704–705 (citing Turner Broad-
casting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U. S. 180 (1997)). Thus,
when Heller expressly rejected that dissent's “interest-
ba lanci ng i nquiry, ” 554 U. S., at 634 ( i nter na l quot a-
tion marks omitted), it necessarily rejected intermediate
scrutiny.
5
5
The dissent asserts that we misread Heller to eschew means-end scru-
tiny because Heller mentioned that the District of Columbia's handgun
ban “would fail constitutional muster” “[u]nder any of the standards of
scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights.” Hel-
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Opinion of the Court
In sum, the Courts of Appeals' second step is inconsistent
w
ith Heller's historical approach and its rejection of means-
end scrutiny. We reiterate that the standard for applying
the Second Amendment is as follows: When the Second
Amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct, the
Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The gov-
ernment must then justify its regulation by demonstrating
that it is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of
frearm regulation. Only then may a court conclude that the
individual's conduct falls outside the Second Amendment's
“unqualifed command.” Konigsberg, 366 U. S., at 50, n. 10.
C
This Second Amendment standard accords with how we
protect other constitutional rights. Take, for instance, the
freedom of speech in the First Amendment, to which Heller
repeatedly compared the right to keep and bear arms. 554
U. S., at 582, 595, 606, 618, 634–635. In that context, “[w]hen
the Government restricts speech, the Government bears
the burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions.”
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529
U. S. 803, 816 (2000); see also Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.
v. Hepps, 475 U. S. 767, 777 (1986). In some cases, that bur-
den includes showing whether the expressive conduct falls
outside of the category of protected speech. See Illinois
ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U. S.
600, 620, n. 9 (2003). And to carry that burden, the govern-
ment must generally point to historical evidence about the
ler, 554 U. S., at 628–629; see post, at 104–105 (opinion of Breyer, J.).
But Heller's passing observation that the District's ban would fail under
any heightened “standar[d] of scrutiny” did not supplant Heller's focus
on constituti ona l text and h istory. Rather, Helle r's comment “was
more of a gilding-the-lily observation about the extreme nature of D. C.'s
law,” Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F. 3d 1244, 1277 (CADC 2011)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), than a refection of Heller's methodology or
holding.
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reach of the First Amendment's protections. See, e. g.,
U
nited States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 468–471 (2010) (plac-
ing the burden on the government to show that a type of
speech belongs to a “historic and traditional categor[y]” of
constitutionally unprotected speech “long familiar to the
bar” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
And beyond the freedom of speech, our focus on history
also comports with how we assess many other constitutional
claims. If a litigant asserts the right in court to “be con-
fronted w ith the w itnesses agai nst h i m, ” U. S. Const.,
Amdt. 6, we require courts to consult history to determine
the scope of that right. See, e. g., Giles v. California, 554
U. S. 353, 358 (2008) (“admitting only those exceptions [to the
Confrontation Clause] established at the time of the found-
ing ” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Similarly, when a
litigant claims a violation of his rights under the Establish-
ment Clause, Members of this Court “loo[k] to history for
guidance.” American Legion v. American Humanist Assn.,
588 U. S. –––, ––– (2019) (plurality opinion). We adopt a sim-
ilar approach here.
To be sure, “[h]istorical analysis can be diffcult; it some-
times requires resolving threshold questions, and making nu-
anced judgments about which evidence to consult and how
to interpret it.” McDonald, 561 U. S., at 803–804 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). But reliance on history to inform the meaning
of constitutional text—especially text meant to codify a pre-
existing right—is, in our view, more legitimate, and more
administrable, than asking judges to “make diffcult empiri-
cal judgments” about “the costs and benefts of frearms re-
strictions,” especially given their “lack [of] expertise” in the
feld. Id., at 790–791 (plurality opinion).
6
6
The dissent claims that Heller's text-and-history test will prove un-
workable compared to means-end scrutiny in part because judges are rela-
tively ill equipped to “resolv[e] diffcult historical questions” or engage in
“searching historical surveys.” Post, at 107, 111. We are unpersuaded.
The job of judges is not to resolve historical questions in the abstract; it
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Opinion of the Court
If the last decade of Second Amendment litigation has
t
aught this Court anything, it is that federal courts tasked
with making such diffcult empirical judgments regarding
frearm regulations under the banner of “intermediate scru-
tiny” often defer to the determinations of legislatures. But
while that judicial deference to legislative interest balancing
is understandable—and, elsewhere, appropriate—it is not
deference that the Constitution demands here. The Second
Amendment “is the very product of an interest balancing by
the people” and it “surely elevates above all other interests
the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms” for
self-defense. Heller, 554 U. S., at 635. It is this balance—
struck by the traditions of the American people—that de-
mands our unqualifed deference.
D
The test that we set forth in Heller and apply today re-
quires courts to assess whether modern frearms regulations
are consistent with the Second Amendment's text and histor-
ical understanding. In some cases, that inquiry will be
fairly straightforward. For instance, when a challenged
regulation addresses a general societal problem that has per-
sisted since the 18th century, the lack of a distinctly similar
historical regulation addressing that problem is relevant evi-
dence that the challenged regulation is inconsistent with the
Second Amendment. Likewise, if earlier generations ad-
dressed the societal problem, but did so through materially
different means, that also could be evidence that a modern
is to resolve legal questions presented in particular cases or controversies.
That “legal inquiry is a refned subset” of a broader “historical inquiry,”
and it relies on “various evidentiary principles and default rules” to re-
solve uncertainties. W. Baude & S. Sachs, Originalism and the Law of
the Past, 37 L. & Hist. Rev. 809, 810–811 (2019). For example, “[i]n our
adversarial system of adjudication, we follow the principle of party presen-
tation.” United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U. S. –––, ––– (2020).
Courts are thus entitled to decide a case based on the historical record
compiled by the parties.
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regulation is unconstitutional. And if some jurisdictions ac-
tua
lly attempted to enact analogous regulations during this
timeframe, but those proposals were rejected on constitu-
tional grounds, that rejection surely would provide some
probative evidence of unconstitutionality.
Heller itself exemplifes this kind of straightforward his-
torical inquiry. One of the District's regulations challenged
in Heller “totally ban[ned] handgun possession in the home.”
Id., at 628. The District in Heller addressed a perceived
societal problem—firearm violence in densely populated
communities—and it employed a regulation—a fat ban on
the possession of handguns in the home—that the Founders
themselves could have adopted to confront that problem.
Accordingly, after considering “founding-era historical prec-
edent,” including “various restrictive laws in the colonial pe-
riod,” and fnding that none was analogous to the District's
ban, Heller concluded that the handgun ban was unconstitu-
tional. Id., at 631; see also id., at 634 (describing the claim
that “there were somewhat similar restrictions in the found-
ing period” a “false proposition”).
New York's proper-cause requirement concerns the same
alleged societal problem addressed in Heller: “handgun vio-
lence,” primarily in “urban area[s].” Ibid. Following the
course charted by Heller, we will consider whether “histori-
cal precedent” from before, during, and even after the found-
ing evinces a comparable tradition of regulation. Id., at 631.
And, as we explain below, we fnd no such tradition in the
historical materials that respondents and their amici have
brought to bear on that question. See Part III–B, infra.
While the historical analogies here and in Heller are rela-
tively simple to draw, other cases implicating unprecedented
societal concerns or dramatic technological changes may re-
quire a more nuanced approach. The regulatory challenges
posed by frearms today are not always the same as those
that preoccupied the Founders in 1791 or the Reconstruction
generation in 1868. Fortunately, the Founders created a

28 NEW
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Opinion of the Court
Constitution—and a Second Amendment—“intended to en-
dure
for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the
various crises of human affairs.” McCulloch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat. 316, 415 (1819) (emphasis deleted). Although its
meaning is fxed according to the understandings of those
who ratifed it, the Constitution can, and must, apply to cir-
cumstances beyond those the Founders specifcally antici-
pated. See, e. g., United States v. Jones, 565 U. S. 400, 404–
405 (2012) (holding that installation of a tracking device was
“a physical intrusion [that] would have been considered a
`search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when
it was adopted”).
We have already recognized in Heller at least one way in
which the Second Amendment's historically fxed meaning
applies to new circumstances: Its reference to “arms” does
not apply “only [to] those arms in existence in the 18th cen-
tury.” 554 U. S., at 582. “Just as the First Amendment
protects modern forms of communications, and the Fourth
Amendment applies to modern forms of search, the Second
Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that
constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in exist-
ence at the time of the founding.” Ibid. (citations omitted).
Thus, even though the Second Amendment's defnition of
“arms” is fxed according to its historical understanding, that
general defnition covers modern instruments that facilitate
armed self-defense. Cf. Caetano v. Massachusetts, 577 U. S.
411, 411–412 (2016) (per curiam) (stun guns).
Much like we use history to determine which modern
“arms” are protected by the Second Amendment, so too does
history guide our consideration of modern regulations that
were unimaginable at the founding. When confronting such
present-day frearm regulations, this historical inquiry that
courts must conduct will often involve reasoning by anal-
ogy—a commonplace task for any lawyer or judge. Like all
analogical reasoning, determining whether a historical regu-
lation is a proper analogue for a distinctly modern frearm
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regulation requires a determination of whether the two reg-
u
lations are “relevantly similar.” C. Sunstein, On Analogi-
cal Reasoning, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 741, 773 (1993). And be-
cause “[e]verything is similar in infnite ways to everything
else,” id., at 774, one needs “some metric enabling the analo-
gizer to assess which similarities are important and which
are not,” F. Schauer & B. Spellman, Analogy, Expertise, and
Experience, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 249, 254 (2017). For instance,
a green truck and a green hat are relevantly similar if one's
metric is “things that are green.” See ibid. They are not
relevantly similar if the applicable metric is “things you can
wear.”
While we do not now provide an exhaustive survey of the
features that render regulations relevantly similar under the
Second Amendment, we do think that Heller and McDonald
point toward at least two metrics: how and why the regula-
tions burden a law-abiding citizen's right to armed self-
defense. As we stated in Heller and repeated in McDonald,
“individual self-defense is `the central component' of the
Second Amendment right.” McDonald, 561 U. S., at 767
(quoting Heller, 554 U. S., at 599); see also id., at 628 (“the
inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second
Amendment right”). Therefore, whether modern and his-
torical regulations impose a comparable burden on the right
of armed self-defense and whether that burden is comparably
justifed are “ `central' ” considerations when engaging in an
analogical inquiry. McDonald, 561 U. S., at 767 (quoting
Heller, 554 U. S., at 599).
7
7
This does not mean that courts may engage in independent means-
end scrutiny under the guise of an analogical inquiry. Again, the Second
Amendment is the “product of an interest balancing by the people,” not
the evolving product of federal judges. Heller, 554 U. S., at 635 (emphasis
altered). Analogical reasoning requires judges to apply faithfully the bal-
ance struck by the founding generation to modern circumstances, and con-
trary to the dissent's assertion, there is nothing “[i]roni[c]” about that
undertaking. Post, at 111. It is not an invitation to revise that balance
through means-end scrutiny.
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Opinion of the Court
To be clear, analogical reasoning under the Second Amend-
ment
is neither a regulatory straightjacket nor a regulatory
blank check. On the one hand, courts should not “uphold
every modern law that remotely resembles a historical ana-
logue,” because doing so “risk[s] endorsing outliers that our
ancestors would never have accepted.” Drummond v. Rob-
inson, 9 F. 4th 217, 226 (CA3 2021). On the other hand,
analogical reasoning requires only that the government iden-
tify a well-established and representative historical ana-
logue, not a historical twin. So even if a modern-day regu-
lation is not a dead ringer for historical precursors, it still
may be analogous enough to pass constitutional muster.
Consider, for example, Heller's discussion of “longstand-
ing ” “laws forbidding the carrying of frearms in sensitive
places such as schools and government buildings.” 554
U. S., at 626. Although the historical record yields rela-
tively few 18th- and 19th-century “sensitive places” where
weapons were altogether prohibited—e. g., legislative assem-
blies, polling places, and courthouses—we are also aware of
no disputes regarding the lawfulness of such prohibitions.
See D. Kopel & J. Greenlee, The “Sensitive Places” Doctrine,
13 Charleston L. Rev. 205, 229–236, 244–247 (2018); see also
Brief for Independent Institute as Amicus Curiae 11–17.
We therefore can assume it settled that these locations were
“sensitive places” where arms carrying could be prohibited
consistent with the Second Amendment. And courts can
use analogies to those historical regulations of “sensitive
places” to determine that modern regulations prohibiting the
carry of frearms in new and analogous sensitive places are
constitutionally permissible.
Although we have no occasion to comprehensively defne
“sensitive places” in this case, we do think respondents err
in their attempt to characterize New York's proper-cause re-
quirement as a “sensitive-place” law. In their view, “sensi-
tive places” where the government may lawfully disarm law-
abiding citizens include all “places where people typically
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congregate and where law-enforcement and other public-
safety
professionals are presumptively available.” Brief for
Respondents 34. It is true that people sometimes congre-
gate in “sensitive places,” and it is likewise true that law
enforcement professionals are usually presumptively avail-
able in those locations. But expanding the category of “sen-
sitive places” simply to all places of public congregation that
are not isolated from law enforcement defnes the category of
“sensitive places” far too broadly. Respondents' argument
would in effect exempt cities from the Second Amendment
and would eviscerate the general right to publicly carry arms
for self-defense that we discuss in detail below. See Part
III–B, infra. Put simply, there is no historical basis for
New York to effectively declare the island of Manhattan a
“sensitive place” simply because it is crowded and protected
generally by the New York City Police Department.
Like Heller, we “do not undertake an exhaustive historical
analysis . . . of the full scope of the Second Amendment.”
554 U. S., at 626. And we acknowledge that “applying con-
stitutional principles to novel modern conditions can be dif-
fcult and leave close questions at the margins.” Heller v.
District of Columbia, 670 F. 3d 1244, 1275 (CADC 2011)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). “But that is hardly unique to
the Second Amendment. It is an essential component of
judicial decisionmaking under our enduring Constitution.”
Ibid. We see no reason why judges frequently tasked with
answering these kinds of historical, analogical questions can-
not do the same for Second Amendment claims.
III
Having made the constitutional standard endorsed in Hel-
ler more explicit, we now apply that standard to New York's
proper-cause requirement.
A
It is undisputed that petitioners Koch and Nash—two ordi-
nary, law-abiding, adult citizens—are part of “the people”
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whom the Second Amendment protects. See Heller, 554
U
. S., at 580. Nor does any party dispute that handguns are
weapons “in common use” today for self-defense. See id., at
627; see also Caetano, 577 U. S., at 411–412. We therefore
turn to whether the plain text of the Second Amendment
protects Koch's and Nash's proposed course of conduct—
carrying handguns publicly for self-defense.
We have little diffculty concluding that it does. Respond-
ents do not dispute this. See Brief for Respondents 19.
Nor could they. Nothing in the Second Amendment's text
draws a home/public distinction with respect to the right to
keep and bear arms. As we explained in Heller, the
“textual elements” of the Second Amendment's opera-
tive clause—“the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed”—“guarantee the individual right to
possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.” 554
U. S., at 592. Heller further confrmed that the right to
“bear arms” refers to the right to “wear, bear, or carry . . .
upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the
purpose . . . of being armed and ready for offensive or defen-
sive action in a case of confict with another person.” Id.,
at 584 (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U. S. 125,
143 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); inter na l quotati on
marks omitted).
This defnition of “bear” naturally encompasses public
carry. Most gun owners do not wear a holstered pistol at
their hip in their bedroom or while sitting at the dinner
table. Although individuals often “keep” frearms in their
home, at the ready for self-defense, most do not “bear” (i. e.,
carry) them in the home beyond moments of actual confron-
tation. To confne the right to “bear” arms to the home
would nullify half of the Second Amendment's operative
protections.
Moreover, confning the right to “bear” arms to the home
would make little sense given that self-defense is “the cen-
tral component of the [Second Amendment] right itself.”
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Heller, 554 U. S., at 599; see also McDonald, 561 U. S., at
767.
After all, the Second Amendment guarantees an “indi-
vidual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confron-
tation,” Heller, 554 U. S., at 592, and confrontation can surely
take place outside the home.
Although we remarked in Heller that the need for armed
self-defense is perhaps “most acute” in the home, id., at 628,
we did not suggest that the need was insignifcant elsewhere.
Many Americans hazard greater danger outside the home
than in it. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F. 3d 933, 937 (CA7
2012) (“[A] Chicagoan is a good deal more likely to be at-
tacked on a sidewalk in a rough neighborhood than in his
apartment on the 35th foor of the Park Tower”). The text
of the Second Amendment refects that reality.
The Second Amendment's plain text thus presumptively
guarantees petitioners Koch and Nash a right to “bear” arms
in public for self-defense.
B
Conceding that the Second Amendment guarantees a gen-
eral right to public carry, contra, Young, 992 F. 3d, at 813,
respondents instead claim that the Amendment “permits a
State to condition handgun carrying in areas `frequented by
the general public' on a showing of a non-speculative need
for armed self-defense in those areas,” Brief for Respond-
ents 19 (citation omitted).
8
To support that claim, the bur-
8
The dissent claims that we cannot answer the question presented with-
out giving respondents the opportunity to develop an evidentiary record
feshing out “how New York's law is administered in practice, how much
discretion licensing offcers in New York possess, or whether the proper
cause standard differs across counties.” Post, at 102. We disagree. The
dissent does not dispute that any applicant for an unrestricted concealed-
carry license in New York can satisfy the proper-cause standard only if he
has “ ` “a special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the
general community.” ' ” Post, at 94 (quoting Kachalsky v. County of West-
chester, 701 F. 3d 81, 86 (CA2 2012)). And in light of the text of the
Second Amendment, along with the Nation's history of frearm regulation,
we conclude below that a State may not prevent law-abiding citizens from
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Opinion of the Court
den falls on respondents to show that New York's proper-
cause
requirement is consistent with this Nation's historical
tradition of frearm regulation. Only if respondents carry
that burden can they show that the pre-existing right codi-
fed in the Second Amendment, and made applicable to the
States through the Fourteenth, does not protect petitioners'
proposed course of conduct.
Respondents appeal to a variety of historical sources from
the late 1200s to the early 1900s. We categorize these peri-
ods as follows: (1) medieval to early modern England; (2) the
American Colonies and the early Republic; (3) antebellum
America; (4) Reconstruction; and (5) the late-19th and early-
20th centuries.
We categorize these historical sources because, when it
comes to interpreting the Constitution, not all history is cre-
ated equal. “Constitutional rights are enshrined with the
scope they were understood to have when the people adopted
them.” Heller, 554 U. S., at 634–635 (emphasis added). The
Second Amendment was adopted in 1791; the Fourteenth in
1868. Historical evidence that long predates either date
may not illuminate the scope of the right if linguistic or legal
conventions changed in the intervening years. It is one
thing for courts to “reac[h] back to the 14th century” for
English practices that “prevailed up to the `period immedi-
ately before and after the framing of the Constitution.' ”
Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc., 554
U. S. 269, 311 (2008) (Roberts, C. J., dissenting). It is quite
publicly carrying handguns because they have not demonstrated a special
need for self-defense. See in fra, at 70. That conclusion does not depend
upon any of the factual questions raised by the dissent. Nash and Koch
allege that they were denied unrestricted licenses because they had not
“demonstrate[d] a special need for self-defense that distinguished [them]
from the general public.” App. 123, 125. If those allegations are proven
true, then it simply does not matter whether licensing offcers have applied
the proper-cause standard differently to other concealed-carry license ap-
plicants; Nash's and Koch's constitutional rights to bear arms in public for
self-defense were still violated.
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another to rely on an “ancient” practice that had become “ob-
solete
in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitu-
tion” and never “was acted upon or accepted in the colonies.”
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474, 477 (1935).
As with historical evidence generally, courts must be care-
ful when assessing evidence concerning English common-law
rights. The common law, of course, developed over time.
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459
U. S. 519, 533, n. 28 (1983); see also Rogers v. Tennessee, 532
U. S. 451, 461 (2001). And English common-law practices
and understandings at any given time in history cannot be
indiscriminately attributed to the Framers of our own Con-
stitution. Even “the words of Magna Charta”—founda-
tional as they were to the rights of America's forefathers—
“stood for very different things at the time of the separation
of the American Colonies from what they represented origi-
nally” in 1215. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 529
(1884). Sometimes, in interpreting our own Constitution, “it
[is] better not to go too far back into antiquity for the best
securities of our liberties,” Funk v. United States, 290 U. S.
371, 382 (1933), unless evidence shows that medieval law sur-
vived to become our Founders' law. A long, unbroken line
of common-law precedent stretching from Bracton to Black-
stone is far more likely to be part of our law than a short-
lived, 14th-century English practice.
Similarly, we must also guard against giving postenact-
ment history more weight than it can rightly bear. It is
true that in Heller we reiterated that evidence of “how the
Second Amendment was interpreted from immediately after
its ratifcation through the end of the 19th century” repre-
sented a “critical tool of constitutional interpretation.” 554
U. S., at 605. We therefore examined “a variety of legal and
other sources to determine the public understanding of [the
Second Amendment] after its . . . ratifcation.” Ibid. And,
in other contexts, we have explained that “ `a regular course
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36 NEW
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or indeterminate `terms & phrases' ” in the Constitution.
C
hiafalo v. Washington, 591 U. S. –––, ––– (2020) (quoting
Letter from J. Madison to S. Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 Writ-
ings of James Madison 450 (G. Hunt ed. 1908)); see also, e. g.,
Houston Community College System v. Wilson, 595 U. S.
468, 474 (2022) (same); The Federalist No. 37, p. 229 (C. Ros-
siter ed. 1961) (J. Madison); see generally C. Nelson, Stare
Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 Va.
L. Rev. 1, 10–21 (2001); W. Baude, Constitutional Liquidation,
71 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2019). In other words, we recognize that
“where a governmental practice has been open, widespread,
and unchallenged since the early days of the Republic, the
practice should guide our interpretation of an ambiguous
constitutional provision.” NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U. S.
513, 572 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); see also
Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 174 (1926); Printz v.
United States, 521 U. S. 898, 905 (1997).
But to the extent later history contradicts what the text
says, the text controls. “ `[L]iquidating ' indeterminacies in
written laws is far removed from expanding or altering
them.” Gamble v. United States, 587 U. S. –––, ––– (2019)
(Thomas, J., concurring); see also Letter from J. Madison
to N. Trist (Dec. 1831), in 9 Writings of James Madison 477
(G. Hunt ed. 1910). Thus, “post-ratifcation adoption or ac-
ceptance of laws that are inconsistent with the original
meaning of the constitutional text obviously cannot over-
come or alter that text.” Heller, 670 F. 3d, at 1274, n. 6
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see also Espinoza v. Montana
Dept. of Revenue, 591 U. S. –––, ––– (2020).
As we recognized in Heller itself, because post-Civil War
discussions of the right to keep and bear arms “took place
75 years after the ratifcation of the Second Amendment,
they do not provide as much insight into its original meaning
as earlier sources.” 554 U. S., at 614; cf. Sprint Communi-
cations Co., 554 U. S., at 312 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting)
(“The belated innovations of the mid- to late-19th-century
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courts come too late to provide insight into the meaning of
[
the Constitution in 1787]”). And we made clear in Gamble
that Heller's interest in mid- to late-19th-century commen-
tary was secondary. Heller considered this evidence “only
after surveying what it regarded as a wealth of authority for
its reading—including the text of the Second Amendment
and state constitutions.” Gamble, 587 U. S., at ––– (majority
opinion). In other words, this 19th-century evidence was
“treated as mere confrmation of what the Court thought had
already been established.” Ibid.
A fnal word on historical method: Strictly speaking, New
York is bound to respect the right to keep and bear arms
because of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Second.
See, e. g., Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7
Pet. 243, 250–251 (1833) (Bill of Rights applies only to the
Federal Government). Nonetheless, we have made clear
that individual rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights and
made applicable against the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment have the same scope as against the Federal Gov-
ernment. See, e. g., Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. –––, –––
(2020); Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2019); Mal-
loy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 10–11 (1964). And we have gener-
ally assumed that the scope of the protection applicable to
the Federal Government and States is pegged to the public
understanding of the right when the Bill of Rights was
adopted in 1791. See, e. g., Crawford v. Washington, 541
U. S. 36, 42–50 (2004) (Sixth Amendment); Virginia v. Moore,
553 U. S. 164, 168–169 (2008) (Fourth Amendment); Nevada
Comm'n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 564 U. S. 117, 122–125 (2011)
(First Amendment).
We also acknowledge that there is an ongoing scholar-
ly debate on whether courts should primarily rely on the
prevailing understanding of an individual right when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratifed in 1868 when defn-
ing its scope (as well as the scope of the right against the
Federal Government). See, e. g., A. Amar, The Bill of

38 NEW
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Opinion of the Court
Rights: Creation and Reconstruction xiv, 223, 243 (1998);
K.
Lash, Re-Speaking the Bill of Rights: A New Doctrine
of Incorporation, 97 Ind. L. J. 1439, 1441 (2022) (“When
the people adopted the Fourteenth Amendment into exist-
ence, they readopted the original Bill of Rights, and did
so in a manner that invested those original 1791 texts with
new 1868 meanings”). We need not address this issue today
because, as we explain below, the public understanding of
the right to keep and bear arms in both 1791 and 1868
was, for all relevant purposes, the same with respect to
public carry.
***
With these principles in mind, we turn to respondents' his-
torical evidence. Throughout modern Anglo-American his-
tory, the right to keep and bear arms in public has tradition-
ally been subject to well-defned restrictions governing the
intent for which one could carry arms, the manner of carry,
or the exceptional circumstances under which one could not
carry arms. But apart from a handful of late-19th-century
jurisdictions, the historical record compiled by respondents
does not demonstrate a tradition of broadly prohibiting the
public carry of commonly used frearms for self-defense.
Nor is there any such historical tradition limiting public
carry only to those law-abiding citizens who demonstrate a
special need for self-defense.
9
We conclude that respond-
ents have failed to meet their burden to identify an American
9
To be clear, nothing in our analysis should be interpreted to suggest
the unconstitutionality of the 43 States' “shall-issue” licensing regimes,
under which “a general desire for self-defense is suffcient to obtain a [per-
mit].” Drake v. Filko, 724 F. 3d 426, 442 (CA3 2013) (Hardiman, J., dis-
senting). Because these licensing regimes do not require applicants to
show an atypical need for armed self-defense, they do not necessarily pre-
vent “law-abiding, responsible citizens” from exercising their Second
Amendment right to public carry. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U. S. 570, 635 (2008). Rather, it appears that these shall-issue regimes,
which often require applicants to undergo a background check or pass a
frearms safety course, are designed to ensure only that those bearing
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tradition justifying New York's proper-cause requirement.
U
nder Heller's text-and-history standard, the proper-cause
requirement is therefore unconstitutional.
1
Respondents' substantial reliance on English history and
custom before the founding makes some sense given our
statement in Heller that the Second Amendment “codifed a
right `inherited from our English ancestors.' ” 554 U. S., at
599 (quoting Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 281 (1897));
see also Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 478 (1888). But
this Court has long cautioned that the English common law
“is not to be taken in all respects to be that of America.”
Van Ness v. Pacard, 2 Pet. 137, 144 (1829) (Story, J., for the
Court); see also Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 659 (1834);
Funk, 290 U. S., at 384. Thus, “[t]he language of the Consti-
tution cannot be interpreted safely except by reference to
the common law and to British institutions as they were
when the instrument was framed and adopted,” not as they
existed in the Middle Ages. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U. S.
87, 108–109 (1925) (emphasis added); see also United States
v. Reid, 12 How. 361, 363 (1852).
We interpret the English history that respondents and the
United States muster in light of these interpretive princi-
ples. We fnd that history ambiguous at best and see little
reason to think that the Framers would have thought it ap-
arms in the jurisdiction are, in fact, “law-abiding, responsible citizens.”
Ibid. And they likewise appear to contain only “narrow, objective, and
defnite standards” guiding licensing offcials, Shuttlesworth v. Bir-
mingham, 394 U. S. 147, 151 (1969), rather than requiring the “appraisal
of facts, the exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion,” Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 305 (1940)—features that typify proper-
cause standards like New York's. That said, because any permitting
scheme can be put toward abusive ends, we do not rule out constitutional
challenges to shall-issue regimes where, for example, lengthy wait times
in processing license applications or exorbitant fees deny ordinary citizens
their right to public carry.

40 NEW
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plicable in the New World. It is not suffciently probative
to
defend New York's proper-cause requirement.
To begin, respondents and their amici point to several me-
dieval English regulations from as early as 1285 that they
say indicate a longstanding tradition of restricting the public
carry of frearms. See 13 Edw. 1, 102. The most prominent
is the 1328 Statute of Northampton (or Statute), passed
shortly after Edward II was deposed by force of arms and
his son, Edward III, took the throne of a kingdom where
“tendency to turmoil and rebellion was everywhere apparent
throughout the realm.” N. Trenholme, The Risings in the
English Monastic Towns in 1327, 6 Am. Hist. Rev. 650, 651
(1901). At the time, “[b]ands of malefactors, knights as well
as those of lesser degree, harried the country, committing
assaults and murders,” prompted by a more general “spirit
of insubordination” that led to a “decay in English national
life.” K. Vickers, England in the Later Middle Ages 107
(1926).
The Statute of Northampton was, in part, “a product of . . .
the acute disorder that still plagued England.” A. Verduyn,
The Politics of Law and Order During the Early Years of
Edward III, 108 Eng. Hist. Rev. 842, 850 (1993). It provided
that, with some exceptions, Englishmen could not “come be-
fore the King 's Justices, or other of the King 's Ministers
doing their offce, with force and arms, nor bring no force in
affray of the peace, nor to go nor ride armed by night nor by
day, in Fairs, Markets, nor in the presence of the Justices or
other Ministers, nor in no part elsewhere, upon pain to forfeit
their Armour to the King, and their Bodies to Prison at the
King 's pleasure.” 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328).
Respondents argue that the prohibition on “rid[ing]” or
“go[ing] . . . armed” was a sweeping restriction on public
carry of self-defense weapons that would ultimately be
adopted in Colonial America and justify onerous public-carry
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regulations. Notwithstanding the ink the parties spill over
th
is provision, the Statute of Northampton—at least as it
was understood during the Middle Ages—has little bearing
on the Second Amendment adopted in 1791. The Statute of
Northampton was enacted nearly 20 years before the Black
Death, more than 200 years before the birth of Shakespeare,
more than 350 years before the Salem Witch Trials, more
than 450 years before the ratifcation of the Constitution,
and nearly 550 years before the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The Statute's prohibition on going or riding “armed” obvi-
ously did not contemplate handguns, given they did not ap-
pear in Europe until about the mid-1500s. See K. Chase,
Firearms: A Global History to 1700, p. 61 (2003). Rather, it
appears to have been centrally concerned with the wearing
of armor. See, e. g., Calendar of the Close Rolls, Edward
III, 1330–1333, p. 131 (Apr. 3, 1330) (H. Maxwell-Lyte ed.
1898); id., at 243 (May 28, 1331); id., Edward III, 1327–1330,
at 314 (Aug. 29, 1328) (1896). If it did apply beyond armor,
it applied to such weapons as the “launcegay,” a 10- to 12-
foot-long lightweight lance. See 7 Rich. 2, c. 13 (1383); 20
Rich. 2, c. 1 (1396).
The Statute's apparent focus on armor and, perhaps, weap-
ons like launcegays makes sense given that armor and lances
were generally worn or carried only when one intended to
engage in lawful combat or—as most early violations of the
Statute show—to breach the peace. See, e. g., Calendar
of the Close Rolls, Edward III, 1327–1330, at 402 (July 7,
1328); id., Edward III, 1333–1337, at 695 (Aug. 18, 1336)
(1898). Contrast these arms with daggers. In the medi-
eval period, “[a]lmost everyone carried a knife or a dagger
in his belt.” H. Peterson, Daggers and Fighting Knives
of the Western World 12 (2001). While these knives were
used by knights in warfare, “[c]ivilians wore them for self-
protection,” among other things. Ibid. Respondents point

42 NEW
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to no evidence suggesting the Statute applied to the smaller
medie
val weapons that strike us as most analogous to mod-
ern handguns.
When handguns were introduced in England during the
Tudor and early Stuart eras, they did prompt royal efforts
at suppression. For example, Henry VIII issued several
proclamations decrying the proliferation of handguns, and
Parliament passed several statutes restricting their posses-
sion. See, e. g., 6 Hen. 8, c. 13, § 1 (1514); 25 Hen. 8, c. 17, § 1
(1533); 33 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1541); Prohibiting Use of Handguns
and Crossbows (Jan. 1537), in 1 Tudor Royal Proclamations
249 (P. Hughes & J. Larkin eds. 1964). But Henry VIII's
displeasure with handguns arose not primarily from con-
cerns about their safety but rather their ineffcacy. Henry
VIII worried that handguns threatened Englishmen's prof-
ciency with the longbow—a weapon many believed was cru-
cial to English military victories in the 1300s and 1400s,
including the legendary English victories at Crécy and Agin-
court. See R. Payne-Gallwey, The Crossbow 32, 34 (1903);
L. Schwoerer, Gun Culture in Early Modern England 54
(2016) (Schwoerer).
Similarly, James I considered small handguns—called
dags—“utterly unserviceable for defence, Militarie practise,
or other lawful use.” A Proclamation Against Steelets,
Pocket Daggers, Pocket Dagges and Pistols (R. Barker
printer 1616). But, in any event, James I's proclamation in
1616 “was the last one regarding civilians carrying dags,”
Schwoerer 63. “After this the question faded without expla-
nation.” Ibid. So, by the time Englishmen began to arrive
in America in the early 1600s, the public carry of handguns
was no longer widely proscribed.
When we look to the latter half of the 17th century, re-
spondents' case only weakens. As in Heller, we consider
this history “[b]etween the [Stuart] Restoration [in 1660] and
the Glorious Revolution [in 1688]” to be particularly instruc-
tive. 554 U. S., at 592. During that time, the Stuart Kings
Charles II and James II ramped up efforts to disarm their
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political opponents, an experience that “caused Englishmen
.
. . to be jealous of their arms.” Id., at 593.
In one notable example, the government charged Sir John
Knight, a prominent detractor of James II, with violating the
Statute of Northampton because he allegedly “did walk
about the streets armed with guns, and that he went into
the church of St. Michael, in Bristol, in the time of divine
service, with a gun, to terrify the King 's subjects.” Sir
John Knight's Case, 3 Mod. 117, 87 Eng. Rep. 75, 76 (K. B.
1686). Chief Justice Herbert explained that the Statute of
Northampton had “almost gone in desuetudinem,” Rex v. Sir
John Knight, 1 Comb. 38, 38–39, 90 Eng. Rep. 330 (K. B.
1686), meaning that the Statute had largely become obsolete
through disuse.
10
And the Chief Justice further explained
10
Another medieval frearm restriction—a 1541 statute enacted under
Henry VIII that limited the ownership and use of handguns (which could
not be shorter than a yard) to those subjects with annual property values
of at least £100, see 33 Hen. 8, c. 6, §§ 1–2—fell into a similar obsolescence.
As far as we can discern, the last recorded prosecutions under the 1541
statute occurred in 1693, neither of which appears to have been successful.
See King and Queen v. Bullock, 4 Mod. 147, 87 Eng. Rep. 315 (K. B. 1693);
King v. Litten, 1 Shower, K. B. 367, 89 Eng. Rep. 644 (K. B. 1693). It
seems that other prosecutions under the 1541 statute during the late 1600s
were similarly unsuccessful. See King v. Silcot, 3 Mod. 280, 280–281, 87
Eng. Rep. 186 (K. B. 1690); King v. Lewellin, 1 Shower, K. B. 48, 89 Eng.
Rep. 440 (K. B. 1689); cf. King and Queen v. Alsop, 4 Mod. 49, 50–51, 87
Eng. Rep. 256, 256–257 (K. B. 1691). By the late 1700s, it was widely
recognized that the 1541 statute was “obsolete.” 2 R. Burn, The Justice
of the Peace, and Parish Offcer 243, n. (11th ed. 1769); see also, e. g., The
Farmer's Lawyer 143 (1774) (“entirely obsolete”); 1 G. Jacob, Game-Laws
II, Law-Dictionary (T. Tomlins ed. 1797); 2 R. Burn, The Justice of the
Peace, and Parish Offcer 409 (18th ed. 1797) (calling the 1541 statute “a
matter more of curiosity than use”).
In any event, lest one be tempted to put much evidentiary weight on
the 1541 statute, it impeded not only public carry, but further made it
unlawful for those without suffcient means to “kepe in his or their houses”
any “handgun.” 33 Hen. 8, c. 6, § 1. Of course, this kind of limitation is
inconsistent with Heller's historical analysis regarding the Second Amend-
ment's meaning at the founding and thereafter. So, even if a severe re-
striction on keeping frearms in the home may have seemed appropriate

44 NEW
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Opinion of the Court
that the act of “go[ing] armed to terrify the King 's subjects”
was
“a great offence at the common law” and that the Stat-
ute of Northampton “is but an affrmance of that law.” 3
Mod., at 118, 87 Eng. Rep., at 76 (frst emphasis added).
Thus, one's conduct “will come within the Act,”—i. e., would
terrify the King 's subjects—only “where the crime shall ap-
pear to be malo animo,” 1 Comb., at 39, 90 Eng. Rep., at 330,
with evil intent or malice. Knight was ultimately acquitted
by the jury.
11
Just three years later, Parliament responded by writing
the “predecessor to our Second Amendment” into the 1689
English Bill of Rights, Heller, 554 U. S., at 593, guaranteeing
that “Protestants . . . may have Arms for their Defence suit-
able to their Conditions, and as allowed by Law,” 1 Wm. &
Mary, c. 2, § 7, in 3 Eng. Stat. at Large 417 (1689). Although
this right was initially limited—it was restricted to Protes-
tants and held only against the Crown, but not Parliament—
it represented a watershed in English history. Englishmen
had “never before claimed . . . the right of the individual
in the mid-1500s, it was not incorporated into the Second Amendment's
scope. We see little reason why the parts of the 1541 statute that address
public carry should not be understood similarly.
We note also that even this otherwise restrictive 1541 statute, which
generally prohibited shooting frearms in any city, exempted discharges
“for the defence of [one's] p[er]son or house.” § 4. Apparently, the para-
mount need for self-defense trumped the Crown's interest in frearm sup-
pression even during the 16th century.
11
The dissent discounts Sir John Knight's Case, 3 Mod. 117, 87 Eng.
Rep. 75, because it only “arguably” supports the view that an evil-intent
requirement attached to the Statute of Northampton by the late 1600s and
early 1700s. See post, at 118. But again, because the Second Amend-
ment's bare text covers petitioners' public carry, the respondents here
shoulder the burden of demonstrating that New York's proper-cause re-
quirement is consistent with the Second Amendment's text and historical
scope. See supra, at 24. To the extent there are multiple plausible inter-
pretations of Sir John Knight's Case, we will favor the one that is more
consistent with the Second Amendment's command.
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to arms.” Schwoerer 156.
12
And
as that individual right
matured, “by the time of the founding,” the right to keep
and bear arms was “understood to be an individual right pro-
tecting against both public and private violence.” Heller,
554 U. S., at 594.
To be sure, the Statute of Northampton survived both Sir
John Knight's Case and the English Bill of Rights, but it was
no obstacle to public carry for self-defense in the decades
leading to the founding. Serjeant William Hawkins, in his
widely read 1716 treatise, confrmed that “no wearing of
Arms is within the meaning of [the Statute of Northampton],
unless it be accompanied with such Circumstances as are apt
to terrify the People.” 1 Pleas of the Crown 136. To illus-
trate that proposition, Hawkins noted as an example that
“Persons of Qua l ity” were “ i n no Danger of Offendi ng
against this Statute by wearing common Weapons” because,
in those circumstances, it would be clear that they had no
“Intention to commit any Act of Violence or Disturbance of
the Peace.” Ibid.; see also T. Barlow, The Justice of Peace
12 (1745). Respondents do not offer any evidence showing
that, in the early 18th century or after, the mere public car-
rying of a handgun would terrify people. In fact, the oppo-
site seems to have been true. As time went on, “domestic
gun culture [in England] softened” any “terror” that fre-
arms might once have conveyed. Schwoerer 4. Thus,
whatever place handguns had in English society during the
Tudor and Stuart reigns, by the time we reach the 18th
century—and near the founding—they had gained a fairly
secure footing in English culture.
12
Even Catholics, who fell beyond the protection of the right to have
arms, and who were stripped of all “Arms, Weapons, Gunpowder, [and]
Ammunition,” were at least allowed to keep “such necessary Weapons as
shall be allowed . . . by Order of the Justices of the Peace . . . for the
Defence of his House or Person.” 1 Wm. & Mary, c. 15, § 4, in 3 Eng. Stat.
at Large 399 (1688).
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At the very least, we cannot conclude from this historical
record
that, by the time of the founding, English law would
have justifed restricting the right to publicly bear arms
suited for self-defense only to those who demonstrate some
special need for self-protection.
2
Respondents next point us to the history of the Colonies
and early Republic, but there is little evidence of an early
American practice of regulating public carry by the general
public. This should come as no surprise—English subjects
founded the Colonies at about the time England had itself
begun to eliminate restrictions on the ownership and use of
handguns.
In the colonial era, respondents point to only three restric-
tions on public carry. For starters, we doubt that three colo-
nial regulations could suffce to show a tradition of public-
carry regulation. In any event, even looking at these laws
on their own terms, we are not convinced that they regulated
public carry akin to the New York law before us.
Two of the statutes were substantively identical. Colo-
nial Massachusetts and New Hampshire both authorized jus-
tices of the peace to arrest “all Affrayers, Rioters, Disturb-
ers, or Breakers of the Peace, and such as shall ride or go
armed Offensively . . . by Night or by Day, in Fear or Affray
of Their Majesties Liege People.” 1692 Mass. Acts and
Laws no. 6, pp. 11–12; see 1699 N. H. Acts and Laws ch. 1. Re-
spondents and their amici contend that being “armed of-
fensively” meant bearing any offensive weapons, including
frearms. See Brief for Respondents 33. In particular, re-
spondents' amici argue that “ `offensive' ” arms in the 1600s
and 1700s were what Blackstone and others referred to as
“ `dangerous or unusual weapons,' ” Brief for Professors of
History and Law as Amici Curiae 7 (quoting 4 Blackstone,
Commentaries, at 148–149), a category that they say included
frearms, see also post, at 121–123 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Respondents, their amici, and the dissent all misunder-
st
and these statutes. Far from banning the carrying of any
class of frearms, they merely codifed the existing common-
law offense of bearing arms to terrorize the people, as had
the Statute of Northampton itself. See supra, at 43–46.
For instance, the Massachusetts statute proscribed “go[ing]
armed Offensively . . . in Fear or Affray” of the people, indi-
cating that these laws were modeled after the Statute of
Northampton to the extent that the statute would have been
understood to limit public carry in the late 1600s. More-
over, it makes very little sense to read these statutes as ban-
ning the public carry of all frearms just a few years after
Chief Justice Herbert in Sir John Knight's Case indicated
that the English common law did not do so.
Regardless, even if respondents' reading of these colonial
statutes were correct, it would still do little to support re-
strictions on the public carry of handguns today. At most,
respondents can show that colonial legislatures sometimes
prohibited the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weap-
ons”—a fact we already acknowledged in Heller. See 554
U. S., at 627. Drawing from this historical tradition, we ex-
plained there that the Second Amendment protects only the
carrying of weapons that are those “in common use at the
time,” as opposed to those that “are highly unusual in society
at large.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). What-
ever the likelihood that handguns were considered “danger-
ous and unusual” during the colonial period, they are indis-
putably in “common use” for self-defense today. They are,
in fact, “the quintessential self-defense weapon.” Id., at
629. Thus, even if these colonial laws prohibited the carry-
ing of handguns because they were considered “dangerous
and unusual weapons” in the 1690s, they provide no justif-
cation for laws restricting the public carry of weapons that
are unquestionably in common use today.
The third statute invoked by respondents was enacted in
East New Jersey in 1686. It prohibited the concealed carry
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of “pocket pistol[s]” or other “unusual or unlawful weapons,”
and
it further prohibited “planter[s]” from carrying all pistols
unless in military service or, if “strangers,” when traveling
through the Province. An Act Against Wearing Swords, &
c., ch. 9, in Grants, Concessions, and Original Constitutions
of the Province of New Jersey 290 (2d ed. 1881) (Grants and
Concessions). These restrictions do not meaningfully sup-
port respondents. The law restricted only concealed carry,
not all public carry, and its restrictions applied only to cer-
tain “unusual or unlawful weapons,” including “pocket pis-
tol[s].” Ibid. It also did not apply to all pistols, let alone
all frearms. “Pocket pistols” had barrel lengths of perhaps
3 or 4 inches, far smaller than the 6-inch to 14-inch barrels
found on the other belt and hip pistols that were commonly
used for lawful purposes in the 1600s. J. George, English
Pistols and Revolvers 16 (1938); see also, e. g., 14 Car. 2 c. 3,
§ 20 (1662); H. Peterson, Ar ms and Ar mor i n Colonial
America, 1526–1783, p. 208 (1956) (Peterson). Moreover, the
law prohibited only the concealed carry of pocket pistols; it
presumably did not by its terms touch the open carry of
larger, presumably more common pistols, except as to “plant-
ers.”
13
In colonial times, a “planter” was simply a farmer
or plantation owner who settled new territory. R. Lederer,
Colonial American English 175 (1985); New Jersey State Ar-
chives, J. Klett, Using the Records of the East and West
Jersey Proprietors 31 (rev. ed. 2014), https://www.nj.gov/
state/archives/pdf/proprietors.pdf. While the reason behind
this singular restriction is not entirely clear, planters may
have been targeted because colonial-era East New Jersey
was riven with “strife and excitement” between planters and
13
Even assuming that pocket pistols were, as East Jersey in 1686
deemed them, “unusual or unlawful,” it appears that they were commonly
used at least by the founding. See, e. g., G. Neumann, The History of
Weapons of the American Revolution 150–151 (1967); see also H. Hendrick,
P. Paradis, & R. Hornick, Human Factors Issues in Handgun Safety and
Forensics 44 (2008).
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the Colony's proprietors “respecting titles to the soil.” See
W
. Whitehead, East Jersey Under the Proprietary Govern-
ments 150–151 (rev. 2d ed. 1875); see also T. Gordon, The
History of New Jersey 49 (1834).
In any event, we cannot put meaningful weight on this
solitary statute. First, although the “planter” restriction
may have prohibited the public carry of pistols, it did not
prohibit planters from carrying long guns for self-defense—
including the popular musket and carbine. See Peterson 41.
Second, it does not appear that the statute survived for very
long. By 1694, East New Jersey provided that no slave “be
permitted to carry any gun or pistol . . . into the woods, or
plantations” unless their owner accompanied them. Grants
and Concessions 341. If slave-owning planters were prohib-
ited from carrying pistols, it is hard to comprehend why
slaves would have been able to carry them in the planter's
presence. Moreover, there is no evidence that the 1686 stat-
ute survived the 1702 merger of East and West New Jersey.
See 1 Nevill, Acts of the General Assembly of the Province
of New-Jersey (1752). At most eight years of history in half
a Colony roughly a century before the founding sheds little
light on how to properly interpret the Second Amendment.
Respondents next direct our attention to three late-18th-
century and early-19th-century statutes, but each parallels
the colonial statutes already discussed. One 1786 Virginia
statute provided that “no man, great nor small, [shall] go nor
ride armed by night nor by day, in fairs or markets, or in
other places, in terror of the Country.” Collection of All
Such Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia ch. 21, p. 33
(1794).
14
A Massachusetts statute from 1795 commanded
justices of the peace to arrest “all affrayers, rioters, disturb-
ers, or breakers of the peace, and such as shall ride or go
14
The Virginia statute all but codifed the existing common law in this
regard. See G. Webb, The Offce and Authority of a Justice of Peace 92
(1736) (explaining how a constable “may take away Arms from such who
ride, or go, offensively armed, in Terror of the People”).

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Opinion of the Court
armed offensively, to the fear or terror of the good citizens
of
this Commonwealth.” 1795 Mass. Acts and Laws ch. 2,
p. 436, in Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
And an 1801 Tennessee statute likewise required any person
who would “publicly ride or go armed to the terror of the
people, or privately carry any dirk, large knife, pistol or any
other dangerous weapon, to the fear or terror of any person”
to post a surety; otherwise, his continued violation of the law
would be “punished as for a breach of the peace, or riot at
common law.” 1801 Tenn. Acts pp. 260–261.
A by-now-familiar thread runs through these three stat-
utes: They prohibit bearing arms in a way that spreads
“fear” or “terror” among the people. As we have already
explained, Chief Justice Herbert in Sir John Knight's Case in-
terpreted this in Terrorem Populi element to require some-
thing more than merely carrying a frearm in public. See
supra, at 43–44. Respondents give us no reason to think that
the founding generation held a different view. Thus, all told,
in the century leading up to the Second Amendment and in the
frst decade after its adoption, there is no historical basis for
concluding that the pre-existing right enshrined in the Sec-
ond Amendment permitted broad prohibitions on all forms
of public carry.
3
Only after the ratification of the Second Amendment in
1791 did public-carry restrictions proliferate. Respondents
rely heavily on these restrictions, which generally fell into
three categories: common-law offenses, statutory prohibi-
tions, and “surety” statutes. None of these restrictions im-
posed a substantial burden on public carry analogous to the
burden created by New York's restrictive licensing regime.
Co mmo n-L aw O ffen ses. As dur i ng the colonia l and
founding periods, the common-law offenses of “affray” or
going armed “to the terror of the people” continued to im-
pose some limits on frearm carry in the antebellum period.
But as with the earlier periods, there is no evidence indicat-

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Opinion of the Court
ing that these common-law limitations impaired the right of
the
general population to peaceable public carry.
For example, the Tennessee attorney general once charged
a defendant with the common-law offense of affray, arguing
that the man committed the crime when he “ `arm[ed] himself
with dangerous and unusual weapons, in such a manner as
will naturally cause terror to the people.' ” Simpson v.
State, 13 Tenn. 356, 358 (1833). More specifcally, the indict-
ment charged that Simpson “with force and arms being ar-
rayed in a warlike manner . . . unlawfully, and to the great
terror and disturbance of divers good citizens, did make
an affray. ” Id., at 361. The Tennessee Supreme Court
quashed the indictment, holding that the Statute of North-
ampton was never part of Tennessee law. Id., at 359. But
even assuming that Tennesseans' ancestors brought with
them the common law associated with the Statute, the Simp-
son court found that if the Statute had made, as an “inde-
pendent ground of affray,” the mere arming of oneself with
frearms, the Tennessee Constitution's Second Amendment
analogue had “completely abrogated it.” Id., at 360. At
least in light of that constitutional guarantee, the court did
not think that it could attribute to the mere carrying of arms
“a necessarily consequent operation as terror to the peo-
ple.” Ibid.
Perhaps more telling was the North Carolina Supreme
Court's decision in State v. Huntly, 25 N. C. 418 (1843) (per
curiam). Unlike the Tennessee Supreme Court in Simpson,
the Huntly court held that the common-law offense codifed
by the Statute of Northampton was part of the State's law.
See 25 N. C., at 421–422. However, consistent with the Stat-
ute's long-settled interpretation, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court acknowledged “that the carrying of a gun” for
a lawful purpose “per se constitutes no offence.” Id., at 422–
423. Only carrying for a “wicked purpose” with a “mischie-
vous result . . . constitute[d a] crime.” Id., at 423; see also
J. Haywood, The Duty and Offce of Justices of Peace 10
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(1800); H. Potter, The Offce and Duty of a Justice of the
P
eace 39 (1816).
15
Other state courts likewise recognized
that the common law did not punish the carrying of deadly
weapons per se, but only the carrying of such weapons “for
the purpose of an affray, and in such manner as to strike
terror to the people.” O'Neil v. State, 16 Ala. 65, 67 (1849).
Therefore, those who sought to carry firear ms publicly
and peaceably in antebellum America were generally free to
do so.
Statutory Prohibitions. In the early to mid-19th century,
some States began enacting laws that proscribed the con-
cealed carry of pistols and other small weapons. As we rec-
ognized in Heller, “the majority of the 19th-century courts
to consider the question held that [these] prohibitions on car-
rying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second
Amendment or state analogues.” 554 U. S., at 626. Re-
spondents unsurprisingly cite these statutes
16
—and deci-
15
The dissent concedes that Huntly, 25 N. C. 418, recognized that citi-
zens were “ `at perfect liberty' to carry for `lawful purpose[s].' ” Post, at
123 (quoting Huntly, 25 N. C., at 423). But the dissent disputes that such
“lawful purpose[s]” included self-defense, because Huntly goes on to speak
more specifcally of carrying arms for “business or amusement.” Id., at
423. This is an unduly stingy interpretation of Huntly. In particular,
Huntly stated that “the citizen is at perfect liberty to carry his gun” “[f]or
any lawful purpose,” of which “business” and “amusement” were then
mentioned. Ibid. (emphasis added). Huntly then contrasted these “law-
ful purpose[s]” with the “wicked purpose . . . to terrify and alarm.” Ibid.
Because there is no evidence that Huntly considered self-defense a
“wicked purpose,” we think the best reading of Huntly would sanction
public carry for self-defense, so long as it was not “in such [a] manner as
naturally will terrify and alarm.” Ibid.
16
Beginning in 1813 with Kentucky, six States (fve of which were in the
South) enacted laws prohibiting the concealed carry of pistols by 1846.
See 1813 Ky. Acts § 1, p. 100; 1813 La. Acts p. 172; 1820 Ind. Acts p. 39;
Ark. Rev. Stat. § 13, p. 280 (1838); 1838 Va. Acts ch. 101, § 1, p. 76; 1839
Ala. Acts no. 77, § 1. During this period, Georgia enacted a law that ap-
peared to prohibit both concealed and open carry, see 1837 Ga. Acts §§ 1,
4, p. 90, but the Georgia Supreme Court later held that the prohibition
could not extend to open carry consistent with the Second Amendment.
See in fra, at 54. Between 1846 and 1859, only one other State, Ohio,
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sions upholding them
17
—as
evidence that States were histor-
ically free to ban public carry.
In fact, however, the history reveals a consensus that
States could not ban public carry altogether. Respondents'
cited opinions agreed that concealed-carry prohibitions were
constitutional only if they did not similarly prohibit open
carry. That was true in Alabama. See State v. Reid, 1 Ala.
612, 616, 619–621 (1840).
18
It was also true in Louisiana.
See State v. Chandler, 5 La. 489, 490 (1850).
19
Kentucky,
meanwhile, went one step further—the State Supreme Court
invalidated a concealed-carry prohibition. See Bliss v.
Commonwealth, 12 Ky. 90 (1822).
20
joined this group. 1859 Ohio Laws § 1, p. 56. Tennessee, meanwhile,
enacted in 1821 a broader law that prohibited carrying, among other
things, “belt or pocket pistols, either public or private,” except while trav-
eling. 1821 Tenn. Acts ch. 13, § 1, p. 15. And the Territory of Florida
prohibited concealed carry during this same timeframe. See 1835 Terr.
of Fla. Laws p. 423.
17
See State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229 (Ind. 1833); State v. Reid, 1 Ala.
612, 616 (1840); State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842); Nunn v. State, 1 Ga.
243 (1846); State v. Chandler, 5 La. 489 (1850); State v. Smith, 11 La. 633
(1856); State v. Jumel, 13 La. 399 (1858). But see Bliss v. Commonwealth,
12 Ky. 90 (1822). See generally 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American
Law *340, n. b.
18
See Reid, 1 Ala., at 619 (holding that “the Legislature cannot inhibit
the citizen from bearing arms openly”); id., at 621 (noting that there was
no evidence “tending to show that the defendant could not have defended
himself as successfully, by carrying the pistol openly, as by secreting it
about his person”).
19
See, e. g., Chandler, 5 La., at 490 (Louisiana concealed-carry prohibi-
tion “interfered with no man's right to carry arms (to use its words) `in
full open view,' which places men upon an equality”); Smith, 11 La., at 633
(The “arms” described in the Second Amendment “are such as are borne
by a people in war, or at least carried openly”); Jumel, 13 La., at 399–400
(“The statute in question does not infringe the right of the people to keep
or bear arms. It is a measure of police, prohibiting only a particular
mode of bearing arms which is found dangerous to the peace of society”).
20
With respect to Indiana's concealed-carry prohibition, the Indiana Su-
preme Court's reasons for upholding it are unknown because the court
issued a one-sentence per curiam order holding the law “not unconstitu-
tional.” Mitchell, 3 Blackf., at 229. Similarly, the Arkansas Supreme
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Opinion of the Court
The Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Nunn v. State,
1
Ga. 243 (1846), is particularly instructive. Georgia's 1837
statute broadly prohibited “wearing ” or “carrying ” pistols
“as arms of offence or defence,” without distinguishing be-
tween concealed and open carry. 1837 Ga. Acts 90, § 1. To
the extent the 1837 Act prohibited “carrying certain weap-
ons secretly,” the court explained, it was “valid.” Nunn, 1
Ga., at 251. But to the extent the Act also prohibited “bear-
ing arms openly,” the court went on, it was “in confict with
the Constitutio[n] and void.” Ibid.; see also Heller, 554 U. S.,
at 612. The Georgia Supreme Court's treatment of the
State's general prohibition on the public carriage of hand-
guns indicates that it was considered beyond the consti-
tutional pale in antebellum America to altogether prohibit
public carry.
Finally, we agree that Tennessee's prohibition on carrying
“public[ly] or private[ly]” any “belt or pocket pisto[l],” 1821
Tenn. Acts ch. 13, p. 15, was, on its face, uniquely severe, see
Heller, 554 U. S., at 629. That said, when the Tennessee Su-
preme Court addressed the constitutionality of a substan-
tively identical successor provision, see 1870 Tenn. Acts ch. 13,
§ 1, p. 28, the court read this language to permit the public
carry of larger, military-style pistols because any categorical
prohibition on their carry would “violat[e] the constitutional
right to keep arms.” Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165, 187
(1871); see also Heller, 554 U. S., at 629 (discussing Andrews).
21
Court upheld Arkansas' prohibition, but without reaching a majority ra-
tionale. See Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18. The Arkansas Supreme Court would
later adopt Tennessee's approach, which tolerated the prohibition of all
public carry of handguns except for military-style revolvers. See, e. g.,
Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455 (1876).
21
Shortly after Andrews, 50 Tenn. 165, Tennessee codifed an exception
to the State's handgun ban for “an[y] army pistol, or such as are commonly
carried and used in the United States Army” so long as they were carried
“openly in [one's] hands.” 1871 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 90, § 1; see also State
v. Wilburn, 66 Tenn. 57, 61–63 (1872); Porter v. State, 66 Tenn. 106, 107–
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All told, these antebellum state-court decisions evince a
consensus
view that States could not altogether prohibit the
public carry of “arms” protected by the Second Amendment
or state analogues.
22
Surety Statutes. In the mid-19th century, many jurisdic-
tions began adopting surety statutes that required certain
individuals to post bond before carrying weapons in public.
Although respondents seize on these laws to justify the
proper-cause restriction, their reliance on them is misplaced.
These laws were not bans on public carry, and they typically
targeted only those threatening to do harm.
As discussed earlier, Massachusetts had prohibited riding
or going “armed offensively, to the fear or terror of the good
citizens of this Commonwealth” since 1795. 1795 Mass. Acts
and Laws ch. 2, at 436, in Laws of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. In 1836, Massachusetts enacted a new law
providing:
“If any person shall go armed with a dirk, dagger,
sword, pistol, or other offensive and dangerous weapon,
without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other in-
jury, or violence to his person, or to his family or prop-
erty, he may, on complaint of any person having reason-
able cause to fear an injury, or breach of the peace, be
required to fnd sureties for keeping the peace, for a
22
The Territory of New Mexico made it a crime in 1860 to carry “any
class of pistols whatever” “concealed or otherwise.” 1860 Terr. of N. M.
Laws §§ 1–2, p. 94. This extreme restriction is an outlier statute enacted
by a territorial government nearly 70 years after the ratifcation of the
Bill of Rights, and its constitutionality was never tested in court. Its
value in discerning the original meaning of the Second Amendment is
insubstantial. Moreover, like many other stringent carry restrictions
that were localized in the Western Territories, New Mexico's prohibition
ended when the Territory entered the Union as a State in 1911 and guar-
anteed in its State Constitution that “[t]he people have the right to bear
arms for their security and defense, but nothing herein shall be held to
permit the carrying of concealed weapons.” N. M. Const., Art. II, § 6
(1911); see in fra, at 69.
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Opinion of the Court
term not exceeding six months, with the right of appeal-
i
ng as before provided.” Mass. Rev. Stat., ch. 134, § 16.
In short, the Commonwealth required any person who was
reasonably likely to “breach the peace,” and who, standing
accused, could not prove a special need for self-defense, to
post a bond before publicly carrying a frearm. Between
1838 and 1871, nine other jurisdictions adopted variants of
the Massachusetts law.
23
Contrary to respondents' position, these “reasonable-cause
laws” in no way represented the “direct precursor” to the
proper-cause requirement. Br ief for Respondents 27.
While New York presumes that individuals have no public
carry right without a showing of heightened need, the surety
statutes presumed that individuals had a right to public
carry that could be burdened only if another could make out
a specifc showing of “reasonable cause to fear an injury, or
breach of the peace.” Mass. Rev. Stat., ch. 134, § 16.
24
As
William Rawle explained in an infuential treatise, an individ-
ual's carrying of arms was “suffcient cause to require him to
give surety of the peace” only when “attended with circum-
stances giving just reason to fear that he purposes to make
an unlawful use of them.” A View of the Constitution of the
United States of America 126 (2d ed. 1829). Then, even on
such a showing, the surety laws did not prohibit public carry
in locations frequented by the general community. Rather,
an accused arms-bearer “could go on carrying without crimi-
nal penalty” so long as he “post[ed] money that would be
23
See 1838 Terr. of Wis. Stat. § 16, p. 381; Me. Rev. Stat., ch. 169, § 16
(1840); Mich. Rev. Stat., ch. 162, § 16 (1846); 1847 Va. Acts ch. 14, § 16; Terr.
of Minn. Rev. Stat., ch. 112, § 18 (1851); 1854 Ore. Stat. ch. 16, § 17, p. 220;
D. C. Rev. Code, ch. 141, § 16 (1857); 1860 Pa. Laws p. 432, § 6; W. Va. Code,
ch. 153, § 8 (1868).
24
It is true that two of the antebellum surety laws were unusually broad
in that they did not expressly require a citizen complaint to trigger the
posting of a surety. See 1847 Va. Acts ch. 14, § 16; W. Va. Code, ch.
153, § 8.
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Opinion of the Court
forfeited if he breached the peace or injured others—a re-
quirement
from which he was exempt if he needed self-de-
fense.” Wrenn, 864 F. 3d, at 661.
Thus, unlike New York's regime, a showing of special need
was required only after an individual was reasonably accused
of intending to injure another or breach the peace. And,
even then, proving special need simply avoided a fee rather
than a ban. All told, therefore, “[u]nder surety laws . . .
everyone started out with robust carrying rights” and only
those reasonably accused were required to show a special
need in order to avoid posting a bond. Ibid. These ante-
bellum special-need requirements “did not expand carrying
for the responsible; it shrank burdens on carrying by the
(allegedly) reckless.” Ibid.
One Court of Appeals has nonetheless remarked that these
surety laws were “a severe constraint on anyone thinking of
carrying a weapon in public.” Young, 992 F. 3d, at 820.
That contention has little support in the historical record.
Respondents cite no evidence showing the average size of
surety postings. And given that surety laws were “in-
tended merely for prevention” and were “not meant as any
degree of punishment,” 4 Blackstone, Commentaries, at 249,
the burden these surety statutes may have had on the right
to public carry was likely too insignifcant to shed light
on New York's proper-cause standard—a violation of which
can carry a 4-year prison term or a $5,000 fne. In Heller,
we noted that founding-era laws punishing unlawful dis-
charge “with a small fne and forfeiture of the weapon . . . ,
not with signifcant criminal penalties,” likely did not “pre-
ven[t] a person in the founding era from using a gun to pro-
tect himself or his family from violence, or that if he did so
the law would be enforced against him.” 554 U. S., at 633–
634. Similarly, we have little reason to think that the hypo-
thetical possibility of posting a bond would have prevented
anyone from carrying a frearm for self-defense in the 19th
century.
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Besides, respondents offer little evidence that authorities
e
ver enforced surety laws. The only recorded case that we
know of involved a justice of the peace declining to require
a surety, even when the complainant alleged that the arms-
bearer “ `did threaten to beat, wou[n]d, mai[m], and kill' ” him.
Brief for Professor Robert Leider et al. as Amici Curiae 31
(quoting Grover v. Bullock, No. 185 (Worcester Cty., Aug. 13,
1853)); see E. Ruben & S. Cornell, Firearm Regionalism and
Public Carry: Placing Southern Antebellum Case Law in
Context, 125 Yale L. J. Forum 121, 130, n. 53 (2015). And
one scholar who canvassed 19th-century newspapers—which
routinely reported on local judicial matters—found only a
handful of other examples in Massachusetts and the District
of Columbia, all involving black defendants who may have
been targeted for selective or pretextual enforcement. See
R. Leider, Constitutional Liquidation, Surety Laws, and the
Right To Bear Arms 15–17, in New Histories of Gun Rights
and Regulation (J. Blocher, J. Charles, & D. Miller eds.)
(forthcoming); see also Brief for Professor Robert Leider
et al. as Amici Curiae 31–32. That is surely too slender a
reed on which to hang a historical tradition of restricting the
right to public carry.
25
Respondents also argue that surety statutes were severe
restrictions on frearms because the “reasonable cause to
fear” standard was essentially pro forma, given that “merely
carrying frearms in populous areas breached the peace”
per se. Brief for Respondents 27. But that is a counter-
intuitive reading of the language that the surety statutes
25
The dissent speculates that the absence of recorded cases involving
surety laws may simply “show that these laws were normally followed.”
Post, at 126. Perhaps. But again, the burden rests with the government
to establish the relevant tradition of regulation, see supra, at 24, and,
given all of the other features of surety laws that make them poor ana-
logues to New York's proper-cause standard, we consider the barren rec-
ord of enforcement to be simply one additional reason to discount their
relevance.
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Opinion of the Court
actually used. If the mere carrying of handguns breached
the
peace, it would be odd to draft a surety statute requir-
ing a complainant to demonstrate “reasonable cause to fear
an injury, or breach of the peace,” Mass. Rev. Stat., ch. 134,
§ 16, rather than a reasonable likelihood that the arms-bearer
carried a covered weapon. After all, if it were the nature
of the weapon rather than the manner of carry that was dis-
positive, then the “reasonable fear” requirement would be
redundant.
Moreover, the overlapping scope of surety statutes and
criminal statutes suggests that the former were not viewed
as substantial restrictions on public carry. For example,
when Massachusetts enacted its surety statute in 1836, it
reaffrmed its 1794 criminal prohibition on “go[ing] armed
offensively, to the terror of the people.” Mass. Rev. Stat.,
ch. 85, § 24. And Massachusetts continued to criminalize the
carrying of various “dangerous weapons” well after passing
the 1836 surety statute. See, e. g., 1850 Mass. Acts ch. 194,
§ 1, p. 401; Mass. Gen. Stat., ch. 164, § 10 (1860). Similarly,
Virginia had criminalized the concealed carry of pistols since
1838, see 1838 Va. Acts ch. 101, § 1, nearly a decade before it
enacted its surety statute, see 1847 Va. Acts ch. 14, § 16. It
is unlikely that these surety statutes constituted a “severe”
restraint on public carry, let alone a restriction tantamount
to a ban, when they were supplemented by direct criminal
prohibitions on specifc weapons and methods of carry.
To summarize: The historical evidence from antebellum
America does demonstrate that the manner of public carry
was subject to reasonable regulation. Under the common
law, individuals could not carry deadly weapons in a manner
likely to terrorize others. Similarly, although surety stat-
utes did not directly restrict public carry, they did provide
fnancial incentives for responsible arms carrying. Finally,
States could lawfully eliminate one kind of public carry—
concealed carry—so long as they left open the option to
carry openly.

60 NEW
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Opinion of the Court
None of these historical limitations on the right to bear
ar
ms approach New York's proper-cause requirement be-
cause none operated to prevent law-abiding citizens with or-
dinary self-defense needs from carrying arms in public for
that purpose.
4
Evidence from around the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment also fails to support respondents' position. For
the most part, respondents and the United States ignore the
“outpouring of discussion of the [right to keep and bear arms]
in Congress and in public discourse, as people debated
whether and how to secure constitutional rights for newly
free slaves” after the Civil War. Heller, 554 U. S., at 614.
Of course, we are not obliged to sift the historical materials
for evidence to sustain New York's statute. That is re-
spondents' burden. Nevertheless, we think a short review
of the public discourse surrounding Reconstruction is useful
in demonstrating how public carry for self-defense remained
a central component of the protection that the Fourteenth
Amendment secured for all citizens.
A short prologue is in order. Even before the Civil War
commenced in 1861, this Court indirectly affrmed the impor-
tance of the right to keep and bear arms in public. Writing
for the Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857),
Chief Justice Taney offered what he thought was a parade of
horribles that would result from recognizing that free blacks
were citizens of the United States. If blacks were citizens,
Taney fretted, they would be entitled to the privileges and
immunities of citizens, including the right “to keep and carry
arms wherever they went.” Id., at 417 (emphasis added).
Thus, even Chief Justice Taney recognized (albeit unenthusi-
astically in the case of blacks) that public carry was a compo-
nent of the right to keep and bear arms—a right free blacks
were often denied in antebellum America.
After the Civil War, of course, the exercise of this funda-
mental right by freed slaves was systematically thwarted.
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Opinion of the Court
This Court has already recounted some of the Southern
abuses
violating blacks' right to keep and bear arms. See
McDonald, 561 U. S., at 771 (noting the “systematic efforts”
made to disarm blacks); id., at 845–847 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment); see also S. Exec.
Doc. No. 43, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1866) (“Pistols, old mus-
kets, and shotguns were taken away from [freed slaves] as
such weapons would be wrested from the hands of lunatics”).
In the years before the 39th Congress proposed the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Freedmen's Bureau regularly kept
it abreast of the dangers to blacks and Union men in the
postbellum South. The reports described how blacks used
publicly carried weapons to defend themselves and their
communities. For example, the Bureau reported that a
teacher from a Freedmen's school in Maryland had written
to say that, because of attacks on the school, “[b]oth the
mayor and sheriff have warned the colored people to go
armed to school, (which they do,)” and that “[t]he superin-
tendent of schools came down and brought [the teacher] a
revolver” for his protection. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess., 658 (1866); see also H. R. Exec. Doc. No. 68, 39th Cong.,
2d Sess., 91 (1867) (noting how, during the New Orleans
riots, blacks under attack “defended themselves . . . with
such pistols as they had”).
Witnesses before the Joint Committee on Reconstruction
also described the depredations visited on Southern blacks,
and the efforts they made to defend themselves. One Vir-
ginia music professor related that when “[t]wo Union men
were attacked . . . they drew their revolvers and held their
assailants at bay.” H. R. Rep. No. 30, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 2, p. 110 (1866). An assistant commissioner to the Bu-
reau from Alabama similarly reported that men were “rob-
bing and disarming negroes upon the highway,” H. R. Exec.
Doc. No. 70, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 297 (1866), indicating that
blacks indeed carried arms publicly for their self-protection,
even if not always with success. See also H. R. Exec. Doc.

62 NEW
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Opinion of the Court
No. 329, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 41 (1868) (describing a Ku Klux
Klan
outft that rode “through the country . . . robbing every
one they come across of money, pistols, papers, &c.”); id., at
36 (noting how a black man in Tennessee had been murdered
on his way to get book subscriptions, with the murderer tak-
ing, among other things, the man's pistol).
Blacks had “procured great numbers of old army muskets
and revolvers, particularly in Texas,” and “employed them
to protect themselves” with “vigor and audacity.” S. Exec.
Doc. No. 43, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 8. Seeing that govern-
ment was inadequately protecting them, “there [was] the
strongest desire on the part of the freedmen to secure arms,
revolvers particularly.” H. R. Rep. No. 30, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 3, at 102.
On July 6, 1868, Congress extended the 1866 Freedmen's
Bureau Act, see 15 Stat. 83, and reaffrmed that freedmen
were entitled to the “full and equal beneft of all laws and
proceedings concerning personal liberty [and] personal secu-
rity . . . including the constitutional right to bear arms.”
§ 14, 14 Stat. 176 (1866) (emphasis added). That same day,
a Bureau offcial reported that freedmen in Kentucky and
Tennessee were still constantly under threat: “No Union man
or negro who attempts to take any active part in politics, or
the improvement of his race, is safe a single day; and nearly
all sleep upon their arms at night, and carry concealed weap-
ons during the day.” H. R. Exec. Doc. No. 329, 40th Cong.,
2d Sess., at 40.
Of course, even during Reconstruction the right to keep
and bear arms had limits. But those limits were consistent
with a right of the public to peaceably carry handguns for
self-defense. For instance, when General D. E. Sickles is-
sued a decree in 1866 pre-empting South Carolina's Black
Codes—which prohibited frearm possession by blacks—he
stated: “The constitutional rights of all loyal and well-
disposed inhabitants to bear arms will not be infringed; nev-
ertheless this shall not be construed to sanction the unlawful
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practice of carrying concealed weapons. . . . And no disor-
der
ly person, vagrant, or disturber of the peace, shall be al-
lowed to bear arms.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at
908–909; see also McDonald, 561 U. S., at 847–848 (opinion
of Thomas, J.).
26
Around the same time, the editors of The
Loyal Georgian, a prominent black-owned newspaper, were
asked by “A Colored Citizen” whether “colored persons
[have] a right to own and carry fre arms.” The editors re-
sponded that blacks had “the same right to own and carry
fre arms that other citizens have.” The Loyal Georgian,
Feb. 3, 1866, p. 3, col. 4. And, borrowing language from a
Freedmen's Bureau circular, the editors maintained that
“[a]ny person, white or black, may be disarmed if convicted
of making an improper or dangerous use of weapons,” even
though “no military or civil offcer has the right or authority
to disarm any class of people, thereby placing them at the
mercy of others.” Ibid. (quoting Circular No. 5, Freedmen's
Bureau, Dec. 22, 1865); see also McDonald, 561 U. S., at 848–
849 (opinion of Thomas, J.).
27
26
Respondents invoke General Orders No. 10, which covered the Second
Military District (North and South Carolina), and provided that “[t]he
practice of carrying deadly weapons, except by offcers and soldiers in the
military service of the United States, is prohibited.” Headquarters Sec-
ond Military Dist., Gen. Orders No. 10 (Charleston, S. C., Apr. 11, 1867),
in S. Exec. Doc. No. 14, 40th Cong., 1st Sess., 64 (1867). We put little
weight on this categorical restriction given that the order also specifed
that a violation of this prohibition would “render the offender amenable
to trial and punishment by military commission,” ibid., rather than a jury
otherwise guaranteed by the Constitution. There is thus little indication
that these military dictates were designed to align with the Constitution's
usual application during times of peace.
27
That said, Southern prohibitions on concealed carry were not always
applied equally, even when under federal scrutiny. One lieutenant posted
in Saint Augustine, Florida, remarked how local enforcement of concealed-
carry laws discriminated against blacks: “To sentence a negro to several
dollars' fne for carrying a revolver concealed upon his person, is in accord-
ance with an ordinance of the town; but still the question naturally arises
in my mind, `Why is this poor fellow fned for an offence which is com-
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As for Reconstruction-era state regulations, there was lit-
tle
innovation over the kinds of public-carry restrictions that
had been commonplace in the early 19th century. For in-
stance, South Carolina in 1870 authorized the arrest of “all
who go armed offensively, to the terror of the people,” 1870
S. C. Acts p. 403, no. 288, § 4, parroting earlier statutes that
codifed the common-law offense. That same year, after it
cleaved from Virginia, West Virginia enacted a surety stat-
ute nearly identical to the one it inherited from Virginia.
See W. Va. Code, ch. 153, § 8. Also in 1870, Tennessee essen-
tially reenacted its 1821 prohibition on the public carry of
handguns but, as explained above, Tennessee courts inter-
preted that statute to exempt large pistols suitable for mili-
tary use. See supra, at 54.
Respondents and the United States, however, direct our
attention primarily to two late-19th-century cases in Texas.
In 1871, Texas law forbade anyone from “carrying on or
about his person . . . any pistol . . . unless he has reasonable
grounds for fearing an unlawful attack on his person.” 1871
Tex. Gen. Laws § 1. The Texas Supreme Court upheld that
restriction in English v. State, 35 Tex. 473 (1871). The
Court reasoned that the Second Amendment, and the State's
constitutional analogue, protected only those arms “as are
useful and proper to an armed militia,” including holster pis-
tols, but not other kinds of handguns. Id., at 474–475. Be-
yond that constitutional holding, the English court further
opined that the law was not “contrary to public policy,” id., at
479, given that it “ma[de] all necessary exceptions” allowing
deadly weapons to “be carried as means of self-defense,” and
therefore “fully cover[ed] all the wants of society,” id., at 477.
Four years later, in State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455 (1875), the
Texas Supreme Court modifed its analysis. The court re-
mitted hourly by every other white man I meet in the streets?' ” H. R.
Exec. Doc. No. 57, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 83 (1867); see also H. R. Rep.
No. 16, 39th Cong., 2d Sess., 427 (1867).
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interpreted Texas' State Constitution to protect not only
mi
litary-style weapons but rather all arms “as are commonly
kept, according to the customs of the people, and are appro-
priate for open and manly use in self-defense.” Id., at 458.
On that understanding, the court recognized that, in addition
to “holster pistol[s],” the right to bear arms covered the
carry of “such pistols at least as are not adapted to being
carried concealed.” Id., at 458–459. Nonetheless, after ex-
panding the scope of frearms that warranted state constitu-
tional protection, Duke held that requiring any pistol-bearer
to have “ `reasonable grounds for fearing an unlawful attack
on [one's] person' ” was a “legitimate and highly proper” reg-
ulation of handgun carriage. Id., at 456, 459–460. Duke
thus concluded that the 1871 statute “appear[ed] to have re-
spected the right to carry a pistol openly when needed for
self-defense.” Id., at 459.
We acknowledge that the Texas cases support New York's
proper-cause requirement, which one can analogize to Texas'
“reasonable grounds” standard. But the Texas statute, and
the rationales set forth in English and Duke, are outliers.
In fact, only one other State, West Virginia, adopted a simi-
lar public-carry statute before 1900. See W. Va. Code,
ch. 148, § 7 (1887). The West Virginia Supreme Court up-
held that prohibition, reasoning that no handguns of any kind
were protected by the Second Amendment, a rationale en-
dorsed by no other court during this period. See State v.
Workman, 35 W. Va. 367, 371–374, 14 S. E. 9, 11 (1891). The
Texas decisions therefore provide little insight into how post-
bellum courts viewed the right to carry protected arms in
public.
In the end, while we recognize the support that postbellum
Texas provides for respondents' view, we will not give dis-
proportionate weight to a single state statute and a pair of
state-court decisions. As in Heller, we will not “stake our
interpretation of the Second Amendment upon a single law,
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Opinion of the Court
in effect in a single [State], that contradicts the overwhelm-
i
ng weight of other evidence regarding the right to keep and
bear arms for defense” in public. 554 U. S., at 632.
5
Finally, respondents point to the slight uptick in gun regu-
lation during the late-19th century—principally in the West-
ern Territories. As we suggested in Heller, however, late-
19th-century evidence cannot provide much insight into the
meaning of the Second Amendment when it contradicts ear-
lier evidence. See id., at 614; supra, at 36–37.
28
Here,
moreover, respondents' reliance on late-19th-century laws
has several serious faws even beyond their temporal dis-
tance from the founding.
The vast majority of the statutes that respondents invoke
come from the Western Territories. Two Territories pro-
hibited the carry of pistols in towns, cities, and villages, but
seemingly permitted the carry of rifes and other long guns
everywhere. See 1889 Ariz. Terr. Sess. Laws no. 13, § 1,
p. 16; 1869 N. M. Laws ch. 32, §§ 1–2, p. 72.
29
Two others
prohibited the carry of all frearms in towns, cities, and vil-
lages, including long guns. See 1875 Wyo. Terr. Sess. Laws
ch. 52, § 1; 1889 Idaho Terr. Gen. Laws § 1, p. 23. And one
Territory completely prohibited public carry of pistols every-
where, but allowed the carry of “shot-guns or rifes” for cer-
28
We will not address any of the 20th-century historical evidence
brought to bear by respondents or their amici. As with their late-19th-
century evidence, the 20th-century evidence presented by respondents and
their amici does not provide insight into the meaning of the Second
Amendment when it contradicts earlier evidence.
29
The New Mexico restriction allowed an exception for individuals car-
rying for “the lawful defence of themselves, their families or their prop-
erty, and the same being then and there threatened with danger.” 1869
Terr. of N. M. Laws ch. 32, § 1, p. 72. The Arizona law similarly exempted
those who have “reasonable ground for fearing an unlawful attack upon
his person.” 1889 Ariz. Terr. Sess. Laws no. 13, § 2, p. 17.

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tain purposes. See 1890 Okla. Terr. Stats., Art. 47, §§ 1–2,
5,
p. 495.
These territorial restrictions fail to justify New York's
proper-cause requirement for several reasons. First, the
bare existence of these localized restrictions cannot over-
come the overwhelming evidence of an otherwise enduring
American tradition permitting public carry. For starters,
“[t]he very transitional and temporary character of the
American [territorial] system” often “permitted legislative
improvisations which might not have been tolerated in a per-
manent setup.” E. Pomeroy, The Territories and the United
States 1861–1890, p. 4 (1947). These territorial “legislative
improvisations,” which confict with the Nation's earlier ap-
proach to frearm regulation, are most unlikely to refect “the
origins and continuing signifcance of the [Second] Amend-
ment” and we do not consider them “instructive.” Heller,
554 U. S., at 614.
The exceptional nature of these western restrictions is all
the more apparent when one considers the miniscule territo-
rial populations who would have lived under them. To put
that point into perspective, one need not look further than
the 1890 census. Roughly 62 million people lived in the
United States at that time. Arizona, Idaho, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, and Wyoming combined to account for only
420,000 of those inhabitants—about two-thirds of 1% of the
population. See Dept. of Interior, Compendium of the Elev-
enth Census: 1890, Part I.–Population 2 (1892). Put simply,
these western restrictions were irrelevant to more than 99%
of the American population. We have already explained
that we will not stake our interpretation of the Second
Amendment upon a law in effect in a single State, or a single
city, “that contradicts the overwhelming weight of other evi-
dence regarding the right to keep and bear arms” in public
for self-defense. Heller, 554 U. S., at 632; see supra, at 65–
66. Similarly, we will not stake our interpretation on a
handful of temporary territorial laws that were enacted
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nearly a century after the Second Amendment's adoption,
gover
ned less than 1% of the American population, and also
“contradic[t] the overwhelming weight” of other, more con-
temporaneous historical evidence. Heller, 554 U. S., at 632.
Second, because these territorial laws were rarely subject
to judicial scrutiny, we do not know the basis of their per-
ceived legality. When States generally prohibited both
open and concealed carry of handguns in the late-19th cen-
tury, state courts usually upheld the restrictions when they
exempted army revolvers, or read the laws to exempt at
least that category of weapons. See, e. g., Haile v. State, 38
Ark. 564, 567 (1882); Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557, 560 (1878);
Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455, 461 (1876); State v. Wilburn, 66
Tenn. 57, 60 (1872); Andrews, 50 Tenn., at 187.
30
Those state
courts that upheld broader prohibitions without qualifcation
generally operated under a fundamental misunderstanding
of the right to bear arms, as expressed in Heller. For exam-
ple, the Kansas Supreme Court upheld a complete ban on
public carry enacted by the city of Salina in 1901 based on
the rationale that the Second Amendment protects only “the
right to bear arms as a member of the state militia, or some
other military organization provided for by law.” Salina v.
Blaksley, 72 Kan. 230, 232, 83 P. 619, 620 (1905). That was
clearly erroneous. See Heller, 554 U. S., at 592.
Absent any evidence explaining why these unprecedented
prohibitions on all public carry were understood to comport
with the Second Amendment, we fail to see how they inform
“the origins and continuing signifcance of the Amendment.”
Id., at 614; see also The Federalist No. 37, at 229 (explaining
30
Many other state courts during this period continued the antebellum
tradition of upholding concealed carry regimes that seemingly provided
for open carry. See, e. g., State v. Speller, 86 N. C. 697 (1882); Chatteaux
v. State, 52 Ala. 388 (1875); Eslava v. State, 49 Ala. 355 (1873); State v.
Shelby, 90 Mo. 302, 2 S. W. 468 (1886); Carroll v. State, 28 Ark. 99 (1872);
cf. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 281–282 (1897) (remarking in dicta
that “the right of the people to keep and bear arms . . . is not infringed
by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons”).
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Opinion of the Court
that the meaning of ambiguous constitutional provisions can
be
“liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular dis-
cussions and adjudications” (emphasis added)).
Finally, these territorial restrictions deserve little weight
because they were—consistent with the transitory nature of
territorial government—short lived. Some were held un-
constitutional shortly after passage. See In re Brickey, 8
Idaho 597, 70 P. 609 (1902). Others did not survive a Terri-
tory's admission to the Union as a State. See Wyo. Rev.
Stat., ch. 3, § 5051 (1899) (1890 law enacted upon statehood
prohibiting public carry only when combined with “intent, or
avowed purpose, of injuring [one's] fellow-man”). Thus,
they appear more as passing regulatory efforts by not-yet-
mature jurisdictions on the way to statehood, rather than
part of an enduring American tradition of state regulation.
Beyond these Territories, respondents identify one West-
ern State—Kansas—that instructed cities with more than
15,000 inhabitants to pass ordinances prohibiting the public
carry of frearms. See 1881 Kan. Sess. Laws §§ 1, 23, pp. 79,
92.
31
By 1890, the only cities meeting the population thresh-
old were Kansas City, Topeka, and Wichita. See Compen-
dium of the Eleventh Census: 1890, at 442–452. Even if each
of these three cities enacted prohibitions by 1890, their com-
bined population (93,000) accounted for only 6.5% of Kansas'
total population. Ibid. Although other Kansas cities may
also have restricted public carry unilaterally,
32
the lone late-
19th-century state law respondents identify does not prove
31
In 1875, Arkansas prohibited the public carry of all pistols. See 1875
Ark. Acts p. 156, § 1. But this categorical prohibition was also short lived.
About six years later, Arkansas exempted “pistols as are used in the army
or navy of the United States,” so long as they were carried “uncovered,
and in [the] hand.” 1881 Ark. Acts p. 191, no. 96, §§ 1, 2.
32
In 1879, Salina, Kansas, prohibited the carry of pistols but broadly
exempted “cases when any person carrying [a pistol] is engaged in the
pursuit of any lawful business, calling or employment” and the circum-
stances were “such as to justify a prudent man in carrying such weapon,
for the defense of his person, property or family.” Salina, Kan., Rev. Ordi-
nance No. 268, § 2.

70 NEW
YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
Opinion of the Court
that Kansas meaningfully restricted public carry, let alone
demonstrate
a broad tradition of States doing so.
***
At the end of this long journey through the Anglo-American
history of public carry, we conclude that respondents have
not met their burden to identify an American tradition justi-
fying the State's proper-cause requirement. The Second
Amendment guaranteed to “all Americans” the right to bear
commonly used arms in public subject to certain reasonable,
well-defned restrictions. Heller, 554 U. S., at 581. Those
restrictions, for example, limited the intent for which one
could carry arms, the manner by which one carried arms, or
the exceptional circumstances under which one could not
carry arms, such as before justices of the peace and other
government offcials. Apart from a few late-19th-century
outlier jurisdictions, American governments simply have not
broadly prohibited the public carry of commonly used fre-
arms for personal defense. Nor, subject to a few late-in-
time outliers, have American governments required law-
abiding, responsible citizens to “demonstrate a special need
for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general
community” in order to carry arms in public. Klenosky, 75
App. Div. 2d, at 793, 428 N. Y. S. 2d, at 257.
IV
The constitutional right to bear arms in public for self-
defense is not “a second-class right, subject to an entirely
different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guaran-
tees.” McDonald, 561 U. S., at 780 (plurality opinion). We
know of no other constitutional right that an individual may
exercise only after demonstrating to government offcers
some special need. That is not how the First Amendment
works when it comes to unpopular speech or the free exer-
cise of religion. It is not how the Sixth Amendment works
when it comes to a defendant's right to confront the wit-
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Alito, J., concurring
nesses against him. And it is not how the Second Amend-
ment
works when it comes to public carry for self-defense.
New York's proper-cause requirement violates the Four-
teenth Amendment in that it prevents law-abiding citizens
with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their right
to keep and bear arms. We therefore reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Alito, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court in full but add the following
comments in response to the dissent.
I
Much of the dissent seems designed to obscure the specifc
question that the Court has decided, and therefore it may be
helpful to provide a succinct summary of what we have actu-
ally held. In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570
(2008), the Court concluded that the Second Amendment
protects the right to keep a handgun in the home for self-
defense. Heller found that the Amendment codifed a pre-
existing right and that this right was regarded at the time
of the Amendment's adoption as rooted in “ `the natural right
of resistance and self-preservation.' ” Id., at 594. “[T]he
inherent right of self-defense,” Heller explained, is “central
to the Second Amendment right.” Id., at 628.
Although Heller concerned the possession of a handgun in
the home, the key point that we decided was that “the peo-
ple,” not just members of the “militia,” have the right to use
a frearm to defend themselves. And because many people
face a serious risk of lethal violence when they venture out-
side their homes, the Second Amendment was understood at
the time of adoption to apply under those circumstances.
The Court's exhaustive historical survey establishes that
point very clearly, and today's decision therefore holds that
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Alito, J., concurring
a State may not enforce a law, like New York's Sullivan Law,
that
effectively prevents its law-abiding residents from car-
rying a gun for this purpose.
That is all we decide. Our holding decides nothing about
who may lawfully possess a frearm or the requirements that
must be met to buy a gun. Nor does it decide anything
about the kinds of weapons that people may possess. Nor
have we disturbed anything that we said in Heller or Mc-
Donald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742 (2010), about restrictions
that may be imposed on the possession or carrying of guns.
In light of what we have actually held, it is hard to see
what legitimate purpose can possibly be served by most of
the dissent's lengthy introductory section. See post, at 85–
90 (opinion of Breyer, J.). Why, for example, does the dis-
sent think it is relevant to recount the mass shootings that
have occurred in recent years? Post, at 86–87. Does the
dissent think that laws like New York's prevent or deter
such atrocities? Will a person bent on carrying out a mass
shooting be stopped if he knows that it is illegal to carry a
handgun outside the home? And how does the dissent ac-
count for the fact that one of the mass shootings near the
top of its list took place in Buffalo? The New York law at
issue in this case obviously did not stop that perpetrator.
What is the relevance of statistics about the use of guns
to commit suicide? See post, at 88. Does the dissent think
that a lot of people who possess guns in their homes will be
stopped or deterred from shooting themselves if they cannot
lawfully take them outside?
The dissent cites statistics about the use of guns in domes-
tic disputes, see ibid., but it does not explain why these sta-
tistics are relevant to the question presented in this case.
How many of the cases involving the use of a gun in a domes-
tic dispute occur outside the home, and how many are pre-
vented by laws like New York's?
The dissent cites statistics on children and adolescents
killed by guns, see post, at 83, 85–86, but what does this have
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Alito, J., concurring
to do with the question whether an adult who is licensed to
possess
a handgun may be prohibited from carrying it out-
side the home? Our decision, as noted, does not expand the
categories of people who may lawfully possess a gun, and
federal law generally forbids the possession of a handgun by
a person who is under the age of 18, 18 U. S. C. §§ 922(x)(2)–
(5), and bars the sale of a handgun to anyone under the age
of 21, §§ 922(b)(1), (c)(1).
1
The dissent cites the large number of guns in private
hands—nearly 400 million—but it does not explain what this
statistic has to do with the question whether a person who
already has the right to keep a gun in the home for self-
defense is likely to be deterred from acquiring a gun by the
knowledge that the gun cannot be carried outside the home.
See post, at 84–85. And while the dissent seemingly thinks
that the ubiquity of guns and our country's high level of gun
violence provide reasons for sustaining the New York law,
1
The dissent makes no effort to explain the relevance of most of the
incidents and statistics cited in its introductory section (post, at 85–91) (opin-
ion of Breyer, J.). Instead, it points to studies (summarized later in its
opinion) regarding the effects of “shall issue” licensing regimes on rates
of homicide and other violent crimes. I note only that the dissent's pres-
entation of such studies is one-sided. See RAND Corporation, Effects of
Concealed-Carry Laws on Violent Crime (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.
rand.org/research/gun-policy/analysis/concealed-carry/violent-crime-html;
see also Brief for William English et al. as Amici Curiae 3 (“The over-
whelming weight of statistical analysis of the effects of [right-to-carry]
laws on violent crime concludes that RTC laws do not result in any stat-
istically signifcant increase in violent crime rates”); Brief for Arizona
et al. as Amici Curiae 12 (“[P]opulation-level data on licensed carry is
extensive, and the weight of the evidence confrms that objective, non-
discriminatory licensed-carry laws have two results: (1) statistically sig-
nifcant reductions in some types of violent crime, or (2) no statistically
signifcant effect on overall violent crime”); Brief for Law Enforcement
Groups et al. as Amici Curiae 12 (“[O]ver the period 1991–2019 the inven-
tory of frearms more than doubled; the number of concealed carry permits
increased by at least sevenfold,” but “murder rates fell by almost half,
from 9.8 per 100,000 people in 1991 to 5.0 per 100,000 in 2019” and “[v]iolent
crimes plummeted by over half ”).
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Alito, J., concurring
the dissent appears not to understand that it is these very
fac
ts that cause law-abiding citizens to feel the need to carry
a gun for self-defense.
No one apparently knows how many of the 400 million pri-
vately held guns are in the hands of criminals, but there can
be little doubt that many muggers and rapists are armed and
are undeterred by the Sullivan Law. Each year, the New
York City Police Department (NYPD) confscates thousands
of guns,
2
and it is fair to assume that the number of guns
seized is a fraction of the total number held unlawfully. The
police cannot disarm every person who acquires a gun for
use in criminal activity; nor can they provide bodyguard pro-
tection for the State's nearly 20 million residents or the 8.8
million people who live in New York City. Some of these
people live in high-crime neighborhoods. Some must tra-
verse dark and dangerous streets in order to reach their
homes after work or other evening activities. Some are
members of groups whose members feel especially vulner-
able. And some of these people reasonably believe that un-
less they can brandish or, if necessary, use a handgun in the
case of attack, they may be murdered, raped, or suffer some
other serious injury.
Ordinary citizens frequently use frearms to protect them-
selves from criminal attack. According to survey data, de-
fensive frearm use occurs up to 2.5 million times per year.
Brief for Law Enforcement Groups et al. as Amici Curiae 5.
A Centers for Disease Control and Prevention report com-
missioned by former President Barack Obama reviewed the
literature surrounding frearms use and noted that “[s]tudies
2
NYPD statistics show approximately 6,000 illegal guns were seized in
2021. A. Southall, This Police Captain's Plan To Stop Gun Violence Uses
More Than Handcuffs, N. Y. Times, Feb. 4, 2022. According to recent
remarks by New York City Mayor Eric Adams, the NYPD has confscated
3,000 frearms in 2022 so far. City of New York, Transcript: Mayor Eric
Adams Makes Announcement About NYPD Gun Violence Suppression Di-
vision (June 6, 2022), https://www1.nyc.gov/offce-of-the-mayor/news/369-
22/transcript-mayor-eric-adams-makes-announcement-about-nypd-gun-
violence-suppression-division.
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that directly assessed the effect of actual defensive uses of
g
uns . . . have found consistently lower injury rates among
gun-using crime victims compared with victims who used
other self-protective strategies.” Institute of Medicine and
National Research Council, Priorities for Research To Re-
duce the Threat of Firearm-Related Violence 15–16 (2013)
(referenced in Brief for Independent Women's Law Center
as Amicus Curiae 19–20).
Many of the amicus briefs fled in this case tell the story
of such people. Some recount incidents in which a potential
victim escaped death or serious injury only because carrying
a gun for self-defense was allowed in the jurisdiction where
the incident occurred. Here are two examples. One night
in 1987, Austin Fulk, a gay man from Arkansas, “was chat-
ting with another man in a parking lot when four gay bashers
charged them with baseball bats and tire irons. Fulk's com-
panion drew his pistol from under the seat of his car, bran-
dished it at the attackers, and fred a single shot over their
heads, causing them to fee and saving the would-be victims
from serious harm.” Brief for DC Project Foundation et al.
as Amici Curiae 31 (footnote omitted).
On July 7, 2020, a woman was brutally assaulted in the
parking lot of a fast food restaurant in Jefferson City, Ten-
nessee. Her assailant slammed her to the ground and began
to drag her around while strangling her. She was saved
when a bystander who was lawfully carrying a pistol pointed
his gun at the assailant, who then stopped the assault and
the assailant was arrested. Ibid. (citing C. Wethington,
Jefferson City Police: Legally Armed Good Samaritan Stops
Assault, ABC News 6, WATE.com (July 9, 2020), https://
www.wate.com/news/ local-news/jefferson-city-police-legally-
armed-good-samaritan-stops-assault/).
In other incidents, a law-abiding person was driven to vio-
late the Sullivan Law because of fear of victimization and
as a result was arrested, prosecuted, and incarcerated. See
Brief for Black Attorneys of Legal Aid et al. as Amici Cu-
riae 22–25.

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Alito, J., concurring
Some briefs were fled by members of groups whose mem-
bers
feel that they have special reasons to fear attacks. See
Brief for Asian Pacifc American Gun Owners Association as
Amicus Curiae; Brief for DC Project Foundation et al. as
Amici Curiae; Brief for Black Guns Matter et al. as Amici
Curiae; Brief for Independent Women's Law Center as Ami-
cus Curiae; Brief for National African American Gun Associ-
ation, Inc., as Amicus Curiae.
I reiterate: All that we decide in this case is that the Sec-
ond Amendment protects the right of law-abiding people to
carry a gun outside the home for self-defense and that the
Sullivan Law, which makes that virtually impossible for most
New Yorkers, is unconstitutional.
II
This brings me to Part II–B of the dissent, post, at 93–102,
which chastises the Court for deciding this case without a
trial and factual fndings about just how hard it is for a law-
abiding New Yorker to get a carry permit. The record be-
fore us, however, tells us everything we need on this score.
At argument, New York's solicitor general was asked about
an ordinary person who works at night and must walk
through dark and crime-infested streets to get home. Tr. of
Oral Arg. 66–67. The solicitor general was asked whether
such a person would be issued a carry permit if she pleaded:
“[T]here have been a lot of muggings in this area, and I am
scared to death.” Id., at 67. The solicitor general's candid
answer was “in general,” no. Ibid. To get a permit, the
applicant would have to show more—for example, that she
had been singled out for attack. Id., at 65; see also id., at
58. A law that dictates that answer violates the Second
Amendment.
III
My fnal point concerns the dissent's complaint that the
Court relies too heavily on history and should instead ap-
prove the sort of “means-end” analysis employed in this case

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77
Alito, J., concurring
by the Second Circuit. Under that approach, a court, in
most
cases, assesses a law's burden on the Second Amend-
ment right and the strength of the State's interest in impos-
ing the challenged restriction. See post, at 102–103. This
mode of analysis places no frm limits on the ability of judges
to sustain any law restricting the possession or use of a gun.
Two examples illustrate the point.
The frst is the Second Circuit's decision in a case the
Court decided two Terms ago, New York State Rife & Pistol
Assn., Inc. v. City of New York, 590 U. S. ––– (2020) (per
curiam). The law in that case affected New York City resi-
dents who had been issued permits to keep a gun in the home
for self-defense. The city recommended that these permit
holders practice at a range to ensure that they are able to
handle their guns safely, but the law prohibited them from
taking their guns to any range other than the seven that
were spread around the city's fve boroughs. Even if such a
person unloaded the gun, locked it in the trunk of a car, and
drove to the nearest range, that person would violate the
law if the nearest range happened to be outside city limits.
The Second Circuit held that the law was constitutional, con-
cluding, among other things, that the restriction was sub-
stantially related to the city's interests in public safety and
crime prevention. See New York State Rife & Pistol Assn.,
Inc. v. New York, 883 F. 3d 45, 62–64 (2018). But after we
agreed to review that decision, the city repealed the law and
admitted that it did not actually have any benefcial effect on
public safety. See N. Y. Penal Law Ann. § 400.00(6) (West
Cum. Supp. 2022); Suggestion of Mootness in New York State
Rife & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. City of New York, O. T. 2019,
No. 18–280, pp. 5–7.
Exhibit two is the dissent fled in Heller by Justice
Breyer, the author of today's dissent. At issue in Heller
was an ordinance that made it impossible for any District of
Columbia resident to keep a handgun in the home for self-
defense. See 554 U. S., at 574–575. Even the respondent,

78 NEW
YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
Alito, J., concurring
who carried a gun on the job while protecting federal facili-
ties,
did not qualify. Id., at 575–576. The District of Co-
lumbia law was an extreme outlier; only a few other jurisdic-
tions in the entire country had similar laws. Nevertheless,
Justice Breyer’s dissent, while accepting for the sake of
argument that the Second Amendment protects the right to
keep a handgun in the home, concluded, based on essentially
the same test that today's dissent defends, that the District's
complete ban was constitutional. See id., at 689, 722 (under
“an interest-balancing inquiry . . .” the dissent would “con-
clude that the District's measure is a proportionate, not a
disproportionate, response to the compelling concerns that
led the District to adopt it”).
Like that dissent in Heller, the real thrust of today's dis-
sent is that guns are bad and that States and local jurisdic-
tions should be free to restrict them essentially as they see
ft.
3
That argument was rejected in Heller, and while the
dissent protests that it is not rearguing Heller, it proceeds
to do just that. See post, at 107–110.
Heller correctly recognized that the Second Amendment
codifes the right of ordinary law-abiding Americans to pro-
tect themselves from lethal violence by possessing and, if
necessary, using a gun. In 1791, when the Second Amend-
ment was adopted, there were no police departments, and
many families lived alone on isolated farms or on the fron-
tiers. If these people were attacked, they were on their own.
It is hard to imagine the furor that would have erupted if
the Federal Government and the States had tried to take
away the guns that these people needed for protection.
3
If we put together the dissent in this case and Justice Breyer's Hel-
ler dissent, States and local governments would essentially be free to ban
the possession of all handguns, and it is unclear whether its approach
would impose any signifcant restrictions on laws regulating long guns.
The dissent would extend a very large measure of deference to legislation
implicating Second Amendment rights, but it does not claim that such
deference is appropriate when any other constitutional right is at issue.
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79
Kavanaugh, J., concurring
Today, unfortunately, many Americans have good reason
to
fear that they will be victimized if they are unable to
protect themselves. And today, no less than in 1791, the
Second Amendment guarantees their right to do so.
Justice Kavanaugh, with whom The Chief Justice
joins, concurring.
The Court employs and elaborates on the text, history, and
tradition test that Heller and McDonald require for evaluat-
ing whether a government regulation infringes on the Sec-
ond Amendment right to possess and carry guns for self-
defense. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570
(2008); McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742 (2010). Apply-
ing that test, the Court correctly holds that New York's out-
lier “may-issue” licensing regime for carrying handguns for
self-defense violates the Second Amendment.
I join the Court's opinion, and I write separately to under-
score two important points about the limits of the Court's
decision.
First, the Court's decision does not prohibit States from
imposing licensing requirements for carrying a handgun for
self-defense. In particular, the Court's decision does not af-
fect the existing licensing regimes—known as “shall-issue”
regimes—that are employed in 43 States.
The Court's decision addresses only the unusual discre-
tionary licensing regimes, known as “may-issue” regimes,
that are employed by 6 States including New York. As the
Court explains, New York's outlier may-issue regime is con-
stitutionally problematic because it grants open-ended dis-
cretion to licensing offcials and authorizes licenses only for
those applicants who can show some special need apart from
self-defense. Those features of New York's regime—the
unchanneled discretion for licensing offcials and the special-
need requirement—in effect deny the right to carry hand-
guns for self-defense to many “ordinary, law-abiding citi-
zens.” Ante, at 9; see also Heller, 554 U. S., at 635. The
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Kavanaugh, J., concurring
Court has held that “individual self-defense is `the central
co
mponent' of the Second Amendment right.” McDonald,
561 U. S., at 767 (quoting Heller, 554 U. S., at 599). New
York's law is inconsistent with the Second Amendment right
to possess and carry handguns for self-defense.
By contrast, 43 States employ objective shall-issue licens-
ing regimes. Those shall-issue regimes may require a li-
cense applicant to undergo fngerprinting, a background
check, a mental health records check, and training in fre-
arms handling and in laws regarding the use of force, among
other possible requirements. Brief for Arizona et al. as
Amici Curiae 7. Unlike New York's may-issue regime,
those shall-issue regimes do not grant open-ended discretion
to licensing offcials and do not require a showing of some
special need apart from self-defense. As petitioners ac-
knowledge, shall-issue licensing regimes are constitutionally
permissible, subject of course to an as-applied challenge if a
shall-issue licensing regime does not operate in that manner
in practice. Tr. of Oral Arg. 50−51.
Going forward, therefore, the 43 States that employ objec-
tive shall-issue licensing regimes for carrying handguns for
self-defense may continue to do so. Likewise, the 6 States
including New York potentially affected by today's deci-
sion may continue to require licenses for carrying handguns
for self-defense so long as those States employ objective li-
censing requirements like those used by the 43 shall-issue
States.
Second, as Heller and McDonald established and the
Court today again explains, the Second Amendment “is nei-
ther a regulatory straightjacket nor a regulatory blank
check. ” Ante, at 30. Properly interpreted, the Second
Amendment allows a “variety” of gun regulations. Heller,
554 U. S., at 636. As Justice Scalia wrote in his opinion for
the Court in Heller, and Justice Alito reiterated in rele-
vant part in the principal opinion in McDonald:
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Barrett, J., concurring
“Like most rights, the right secured by the Second
A
mendment is not unl i mited. From Blackstone
through the 19th-century cases, commentators and
courts routinely explained that the right was not a right
to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any man-
ner whatsoever and for whatever purpose. . . . [N]oth-
ing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on long-
standing prohibitions on the possession of frearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carry-
ing of frearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and
qualifcations on the commercial sale of arms. [Foot-
note 26: We identify these presumptively lawful regula-
tory measures only as examples; our list does not pur-
port to be exhaustive.]
“We also recognize another important limitation on
the right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we
have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected
were those in common use at the time. We think that
limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition
of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual
weapons.” Heller, 554 U. S., at 626−627, and n. 26 (cita-
tions and quotation marks omitted); see also McDonald,
561 U. S., at 786 (plurality opinion).
***
With those additional comments, I join the opinion of the
Court.
Justice Barrett, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion in full. I write separately to
highlight two methodological points that the Court does not
resolve. First, the Court does not conclusively determine
the manner and circumstances in which postratifcation prac-
tice may bear on the original meaning of the Constitution.
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Barrett, J., concurring
See ante, at 33–38. Scholars have proposed competing and
potentia
lly conficting frameworks for this analysis, including
liquidation, tradition, and precedent. See, e. g., Nelson,
Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev.
519 (2003); McConnell, Time, Institutions, and Interpreta-
tion, 95 B. U. L. Rev. 1745 (2015). The limits on the permis-
sible use of history may vary between these frameworks (and
between different articulations of each one). To name just
a few unsettled questions: How long after ratifcation may
subsequent practice illuminate original public meaning? Cf.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 401 (1819) (citing
practice “introduced at a very early period of our history”).
What form must practice take to carry weight in constitu-
tional analysis? See Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52,
175 (1926) (citing a “legislative exposition of the Constitution
. . . acquiesced in for a long term of years”). And may prac-
tice settle the meaning of individual rights as well as struc-
tural provisions? See Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71
Stan. L. Rev. 1, 49–51 (2019) (canvassing arguments). The
historical inquiry presented in this case does not require us
to answer such questions, which might make a difference in
another case. See ante, at 26–28.
Second and relatedly, the Court avoids another “ongoing
scholarly debate on whether courts should primarily rely on
the prevailing understanding of an individual right when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratifed in 1868” or when the
Bill of Rights was ratifed in 1791. Ante, at 37. Here, the
lack of support for New York's law in either period makes
it unnecessary to choose between them. But if 1791 is the
benchmark, then New York's appeals to Reconstruction-era
history would fail for the independent reason that this evi-
dence is simply too late (in addition to too little). Cf. Es-
pinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 591 U. S. –––, ––– – –––
(2020) (a practice that “arose in the second half of the 19th
century . . . cannot by itself establish an early American tra-
dition” informing our understanding of the First Amend-
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83
Breyer, J., dissenting
ment). So today's decision should not be understood to en-
dorse
freewheeling reliance on historical practice from the
mid-to-late 19th century to establish the original meaning of
the Bill of Rights. On the contrary, the Court is careful to
caution “against giving postenactment history more weight
than it can rightly bear.” Ante, at 35.
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Sotomayor and
Justice Kagan join, dissenting.
In 2020, 45,222 Americans were killed by frearms. See
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Fast Facts:
Firearm Violence Prevention ( last updated May 4, 2022)
(CDC, Fast Facts), https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/
frearms/fastfact.html. Since the start of this year (2022),
there have been 277 reported mass shootings—an average of
more than one per day. See Gun Violence Archive (last vis-
ited June 20, 2022), https://www.gunviolencearchive.org.
Gun violence has now surpassed motor vehicle crashes as
the leading cause of death among children and adolescents.
J. Goldstick, R. Cunningham, & P. Carter, Current Causes of
Death in Children and Adolescents in the United States, 386
New England J. Med. 1955 (May 19, 2022) (Goldstick).
Many States have tried to address some of the dangers of
gun violence just described by passing laws that limit, in
various ways, who may purchase, carry, or use frearms of
different kinds. The Court today severely burdens States'
efforts to do so. It invokes the Second Amendment to strike
down a New York law regulating the public carriage of
concealed handguns. In my view, that decision rests upon
several serious mistakes.
First, the Court decides this case on the basis of the plead-
ings, without the beneft of discovery or an evidentiary rec-
ord. As a result, it may well rest its decision on a mistaken
understanding of how New York's law operates in practice.
Second, the Court wrongly limits its analysis to focus nearly
exclusively on history. It refuses to consider the govern-
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Breyer, J., dissenting
ment interests that justify a challenged gun regulation, re-
gardless
of how compelling those interests may be. The
Constitution contains no such limitation, and neither do our
precedents. Third, the Court itself demonstrates the practi-
cal problems with its history-only approach. In applying
that approach to New York's law, the Court fails to correctly
identify and analyze the relevant historical facts. Only by
ignoring an abundance of historical evidence supporting reg-
ulations restricting the public carriage of frearms can the
Court conclude that New York's law is not “consistent with
the Nation's historical tradition of frearm regulation.” See
ante, at 24.
In my view, when courts interpret the Second Amend-
ment, it is constitutionally proper, indeed often necessary,
for them to consider the serious dangers and consequences
of gun violence that lead States to regulate frearms. The
Second Circuit has done so and has held that New York's law
does not violate the Second Amendment. See Kachalsky v.
County of Westchester, 701 F. 3d 81, 97–99, 101 (2012). I
would affrm that holding. At a minimum, I would not
strike down the law based only on the pleadings, as the
Court does today—without frst allowing for the develop-
ment of an evidentiary record and without considering the
State's compelling interest in preventing gun violence. I re-
spectfully dissent.
I
The question before us concerns the extent to which the
Second Amendment prevents democratically elected offcials
from enacting laws to address the serious problem of gun
violence. And yet the Court today purports to answer that
question without discussing the nature or severity of that
problem.
In 2017, there were an estimated 393.3 million civilian-held
frearms in the United States, or about 120 fre-arms per 100
people. A. Karp, Estimating Global Civilian-Held Firearms
Numbers, Small Arms Survey 4 (June 2018), https://www.
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Breyer, J., dissenting
smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/SAS-BP-
C
ivilian-Firearms-Numbers.pdf. That is more guns per
capita than in any other country in the world. Ibid. (By
comparison, Yemen is second with about 52.8 frearms per
100 people—less than half the per capita rate in the United
States—and some countries, like Indonesia and Japan, have
fewer than one frearm per 100 people. Id., at 3–4.)
Unsurprisingly, the United States also suffers a dispro-
portionately high rate of frearm-related deaths and inju-
ries. Cf. Brief for Educational Fund To Stop Gun Violence
et al. as Amici Curiae 17–18 (Brief for Educational Fund)
(citing studies show ing that, w ith in the United States,
“states that rank among the highest in gun ownership also
rank among the highest in gun deaths” while “states with
lower rates of gun ownership have lower rates of gun
deaths”). In 2015, approximately 36,000 people were killed
by frearms nationwide. M. Siegel et al., Easiness of Legal
Access to Concealed Firearm Permits and Homicide Rates in
the United States, 107 Am. J. Pub. Health 1923 (2017). Of
those deaths, 22,018 (or about 61%) were suicides, 13,463
(37%) were homicides, and 489 (1%) were unintentional inju-
ries. Ibid. On top of that, frearms caused an average of
85,694 emergency room visits for nonfatal injuries each year
between 2009 and 2017. E. Kaufman et al., Epidemiologi-
cal Trends in Fataland Nonfatal Firearm Injuries in the
US, 2009–2017, 181 JAMA Internal Medicine 237 (2021)
(Kaufman).
Worse yet, gun violence appears to be on the rise. By
2020, the number of frearm-related deaths had risen to
45,222, CDC, Fast Facts, or by about 25% since 2015. That
means that, in 2020, an average of about 124 people died from
gun violence every day. Ibid. As I mentioned above, gun
violence has now become the leading cause of death in chil-
dren and adolescents, surpassing car crashes, which had pre-
viously been the leading cause of death in that age group for
over 60 years. Goldstick 1955; J. Bates, Guns Became the
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Leading Cause of Death for American Children and Teens in
2020,
Time, Apr. 27, 2022, https://www.time.com/6170864/
cause-of-death-children-guns/. And the consequences of
gun violence are borne disproportionately by communities of
color, and Black communities in particular. See CDC, Age-
Adjusted Rates of Firearm-Related Homicide, by Race, His-
panic Origin, and Sex—National Vital Statistics System,
United States, 2019, at 1491 (Oct. 22, 2021), https://www.cdc.
gov/mmwr/volumes/70/wr/pdfs/mm7042a6-H.pdf (document-
ing 34.9 frearm-related homicides per 100,000 population for
non-Hispanic Black men in 2019, compared to 7.7 such homi-
cides per 100,000 population for men of all races); S. Kegler
et al., CDC, Vital Signs: Changes in Firearm Homicide
and Suicide Rates—United States, 2019–2020, at 656–658
(May 13, 2022), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/71/wr/
pdfs/mm7119e1-H.pdf.
The dangers posed by frearms can take many forms.
Newspapers report mass shootings occurring at an enter-
tainment district in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (3 dead and
11 injured); an elementary school in Uvalde, Texas (21 dead);
a supermarket in Buffalo, New York (10 dead and 3 injured);
a series of spas in Atlanta, Georgia (8 dead); a busy street in
an entertainment district of Dayton, Ohio (9 dead and 17
injured); a nightclub in Orlando, Florida (50 dead and 53 in-
jured); a church in Charleston, South Carolina (9 dead); a
movie theater in Aurora, Colorado (12 dead and 50 injured);
an elementary school in Newtown, Connecticut (26 dead);
and many, many more. See, e. g., R. Todt, 3 Dead, 11
Wounded in Philadelphia Shooting on Busy Street, Washing-
ton Post, June 5, 2022; A. Hernández, J. Slater, D. Barrett, &
S. Foster-Frau, At Least 19 Children, 2 Teachers Killed at
Texas Elementary School, Washington Post, May 25, 2022;
A. Joly, J. Slater, D. Barrett, & A. Hernandez, 10 Killed in
Racially Motivated Shooting at Buffalo Grocery Store, Wash-
ington Post, May 14, 2022; C. McWhirter & V. Bauerlein,
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Breyer, J., dissenting
Atlanta-Area Shootings at Spas Leave Eight Dead, Wall
Street
Journal, Mar. 17, 2021; A. Hassan, Dayton Gunman
Shot 26 People in 32 Seconds, Police Timeline Reveals, N. Y.
Times, Aug. 13, 2019; L. Alvarez & R. Pérez-Peña, Orlando
Gunman Attacks Gay Nightclub, Leaving 50 Dead, N. Y.
Times, June 12, 2016; J. Horowitz, N. Corasaniti, & A. Sout-
hall, Nine Killed in Shooting at Black Church in Charleston,
N. Y. Times, June 17, 2015; R. Lin, Gunman Kills 12 at
`Dark Knight Rises' Screening in Colorado, L. A. Times,
July 20, 2012; J. Barron, Nation Reels After Gunman Mass-
acres 20 Children at School in Connecticut, N. Y. Times,
Dec. 14, 2012. Since the start of this year alone (2022), there
have already been 277 reported mass shootings—an average
of more than one per day. Gun Violence Archive; see also
Gun Violence Archive, General Methodology, https://www.
gunviolencearchive.org/methodology (defning mass shoot-
ings to include incidents in which at least four victims are
shot, not including the shooter).
And mass shootings are just one part of the problem.
Easy access to frearms can also make many other aspects of
American life more dangerous. Consider, for example, the
effect of guns on road rage. In 2021, an average of 44 people
each month were shot and either killed or wounded in road
rage incidents, double the annual average between 2016 and
2019. S. Burd-Sharps & K. Bistline, Everytown for Gun
Safety, Reports of Road Rage Shootings Are on the Rise
(Apr. 4, 2022), https://www.everytownresearch.org/reports-
of-road-rage-shootings-are-on-the-rise/; see also J. Donohue,
A. Aneja, & K. Weber, Right-to-Carry Laws and Violent
Crime: A Comprehensive Assessment Using Panel Data and
a State-Level Synthetic Control Analysis, 16 J. Empirical
Legal Studies 198, 204 (2019). Some of those deaths might
have been avoided if there had not been a loaded gun in the
car. See ibid.; Brief for American Bar Association as Ami-
cus Curiae 17–18; Brief for Educational Fund 20–23 (citing
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studies showing that the presence of a frearm is likely to
i
ncrease aggression in both the person carrying the gun and
others who see it).
The same could be said of protests: A study of 30,000
protests between January 2020 and June 2021 found that
armed protests were nearly six times more likely to become
violent or destructive than unarmed protests. Everytown
for Gun Safety, Armed Assembly: Guns, Demostrations,
and Political Violence in America (Aug. 23, 2021), https://
www.everytownresearch.org/report/armed-assembly-guns-
demonstrations-and-political-violence-in-america / (finding
that 16% of armed protests turned violent, compared to less
than 3% of unarmed protests). Or domestic disputes: An-
other study found that a woman is fve times more likely to
be killed by an abusive partner if that partner has access
to a gun. Brief for Educational Fund 8 (citing A. Zeoli, R.
Malinski, & B. Turchan, Risks and Targeted Interventions:
Firearms in Intimate Partner Violence, 38 Epidemiologic
Revs. 125 (2016); J. Campbell et al., Risk Factors for Femi-
cide in Abusive Relationships: Results From a Multisite
Case Control Study, 93 Am. J. Pub. Health 1089, 1092 (2003)).
Or suicides: A study found that men who own handguns are
three times as likely to commit suicide than men who do not
and women who own handguns are seven times as likely to
commit suicide than women who do not. D. Studdert et al.,
Handgun Ownership and Suicide in California, 382 New Eng-
land J. Med. 2220, 2224 (June 4, 2020).
Consider, too, interactions with police offcers. The pres-
ence of a gun in the hands of a civilian poses a risk to both
offcers and civilians. Amici prosecutors and police chiefs
tell us that most offcers who are killed in the line of duty
are killed by frearms; they explain that offcers in States
with high rates of gun ownership are three times as likely
to be killed in the line of duty as offcers in States with low
rates of gun ownership. Brief for Prosecutors Against Gun
Violence as Amicus Curiae 23–24; Brief for Former Major
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Breyer, J., dissenting
City Police Chiefs as Amici Curiae 13–14, and n. 21, (citing
D
. Swedler, M. Simmons, F. Dominici, & D. Hemenway, Fire-
arm Prevalence and Homicides of Law Enforcement Offcers
in the United States, 105 Am. J. Pub. Health 2042, 2045
(2015)). They also say that States with the highest rates of
gun ownership report four times as many fatal shootings of
civilians by police offcers compared to States with the low-
est rates of gun ownership. Brief for Former Major City
Police Chiefs as Amici Curiae 16 (citing D. Hemenway, D.
Azrael, A. Connor, & M. Miller, Variation in Rates of Fatal
Police Shootings Across US States: The Role of Firearm
Availability, 96 J. Urb. Health 63, 67 (2018)).
These are just some examples of the dangers that frearms
pose. There is, of course, another side to the story. I am
not simply saying that “guns are bad.” See ante, at 78
(Alito, J., concurring). Some Americans use guns for legiti-
mate purposes, such as sport (e. g., hunting or target shoot-
ing), certain types of employment (e. g., as a private security
guard), or self-defense. Cf. ante, at 74–76 (Alito, J., concur-
ring). Balancing these lawful uses against the dangers of
frearms is primarily the responsibility of elected bodies,
such as legislatures. It requires consideration of facts, sta-
tistics, expert opinions, predictive judgments, relevant val-
ues, and a host of other circumstances, which together make
decisions about how, when, and where to regulate guns more
appropriately legislative work. That consideration counsels
modesty and restraint on the part of judges when they inter-
pret and apply the Second Amendment.
Consider, for one thing, that different types of frearms
may pose different risks and serve different purposes. The
Court has previously observed that handguns, the type of
frearm at issue here, “are the most popular weapon chosen
by Americans for self-defense in the home.” District of Co-
lumbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 629 (2008). But handguns
are also the most popular weapon chosen by perpetrators of
violent crimes. In 2018, 64.4% of frearm homicides and
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Breyer, J., dissenting
91.8% of nonfatal frearm assaults were committed with a
h
andgun. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
G. Kena & J. Truman, Trends and Patterns in Firearm Vio-
lence, 1993–2018, pp. 5–6 (Apr. 2022). Handguns are also
the most commonly stolen type of frearm—63% of bur-
glaries resulting in gun theft between 2005 and 2010 in-
volved the theft of at least one handgun. Dept. of Justice,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, L. Langton, Firearms Stolen
During Household Burglaries and Other Property Crimes,
2005–2010, p. 3 (Nov. 2012).
Or consider, for another thing, that the dangers and bene-
fts posed by frearms may differ between urban and rural
areas. See generally Brief for City of Chicago et al. as
Amici Curiae (detailing particular concerns about gun vio-
lence in large cities). Firearm-related homicides and as-
saults are signifcantly more common in urban areas than
rural ones. For example, from 1999 to 2016, 89.8% of the
213,175 frearm-related homicides in the United States oc-
curred in “metropolitan” areas. M. Siegel et al., The Impact
of State Firearm Laws on Homicide Rates in Suburban and
Rural Areas Compared to Large Cities in the United States,
1991–2016, 36 J. Rural Health 255 (2020); see also Brief for
Partnership for New York City as Amicus Curiae 10; Kauf-
man 237 (fnding higher rates of fatal assault injuries from
frearms in urban areas compared to rural areas); C. Branas,
M. Nance, M. Elliott, T. Richmond, & C. Schwab, Urban-
Rural Shifts in Intentional Firearm Death: Different Causes,
Same Results, 94 Am. J. Pub. Health 1750, 1752 (2004) (fnd-
ing higher rates of frearm homicide in urban counties com-
pared to rural counties).
Justice Alito asks why I have begun my opinion by re-
viewing some of the dangers and challenges posed by gun
violence and what relevance that has to today's case. Ante,
at 72–74 (concurring opinion). All of the above considerations
illustrate that the question of frearm regulation presents a
complex problem—one that should be solved by legislatures
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rather than courts. What kinds of frearm regulations
shou
ld a State adopt? Different States might choose to an-
swer that question differently. They may face different
challenges because of their different geographic and demo-
graphic compositions. A State like New York, which must
account for the roughly 8.5 million people living in the 303
square miles of New York City, might choose to adopt differ-
ent (and stricter) frearms regulations than States like Mon-
tana or Wyoming, which do not contain any city remotely
comparable in terms of population or density. See U. S.
Census Bureau, Quick Facts: New York City (last updated
July 1, 2021) (Quick Facts: New York City), https://www.
census.gov/quickfacts/newyorkcitynewyork/; Brief for City of
New York as Amicus Curiae 8, 22. For a variety of rea-
sons, States may also be willing to tolerate different degrees
of risk and therefore choose to balance the competing bene-
fts and dangers of frearms differently.
The question presented in this case concerns the extent to
which the Second Amendment restricts different States (and
the Federal Government) from working out solutions to
these problems through democratic processes. The primary
difference between the Court's view and mine is that I be-
lieve the Amendment allows States to take account of the
serious problems posed by gun violence that I have just de-
scribed. I fear that the Court's interpretation ignores these
signifcant dangers and leaves States without the ability to
address them.
II
A
New York State requires individuals to obtain a license in
order to carry a concealed handgun in public. N. Y. Penal
Law Ann. § 400.00(2) (West Cum. Supp. 2022). I address the
specifcs of that licensing regime in greater detail in Part II–
B below. Because, at this stage in the proceedings, the par-
ties have not had an opportunity to develop the evidentiary
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record, I refer to facts and representations made in petition-
ers'
complaint and in amicus briefs fled before us.
Under New York's regime, petitioners Brandon Koch and
Robert Nash have obtained restricted licenses that permit
them to carry a concealed handgun for certain purposes and
at certain times and places. They wish to expand the scope
of their licenses so that they can carry a concealed handgun
without restriction.
Koch and Nash are residents of Rensselaer County, New
York. Koch lives in Troy, a town of about 50,000, located
eight miles from New York's capital city of Albany, which
has a population of about 98,000. See App. 100; U. S. Census
Bureau, Quick Facts: Troy City, New York (last updated July
1, 2021), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/troycitynewyork;
i d., Albany City, New York, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/albanycitynewyork. Nash lives in Averill Park, a
small town 12.5 miles from Albany. App. 100.
Koch and Nash each applied for a license to carry a con-
cealed handgun. Both were issued restricted licenses that
allowed them to carry handguns only for purposes of hunting
and target shooting. Id., at 104, 106. But they wanted “un-
restricted” licenses that would allow them to carry concealed
handguns “for personal protection and all lawful purposes.”
Id., at 112; see also id., at 40. They wrote to the licensing
offcer in Rensselaer County—Justice Richard McNally, a
justice of the New York Supreme Court—requesting that the
hunting and target shooting restrictions on their licenses be
removed. Id., at 40, 111–113. After holding individual
hearings for each petitioner, Justice McNally denied their
requests. Id., at 31, 41, 105, 107, 114. He clarifed that, in
addition to hunting and target shooting, Koch and Nash
could “carry concealed for purposes of off road back country,
outdoor activities similar to hunting, for example fshing, hik-
ing & camping.” Id., at 41, 114. He also permitted Koch,
who was employed by the New York Court System's Division
of Technology, to “carry to and from work.” Id., at 111, 114.

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But he reaffrmed that Nash was prohibited from carrying a
concea
led handgun in locations “typically open to and fre-
quented by the general public.” Id., at 41. Neither Koch
nor Nash alleges that he appealed Justice McNally's decision.
Brief for Respondents 13; see App. 122–126.
Instead, petitioners Koch and Nash, along with the New
York State Rife & Pistol Association, Inc., brought this law-
suit in federal court against Justice McNally and other State
representatives responsible for enforcing New York's fre-
arms laws. Petitioners claimed that the State's refusal to
modi fy Koch's and Nash's l icenses v i olated the Second
Amendment. The District Court dismissed their complaint.
It followed Second Circuit precedent holding that New
York's licensing regime was constitutional. See Kachalsky,
701 F. 3d, at 101. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affrmed. We granted certiorari to review the con-
stitutionality of “New York's denial of petitioners' license
applications.” Ante, at 17 (majority opinion).
B
As the Court recognizes, New York's licensing regime
traces its origins to 1911, when New York enacted the “Sulli-
van Law,” which prohibited public carriage of handguns
without a license. See 1911 N. Y. Laws ch. 195, § 1, p. 443.
Two years later in 1913, New York amended the law to es-
tablish substantive standards for the issuance of a license.
See 1913 N. Y. Laws ch. 608, § 1, pp. 1627–1629. Those
standards have remained the foundation of New York's li-
censing regime ever since—a regime that the Court now,
more than a century later, strikes down as unconstitutional.
As it did over 100 years ago, New York's law today con-
tinues to require individuals to obtain a license before carry-
ing a concealed handgun in public. N. Y. Penal Law Ann.
§ 400.00(2); Kachalsky, 701 F. 3d, at 85–86. Because the
State does not allow the open carriage of handguns at all, a
concealed-carry license is the only way to legally carry a
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handgun in public. Id., at 86. This licensing requirement
appl
ies only to handguns (i. e., “pistols and revolvers”) and
short-barreled rifes and shotguns, not to all types of fre-
arms. Id., at 85. For instance, the State does not require
a license to carry a long gun (i. e., a rife or a shotgun over a
certain length) in public. Ibid.; § 265.00(3) (West 2022).
To obtain a concealed-carry license for a handgun, an appli-
cant must satisfy certain eligibility criteria. Among other
things, he must generally be at least 21 years old and of
“good moral character.” § 400.00(1). And he cannot have
been convicted of a felony, dishonorably discharged from the
military, or involuntarily committed to a mental hygiene fa-
cility. Ibid. If these and other eligibility criteria are satis-
fed, New York law provides that a concealed-carry license
“shall be issued” to individuals working in certain profes-
sions, such as judges, corrections offcers, or messengers of
a “banking institution or express company.” § 400.00(2).
Individuals who satisfy the eligibility criteria but do not
work in one of these professions may still obtain a concealed-
carry license, but they must additionally show that “proper
cause exists for the issuance thereof.” § 400.00(2)(f ).
The words “proper cause” may appear on their face to be
broad, but there is “a substantial body of law instructing
licensing offcials on the application of this standard.” Id.,
at 86. New York courts have interpreted proper cause “to
include carrying a handgun for target practice, hunting, or
self-defense.” Ibid. When an applicant seeks a license for
target practice or hunting, he must show “ `a sincere desire to
participate in target shooting and hunting.' ” Ibid. (quoting
In re O'Connor, 154 Misc. 2d 694, 697, 585 N. Y. S. 2d 1000,
1003 (Westchester Cty. 1992)). When an applicant seeks a
license for self-defense, he must show “ `a special need for
self-protection distinguishable from that of the general com-
munity.' ” 701 F. 3d, at 86 (quoting In re Klenosky, 75 App.
Div. 2d 793, 428 N. Y. S. 2d 256, 257 (1980)). Whether
an applicant meets these proper cause standards is deter-
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mined in the frst instance by a “licensing offcer in the city
or
county . . . where the applicant resides.” § 400.00(3). In
most counties, the licensing offcer is a local judge. Kachal-
sky, 701 F. 3d, at 87, n. 6. For example, in Rensselaer
County, the licensing offcer who denied petitioners' requests
to remove the restrictions on their licenses was a justice of
the New York Supreme Court. App. 31. If the offcer de-
nies an application, the applicant can obtain judicial review
under Article 78 of New York's Civil Practice Law and
Rules. Kachalsky, 701 F. 3d, at 87. New York courts will
then review whether the denial was arbitrary and capri-
cious. Ibid.
In describing New York's law, the Court recites the above
facts but adds its own gloss. It suggests that New York's
licensing regime gives licensing offcers too much discretion
and provides too “limited” judicial review of their decisions,
ante, at 13; that the proper cause standard is too “demand-
ing,” ante, at 12; and that these features make New York an
outlier compared to the “vast majority of States,” ante, at 13.
But on what evidence does the Court base these character-
izations? Recall that this case comes to us at the pleading
stage. The parties have not had an opportunity to conduct
discovery, and no evidentiary hearings have been held to de-
velop the record. See App. 15–26. Thus, at this point,
there is no record to support the Court's negative character-
izations, as we know very little about how the law has actu-
ally been applied on the ground.
Consider each of the Court's criticisms in turn. First, the
Court says that New York gives licensing offcers too much
discretion and “leaves applicants little recourse if their local
licensing offcer denies a permit.” Ante, at 13. But there is
nothing unusual about broad statutory language that can be
given more specifc content by judicial interpretation. Nor
is there anything unusual or inadequate about subjecting li-
censing offcers' decisions to arbitrary-and-capricious review.
Judges routinely apply that standard, for example, to deter-

96 NEW
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mine whether an agency action is lawful under both New
Y
ork law and the Administrative Procedure Act. See, e. g.,
N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law Ann. § 7803(3) (2021); 5 U. S. C.
§ 706(2)(A). The arbitrary-and-capricious standard has thus
been used to review important policies concerning health,
safety, and immigration, to name just a few examples. See,
e. g., Biden v. Missouri, 595 U. S. 87, 96 (2022) (per curiam);
Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 591 U. S. –––, –––, ––– (2020); Department of Commerce
v. New York, 588 U. S. –––, ––– (2019); Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile
Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 41, 46 (1983).
Without an evidentiary record, there is no reason to as-
sume that New York courts applying this standard fail to
provide license applicants with meaningful review. And
there is no evidentiary record to support the Court's assump-
tion here. Based on the pleadings alone, we cannot know
how often New York courts fnd the denial of a concealed-
carry license to be arbitrary and capricious or on what basis.
We do not even know how a court would have reviewed the
licensing offcer's decisions in Koch's and Nash's cases be-
cause they do not appear to have sought judicial review at
all. See Brief for Respondents 13; App. 122–126.
Second, the Court characterizes New York's proper cause
standard as substantively “demanding.” Ante, at 12. But,
again, the Court has before it no evidentiary record to dem-
onstrate how the standard has actually been applied. How
“demanding ” is the proper cause standard in practice?
Does that answer differ from county to county? How many
license applications are granted and denied each year? At
the pleading stage, we do not know the answers to these and
other important questions, so the Court's characterization of
New York's law may very well be wrong.
In support of its assertion that the law is “demanding,”
the Court cites only to cases originating in New York City.
Ibid. (citing In re Martinek, 294 App. Div. 2d 221, 743 N. Y. S.
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2d 80 (2002) (New York County, i. e., Manhattan); In re
Kapl
an, 249 App. Div. 2d 199, 673 N. Y. S. 2d 66 (1998)
(same); In re Klenosky, 75 App. Div. 2d 793, 428 N. Y. S. 2d
256 (same); In re Bernstein, 85 App. Div. 2d 574, 445 N. Y. S.
2d 716 (1981) (Bronx County)). But cases from New York
City may not accurately represent how the proper cause
standard is applied in other parts of the State, including in
Rensselaer County where petitioners reside.
To the contrary, amici tell us that New York's licensing
regime is purposefully fexible: It allows counties and cities
to respond to the particular needs and challenges of each
area. See Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus
Curiae 12; Brief for City of New York as Amicus Curiae
20–29. Amici suggest that some areas may interpret words
such as “proper cause” or “special need” more or less strictly,
depending upon each area's unique circumstances. See ibid.
New York City, for example, reports that it “has applied the
[proper cause] requirement relatively rigorously” because its
densely populated urban areas pose a heightened risk of gun
violence. Brief for City of New York as Amicus Curiae 20.
In comparison, other (perhaps more rural) counties “have
tailored the requirement to their own circumstances, often
issuing concealed-carry licenses more freely than the City.”
Ibid.; see also In re O'Connor, 154 Misc. 2d, at 698, 585
N. Y. S. 2d, at 1004 (“The circumstances which exist in New
York City are signifcantly different than those which exist
in Oswego or Putnam Counties. . . . The licensing offcers in
each county are in the best position to determine whether
any interest of the population of their county is furthered by
the use of restrictions on pistol licenses”); Brief for Citizens
Crime Commission of New York City as Amicus Curiae 18–
19. Given the geographic variation across the State, it is
too sweeping for the Court to suggest, without an eviden-
tiary record, that the proper cause standard is “demanding ”
in Rensselaer County merely because it may be so in New
York City.
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Finally, the Court compares New York's licensing regime
to
that of other States. Ante, at 13–15. It says that New
York's law is a “may issue” licensing regime, which the Court
describes as a law that provides licensing offcers greater
discretion to grant or deny licenses than a “shall issue” li-
censing regime. Ante, at 13–14. Because the Court counts
43 “shall issue” jurisdictions and only 7 “may issue” jurisdic-
tions, it suggests that New York's law is an outlier. Ibid.;
see also ante, at 79–80 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Im-
plicitly, the Court appears to ask, if so many other States
have adopted the more generous “shall issue” approach, why
can New York not be required to do the same?
But the Court's tabulation, and its implicit question, over-
look important context. In drawing a line between “may
issue” and “shall issue” licensing regimes, the Court ignores
the degree of variation within and across these categories.
Not all “may issue” regimes are necessarily alike, nor are
all “shall issue” regimes. Conversely, not all “may issue”
regimes are as different from the “shall issue” regimes as
the Court assumes. For instance, the Court recognizes in
a footnote that three States (Connecticut, Delaware, and
Rhode Island) have statutes with discretionary criteria, like
so-called “may issue” regimes do. Ante, at 13, n. 1. But the
Court nonetheless counts them among the 43 “shall issue”
jurisdictions because, it says, these three States' laws oper-
ate in practice more like “shall issue” regimes. Ibid.; see
also Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae
10 (recognizing, conversely, that some “shall issue” States,
e. g., Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Oregon, and Virginia, still
grant some degree of discretion to licensing authorities).
As these three States demonstrate, the line between “may
issue” and “shall issue” regimes is not as clear cut as the
Court suggests, and that line depends at least in part on how
statutory discretion is applied in practice. Here, because
the Court strikes down New York's law without affording
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we do not know how much discretion licensing offcers in
N
ew York have in practice or how that discretion is exer-
cised, let alone how the licensing regimes in the other six
“may issue” jurisdictions operate.
Even accepting the Court's line between “may issue” and
“shall issue” regimes and assuming that its tally (7 “may
issue” and 43 “shall issue” jurisdictions) is correct, that count
does not support the Court's implicit suggestion that the
seven “may issue” jurisdictions are somehow outliers or
anomalies. The Court's count captures only a snapshot in
time. It forgets that “shall issue” licensing regimes are a
relatively recent development. Until the 1980s, “may issue”
regimes predominated. See id., at 9; R. Grossman & S. Lee,
May Issue Versus Shall Issue: Explaining the Pattern of
Concealed-Carry Handgun Laws, 1960–2001, 26 Contemp.
Econ. Pol'y 198, 200 (2008) (Grossman). As of 1987, 16
States and the District of Columbia prohibited concealed car-
riage outright, 26 States had “may issue” licensing regimes,
7 States had “shall issue” regimes, and 1 State (Vermont)
allowed concealed carriage without a permit. Congres-
sional Research Service, Gun Control: Concealed Carry Leg-
islation in the 115th Congress 1 (Jan. 30, 2018). Thus, it has
only been in the last few decades that States have shifted
toward “shall issue” licensing laws. Prior to that, most
States operated “may issue” licensing regimes without legal
or practical problem.
Moreover, even considering, as the Court does, only the
present state of play, its tally provides an incomplete picture
because it accounts for only the number of States with “may
issue” regimes, not the number of people governed by those
regimes. By the Court's count, the seven “may issue” juris-
dictions are New York, California, Hawaii, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, New Jersey, and the District of Columbia. Ante,
at 13–15. Together, these seven jurisdictions comprise about
84.4 million people and account for over a quarter of the
country's population. U. S. Census Bureau, 2020 Population
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and Housing State Data (Aug. 12, 2021) (2020 Population),
h
ttps://www.census.gov/ library/visualizations/ interactive/
2020-population-and-housing-state-data.html. Thus, “may
issue” laws can hardly be described as a marginal or out-
dated regime.
And there are good reasons why these seven jurisdictions
may have chosen not to follow other States in shifting to-
ward “shall issue” regimes. The seven remaining “may
issue” jurisdictions are among the most densely populated in
the United States: the District of Columbia (with an average
of 11,280.0 people/square mile in 2020), New Jersey (1,263.0),
Massachusetts (901.2), Maryland (636.1), New York (428.7),
California (253.7), and Hawaii (226.6). U. S. Census Bureau,
Historical Population Density (1910–2020) (Apr. 26, 2001),
https://www.census.gov/data /tables/time-series/dec/density-
data-text.html. In comparison, the average population den-
sity of the United States as a whole is 93.8 people/square
mile, and some States have population densities as low as
1.3 (Alaska), 5.9 (Wyoming), and 7.4 (Montana) people/square
mile. Ibid. These numbers refect in part the fact that
these “may issue” jurisdictions contain some of the country's
densest and most populous urban areas, e. g., New York City,
Los Angeles, San Francisco, the District of Columbia, Hono-
lulu, and Boston. U. S. Census Bureau, Urban Area Facts
(Oct. 8, 2021), https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/
geography/guidance/geo-areas/urban-rural/ua-facts.html.
New York City, for example, has a population of about 8.5
million people, making it more populous than 38 States, and
it squeezes that population into just over 300 square miles.
Quick Facts: New York City; 2020 Population; Brief for City
of New York as Amicus Curiae 8, 22.
As I explained above, supra, at 90, densely populated
urban areas face different kinds and degrees of dangers from
gun violence than rural areas. It is thus easy to see why
the seven “may issue” jurisdictions might choose to regulate
frearm carriage more strictly than other States. See
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Grossman 199 (“We fnd strong evidence that more urban
st
ates are less likely to shift to `shall issue' than rural
states”).
New York and its amici present substantial data justifying
the State's decision to retain a “may issue” licensing regime.
The data show that stricter gun regulations are associated
with lower rates of frearm-related death and injury. See,
e. g., Brief for Citizens Crime Commission of New York City
as Amicus Curiae 9–11; Brief for Former Major City Police
Chiefs as Amici Curiae 9–12; Brief for Educational Fund
25–28; Brief for Social Scientists et al. as Amici Curiae 9–19.
In particular, studies have shown that “may issue” licensing
regimes, like New York's, are associated with lower homicide
rates and lower violent crime rates than “shall issue” licens-
ing regimes. For example, one study compared homicide
rates across all 50 States during the 25-year period from
1991 to 2015 and found that “shall issue” laws were associ-
ated with 6.5% higher total homicide rates, 8.6% higher fre-
arm homicide rates, and 10.6% higher handgun homicide
rates. Siegel, 107 Am. J. Pub. Health, at 1924–1925, 1927.
Another study longitudinally followed 33 States that had
adopted “shall-issue” laws between 1981 and 2007 and found
that the adoption of those laws was associated with a 13%–
15% increase in rates of violent crime after 10 years. Don-
ohue, 16 J. Empirical Legal Studies, at 200, 240. Numerous
other studies show similar results. See, e. g., Siegel, 36 J.
Rural Health, at 261 (fnding that “may issue” laws are as-
sociated with 17% lower frearm homicide rates in large
cities); C. Crifasi et al., Association Between Firearm Laws
and Homicide in Urban Counties, 95 J. Urb. Health 383, 387
(2018) (fnding that “shall issue” laws are associated with a
4% increase in frearm homicide rates in urban counties);
M. Doucette, C. Crifasi, & S. Frattaroli, Right-to-Carry Laws
and Firearm Workplace Homicides: A Longitudinal Analysis
(1992–2017), 109 Am. J. Pub. Health 1747, 1751 (Dec. 2019)
(fnding that States with “shall issue” laws between 1992 and

102 NEW
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Breyer, J., dissenting
2017 experienced 29% higher rates of frearm-related work-
place
homicides); Brief for Social Scientists et al. as Amici
Curiae 15–16, and nn. 17–20 (citing “thirteen . . . empirical
papers from just the last few years linking [“shall issue”]
laws to higher violent crime”).
Justice Alito points to competing empirical evidence
that arrives at a different conclusion. Ante, at 73, n. 1 (con-
curring opinion). But these types of disagreements are ex-
actly the sort that are better addressed by legislatures than
courts. The Court today restricts the ability of legislatures
to fulfll that role. It does so without knowing how New
York's law is administered in practice, how much discretion
licensing offcers in New York possess, or whether the proper
cause standard differs across counties. And it does so with-
out giving the State an opportunity to develop the eviden-
tiary record to answer those questions. Yet it strikes down
New York's licensing regime as a violation of the Second
Amendment.
III
A
How does the Court justify striking down New York's law
without frst considering how it actually works on the ground
and what purposes it serves? The Court does so by pur-
porting to rely nearly exclusively on history. It requires
“the government [to] affrmatively prove that its frearms
regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the
outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” Ante, at
19. Beyond this historical inquiry, the Court refuses to em-
ploy what it calls “means-end scrutiny.” Ibid. That is, it
refuses to consider whether New York has a compelling in-
terest in regulating the concealed carriage of handguns or
whether New York's law is narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest. Although I agree that history can often be a useful
tool in determining the meaning and scope of constitutional
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provisions, I believe the Court's near-exclusive reliance on
that
single tool today goes much too far.
The Court concedes that no Court of Appeals has adopted
its rigid history-only approach. See ante, at 17. To the
contrary, every Court of Appeals to have addressed the ques-
tion has agreed on a two-step framework for evaluating
whether a frearm regulation is consistent with the Second
Amendment. Ibid.; ante, at 19, n. 4 (majority opinion) (list-
ing cases from the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D. C. Circuits). At
the frst step, the Courts of Appeals use text and history to
determine “whether the regulated activity falls within the
scope of the Second Amendment.” Ezell v. Chicago, 846
F. 3d 888, 892 (CA7 2017). If it does, they go on to the sec-
ond step and consider “ `the strength of the government's
justifcation for restricting or regulating ' ” the Second
Amendment right. Ibid. In doing so, they apply a level of
“means-ends” scrutiny “that is proportionate to the severity
of the burden that the law imposes on the right”: strict scru-
tiny if the burden is severe, and intermediate scrutiny if it
is not. National Rife Assn. of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alco-
hol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 700 F. 3d 185, 195,
198, 205 (CA5 2012).
The Court today replaces the Courts of Appeals' consensus
framework with its own history-only approach. That is un-
usual. We do not normally disrupt settled consensus among
the Courts of Appeals, especially not when that consensus
approach has been applied without issue for over a decade.
See Brief for Second Amendment Law Professors as Amici
Curiae 4, 13–15; see also this Court's Rule 10. The Court
attempts to justify its deviation from our normal practice by
claiming that the Courts of Appeals' approach is inconsistent
with Heller. See ante, at 17. In doing so, the Court implies
that all 11 Courts of Appeals that have considered this ques-
tion misread Heller.
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To the contrary, it is this Court that misreads Heller. The
opi
nion in Heller did focus primarily on “constitutional text
and history,” ante, at 22 (majority opinion), but it did not
“rejec[t] . . . means-end scrutiny,” as the Court claims, ante,
at 24. Consider what the Heller Court actually said. True,
the Court spent many pages in Heller discussing the text
and historical context of the Second Amendment. 554 U. S.,
at 579–619. But that is not surprising because the Heller
Cour t was asked to answer the prel i mi nary questi on
whether the Second Amendment right to “bear Arms” en-
compasses an individual right to possess a frearm in the
home for self-defense. Id., at 577. The Heller Court con-
cluded that the Second Amendment's text and history were
suffciently clear to resolve that question: The Second
Amendment, it said, does include such an individual right.
Id., at 579–619. There was thus no need for the Court to go
further—to look beyond text and history, or to suggest what
analysis would be appropriate in other cases where the text
and history are not clear.
But the Heller Court did not end its opinion with that
preliminary question. After concluding that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to possess a frearm
for self-defense, the Heller Court added that that right is
“not unlimited.” Id., at 626. It thus had to determine
whether the District of Columbia's law, which banned hand-
gun possession in the home, was a permissible regulation of
the right. Id., at 628–630. In answering that second ques-
tion, it said: “Under any of the standards of scrutiny that
we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights, ban-
ning from the home `the most preferred frearm in the nation
to “keep” and use for protection of one's home and family'
would fail constitutional muster.” Id., at 628–629 (emphasis
added; footnote and citation omitted). That language makes
clear that the Heller Court understood some form of means-
end scrutiny to apply. It did not need to specify whether
that scrutiny should be intermediate or strict because, in its
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view, the District's handgun ban was so “severe” that it
wou
ld have failed either level of scrutiny. Id., at 628–629;
see also id., at 628, n. 27 (clarifying that rational-basis review
was not the proper level of scrutiny).
Despite Heller's express invocation of means-end scrutiny,
the Court today claims that the majority in Heller rejected
means-end scrutiny because it rejected my dissent in that
case. But that argument misreads both my dissent and the
majority opinion. My dissent in Heller proposed directly
weighing “the interests protected by the Second Amend-
ment on one side and the governmental public-safety con-
cer ns on the other. ” Id., at 689. I wou ld have asked
“whether the statute burdens a protected interest in a way
or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute's salu-
tary effects upon other important governmental interests.”
Id., at 689–690. The majority rejected my dissent, not be-
cause I proposed using means-end scrutiny, but because, in
its view, I had done the opposite. In its own words, the
majority faulted my dissent for proposing “a freestanding
`interest-balancing ' approach” that accorded with “none of
the traditionally expressed levels [of scrutiny] (strict scru-
tiny, intermediate scrutiny, rational basis).” Id., at 634 (em-
phasis added).
The majority further made clear that its rejection of free-
standing interest balancing did not extend to traditional
forms of means-end scrutiny. It said: “We know of no other
enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has
been subjected to a freestanding `interest-balancing ' ap-
proach.” Ibid. To illustrate this point, it cited as an exam-
ple the First Amendment right to free speech. Id., at 635.
Judges, of course, regularly use means-end scrutiny, includ-
ing both strict and intermediate scrutiny, when they inter-
pret or apply the First Amendment. See, e. g., United
States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803,
813 (2000) (applying strict scrutiny); Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U. S. 180, 186, 189–190 (1997)
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(applying intermediate scrutiny). The majority therefore
cannot
have intended its opinion, consistent with our First
Amendment jurisprudence, to be read as rejecting all tradi-
tional forms of means-end scrutiny.
As Heller's First Amendment example illustrates, the
Court today is wrong when it says that its rejection of
means-end scrutiny and near-exclusive focus on history “ac-
cords with how we protect other constitutional rights.”
Ante, at 24. As the Court points out, we do look to history
in the First Amendment context to determine “whether the
expressive conduct falls outside of the category of protected
speech.” Ibid. But, if conduct falls within a category of
protected speech, we then use means-end scrutiny to deter-
mine whether a challenged regulation unconstitutionally
burdens that speech. And the degree of scrutiny we apply
often depends on the type of speech burdened and the sever-
ity of the burden. See, e. g., Arizona Free Enterprise
Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U. S. 721, 734
(2011) (applying strict scrutiny to laws that burden political
speech); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 791
(1989) (applying intermediate scrutiny to time, place, and
manner restrictions); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557, 564–566 (1980)
(applying intermediate scrutiny to laws that burden commer-
cial speech).
Additionally, beyond the right to freedom of speech, we
regularly use means-end scrutiny in cases involving other
constitutional provisions. See, e. g., Church of Lukumi Ba-
balu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 546 (1993) (applying
strict scrutiny under the First Amendment to laws that re-
strict free exercise of religion in a way that is not neutral
and generally applicable); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 227 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause to race-based classifca-
tions); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U. S. 456, 461 (1988) (applying in-
termediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause to
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sex-based classifcations); see also Virginia v. Moore, 553
U
. S. 164, 171 (2008) (“When history has not provided a con-
clusive answer, we have analyzed a search or seizure in light
of traditional standards of reasonableness”).
The upshot is that applying means-end scrutiny to laws
that regulate the Second Amendment right to bear arms
would not create a constitutional anomaly. Rather, it is the
Court's rejection of means-end scrutiny and adoption of a
rigid history-only approach that is anomalous.
B
The Court's near-exclusive reliance on history is not only
unnecessary, it is deeply impractical. It imposes a task on
the lower courts that judges cannot easily accomplish.
Judges understand well how to weigh a law's objectives (its
“ends”) against the methods used to achieve those objectives
(its “means”). Judges are far less accustomed to resolving
diffcult historical questions. Courts are, after all, staffed
by lawyers, not historians. Legal experts typically have lit-
tle experience answering contested historical questions or
applying those answers to resolve contemporary problems.
The Court's insistence that judges and lawyers rely nearly
exclusively on history to interpret the Second Amendment
thus raises a host of troubling questions. Consider, for ex-
ample, the following. Do lower courts have the research re-
sources necessary to conduct exhaustive historical analyses
in every Second Amendment case? What historical regula-
tions and decisions qualify as representative analogues to
modern laws? How will judges determine which historians
have the better view of close historical questions? Will the
meaning of the Second Amendment change if or when new
historical evidence becomes available? And, most impor-
tantly, will the Court's approach permit judges to reach the
outcomes they prefer and then cloak those outcomes in the
language of history? See S. Cornell, Heller, New Original-
ism, and Law Offce History: “Meet the New Boss, Same as
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the Old Boss,” 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1095, 1098 (2009) (describing
“
law offce history” as “a results oriented methodology in
which evidence is selectively gathered and interpreted to
produce a preordained conclusion”). Consider Heller itself.
That case, fraught with diffcult historical questions, illus-
trates the practical problems with expecting courts to decide
important constitutional questions based solely on history.
The majority in Heller undertook 40 pages of textual and
historical analysis and concluded that the Second Amend-
ment's protection of the right to “keep and bear Arms”
historically encompassed an “individual right to possess and
carry weapons in case of confrontation”—that is, for self-
defense. 554 U. S., at 592; see also id., at 579–619. Justice
Stevens' dissent conducted an equally searching textual and
historical inquiry and concluded, to the contrary, that the
term “bear Arms” was an idiom that protected only the right
“to use and possess arms in conjunction with service in a
well-regulated militia.” Id., at 651. I do not intend to relit-
igate Heller here. I accept its holding as a matter of stare
decisis. I refer to its historical analysis only to show the
diffculties inherent in answering historical questions and to
suggest that judges do not have the expertise needed to an-
swer those questions accurately. For example, the Heller
majority relied heavily on its interpretation of the English
Bill of Rights. Citing Blackstone, the majority claimed that
the English Bill of Rights protected a “ `right of having
and using arms for self-preservation and defence.' ” Id., at
594 (quoting 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 140
(1765)). The majority interpreted that language to mean a
private right to bear arms for self-defense, “having nothing
whatever to do with service in a militia.” 554 U. S., at 593.
Two years later, however, 21 English and early American
historians (including experts at top universities) told us in
McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742 (2010), that the Heller
Court had gotten the history wrong: The English Bill of
Rights “did not . . . protect an individual's right to possess,
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own, or use arms for private purposes such as to defend a
home
against burglars.” Brief for English/Early American
Historians as Amici Curiae in McDonald v. Chicago, O. T.
2009, No. 08–1521, p. 2. Rather, these amici historians ex-
plained, the English right to “have arms” ensured that the
Crown could not deny Parliament (which represented the
people) the power to arm the landed gentry and raise a
militia—or the right of the people to possess arms to take
part in that militia—“should the sovereign usurp the laws,
liberties, estates, and Protestant religion of the nation.”
Id., at 2–3. Thus, the English right did protect a right of
“self-preservation and defence,” as Blackstone said, but that
right “was to be exercised not by individuals acting privately
or independently, but as a militia organized by their elected
representatives,” i. e., Parliament. Id., at 7–8. The Court,
not an expert in history, had misread Blackstone and other
sources explaining the English Bill of Rights.
And that was not the Heller Court's only questionable
judgment. The majority rejected Justice Stevens' argu-
ment that the Second Amendment's use of the words “bear
Arms” drew on an idiomatic meaning that, at the time of the
founding, commonly referred to military service. 554 U. S.,
at 586. Linguistics experts now tell us that the majority
was wrong to do so. See, e. g., Brief for Corpus Linguistics
Professors and Experts as Amici Curiae (Brief for Linguis-
tics Professors); Brief for Neal Goldfarb as Amicus Curiae;
Brief for Americans Against Gun Violence as Amicus Curiae
13–15. Since Heller was decided, experts have searched
over 120,000 founding-era texts from between 1760 and 1799,
as well as 40,000 texts from sources dating as far back as
1475, for historical uses of the phrase “bear arms,” and they
concluded that the phrase was overwhelmingly used to refer
to “ `war, soldiering, or other forms of armed action by a
group rather than an individual.' ” Brief for Linguistics
Professors 11, 14; see also D. Baron, Corpus Evidence Illumi-
nates the Meaning of Bear Arms, 46 Hastings Const. L. Q.
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509, 510 (2019) (“Non-military uses of bear arms in reference
to
hunting or personal self-defense are not just rare, they
are almost nonexistent”); id., at 510–511 (reporting 900 in-
stances in which “bear arms” was used to refer to military
or collective use of frearms and only 7 instances that were
either ambiguous or without a military connotation).
These are just two examples. Other scholars have contin-
ued to write books and articles arguing that the Court's deci-
sion in Heller misread the text and history of the Second
Amendment. See generally, e. g., M. Waldman, The Second
Amendment (2014); S. Cornell, The Changing Meaning of the
Right To Keep and Bear Arms: 1688–1788, in Guns in Law
20–27 (A. Sarat, L. Douglas, & M. Umphrey eds. 2019);
P. Finkelman, The Living Constitution and the Second
Amendment: Poor History, False Originalism, and a Very
Confused Court, 37 Cardozo L. Rev. 623 (2015); D. Walker,
Necessary to the Security of Free States: The Second
Amendment as the Auxiliary Right of Federalism, 56 Am. J.
Legal Hist. 365 (2016); W. Merkel, Heller as Hubris, and How
McDonald v. City of Chicago May Well Change the Consti-
tutional World as We Know It, 50 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1221
(2010).
I repeat that I do not cite these arguments in order to
relitigate Heller. I wish only to illustrate the difficulties
that may befall lawyers and judges when they attempt to rely
solely on history to interpret the Constitution. In Heller,
we attempted to determine the scope of the Second Amend-
ment right to bear arms by conducting a historical analysis,
and some of us arrived at very different conclusions based
on the same historical sources. Many experts now tell us
that the Court got it wrong in a number of ways. That is
understandable given the diffculty of the inquiry that the
Court attempted to undertake. The Court's past experience
with historical analysis should serve as a warning against
relying exclusively, or nearly exclusively, on this mode of
analysis in the future.
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Failing to heed that warning, the Court today does just
that.
Its near-exclusive reliance on history will pose a num-
ber of practical problems. First, the diffculties attendant
to extensive historical analysis will be especially acute in the
lower courts. The Court's historical analysis in this case is
over 30 pages long and reviews numerous original sources
from over 600 years of English and American history. Ante,
at 39–70. Lower courts—especially district courts—typi-
cally have fewer research resources, less assistance from
amici historians, and higher caseloads than we do. They
are therefore ill equipped to conduct the type of searching
historical surveys that the Court's approach requires. Tell-
ingly, even the Courts of Appeals that have addressed the
question presented here (namely, the constitutionality of
public carriage restrictions like New York's) “have, in large
part, avoided extensive historical analysis.” Young v.
Hawaii, 992 F. 3d 765, 784–785 (CA9 2021) (collecting cases).
In contrast, lawyers and courts are well equipped to adminis-
ter means-end scrutiny, which is regularly applied in a vari-
ety of constitutional contexts, see supra, at 105–107.
Second, the Court's opinion today compounds these prob-
lems, for it gives the lower courts precious little guidance
regarding how to resolve modern constitutional questions
based almost solely on history. See, e. g., ante, at 81 (Bar-
rett, J., concurring) (“highlight[ing] two methodological
points that the Court does not resolve”). The Court de-
clines to “provide an exhaustive survey of the features that
render regulations relevantly similar under the Second
Amendment. ” Ante, at 29. Other than noting that its
history-only analysis is “neither a . . . straightjacket nor a
. . . blank check,” the Court offers little explanation of how
stringently its test should be applied. Ante, at 30. Ironi-
cally, the only two “relevan[t]” metrics that the Court does
identify are “how and why” a gun control regulation “bur-
den[s the] right to armed self-defense.” Ante, at 29. In
other words, the Court believes that the most relevant met-
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rics of comparison are a regulation's means (how) and ends
(
why)—even as it rejects the utility of means-end scru-
tiny. What the Court offers instead is a laundry list of rea-
sons to discount seemingly relevant historical evidence.
The Court believes that some historical laws and decisions
cannot justify upholding modern regulations because, it says,
they were outliers. It explains that just two court decisions
or three colonial laws are not enough to satisfy its test.
Ante, at 46, 65. But the Court does not say how many cases
or laws would suffce “to show a tradition of public-carry
regulation.” Ante, at 46. Other laws are irrelevant, the
Court claims, because they are too dissimilar from New
York's concealed-carry licensing regime. See, e. g., ante, at
56–57. But the Court does not say what “representative
historical analogue,” short of a “twin” or a “dead ringer,”
would suffce. See ante, at 30 (emphasis deleted). Indeed,
the Court offers many and varied reasons to reject potential
representative analogues, but very few reasons to accept
them. At best, the numerous justifcations that the Court
fnds for rejecting historical evidence give judges ample tools
to pick their friends out of history's crowd. At worst, they
create a one-way ratchet that will disqualify virtually any
“representative historical analogue” and make it nearly im-
possible to sustain common-sense regulations necessary to
our Nation's safety and security.
Third, even under ideal conditions, historical evidence will
often fail to provide clear answers to diffcult questions. As
an initial matter, many aspects of the history of frearms and
their regulation are ambiguous, contradictory, or disputed.
Unsurprisingly, the extent to which colonial statutes enacted
over 200 years ago were actually enforced, the basis for an
acquittal in a 17th-century decision, and the interpretation
of English laws from the Middle Ages (to name just a few
examples) are often less than clear. And even historical ex-
perts may reach conficting conclusions based on the same
sources. Compare, e. g., P. Charles, The Faces of the Second
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Amendment Outside the Home: History Versus Ahistorical
St
andards of Review, 60 Clev. St. L. Rev. 1, 14 (2012), with
J. Malcolm, To Keep and Bear Arms: The Origins of an
Anglo-American Right 104 (1994). As a result, history, as
much as any other interpretive method, leaves ample discre-
tion to “loo[k] over the heads of the [crowd] for one's
friends.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Inter-
pretation of Legal Texts 377 (2012).
Fourth, I fear that history will be an especially inadequate
tool when it comes to moder n cases presenting modern
problems. Consider the Court's apparent preference for
founding-era regulation. See ante, at 34–37. Our country
confronted profoundly different problems during that time
period than it does today. Society at the founding was “pre-
dominantly rural.” C. McKirdy, Misreading the Past: The
Faulty Historical Basis Behind the Supreme Court's Decision
in District of Columbia v. Heller, 45 Capital U. L. Rev. 107,
151 (2017). In 1790, most of America's relatively small pop-
ulation of just four million people lived on farms or in small
towns. Ibid. Even New York City, the largest American
city then, as it is now, had a population of just 33,000 people.
Ibid. Small founding-era towns are unlikely to have faced
the same degrees and types of risks from gun violence as
major metropolitan areas do today, so the types of regula-
tions they adopted are unlikely to address modern needs.
Id., at 152 (“For the most part, a population living on farms
and in very small towns did not create conditions in which
frearms created a signifcant danger to the public welfare”);
see also supra, at 30–31.
This problem is all the more acute when it comes to
“modern-day circumstances that [the Framers] could not
have anticipated.” Heller, 554 U. S., at 721–722 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). How can we expect laws and cases that are
over a century old to dictate the legality of regulations tar-
geting “ghost guns” constructed with the aid of a three-
dimensi ona l pr inter? See, e. g., Wh ite House Br iefi ng
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Room, FACT SHEET: The Biden Administration Cracks
Down
on Ghost Guns, Ensures That ATF Has the Leadership
It Needs To Enforce Our Gun Laws (Apr. 11, 2022), https://
whitehouse.gov/ briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/
11/fact-sheet-the-biden-administrati on-cracks-down-on-
ghost-guns-ensures-that-atf-has-the-leadership-it-needs-to-
enforce-our-gun-laws/. Or modern laws requiring all gun
shops to offer smart guns, which can only be fred by author-
ized users? See, e. g., N. J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58–2.10(a) (West
Cum. Supp. 2022). Or laws imposing additional criminal
penalties for the use of bullets capable of piercing body
armor? See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. §§ 921(a)(17)(B), 929(a).
The Court's answer is that judges will simply have to em-
ploy “analogical reasoning.” Ante, at 29–30. But, as I ex-
plained above, the Court does not provide clear guidance on
how to apply such reasoning. Even seemingly straightfor-
ward historical restrictions on frearm use may prove sur-
prisingly diffcult to apply to modern circumstances. The
Court affrms Heller's recognition that States may forbid
public carriage in “sensitive places.” Ante, at 30–31. But
what, in 21st-century New York City, may properly be con-
sidered a sensitive place? Presumably “legislative assem-
blies, polling places, and courthouses,” which the Court tells
us were among the “relatively few” places “where weapons
were altogether prohibited” in the 18th and 19th centuries.
Ante, at 30. On the other hand, the Court also tells us that
“expanding the category of `sensitive places' simply to all
places of public congregation that are not isolated from law
enforcement defnes th[at] category . . . far too broadly.”
Ante, at 31. So where does that leave the many locations in
a modern city with no obvious 18th- or 19th-century ana-
logue? What about subways, nightclubs, movie theaters,
and sports stadiums? The Court does not say.
Although I hope—fervently—that future courts will be
able to identify historical analogues supporting the validity
of regulations that address new technologies, I fear that it
will often prove diffcult to identify analogous technological
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and social problems from Medieval England, the founding
era,
or the time period in which the Fourteenth Amendment
was rati fied. Laws addressi ng repeati ng crossbows,
launcegays, dirks, dagges, skeines, stilladers, and other an-
cient weapons will be of little help to courts confronting mod-
ern problems. And as technological progress pushes our
society ever further beyond the bounds of the Framers'
imaginations, attempts at “analogical reasoning ” will become
increasingly tortured. In short, a standard that relies solely
on history is unjustifable and unworkable.
IV
Indeed, the Court's application of its history-only test in
this case demonstrates the very pitfalls described above.
The historical evidence reveals a 700-year Anglo-American
tradition of regulating the public carriage of frearms in gen-
eral, and concealed or concealable frearms in particular.
The Court spends more than half of its opinion trying to
discredit this tradition. But, in my view, the robust evi-
dence of such a tradition cannot be so easily explained away.
Laws regulating the public carriage of weapons existed in
England as early as the 13th century and on this Continent
since before the founding. Similar laws remained on the
books through the ratifcations of the Second and Fourteenth
Amendments through to the present day. Many of those
historical regulations imposed signifcantly stricter restric-
tions on public carriage than New York's licensing require-
ments do today. Thus, even applying the Court's history-
only analysis, New York's law must be upheld because
“historical precedent from before, during, and . . . after the
founding evinces a comparable tradition of regulation.”
Ante, at 27 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
A. England.
The right codifed by the Second Amendment was “ `inher-
ited from our English ancestors.' ” Heller, 554 U. S., at 599
(quoting Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 281 (1897)); see

116 NEW
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also ante, at 39 (majority opinion). And some of England's
ear
liest laws regulating the public carriage of weapons were
precursors of similar American laws enacted roughly con-
temporaneously with the ratifcation of the Second Amend-
ment. See infra, at 121–123. I therefore begin, as the
Court does, ante, at 39–40, with the English ancestors of
New York's laws regulating public carriage of frearms.
The relevant English history begins in the late-13th and
early-14th centuries, when Edward I and Edward II issued
a series of orders to local sheriffs that prohibited any person
from “going armed.” See 4 Calendar of the Close Rolls, Ed-
ward I, 1296–1302, p. 318 (Sept. 15, 1299) (1906); id., at 588
(July 16, 1302); 5 id., Edward I, 1302–1307, at 210 (June 10,
1304) (1908); id., Edward II, 1307–1313, at 52 (Feb. 9, 1308)
(1892); id., at 257 (Apr. 9, 1310); id., at 553 (Oct. 12, 1312);
id., Edward II, 1323–1327, at 560 (Apr. 28, 1326) (1898); 1
Calendar of Plea and Memoranda Rolls of the City of Lon-
don, 1323–1364, p. 15 (Nov. 1326) (A. Thomas ed. 1926). Vio-
lators were subject to punishment, including “forfeiture of
life and limb.” See, e. g., 4 Calendar of the Close Rolls,
Edward I, 1296–1302, at 318. Many of these royal edicts
cont ai ned exempti ons for persons who had obt ai ned
“the king 's special licence.” See ibid.; 5 id., Edward I,
1302–1307, at 210 (June 10, 1304); id., Edward II, 1307–1313,
at 553 (Oct. 12, 1312); id., Edward II, 1323–1327, at 560
(Apr. 28, 1326). Like New York's law, these early edicts
prohibited public carriage absent special governmental
per missi on and enforced that proh ibiti on on pai n of
punishment.
The Court seems to suggest that these early regulations
are irrelevant because they were enacted during a time of
“turmoil” when “malefactors . . . harried the country, com-
mitting assaults and murders.” Ante, at 40 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). But it would seem to me that what
the Court characterizes as a “right of armed self-defense”
would be more, rather than less, necessary during a time of
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“turmoil.” Ante, at 29. The Court also suggests that laws
that
were enacted before frearms arrived in England, like
these early edicts and the subsequent Statute of Northamp-
ton, are irrelevant. Ante, at 40–41. But why should that
be? Pregun regulations prohibiting “going armed” in public
illustrate an entrenched tradition of restricting public car-
riage of weapons. That tradition seems as likely to apply to
frearms as to any other lethal weapons—particularly if we
follow the Court's instruction to use analogical reasoning.
See ante, at 28–29. And indeed, as we shall shortly see, the
most signifcant prefrearm regulation of public carriage—
the Statute of Northampton—was in fact applied to guns
once they appeared in England. See Sir John Knight's
Case, 3 Mod. 117, 87 Eng. Rep. 75, 76 (K. B. 1686).
The Statute of Northampton was enacted in 1328. 2 Edw.
3, 258, c. 3. By its terms, the statute made it a criminal
offense to carry arms without the King 's authorization. It
provided that, without such authorization, “no Man great nor
small, of what Condition soever he be,” could “go nor ride
armed by night nor by day, in Fairs, Markets, nor in the
presence of the Justices or other Ministers, nor in no part
elsewhere, upon pain to forfeit their Armour to the King,
and their Bodies to Prison at the King 's pleasure.” Ibid.
For more than a century following its enactment, England's
sheriffs were routinely reminded to strictly enforce the Stat-
ute of Northampton against those going armed without the
King 's permission. See Calendar of the Close Rolls, Ed-
ward III, 1330–1333, at 131 (Apr. 3, 1330) (1898); 1 Calendar
of the Close Rolls, Richard II, 1377–1381, at 34 (Dec. 1, 1377)
(1914); 2 id., Richard II, 1381–1385, at 3 (Aug. 7, 1381) (1920);
3 id., Richard II, 1385–1389, at 128 (Feb. 6, 1386) (1921); id.,
at 399–400 (May 16, 1388); 4 id., Henry VI, 1441–1447, at 224
(May 12, 1444) (1937); see also 11 Tudor Royal Proclamations,
The Later Tudors: 1553–1587, pp. 442–445 (Proclamation 641,
21 Elizabeth I, July 26, 1579) (P. Hughes & J. Larkin eds.
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118 NEW
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The Court thinks that the Statute of Northampton “has
l
ittle bearing on the Second Amendment,” in part because it
was “enacted . . . more than 450 years before the ratifcation
of the Constitution.” Ante, at 41. The statute, however,
remained in force for hundreds of years, well into the 18th
century. See 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 148–149 (1769)
(“The offence of riding or going armed, with dangerous or
unusual weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by ter-
rifying the good people of the land; and is particularly pro-
hibited by the Statute of Northampton” (frst emphasis in
original, second emphasis added)). It was discussed in the
writings of Blackstone, Coke, and others. See ibid.; W. Hawk-
ins, 1 Pleas of the Crown 135 (1716) (Hawkins); E. Coke, The
Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 160
(1797). And several American Colonies and States enacted
restrictions modeled on the statute. See infra, at 121–124.
There is thus every reason to believe that the Framers of
the Second Amendment would have considered the Statute
of Northampton a signifcant chapter in the Anglo-American
tradition of frearms regulation.
The Court also believes that, by the end of the 17th cen-
tury, the Statute of Northampton was understood to contain
an extratextual intent element: the intent to cause terror
in others. Ante, at 43–47, 49–50. The Court relies on two
sources that arguably suggest that view: a 1686 decision, Sir
John Knight's Case, and a 1716 treatise written by Serjeant
William Hawkins. Ante, at 43–46. But other sources sug-
gest that carrying arms in public was prohibited because it
naturally tended to terrify the people. See, e. g., M. Dalton,
The Country Justice 282–283 (1690) (“[T]o wear Armor, or
Weapons not usually worn, . . . seems also be a breach, or
means of breach of the Peace . . . ; for they strike a fear and
terror in the People” (emphasis added)). According to these
sources, terror was the natural consequence—not an addi-
tional element—of the crime.
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I fnd this view more persuasive in large part because it is
not
entirely clear that the two sources the Court relies on
actually support the existence of an intent-to-terrify require-
ment. Start with Sir John Knight's Case, which, according
to the Court, considered Knight's arrest for walking “ `about
the streets' ” and into a church “ `armed with guns.' ” Ante,
at 43 (quoting Sir John Knight's Case, 3 Mod. 117, 87 Eng.
Rep., at 76). The Court thinks that Knight's acquittal by
a jury demonstrates that the Statute of Northampton only
prohibited public carriage of frearms with an intent to ter-
rify. Ante, at 43–44. But by now the legal signifcance of
Knight's acquittal is impossible to reconstruct. Brief for
Patrick J. Charles as Amicus Curiae 23, n. 9. The primary
source describing the case (the English Reports) was notori-
ously incomplete at the time Sir John Knight's Case was
decided. Id., at 24–25. And the facts that historians can
reconstruct do not uniformly support the Court's interpreta-
tion. The King 's Bench required Knight to pay a surety to
guarantee his future good behavior, so it may be more accu-
rate to think of the case as having ended in “a conditional
pardon” than acquittal. Young, 992 F. 3d, at 791; see also
Rex v. Sir John Knight, 1 Comb. 40, 90 Eng. Rep. 331 (K. B.
1686). And, notably, it appears that Knight based his de-
fense on his loyalty to the Crown, not a lack of intent to
terrify. 3 The Entring Book of Roger Morrice 1677–1691:
The Reign of James II, 1685–1687, pp. 307–308 (T. Harris
ed. 2007).
Similarly, the passage from the Hawkins treatise on which
the Court relies states that the Statute of Northampton's
prohibition on the public carriage of weapons did not apply
to the “wearing of Arms . . . unless it be accompanied with
such Circumstances as are apt to terrify the People.”
Hawkins 136. But Hawkins goes on to enumerate relatively
narrow circumstances where this exception applied: when
“Persons of Quality . . . wea[r] common Weapons, or hav[e]
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their usual Number of Attendants with them, for their Orna-
ment
or Defence, in such Places, and upon such Occasions, in
which it is the common Fashion to make use of them,” or
to persons merely wearing “privy Coats of Mail.” Ibid. It
would make little sense if a narrow exception for nobility,
see Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed., Dec. 2012), https://
www.oed.com/view/Entry/155878 (defning “quality,” A.I.5.a),
and “privy coats of mail” were allowed to swallow the broad
rule that Hawkins (and other commentators of his time) de-
scribed elsewhere. That rule provided that “there may be
an Affray where there is no actual Violence; as where a Man
arms himself with dangerous and unusual Weapons, in such
a Manner as will naturally cause a Terror to the People,
which is . . . strictly prohibited by [the Statute of Northamp-
ton].” Hawkins 135. And it provided no exception for
those who attempted to “excuse the wearing such Armour
in Publick, by alleging that . . . he wears it for the Safety of
his Person from . . . Assault.” Id., at 136. In my view, that
rule announces the better reading of the Statute of North-
ampton—as a broad prohibition on the public carriage of
frearms and other weapons, without an intent-to-terrify re-
quirement or exception for self-defense.
Although the Statute of Northampton is particularly sig-
nifcant because of its breadth, longevity, and impact on
American law, it was far from the only English restriction
on frearms or their carriage. See, e. g., 6 Hen. 8, c. 13, § 1
(1514) (restricting the use and ownership of handguns); 25
Hen. 8, c. 17, § 1 (1533) (same); 33 Hen. 8, c. 6, §§ 1–2 (1541)
(same); 25 Edw. 3, st. 5, c. 2 (1350) (making it a “Felony or
Trespass” to “ride armed covertly or secretly with Men of
Arms against any other, to slay him, or rob him, or take him,
or retain him till he hath made Fine or Ransom for to have
his Deliverance”) (brackets and footnote omitted). What-
ever right to bear arms we inherited from our English fore-
bears, it was qualifed by a robust tradition of public car-
riage regulations.
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As I have made clear, I am not a historian. But if the
foregoi
ng facts, which historians and other scholars have
presented to us, are even roughly correct, it is diffcult to see
how the Court can believe that English history fails to sup-
port legal restrictions on the public carriage of frearms.
B. The Colonies.
The American Colonies continued the English tradition of
regulating public carriage on this side of the Atlantic. In
1686, the colony of East New Jersey passed a law providing
that “no person or persons . . . shall presume privately to
wear any pocket pistol, skeines, stilladers, daggers or dirks,
or other unusual or unlawful weapons within this Province.”
An Act Against Wearing Swords, &c., ch. 9, in Grants, Con-
cessions, and Original Constitutions of the Province of New
Jersey 290 (2d ed. 1881). East New Jersey also specifcally
prohibited “planter[s]” from “rid[ing] or go[ing] armed with
sword, pistol, or dagger.” Ibid. Massachusetts Bay and
New Hampshire followed suit in 1692 and 1771, respectively,
enacting laws that, like the Statute of Northampton, pro-
vided that those who went “armed Offensively” could be pun-
ished. An Act for the Punishing Criminal Offenders, 1692
Mass. Acts and Laws no. 6, pp. 11–12; An Act for the Punish-
ing of Criminal Offenders, 1771 N. H. Acts and Laws ch. 11,
§ 5, p. 17.
It is true, as the Court points out, that these laws were
only enacted in three colonies. Ante, at 46. But that does
not mean that they may be dismissed as outliers. They
were successors to several centuries of comparable laws in
England, see supra, at 115–121, and predecessors to numer-
ous similar (in some cases, materially identical) laws enacted
by the States after the founding, see infra, at 122–123. And
while it may be true that these laws applied only to “danger-
ous and unusual weapons,” see ante, at 47 (majority opinion),
that category almost certainly included guns, see Charles, 60
Clev. St. L. Rev., at 34, n. 181 (listing 18th-century sources
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defning “ `offensive weapons' ” to include “ `Fire Arms' ” and
“
`Guns' ”); State v. Huntly, 25 N. C. 418, 422 (1843) (per cu-
riam) (“A gun is an `unusual weapon,' wherewith to be
armed and clad”). Finally, the Court points out that New
Jersey's ban on public carriage applied only to certain people
or to the concealed carriage of certain smaller frearms.
Ante, at 47–49. But the Court's refusal to credit the rele-
vance of East New Jersey's law on this basis raises a serious
question about what, short of a “twin” or a “dead ringer,”
qualifes as a relevant historical analogue. See ante, at 30
(majority opinion) (emphasis deleted).
C. The Founding Era.
The tradition of regulations restricting public carriage of
frearms, inherited from England and adopted by the Colo-
nies, continued into the founding era. Virginia, for example,
enacted a law in 1786 that, like the Statute of Northampton,
prohibited any person from “go[ing] nor rid[ing] armed by
night nor by day, in fairs or markets, or in other places, in
terror of the Country.” 1786 Va. Acts, ch. 21. And, as
the Court acknowledges, “public-carry restrictions prolifer-
ate[d]” after the Second Amendment's ratifcation fve years
later in 1791. Ante, at 50. Just a year after that, North
Carolina enacted a law whose language was lifted from the
Statute of Northampton virtually verbatim (vestigial refer-
ences to the King included). Collection of Statutes, pp. 60–
61, ch. 3 (F. Martin ed. 1792). Other States passed similar
laws in the late-18th and 19th centuries. See, e. g., 1795
Mass. Acts and Laws ch. 2, p. 436; 1801 Tenn. Acts pp. 260–
261; 1821 Me. Laws p. 285; see also Charles, 60 Clev.
St. L. Rev., at 40, n. 213 (collecting sources).
The Court discounts these laws primarily because they
were modeled on the Statute of Northampton, which it be-
lieves prohibited only public carriage with the intent to ter-
rify. Ante, at 49–50. I have previously explained why I
believe that preventing public terror was one reason that the
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Statute of Northampton prohibited public carriage, but not
an
element of the crime. See supra, at 118–120. And, con-
sistent with that understanding, American regulations mod-
eled on the Statute of Northampton appear to have been un-
derstood to set forth a broad prohibition on public carriage
of frearms without any intent-to-terrify requirement. See
Charles, 60 Clev. St. L. Rev., at 35, 37–41; J. Haywood, A
Manual of the Laws of North-Carolina, pt. 2, p. 40 (3d
ed.1814); J. Ewing, The Offce and Duty of a Justice of the
Peace 546 (1805).
The Court cites three cases considering common-law of-
fenses, ante, at 50–52, but those cases do not support the
view that only public carriage in a manner likely to terrify
violated American successors to the Statute of Northampton.
If anything, they suggest that public carriage of frearms was
not common practice. At least one of the cases the Court
cites, State v. Huntly, wrote that the Statute of Northampton
codifed a pre-existing common-law offense, which provided
that “ `riding or going armed with dangerous or unusual
weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by terrifying
the good people of the land.' ” 25 N. C., at 420–421 (quot-
ing 4 Blackstone, Commentaries, at 149; emphasis added).
Huntly added that “[a] gun is an `unusual weapon' ” and that
“[n]o man amongst us carries it about with him, as one of his
every day accoutrements—as a part of his dress—and never,
we trust, will the day come when any deadly weapon will be
worn or wielded in our peace loving and law-abiding State,
as an appendage of manly equipment.” 25 N. C., at 422.
True, Huntly recognized that citizens were nonetheless “at
perfect liberty” to carry for “lawful purpose[s]”—but it spec-
ifed that those purposes were “business or amusement.”
Id., at 422–423. New York's law similarly recognizes that
hunting, target shooting, and certain professional activities
are proper causes justifying lawful carriage of a frearm.
See supra, at 93–95. The other two cases the Court cites
for this point similarly offer it only limited support—either
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because the atextual intent element the Court advocates was
irrele
vant to the decision's result, see O'Neill v. State, 16 Ala.
65 (1849), or because the decision adopted an outlier position
not refected in the other cases cited by the Court, see Simp-
son v. State, 13 Tenn. 356, 360 (1833); see also ante, at 51,
65 (majority opinion) (refusing to give “a pair of state-court
decisions” “disproportionate weight”). The founding-era
regulations—like the colonial and English laws on which
they were modeled—thus demonstrate a longstanding tradi-
tion of broad restrictions on public carriage of frearms.
D. The 19th Century.
Beginning in the 19th century, States began to innovate
on the Statute of Northampton in at least two ways. First,
many States and Territories passed bans on concealed car-
riage or on any carriage, concealed or otherwise, of certain
concealable weapons. For example, Georgia made it unlaw-
ful to carry, “unless in an open manner and fully exposed to
view, any pistol, (except horseman's pistols,) dirk, sword in a
cane, spear, bowie-knife, or any other kind of knives, manu-
factured and sold for the purpose of offence and defence.”
Ga. Code § 4413 (1861). Other St ates and Terr itor ies
enacted similar prohibitions. See, e. g., Ala. Code § 3274
(1852) (banning, with limited exceptions, concealed carriage
of “a pistol, or any other description of fre arms”); see also
ante, at 52–53, n. 16 (majority opinion) (collecting sources).
And the Territory of New Mexico appears to have banned
all carriage whatsoever of “any class of pistols whatever,” as
well as “bowie kni[ves,] . . . Arkansas toothpick[s], Spanish
dagger[s], slung-shot[s], or any other deadly weapon.” 1860
Terr. of N. M. Laws §§ 1–2, p. 94. These 19th-century bans
on concealed carriage were stricter than New York's law,
for they prohibited concealed carriage with at most limited
exceptions, while New York permits concealed carriage with
a lawfully obtained license. See supra, at 93. Moreover, as
Heller recognized, and the Court acknowledges, “the major-
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ity of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held
that
[these types of] prohibitions on carrying concealed
weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state
analogues.” 554 U. S., at 626 (emphasis added); see also
ante, at 52–53.
The Court discounts this history because, it says, courts
in four Southern States suggested or held that a ban on con-
cealed carriage was only lawful if open carriage or carriage
of military pistols was a llowed. Ante, at 53 – 55. (The
Court also cites Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. 90 (1822),
which invalidated Kentucky's concealed-carry prohibition as
contrary to that State's Second Amendment analogue. Id.,
at 90–93. Bliss was later overturned by constitutional
amendment and was, as the Court appears to concede, an
outlier. See Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F. 3d 919,
935–936 (CA9 2016); ante, at 53.) Several of these decisions,
however, emphasized States' leeway to regulate frearms
carriage as necessary “to protect the orderly and well dis-
posed citizens from the treacherous use of weapons not even
designed for any purpose of public defence.” State v. Smith,
11 La. 633 (1856); see also Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165,
179–180 (1871) (stating that “the right to keep” rifes, shot-
guns, muskets, and repeaters could not be “infringed or for-
bidden,” but “[t]heir use [may] be subordinated to such regu-
lations and limitations as are or may be authorized by the
law of the land, passed to subserve the general good, so as
not to infringe the right secured and the necessary incidents
to the exercise of such right”); State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 616
(1840) (recognizing that the constitutional right to bear arms
“necessarily . . . leave[s] with the Legislature the authority
to adopt such regulations of police, as may be dictated by the
safety of the people and the advancement of public morals”).
And other courts upheld concealed-carry restrictions with-
out any reference to an exception allowing open carriage, so
it is far from clear that the cases the Court cites represent a
consensus view. See State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229 (Ind.

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1833); State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842). And, of course,
the
Court does not say whether the result in this case would
be different if New York allowed open carriage by law-
abiding citizens as a matter of course.
The second 19th-century innovation, adopted in a number
of States, was surety laws. Massachusetts' surety law,
which served as a model for laws adopted by many other
States, provided that any person who went “armed with a
dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and dangerous
weapon,” and who lacked “reasonable cause to fear an assualt
[sic],” could be made to pay a surety upon the “complaint of
any person having reasonable cause to fear an injury, or
breach of the peace.” Mass. Rev. Stat., ch. 134, § 16 (1836).
Other States and Territories enacted identical or substan-
tially similar laws. See, e. g., Me. Rev. Stat., ch. 169, § 16
(1840); Mich. Rev. Stat., ch. 162, § 16 (1846); Terr. of Minn.
Rev. Stat., ch. 112, § 18 (1851); 1854 Ore. Stat., ch. 16, § 17;
W. Va. Code, ch. 153, § 8 (1868); 1862 Pa. Laws p. 250, § 6.
These laws resemble New York's licensing regime in many,
though admittedly not all, relevant respects. Most notably,
like New York's proper cause requirement, the surety laws
conditioned public carriage in at least some circumstances on
a special showing of need. Compare supra, at 94–95, with
Mass. Rev. Stat., ch. 134, § 16.
The Court believes that the absence of recorded cases in-
volving surety laws means that they were rarely enforced.
Ante, at 58. Of course, this may just as well show that these
laws were normally followed. In any case, scholars cited by
the Court tell us that “traditional case law research is not
especially probative of the application of these restrictions”
because “in many cases those records did not survive the
passage of time” or “are not well indexed or digitally search-
able.” E. Ruben & S. Cornell, Firearm Regionalism and
Public Carry: Placing Southern Antebellum Case Law in
Context, 125 Yale L. J. Forum 121, 130–131, n. 53 (2015). On
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well accepted in places like Massachusetts and were included
i
n the relevant manuals for justices of the peace” suggests
“that violations were enforced at the justice of peace level,
but did not result in expensive appeals that would have
produced searchable case law.” Id., at 131, n. 53 (citation
omitted). The surety laws and broader bans on concealed
carriage enacted in the 19th century demonstrate that even
relatively stringent restrictions on public carriage have long
been understood to be consistent with the Second Amend-
ment and its state equivalents.
E. Postbellum Regulation.
After the Civil War, public carriage of frearms remained
subject to extensive regulation. See, e. g., Cong. Globe, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess., 908 (1866) (“The constitutional rights of all
loyal and well-disposed inhabitants to bear arms will not be
infringed; nevertheless this shall not be construed to sanc-
tion the unlawful practice of carrying concealed weapons”).
Of course, during this period, Congress provided (and com-
mentators recognized) that frearm regulations could not be
designed or enforced in a discriminatory manner. See ibid.;
Act of July 16, 1866, § 14, 14 Stat. 176–177 (ensuring that
all citizens were entitled to the “full and equal beneft of all
laws . . . including the constitutional right to bear arms . . .
without respect to race or color, or previous condition of slav-
ery”); see also The Loyal Georgian, Feb. 3, 1866, p. 3, col. 4.
But that by-now uncontroversial proposition says little about
the validity of nondiscriminatory restrictions on public car-
riage, like New York's.
What is more relevant for our purposes is the fact that, in
the postbellum period, States continued to enact generally
applicable restrictions on public carriage, many of which
were even more restrictive than their predecessors. See S.
Cornell & J. Florence, The Right to Bear Arms in the Era of
the Fourteenth Amendment: Gun Rights or Gun Regulation?
50 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1043, 1066 (2010). Most notably,
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many States and Western Territories enacted stringent reg-
u
lations that prohibited any public carriage of frearms, with
only limited exceptions. For example, Texas made it a mis-
demeanor to carry in public “any pistol, dirk, dagger, slung-
shot, sword-cane, spear, brass-knuckles, bowie-knife, or any
other kind of knife manufactured or sold for the purpose of
offense or defense” absent “reasonable grounds for fearing
an [immediate and pressing] unlawful attack.” 1871 Tex.
Gen. Laws ch. 34, § 1. Similarly, New Mexico made it “un-
lawful for any person to carry deadly weapons, either con-
cealed or otherwise, on or about their persons within any of
the settlements of this Territory.” 1869 Terr. of N. M. Laws
ch. 32, § 1. New Mexico's prohibition contained only narrow
exceptions for carriage on a person's own property, for self-
defense in the face of immediate danger, or with offcial au-
thorization. Ibid. Other States and Territories adopted
similar laws. See, e. g., 1875 Wyo. Terr. Sess. Laws ch. 52,
§ 1; 1889 Idaho Terr. Gen. Laws § 1, p. 23; 1881 Kan. Sess.
Laws § 23, p. 92; 1889 Ariz. Terr. Sess. Laws no. 13, § 1, p. 16.
When they were challenged, these laws were generally up-
held. P. Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment Out-
side the Home, Take Two: How We Got Here and Why It
Matters, 64 Clev. St. L. Rev. 373, 414 (2016); see also ante, at
64–65 (majority opinion) (recognizing that postbellum Texas
law and court decisions support the validity of New York's
licensing regime); Andrews, 50 Tenn., at 182 (recognizing
that “a man may well be prohibited from carrying his arms
to church, or other public assemblage,” and that the carriage
of arms other than rifes, shot guns, muskets, and repeaters
“may be prohibited if the Legislature deems proper, abso-
lutely, at all times, and under all circumstances”).
The Court's principal answer to these broad prohibitions
on public carriage is to discount gun control laws passed in
the American West. Ante, at 66–69. It notes that laws
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judicial scrutiny.” Ante, at 68. But, of course, that may
wel
l mean that “[w]e . . . can assume it settled that these”
regulations were “consistent with the Second Amendment.”
See ante, at 30 (majority opinion). The Court also reasons
that laws enacted in the Western Territories applied to a
relatively small portion of the population and were compara-
tively short lived. See ante, 67–69. But even assuming
that is true, it does not mean that these laws were historical
aberrations. To the contrary, bans on public carriage in the
American West and elsewhere constitute just one chapter of
the centuries-old tradition of comparable frearms regula-
tions described above.
F. The 20th Century.
The Court disregards “20th-century historical evidence.”
Ante, at 66, n. 28. But it is worth noting that the law the
Court strikes down today is well over 100 years old, having
been enacted in 1911 and amended to substantially its pres-
ent form in 1913. See supra, at 93–94. That alone gives it
a longer historical pedigree than at least three of the four
types of frearms regulations that Heller identifed as “pre-
sumptively lawful.” 554 U. S., at 626–627, and n. 26; see C.
Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of
Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 Hastings L. J.
1371, 1374–1379 (2009) (concluding that “ `prohibitions on the
possession of frearms by felons and the mentally ill [and]
laws imposing conditions and qualifcations on the commer-
cial sale of arms' ” have their origins in the 20th century);
Kanter v. Barr, 919 F. 3d 437, 451 (CA7 2019) (Barrett, J.,
dissenting) (“Founding-era legislatures did not strip felons of
the right to bear arms simply because of their status as fel-
ons”). Like Justice Kavanaugh, I understand the Court's
opinion today to cast no doubt on that aspect of Heller's hold-
ing. Ante, at 80–81 (concurring opinion). But unlike Jus-
tice Kavanaugh, I fnd the disconnect between Heller's
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130 NEW
YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
Breyer, J., dissenting
treatment of laws prohibiting, for example, frearms posses-
si
on by felons or the mentally ill, and the Court's treatment
of New York's licensing regime, hard to square. The incon-
sistency suggests that the Court today takes either an un-
necessarily cramped view of the relevant historical record or
a needlessly rigid approach to analogical reasoning.
***
The historical examples of regulations similar to New
York's licensing regime are legion. Closely analogous Eng-
lish laws were enacted beginning in the 13th century, and
similar American regulations were passed during the colo-
nial period, the founding era, the 19th century, and the 20th
century. Not all of these laws were identical to New York's,
but that is inevitable in an analysis that demands examina-
tion of seven centuries of history. At a minimum, the laws
I have recounted resembled New York's law, similarly re-
stricting the right to publicly carry weapons and serving
roughly similar purposes. That is all that the Court's test,
which allows and even encourages “analogical reasoning,”
purports to require. See ante, at 30 (disclaiming the neces-
sity of a “historical twin”).
In each instance, the Court fnds a reason to discount the
historical evidence's persuasive force. Some of the laws
New York has identifed are too old. But others are too re-
cent. Still others did not last long enough. Some applied to
too few people. Some were enacted for the wrong reasons.
Some may have been based on a constitutional rationale that
is now impossible to identify. Some arose in historically
unique circumstances. And some are not suffciently analo-
gous to the licensing regime at issue here. But if the exam-
ples discussed above, taken together, do not show a tradition
and history of regulation that supports the validity of New
York's law, what could? Sadly, I do not know the answer to
that question. What is worse, the Court appears to have no
answer either.
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131
Breyer, J., dissenting
V
W
e are bound by Heller insofar as Heller interpreted the
Second Amendment to protect an individual right to possess
a frearm for self-defense. But Heller recognized that that
right was not without limits and could appropriately be sub-
ject to government regulation. 554 U. S., at 626–627. Hel-
ler therefore does not require holding that New York's law
violates the Second Amendment. In so holding, the Court
goes beyond Heller.
It bases its decision to strike down New York's law almost
exclusively on its application of what it calls historical “ana-
logical reasoning.” Ante, at 28–29. As I have admitted
above, I am not a historian, and neither is the Court. But
the history, as it appears to me, seems to establish a robust
tradition of regulations restricting the public carriage of con-
cealed frearms. To the extent that any uncertainty re-
mains between the Court's view of the history and mine, that
uncertainty counsels against relying on history alone. In
my view, it is appropriate in such circumstances to look be-
yond the history and engage in what the Court calls means-
end scrutiny. Courts must be permitted to consider the
State's interest in preventing gun violence, the effectiveness
of the contested law in achieving that interest, the degree to
which the law burdens the Second Amendment right, and, if
appropriate, any less restrictive alternatives.
The Second Circuit has previously done just that, and
it held that New York's law does not violate the Second
Amendment. See Kachalsky, 701 F. 3d, at 101. It frst
evaluated the degree to which the law burdens the Second
Amendment right to bear arms. Id., at 93–94. It con-
cluded that the law “places substantial limits on the ability
of law-abiding citizens to possess frearms for self-defense in
public,” but does not burden the right to possess a frearm
in the home, where Heller said “ `the need for defense of self,
family, and property is most acute.' ” Kachalsky, 701 F. 3d,
at 93–94 (quoting Heller, 554 U. S., at 628). The Second Cir-
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132 NEW
YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
Breyer, J., dissenting
cuit therefore determined that the law should be subject to
heightened
scrutiny, but not to strict scrutiny and its attend-
ant presumption of unconstitutionality. 701 F. 3d, at 93–94.
In applying such heightened scrutiny, the Second Circuit rec-
ognized that “New York has substantial, indeed compelling,
governmental interests in public safety and crime preven-
tion.” Id., at 97. I agree. As I have demonstrated above,
see supra, at 84–91, frearms in public present a number of
dangers, ranging from mass shootings to road rage killings,
and are responsible for many deaths and injuries in the
United States. The Second Circuit then evaluated New
York's law and concluded that it is “substantially related” to
New York's compelling interests. Kachalsky, 701 F. 3d, at
98–99. To support that conclusion, the Second Circuit
pointed to “studies and data demonstrating that widespread
access to handguns in public increases the likelihood that fel-
onies will result in death and fundamentally alters the safety
and character of public spaces.” Id., at 99. We have before
us additional studies confrming that conclusion. See, e. g.,
supra, at 101–102 (summarizing studies fnding that “may
issue” licensing regimes are associated with lower rates of
violent crime than “shall issue” regimes). And we have
been made aware of no less restrictive, but equally effective,
alternative. After considering all of these factors, the Sec-
ond Circuit held that New York's law does not unconstitu-
tionally burden the right to bear arms under the Second
Amendment. I would affrm that holding.
New York's Legislature considered the empirical evidence
about gun violence and adopted a reasonable licensing law to
regulate the concealed carriage of handguns in order to keep
the people of New York safe. The Court today strikes down
that law based only on the pleadings. It gives the State
no opportunity to present evidence justifying its reasons for
adopting the law or showing how the law actually operates
in practice, and it does not so much as acknowledge these
important considerations. Because I cannot agree with the
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133
Breyer, J., dissenting
Court's decision to strike New York's law down without
a
llowing for discovery or the development of any evidentiary
record, without considering the State's compelling interest
in preventing gun violence and protecting the safety of its
citizens, and without considering the potentially deadly con-
sequences of its decision, I respectfully dissent.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
p. 20, line 5: “. . .” is inserted after “Arms”
p. 21, line 11: “freed” is replaced with “free”
p. 23, lines 19 and 20: “(dissenting opinion)' ” is deleted
p. 38, lines 3 and 4: “(Jan. 15, 2021) (manuscript, at 2), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3766917” is replaced with “97 Ind. L. J.
1439, 1441 (2022)”
p. 43, line 10: “Holt” is replaced with “Herbert”
p. 47, line 13: “Holt” is replaced with “Herbert”
p. 50, line 14: “Holt” is replaced with “Herbert”
p. 52, line 1: “Duties” is replaced with “Duty”
p. 59, line 6: “was” is replaced with “were”
p. 61, line 18: “the” is deleted
p. 62, line 19: “keep and” is deleted
p. 64, line 3 from bottom: “the” is inserted after “all”
p. 65, line 11: “for” is inserted after “grounds”
p. 67, line 15: “Second” is replaced with “[Second]”
p. 73, n. 1, line 7: “2022” is replaced to “2020”
p. 73, n. 1, line 10: “on” replaced with “of ”
p. 74, n. 2, line 8: “trascript” is replaced with “transcript”
p. 74, n. 2, line 8: “about-“ is inserted before “nypd”
p. 77, line 10: “(per curiam)” is inserted after “(2020)”
p. 121, line 15 from bottom: “of ” is deleted
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p. 126, line 4 from bottom: “Firearms” is replaced with “Firearm”
p. 127, line 13 from bottom: “keep and” is deleted
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