Garland v. Gonzalez

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 596 U. S. Part 2
Pages 543–572
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 13, 2022
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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543
Syllabus
GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. v.
ALEMAN
GONZALEZ et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 20–322. Argued January 11, 2022—Decided June 13, 2022*
Respondents are aliens who were detained by the Federal Government
pursuant to 8 U. S. C. § 1231(a)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA). Respondents Esteban Aleman Gonzalez and Jose Eduardo
Gutierrez Sanchez—the named plaintiffs in the case that bears Aleman
Gonzalez's name—are natives and citizens of Mexico who were detained
under § 1231(a)(6) after reentering the United States illegally. They
fled a putative class action in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, alleging that aliens detained under
§ 1231(a)(6) are entitled to bond hearings after six months' detention.
The District Court certifed a class of similarly situated plaintiffs and
“enjoined [the Government] from detaining [respondents] and the class
members pursuant to section 1231(a)(6) for more than 180 days without
providing each a bond hearing.” Gonzalez v. Sessions, 325 F. R. D. 616,
629. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affrmed. Aleman Gonzalez
v. Barr, 955 F. 3d 762, 766. Respondent Edwin Flores Tejada—the
named plaintiff in the case that bears his name—is a native and citizen
of El Salvador. He likewise reentered the country illegally and was
detained under § 1231(a)(6). He fled suit in the Western District of
Washington, alleging that § 1231(a)(6) entitled him to a bond hearing.
The District Court certifed a class, granted partial summary judgment
against the Government, and entered class-wide injunctive relief. A
divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affrmed. Flores Tejada v. Godfrey,
954 F. 3d 1245, 1247. This Court granted certiorari and instructed the
parties to brief the threshold question whether the District Courts had
jurisdiction to entertain respondents' requests for class-wide injunctive
relief under the INA.
Held: Section 1252(f )(1) of the INA deprived the District Courts of juris-
diction to entertain respondents' requests for class-wide injunctive re-
lief. Pp. 548–556.
(a) Section 1252(f )(1) generally strips lower courts of “jurisdiction or
authority” to “enjoin or restrain the operation of ” certain provisions of
*Together with Garland, Attorney General, et al. v. Flores Tejada et al.
(see this Court's Rule 12.4), also on certiorari to the same court.

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544 GARLAND
v. ALEMAN GONZALEZ
Syllabus
the INA. The ordinary meaning of the terms “enjoin” and “restrain”
bars
the class-wide relief awarded by the two District Courts here.
When a court “enjoins” conduct, it issues an “injunction,” which is a
judicial order that “tells someone what to do or not to do.” Nken v.
Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 428. The Court has suggested that “restrain”
sometimes has a “broad meaning ” that refers to judicial orders that
“inhibit” particular actions, and at other times it has a “narrower mean-
ing ” that includes “orders that stop (or perhaps compel)” such acts. Di-
rect Marketing Assn. v. Brohl, 575 U. S. 1, 12–13. In § 1252(f )(1), the
object of the verbs “enjoin or restrain” is the “operation of ” certain
provisions of the INA—provisions that charge the Federal Government
with the implementation and enforcement of the immigration laws gov-
erning the inspection, apprehension, examination, and removal of aliens.
See §§ 1221–1232. Putting these terms together, § 1252(f )(1) generally
prohibits lower courts from entering injunctions that order federal off-
cials to take or to refrain from taking actions to enforce, implement, or
otherwise carry out the referenced INA statutory provisions.
Section 1252(f )(1) includes one exception to this general prohibition:
The lower courts retain the authority to “enjoin or restrain the opera-
tion of ” the relevant statutory provisions “with respect to the applica-
tion of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings
under such part have been initiated.” In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm., 525 U. S. 471, 481–482, the Court stated that
§ 1252(f )(1) “prohibits federal courts from granting classwide injunctive
relief ” but “does not extend to individual cases.” Here, both District
Courts entered injunctions requiring the Government to provide bond
hearings, not only for respondents, but also for all other class members.
Those orders “enjoin or restrain the operation” of § 1231(a)(6) because
they require offcials to take actions that (in the Government's view) are
not required by § 1231(a)(6) and to refrain from actions that (again in
the Government's view) are allowed by § 1231(a)(6). Those injunctions
thus interfere with the Government's efforts to operate § 1231(a)(6), and
the injunctions do not fall within the exception for individualized relief
because the injunctions were entered on behalf of entire classes of
aliens. Pp. 548–551.
(b) Respondents' two counter-arguments fail. First, respondents
contend that “the operation” of the covered immigration provisions
means the operation of those provisions “as properly interpreted” and
that what § 1252(f )(1) bars are class-wide injunctions that prohibit the
Government from doing what the statute allows or commands. Brief
for Respondents 49 (emphasis added). The ordinary meaning of the
language of § 1252(f )(1) weighs against respondents' interpretation. It
is very common to refer to the “unlawful” or “improper” operation of
something, and it is not apparent why the same cannot be said of a

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Cite
as: 596 U. S. 543 (2022)
545
Syllabus
statute. The statutory context provides additional reasons to reject
respondents'
reading.
Respondents next argue that § 1252(f )(1) allows class-wide relief so
long as all the class members are “individuals who already face the
enforcement action.” Id., at 55 (emphasis added). But § 1252(f )(1) re-
fers to “an individual,” not “individuals,” and the Court has repeatedly
stated that it bars class-wide injunctive relief. See, e. g., American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U. S., at 481. Respondents
argue that the absence of any express reference to class actions in
§ 1252(f )(1)—unlike the express reference in § 1252(e)(1)—suggests that
no preclusion of class-wide relief was intended. The Court is reluctant
to give much weight to this negative inference; it is possible that
§ 1252(f )(1) simply uses different language to bar class-wide injunctive
relief. But a literal reading of the provision could also rule out efforts
to obtain any injunctive relief that applies to multiple named plaintiffs.
The Court has no occasion to adopt such an interpretation here. It is
suffcient to hold that the class-wide injunctive relief awarded in these
cases was unlawful. Pp. 552–555.
955 F. 3d 762 and 954 F. 3d 1245, reversed and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Soto-
mayor, J., fled an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part, in which Kagan, J., joined, and in which Breyer, J., joined as
to Parts II–A–2, II–B–2, and III, post, p. 556.
Deputy Solicitor General Gannon argued the cause for
petitioners. With him on the brief were Solicitor General
Prelogar, Acting Solicitor General Fletcher, Acting Assist-
ant Attorney General Boynton, Vivek Suri, Austin L.
Raynor, and Jessica W. D'Arrigo.
Matthew H. Adams argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief were Leila Kang, Aaron Korthuis,
Michael Kaufman, Ahilan Arulanantham, Marc Van Der
Hout, Johnny Sinodis, Alison Pennington, Claudia Valen-
zuela, Vasudha Talla, David D. Cole, Judah Lakin, Amalia
Wille, Jesse Newmark, Bardis Vakili, Cecillia D. Wang, and
Michael K. T. Tan.†
†Lawrence J. Joseph and Christopher J. Hajec fled a brief for the Immi-
gration Reform Law Institute as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the Constitu-
tional Accountability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod,

546 GARLAND
v. ALEMAN GONZALEZ
Opinion of the Court
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondents
in these two cases are aliens who were de-
tained by the Federal Government pursuant to 8 U. S. C.
§ 1231(a)(6) pending removal from this country. Respond-
ents sued in two Federal District Courts, alleging that
§ 1231(a)(6) requires the Government to provide bond hear-
ings in cases like theirs. Both District Courts certifed
classes, agreed with respondents' claims on the merits, and
entered class-wide injunctive relief. The Ninth Circuit af-
frmed both judgments in relevant part.
We granted certiorari and instructed the parties to ad-
dress whether another provision of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act, 66 Stat. 208, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1252(f )(1),
deprived the District Courts of jurisdiction to entertain
respondents' requests for class-w ide i n junc tive rel ief.
We hold that the statute has that effect, and we therefore
reverse.
I
The two cases before us arise out of respondents' detention
pursuant to § 1231(a)(6), which gives the Federal Govern-
ment discretionary authority in specifed circumstances to
detain aliens who have been “ `ordered removed' ” from the
United States. See Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U. S.
573, 578–579 (2022).
Respondents Esteban Aleman Gonzalez and Jose Eduardo
Gutierrez Sanchez—the named plaintiffs in the case that
bears Aleman Gonzalez's name—are natives and citizens of
Mexico. They each reentered the United States illegally
and Brian R. Frazelle; for Former Immigration Judges et al. by Joseph
R. Palmore and James J. Beha II; and for Law Professors by Samir Deger-
Sen and Richard P. Bress.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for Asian Americans Advancing
Justice–Asian Law Caucus et al. by Nancy Morawetz; and for Retired
Federal Judges by Joshua A. Matz.
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547
Opinion of the Court
after being removed, and after they were apprehended, their
pr
ior orders of removal were “reinstated” as authorized by
§ 1231(a)(5). They sought withholding of removal on the
ground that they would be subject to torture or persecution
if they were returned to Mexico. While they awaited pro-
ceedings before an immigration judge, they were detained
under § 1231(a)(6), and they then fled a putative class action
in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California, alleging that aliens detained under § 1231(a)(6)
are entitled to bond hearings after six months' detention.
The District Court certifed a class of similarly situated
plaintiffs and “enjoined [the Government] from detaining [re-
spondents] and the class members pursuant to section
1231(a)(6) for more than 180 days without providing each a
bond hearing.” Gonzalez v. Sessions, 325 F. R. D. 616, 629
(2018). A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affrmed.
Compare Aleman Gonzalez v. Barr, 955 F. 3d 762, 766 (2020),
with id., at 790 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
Respondent Edwin Flores Tejada—the named plaintiff in
the case that bears his name—is a native and citizen of El
Salvador. He likewise was previously ordered removed, re-
entered the country illegally, had his prior removal order
reinstated, applied for withholding of removal, and was de-
tained under § 1231(a)(6). He fled suit in the Western Dis-
trict of Washington, likewise alleging (as relevant here) that
§ 1231(a)(6) entitled him to a bond hearing. The District
Court certifed a class, granted partial summary judgment
against the Government, and entered class-wide injunctive
relief. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 110a; Report and Recom-
mendation in Martinez Baños v. Asher, No. 2:16–cv–01454
(WD Wash., Jan. 23, 2018) (ECF), Doc. 77–1, p. 2. A divided
panel of the Ninth Circuit affrmed in relevant part. Com-
pare Flores Tejada v. Godfrey, 954 F. 3d 1245, 1247 (2020),
with id., at 1251 (Fernandez, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
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548 GARLAND
v. ALEMAN GONZALEZ
Opinion of the Court
The Government petitioned for certiorari and asked us to
decide
whether an alien detained under § 1231(a)(6) is enti-
tled to a bond hearing. We granted that petition and in-
structed the parties to address the threshold question
whether the District Courts had jurisdiction to entertain re-
spondents' requests for class-wide injunctive relief. 594
U. S. ––– (2021).
II
We hold that the District Courts exceeded their jurisdic-
tion in awarding such relief.
A
1
We begin with the text of § 1252(f )(1), which provides:
“Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or of
the identity of the party or parties bringing the action,
no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have ju-
risdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the opera-
tion of the provisions of part IV of this subchapter, as
amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act of 1996, other than with re-
spect to the application of such provisions to an individ-
ual alien against whom proceedings under such part
have been initiated.” (Emphasis added.)
With one exception that we will discuss momentarily, the
critical language in this provision strips lower courts of “ju-
risdiction or authority” to “enjoin or restrain the operation
of ” the relevant statutory provisions. The ordinary mean-
ing of these terms bars the class-wide relief awarded by the
two District Courts.
The term “to enjoin” ordinarily means to “require,” “com-
mand,” or “positively direct” an action or to “require a per-
son . . . to perform, or to abstain or desist from, some act.”
Black's Law Dictionary 529 (6th ed. 1990); see also Webster's
Third New International Dictionary 754 (1993) (defning “en-
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549
Opinion of the Court
join” to mean “to direct, prescribe, or impose by order”).
W
hen a court “enjoins” conduct, it issues an “injunction,”
which is a judicial order that “tells someone what to do or
not to do.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 428 (2009); see
also Black's Law Dictionary, at 784 (defning an “injunction”
as a “court order prohibiting someone from doing some speci-
fed act or commanding someone to undo some wrong or in-
jury”); 2 J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence
§ 861, p. 178 (13th ed. 1886) (similar).
The term “to restrain” means to “check, hold back, or pre-
vent (a person or thing) from some course of action.” 5 Ox-
ford English Dictionary 756 (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis deleted);
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, at 1936 (“to
hold (as a person) back from some action, procedure, or
course: prevent from doing something ”). We have sug-
gested in another context that “restrain” sometimes has a
“broad meaning ” that refers to judicial orders that “inhibit”
particular actions, and at other times it has a “narrower
meaning ” that includes “orders that stop (or perhaps com-
pel)” such acts. Direct Marketing Assn. v. Brohl, 575 U. S.
1, 12–13 (2015) (emphasis deleted).
The object of the verbs “enjoin or restrain” is the “opera-
tion of ” certain provisions of federal immigration law. See
§§ 1221–1232. The “operation of ” (a thing) means the func-
tioning of or working of (that thing). Random House Dic-
tionary of the English Language 1357 (2d ed. 1987) (“an act
or instance, process, or manner of functioning or operating ”);
Webster 's Th ird New Inter nationa l Dicti onary, at 1581
(“method or manner of functioning ”). The way in which
laws ordinarily “work” or “function” is through the actions
of offcials or other persons who implement them. This is
certainly true of the statutes to which § 1252(f )(1) refers—
i.e., the provisions of part IV of subchapter II of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act. Those provisions charge the
Federal Government with the implementation and enforce-
ment of the immigration laws governing the inspection, ap-
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550 GARLAND
v. ALEMAN GONZALEZ
Opinion of the Court
prehensi on, exami nati on, and remova l of a l iens. See
§§
1221–1232. Accordingly, the “operation of ” the relevant
statutes is best understood to refer to the Government's ef-
forts to enforce or implement them. As the Government
put it at oral argument, the “operation of the provisions” is
a reference “not just to the statute itself but to the way that
[it is] being carried out.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 11.
Putting these terms together, § 1252(f )(1) generally pro-
hibits lower courts from entering injunctions that order fed-
eral offcials to take or to refrain from taking actions to
enforce, implement, or otherwise carry out the specifed
statutory provisions.
2
Section 1252(f )(1) includes one exception to this general
prohibition: The lower courts retain the authority to “enjoin
or restrain the operation of ” the relevant statutory provi-
sions “with respect to the application of such provisions to
an individual alien against whom proceedings under such
part have been initiated.”
The Court has already commented on the meaning of this
exception. In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm., 525 U. S. 471, 481–482 (1999), we wrote that § 1252(f )
(1) “prohibits federal courts from granting classwide injunc-
tive relief ” but “does not extend to individual cases.” See
also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S. –––, ––– (2018); Nken,
556 U. S., at 431.
This interpretation follows from the statutory text. In
framing the exception to the general ban on injunctive relief,
Congress used the phrase “an individual alien.” It thus em-
ployed a singular noun (“an alien”), modifed by an adjective
(“individual”) that means “pertaining or belonging to, or
characteristic of, one single person.” Black's Law Diction-
ary, at 773. Therefore, § 1252(f )(1) does not preclude a court
from entering injunctive relief on behalf of a particular alien
(so long as “proceedings” against the alien have been “initi-
ated”), but injunctive relief on behalf of an entire class of
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as: 596 U. S. 543 (2022)
551
Opinion of the Court
aliens is not allowed because it is not limited to remedying
the
unlawful “application” of the relevant statutes to “an
individual alien.”
3
On this interpretation of § 1252(f )(1), the injunctions en-
tered by the District Courts in these cases were barred.
The respondents in both cases were detained pursuant to
§ 1231(a)(6), and no one disputes that § 1231(a)(6) is among
the provisions the “operation” of which cannot be “enjoined
or restrained” under § 1252(f )(1). Both District Courts en-
tered injunctions requiring the Government to provide bond
hearings not only for respondents but also for all other class
members.
1
Those orders “enjoin or restrain the operation”
of § 1231(a)(6) because they require offcials to take actions
that (in the Government's view) are not required by § 1231(a)
(6) and to refrain from actions that (again in the Govern-
ment's view) are allowed by § 1231(a)(6). Those injunctions
thus interfere with the Government's efforts to operate
§ 1231(a)(6), and the injunctions do not fall within the excep-
tion for individualized relief because the injunctions were
entered on behalf of entire classes of aliens.
2
1
See Gonzalez v. Sessions, 325 F. R. D. 616, 629 (ND Cal. 2018) (“The
Government is enjoined from detaining Plaintiffs and the class members
pursuant to section 1231(a)(6) for more than 180 days without providing
each a bond hearing before an [immigration judge]”); ECF Doc. 77–1, at 2
(“The Government is enjoined from enforcing their policy and practice of
failing to provide class members with individualized custody hearings be-
fore an [immigration judge] every six months” (boldface and capitaliza-
tion omitted)).
2
At oral argument, the Government suggested that § 1252(f )(1) not only
bars class-wide injunctive relief but also prohibits any other form of relief
that is “practically similar to an injunction,” including class-wide declara-
tory relief. Tr. of Oral Arg. 16. The Government analogized § 1252(f )(1)
to the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1341, which we have held extends
to declaratory judgments. See California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457
U. S. 393, 408–409 (1982). Because only injunctive relief was entered
here, we have no occasion to address this argument.
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552 GARLAND
v. ALEMAN GONZALEZ
Opinion of the Court
B
Respondents
advance two counter-arguments, but both
fail.
1
Respondents frst contend that “the operation” of the cov-
ered immigration provisions means the operation of those
provisions “as properly interpreted” and that what § 1252(f )
(1) bars are class-wide injunctions that prohibit the Govern-
ment from doing what the statute allows or commands.
Brief for Respondents 49 (emphasis added).
We do not think that this is the most natural interpreta-
tion of the term “operation,” since it is very common to refer
to the “unlawful” or “improper” operation of whatever it is
that is being operated. See, e. g., Brendlin v. California,
551 U. S. 249, 253 (2007) (“unlawful operation of the car”);
Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U. S. 1, 7 (2001) (“improper opera-
tion” of “drainage ditches”); Jeffers v. United States, 432
U. S. 137, 149, n. 14 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“unlawful oper-
ation of motor carriers”); Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Willard,
220 U. S. 413, 424 (1911) (“unlawful operation of a railway”);
United States v. Medford, 661 F. 3d 746, 747 (CA4 2011) (“un-
lawful operation of video poker machines”); In re Dillon, 138
Fed. Appx. 609, 611 (CA5 2005) (“unlawful operation of public
water utilities”); Cadillac/Oldsmobile/Nissan Center, Inc. v.
General Motors Corp., 391 F. 3d 304, 311 (CA1 2004) (“unlaw-
ful operation of [auto dealership]”); Ickes v. FAA, 299 F. 3d
260, 265–266 (CA3 2002) (per curiam) (“unlawful operation
of [airplane]”); Williams v. Panetta, 70 F. 3d 110, 1995 WL
686128, *1 (CA1 1995) (per curiam) (“unlawful operation of
a `megawatt' CB radio”); Cox Cable Tucson, Inc. v. Ladd, 795
F. 2d 1479, 1485 (CA9 1986) (“unlawful operation of its CATV
cable systems” (internal quotation marks omitted)). If cars,
trucks, railroads, water utilities, drainage ditches, auto deal-
erships, planes, radios, video poker machines, cable TV sys-
tems, and many other things can be unlawfully or improperly
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as: 596 U. S. 543 (2022)
553
Opinion of the Court
operated, it is not apparent why the same cannot be said of
a
statute. Thus, the ordinary meaning of the language of
§ 1252(f )(1) weighs against respondents' interpretation.
3
Apart from ordinary meaning, the statutory context pro-
vides three additional reasons to reject respondents' reading.
First, respondents' interpretation, which makes the reach of
§ 1252(f )(1) depend on the nature of the claim in question,
clashes with § 1252(f )(1)'s prefatory clause, which states that
the bar applies “[r]egardless of the nature of the action or
claim.” See also Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U. S. –––, ––– (2019)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Second, respondents' interpretation would limit § 1252(f )
(1)'s restriction to a most unlikely set of claims. With
perhaps a few small exceptions,
4
the only claims to which
3
The dissent agrees that “operation” means “functioning ” or “working,”
but it claims that “unlawful agency action is not a part of the functioning
or working of the authorizing statute.” Post, at 559 (opinion of Soto-
mayor, J.). The reason that statutes cannot be operated unlawfully, ac-
cording to the dissent, is this: “[A] statute is the law. Offcials may imple-
ment a statute unlawfully, but a statute does not operate in confict with
itself.” Post, at 566. But because to “implement” a statute is to “carry
out” that statute, Random House Dictionary of the English Language 715
(2d ed. 1987); Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1134 (1993),
the dissent's concession that a statute can be “implement[ed]” “unlawfully”
is quite damaging to its position. The dissent asserts, but never explains
why, the same cannot be said of a statute's “operation.”
4
Respondents argue in passing that their interpretation would also bar
injunctive relief for certain statutory claims. See Brief for Respondents
52; see also post, at 567–568. Respondents hypothesize a situation in
which a non-immigration statute, or some immigration statute not speci-
fed in § 1252(f )(1), might require injunctive relief against the enforcement
of one of the covered immigration provisions. Their brief cited no case
in which such a situation has ever arisen. At oral argument counsel for
respondents did reference one case, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 34–35 (referencing
Gonzales v. DHS, 508 F. 3d 1227 (CA9 2007)), but that case stands at
most for the unresponsive proposition that a court may enjoin the unlawful
operation of a provision that is not specifed in § 1252( f)(1) even if that
injunction has some collateral effect on the operation of a covered provi-
sion, see id., at 1233.

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554 GARLAND
v. ALEMAN GONZALEZ
Opinion of the Court
§ 1252(f )(1)'s proh ibition wou ld apply are constituti onal
clai
ms. But it would be most unusual for Congress to disfa-
vor constitutional claims in this way. Cf. Webster v. Doe,
486 U. S. 592, 603 (1988) (requiring “clear” indication of con-
gressional intent to “preclude judicial review of constitu-
tional claims”). And if Congress had wanted to target just
constitutional claims, it could have surely made the point
more directly. The suggestion that Congress sought to
achieve that goal by using the term “operation” is far-fetched.
Third, respondents' interpretation would make a court's
jurisdiction to entertain a request for class-wide injunctive
relief dependent upon the merits of the claim. Under re-
spondents' reading, if a complaint sought class-wide relief on
the ground that the Government was misinterpreting and
misapplying a covered statutory provision, the court would
proceed to adjudicate the merits of that claim and might even
hold a trial. But if the court ultimately rejected the claim
on the merits, that holding would mean that the court never
had jurisdiction to grant that request for relief.
5
For all these reasons, respondents' interpretation of “oper-
ation” must be rejected.
2
Respondents next argue that § 1252(f )(1) allows class-wide
relief so long as all the class members are “individuals who
already face the enforcement action.” Brief for Respond-
ents 55 (emphasis added). But § 1252(f )(1) refers to “an indi-
vidual,” not “individuals,” and as noted, we have stated on
5
The dissent says, post, at 567, that it is common for jurisdictional in-
quiries and the merits to overlap, and that is of course true. But the
dissent's interpretation would mean that § 1252(f )(1) precludes injunctive
relief for a plaintiff 's statutory claim if, but only if, that claim already
independently fails on the merits. The dissent cannot seriously dispute
that such complete overlap between a jurisdictional inquiry and the merits
of a claim is unusual, and an interpretation of § 1252(f )(1) that bars injunc-
tive relief only when such relief would already be improper fails to “give
effect” to “every clause” of § 1252(f )(1). Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167,
174 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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as: 596 U. S. 543 (2022)
555
Opinion of the Court
more than one occasion that it bars class-wide injunctive re-
l
ief. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525
U. S., at 481; Jennings, 583 U. S., at –––; Nken, 556 U. S.,
at 431.
Respondents dispute the correctness of these statements
and point out that a nearby provision, § 1252(e)(1)(B), ex-
pressly bars the certifcation of “a class under Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Because § 1252(f )(1)
lacks any express reference to class actions, respondents
infer that no preclusion of class-wide relief was intended.
We are reluctant to give much weight to this negative in-
ference. It is possible that § 1252(f )(1) simply uses different
language to bar class-wide injunctive relief and extends no
further. But if the provision is not read that way, then the
most plausible reading is not that it allows class-wide relief
but rather that it permits injunctive relief only “with respect
to the application of [a covered provision] to an individual
alien against whom proceedings under such part have been
initiated.” § 1252(f )(1) (emphasis added). A literal reading
of that language could rule out efforts to obtain any injunc-
tive relief that applies to multiple named plaintiffs (or per-
haps even rule out injunctive relief in a lawsuit brought by
multiple named plaintiffs).
The Government does not advocate that we adopt such an
interpretation, see Reply Brief 11, and we have no occasion
to do so in these cases. It is suffcient to hold that the class-
wide injunctive relief awarded in these cases was unlawful.
6
6
The dissent also notes that Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 698–
701 (1979), held that the Social Security Act provisions permitting “ `[a]ny
individual' ” to fle a “civil action” did not preclude class-wide relief. See
post, at 562–563, 568–569. That judicial-review provision, the Court rea-
soned, was not “exempt” from the “operation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure” that authorized class actions. Califano, 442 U. S., at 700.
Section 1252(f ) (1) is quite different: It does not authorize judicial review
but limits it, and the saving clause is an exception to the general bar on
injunctive relief that must be read “narrowly in order to preserve the
primary operation of the provision.” Maracich v. Spears, 570 U. S. 48, 60
(2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Califano is thus inapposite.
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556 GARLAND
v. ALEMAN GONZALEZ
Opinion of Sotomayor, J.
***
The
judgments of the Court of Appeals are reversed, and
the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Kagan joins,
and with whom Justice Breyer joins as to Parts II–A–
2, II–B–2, and III, concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part.
The Court holds that lower federal courts are powerless
to issue classwide injunctive relief against the Executive
Branch's violation of noncitizens' rights under several provi-
sions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). It
reaches this conclusion in a purportedly textualist opinion
that, in truth, elevates piecemeal dictionary defnitions and
policy concerns over plain meaning and context. I respect-
fully dissent from the Court's blinkered analysis, which will
leave many vulnerable noncitizens unable to protect their
rights.
1
I
Respondents in these two cases are named plaintiffs in two
class actions: Esteban Aleman Gonzalez and Jose Eduardo
Gutierrez Sanchez in the Aleman Gonzalez litigation, and
Edwin Omar Flores Tejada in the Flores Tejada litigation.
Respondents sought withholding of removal under the INA
based on their fear that, if returned to their countries of
origin, they would face persecution or torture. See ante, at
547; Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U. S. –––, ––– – –––
(2021) (explaining “withholding-only proceedings”). The
Government detained them pending their proceedings, a de-
1
I concur in the judgment because the Government prevails on the mer-
its. See Pet. for Cert. I; Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U. S. 573
(2022).

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Opinion of Sotomayor, J.
tention this Court has held authorized by 8 U. S. C. § 1231.
See
Guzman Chavez, 594 U. S., at –––.
In both cases, respondents raised statutory and constitu-
tional challenges to their prolonged detention without bond
hear ings. In both cases, respondents moved to cer tify
classes of similarly situated individuals. In Aleman Gonza-
lez, the District Court certifed a class of “ `all individuals
who are detained pursuant to 8 U. S. C. § 1231(a)(6) in the
Ninth Circuit . . . and who have reached or will reach six
months in detention, and have been or will be denied a
prolonged detention bond hearing before an Immigration
Judge.' ” Gonzalez v. Sessions, 325 F. R. D. 616, 621, 626
(ND Cal. 2018). In Flores Tejada, the District Court certi-
fed a class of “ `[a]ll individuals who (1) were placed in with-
holding only proceedings . . . in the Western District of
Washington . . . , and (2) have been detained for 180 days (a)
without a custody hearing or (b) since receiving a custody
hearing.' ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 149a. By these defni-
tions, the specifed classes include only individuals against
whom the Government has initiated removal proceedings.
Both District Courts held that § 1231(a)(6) did not author-
ize prolonged detention exceeding six months without bond
hearings.
2
Both District Courts issued classwide injunctive
relief (preliminary in Aleman Gonzalez and permanent in
Flores Tejada) requiring individualized bond hearings. The
Ninth Circuit affrmed in relevant part.
When the Government petitioned for certiorari, it chal-
lenged only the lower courts' interpretations of § 1231(a)(6)
as requiring bond hearings after six months of detention.
See Pet. for Cert. I. The Court granted certiorari on the
question presented by the Government in these cases and a
companion case from the Third Circuit. 594 U. S. ––– (2021);
see Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U. S. 573 (2022). The
Court additionally directed the parties in these cases “to
2
The District Courts did not reach respondents' constitutional claims.
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brief and argue the following question: Whether, under 8
U
. S. C. § 1252(f )(1), the courts below had jurisdiction to
grant classwide injunctive relief.” 594 U. S. –––. As to
that question, the Court now holds that § 1252(f )(1) barred
the lower courts from granting such relief.
II
Section 1252(f )(1) sets forth a precise limitation on the
lower federal courts' jurisdiction to enter injunctive relief in
cases involving specifed sections of the INA. The provi-
sion states:
“(f ) Limit on in junctive relief
“(1) In general
“Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or of
the identity of the party or parties bringing the action,
no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have ju-
risdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the opera-
tion of [§§ 1221–1232], as amended by the Illegal Immi-
gration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996, other than with respect to the application of such
provisions to an individual alien against whom proceed-
ings under such part have been initiated.”
Section 1252(f )(1) includes two operative clauses: a pri-
mary clause that strips courts of authority “to enjoin or re-
strain the operation of ” the specifed provisions of the INA,
and a saving clause that reserves that authority as applied
to a noncitizen “against whom proceedings . . . have been
initiated.” Properly read, both clauses independently pre-
serve the lower courts' authority to order classwide injunc-
tive relief compelling the Executive Branch to comply with
the INA in these cases. The Court holds otherwise only by
disregarding the language Congress used in § 1252(f )(1) it-
self, elsewhere in § 1252, and in the INA as a whole.
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559
Opinion of Sotomayor, J.
A
1
Sec
tion 1252(f )(1)'s primary clause provides that the lower
federal courts may not “enjoin or restrain the operation of ”
the specified provisions of the INA. An injunction that
compels the Executive Branch to comply with the specifed
provisions (or, phrased differently, prohibits the unlawful im-
plementation of the specifed provisions) does not “enjoin or
restrain” the “operation” of those provisions.
This is clear as a matter of plain meaning. Starting with
the word “operation,” all agree that the ordinary meaning of
“operation” is “functioning ” or “working.” Ante, at 549.
An injunction requiring the Executive Branch to conform its
conduct with a statute or to cease statutorily unauthorized
conduct does not enjoin or restrain the “functioning or work-
ing ” of the statute. That is because unlawful agency action
is not a part of the functioning or working of the authoriz-
ing statute.
The Government responds that “operation,” as used in
§ 1252(f )(1), is synonymous with “implementation,” which may
include either lawful or unlawful implementation. Reply
Brief 3. This contention, however, disregards Congress'
careful choice of language. Section 1252(f )(1) says nothing
about enjoining or restraining the Executive Branch's “imple-
mentation” of the law. By contrast, in other subsections of
§ 1252 enacted simultaneously with this one, Congress twice
expressly limited jurisdiction over challenges to “implementa-
tion” of a statute or order or specifed a particular forum for
judicial review of such challenges. See § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i) (re-
stricting jurisdiction to review claims “arising from or relating
to the implementation or operation of an order of removal”);
§ 1252(e)(3)(A) (channeling review of the “implementation” of
specifed provisions into the U. S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia); see also § 1252(a)(2)(A)(iv) (limiting juris-
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diction to review “procedures and policies adopted by the
A
ttorney General to implement” a certain provision). As
this Court previously explained when interpreting this very
statute: “ `[W]here Congress includes particular language in
one section of a statute but omits it in another section . . . it
is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.' ” Nken v.
Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 430 (2009). “This is particularly true
here, where [the relevant subsections of § 1252] were enacted
as part of a unifed overhaul of judicial review procedures.”
Id., at 430–431.
In addition to Congress' deliberate use of “operation,” its
use of “enjoin or restrain” in this context is most naturally
read to bar only lower court injunctions that stop the opera-
tion of a statute, not those that command the Executive
Branch to conform its conduct to the statute. It is true that,
depending on the context, the word “enjoin” may describe a
prohibition (“abstain or desist from . . . some act”) or an
affrmative command (“perform . . . some act”). Black's Law
Dictionary 529 (6th ed. 1990); see ante, at 548–549. In
§ 1252(f )(1), however, clear textual signals point to the con-
clusion that “enjoin” refers to a prohibition on the operation
of a statute. First, Congress consistently has used the term
“enjoin” in Title 8 to refer to prohibitions, including in the
immediately neighboring and simultaneously enacted subsec-
tion, § 1252(f )(2).
3
“A standard principle of statutory con-
struction provides that identical words and phrases within
the same statute should normally be given the same meaning,”
Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U. S. 224,
232 (2007), particularly where, as here, “the same term was
used in related provisions enacted at the same time,” Return
3
Section 1252(f )(2) provides: “[N]o court shall enjoin the removal of any
alien pursuant to a fnal order under this section unless the alien shows
by clear and convincing evidence that the entry or execution of such order
is prohibited as a matter of law.” This use of “enjoin” can only mean
“prohibit.”
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561
Opinion of Sotomayor, J.
Mail, Inc. v. Postal Service, 587 U. S. –––, ––– (2019). Even
beyond
§ 1252 itself, every use of “enjoin” in Title 8 refers to
prohibitory injunctions.
4
Moreover, in § 1252(f )(1) specif-
cally, “enjoin” is paired with the term “restrain,” which
means to “check, hold back, or prevent (a person or thing)
from some course of action.” 13 Oxford English Dictionary
756 (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis deleted). “[T]he company [the
word] keeps,” Direct Marketing Assn. v. Brohl, 575 U. S. 1,
13 (2015), thus cements a prohibitory reading of “enjoin.”
Under this reading, lower courts may not prohibit the opera-
tion of the specifed statutes, but nothing in § 1252(f )(1) pre-
vents them from commanding compliance with the statutes
or enjoining unauthorized agency action.
Finally, if any ambiguity remains as to the meaning of the
primary “enjoin or restrain the operation of ” clause, a long-
standing clear-statement principle counsels in favor of pre-
serving the lower courts' remaining equitable jurisdiction.
This Court “ `will not construe a statute to displace courts'
traditional equitable authority absent the clearest com-
mand.' ” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U. S. 383, 397 (2013)
(quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. 631, 646 (2010)); ac-
cord, e. g., Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U. S. 395, 398
(1946); Brown v. Swann, 10 Pet. 497, 503 (1836). There can
be no doubt that § 1252(f )(1) operates to displace equitable
authority to an extent. As explained, however, the most
natural and contextual reading of the provision's primary
clause does not limit federal courts' authority to enjoin or
4
See § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) (enacted simultaneously with § 1252 and refer-
ring to a noncitizen “who at any time after admission is enjoined under a
protection order issued by a court,” with “protection order” defned as
“any injunction issued for the purpose of preventing violent or threatening
acts of domestic violence”); § 1324a(f )(2) (authorizing the Attorney General
to sue over pattern or practice of unlawful employment, recruitment, or
referral of noncitizens under header titled “[e]njoining of pattern or prac-
tice violations”). After oral argument in these cases, Congress used the
term “enjoined” in an amendment to an additional provision of Title 8,
again in a prohibitory sense. See § 1153(b)(5)(I)(iv)(I).
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restrain agency action unauthorized by statute, or to compel
agency
action commanded by a statute. The clause con-
tains nothing approaching the clear command necessary,
under centuries of this Court's precedents, to displace that
authority.
2
Independently of § 1252(f )(1)'s primary clause, the provi-
sion's saving clause also operates to preserve the lower fed-
eral courts' equitable authority here. That clause provides
that lower courts may enjoin or restrain the operation of the
covered statutory provisions “with respect to the application
of such provisions to an individual alien against whom pro-
ceedings under such part have been initiated.” § 1252(f )(1).
Each benefciary of the injunctions in these cases is “an in-
dividua l a lien against whom [remova l] proceedi ngs . . .
have been initiated. ” Ibid. Under these circumstances,
§ 1252(f )(1) poses no barrier to classwide injunctive relief.
The Government contends that the phrase “an individual
alien” is inconsistent with injunctive relief on a classwide
basis. A class action, however, is a collection of individual
claims. See, e. g., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 701
(1979) (“Where the district court has jurisdiction over the
claim of each individual member of the class, Rule 23 pro-
vides a procedure by which the court may exercise that juris-
diction over the various individual claims in a single proceed-
ing ”); Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P. A. v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 559 U. S. 393, 408 (2010) (plurality opinion of Scalia,
J.) (“A class action, no less than traditional joinder (of which
it is a species), merely enables a federal court to adjudicate
claims of multiple parties at once, instead of in separate
suits”). Moreover, contextual and historical evidence dem-
onstrates that the enacting Congress would not have prohib-
ited classwide relief simply by using the word “individual.”
It was well understood when Congress enacted § 1252(f )(1)
in 1996 that mere use of the word “individual” would not
preclude classwide adjudication or relief. In Califano, a
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563
Opinion of Sotomayor, J.
unanimous Court interpreted § 205(g) of the Social Security
A
ct, codifed at 42 U. S. C. § 405(g), to permit class actions
and classwide relief, even though the statute provided only
that “ `[a]ny individual' ” could obtain judicial review. See
442 U. S., at 698–701. The Court rejected the Government's
argument that the word “individual” required “a case-by-
case adjudication of claims under § 205(g) that is incompatible
with class relief.” Id., at 698–699. “[C]lass relief is consist-
ent with the need for case-by-case adjudication,” the Court
noted, “at least so long as the membership of the class is
limited to those who meet the requirements of ” the provi-
sion. Id., at 701.
“We normally assume that, when Congress enacts stat-
utes, it is aware of relevant judicial precedent.” Merck &
Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U. S. 633, 648 (2010). When § 1252(f )(1)
was enacted in 1996, that precedent included both Califano
and the settled rule, discussed above, that a statute should
not be construed to displace a court's equitable authority ab-
sent a clear command. Yet Congress provided no such com-
mand against all classwide injunctive relief in § 1252(f )(1).
Indeed, in other subsections of § 1252, Congress provided
precisely such a clear command. Section 1252(e)(1)(B), en-
acted simultaneously with § 1252(f )(1), explicitly divests fed-
eral courts of authority to “certify a class under Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” in certain cases. The
enacting Congress thus knew how to preclude classwide re-
lief and did so in unmistakable terms when that was its in-
tent. In § 1252(f )(1), however, it made no mention of class
actions or Rule 23. Again, “ `it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion' ” of language, particularly where,
as here, it enacted the language as part of a unifed whole.
Nken, 556 U. S., at 430.
The Gover nment responds that th is readi ng of
§ 1252(f )(1)'s saving clause renders the word “individual” su-
perfuous. “ `[S]ometimes the better overall reading of the
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Opinion of Sotomayor, J.
statute contains some redundancy,' ” however, as Congress
may
“emplo[y] a belt and suspenders approach” to ensure its
aims are met. Atlantic Richfeld Co. v. Christian, 590 U. S.
–––, –––, n. 5 (2020). Relevant here, parties other than indi-
viduals in removal proceedings may bring immigration-
related lawsuits. For example, prior to 1996, several organi-
zations brought preenforcement challenges to immigration
statutes. See Brief for Respondents 55 (collecting exam-
ples). In recent years, States, too, increasingly have sued
on behalf of their own interests. See, e. g., Biden v. Texas,
No. 21–954, now pending before the Court; Department of
Homeland Security v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 591 U. S. –––
(2020); United States v. Texas, 579 U. S. 547 (2016) (per cu-
riam). In drafting § 1252(f )(1), Congress had every reason
“to be doubly sure,” Barton v. Barr, 590 U. S. –––, ––– (2020),
that only individuals in removal proceedings and not other
entities would receive injunctive relief restraining the opera-
tion of the specifed provisions of the INA. Additionally, the
Government's redundancy concern is particularly unpersua-
sive because Congress used the adjective “individual” redun-
dantly in other immigration-related provisions within Title 8.
See § 1446(a) (authorizing the Attorney General to waive in-
vestigation of applicant for naturalization “in an individual
case or in such cases or classes of cases as may be designated
by h im”); § 1601(4) (expressi ng concer n that “ individua l
aliens,” prior to 1996, were “burden[ing] the public benefts
system”).
3
In sum, the courts below retained their equitable authority
to issue classwide injunctive relief for two independent rea-
sons. First, the relief the District Courts issued did not
purport “to enjoin or restrain the operation of ” any statute;
rather, the District Courts sought to enforce a statute and
enjoin what they deemed to be unlawful agency action. Sec-
ond, and in any event, the injunctive relief issued below fell
within § 1252(f )(1)'s saving clause because it concerned only
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565
Opinion of Sotomayor, J.
the application of provisions of the INA to individual nonciti-
zens
in removal proceedings.
This interpretation is a reasonable one. Congress' ex-
press and particular use of words in § 1252(f )(1) protected
the specifed statutory provisions against restraint by lower
court injunctions, but evinced no quarrel with lower courts
ensuring that the Executive Branch complied with the com-
mands in those provisions. In addition, Congress ensured
that this goal did not come at the expense of violating the
rights of noncitizens in removal proceedings.
B
The Court reaches a contrary result only by prioritizing
unavailing and largely atextual concerns.
1
Starting with the primary “enjoin or restrain the opera-
tion of ” clause, the Court accepts the Government's argu-
ment that “the `operation of ' the relevant statutes is best
understood to refer to the Government's efforts to enforce
or implement them.” Ante, at 550. Aside from ignoring
Congress' choice to restrict judicial review of “implementa-
tion” in some subsections of § 1252 but not others, the Court
misapprehends how statutes operate. No doubt, “laws ordi-
narily `work' or `function' . . . through the actions of offcials
or other persons who implement them.” Ante, at 549.
That proposition, however, only holds if those individuals
properly implement the relevant statute. An unlawful im-
plementation of a statute is not the “work[ing]” or “function-
[ing]” of the statute at all; it is simply unauthorized. Re-
straining such action does not interfere with the operation
of the statute for purposes of § 1252(f )(1).
Resisting this result, the Court offers a string cite of sev-
eral inapt uses of “operation,” none of which concern the op-
eration of legal authority. See ante, at 552. The Court
wonders why, “[i]f cars, trucks, railroads, water utilities,
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drainage ditches, auto dealerships, planes, radios, video
poker
machines, cable TV systems, and many other things
can be unlawfully or improperly operated, . . . the same can-
not be said of a statute.” Ante, at 552–553. The answer is
obvious: Unlike all of those examples, a statute is the law.
Offcials may implement a statute unlawfully, but a statute
does not operate in confict with itself.
5
The Court also agrees with the Government that “enjoin,”
as used in § 1252(f )(1), necessarily takes on both affrmative
and negative connotations, but only by rigidly segmenting
each word in the clause, defning each in isolation, and adding
those definitions together. See ante, at 548– 549. Else-
where, however, this Court has cautioned against such a
piecemeal approach to statutory interpretation. Cf., e. g.,
FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U. S. 397, 406 (2011) (cautioning that
“two words together may assume a more particular meaning
than those words in isolation”). Moreover, the Court pays
no mind to Congress' other uses of “enjoin” in § 1252 and
elsewhere in Title 8 as meaning banning or stopping.
The Court offers one fnal purportedly textual basis for its
strained reading of the primary clause: that it is the only
option consistent with § 1252(f )(1)'s prefatory clause. See
ante, at 553; § 1252(f )(1) (“Regardless of the nature of the
action or claim . . . ”). The prefatory clause, however, does
not purport to expand the scope of § 1252(f )(1)'s restriction;
it simply makes clear that the restriction must apply to all
claims that would otherwise fall within it, without exception.
See Atlantic Richfeld Co., 590 U. S., at –––, n. 5 (reasoning
similarly as to phrase “ `without regard to the citizenship of
the parties or the amount in controversy' ”).
5
The Court's sole response is to suggest that if an offcial can “ `carry out' ”
a statute contrary to its terms, the statute should be able to “ `operat[e]' ”
contrary to itself, too. Ante, at 553, n. 3. This once again elides the dis-
tinction Congress drew in § 1252 between “implementation” and “opera-
tion,” a difference that must be given meaning. See supra, at 559–560.
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The Court closes with two policy arguments. It deems
it
“most unlikely” that Congress would enact a statute that
disproportionately limits lower courts' authority to issue in-
junctive relief to remedy constitutional claims, a result it con-
tends would fow from respondents' reading. Ante, at 553.
This is in large part a problem of the Court's own making.
As explained, a proper interpretation of § 1252(f )(1)'s saving
clause preserves lower courts' authority to issue injunctive
relief on constitutional claims, including on a classwide basis,
so long as all plaintiffs are individuals against whom removal
proceedings have been initiated. Moreover, even in pre-
enforcement challenges brought by entities or by individ-
uals not in removal proceedings, respondents' reading of
§ 1252(f )(1) does not prohibit injunctive relief exclusively as
to constitutional claims, but also as to claims that arise from
any statutes external to the covered INA provisions (for ex-
ample, a claim that a covered provision violates the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)). See ante, at 553, n. 4.
The correct reading of § 1252(f )(1) evenhandedly protects the
specifed INA provisions from all such external, preenforce-
ment, lower court injunctions, whether on statutory or con-
stitutional grounds, without shielding unlawful agency action
inconsistent with the specifed provisions. Whatever the
Court may think of the wisdom of that policy, it is a perfectly
plausible one.
The Cour t a lso worr ies that under th is readi ng of
§ 1252(f )(1), the inquiry as to whether injunctive relief
is available may overlap with the merits of a claim that a
covered provision has been violated. Ante, at 554. The
Court is wrong to fnd “anything unusual about that conse-
quence.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U. S. 338, 351
(2011). Even as to the question of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion (as opposed to the remedial authority at issue here),
“[t]he necessity of touching aspects of the merits . . . is a
familiar feature of litigation.” Id., at 351–352; accord, e. g.,
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Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 582 U. S. 420, 434–
435
(2017) (“[T]he distinction between jurisdictional and
merits issues is not inevitably sharp, for the two inquiries
may overlap”). Any overlap may be substantial: Under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, for instance, “all elements of a mer-
itorious claim are also jurisdictional.” Brownback v. King,
592 U. S. –––, ––– (2021).
6
This concern, too, offers no justi-
fcation for the Court's departure from ordinary meaning or
its disregard of clear contextual evidence contrary to its view.
2
The Court's arguments in support of its reading of the sav-
ing clause fare little better. The Court opens with language
from past cases suggesting support for its interpretation.
See ante, at 550. None of the cases the Court quotes, how-
ever, presented or decided the scope of § 1252(f )(1)'s bar on
injunctive relief.
The Court next affords dispositive weight to its class-exclu-
sive view of the word “individual” in § 1252(f )(1). See ante,
at 550–551. The Court distinguishes Califano in a footnote,
asserting that § 1252(f )(1)'s saving clause should be construed
narrowly because it is an exception to the primary clause.
See ante, at 555, n. 6. The point, however, is not that the stat-
ute interpreted in Califano was identical to § 1252(f )(1), but
that Califano established that a statute's mere use of the word
“individual” does not suffce to preclude classwide relief.
Moreover, the Court overlooks that it is § 1252(f )(1)'s prima-
ry clause (wh ich divests lower cour ts of their “ ` tradi-
6
The Court states that respondents' reading of § 1252(f )(1) will, in some
cases, cause a “complete overlap between a jurisdictional inquiry and the
merits of a claim.” Ante, at 554, n. 5. Once again, such an overlap is far
from unprecedented. Moreover, as the Court implicitly concedes, it will
not always be present. As explained, respondents' interpretation divests
the lower courts of authority to issue injunctive relief on external chal-
lenges to the specifed provisions (e. g., a challenge to a specifed provision
based on RFRA or the Due Process Clause), regardless of the merits of
those challenges, unless the saving clause applies.
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as: 596 U. S. 543 (2022)
569
Opinion of Sotomayor, J.
tional equitable authority' ”) that constitutes an exception
to
the norm. McQuiggin, 569 U. S., at 397. The Court
ignores the clear-statement rule for such displacements
of courts' equitable jurisdiction. Califano and the clear-
statement rule both instruct that Congress would not have
done so much so obliquely, particularly when it clearly
prohibited class relief in another subsection of the same
statute.
On the question of Congress' disparate inclusion and exclu-
sion of language in § 1252 referring to class actions, the
Court declines to decide what it thinks. Taking one path, it
suggests that one should not “give much weight to this nega-
tive inference.” Ante, at 555. But see Nken, 556 U. S., at
430–431 (giving weight to equivalent inference when inter-
preting same statute). Taking another, the Court admits
that adhering to its holding might well “rule out efforts to
obtain any injunctive relief that applies to multiple named
plaintiffs (or perhaps even rule out injunctive relief in a law-
suit brought by multiple named plaintiffs).” Ante, at 555.
That result, which would require separate remedial orders
or even separate lawsuits for family members asserting le-
gally and factually identical claims based on joint immigra-
tion applications or proceedings, is absurd. There is no con-
ceivable beneft in requiring identical claims to be raised in
separate, duplicative actions. This bizarre outcome offers
further proof that the Court has erred.
III
The ramifcations of the Court's errors should not be ig-
nored. Today's holding risks depriving many vulnerable
noncitizens of any meaningful opportunity to protect their
rights.
To understand why, consider the practical realities of the
removal and detention system. Noncitizens subjected to re-
moval proceedings are disproportionately unlikely to be fa-
miliar with the U. S. legal system or fuent in the English
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570 GARLAND
v. ALEMAN GONZALEZ
Opinion of Sotomayor, J.
language. Even so, these individuals must navigate the Na-
ti
on's labyrinthine immigration laws without entitlement to
appointed counsel or legal support. If they are detained,
like respondents here, they face particularly daunting hur-
dles. On average, immigration detention facilities are lo-
cated signifcantly farther away from detained individuals'
communities and court proceedings than criminal jails, mak-
ing it extraordinarily diffcult to secure legal representation.
Even for those individuals who can locate and afford counsel
under these circumstances, such remote confnement im-
pedes evidence gathering and communication with counsel.
After traveling (perhaps for hours) to meet with detained
clients, attorneys may be barred from doing so due to logisti-
cal or administrative errors; legal phone calls, too, frequently
are nonconfdential, prohibitively costly, or otherwise un-
available. Exacerbating these challenges, the Government
regularly transfers detained noncitizens between facilities,
often multiple times.
7
It is one matter to expect noncitizens facing these obsta-
cles to defend against their removal in immigration court.
It is another entirely to place upon each of them the added
burden of contesting systemic violations of their rights
through discrete, collateral, federal-court proceedings. In a
7
See, e. g., Brief for Former Immigration Judges et al. as Amici Curiae
8–14; Z. Manfredi & J. Meyers, Isolated and Unreachable: Contesting Un-
constitutional Restrictions on Communication in Immigration Detention,
95 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 130, 139–145 (2020); E. Ryo & I. Peacock, A National
Study of Immigration Detention in the United States, 92 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1, 29, 37–41 (2018); I. Eagly & S. Shafer, A National Study of Access to
Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 30–36 (2015); P. Mar-
kowitz et al., Accessing Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel
in Removal Proceedings, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 357, 367–373 (2011); M. Tay-
lor, Promoting Legal Representation for Detained Aliens: Litigation and
Administrative Reform, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 1647, 1670–1673 (1997); cf. De-
more v. Kim, 538 U. S. 510, 554 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (explaining that immigration offcials “can detain, trans-
fer, and isolate aliens away from their lawyers, witnesses, and evidence”).
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571
Opinion of Sotomayor, J.
great many cases, the inevitable consequence of barring
classw
ide injunctive relief will be that those violations will
go unremedied, except as to the few fortunate enough to af-
ford competent collateral counsel or to secure vigorous
pro bono representation. The burdens will fall on those
least able to vindicate their rights, as well as the law frms
and nonproft organizations that will endeavor to assist as
many of these noncitizens as their capacity permits.
8
If, somehow, a substantial number of noncitizens are able
to overcome these obstacles and fle separate federal lawsuits
against unlawful removal or detention policies, a different
problem will arise. Class litigation not only enables individ-
ual class members to enforce their rights against powerful
actors, but also advances judicial economy by eliminating the
need for duplicative proceedings pertaining to each class
member. In contrast, the Court's overbroad reading of
§ 1252(f )(1) forces noncitizens facing unlawful detention, if
they are able, “to food district court dockets with individual
habeas actions raising materially indistinguishable claims
and requesting materially indistinguishable injunctive re-
lief.” Brief for Retired Federal Judges as Amici Curiae 15.
There is no reason to think Congress intended either of these
untenable results.
In fairness, the Court's decision is not without limits. For
instance, the Court does not purport to hold that § 1252(f )(1)
affects courts' ability to “hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, fndings, and conclusions” under the Administrative
Procedure Act. 5 U. S. C. § 706(2). No such claim is raised
here. In addition, the Court rightly does not embrace the
Government's eleventh-hour suggestion at oral argument to
8
It is no answer to say that other individuals similarly situated may
generate controlling precedent by pursuing their own claims. In the
months or years it may take to secure a published appellate ruling resolv-
ing a pertinent legal issue, a great many noncitizens without meaningful
access to justice will suffer irreparable injury.
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572 GARLAND
v. ALEMAN GONZALEZ
Opinion of Sotomayor, J.
hold that § 1252(f )(1) bars even classwide declaratory relief,
9
a
suggestion that would (if accepted) leave many noncitizens
with no practical remedy whatsoever against clear violations
by the Executive Branch.
Even with these limits, however, the repercussions of to-
day's decision will be grave. In view of the text and context
of § 1252(f )(1), these repercussions offer yet more evidence
that the Court's interpretive effort has gone badly astray.
***
The essence of statutory interpretation is to review the
plain meaning of a provision in its context. The Court's
analysis, by violating several interpretive principles, ulti-
mately fails in that endeavor. I respectfully dissent.
9
Although I reach no defnitive conclusion on this unpresented issue, it
is diffcult to square the Government's claim with the statute Congress
enacted. Section 1252(f )(1) limits lower courts' authority to “enjoin or
restrain,” whereas a declaratory judgment (unlike an injunction) “ `is not
ultimately coercive.' ” Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 471 (1974). In
addition, § 1252(f )(1) is titled “[ l]imit on injunctive relief,” in contrast to
nearby § 1252(e)(1)'s broader “[ l]imitations on relief.” True to its title,
§ 1252(e)(1) expressly prohibits courts from “enter[ing] declaratory, injunc-
tive, or other equitable relief ” under certain circumstances, whereas
§ 1252(f )(1) makes no mention of declaratory relief.
Moreover, if (as the Court holds today) § 1252(f )(1) bars classwide relief,
and (as the Government suggests) the provision affects both injunctive
and declaratory relief, it is hard to see how any class action could proceed,
as no relief would be available in the lower courts. That, in turn, would
prevent any such case from reaching this Court, rendering Congress' res-
ervation of this Court's authority a nullity. See § 1252(f )(1) (stripping au-
thority from all courts “other than the Supreme Court”).
For these reasons and others, several Courts of Appeals have held that
§ 1252(f )(1) poses no bar to the issuance of declaratory relief. See Brito
v. Garland, 22 F. 4th 240, 250–252 (CA1 2021); Make The Road New York
v. Wol f, 962 F. 3d 612, 635 (CADC 2020); Alli v. Decker, 650 F. 3d 1007,
1010–1013 (CA3 2011); Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F. 3d 1105, 1119–1120 (CA9
2010). But see Hamama v. Adducci, 912 F. 3d 869, 880, n. 8 (CA6 2018)
(suggesting, but not holding, otherwise).

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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
p. 570, n. 7, line 8 from bottom: “Markovitz” is replaced with “Markowitz”