Shoop v. Twyford

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 596 U. S. Part 2
Pages 811–831
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 21, 2022
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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811
Syllabus
SHOOP, WARDEN v. TWYFORD
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 21–511. Argued April 26, 2022—Decided June 21, 2022
Respondent Raymond Twyford was convicted by an Ohio jury of aggra-
vated murder and other charges and was sentenced to death. The Ohio
appellate courts affrmed his conviction and sentence. Twyford then
sought state postconviction relief, claiming that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to present evidence of a head injury Twyford sus-
tained as a teenager. The Ohio courts rejected his claim, concluding
that trial counsel had simply presented a competing psychological the-
ory for Twyford's actions. Twyford then fled a petition for federal ha-
beas relief. The District Court dismissed most of Twyford's claims as
procedurally defaulted but allowed a few to proceed. He then moved
for an order compelling the State to transport him to a medical facility,
arguing that neurological testing would plausibly lead to the develop-
ment of evidence to support his claim that he suffers neurological de-
fects. The District Court granted Twyford's motion under the All
Writs Act, which authorizes federal courts to “issue all writs necessary
or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to
the usages and principles of law.” 28 U. S. C. § 1651(a). The Court of
Appeals affrmed. Both courts concluded that it was unnecessary to
consider the admissibility of any resulting evidence prior to ordering
the State to transport Twyford to gather it.
Held: A transportation order that allows a prisoner to search for new
evidence is not “necessary or appropriate in aid of ” a federal court's
adjudication of a habeas corpus action when the prisoner has not shown
that the desired evidence would be admissible in connection with a par-
ticular claim for relief. Pp. 817–824.
(a) The State argues that the All Writs Act does not authorize the
issuance of transportation orders for medical testing at all. The State
also argues that the order issued in this case was not “necessary or
appropriate in aid of ” the District Court's jurisdiction because Twyford
failed to show that the evidence he hoped to fnd would be useful to
his habeas case. Because this Court agrees with the State's second
argument, it does not address the frst.
In habeas cases such as this, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA) restricts a federal court's authority to grant re-
lief. AEDPA provides that a federal habeas court cannot grant relief

812 SH
OOP v. TWYFORD
Syllabus
in a case adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court
(1)
contradicted or unreasonably applied this Court's precedents, or (2)
handed down a decision “based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
§§ 2254(d)(1)–(2). AEDPA also restricts the ability of a federal habeas
court to develop and consider new evidence, limiting review of factual
determinations under § 2254(d)(2) to “the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding,” and review of legal claims under § 2254(d)(1)
“to the record that was before the state court.” Cullen v. Pinholster,
563 U. S. 170, 181. A federal court may admit new evidence only in two
limited situations: Either the claim must rely on a “new” and “pre-
viously unavailable” “rule of constitutional law” made retroactively ap-
plicable by this Court, or it must rely on “a factual predicate that could
not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due dili-
gence. ” § 2254(e)(2)(A). But before a federa l cour t may decide
whether to grant an evidentiary hearing or “otherwise consider new
evidence” under § 2254(e)(2), it must frst determine that such evidence
could be legally considered in the prisoner's case. Shinn v. Martinez
Ramirez, 596 U. S. 366, 389. That is because a federal court “may never
needlessly prolong a habeas case, particularly given the essential need
to promote the fnality of state convictions.” Id., at 390 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
Twyford's transportation request was granted under the All Writs
Act. This Court has held that the All Writs Act cannot be used to
circumvent statutory requirements or otherwise binding procedural
rules. See Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Mar-
shals Service, 474 U. S. 34, 43. In federal habeas proceedings, AEDPA
provides the governing rules. And this Court's precedents explain that
a district court must consider AEDPA's requirements before facilitating
the development of new evidence. By the same token, if an order is-
sued under the All Writs Act enables a prisoner to fsh for unusable
evidence, such a writ would not be “necessary or appropriate in aid of ”
the federal court's jurisdiction, as all orders issued under the Act must
be. § 1651(a). “[G]uided by the general principles underlying [this
Court's] habeas corpus jurisprudence,” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U. S.
538, 554, a writ that enables a prisoner to gather evidence that would
not be admissible would “ `needlessly prolong ' ” resolution of the federal
habeas case, Shinn, 596 U. S., at 390, and frustrate the “State's inter-
est[ ] in fnality,” Calderon, 523 U. S., at 556. A federal court order
requiring a State to transport a prisoner to a public setting not only
delays resolution of his habeas case, but may also present serious risks
to public safety. Commanding a State to take such risks so that a pris-
oner can search for unusable evidence would not be a “necessary or
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Syllabus
appropriate” means of aiding a federal court's limited habeas review.
Pp
. 818–822.
(b) The District Court and Court of Appeals in this case concluded
that directing the State to transport Twyford to a medical facility would
aid the adjudication of his habeas petition, but they never determined
how this could aid his cause. For the reasons discussed, that was error.
Applying the proper standard here is straightforward. Twyford never
explained how the results of the neurological testing could be admissi-
ble in his habeas proceedings, and it is hard to see how they could be,
since the District Court's AEDPA review is limited to “the record that
was before the state court,” Pinholster, 563 U. S., at 181, and Twyford
made no attempt to explain how that bar would be inapplicable in his
case. Twyford suggested that the results of his brain testing could
“plausibly” bear on the question whether to excuse procedural default,
but he did not identify the particular defaulted claims nor explain how
the testing would allow him to resurrect those claims. Pp. 822–823.
11 F. 4th 518, reversed and remanded.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Thomas,
Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., fled a dis-
senting opinion, in which Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., joined, post, p. 824.
Gorsuch, J., fled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 831.
Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General of Ohio, argued
the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Dave
Yost, Attorney General, and Zachery P. Keller, Deputy Solic-
itor General.
Nicole F. Reaves argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae supporting neither party. With her on the
brief were Solicitor General Prelogar, Assistant Attorney
General Clarke, Deputy Solicitor General Fletcher, and
Erin H. Flynn.
David A. O'Neil argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were Anna A. Moody, John Gleeson, Mat-
thew Specht, Michael J. Benza, Alan C. Rossman, and
Sharon A. Hicks.*
*A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was fled for the State of Utah
et al. by Sean D. Reyes, Attorney General of Utah, Melissa Holyoak, Solic-
itor General, Thomas B. Brunker, Deputy Solicitor General, and Aaron G.
Murphy, Assistant Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for

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814 SH
OOP v. TWYFORD
Opinion of the Court
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the
Cour
t.
The All Writs Act authorizes federal courts to “issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective ju-
risdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of
law.” 28 U. S. C. § 1651(a). In this case, the District Court
ordered the State to transport a prisoner in its custody to a
hospital for medical testing. The prisoner argued that the
testing could reveal evidence helpful in his effort to obtain
habeas corpus relief. The question is whether the District
Court's order is “necessary or appropriate in aid of ” the fed-
eral court's resolution of the prisoner's habeas case. We
hold that it is not, and therefore reverse.
I
On the evening of September 23, 1992, Raymond Twyford
and his co-conspirator lured Richard Franks to a remote loca-
tion, and shot and killed him. To hide their crime, the pair
mutilated Franks's body and pushed it into a pond. But a
sheriff found the body a few days later, and his investigation
led to Twyford. Twyford confessed, claiming that Franks
had raped his girlfriend's daughter and that he had killed
Franks out of revenge. A jury convicted Twyford of aggra-
their respective States as follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Mark
Brnovich of Arizona, Leslie Rutledge of Arkansas, Ashley Moody of Flor-
ida, Christopher M. Carr of Georgia, Lawrence Wasden of Idaho, Theodore
E. Rokita of Indiana, Derek Schmidt of Kansas, Daniel Cameron of Ken-
tucky, Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, Eric Schmitt
of Missouri, Austin Knudsen of Montana, Douglas J. Peterson of Ne-
braska, John M. O'Connor of Oklahoma, Alan Wilson of South Carolina,
Jason R. Ravnsborg of South Dakota, Herbert Slatery III of Tennessee,
Ken Paxton of Texas, and Jason S. Miyares of Virginia.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the American
Bar Association by Reginald M. Turner, Melissa C. Cassel, and Meaghan
VerGow; for Law Professors by Jonathan P. Schneller, Dimitri D. Port-
noi, and Heather Welles; for the Massachusetts General Hospital Center
for Law, Brain & Behavior by Christopher M. Mason, Brian K. French,
and Tracy S. Ickes; and for 18 Former Federal Judges by Christopher
D. Man.

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Opinion of the Court
vated murder, kidnapping, robbery, and other charges, and
he
was sentenced to death. The Ohio appellate courts af-
frmed his conviction and sentence, State v. Twyford, 94 Ohio
St. 3d 340, 763 N. E. 2d 122, and this Court denied certiorari,
537 U. S. 917 (2002).
Twyford then sought postconviction relief in Ohio state
court. Relevant here, he claimed that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to present evidence of a head injury
Twyford sustained as a teenager during a suicide attempt.
That injury, Twyford argued, left him “unable to make ra-
tional and voluntary choices.” State v. Twyford, 2001 WL
301411, *10 (Ohio App. 7th, Mar. 19, 2001). The Ohio trial
court and Court of Appeals rejected this claim on the merits,
concluding that “a fnding of ineffective assistance cannot be
based upon the trial counsel's choice of one competing psy-
cholog ical explanation over another. ” Id., at *13. The
Court of Appeals noted that Twyford's counsel had called a
psychologist who testifed in support of a completely differ-
ent theory: that Twyford's “commission of the murder was
his way of protecting the alleged rape victim from the same
type of abusive behavior [he] had experienced when he was
young.” Ibid. Unlike the head injury theory, this one ex-
plained Twyford's seemingly deliberate and rational actions:
planning a fake hunting trip as a ruse to lure Franks to a
remote location, dismembering his body, and disposing of it
in such a way as would conceal his identity. This theory
was also consistent with Twyford's own written confession,
which described his plan in detail. The Ohio Supreme
Court denied review. State v. Twyford, 95 Ohio St. 3d 1436,
2002-Ohio-2084, 766 N. E. 2d 1002 (Table).
In 2003, Twyford fled a petition in federal court for habeas
relief, from which this case stems. Despite the passing of
two decades, relatively little has happened. The State
moved in 2008 to dismiss many of Twyford's claims on the
ground that he failed to raise them in state court. The Dis-
trict Court did not rule on that motion for nine years.
Eventually, it dismissed most of Twyford's claims as proce-
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816 SH
OOP v. TWYFORD
Opinion of the Court
dura l ly defau lted but a l lowed a few, i ncludi ng some
i
neffective assistance of counsel claims, to proceed. Twyford
v. Bradshaw, No. 2:03–cv–906 (SD Ohio, Sept. 27, 2017).
Twyford then moved for an order compelling the State “to
transport [him] to The Ohio State University Medical Center
for medical testing necessary for the investigation, presenta-
tion, and development of claims.” Motion to Transport for
Medical Testing in No. 2:03–cv–906 (SD Ohio), p. 1 (Motion
to Transport). Twyford explained that such testing could
not be conducted at the prison, and argued that it was neces-
sary to determine whether he suffers neurological defects
due to childhood physical abuse, alcohol and drug use, and
the self-inficted gunshot wound to his head. Id., at 3. In
support of his motion, he attached a letter from a neurologist
stating that “a CT/FDG-PET scan would be a useful next
step to further evaluate [him] for brain injury,” in part be-
cause previous scans revealed 20 to 30 metal fragments in
his skull. App. to Pet. for Cert. 272a. Twyford argued that
it was “plausible” that the testing was “likely to reveal evi-
dence in support of ” claims and that it “could plausibly lead
to the development of evidence and materials” that could
counter arguments of “procedural default or exhaustion.”
Motion to Transport 8. He also urged the court to disre-
gard, at least for now, the question whether the results of
the brain testing would be admissible.
The District Court granted Twyford's motion and ordered
the State to transport him to the Medical Center. It deter-
mined that the order was appropriate under the All Writs
Act, which authorizes federal courts to “issue all writs neces-
sary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions
and agreeable to the usages and principles of law. ” 28
U. S. C. § 1651(a). The D istr ic t Cour t did not address
whether it would be able to consider the evidence that Twy-
ford hoped to develop.
The District Court stayed the transportation order pend-
ing appeal, and the Court of Appeals affrmed, 11 F. 4th 518

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Opinion of the Court
(CA6 2021). That court frst concluded that transportation
orders
to gather evidence are “agreeable to the usages and
principles of law.” § 1651(a). It then determined that Twy-
ford's transportation to gather evidence was “necessary or
appropriate” under the Act because the desired evidence
“plausibly relate[d]” to his claims for relief. 11 F. 4th, at
526–527. Like the District Court, the Court of Appeals con-
cluded that it was not required to “consider the admissibility
of any resulting evidence” before ordering the State to trans-
port Twyford to gather it. Id., at 527.
Judge Batchelder dissented, contending that such an order
is “necessary or appropriate in aid of ” a court's jurisdiction
only if “(1) the petitioner has identifed specifc claims for
relief that the evidence being sought would support or fur-
ther; and (2) the district court has determined that if that
evidence is as the petitioner proposed or anticipated, then it
could entitle the petitioner to habeas relief.” Id., at 529.
The majority's approach, she argued, allowed Twyford to
“proceed in reverse order by collecting evidence before justi-
fying it.” Ibid.
We granted certiorari. 595 U. S. ––– (2022).
II
The State argues that the lower courts erred for two inde-
pendent reasons. First, the State contends that the All
Writs Act does not authorize the issuance of transportation
orders for medical testing at all. Second, the State argues
that the transportation order was not “necessary or appro-
priate in aid of ” the District Court's jurisdiction because
Twyford failed to show that the evidence he hoped to fnd
would be useful to his habeas case. We agree with the
State's second argument and thus need not address the frst.
1
1
The Court of Appeals concluded that it had jurisdiction to review the
District Court's order, and we agree. See Cohen v. Benefcial Industrial
Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546 (1949). Transportation orders issued under
the All Writs Act (1) conclusively require transportation; (2) resolve an
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818 SH
OOP v. TWYFORD
Opinion of the Court
A
A
federal court's power to grant habeas relief is restricted
under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA), which provides that the writ may issue “only
on the ground that [the prisoner] is in custody in violation of
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
28 U. S. C. § 2254(a). To understand the propriety of the
transportation order the District Court entered while adju-
dicating Twyford's habeas corpus action, it is necessary to
review the limits AEDPA imposes on federal courts.
Congress enacted AEDPA “to reduce delays in the execu-
tion of state and federal criminal sentences, particularly in
capital cases,” Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U. S. 202, 206 (2003),
and to advance “the principles of comity, fnality, and federal-
ism,” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 420, 436 (2000) (Michael
Williams). It furthered those goals “in large measure [by]
revising the standards used for evaluating the merits of a
habeas application.” Garceau, 538 U. S., at 206. Pertinent
here, § 2254(d) provides that if a claim was adjudicated on
the merits in state court, a federal court cannot grant relief
important question of state sovereignty conceptually distinct from the
merits of the prisoner's claims, see Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer
Authority v. Metcal f & Eddy, Inc., 506 U. S. 139, 144–145 (1993); and
(3) are entirely unreviewable by the time the case has gone to fnal judg-
ment. The dissent treats the order at issue as a mere discovery order,
see post, at 826–830 (opinion of Breyer, J.), but that glosses over what it
entails: requiring a State to take a convicted felon outside the prison's
walls. Such an order creates public safety risks and burdens on the State
that cannot be remedied after fnal judgment, and we have in fact re-
viewed an identical order before. See Pennsylvania Bureau of Correc-
tion v. United States Marshals Service, 474 U. S. 34 (1985); see also Brief
for Petitioners 10, n. 6, and Brief for Federal Respondents 17, n. 8, in
Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction, O. T. 1984, No. 84–489 (noting the
Cohen jurisdictional issue). Every Court of Appeals to consider the ques-
tion, moreover, has held that such orders are immediately appealable.
See 11 F. 4th 515, 522 (CA6 2021); Jones v. Lilly, 37 F. 3d 964, 965–966
(CA3 1994); Jackson v. Vasquez, 1 F. 3d 885, 887–888 (CA9 1993); Ballard
v. Spradley, 557 F. 2d 476, 479 (CA5 1977); see also Barnes v. Black, 544
F. 3d 807, 810–811 (CA7 2008).
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unless the state court (1) contradicted or unreasonably ap-
pl
ied this Court's precedents, or (2) handed down a decision
“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
The question under AEDPA is thus not whether a federal
court believes the state court's determination was incorrect,
but whether that determination was unreasonable—“a sub-
stantially higher threshold” for a prisoner to meet. Schriro
v. Landrigan, 550 U. S. 465, 473 (2007); see also Harrington
v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 102–103 (2011).
AEDPA also restricts the ability of a federal habeas court
to develop and consider new evidence. Review of factual
determinations under § 2254(d)(2) is expressly limited to “the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” And in
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U. S. 170 (2011), we explained that
review of legal claims under § 2254(d)(1) is also “limited to
the record that was before the state court.” Id., at 181.
This ensures that the “state trial on the merits” is the “main
event, so to speak, rather than a tryout on the road for what
will later be the determinative federal habeas hearing.”
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 90 (1977) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
If a prisoner “failed to develop the factual basis of a claim
in State court proceedings,” a federal court may admit new
ev idence, but only i n two quite l i mited situati ons.
§ 2254(e)(2). Either the claim must rely on a “new” and
“previously unavailable” “rule of constitutional law” made
retroactively applicable by this Court, or it must rely on “a
factual predicate that could not have been previously discov-
ered through the exercise of due diligence.” § 2254(e)(2)(A).
And even if a prisoner can satisfy one of those two excep-
tions, he must also show that the desired evidence would
demonstrate, “by clear and convincing evidence,” that “no
reasonable factfinder ” would have convicted him of the
charged crime. § 2254(e)(2)(B). Thus, although state pris-
oners may occasionally submit new evidence in federal court,
“AEDPA's statutory scheme is designed to strongly discour-

820 SH
OOP v. TWYFORD
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age them from doing so.” Pinholster, 563 U. S., at 186; see
a
lso Michael Williams, 529 U. S., at 437 (“Federal courts sit-
ting in habeas are not an alternative forum for trying facts
and issues which a prisoner made insuffcient effort to pursue
in state proceedings.”).
We have explai ned that a federa l cour t, i n decidi ng
whether to grant an evidentiary hearing or “otherwise con-
sider new evidence” under § 2254(e)(2), must frst take into
account these restrictions. Shinn v. Martinez Ramirez, 596
U. S. 366, 389 (2022); see also Schriro, 550 U. S., at 474. The
reasons for this are familiar. A federal court “may never
needlessly prolong a habeas case, particularly given the es-
sential need to promote the fnality of state convictions,” so
a court must, before facilitating the development of new evi-
dence, determine that it could be legally considered in the
prisoner's case. Shinn, 596 U. S., at 390 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); see also Bracy v. Gramley, 520
U. S. 899, 904 (1997) (“A habeas petitioner, unlike the usual
civil litigant in federal court, is not entitled to discovery as
a matter of ordinary course.”). If § 2254(e)(2) applies and
the prisoner cannot satisfy its “stringent requirements,” Mi-
chael Williams, 529 U. S., at 433, holding an evidentiary
hearing or otherwise expanding the state-court record would
“prolong federa l habeas proceedings w ith no purpose, ”
Shinn, 596 U. S., at 390 (internal quotation marks omitted).
And that would in turn disturb the “State's signifcant inter-
est in repose for concluded litigation.” Harrington, 562
U. S., at 103. A cour t therefore must, consistent w ith
AEDPA, determine at the outset whether the new evidence
sought could be lawfully considered.
This is true even when the All Writs Act is the asserted
vehicle for gathering new evidence. We have made clear
that a petitioner cannot use that Act to circumvent statutory
requirements or otherwise binding procedural rules. See
Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Mar-
shals Service, 474 U. S. 34, 43 (1985) (“Although [the Act]
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empowers federal courts to fashion extraordinary remedies
when
the need arises, it does not authorize them to issue
ad hoc writs whenever compliance with statutory procedures
appears inconvenient or less appropriate.”); Syngenta Crop
Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U. S. 28, 32–33 (2002) (same).
AEDPA provides the governing rules for federal habeas pro-
ceedings, and our precedents explain that a district court
must consider that statute's requirements before facilitating
the development of new evidence. See Schriro, 550 U. S., at
474; see also Shinn, 596 U. S., at 389–390.
By the same token, a writ seeking new evidence would not
be “necessary or appropriate in aid of ” a federal habeas
court's jurisdiction, as all orders issued under the All Writs
Act must be, if it enables a prisoner to fsh for unusable evi-
dence, in the hope that it might undermine his conviction in
some way. In every habeas case, “the court must be guided
by the general principles underlying our habeas corpus juris-
pr udence. ” Ca l de ro n v. Tho mpso n, 523 U. S. 538, 554
(1998). A writ that enables a prisoner to gather evidence
that would not be admissible would “ `needlessly prolong ' ”
resolution of the federal habeas case, Shinn, 596 U. S., at 390,
and frustrate the “State's interest[ ] in fnality,” Calderon,
523 U. S., at 556. Cf. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U. S. 286, 300
(1969) (recognizing, before AEDPA, that a writ is “necessary
or appropriate in aid of ” a federal habeas court's jurisdiction
if “specifc allegations” show that the petitioner may, “if the
facts are fully developed,” be able to demonstrate that he is
“entitled to relief ”).
A federal court order requiring a State to transport a pris-
oner to a public setting—here, a medical center for testing—
not only delays resolution of his habeas case, but may also
present serious risks to public safety. See Brief for State
of Utah et al. as Amici Curiae 7–18 (describing the dangers
inherent in prisoner transport); cf. Price v. Johnston, 334
U. S. 266, 285 (1948) (a court should not require that a pris-
oner be transported if doing so would cause “undue inconven-
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822 SH
OOP v. TWYFORD
Opinion of the Court
ience or danger”).
2
Commandi
ng a State to take these risks
so that a prisoner can search for unusable evidence would
not be a “necessary or appropriate” means of aiding a federal
court's limited habeas review.
B
The District Court entered an order directing the State to
transport Twyford to a medical facility, concluding that doing
so would aid its adjudication of his habeas petition. But the
court never determined how, in light of the limitations on
its review described above, newly developed evidence could
aid Twyford's cause. See Twy ford v. Warden, 2020 WL
1308318, *4 (SD Ohio, Mar. 19, 2020) (“the Court does not
fnd itself in a position at this stage of proceedings to make
a determination as to whether or to what extent it would be
precluded by Cullen v. Pinholster from considering any new
evidence”). Nor did the Sixth Circuit. See 11 F. 4th, at 527
(“At this stage, on review of Twyford's interlocutory appeal
seeking a transport order, we need not consider the admissi-
bility of any resulting evidence.”). For the reasons just dis-
cussed, that was error.
Reviewing Twyford's request for transportation under the
proper standard is straightforward, because his motion sheds
no light on how he might persuade a court to consider the
results of his testing, given the limitations AEDPA imposes
on presenting new evidence. He argued that it is “plausible
that the testing to be administered is likely to reveal evi-
dence in support of ” his claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel and expert witness, lack of competency to stand trial,
2
These risks are not speculative. To give just one example, earlier this
year a convicted murderer escaped from a prison bus transporting him to
a medical appointment by breaking out of his restraints and stabbing the
bus driver. He was on the run for three weeks—and allegedly killed a
family of fve during that time—before dying in a shootout with the police.
See M. Ives & A. Traub, Hunt for Escaped Murderer Ends in Shootout
With Police in Texas, N. Y. Times, June 4, 2022, p. A14.
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Opinion of the Court
and the involuntariness of his confession. Motion to Trans-
por
t 8. Whether or not that is true, Twyford never ex-
plained how the results of the neurological testing could be
admissible in his habeas proceeding, and it is hard to see
how they could be. The Ohio courts already adjudicated
and rejected most of these claims on the merits, and the Dis-
trict Court's AEDPA review will therefore be limited to “the
record that was before the state court.” Pinholster, 563
U. S., at 181. As for the claims that the state courts did not
consider, Twyford never argued that he could clear the bar
in § 2254(e)(2) for expanding the state court record, or that
the bar was somehow inapplicable.
Twyford asserted in passing that the desired evidence
could “plausibly” bear on the question whether to excuse
procedural default. Motion to Transport 8. By way of
background, a federal court may not review a claim a habeas
petitioner failed to adequately present to state courts, unless
he shows “cause to excuse his failure to comply with the
state procedural rule and actual prejudice resulting from the
alleged constitutional violation.” Davila v. Davis, 582 U. S.
521, 528 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Twyford
suggested that the results of his brain testing could help
make that showing. But he did not identify the particular
defaulted claims he hopes to resurrect, nor did he explain
how the testing would matter to his ability to do so. And
in any event, this Court has already held that, if § 2254(e)(2)
applies and the prisoner cannot meet the statute's standards
for admitting new merits evidence, it serves no purpose to
develop such evidence just to assess cause and prejudice.
See Shinn, 596 U. S., at 389 (“when a federal habeas court
. . . admits or reviews new evidence for any purpose, it may
not consider that evidence on the merits of a negligent pris-
oner's defaulted claim unless the exceptions in § 2254(e)(2)
are satisfed”). The District Court thus erred in ordering
Twyford's transfer to gather evidence he had never demon-
strated would be admissible.

824 SH
OOP v. TWYFORD
Breyer, J., dissenting
***
A
transportation order that allows a prisoner to search for
new evidence is not “necessary or appropriate in aid of ” a
federal court's adjudication of a habeas corpus action, 28
U. S. C. § 1651(a), when the prisoner has not shown that the
desired evidence would be admissible in connection with a
particular claim for relief. Because the District Court en-
tered such an order despite Twyford's failure to make the
required showing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals af-
frming that order is reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Sotomayor and
Justice Kagan join, dissenting.
The Court today reviews a District Court's pretrial order
requiring Ohio “to transport a prisoner in its custody to a
hospital for medical testing ” in order to develop evidence to
support the prisoner's habeas petition. Ante, at 814. The
Court holds that the District Court's order did not comply
with the All Writs Act because the District Court failed to
consider whether the evidence sought could be admissible in
the habeas proceeding. See ante, at 822–823. I would not
reach the merits of that question because I do not believe
that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear the State's
interlocutory appeal. I respectfully dissent.
I
Courts of Appeals generally have jurisdiction to review
“fnal decisions of the district courts.” 28 U. S. C. § 1291.
They do not ordinarily hear interlocutory appeals. Limiting
appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory matters avoids
piecemeal decisionmaking and “combine[s] in one review all
stages of the proceeding that effectively may be reviewed
and corrected if and when fnal judgment results.” Cohen
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Breyer, J., dissenting
v. Benefcial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546 (1949).
T
oo many interlocutory appeals could slow down the work-
ings of the judicial system. That can lead to a number of
harms, including, e. g., “mak[ing] it more diffcult for trial
judges to do their basic job—supervising trial proceedings”;
“threaten[ing] those proceedings with delay, adding costs
and diminishing coherence”; and “risk[ing] additional, and
unnecessary, appellate court work.” Johnson v. Jones, 515
U. S. 304, 309 (1995).
At the same time, interlocutory appeals can sometimes
have “important countervailing benefts.” Ibid. Balancing
the harms and benefts can be a diffcult task, and Congress
has prescribed a means for accomplishing that task by way
of rulemaking. It has authorized this Court to promulgate
rules “defn[ing] when a ruling of a district court is fnal for
the purposes of appeal under section 1291,” § 2072(c), and
“provid[ing] for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the
courts of appeals that is not otherwise provided for” by stat-
ute, § 1292(e). The State does not claim that any rule pro-
mulgated pursuant to this authority permits interlocutory
appeal of the transportation order here. Instead, the State
asks us to create such a rule by court decision, outside of the
congressionally prescribed rulemaking process.
It is true that, in the past, we have occasionally done so
under what we have called the “collateral order doctrine.”
That doctrine allows interlocutory appeal from a “small
class” of orders that “fnally determine claims of right sepa-
rable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action.”
Cohen, 337 U. S., at 546. But we have repeatedly stated
that this doctrine is a “ `narrow' exception [that] should stay
that way and never be allowed to swallow the general rule
that a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred
until fnal judgment has been entered.” Digital Equipment
Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U. S. 863, 868 (1994) (cita-
tion omitted); see also Will v. Hallock, 546 U. S. 345, 350
(2006) (“[A]lthough the Court has been asked many times to

826 SH
OOP v. TWYFORD
Breyer, J., dissenting
expand the `small class' of collaterally appealable orders, we
have
instead kept it narrow and selective in its member-
ship”); Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U. S. 100,
113 (2009) (“[R]ulemaking, `not expansion by court decision,'
[is] the preferred means for determining whether and when
prejudgment orders should be immediately appealable”).
We must therefore exercise caution before extending the
collateral order doctrine. We have “stringent[ly]” limited
that doctrine to only those district court orders “[1] that are
conclusive, [2] that resolve important questions completely
separate from the merits, and [3] that would render such
important questions effectively unreviewable on appeal from
fnal judgment in the underlying action.” Digital Equip-
ment Corp., 511 U. S., at 867–868.
II
A
The Court today extends the collateral order doctrine to a
new category of orders, which it describes as “[t]ransporta-
tion orders issued under the All Writs Act.” Ante, at 817–
818, n. 1. The Court believes these kinds of orders are col-
lateral and therefore immediately appealable because, it
says, they “(1) conclusively require transportation; (2) re-
solve an important question of state sovereignty conceptu-
ally distinct from the merits of the prisoner's claims; and (3)
are entirely unreviewable by the time the case has gone to
fnal judgment.” Ibid. (citation omitted). I agree that or-
ders like the one at issue here “conclusively require transpor-
tation” and are largely “unreviewable by the time the case
has gone to fnal judgment.” Ibid. But I do not agree that
such orders “resolve an important question of state sover-
eignty conceptually distinct from the merits of the prisoner's
claims.” Ibid. That is so for three reasons.
First, transportation orders do not appear to me to be es-
pecially “important.” Even if those orders are unreview-
able after fnal judgment, we have said that “the mere identi-
fcation of some interest that would be `irretrievably lost' has
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827
Breyer, J., dissenting
never suffced,” on its own, to justify interlocutory appeal.
D
igital Equipment Corp., 511 U. S., at 872. Rather, the
order must implicate “ `a substantial public interest' or `some
particular value of a high order.' ” Mohawk Industries,
Inc., 558 U. S., at 107. It is diffcult to see how transporta-
tion orders of the kind at issue here meet that requirement.
The order is analogous to a discovery order because it re-
quires the State to transport a prisoner for medical testing
in order to develop evidence relating to the prisoner's habeas
claims. See ante, at 814, 820–821 (comparing requirements
for a transportation order to requirements for discovery and
for an evidentiary hearing). I see no reason why such an
order ordinarily should be of greater importance than a dis-
covery order of some other kind.
We have held that discovery orders are not immediately
appealable, even where discovery would require revealing
privileged information that, once shared, could not be un-
shared if the disclosing party prevailed on appeal after fnal
judgment. Mohawk Industries, Inc., 558 U. S., at 108–109.
Why should discovery-like transportation orders be immedi-
ately appealable when ordinary discovery orders are not?
Neither touches upon substantial public interests. And, in
both instances, the harms of interlocutory appeal are signif-
cant while the countervailing benefts are minimal.
Take frst the harms. As I said above, interlocutory ap-
peals “unduly delay the resolution of district court litigation
and needlessly burden the courts of appeals.” See id., at
112. In this case, for example, the appeal of the District
Court's transportation order has lasted over two years. See
App. to Pet. for Cert. 33a (order entered March 19, 2020). If
interlocutory appeals were permitted as of right in all simi-
lar cases requiring transportation of a prisoner, the resulting
delays would impair the ability of district courts to manage
their own dockets and supervise trial proceedings.
By comparison, the benefts of interlocutory appeal here
are small. District courts, not appellate courts, have “com-
parative expertise” in deciding when evidentiary develop-
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828 SH
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Breyer, J., dissenting
ment is appropriate and when transportation orders are nec-
essary
to facilitate that development. See Johnson, 515
U. S., at 317. As a result, interlocutory appeal is unlikely
“to bring important error-correcting benefts” in most cases.
Id., at 316. In the rare case where an erroneous transporta-
tion order happens to implicate unusually important inter-
ests, a State has other avenues for addressing that error. It
can ask district courts to certify a discretionary interlocu-
tory appeal under § 1292(b); seek a writ of mandamus; or
defy the order and incur a court-imposed sanction, which
may then itself be appealed immediately in some cases. See
Mohawk Industries Inc., 558 U. S., at 110–112. Those ave-
nues—sufficient to protect against errors in discovery,
see ibid.—should generally be suffcient for transportation-
related errors as well.
Second, the Court overstates transportation orders' im-
pact on “state sovereignty.” See ante, at 818, n. 1. The
Court of Appeals noted respondent's argument that “discov-
ery orders generally are not appealable under the collateral-
order doctrine,” but it distinguished the transportation order
at issue here on the ground that it “implicates . . . a federal
court's authority to compel state action.” 11 F. 4th 518, 523
(CA6 2021). But the mere fact that the appealing party is
a State is not, on its own, enough to justify interlocutory
appeal. We have never suggested, for example, that a dis-
covery order against a State is immediately appealable sim-
ply because it imposes costs on a sovereign State. To allow
interlocutory appeal on such grounds would create an anom-
aly: The State would be able to immediately appeal a discov-
ery order entered against it, but an opposing party would
not.
The Court suggests that the transportation order here is
not a mere discovery order because it “requir[es] a State to
take a convicted felon outside the prison's walls.” Ante, at
818, n. 1. The Court says doing so “creates public safety risks
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829
Breyer, J., dissenting
and burdens on the State that cannot be remedied after fnal
judg
ment.” Ibid. But what exactly are those risks? The
order here requires transporting respondent to a medical
center—the Ohio State University Wexner Medical Center.
11 F. 4th, at 520. That medical center is the “offcial prison
hospital,” which “has the security and other infrastructure”
to safely accommodate pr isoners and does so regu larly.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a; Tr. of Oral Arg. 40, 57–58. Re-
spondent tells us that he has personally been transported
between the prison and the medical center 16 times without
incident. Id., at 57.
Other orders might well create similar kinds of risks. A
writ of habeas corpus might require the State to transport a
prisoner to court to testify or for trial, see § 2241(c)(5), or an
order appointing a psychiatrist or other expert to conduct a
psychological examination might require the State to allow
access to a dangerous prisoner, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 35(a).
Would the Court's logic require that all such orders with se-
curity risks be immediately appealable? That would be a
dramatic extension of the collateral order doctrine, which we
have said should remain “ `narrow,' ” Digital Equipment
Corp., 511 U. S., at 868 (emphasis added).
Finally, we have also said that some interlocutory appeals
“mak[e] unwise use of appellate courts' time, by forcing them
to decide in the context of a less developed record, an issue
very similar to one they may well decide anyway later, on a
record that will permit a better decision.” Johnson, 515
U. S., at 317. That warning is applicable here. The ques-
tion whether the transportation order was proper under the
All Writs Act is not conceptually distinct from the merits of
respondent's habeas claims. In order to obtain a transporta-
tion order, the Court says, a prisoner must show that “the
desired evidence would be admissible in connection with a
particular claim for relief.” Ante, at 824. Of course, at this
early stage, a district court's assessment of that issue is only

830 SH
OOP v. TWYFORD
Breyer, J., dissenting
preliminary because it cannot know for certain what evi-
dence
will be revealed. After the evidence is developed, the
court will need to make a fnal determination of whether it
is in fact admissible. Requiring appellate courts to review
both the district court's preliminary assessment of admissi-
bility on interlocutory appeal and its ultimate assessment
of the same question after fnal judgment is unnecessarily
duplicative and ineffcient.
All of these concerns suggest that transportation orders
like the one here do not satisfy the requirements for interloc-
utory appeal under the collateral order doctrine.
B
The Court points out in response that “[e]very Court of
Appeals to consider the question” has found a transportation
order to be immediately appealable. Ante, at 818, n. 1.
True. But few Courts of Appeals have been asked to “con-
sider the question.” The Court cites, over the last fve dec-
ades, only four cases (besides this one) that have concluded
that transportation orders are immediately appealable.
Ibid. (citing Jones v. Lilly, 37 F. 3d 964, 965–966 (CA3 1994);
Jackson v. Vasquez, 1 F. 3d 885, 887–888 (CA9 1993); Ballard
v. Spradley, 557 F. 2d 476, 479 (CA5 1977); Barnes v. Black,
544 F. 3d 807, 810–811 (CA7 2008)). An average of one deci-
sion every decade can hardly be thought to establish a lower
court consensus. A contrary determination here would not
disturb settled practice.
The Court also asserts that, on one occasion, we have pre-
viously reviewed a transportation order. See Pennsylva-
nia Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals Service,
474 U. S. 34 (1985). But the precedential value of that deci-
sion is limited because the opinion did not discuss the Court
of Appeals' jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal from
the order. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 511
(2006). It does not set forth a jurisdictional ruling at
all.
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831
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
***
F
or these reasons, I would not reach the merits of the
questions presented by petitioner. I respectfully dissent.
Justice Gorsuch, dissenting.
The Court granted review to decide whether and under
what circumstances a federal district court may order a
State to transport a prisoner to a hospital for testing.
Later, however, it became clear a potential jurisdictional de-
fect threatened to preclude the Court from reaching that
question. The District Court's transportation ruling was an
interlocutory order, not a fnal judgment. To address its
merits, the Court would frst have to extend the collateral
order doctrine to a new class of cases. See Cohen v. Benef-
cial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 545–547 (1949).
In a terse footnote today, the Court does just that. Ante,
at 817–818, n. 1.
Respectfully, I would have dismissed this case as improvi-
dently granted when the jurisdictional complication became
apparent. We did not take this case to extend Cohen. And
this Court has repeatedly “admoni[shed]” other courts to
keep “the class of collaterally appealable orders . . . `narrow
and selective.' ” Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558
U. S. 100, 113 (2009). If anything, this call for caution “has
acquired special force in recent years with the enactment of
legislation designating rulemaking . . . as the preferred
means for determining whether and when prejudgment or-
ders should be immediately appealable.” Ibid.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None