Alaska v. Wright

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 593 U. S. Part 1
Pages 152–154
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
April 26, 2021
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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152 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Per Curiam
ALASKA v. WRIGHT
on
petition for writ of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 20–940. Decided April 26, 2021
An Alaska jury convicted Sean Wright of sexual abuse charges, and he
served his sentence for those state crimes. Wright then moved to Ten-
nessee, where he failed to register as a sex offender as required by
federal law. See 34 U. S. C. §§ 20911, 20913. Wright pleaded guilty to
failure to register and received a sentence of time served along with
fve years of supervised release. During those federal proceedings in
Tennessee, Wright fled a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the District of Alaska pursuant to 28
U. S. C. §§ 2241 and 2254. He argued that the Alaska Supreme Court
had unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when it denied
his Sixth Amendment claims and affrmed his state conviction on the
sexual abuse charges. The District Court denied Wright's petition be-
cause Wright was not “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court.” § 2254(a). The Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that because
Wright's state conviction was “a necessary predicate” to his federal con-
viction, Wright was in custody pursuant to a state-court judgment.
Held: The Court of Appeals clearly erred. Section 2254(a) permits a fed-
eral court to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on
behalf of a person “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court.” That Wright's state conviction served as a predicate for his
federal conviction did not render him “in custody pursuant to the judg-
ment of a State court” under § 2254(a). See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U. S.
488 (per curiam).
Certiorari granted; 819 Fed. Appx. 544, vacated and remanded.
Per Curiam.
In 2009, an Alaska jury convicted Sean Wright of 13 counts
of sexual abuse of a minor. See State v. Wright, 404 P. 3d
166, 170 (Alaska 2017). Wright fnished serving his sentence
in Alaska in 2016, and shortly thereafter he moved to Ten-
nessee. Once there, he failed to register as a sex offender
as required by federal law. See Sex Offender Registration
and Notifcation Act, 120 Stat. 591, 593, 34 U. S. C. §§ 20911,

Cite
as: 593 U. S. 152 (2021)
153
Per Curiam
20913. Wright pleaded guilty to one count of failure to reg-
ister
, see 18 U. S. C. § 2250(a), and ultimately received a sen-
tence of time served along with fve years of supervised
release. See Judgment in United States v. Wright, No. 1:17–
cr–00112, ECF Doc. No. 66 (ED Tenn.).
During the course of those federal proceedings, Wright
fled a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for the District of Alaska pursuant to
28 U. S. C. §§ 2241 and 2254. He argued that the Alaska Su-
preme Court had unreasonably applied clearly established
federal law when it denied his Sixth Amendment claims and
affrmed his 2009 state conviction and sentence. The Dis-
trict Court denied the motion on the threshold ground that
Wright was not “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court.” § 2254(a). Noting that a proper motion under
§ 2254(a) requires more than merely being “in custody” some-
where, the court reasoned that “the proper procedure for
Wright to challenge his current federal custody would be a
motion fled in the Eastern District of Tennessee pursuant
to 28 U. S. C. § 2255.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 16a.
The Court of Appeals reversed. In its view, Wright's
state conviction was “ `a necessary predicate' ” to his federal
conviction, 819 Fed. Appx. 544, 545 (CA9 2020) (quoting
Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F. 3d 1015, 1019 (CA9 2001)), so Wright
was in fact in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state
court. The panel declined to assess the District Court's
view that § 2255, rather than § 2254, provided the proper
route for Wright to challenge his current custody. 819 Fed.
Appx., at 546, n. 1. One judge concurred and asserted that
§ 2254 was the proper mechanism “because Wright is not at-
tacking the constitutionality of his federal conviction for fail-
ing to register as a sex offender in Tennessee; he is collater-
ally attacking the constitutionality of his predicate Alaska
conviction for sexual abuse of a minor.” Id., at 546.
The Court of Appeals clearly erred. Section 2254(a) per-
mits a federal court to entertain an application for a writ of
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154 ALASK
A v. WRIGHT
Per Curiam
habeas corpus on behalf of a person “in custody pursuant to
the
judgment of a State court.” In Maleng v. Cook, 490
U. S. 488 (1989) (per curiam), we held that a habeas peti-
tioner does not remain “in custody” under a conviction “after
the sentence imposed for it has fully expired, merely because
of the possibility that the prior conviction will be used to
enhance the sentences imposed for any subsequent crimes
of which he is convicted.” Id., at 492; see also id., at
490 (noting the “in custody” requirement appears in both
§§ 2241(c)(3) and 2254(a)). It made no difference, we said,
that the possibility of a prior-conviction enhancement had
materialized for the habeas petitioner in that case: “When
the second sentence is imposed, it is pursuant to the second
conviction that the petitioner is incarcerated and is therefore
`in custody.' ” Id., at 492–493.
That Wright's state conviction served as a predicate for
his federal conviction thus did not render him “in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court” under § 2254(a).
If Wright's second conviction had been for a state crime, he
independently could have satisfed § 2254(a)'s “in custody” re-
quirement, see Lackawanna County District Attorney v.
Coss, 532 U. S. 394, 401–402 (2001), though his ability to at-
tack the frst conviction by that means would have been lim-
ited, see id., at 402–404. Wright could not satisfy § 2254(a)
on that independent basis for the simple reason that his sec-
ond judgment was entered by a federal court.
***
We express no view on the other theories Wright advanced
before the District Court for meeting the requirements of
§ 2254(a). We grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, va-
cate the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, and remand the case to that court for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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