National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Alston

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 594 U. S. Part 1
Pages 69–112
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 21, 2021
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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OCTOBER TERM, 2020 69
Syllabus
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION
v
. ALSTON et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 20–512. Argued March 31, 2021—Decided June 21, 2021*
Colleges and universities across the country have leveraged sports to
bring in revenue, attract attention, boost enrollment, and raise money
from alumni. That proftable enterprise relies on “amateur” student-
athletes who compete under horizontal restraints that restrict how the
schools may compensate them for their play. The National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) issues and enforces these rules, which re-
strict compensation for student-athletes in various ways. These rules
depress compensation for at least some student-athletes below what a
competitive market would yield.
Against this backdrop, current and former student-athletes brought
this antitrust lawsuit challenging the NCAA's restrictions on compensa-
tion. Specifcally, they alleged that the NCAA's rules violate § 1 of the
Sherman Act, which prohibits “contract[s], combination[s], or conspira-
c[ies] in restraint of trade or commerce.” 15 U. S. C. § 1. Key facts
were undisputed: The NCAA and its members have agreed to compen-
sation limits for student-athletes; the NCAA enforces these limits on its
member-schools; and these compensation limits affect interstate com-
merce. Following a bench trial, the district court issued a 50-page opin-
ion that refused to disturb the NCAA's rules limiting undergraduate
athletic scholarships and other compensation related to athletic per-
formance. At the same time, the court found unlawful and thus en-
joined certain NCA A r ules limiting the education-related benefits
schools may make available to student-athletes. Both sides appealed.
The Ninth Circuit affrmed in full, holding that the district court “struck
the right balance in crafting a remedy that both prevents anticompeti-
tive harm to Student-Athletes while serving the procompetitive purpose
of preserving the popularity of college sports.” 958 F. 3d 1239, 1263.
Unsatisfed with that result, the NCAA asks the Court to fnd that all
of its existing restraints on athlete compensation survive antitrust scru-
tiny. The student-athletes have not renewed their across-the-board
challenge and the Court thus does not consider the rules that remain in
place. The Court considers only the subset of NCAA rules restricting
*Together with No. 20–520, American Athletic Con ference et al. v. Al-
ston et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
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70 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON
Syllabus
education-related benefts that the district court enjoined. The Court
does
so based on the uncontested premise that the NCAA enjoys
monopsony control in the relevant market—such that it is capable of
depressing wages below competitive levels for student-athletes and
thereby restricting the quantity of student-athlete labor.
Held: The district court's injunction is consistent with established anti-
trust principles. Pp. 87–107.
(a) The courts below properly subjected the NCAA's compensation
restrictions to antitrust scrutiny under a “rule of reason” analysis. In
the Sherman Act, Congress tasked courts with enforcing an antitrust
policy of competition on the theory that market forces “yield the best
allocation” of the Nation's resources. National Colleg iate Athletic
Assn. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U. S. 85, 104, n. 27.
The Sherman Act's prohibition on restraints of trade has long been un-
derstood to prohibit only restraints that are “undue.” Ohio v. Ameri-
can Express Co., 585 U. S. 529, 540. Whether a particular restraint
is undue “presumptively” turns on an application of a “rule of reason
analysis.” Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U. S. 1, 5. That manner of
analysis generally requires a court to “conduct a fact-specifc assessment
of market power and market structure” to assess a challenged re-
straint's “actual effect on competition.” American Express, 585 U. S.,
at 541. Pp. 87–96.
(1) The NCAA maintains the courts below should have analyzed
its compensation restrictions under an extremely deferential standard
because it is a joint venture among members who must collaborate to
offer consumers the unique product of intercollegiate athletic competi-
tion. Even assuming the NCAA is a joint venture, though, it is a joint
venture with monopoly power in the relevant market. Its restraints
are appropriately subject to the ordinary rule of reason's fact-specifc
assessment of their effect on competition. American Express, 585
U. S., at 542–544. Circumstances sometimes allow a court to determine
the anticompetitive effects of a challenged restraint (or lack thereof )
under an abbreviated or “quick look.” See Dagher, 547 U. S., at 7, n. 3;
Board of Regents, 468 U. S., at 109, n. 39. But not here. Pp. 87–91.
(2) The NCAA next contends that the Court's decision in Board
of Regents expressly approved the NCAA's limits on student-athlete
compensation. That is incorrect. The Court in Board of Regents did
not analyze the lawfulness of the NCAA's restrictions on student-athlete
compensation. Rather, that case involved an antitrust challenge to the
NCAA's restraints on televising games—an antitrust challenge the
Court sustained. Along the way, the Court commented on the NCAA's
critical role in maintaining the revered tradition of amateurism in col-
lege sports as one “entirely consistent with the goals of the Sherman
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Syllabus
Act.” Id., at 120. But that sort of passing comment on an issue not
presented
is not binding, nor is it dispositive here. Pp. 91–93.
(3) The NCAA also submits that a rule of reason analysis is inap-
propriate because its member schools are not “commercial enterprises”
but rather institutions that exist to further the societally important non-
commercial objective of undergraduate education. This submission also
fails. The Court has regularly refused these sorts of special dispensa-
tions from the Sherman Act. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Law-
yers Assn., 493 U. S. 411, 424. The Court has also previously subjected
the NCAA to the Sherman Act, and any argument that “the special
characteristics of [the NCAA's] particular industry” should exempt it
from the usual operation of the antitrust laws is “properly addressed to
Congress.” National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. United States,
435 U. S. 679, 689. Pp. 94–96.
(b) The NCAA's remaining attacks on the district court's decision lack
merit. Pp. 96–107.
(1) The NCA A contends that the distr ic t cour t erroneously
required it to prove that its rules are the least restrictive means of
achieving the procompetitive purpose of preserving consumer demand
for college sports. True, a least restrictive means test would be errone-
ous and overly intrusive. But the district court nowhere expressly or
effectively required the NCAA to show that its rules met that standard.
Rather, only after fnding the NCAA's restraints “patently and inexpli-
cably stricter than is necessary” did the district court fnd the restraints
unlawful. Pp. 96–101.
(2) The NCAA contends the district court should have deferred to
its conception of amateurism instead of “impermissibly redefn[ing]” its
“product.” But a party cannot declare a restraint “immune from § 1
scrutiny” by relabeling it a product feature. American Needle, Inc. v.
National Football League, 560 U. S. 183, 199, n. 7. Moreover, the dis-
trict court found the NCAA had not even maintained a consistent def-
nition of amateurism. Pp. 101–102.
(3) The NCA A disagrees that it can ach ieve the same pro-
competitive benefts using substantially less restrictive alternatives and
claims the district court's injunction will “micromanage” its business.
Judges must indeed be sensitive to the possibility that the “continuing
supervision of a highly detailed decree” could wind up impairing rather
than enhancing competition. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Of-
fces of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U. S. 398, 415. The district court's
injunction honored these principles, though. The court enjoined only
certain restraints—and only after fnding both that relaxing these re-
strictions would not blur the distinction between college and profes-
sional sports and thus impair demand, and further that this course

72 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON
Syllabus
represented a signifcantly (not marginally) less restrictive means of
ach
ieving the same procompetitive benefts as the NCAA's current
rules. Finally, the court's injunction preserves considerable leeway for
the NCAA, while individual conferences remain free to impose what-
ever rules they choose. To the extent the NCAA believes meaningful
ambiguity exists about the scope of its authority, it may seek clarifca-
tion from the district court. Pp. 102–107.
958 F. 3d 1239, affrmed.
Gorsuch, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Kava-
naugh, J., fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 107.
Seth P. Waxman argued the cause for petitioners in both
cases. With him on the briefs in No. 20–512 were Daniel S.
Volchok, David M. Lehn, Donald M. Remy, Scott Bearby, Jef-
frey A. Mishkin, Beth A. Wilkinson, and Rakesh N. Kilaru.
Andrew J. Pincus fled a brief for petitioners in No. 20–520.
With him on the briefs were Charles A. Rothfeld, Richard J.
Favretto, Britt M. Miller, Jed W. Glickstein, Robert W. Fuller
III, Lawrence C. Moore III, Erik R. Zimmerman, Mark Seif-
ert, Benjamin C. Block, Leane K. Capps, Scott P. Cooper,
Shawn S. Ledingham, Jr., R. Todd Hunt, Richard Young,
Brent E. Rychener, Mark A. Cunningham, D. Erik Albright,
Gregory G. Holland, and Jonathan P. Heyl.
Jeffrey L. Kessler argued the cause for respondents in
both cases. With him on the briefs were David G. Feher,
Linda T. Coberly, Steve W. Berman, Bruce L. Simon, Eliza-
beth C. Pritzker, Jonathan K. Levine, and Bethany L.
Caracuzzo.
Acting Solicitor General Prelogar argued the case for the
United States as amicus curiae urging affrmance in both
cases. With her on the brief were Acting Assistant Attor-
ney General Powers, Deputy Solicitor General Stewart,
Erica L. Ross, Kathleen S. O'Neill, Daniel E. Haar, Nicko-
lai G. Levin, Bryan J. Leitch, Joel Marcus, and Mark S.
Hegedus.†
†Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were fled for the
State of Georgia et al. by Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General of Geor-
gia, Andrew A. Pinson, Solicitor General, Ross W. Bergethon, Deputy So-
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Opinion of the Court
Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court.
In
the Sherman Act, Congress tasked courts with enforc-
ing a policy of competition on the belief that market forces
“yield the best allocation” of the Nation's resources. Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of Regents of Univ.
of Okla., 468 U. S. 85, 104, n. 27 (1984). The plaintiffs before
licitor General, Drew F. Waldbeser, Assistant Solicitor General, and Miles
C. Skedsvold and Zack W. Lindsey, Assistant Attorneys General; for the
American Council on Education et al. by Jessica L. Ellsworth; for Anti-
trust Economists by Bruce D. Oakley; for Antitrust Law Professors and
Business School Professors by Jack E. Pace III and Michael E.
Hamburger; for Former Student-Athletes by Mark Davies, Katherine
M. Kopp, and by E. Joshua Rosenkranz; and for Thomas B. Nachbar, by
Thomas Nachbar, pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance in both cases were fled for
African American Antitrust Lawyers by Tillman J. Breckenridge; for the
American Antitrust Institute by Randy M. Stutz; for the Committee to
Support the Antitrust Laws by Robert S. Kitchenoff and Joseph Goldberg;
for Former NCAA Executives by James W. Quinn; for Plaintiff Class
Representatives in O'Bannon v. NCAA by Jonathan S. Massey, William
A. Isaacson, Michael D. Hausfeld, Hilary K. Scherrer, Michael P. Leh-
mann, Bruce Wecker, and Gary I. Smith, Jr.; for the Players Associations
of the National Football League et al. by Andrew S. Tulumello and Kris-
ten C. Limarzi; for Dr. Ellen J. Staurowsky et al. by Seth A. Rosenthal
and Mitchell Y. Mirviss; and for 65 Professors of Law et al. by Lisa M.
Geary and Michael A. Carrier, pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled in both cases for the State of Arizona
et al. by Mark Brnovich, Attorney General of Arizona, Joseph A. Kane-
feld, Brunn W. Roysden III, Solicitor General, Michael S. Catlett, Deputy
Solicitor General, and Katlyn J. Divis, Assistant Attorney General, and
by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Philip J.
Weiser of Colorado, Kathleen Jennings of Delaware, Kwame Raoul of Illi-
nois, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Letitia James of New York, Ellen F.
Rosenblum of Oregon, and Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania; for Advocates
for Minor Leaguers by Andrew Schmidt and Garrett R. Broshuis; for His-
torians by Erik S. Jaffe and Gene C. Schaerr; for the Open Markets Insti-
tute et al. by Jay L. Himes; for Sports Economists by Daniel J. Walker;
and for Sam C. Ehrlich by Anita M. Moorman.
Yen-Shyang Tseng and Bradley S. Pauley fled a brief for the National
Federation of State High School Associations as amicus curiae urging
reversal in No. 20–512.

74 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON
Opinion of the Court
us brought this lawsuit alleging that the National Collegiate
A
thletic Association (NCAA) and certain of its member
instituti ons vi olated th is policy by agreeing to restrict
the compensation colleges and universities may offer the
student-athletes who play for their teams. After amassing
a vast record and conducting an exhaustive trial, the district
court issued a 50-page opinion that cut both ways. The
court refused to disturb the NCAA's rules limiting under-
graduate athletic scholarships and other compensation re-
lated to athletic performance. At the same time, the court
struck down NCAA rules limiting the education-related ben-
efts schools may offer student-athletes—such as rules that
prohibit schools from offering graduate or vocational school
scholarships. Before us, the student-athletes do not chal-
lenge the district court's judgment. But the NCAA does.
In essence, it seeks immunity from the normal operation of
the antitrust laws and argues, in any event, that the district
court should have approved all of its existing restraints.
We took this case to consider those objections.
I
A
From the start, American colleges and universities have
had a complicated relationship with sports and money. In
1852, students from Harvard and Ya le par ticipated i n
what many regard as the Nation's frst intercollegiate
competition—a boat race at Lake Winnipesaukee, New
Hampshire. But this was no pickup match. A railroad ex-
ecutive sponsored the event to promote train travel to the
picturesque lake. T. Mendenhall, The Harvard-Yale Boat
Race 1852–1924, pp. 15–16 (1993). He offered the competi-
tors an all-expenses-paid vacation with lavish prizes—along
with unlimited alcohol. See A. Zimbalist, Unpaid Profes-
sionals 6–7 (1999) (Zimbalist); Rushin, Inside the Moat,
Sports Illustrated, Mar. 3, 1997. The event flled the resort
with “life and excitement,” N. Y. Herald, Aug. 10, 1852, p. 2,
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col. 2, and one student-athlete described the “ `junket' ” as
an
experience “ `as unique and irreproducible as the Rhodian
colossus,' ” Mendenhall, Harvard-Yale Boat Race, at 20.
Life might be no “less than a boat race,” Holmes, On Re-
ceiving the Degree of Doctor of Laws, Yale University Com-
mencement, June 30, 1886, in Speeches by Oliver Wendell
Holmes, p. 27 (1918), but it was football that really caused
college sports to take off. “By the late 1880s the traditional
rivalry between Princeton and Yale was attracting 40,000
spectators and generating in excess of $25,000 . . . in gate
revenues.” Zimbalist 7. Schools regularly had “graduate
students and paid ringers” on their teams. Ibid.
Colleges offered all manner of compensation to talented
ath letes. Ya le repor tedly lured a tackle named James
Hogan with free meals and tuition, a trip to Cuba, the exclu-
sive right to sell scorecards from his games—and a job as a
cigarette agent for the American Tobacco Company. Ibid.;
see also Needham, The College Athlete, McClure's Magazine,
June 1905, p. 124. The absence of academic residency re-
quirements gave rise to “ `tramp athletes' ” who “roamed the
country making cameo athletic appearances, moving on
whenever and wherever the money was better.” F. Dealy,
Win at Any Cost 71 (1990). One famous example was a law
student at West Virginia University—Fielding H. Yost—
“who, in 1896, transferred to Lafayette as a freshman just in
time to lead his new teammates to victory against its arch-
rival, Penn.” Ibid. The next week, he “was back at West
Virginia's law school.” Ibid. College sports became such
a big business that Woodrow Wilson, then President of
Pr i nceton University, quipped to a lumni i n 1890 that
“ `Princeton is noted in this wide world for three things: foot-
ball, baseball, and collegiate instruction.' ” Zimbalist 7.
By 1905, though, a crisis emerged. While college football
was hugely popular, it was extremely violent. Plays like the
fying wedge and the players' light protective gear led to 7
football fatalities in 1893, 12 deaths the next year, and 18 in
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76 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON
Opinion of the Court
1905. Id., at 8. President Theodore Roosevelt responded
by
convening a meeting between Harvard, Princeton, and
Yale to review the rules of the game, a gathering that ulti-
mately led to the creation of what we now know as the
NCAA. Ibid. Organized primarily as a standard-setting
body, the association also expressed a view at its founding
about compensating college athletes—admonishing that “[n]o
student shall represent a College or University in any inter-
collegiate game or contest who is paid or receives, directly
or indirectly, any money, or fnancial concession.” Intercol-
legiate Athletic Association of the United States Constitu-
tion By-Laws, Art. VII, § 3 (1906); see also Proceedings of
the Eleventh Annual Convention of the National Collegiate
Athletic Association, Dec. 28, 1916, p. 34.
Reality did not always match aspiration. More than two
decades later, the Carnegie Foundation produced a report
on college athletics that found them still “sodden with the
commercial and the material and the vested interests that
these forces have created.” H. Savage, The Carnegie Foun-
dation for the Advancement of Teaching, American College
Athletics Bull. 23, p. 310 (1929). Schools across the country
sought to leverage sports to bring in revenue, attract atten-
tion, boost enrollment, and raise money from alumni. The
University of California's athletic revenue was over $480,000,
while Harvard's football revenue alone came in at $429,000.
Id., at 87. College football was “not a student's game”; it
was an “organized commercial enterprise” featuring athletes
with “years of training,” “professional coaches,” and compe-
titions that were “highly proftable.” Id., at viii.
The commercialism extended to the market for student-
athletes. Seeking the best players, many schools actively
participated in a system “under which boys are offered pecu-
niary and other inducements to enter a particular college.”
Id., at xiv–xv. One coach estimated that a rival team “spent
over $200,000 a year on players.” Zimbalist 9. In 1939,
freshmen at the University of Pittsburgh went on strike be-

Cite as: 594 U. S. 69 (2021) 77
Opinion of the Court
cause upperclassmen were reportedly earning more money.
Crabb
, The Amateurism Myth: A Case for a New Tradition,
28 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 181, 190 (2017). In the 1940s, Hugh
McElhenny, a half back at the University of Washington, “be-
came known as the frst college player `ever to take a cut in
salary to play pro football.' ” Zimbalist 22–23. He report-
edly said: “ `[A] wealthy guy puts big bucks under my pillow
every time I score a touchdown. Hell, I can't afford to grad-
uate.' ” Id., at 211, n. 17. In 1946, a commentator offered
this view: “[W]hen it comes to chicanery, double-dealing, and
general undercover work behind the scenes, big-time college
football is in a class by itself.” Woodward, Is College Foot-
ball on the Level?, Sport, Nov. 1946, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 35.
In 1948, the NCAA sought to do more than admonish. It
adopted the “Sanity Code. ” Colleges Adopt the `Sanity
Code' To Govern Sports, N. Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1948, p. 1, col.
1. The code reiterated the NCAA's opposition to “promised
pay in any form.” Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on In-
terstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Congress, 2d Sess.,
pt. 2, p. 1094 (1978). But for the frst time the code also au-
thorized colleges and universities to pay athletes' tuition.
Ibid. And it created a new enforcement mechanism—provid-
ing for the “suspension or expulsion” of “proven offenders.”
Colleges Adopt `Sanity Code,' N. Y. Times, p. 1, col. 1. To
some, these changes sought to substitute a consistent, above-
board compensation system for the varying under-the-table
schemes that had long proliferated. To others, the code
marked “the beginning of the NCAA behaving as an effec-
tive cartel,” by enabling its member schools to set and en-
force “rules that limit the price they have to pay for their
inputs (mainly the `student-athletes').” Zimbalist 10.
The rules regarding student-athlete compensation have
evolved ever since. In 1956, the NCAA expanded the scope
of allowable payments to include room, board, books, fees,
and “cash for incidental expenses such as laundry.” In re
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78 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON
Opinion of the Court
National Collegiate Athletic Assn. Athletic Grant-in-Aid
C
ap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1063 (ND Cal.
2019) (hereinafter D. Ct. Op.). In 1974, the NCAA began
permitting paid professionals in one sport to compete on
an amateur basis in another. Brief for Historians as Amici
Curiae 10. In 2014, the NCAA “announced it would allow
athletic conferences to authorize their member schools to
increase scholarships up to the full cost of attendance.”
O'Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 802 F. 3d
1049, 1054–1055 (CA9 2015). The 80 member schools of the
“Power Five” athletic conferences—the conferences with the
highest revenue in Division I—promptly voted to raise their
scholarship limits to an amount that is generally several
thousand dollars higher than previous limits. D. Ct. Op.,
at 1064.
In recent years, changes have continued. The NCAA has
created the “Student Assistance Fund” and the “Academic
Enhancement Fund” to “assist student-athletes in meeting
fnancial needs,” “improve their welfare or academic sup-
port,” or “recognize academic achievement.” Id., at 1072.
These funds have supplied money to student-athletes for
“postgraduate scholarships” and “school supplies,” as well as
“benefts that are not related to education,” such as “loss-
of-value insurance premiums,” “travel expenses,” “clothing,”
and “magazine subscriptions.” Id., at 1072, n. 15. In 2018,
the NCAA made more than $84 million available through the
Student Activities Fund and more than $48 million available
through the Academic Enhancement Fund. Id., at 1072.
Assistance may be provided in cash or in kind, and there is
no limit to the amount any particular student-athlete may
receive. Id., at 1073. Since 2015, disbursements to individ-
ual students have sometimes been tens of thousands of dol-
lars above the full cost of attendance. Ibid.
The NCAA has also allowed payments “ `incidental to ath-
letics participation,' ” including awards for “participation or
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achievement in athletics” (like “qualifying for a bowl game”)
and
certain “payments from outside entities” (such as for
“performance in the Olympics”). Id., at 1064, 1071, 1074.
The NCAA permits its member schools to award up to (but
no more than) two annual “Senior Scholar Awards” of $10,000
for students to attend graduate school after their athletic
eligibility expires. Id., at 1074. Finally, the NCAA allows
schools to fund travel for student-athletes' family members
to attend “certain events.” Id., at 1069.
Over the decades, the NCAA has become a sprawling en-
terprise. Its membership comprises about 1,100 colleges
and universities, organized into three divisions. Id., at 1063.
Division I teams are often the most popular and attract the
most money and the most talented athletes. Currently, Di-
vision I includes roughly 350 schools divided across 32 con-
ferences. See ibid. Within Division I, the most popular
sports are basketball and football. The NCAA divides Divi-
sion I football into the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) and
the Football Championship Subdivision, with the FBS gener-
ally featuring the best teams. Ibid. The 32 conferences in
Division I function similarly to the NCAA itself, but on a
smaller scale. They “can and do enact their own rules.”
Id., at 1090.
At the center of this thicket of associations and rules sits
a massive business. The NCAA's current broadcast con-
tract for the March Madness basketball tournament is worth
$1.1 billion annually. See id., at 1077, n. 20. Its television
deal for the FBS conference's College Football Playoff is
worth approximately $470 million per year. See id., at 1063;
Bachman, ESPN Strikes Deal for College Football Playoff,
Wall Street Journal, Nov. 21, 2012. Beyond these sums,
the Division I conferences earn substantial revenue from
regular-season games. For example, the Southeastern Con-
ference (SEC) “made more than $409 million in revenues
from television contracts alone in 2017, with its total confer-
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80 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON
Opinion of the Court
ence revenues exceeding $650 million that year.” D. Ct. Op.,
at
1063. All these amounts have “increased consistently
over the years.” Ibid.
Those who run this enterprise proft in a different way
than the student-athletes whose activities they oversee.
The president of the NCAA earns nearly $4 million per year.
Br ief for Players Associati on of the Nati ona l Footba l l
League et al. as Amici Curiae 17. Commissioners of the
top conferences take home between $2 to $5 million. Ibid.
College athletic directors average more than $1 million annu-
ally. Ibid. And annual salaries for top Division I college
football coaches approach $11 million, with some of their
assistants making more than $2.5 million. Id., at 17–18.
B
The plaintiffs are current and former student-athletes in
men's Division I FBS football and men's and women's Divi-
sion I basketball. They fled a class action against the
NCAA and 11 Division I conferences (for simplicity's sake,
we refer to the defendants collectively as the NCAA). The
student-athletes challenged the “current, interconnected set
of NCAA rules that limit the compensation they may receive
in exchange for their athletic services.” D. Ct. Op., at 1062,
1065, n. 5. Specifcally, they alleged that the NCAA's rules
violate § 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits “contract[s],
combination[s], or conspirac[ies] in restraint of trade or
commerce.” 15 U. S. C. § 1.
After pretrial proceedings stretching years, the district
court conducted a 10-day bench trial. It heard experts and
lay witnesses from both sides, and received volumes of evi-
dence and briefng, all before issuing an exhaustive decision.
In the end, the court found the evidence undisputed on cer-
tain points. The NCAA did not “contest evidence showing ”
that it and its members have agreed to compensation limits
on student-athletes; the NCAA and its conferences enforce
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Opinion of the Court
these limits by punishing violations; and these limits “affect
i
nterstate commerce.” D. Ct. Op., at 1066.
Based on these premises, the district court proceeded to
assess the lawfulness of the NCAA's challenged restraints.
This Court has “long recognized that in view of the common
law and the law in this country when the Sherman Act was
passed, the phrase `restraint of trade' is best read to mean
`undue restraint.' ” Ohio v. American Express Co., 585 U. S.
529, 540 (2018) (brackets and some internal quotation marks
omitted). Determining whether a restraint is undue for
purposes of the Sherman Act “presumptively” calls for what
we have described as a “rule of reason analysis.” Texaco
Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U. S. 1, 5 (2006); Standard Oil Co. of N. J.
v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 60–62 (1911). That manner of
analysis generally requires a court to “conduct a fact-specifc
assessment of market power and market structure” to assess
a cha llenged restraint's “actua l effect on competiti on. ”
American Express, 585 U. S., at 541 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Always, “[t]he goal is to distinguish be-
tween restraints with anticompetitive effect that are harmful
to the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that
are in the consumer's best interest.” Ibid. (brackets and
internal quotation marks omitted).
In applying the rule of reason, the district court began by
observing that the NCAA enjoys “near complete dominance
of, and exercise[s] monopsony power i n, the relevant
market”—which it defned as the market for “athletic serv-
ices in men's and women's Division I basketball and FBS
football, wherein each class member participates in his or
her sport-specifc market.” D. Ct. Op., at 1097. The “most
talented athletes are concentrated” in the “markets for Divi-
sion I basketball and FBS football.” Id., at 1067. There
are no “viable substitutes,” as the “NCAA's Division I essen-
tially is the relevant market for elite college football and
basketball.” Id., at 1067, 1070. In short, the NCAA and its
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82 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON
Opinion of the Court
member schools have the “power to restrain student-athlete
compensati
on in any way and at any time they wish, without
any meaningful risk of diminishing their market dominance.”
Id., at 1070.
The district court then proceeded to fnd that the NCAA's
compensation limits “produce signifcant anticompetitive ef-
fects in the relevant market.” Id., at 1067. Though mem-
ber schools compete fercely in recruiting student-athletes,
the NCAA uses its monopsony power to “cap artifcially the
compensation offered to recruits.” Id., at 1097. In a mar-
ket without the challenged restraints, the district court
found, “competition among schools would increase in terms
of the compensation they would offer to recruits, and
student-athlete compensation would be higher as a result.”
Id., at 1068. “Student-athletes would receive offers that
would more closely match the value of their athletic serv-
ices.” Ibid. And notably, the court observed, the NCAA
“did not meaningfully dispute” any of this evidence. Id., at
1067; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 31 (“[T]here's no dispute that
the—the no-pay-for-play rule imposes a signifcant restraint
on a relevant antitrust market”).
The district court next considered the NCAA's procompet-
itive justifcations for its restraints. The NCAA suggested
that its restrictions help increase output in college sports
and maintain a competitive balance among teams. But the
district court rejected those justifcations, D. Ct. Op., at 1070,
n. 12, and the NCAA does not pursue them here. The
NCAA's only remaining defense was that its rules preserve
amateurism, which in turn widens consumer choice by pro-
viding a unique product—amateur college sports as distinct
from professional sports. Admittedly, this asserted beneft
accrues to consumers in the NCAA's seller-side consumer
market rather than to student-athletes whose compensation
the NCAA fxes in its buyer-side labor market. But, the
NCAA argued, the district court needed to assess its re-
straints in the labor market in light of their procompetitive

Cite as: 594 U. S. 69 (2021) 83
Opinion of the Court
benefts in the consumer market—and the district court
agreed
to do so. Id., at 1098.
Turning to that task, the court observed that the NCAA's
conception of amateurism has changed steadily over the
years. See id., at 1063–1064, 1072–1073; see also supra, at
75–80. The court noted that the NCAA “nowhere defne[s]
the nature of the amateurism they claim consumers insist
upon.” D. Ct. Op., at 1070. And, given all this, the court
struggled to ascertain for itself “any coherent defnition” of
the term, id., at 1074, noting the testimony of a former SEC
commissioner that he's “ `never been clear on . . . what is
really meant by amateurism.' ” Id., at 1070–1071.
Nor did the district court fnd much evidence to support
the NCAA's contention that its compensation restrictions
play a role in consumer demand. As the court put it, the
evidence failed “to establish that the challenged compensa-
tion rules, in and of themselves, have any direct connection
to consumer demand.” Id., at 1070. The court observed,
for example, that the NCAA's “only economics expert on the
issue of consumer demand” did not “study any standard
measures of consumer demand” but instead simply “inter-
viewed people connected with the NCAA and its schools,
who were chosen for him by defense counsel.” Id., at 1075.
Meanwhile, the student-athletes presented expert testimony
and other evidence showing that consumer demand has in-
creased markedly despite the new types of compensation the
NCAA has allowed in recent decades. Id., at 1074, 1076.
The plaintiffs presented economic and other evidence sug-
gesting as well that further increases in student-athlete com-
pensation would “not negatively affect consumer demand.”
Id., at 1076. At the same time, however, the district court
did fnd that one particular aspect of the NCAA's compensa-
tion limits “may have some effect in preserving consumer
demand.” Id., at 1082. Specifcally, the court found that
rules aimed at ensuring “student-athletes do not receive un-
limited payments unrelated to education” could play some
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role in product differentiation with professional sports and
thus
help sustain consumer demand for college athletics.
Id., at 1083.
The court next required the student-athletes to show that
“substantially less restrictive alternative rules” existed that
“would achieve the same procompetitive effect as the chal-
lenged set of rules.” Id., at 1104. The district court em-
phasized that the NCAA must have “ample latitude” to run
its enterprise and that courts “may not use antitrust laws
to make marginal adjustments to broadly reasonable market
restraints.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). In
light of these standards, the court found the student-athletes
had met their burden in some respects but not others. The
court rejected the student-athletes' challenge to NCAA
rules that limit athletic scholarships to the full cost of attend-
ance and that restrict compensation and benefts unrelated
to education. These may be price-fxing agreements, but
the court found them to be reasonable in light of the possibil-
ity that “professional-level cash payments . . . could blur the
distinction between college sports and professional sports
and thereby negatively affect consumer demand.” Ibid.
The court reached a different conclusion for caps on
education-related benefts—such as rules that limit scholar-
ships for graduate or vocational school, payments for aca-
demic tutoring, or paid posteligibility internships. Id., at
1088. On no account, the court found, could such education-
related benefts be “confused with a professional athlete's
salary.” Id., at 1083. If anything, they “emphasize that the
recipients are students.” Ibid. Enjoining the NCAA's re-
strictions on these forms of compensation alone, the court
concluded, would be substantially less restrictive than the
NCAA's current rules and yet fully capable of preserving
consumer demand for college sports. Id., at 1088.
The court then entered an injunction refecting its fndings
and conclusions. Nothing in the order precluded the NCAA
from continuing to fx compensation and benefts unrelated
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Opinion of the Court
to education; limits on athletic scholarships, for example, re-
mai
ned untouched. The court enjoined the NCAA only
from limiting education-related compensation or benefts
that conferences and schools may provide to student-athletes
playing Division I football and basketball. App. to Pet. for
Cert. in No. 20–512, p. 167a, ¶1. The court's injunction fur-
ther specifed that the NCAA could continue to limit cash
awards for academic achievement—but only so long as those
limits are no lower than the cash awards allowed for athletic
achievement (currently $5,980 annually). Id., at 168a–169a,
¶5; Order Granting Motion for Clarifcation of Injunction in
No. 4:14–md–02541, ECF Doc. 1329, pp. 5–6 (ND Cal., Dec.
30, 2020). The court added that the NCAA and its members
were free to propose a defnition of compensation or benefts
“ `related to education.' ” App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 20–
512, at 168a, ¶4. And the court explained that the NCAA
was free to regulate how conferences and schools provide
education-related compensation and benefts. Ibid. The
court further emphasized that its injunction applied only to
the NCAA and multi-conference agreements—thus allowing
individual conferences (and the schools that constitute them)
to impose tighter restrictions if they wish. Id., at 169a, ¶6.
The district court's injunction issued in March 2019, and took
effect in August 2020.
Both sides appealed. The student-athletes said the dis-
trict court did not go far enough; it should have enjoined all
of the NCAA's challenged compensation limits, including
those “untethered to education,” like its restrictions on the
size of athletic scholarships and cash awards. In re Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Assn. Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap
Antitrust Litig., 958 F. 3d 1239, 1263 (CA9 2020). The
NCAA, meanwhile, argued that the district court went too
far by weakening its restraints on education-related compen-
sation and benefts. In the end, the court of appeals af-
frmed in full, explaining its view that “the district court
struck the right balance in crafting a remedy that both
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86 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON
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prevents anticompetitive harm to Student-Athletes while
serv
ing the procompetitive purpose of preserving the popu-
larity of college sports.” Ibid.
C
Unsatisfed with this result, the NCAA asks us to reverse
to the extent the lower courts sided with the student-
athletes. For their part, the student-athletes do not renew
their across-the-board challenge to the NCAA's compensa-
tion restrictions. Accordingly, we do not pass on the rules
that remain in place or the district court's judgment uphold-
ing them. Our review is confned to those restrictions now
enjoined.
Before us, as through much of the litigation below, some
of the issues most frequently debated in antitrust litigation
are uncontested. The parties do not challenge the district
court's defnition of the relevant market. They do not con-
test that the NCAA enjoys monopoly (or, as it's called on the
buyer side, monopsony) control in that labor market—such
that it is capable of depressing wages below competitive lev-
els and restricting the quantity of student-athlete labor.
Nor does the NCAA dispute that its member schools com-
pete fercely for student-athletes but remain subject to
NCAA-issued-and-enforced limits on what compensation
they can offer. Put simply, this suit involves admitted hori-
zontal price fxing in a market where the defendants exercise
monopoly control.
Other signifcant matters are taken as given here too. No
one disputes that the NCAA's restrictions in fact decrease
the compensation that student-athletes receive compared to
what a competitive market would yield. No one questions
either that decreases in compensation also depress partici-
pation by student-athletes in the relevant labor market—
so that price and quantity are both suppressed. See 12
P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶2011b, p. 134
(4th ed. 2019) (Areeda & Hovenkamp). Nor does the NCAA
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Opinion of the Court
suggest that, to prevail, the plaintiff student-athletes must
show
that its restraints harm competition in the seller-side
(or consumer facing) market as well as in its buyer-side
(or labor) market. See, e. g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc.
v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 235 (1948);
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co.,
549 U. S. 312, 321 (2007); 2A Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶352c,
pp. 288–289 (2014); 12 id., ¶2011a, at 132–134.
Meanwhile, the student-athletes do not question that the
NCAA may permissibly seek to justify its restraints in the
labor market by pointing to procompetitive effects they
produce in the consumer market. Some amici argue that
“competition in input markets is incommensurable with com-
petition in output markets,” and that a court should not
“trade off” sacrifcing a legally cognizable interest in compe-
tition in one market to better promote competition in a dif-
ferent one; review should instead be limited to the particular
market in which antitrust plaintiffs have asserted their
injury. Brief for American Antitrust Institute as Amicus
Curiae 3, 11–12. But the parties before us do not pursue
this line.
II
A
With all these matters taken as given, we express no
views on them. Instead, we focus only on the objections the
NCAA does raise. Principally, it suggests that the lower
courts erred by subjecting its compensation restrictions to a
rule of reason analysis. In the NCAA's view, the courts
should have given its restrictions at most an “abbreviated
deferential review,” Brief for Petitioner in No. 20–512, p. 14,
or a “ `quick look,' ” Brief for Petitioners in No. 20–520, p. 18,
before approving them.
The NCAA offers a few reasons why. Perhaps domi-
nantly, it argues that it is a joint venture and that collabora-
tion among its members is necessary if they are to offer
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Opinion of the Court
consumers the beneft of intercollegiate athletic competition.
W
e doubt little of this. There's no question, for example,
that many “joint ventures are calculated to enable frms to
do something more cheaply or better than they did it before.”
13 Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶2100c, at 7. And the fact that
joint ventures can have such procompetitive benefts surely
stands as a caution against condemning their arrangements
too refexively. See Dagher, 547 U. S., at 7; Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U. S.
1, 22–23 (1979).
But even assuming (without deciding) that the NCAA is a
joint venture, that does not guarantee the foreshortened re-
view it seeks. Most restraints challenged under the Sher-
man Act—including most joint venture restrictions—are
subject to the rule of reason, which (again) we have de-
scribed as “a fact-specifc assessment of market power and
market structure” aimed at assessing the challenged re-
straint's “actual effect on competition”—especially its capac-
ity to reduce output and increase price. American Express,
585 U. S., at 541 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Admittedly, the amount of work needed to conduct a fair
assessment of these questions can vary. As the NCAA ob-
serves, this Court has suggested that sometimes we can de-
termine the competitive effects of a challenged restraint in
the “ `twinkling of an eye.' ” Board of Regents, 468 U. S., at
110, n. 39 (quoting P. Areeda, The “Rule of Reason” in Anti-
trust Analysis: General Issues 37–38 (Federal Judicial Cen-
ter, June 1981)); American Needle, Inc. v. National Football
League, 560 U. S. 183, 203 (2010). That is true, though, only
for restraints at opposite ends of the competitive spectrum.
For those sorts of restraints—rather than restraints in the
great in-between—a quick look is suffcient for approval or
condemnation.
At one end of the spectrum, some restraints may be so
obviously incapable of harming competition that they require
little scrutiny. In Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van
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Opinion of the Court
Lines, Inc., 792 F. 2d 210 (CADC 1986), for example, Judge
Bork
explained that the analysis could begin and end with
the observation that the joint venture under review “com-
mand[ed] between 5.1 and 6% of the relevant market.” Id.,
at 217. Usually, joint ventures enjoying such small market
share are incapable of impairing competition. Should they
reduce their output, “there would be no effect upon market
price because frms making up the other 94% of the market
would simply take over the abandoned business.” Ibid.; see
also 7 Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶1507a, p. 444 (2017) (If “the
exercise of market power is not plausible, the challenged
practice is legal”); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enter-
prises, Inc., 776 F. 2d 185, 191 (CA7 1985) (“Unless the frms
have the power to raise price by curtailing output, their
agreement is unlikely to harm consumers, and it makes sense
to understand their cooperation as benign or benefcial”).
At the other end, some agreements among competitors so
obviously threaten to reduce output and raise prices that
they might be condemned as unlawful per se or rejected
after only a quick look. See Dagher, 547 U. S., at 7, n. 3;
California Dental Assn. v. FTC, 526 U. S. 756, 770 (1999).
Recognizing the inherent limits on a court's ability to
master an entire industry—and aware that there are often
hard-to-see efficiencies attendant to complex busi ness
arrangements—we take special care not to deploy these con-
demnatory tools until we have amassed “considerable experi-
ence with the type of restraint at issue” and “can predict
with confdence that it would be invalidated in all or almost
all instances.” Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc., 551 U. S. 877, 886–887 (2007); Easterbrook, On
Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev.
972, 975 (1986) (noting that it can take “economists years,
sometimes decades, to understand why certain business
practices work [and] determine whether they work because
of increased effciency or exclusion”); see also infra, at 98–99
(further reasons for caution).
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None of this helps the NCAA. The NCAA accepts that
its
members collectively enjoy monopsony power in the mar-
ket for student-athlete services, such that its restraints can
(and in fact do) harm competition. See D. Ct. Op., at 1067.
Unlike customers who would look elsewhere when a small
van company raises its prices above market levels, the dis-
trict court found (and the NCAA does not here contest) that
student-athletes have nowhere else to sell their labor. Even
if the NCAA is a joint venture, then, it is hardly of the sort
that would warrant quick-look approval for all its myriad
rules and restrictions.
Nor does the NCAA's status as a particular type of ven-
ture categorically exempt its restraints from ordinary rule
of reason review. We do not doubt that some degree of coor-
dination between competitors within sports leagues can be
procompetitive. Without some agreement among rivals—on
things like how many players may be on the feld or the time
allotted for play—the very competitions that consumers
value would not be possible. See Board of Regents, 468
U. S., at 101 (quoting R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 278
(1978)). Accordingly, even a sports league with market
power might see some agreements among its members win
antitrust approval in the “ `twinkling of an eye.' ” Ameri-
can Needle, 560 U. S., at 203.
But this insight does not always apply. That some re-
straints are necessary to create or maintain a league sport
does not mean all “aspects of elaborate interleague coopera-
tion are.” Id., at 199, n. 7. While a quick look will often be
enough to approve the restraints “necessary to produce a
game,” ibid., a fuller review may be appropriate for others.
See, e. g., Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v.
National Basketball Assn., 95 F. 3d 593, 600 (CA7 1996)
(“Just as the ability of McDonald's franchises to coordinate
the release of a new hamburger does not imply their ability
to agree on wages for counter workers, so the ability of
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Opinion of the Court
sports teams to agree on a TV contract need not imply an
abi
lity to set wages for players”).
The NCAA's rules fxing wages for student-athletes fall on
the far side of this line. Nobody questions that Division I
basketball and FBS football can proceed (and have pro-
ceeded) without the education-related compensation restric-
tions the district court enjoined; the games go on. Instead,
the parties dispute whether and to what extent those restric-
tions in the NCAA's labor market yield benefts in its
consumer market that can be attained using substantially
less restrictive means. That dispute presents complex ques-
tions requiring more than a blink to answer.
B
Even if background antitrust principles counsel in favor of
the rule of reason, the NCAA replies that a particular prece-
dent ties our hands. The NCAA directs our attention to
Board of Regents, where this Court considered the league's
rules restricting the ability of its member schools to televise
football games. 468 U. S., at 94. On the NCAA's reading,
that decision expressly approved its limits on student-athlete
compensation—and this approval forecloses any meaningful
review of those limits today.
We see things differently. Board of Regents explained
that the league's television rules amounted to “[h]orizontal
price fxing and output limitation[s]” of the sort that are “or-
dinarily condemned” as “ `illegal per se.' ” Id., at 100. The
Court declined to declare the NCAA's restraints per se un-
lawful only because they arose in “an industry” in which
some “horizontal restraints on competition are essential if
the product is to be available at all.” Id., at 101–102. Our
analysis today is fully consistent with all of this. Indeed, if
any daylight exists it is only in the NCAA's favor. While
Board of Regents did not condemn the NCAA's broadcasting
restraints as per se unlawful, it invoked abbreviated anti-
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trust review as a path to condemnation, not salvation. Id.,
at
109, n. 39. If a quick look was thought suffcient before
rejecting the NCAA's procompetitive rationales in that case,
it is hard to see how the NCAA might object to a court
providing a more cautious form of review before reaching a
similar judgment here.
To be sure, the NCAA isn't without a reply. It notes that,
in the course of reaching its judgment about television mar-
keting restrictions, the Board of Regents Court commented
on student-athlete compensation restrictions. Most particu-
larly, the NCAA highlights this passage:
“The NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance
of a revered tradition of amateurism in college sports.
There can be no question but that it needs ample
latitude to play that role, or that the preservation of the
student-athlete in higher education adds richness and
diversity to intercollegiate athletics and is entirely
consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act.” Id.,
at 120.
See also id., at 101, 102 (the NCAA “seeks to market a par-
ticular brand of football” in which “athletes must not be paid,
must be required to attend class, and the like”). On the
NCAA's telling, these observations foreclose any rule of
reason review in this suit.
Once more, we cannot agree. Board of Regents may
suggest that cour ts shou ld t ake care when assessi ng
the NCAA's restraints on student-athlete compensation,
sensitive to their procompetitive possibilities. But these re-
marks do not suggest that courts must refexively reject
all challenges to the NCAA's compensation restrictions.
Student-athlete compensation rules were not even at issue
in Board of Regents. And the Court made clear it was only
assuming the reasonableness of the NCAA's restrictions:
“It is reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory
controls of the NCAA are justifable means of fostering
competition among amateur athletic teams and are therefore
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Opinion of the Court
procompetitive . . . .” Id., at 117 (emphasis added). Accord-
i
ng ly, the Cour t si mply did not have occasi on to
declare—nor did it declare—the NCAA's compensation
restrictions procompetitive both in 1984 and forevermore.
Our confdence on this score is fortifed by still another
factor. Whether an antitrust violation exists necessarily de-
pends on a careful analysis of market realities. See, e. g.,
American Express Co., 585 U. S., at 542–544; 2B Areeda &
Hovenkamp ¶500, p. 107 (2014). If those market realities
change, so may the legal analysis.
When it comes to college sports, there can be little doubt
that the market realities have changed signifcantly since
1984. Since then, the NCAA has dramatically increased
the amounts and kinds of benefts schools may provide to
student-athletes. For example, it has allowed the confer-
ences fexibility to set new and higher limits on athletic
scholarships. D. Ct. Op., at 1064. It has increased the size
of permissible benefts “incidental to athletics participation.”
Id., at 1066. And it has developed the Student Assistance
Fund and the Academic Enhancement Fund, which in 2018
alone provided over $100 million to student-athletes. Id., at
1072. Nor is that all that has changed. In 1985, Division I
football and basketball raised approximately $922 million and
$41 million respectively. Brief for Former NCAA Execu-
tives as Amici Curiae 7. By 2016, NCAA Division I schools
raised more than $13.5 billion. Ibid. From 1982 to 1984,
CBS paid $16 million per year to televise the March Madness
Division I men's basketball tournament. Ibid. In 2016,
those annual television rights brought in closer to $1.1 bil-
lion. D. Ct. Op., at 1077, n. 20.
Given the sensitivity of antitrust analysis to market
realities—and how much has changed in this market—we
think it would be particularly unwise to treat an aside in
Board of Regents as more than that. This Court may be
“infallible only because we are fnal,” Brown v. Allen, 344
U. S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result), but
those sorts of stray comments are neither.
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C
The
NCAA submits that a rule of reason analysis is inap-
propriate for still another reason—because the NCAA and
its member schools are not “commercial enterprises” and
instead oversee intercollegiate athletics “as an integral part
of the undergraduate experience.” Brief for Petitioner in
No. 20–512, at 31. The NCAA represents that it seeks to
“maintain amateurism in college sports as part of serving
[the] societally important non-commercial objective” of
“higher education.” Id., at 3.
Here again, however, there may be less of a dispute than
meets the eye. The NCAA does not contest that its re-
straints affect interstate trade and commerce and are thus
subject to the Sherman Act. See D. Ct. Op., at 1066. The
NCAA acknowledges that this Court already analyzed (and
struck down) some of its restraints as anticompetitive in
Board of Regents. And it admits, as it must, that the Court
did all this only after observing that the Sherman Act had
already been applied to other nonproft organizations—and
that “the economic signifcance of the NCAA's nonproft
character is questionable at best” given that “the NCAA and
its member institutions are in fact organized to maximize
revenues.” 468 U. S., at 100–101, n. 22. Nor, on the other
side of the equation, does anyone contest that the status of
the NCAA's members as schools and the status of student-
athletes as students may be relevant in assessing consumer
demand as part of a rule of reason review.
With this much agreed it is unclear exactly what the
NCAA seeks. To the extent it means to propose a sort of
judicially ordained immunity from the terms of the Sherman
Act for its restraints of trade—that we should overlook its
restrictions because they happen to fall at the intersection
of higher education, sports, and money—we cannot agree.
This Court has regularly refused materially identical re-
quests from litigants seeking special dispensation from the
Sherman Act on the ground that their restraints of trade
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Opinion of the Court
serve uniquely important social objectives beyond enhanc-
i
ng competition.
Take two examples. In National Soc. of Professional
Engineers v. United States, 435 U. S. 679 (1978), a trade asso-
ciation argued that price competition between engineers
competing for building projects had to be restrained to en-
sure quality work and protect public safety. Id., at 693–694.
This Court rejected that appeal as “nothing less than a fron-
tal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act.” Id., at
695. The “statutory policy” of the Act is one of competition
and it “precludes inquiry into the question whether competi-
tion is good or bad.” Ibid. In FTC v. Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Assn., 493 U. S. 411 (1990), criminal defense law-
yers agreed among themselves to refuse court appointments
until the government increased their compensation. Id., at
414. And once more the Court refused to consider whether
this restraint of trade served some social good more impor-
tant than competition: “The social justifcations proffered for
respondents' restraint of trade . . . do not make it any less
unlawful.” Id., at 424.
To be sure, this Court once dallied with something that
looks a bit like an antitrust exemption for professional base-
ball. In Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Na-
tional League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U. S. 200
(1922), the Court reasoned that “exhibitions” of “base ball”
did not implicate the Sherman Act because they did not in-
volve interstate trade or commerce—even though teams reg-
ularly crossed state lines (as they do today) to make money
and enhance their commercial success. Id., at 208–209.
But this Court has refused to extend Federal Baseball's rea-
soning to other sports leagues—and has even acknowledged
criticisms of the decision as “ `unrealistic' ” and “ `inconsist-
ent' ” and “aberration[al].” Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U. S. 258,
282 (1972) (quoting Radovich v. National Football League,
352 U. S. 445, 452 (1957)); see also Brief for Advocates for
Minor Leaguers as Amicus Curiae 5, n. 3 (gathering criti-
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cisms). Indeed, as we have seen, this Court has already rec-
og
nized that the NCAA itself is subject to the Sherman Act.
The “orderly way” to temper that Act's policy of competi-
tion is “by legislation and not by court decision.” Flood,
407 U. S., at 279. The NCAA is free to argue that, “because
of the special characteristics of [its] particular industry,” it
should be exempt from the usual operation of the antitrust
laws—but that appeal is “properly addressed to Congress.”
National Soc. of Professional Engineers, 435 U. S., at 689.
Nor has Congress been insensitive to such requests. It has
modifed the antitrust laws for certain industries in the past,
and it may do so again in the future. See, e. g., 7 U. S. C.
§§ 291–292 (agricultural cooperatives); 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011–
1013 (insurance); 15 U. S. C. §§ 1801–1804 (newspaper joint
operating agreements). But until Congress says otherwise,
the only law it has asked us to enforce is the Sherman
Act, and that law is predicated on one assumption alone—
“competition is the best method of allocating resources” in
the Nation's economy. National Soc. of Professional Engi-
neers, 435 U. S., at 695.
III
A
While the NCAA devotes most of its energy to resisting
the rule of reason in its usual form, the league lodges some
objections to the district court's application of it as well.
When describing the rule of reason, this Court has some-
times spoken of “a three-step, burden-shifting framework”
as a means for “ `distinguish[ing] between restraints with an-
ticompetitive effect that are harmful to the consumer and
restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer's
best interest.' ” American Express Co., 585 U. S., at 541.
As we have described it, “the plaintiff has the initial burden
to prove that the challenged restraint has a substantial anti-
competitive effect.” Ibid. Should the plaintiff carry that
burden, the burden then “shifts to the defendant to show
a procompetitive rationale for the restraint.” Ibid. If the
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defendant can make that showing, “the burden shifts back
to
the plaintiff to demonstrate that the procompetitive eff-
ciencies could be reasonably achieved through less anticom-
petitive means.” Id., at 542.
These three steps do not represent a rote checklist, nor
may they be employed as an infexible substitute for careful
analysis. As we have seen, what is required to assess
whether a challenged restraint harms competition can vary
depending on the circumstances. See supra, at 87–91. The
whole point of the rule of reason is to furnish “an enquiry
meet for the case, looking to the circumstances, details, and
logic of a restraint” to ensure that it unduly harms competi-
tion before a court declares it unlawful. California Dental,
526 U. S., at 781; see also, e. g., Leegin Creative, 551 U. S., at
885 (“ `[T]he factfnder weighs all of the circumstances of a
case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be pro-
hibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competi-
tion' ”); Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467
U. S. 752, 768 (1984); 7 Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶1507a, at 442–
444 (slightly different “decisional model” using sequential
questions).
In the proceedings below, the district court followed circuit
precedent to apply a multistep framework closely akin to
American Express's. As its frst step, the district court
required the student-athletes to show that “the challenged
restraints produce signifcant anticompetitive effects in the
relevant market.” D. Ct. Op., at 1067. This was no slight
burden. According to one amicus, courts have disposed of
nearly all rule of reason cases in the last 45 years on the
ground that the plaintiff failed to show a substantial anticom-
petitive effect. Brief for 65 Professors of Law, Business,
Economics, and Sports Management as Amici Curiae 21, n. 9
(“Si nce 1977, cour ts decided 90% (809 of 897) on th is
ground”). This suit proved different. As we have seen,
based on a voluminous record, the district court held that
the student-athletes had shown the NCAA enjoys the power
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to set wages in the market for student-athletes' labor—and
that
the NCAA has exercised that power in ways that have
produced signifcant anticompetitive effects. See D. Ct. Op.,
at 1067. Perhaps even more notably, the NCAA “did not
meaningfully dispute” this conclusion. Ibid.
Unlike so many cases, then, the district court proceeded
to the second step, asking whether the NCAA could muster
a procompetitive rationale for its restraints. Id., at 1070.
This is where the NCAA claims error frst crept in. On its
account, the district court examined the challenged rules at
different levels of generality. At the frst step of its inquiry,
the court asked whether the NCAA's entire package of com-
pensation restrictions has substantial anticompetitive effects
collectively. Yet, at the second step, the NCAA says the
district court required it to show that each of its distinct
rules limiting student-athlete compensation has procompeti-
tive benefts individually. The NCAA says this mismatch
had the result of effectively—and erroneously—requiring
it to prove that each rule is the least restrictive means
of achieving the procompetitive purpose of differentiating
college sports and preserving demand for them.
We agree with the NCAA's premise that antitrust law
does not require businesses to use anything like the least
restrictive means of achieving legitimate business purposes.
To the contrary, courts should not second-guess “degrees
of reasonable necessity” so that “the lawfulness of conduct
turn[s] upon judgments of degrees of effciency.” Rothery
Storage, 792 F. 2d, at 227; Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36, 58, n. 29 (1977). That would be
a recipe for disaster, for a “skilled lawyer” will “have little
diffculty imagining possible less restrictive alternatives to
most joi nt arrangements. ” 11 Areeda & Hovenkamp
¶1913b, p. 398 (2018). And judicial acceptance of such imag-
inings would risk interfering “with the legitimate objectives
at issue” without “adding that much to competition.” 7 id.,
¶1505b, at 435–436.
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Even worse, “[r]ules that seek to embody every economic
complexity
and qualifcation may well, through the vagaries
of administration, prove counter-productive, undercutting
the very economic ends they seek to serve.” Barry Wright
Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F. 2d 227, 234 (CA1 1983)
(Breyer, J.). After all, even “[u]nder the best of circum-
stances,” applying the antitrust laws “ `can be diffcult' ”—
and mistaken condemnations of legitimate business arrange-
ments “ `are especially costly, because they chill the very' ”
procompetitive conduct “ `the antitrust laws are designed to
protect.' ” Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offces of
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U. S. 398, 414 (2004). Indeed,
static judicial decrees in ever-evolving markets may them-
selves facilitate collusion or frustrate entry and competition.
Ibid. To know that the Sherman Act prohibits only unrea-
sonable restraints of trade is thus to know that attempts
to “ `[m]ete[r]' small deviations is not an appropriate anti-
tr ust func ti on. ” Hovenkamp, Antitr ust Ba lancing, 12
N. Y. U. J. L. & Bus. 369, 377 (2016).
While we agree with the NCAA's legal premise, we cannot
say the same for its factual one. Yes, at the frst step of its
inquiry, the district court held that the student-athletes had
met their burden of showing the NCAA's restraints collec-
tively bear an anticompetitive effect. And, given that, yes,
at step two the NCAA had to show only that those same
rules collectively yield a procompetitive beneft. The trou-
ble for the NCAA, though, is not the level of generality. It
is the fact that the district court found unpersuasive much
of its proffered evidence. See D. Ct. Op., at 1070–1076,
1080–1083. Recall that the court found the NCAA failed “to
establish that the challenged compensation rules . . . have
any direct connection to consumer demand.” Id., at 1070.
To be sure, there is a wrinkle here. While fnding the
NCAA had failed to establish that its rules collectively sus-
tain consumer demand, the court did fnd that “some” of
those rules “may” have procompetitive effects “to the ex-
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100 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON
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tent” they prohibit compensation “unrelated to education,
ak
in to salaries seen in professional sports leagues.” Id., at
1082–1083. The court then proceeded to what corresponds
to the third step of the American Express framework, where
it required the student-athletes “to show that there are
substantially less restrictive alternative rules that would
achieve the same procompetitive effect as the challenged
set of rules.” D. Ct. Op., at 1104. And there, of course,
the district court held that the student-athletes partially
succeeded—they were able to show that the NCAA could
achieve the procompetitive benefts it had established with
substantially less restrictive restraints on education-related
benefts.
Even acknowledging this wrinkle, we see nothing about
the district court's analysis that offends the legal principles
the NCA A i nvokes. The cour t's judg ment u lti mately
turned on the key question at the third step: whether the
student-athletes could prove that “substantially less restric-
tive alternative rules” existed to achieve the same procom-
petitive benefts the NCAA had proven at the second step.
Ibid. Of course, defciencies in the NCAA's proof of procom-
petitive benefts at the second step infuenced the analysis at
the third. But that is only because, however framed and at
whichever step, anticompetitive restraints of trade may wind
up funking the rule of reason to the extent the evidence
shows that substantially less restrictive means exist to
achieve any proven procompetitive benefts. See, e. g., 7
Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶1505, p. 428 (“To be sure, these two
questions can be collapsed into one,” since a “legitimate ob-
jective that is not promoted by the challenged restraint can
be equally served by simply abandoning the restraint, which
is surely a less restrictive alternative”).
Simply put, the district court nowhere—expressly or
effectively—required the NCAA to show that its rules con-
stituted the least restrictive means of preserving consumer
demand. Rather, it was only after fnding the NCAA's re-
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Opinion of the Court
straints “ `patently and inexplicably stricter than is neces-
sary'
” to achieve the procompetitive benefts the league had
demonstrated that the district court proceeded to declare a
violation of the Sherman Act. D. Ct. Op., at 1104. That
demanding standard hardly presages a future flled with ju-
dicial micromanagement of legitimate business decisions.
B
In a related critique, the NCAA contends the district
court “impermissibly redefned” its “product” by rejecting
its views about what amateurism requires and replacing
them with its preferred conception. Brief for Petitioner in
No. 20–512, at 35–36.
This argument, however, misapprehends the way a defend-
ant's procompetitive business justifcation relates to the anti-
trust laws. Firms deserve substantial latitude to fashion
agreements that serve leg iti mate busi ness interests—
agreements that may include efforts aimed at introducing a
new product into the marketplace. Supra, at 87–91. But
none of that means a party can relabel a restraint as a prod-
uct feature and declare it “immune from § 1 scrutiny.”
American Needle, 560 U. S., at 199, n. 7. In this suit, as in
any, the district court had to determine whether the defend-
ants' agreements harmed competition and whether any pro-
competitive benefts associated with their restraints could
be achieved by “substantially less restrictive alternative”
means. D. Ct. Op., at 1104.
The NCAA's argument not only misapprehends the in-
quiry, it would require us to overturn the district court's
factual fndings. While the NCAA asks us to defer to its
conception of amateurism, the district court found that the
NCAA had not adopted any consistent defnition. Id., at
1070. Instead, the court found, the NCAA's rules and re-
strictions on compensation have shifted markedly over time.
Id., at 1071–1074. The court found, too, that the NCAA
adopted these restrictions without any reference to “consid-
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Opinion of the Court
erations of consumer demand,” id., at 1100, and that some
were
“not necessary to preserve consumer demand,” id., at
1075, 1080, 1104. None of this is product redesign; it is a
straightforward application of the rule of reason.
C
Finally, the NCAA attacks as “indefensible” the lower
courts' holding that substantially less restrictive alternatives
exist capable of delivering the same procompetitive benefts
as its current rules. Brief for Petitioner in No. 20–512, at
46. The NCAA claims, too, that the district court's injunc-
tion threatens to “micromanage” its business. Id., at 50.
Once more, we broadly agree with the legal principles the
NCAA invokes. As we have discussed, antitrust courts
must give wide berth to business judgments before fnding
liability. See supra, at 87–91. Similar considerations apply
when it comes to the remedy. Judges must be sensitive to
the possibility that the “continuing supervision of a highly
detailed decree” could wind up impairing rather than enhan-
cing competition. Trinko, 540 U. S., at 415. Costs associ-
ated with ensuring compliance with judicial decrees may
exceed effciencies gained; the decrees themselves may unin-
tentionally suppress procompetitive innovation and even fa-
cilitate collusion. See supra, at 98–99. Judges must be
wary, too, of the temptation to specify “the proper price,
quantity, and other terms of dealing ”—cognizant that they
are neither economic nor industry experts. Trinko, 540
U. S., at 408. Judges must be open to reconsideration and
modifcation of decrees in light of changing market realities,
for “what we see may vary over time.” California Dental,
526 U. S., at 781. And throughout courts must have a
healthy respect for the practical limits of judicial administra-
tion: “An antitrust court is unlikely to be an effective
day-to-day enforcer” of a detailed decree, able to keep pace
with changing market dynamics alongside a busy docket.
Trinko, 540 U. S., at 415. Nor should any court “ `impose a
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Opinion of the Court
duty . . . that it cannot explain or adequately and reasonably
superv
ise.' ” Ibid. In short, judges make for poor “central
planners” and should never aspire to the role. Id., at 408.
Once again, though, we think the district court honored
these principles. The court enjoined only restraints on
education-related benefts—such as those limiting scholar-
ships for graduate school, payments for tutoring, and the
like. The court did so, moreover, only after fnding that
relaxing these restrictions would not blur the distinction
between college and professional sports and thus impair
demand—and only after fnding that this course represented
a signifcantly (not marginally) less restrictive means of
achieving the same procompetitive benefts as the NCAA's
current rules. D. Ct. Op., at 1104–1105.
Even with respect to education-related benefts, the dis-
trict court extended the NCAA considerable leeway. As we
have seen, the court provided that the NCAA could develop
its own defnition of benefts that relate to education and
seek modifcation of the court's injunction to refect that
defnition. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 20–512, at 168a, ¶4.
The court explained that the NCAA and its members could
agree on rules regulating how conferences and schools go
about providing these education-related benefits. Ibid.
The court said that the NCAA and its members could con-
tinue fxing education-related cash awards, too—so long as
those “limits are never lower than the limit” on awards for
athletic performance. D. Ct. Op., at 1104; App. to Pet. for
Cert. in No. 20–512, at 168a–169a, ¶5. And the court em-
phasized that its injunction applies only to the NCAA and
multiconference agreements; individual conferences remain
free to reimpose every single enjoined restraint tomorrow—
or more restrictive ones still. Id., at 169a–170a, ¶¶6–7.
In the end, it turns out that the NCAA's complaints really
boil down to three principal objections.
First, the NCAA worries about the district court's inclu-
sion of paid posteligibility internships among the education-
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Opinion of the Court
related benefts it approved. The NCAA fears that schools
w
ill use internships as a way of circumventing limits on pay-
ments that student-athletes may receive for athletic per-
formance. The NCAA even imagines that boosters might
promise posteligibility internships “at a sneaker company or
auto dealership” with extravagant salaries as a “thinly dis-
guised vehicle” for paying professional-level salaries. Brief
for Petitioner in No. 20–512, at 37–38.
This argument rests on an overly broad reading of the
injunction. The district court enjoined only restrictions on
education-related compensation or benefts “that may be
made available from conferences or schools.” App. to Pet.
for Cert. in No. 20–512, at 167a, ¶1 (emphasis added). Ac-
cordingly, as the student-athletes concede, the injunction
“does not stop the NCAA from continuing to prohibit com-
pensation from” sneaker companies, auto dealerships, boost-
ers, “or anyone else.” Brief for Respondents 47–48; see also
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 33. The NCAA
itself seems to understand this much. Following the district
court's injunction, the organization adopted new regulations
specifying that only “a conference or institution” may fund
post-el ig ibi l ity i nter nsh ips. See Decl. of M. Boyer i n
No. 4:14–md–02541, ECF Doc. 1302–2, p. 6 (ND Cal., Sept.
22, 2020) (NCAA Bylaw 16.3.4(d)).
Even when it comes to internships offered by conferences
and schools, the district court left the NCAA considerable
fexibility. The court refused to enjoin NCAA rules prohib-
iting its members from providing compensation or benefts
unrelated to legitimate educational activities—thus leaving
the league room to police phony internships. As we've ob-
served, the district court also allowed the NCAA to propose
(and enforce) rules defning what benefts do and do not re-
late to education. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 20–512, at
168a, ¶4. Accordingly, the NCAA may seek whatever limits
on paid internships it thinks appropriate. And, again, the
court stressed that individual conferences may restrict in-

Cite as: 594 U. S. 69 (2021) 105
Opinion of the Court
ternships however they wish. Id., at 169a, ¶6. All these
features
underscore the modesty of the current decree.
Second, the NCAA attacks the district court's ruling that
it may fx the aggregate limit on awards schools may give
for “academic or graduation” achievement no lower than its
aggregate limit on parallel athletic awards (currently $5,980
per year). Id., at 168a–169a, ¶5; D. Ct. Op., at 1104. This,
the NCAA asserts, “is the very defnition of a professional
salary.” Brief for Petitioner in No. 20–512, at 48. The
NCAA also represents that “[m]ost” of its currently permis-
sible athletic awards are “for genuine individual or team
achievement” and that “[m]ost . . . are received by only a few
student-athletes each year.” Ibid. Meanwhile, the NCAA
says, the district court's decree would allow a school to pay
players thousands of dollars each year for minimal achieve-
ments like maintaining a passing GPA. Ibid.
The basis for this critique is unclear. The NCAA does
not believe that the athletic awards it presently allows are
tantamount to a professional salary. And this portion of the
injunction sprang directly from the district court's fnding
that the cap on athletic participation awards “is an amount
that has been shown not to decrease consumer demand.”
D. Ct. Op., at 1088. Indeed, there was no evidence before
the district court suggesting that corresponding academic
awards would impair consumer interest in any way. Again,
too, the district court's injunction affords the NCAA leeway.
It leaves the NCAA free to reduce its athletic awards. And
it does not ordain what criteria schools must use for their
academic and graduation awards. So, once more, if the
NCAA believes certain criteria are needed to ensure that
academic awards are legitimately related to education, it is
presently free to propose such rules—and individual confer-
ences may adopt even stricter ones.
Third, the NCAA contends that allowing schools to pro-
vide in-kind educational benefts will pose a problem. This
relief focuses on allowing schools to offer scholarships for
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Opinion of the Court
“graduate degrees” or “vocational school” and to pay for
th
ings like “computers” and “tutoring.” App. to Pet. for
Cert. in No. 20–512, at 167a–168a, ¶2. But the NCAA fears
schools might exploit this authority to give student-athletes
“ `luxury cars' ” “to get to class” and “other unnecessary or
inordinately valuable items” only “nominally” related to edu-
cation. Brief for Petitioner in No. 20–512, at 48–49.
Again, however, this over-reads the injunction in ways we
have seen and need not belabor. Under the current decree,
the NCAA is free to forbid in-kind benefts unrelated to a
student's actual education; nothing stops it from enforcing
a “no Lamborghini” rule. And, again, the district court
invited the NCAA to specify and later enforce rules deline-
ating which benefts it considers legitimately related to edu-
cati on. To the extent the NCA A believes meaning fu l
ambiguity really exists about the scope of its authority—
regarding internships, academic awards, in-kind benefts, or
anything else—it has been free to seek clarifcation from the
district court since the court issued its injunction three years
ago. The NCAA remains free to do so today. To date, the
NCAA has sought clarifcation only once—about the precise
amount at which it can cap academic awards—and the ques-
tion was quickly resolved. Before conjuring hypothetical
concerns in this Court, we believe it best for the NCAA to
present any practically important question it has in district
court frst.
When it comes to fashioning an antitrust remedy, we
acknowledge that caution is key. Judges must resist the
temptation to require that enterprises employ the least re-
strictive means of achieving their legitimate business objec-
tives. Judges must be mindful, too, of their limitations—as
generalists, as lawyers, and as outsiders trying to under-
stand intricate business relationships. Judges must remain
aware that markets are often more effective than the heavy
hand of judicial power when it comes to enhancing consumer
welfare. And judges must be open to clarifying and recon-

Cite as: 594 U. S. 69 (2021) 107
Kavanaugh, J., concurring
sidering their decrees in light of changing market realities.
Cour
ts reviewing complex business arrangements should, in
other words, be wary about invitations to “set sail on a sea
of doubt.” United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85
F. 271, 284 (CA6 1898) (Taft, J.). But we do not believe the
district court fell prey to that temptation. Its judgment
does not foat on a sea of doubt but stands on frm ground—
an exhaustive factual record, a thoughtful legal analysis con-
sistent with established antitrust principles, and a healthy
dose of judicial humility.
*
Some will think the district court did not go far enough.
By permitting colleges and universities to offer enhanced
education-related benefts, its decision may encourage scho-
lastic achievement and allow student-athletes a measure of
compensation more consistent with the value they bring to
their schools. Still, some will see this as a poor substitute
for fuller relief. At the same time, others will think the dis-
trict court went too far by undervaluing the social benefts
associated with amateur athletics. For our part, though, we
can only agree with the Ninth Circuit: “ `The national debate
about amateurism in college sports is important. But our
task as appellate judges is not to resolve it. Nor could we.
Our task is simply to review the district court judgment
through the appropriate lens of antitrust law.' ” 958 F. 3d,
at 1265. That review persuades us the district court acted
within the law's bounds.
The judgment is
Affrmed.
Justice Kavanaugh, concurring.
The NCAA has long restricted the compensation and ben-
efts that student athletes may receive. And with surpris-
ing success, the NCAA has long shielded its compensation
rules from ordinary antitrust scrutiny. Today, however, the
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108 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON
Kavanaugh, J., concurring
Court holds that the NCAA has violated the antitrust laws.
The
Court's decision marks an important and overdue course
correction, and I join the Court's excellent opinion in full.
But this case involves only a narrow subset of the NCAA's
compensati on r u les—namely, the r u les restr ic ting the
education-related benefts that student athletes may receive,
such as post-eligibility scholarships at graduate or vocational
schools. The rest of the NCAA's compensation rules are not
at issue here and therefore remain on the books. Those
remaining compensation rules generally restrict student
athletes from receiving compensation or benefts from their
colleges for playing sports. And those rules have also
historically restricted student athletes from receiving money
from endorsement deals and the like.
I add this concurring opinion to underscore that the
NCAA's remaining compensation rules also raise serious
questions under the antitrust laws. Three points warrant
emphasis.
First, the Court does not address the legality of the
NCAA's remaining compensation rules. As the Court says,
“the student-athletes do not renew their across-the-board
challenge to the NCAA's compensation restrictions. Ac-
cordingly, we do not pass on the rules that remain in place or
the district court's judgment upholding them. Our review
is confned to those restrictions now enjoined.” Ante, at 86.
Second, although the Court does not weigh in on the ulti-
mate legality of the NCAA's remaining compensation rules,
the Court's decision establishes how any such rules should
be analyzed going forward. After today's decision, the
NCAA's remaining compensation rules should receive ordi-
nary “rule of reason” scrutiny under the antitrust laws.
The Court makes clear that the decades-old “stray com-
ments” about college sports and amateurism made in Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of Regents of Univ.
of Okla., 468 U. S. 85 (1984), were dicta and have no bearing
on whether the NCAA's current compensation rules are law-
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Kavanaugh, J., concurring
ful. Ante, at 93. And the Court stresses that the NCAA
is
not otherwise entitled to an exemption from the antitrust
laws. Ante, at 95–96; see also Radovich v. National Foot-
ball League, 352 U. S. 445, 449–452 (1957). As a result, ab-
sent legislation or a negotiated agreement between the
NCAA and the student athletes, the NCAA's remaining com-
pensation rules should be subject to ordinary rule of reason
scrutiny. See ante, at 90–91.
Third, there are serious questions whether the NCAA's
remaining compensation rules can pass muster under ordi-
nary rule of reason scrutiny. Under the rule of reason, the
NCAA must supply a legally valid procompetitive justifca-
tion for its remaining compensation rules. As I see it, how-
ever, the NCAA may lack such a justifcation.
The NCAA acknowledges that it controls the market for
college athletes. The NCAA concedes that its compensa-
tion rules set the price of student athlete labor at a below-
market rate. And the NCA A recog ni zes that student
athletes currently have no meaningful ability to negotiate
with the NCAA over the compensation rules.
The NCAA nonetheless asserts that its compensation
rules are procompetitive because those rules help defne the
product of college sports. Specifcally, the NCAA says that
colleges may decline to pay student athletes because the de-
fning feature of college sports, according to the NCAA, is
that the student athletes are not paid.
In my view, that argument is circular and unpersuasive.
The NCAA couches its arguments for not paying student
athletes in innocuous labels. But the labels cannot disguise
the reality: The NCAA's business model would be fatly ille-
gal in almost any other industry in America. All of the res-
taurants in a region cannot come together to cut cooks'
wages on the theory that “customers prefer” to eat food from
low-paid cooks. Law frms cannot conspire to cabin lawyers'
salaries in the name of providing legal services out of a “love
of the law.” Hospitals cannot agree to cap nurses' income in
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110 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON
Kavanaugh, J., concurring
order to create a “purer” form of helping the sick. News
organi
zations cannot join forces to curtail pay to reporters to
preserve a “tradition” of public-minded journalism. Movie
studios cannot collude to slash benefts to camera crews to
kindle a “spirit of amateurism” in Hollywood.
Price-fxing labor is price-fxing labor. And price-fxing
labor is ordinarily a textbook antitrust problem because it
extinguishes the free market in which individuals can other-
wise obtain fair compensation for their work. See, e. g., Tex-
aco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U. S. 1, 5 (2006). Businesses like the
NCAA cannot avoid the consequences of price-fxing labor
by incorporating price-fxed labor into the defnition of the
product. Or to put it in more doctrinal terms, a monopsony
cannot launder its price-fxing of labor by calling it product
defnition.
The bottom line is that the NCAA and its member colleges
are suppressing the pay of student athletes who collectively
generate billions of dollars in revenues for colleges every
year. Those enormous sums of money fow to seemingly
everyone except the student athletes. College presidents,
athletic directors, coaches, conference commissioners, and
NCAA executives take in six- and seven-fgure salaries.
Colleges build lavish new facilities. But the student ath-
letes who generate the revenues, many of whom are African
American and from lower-income backgrounds, end up with
little or nothing. See Brief for African American Antitrust
Lawyers as Amici Curiae 13–17.
Everyone agrees that the NCAA can require student
athletes to be enrolled students in good standing. But the
NCAA's business model of using unpaid student athletes to
generate billions of dollars in revenue for the colleges raises
serious questions under the antitrust laws. In particular, it
is highly questionable whether the NCAA and its member
colleges can justify not paying student athletes a fair share
of the revenues on the circular theory that the defning char-
acteristic of college sports is that the colleges do not pay
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Cite as: 594 U. S. 69 (2021) 111
Kavanaugh, J., concurring
student athletes. And if that asserted justifcation is un-
avai
ling, it is not clear how the NCAA can legally defend its
remaining compensation rules.
If it turns out that some or all of the NCAA's remaining
compensation rules violate the antitrust laws, some diffcult
policy and practical questions would undoubtedly ensue.
Among them: How would paying greater compensation to
student athletes affect non-revenue-raising sports? Could
student athletes in some sports but not others receive com-
pensation? How would any compensation regime comply
with Title IX? If paying student athletes requires some-
thing like a salary cap in some sports in order to preserve
competitive balance, how would that cap be administered?
And given that there are now about 180,000 Division I stu-
dent athletes, what is a fnancially sustainable way of fairly
compensating some or all of those student athletes?
Of course, those diffcult questions could be resolved in
ways other than litigation. Legislation would be one option.
Or colleges and student athletes could potentially engage in
collective bargaining (or seek some other negotiated agree-
ment) to provide student athletes a fairer share of the reve-
nues that they generate for their colleges, akin to how
professional football and basketball players have negotiated
for a share of league revenues. Cf. Brown v. Pro Football,
Inc., 518 U. S. 231, 235–237 (1996); Wood v. National Basket-
ball Assn., 809 F. 2d 954, 958–963 (CA2 1987) (R. Winter, J.).
Regardless of how those issues ultimately would be resolved,
however, the NCAA's current compensation regime raises
serious questions under the antitrust laws.
To be sure, the NCAA and its member colleges maintain
important traditions that have become part of the fabric of
America—game days in Tuscaloosa and South Bend; the
packed gyms in Storrs and Durham; the women's and men's
lacrosse championships on Memorial Day weekend; track and
feld meets in Eugene; the spring softball and baseball World
Series in Oklahoma City and Omaha; the list goes on. But
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112 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON
Kavanaugh, J., concurring
those traditions alone cannot justify the NCAA's decision to
bui
ld a massive money-raising enterprise on the backs of stu-
dent athletes who are not fairly compensated. Nowhere
else in America can businesses get away with agreeing not
to pay their workers a fair market rate on the theory that
their product is defned by not paying their workers a fair
market rate. And under ordinary principles of antitrust
law, it is not evident why college sports should be any differ-
ent. The NCAA is not above the law.
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