Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 596 U. S. Part 1
Pages 450–463
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 6, 2022
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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450 OCTOBER
TERM, 2021
Syllabus
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO. v. SAXON
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the seventh circuit
No. 21–309. Argued March 28, 2022—Decided June 6, 2022
Respondent Latrice Saxon, a ramp supervisor for Southwest Airlines,
trains and supervises teams of ramp agents who physically load and
unload cargo on and off airplanes that travel across the country. Like
many ramp supervisors, Saxon also frequently loads and unloads cargo
alongside the ramp agents. Saxon came to believe that Southwest was
failing to pay proper overtime wages to ramp supervisors, and she
brought a putative class action against Southwest under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938. Because Saxon's employment contract required
her to arbitrate wage disputes individually, Southwest sought to enforce
its arbitration agreement and moved to dismiss. In response, Saxon
claimed that ramp supervisors were a “class of workers engaged in for-
eign or interstate commerce” and therefore exempt from the Federal
Arbitration Act's coverage. 9 U. S. C. § 1. The District Court dis-
agreed, holding that only those involved in “actual transportation,” and
not those who merely handle goods, fell within § 1's exemption. The
Court of Appeals reversed. It held that “[t]he act of loading cargo onto
a vehicle to be transported interstate is itself commerce, as that term
was understood at the time of the [FAA's] enactment in 1925.” 993
F. 3d 492, 494.
Held: Saxon belongs to a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce” to which § 1's exemption applies. Pp. 455–463.
(a) This Court interprets § 1's language according to its “ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning.” Sandifer v. United States Steel
Corp., 571 U. S. 220, 227. To discern that ordinary meaning, those
words “ `must be read' ” and interpreted “ `in their context.' ” Parker
Drilling Management Services, Ltd. v. Newton, 587 U. S. –––, –––.
Pp. 455–459.
(1) The parties dispute how to defne the relevant “class of work-
ers.” Saxon argues that because the air transportation industry en-
gages in interstate commerce, airline employees, as a whole, constitute
a “class of workers” covered by § 1. By contrast, Southwest maintains
that the relevant class includes only those airline employees actually
engaged day-to-day in interstate commerce. This Court rejects Sax-
on's industrywide approach. By referring to “workers” rather than
“employees,” the FAA directs attention to “the performance of work.”

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as: 596 U. S. 450 (2022)
451
Syllabus
New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U. S. –––, –––. And the word “en-
gaged”
similarly emphasizes the actual work that class members typi-
cally carry out. Saxon is therefore a member of a “class of workers”
based on what she frequently does at Southwest—that is, physically
loading and unloading cargo on and off airplanes—and not on what
Southwest does generally. Pp. 455–456.
(2) The parties also dispute whether the class of airplane cargo
loaders is “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” It is. To be
“engaged” in “commerce” means to be directly involved in transporting
goods across state or international borders. Thus, any class of workers
so engaged falls within § 1's exemption. Airplane cargo loaders are
such a class.
Context confrms this reading. In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U. S. 105, the Court applied two well-settled canons of stat-
utory interpretation to hold that § 1 exempted only “transportation
workers,” rather than all employees. The Court indicated that any
such exempted worker must at least play a direct and “necessary role
in the free fow of goods” across borders. Id., at 121. Cargo loaders
exhibit this central feature of a transportation worker.
A fnal piece of statutory context further confrms that cargo loading
is part of cross-border “commerce.” Section 1 of the FAA defnes ex-
empted “maritime transactions” to include “agreements relating to
wharfage . . . or any other matters in foreign commerce.” Thus, if an
“agreemen[t] relating to wharfage”—i. e., money paid to access a cargo-
loading facility—is a “matte[r] in foreign commerce,” it stands to reason
that an individual who actually loads cargo on vehicles traveling across
borders is himself engaged in such commerce. Pp. 456–459.
(b) Both parties proffer arguments disagreeing with this analysis, but
none is convincing. Pp. 459–463.
(1) Saxon thinks the relevant “class of workers” should include all
airline employees, not just cargo loaders. For support, she argues that
“railroad employees” and “seamen”—two classes of workers listed im-
mediately before § 1's catchall provision—refer generally to employees
in those industries. Saxon's premise is fawed. “Seamen” is not an
industrywide category but instead a subset of workers engaged in the
maritime shipping industry. For example, “seamen” did not include all
those employed by companies engaged in maritime shipping when the
FAA was enacted. Pp. 460–461.
(2) Southwest's three counterarguments all fail. First, Southwest
narrowly construes § 1's catchall category—“any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce”—to include only workers
who physically transport goods or people across foreign or international
boundaries. Southwest relies on the defnition of “seamen” as only
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452 SOUTHWEST
AIRLINES CO. v. SAXON
Syllabus
those “employed on board a vessel,” McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander,
498
U. S. 337, 346, and argues that the catchall category should be read
along the same lines to exclude airline workers, like Saxon, who do not
ride aboard an airplane in interstate or foreign transit. But South-
west's acknowledgment that the statute's reference to “railroad employ-
ees” is somewhat ambiguous in effect concedes that the three statutory
categories in § 1—“seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce”—do not share the
attribute that Southwest would like read into the catchall provision.
Well-settled canons of statutory interpretation neither demand nor per-
mit limiting a broadly worded catchall phrase based on an attribute
that inheres in only one of the list's preceding specifc terms. Second,
Southwest argues that cargo loading is similar to other activities that
this Court has found to lack a necessary nexus to interstate commerce
in other contexts. But the cases Southwest invokes all addressed activ-
ities far more removed from interstate commerce than physically load-
ing cargo directly on and off an airplane headed out of State. See, e. g.,
Gul f Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186. Finally, Southwest
argues that the FAA's “proarbitration purposes” counsel in favor of an
interpretation that errs on the side of fewer § 1 exemptions. Here,
however, plain text suffces to show that airplane cargo loaders, and
thus ramp supervisors who frequently load and unload cargo, are ex-
empt from the FAA's scope under § 1. Pp. 461–463.
993 F. 3d 492, affrmed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Mem-
bers joined, except Barrett, J., who took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case.
Shay Dvoretzky argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Parker Rider-Longmaid, Kyser
Blakely, Melissa A. Siebert, and Scott A. Chesin.
Jennifer D. Bennett argued the cause for respondent.
With her on the brief were Deepak Gupta, Jonathan E. Tay-
lor, Ryan F. Stephan, James B. Zouras, and Andrew C.
Ficzko.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for Airlines for
America by Ishan K. Bhabha, Marc L. Warren, and Patricia N. Vercelli;
for Amazon.com, Inc., by David B. Salmons, Michael E. Kenneally, and
Richard G. Rosenblatt; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States
of America et al. by Andrew J. Pincus, Archis A. Parasharami, Daniel

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as: 596 U. S. 450 (2022)
453
Opinion of the Court
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
Latr
ice Saxon works for Southwest Airlines as a ramp su-
pervisor. Her work frequently requires her to load and
unload baggage, airmail, and commercial cargo on and off
airplanes that travel across the country. The question pre-
sented is whether, under § 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act,
she belongs to a “class of workers engaged in foreign or in-
terstate commerce” that is exempted from the Act's cover-
age. We hold that she does.
I
Southwest Airlines moves a lot of cargo. In 2019, South-
west carried the baggage of over 162 million passengers to
E. Jones, Daryl Joseffer, and Paul Lettow; for Lyft, Inc., by Donald B.
Verrilli, Jr., Elaine J. Goldenberg, Rachel G. Miller-Ziegler, and Rohit K.
Singla; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Cory L. Andrews
and John M. Masslon II.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of
Illinois et al. by Kwame Raoul, Attorney General of Illinois, Jane Elinor
Notz, Solicitor General, Sarah A. Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General, and
R. Henry Weaver, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys Gen-
eral and other offcials for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Rob
Bonta of California, Philip J. Weiser of Colorado, William Tong of Con-
necticut, Kathleen Jennings of Delaware, Karl A. Racine of the District
of Columbia, Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Brian E. Frosh of Maryland, Maura
Healey of Massachusetts, Dana Nessel of Michigan, Keith Ellison of Min-
nesota, Matthew J. Platkin, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, Leti-
tia James of New York, Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Josh Shapiro of
Pennsylvania, Peter F. Neronha of Rhode Island, Thomas J. Donovan, Jr.,
of Vermont, and Robert W. Ferguson of Washington; for the American
Association for Justice by Gerson H. Smoger and Jeffrey R. White; for the
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
by Harold C. Becker and James B. Coppess; for the National Employment
Lawyers Association by Michael L. Foreman; and for Public Justice by
John J. Korzen and Ellen Noble.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for Historians by Sachin S. Pandya
and Richard Frankel; for the National Academy of Arbitrators et al. by
Barry Winograd and Matthew W. Finkin; and for Uber Technolo-
g ies, Inc., by Theane Ev angel is, Blaine H. Ev anso n, and Joshu a M.
Wesneski.

454 SOUTHWEST
AIRLINES CO. v. SAXON
Opinion of the Court
domestic and international destinations. Dept. of Transp.,
Bureau
of Transp. Statistics (BTS), Passengers Southwest
Airlines—All Airports (May 2, 2022) (online source archived
at www.supremecourt.gov). In total, Southwest trans-
ported more than 256 million pounds of passenger, commer-
cial, and mail cargo. BTS, Air Carriers: T–100 Domestic
Market (U. S. Carriers) (May 2, 2022) (online source archived
at www.supremecourt.gov).
To move that cargo, Southwest employs “ramp agents,”
who physically load and unload baggage, airmail, and freight.
It also employs “ramp supervisors,” who train and supervise
teams of ramp agents. Frequently, ramp supervisors step
in to load and unload cargo alongside ramp agents. See 993
F. 3d 492, 494 (CA7 2021).
Saxon is a ramp supervisor for Southwest at Chicago Mid-
way International Airport. As part of her employment con-
tract, she agreed to arbitrate wage disputes individually.
Nevertheless, when Saxon came to believe that Southwest
was failing to pay proper overtime wages to her and other
ramp supervisors, she brought a putative class action against
Southwest under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52
Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C. § 201 et seq.
Southwest sought to enforce its arbitration agreement
with Saxon under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9
U. S. C. § 1 et seq., and moved to dismiss the lawsuit. In re-
sponse, Saxon invoked § 1 of the FAA, which exempts from
the statute's ambit “contracts of employment of seamen, rail-
road employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce.” Saxon argued that ramp
supervisors, like seamen and railroad employees, were an ex-
empt “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce.” Ibid.
The District Court disagreed, holding that only those
involved in “actual transportation,” and not the “mer[e]
handling [of] goods,” fell within the exemption. 2019 WL
4958247, *7 (ND Ill., Oct. 8, 2019). The Court of Appeals
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455
Opinion of the Court
reversed. It held that “[t]he act of loading cargo onto a ve-
h
icle to be transported interstate is itself commerce, as that
term was understood at the time of the [FAA's] enactment
in 1925.” 993 F. 3d, at 494. Citing Saxon's “uncontroverted
declaration” that ramp supervisors at Midway “frequently”
load and unload cargo, the Court of Appeals reserved the
question “whether supervision of cargo loading alone” would
also fall within the FAA's § 1 exemption. Id., at 494, 497.
The Seventh Circuit's decision conficted with an earlier
decision of the Fifth Circuit. See Eastus v. ISS Facility
Services, Inc., 960 F. 3d 207 (2020). We granted certiorari
to resolve the disagreement. 595 U. S. ––– (2021).
II
In this case, we must decide whether Saxon falls within
a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce.” 9 U. S. C. § 1. We interpret this language accord-
ing to its “ `ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.' ”
Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp., 571 U. S. 220, 227
(2014) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U. S. 37, 42
(1979)); see also New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U. S.
–––, ––– – ––– (2019). To discern that ordinary meaning,
those words “ `must be read' ” and interpreted “ `in their con-
text,' ” not in isolation. Parker Drilling Management Ser-
vices, Ltd. v. Newton, 587 U. S. –––, ––– (2019) (quoting Rob-
erts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., 566 U. S. 93, 101 (2012)).
We begin by defning the relevant “class of workers” to
which Saxon belongs. Then, we determine whether that
class of workers is “engaged i n foreig n or i nterst ate
commerce.”
A
First, the parties dispute how to defne the relevant “class
of workers.” Saxon argues that because air transportation
“[a]s an industry” is engaged in interstate commerce, “airline
employees” constitute a “ `class of workers' ” covered by § 1.
Brief for Respondent 17. Southwest, by contrast, maintains
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456 SOUTHWEST
AIRLINES CO. v. SAXON
Opinion of the Court
that § 1 “exempts classes of workers based on their conduct,
not
their employer's,” and the relevant class therefore in-
cludes only those airline employees who are actually engaged
in interstate commerce in their day-to-day work. Reply
Brief 4. The Court of Appeals rejected Saxon's industry-
wide approach, see 993 F. 3d, at 497, and so do we.
As we have observed before, the FAA speaks of “ `work-
ers,' ” not “ `employees' or `servants.' ” New Prime, 586
U. S., at ––– – –––. The word “workers” directs the inter-
preter's attention to “the performance of work.” Id., at –––
(emphasis altered); see also Webster's New International
D ic ti onary 2350 (1922) (Webster 's) (worker: “One that
works”); Funk & Wagnall's New Standard Dictionary 2731
(1913) (worker: “One who or that which performs work”).
Further, the word “engaged”—meaning “[o]ccupied,” “em-
ployed,” or “[i]nvolved,” Webster's 725; see also, e. g., Black's
Law Dictionary 661 (3d ed. 1933) (defning “engage”)—simi-
larly emphasizes the actual work that the members of the
class, as a whole, typically carry out. Saxon is therefore a
member of a “class of workers” based on what she does at
Southwest, not what Southwest does generally.
On that point, Southwest has not meaningfully contested
that ramp supervisors like Saxon frequently load and unload
cargo. See 993 F. 3d, at 494, 497 (noting Saxon's “uncontro-
verted declaration assert[ing] that she and the other ramp
supervisors . . . frequently fll in as ramp agents” for up to
three shifts per week). Thus, as relevant here, we accept
that Saxon belongs to a class of workers who physically load
and unload cargo on and off airplanes on a frequent basis.
1
B
Second, the parties dispute whether that class of airplane
cargo loaders is “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce”
under § 1. We hold that it is.
1
Like the Seventh Circuit, we “need not consider . . . whether supervi-
sion of cargo loading alone would suffce” to exempt a class of workers
under § 1. 993 F. 3d 492, 497 (2021).
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As always, we begin with the text. Again, to be “en-
gaged”
in something means to be “occupied,” “employed,” or
“involved” in it. “Commerce,” meanwhile, includes, among
other things, “the transportation of . . . goods, both by land
and by sea.” Black's Law Dictionary 220 (2d ed. 1910)
(Black's); see also, e. g., Webster's 448 (commerce: “the ex-
change of merchandise on a large scale between different
places or communities”). Thus, any class of workers directly
involved in transporting goods across state or international
borders falls within § 1's exemption.
Airplane cargo loaders are such a class. We have said
that it is “too plain to require discussion that the loading or
unloading of an interstate shipment by the employees of a
carrier is so closely related to interstate transportation as to
be practically a part of it.” Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern
R. Co. v. Burtch, 263 U. S. 540, 544 (1924). We think it
equally plain that airline employees who physically load and
unload cargo on and off planes traveling in interstate com-
merce are, as a practical matter, part of the interstate trans-
portation of goods. They form “a class of workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce.”
2
Context confrms this reading. In Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, 532 U. S. 105 (2001), we considered whether
§ 1 exempts all employment contracts or only those contracts
involving “transportation workers.” Id., at 109. In con-
cluding that § 1 exempts only transportation-worker con-
tracts, we relied on two well-settled canons of statutory in-
terpretation. First, we applied the meaningful-variation
canon. See, e. g., A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law 170
2
We recognize that the answer will not always be so plain when the
class of workers carries out duties further removed from the channels of
interstate commerce or the actual crossing of borders. Compare, e. g.,
Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F. 3d 904, 915 (CA9 2020) (holding
that a class of “last leg ” delivery drivers falls within § 1's exemption),
with, e. g., Wallace v. Grubhub Holdings, Inc., 970 F. 3d 798, 803 (CA7
2020) (holding that food delivery drivers do not). In any event, we need
not address those questions to resolve this case.
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(2012) (“[W]here [a] document has used one term in one
place
, and a materially different term in another, the pre-
sumption is that the different term denotes a different idea”).
We observed that Congress used “more open-ended formula-
tions” like “ `affecting ' ” or “ `involving ' ” commerce to signal
“congressional intent to regulate to the outer limits of au-
thority under the Commerce Clause.” Circuit City, 532
U. S., at 115–116, 118. By contrast, Congress used a “nar-
rower” phrase—“ `engaged in commerce' ”—when it wanted
to regulate short of those limits. Id., at 118. Second, we
applied the ejusdem generis canon, which instructs courts to
interpret a “general or collective term” at the end of a list
of specifc items in light of any “common attribute[s]” shared
by the specifc items. Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552
U. S. 214, 225 (2008). As applied to § 1, that canon counseled
that the phrase “ `class of workers engaged in . . . commerce' ”
should be “controlled and defned by reference” to the spe-
cifc classes of “ `seamen' ” and “ `railroad employees' ” that
precede it. Circuit City, 532 U. S., at 115.
Taken together, these canons showed that § 1 exempted
only contracts with transportation workers, rather than all
employees, from the FAA. See id., at 119. And, while we
did not provide a complete defnition of “transportation
worker,” we indicated that any such worker must at least
play a direct and “necessary role in the free fow of goods”
across borders. Id., at 121. Put another way, transporta-
tion workers must be actively “engaged in transportation”
of those goods across borders via the channels of foreign or
interstate commerce. Ibid.
Cargo loaders exhibit this central feature of a transporta-
tion worker. As stated above, one who loads cargo on a
plane bound for interstate transit is intimately involved with
the commerce (e. g., transportation) of that cargo. “[T]here
could be no doubt that [interstate] transportation [is] still in
progress,” and that a worker is engaged in that transporta-
tion, when she is “doing the work of unloading ” or loading
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Opinion of the Court
cargo from a vehicle carrying goods in interstate transit.
Er
ie R. Co. v. Shuart, 250 U. S. 465, 468 (1919).
A fnal piece of statutory context further confrms that
cargo loading is part of cross-border “commerce.” The frst
sentence of § 1 of the FAA defnes exempted “maritime
transactions” to include, among other things, “agreements
relating to wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs to
vessels, collisions, or any other matters in foreign com-
merce.” (Emphasis added.) The use of “other” in the
catchall provision indicates that Congress considered the
preceding items to be “matters in foreign commerce.” And
agreements related to the enumerated “matte[r] in foreign
commerce” of “wharfage,” to take one example, included
agreements for mere access to a wharf—which is simply a
cargo-loading facility. See Black's 1226 (wharfage: “[m]oney
paid for landing wares at a wharf, or for shipping or taking
goods into a boat or barge from thence”); Webster's 2323
(similar); see also, e. g., Black's 1226 (wharf: “A perpendicular
bank or mound . . . extending some distance into the water,
for the convenience of lading and unlading ships and other
vessels”). It stands to reason, then, that if payments to ac-
cess a cargo-loading facility relate to a “matte[r] in foreign
commerce,” then an individual who actually loads cargo on
foreign-bound ships docked along a wharf is himself engaged
in such commerce. Likewise, any class of workers that loads
or unloads cargo on or off airplanes bound for a different
St ate or country is “engaged i n foreig n or i nterst ate
commerce.”
In sum, text and context point to the same place: Workers,
like Saxon, who load cargo on and off airplanes belong to a
“class of workers in foreign or interstate commerce.”
III
Both Saxon and Southwest proffer arguments that dis-
agree with portions of our analysis. Neither of them con-
vinces us to change course.
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460 SOUTHWEST
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A
F
or her part, Saxon thinks that we should defne the “class
of workers” as all airline employees who carry out the “cus-
tomary work” of the airline, rather than cargo loaders more
specifcally. Tr. of Oral Arg. 56. That larger class of em-
ployees potentially includes everyone from cargo loaders to
shift schedulers to those who design Southwest's website.
See id., at 51–52; but cf. ibid. (conceding that those who run
the Southwest credit-card points program likely would not
count).
To support this reading, Saxon invokes the ejusdem gene-
ris canon. She argues, frst, that “railroad employees” and
“seamen” refer generally to employees in those industries
providing “dominant mode[s] of transportation” in interstate
and foreign commerce. Brief for Respondent 17. She then
reasons, second, that all “workers who do the work of the
airlines have the same relationship to commerce as those
who do the work of the railroad or ship.” Ibid.
Saxon's attempted invocation of ejusdem generis is un-
availing because it proceeds from the fawed premise that
“seamen” and “railroad employees” are both industrywide
categories. The statute's use of “seamen” shows why that
premise is mistaken. In 1925, seamen did not include all
those employed by companies engaged in maritime shipping.
Rather, seamen were only those “whose occupation [was] to
assist in the management of ships at sea; a mariner; a sailor;
. . . any person (except masters, pilots, and apprentices duly
indentured and registered) employed or engaged in any ca-
pacity on board any ship.” Webster's 1906; see also, e. g.,
Black's 1063 (seamen: “[s]ailors; mariners; persons whose
business is navigating ships”).
Because “seamen” includes only those who work on board
a vessel, they constitute a subset of workers engaged in the
maritime shipping industry. Regardless of whether “rail-
road employees” include all rail-transportation workers, the
narrow defnition of “seamen” shows that the two terms can-
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461
Opinion of the Court
not share a “common attribute” of identifying transportation
workers
on an industrywide basis. Ali, 552 U. S., at 224.
We therefore reject Saxon's argument that § 1 exempts vir-
tually all employees of major transportation providers.
B
While Saxon defnes the relevant class of workers too
broadly, Southwest construes § 1's catchall category—“any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce”—too narrowly. The airline argues that only work-
ers who physically move goods or people across foreign or
international boundaries—pilots, ship crews, locomotive en-
gineers, and the like—are “engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.” So construed, § 1 does not exempt cargo load-
ers because they do not physically accompany freight across
state or international boundaries.
Southwest's reading rests on three arguments. None per-
suades us. First, taking its turn with ejusdem generis, the
airline argues that because “seamen” are “employed on
board a vessel,” McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U. S.
337, 346 (1991) (emphasis added), and “ `railroad employees'
is somewhat ambiguous,” Brief for Petitioner 26, we should
limit the exempted class of railroad employees to those who
are physically on board a locomotive as it crosses state lines.
Then, having limited railroad employees in that way, South-
west likewise urges us to narrow § 1's catchall provision to
exclude those airline-transportation workers, like Saxon and
other cargo loaders, who do not ride aboard an airplane in
interstate or foreign transit.
Southwest's application of ejusdem generis is as fawed as
Saxon's. It purports to import a limitation from the defni-
tion of “seamen” into the defnition of “railroad employees”
and then engrafts that limit onto the catchall provision. But
by conceding that “railroad employees” is ambiguous, South-
west sinks its own ejusdem generis argument. Again, the
“inference embodied in ejusdem generis [is] that Congress
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462 SOUTHWEST
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Opinion of the Court
remained focused on [some] common attribute” shared by the
precedi
ng list of specifc items “when it used the catchall
phrase.” Ali, 552 U. S., at 225. By recognizing that the
term “railroad employees” is at most ambiguous, Southwest
in effect concedes that it does not necessarily share the at-
tribute that Southwest would like us to read into the catchall
provision. Ejusdem generis neither demands nor permits
that we limit a broadly worded catchall phrase based on an
attribute that inheres in only one of the list's preceding spe-
cifc terms.
Second, Southwest argues that cargo loading is similar to
other activities that this Court has found to lack a necessary
nexus to interstate commerce in other contexts. But the
cases Southwest invokes all addressed activities far more re-
moved from interstate commerce than physically loading
cargo directly on and off an airplane headed out of State. In
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186 (1974), for
instance, this Court held that a frm making intrastate sales
of asphalt was not “engaged in [interstate] commerce,” id.,
at 194 (internal quotation marks omitted), merely because
the asphalt was later used to make interstate highways,
id. at 198. Being only “perceptibly connected to . . . instru-
mentalities” of interstate commerce was not enough. Ibid.
Similarly, in United States v. American Building Mainte-
nance Industries, 422 U. S. 271 (1975), this Court held that
“simply supplying localized [ janitorial] services to a corpora-
tion engaged in interstate commerce does not satisfy the `in
commerce' requirement” in § 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat.
731, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 18. 422 U. S., at 283. In each
case, the Court explained that the relevant frm was not “en-
gaged in” interstate commerce because it did not perform
“activities within the fow of interstate commerce.” Id. at
276 (internal quotation marks omitted); Gulf Oil, 419 U. S.,
at 195.
But unlike those who sell asphalt for intrastate construc-
tion or those who clean up after corporate employees, our
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as: 596 U. S. 450 (2022)
463
Opinion of the Court
case law makes clear that airplane cargo loaders plainly do
per
form “activities within the fow of interstate commerce”
when they handle goods traveling in interstate and foreign
commerce, either to load them for air travel or to unload
them when they arrive. See Burtch, 263 U. S., at 544.
Third, Southwest falls back on statutory purpose. It ob-
serves that § 2 of the FAA broadly requires courts to enforce
arbitration agreements in any “contract evidencing a trans-
action involving commerce,” while § 1 provides only a nar-
rower exemption. This structure, in its view, demonstrates
the FAA's “proarbitration purposes” and counsels in favor of
an interpretation that errs on the side of fewer § 1 exemp-
tions. Brief for Petitioner 16, 30–33.
To be sure, we have relied on statutory purpose to inform
our interpretation of the FAA when that “purpose is readily
apparent from the FAA's text.” AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U. S. 333, 344 (2011). But we are not “free
to pave over bumpy statutory texts in the name of more
expeditiously advancing a policy goal.” New Prime, 586
U. S., at –––. Here, § 1's plain text suffces to show that air-
plane cargo loaders are exempt from the FAA's scope, and
we have no warrant to elevate vague invocations of statutory
purpose over the words Congress chose.
***
Latrice Saxon frequently loads and unloads cargo on and
off airplanes that travel in interstate commerce. She there-
fore belongs to a “class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce” to which § 1's exemption applies. Ac-
cordingly, we affrm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or de-
cision of this case.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None