Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist.

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 592 U. S. Part 2
Pages 351–384
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
March 25, 2021
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

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OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
351
Syllabus
FORD MOTOR CO. v. MONTANA EIGHTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT
COURT et al.
certiorari to the supreme court of montana
No. 19–368. Argued October 7, 2020—Decided March 25, 2021*
Ford Motor Company is a global auto company, incorporated in Delaware
and headquartered in Michigan. Ford markets, sells, and services its
products across the United States and overseas. The company also en-
courages a resale market for its vehicles. In each of these two cases, a
state court exercised jurisdiction over Ford in a products-liability suit
stemming from a car accident that injured a resident in the State. The
frst suit alleged that a 1996 Ford Explorer had malfunctioned, killing
Markkaya Gullett near her home in Montana. In the second suit, Adam
Bandemer claimed that he was injured in a collision on a Minnesota road
involving a defective 1994 Crown Victoria. Ford moved to dismiss both
suits for lack of personal jurisdiction. It argued that each state court
had jurisdiction only if the company's conduct in the State had given
rise to the plaintiff 's claims. And that causal link existed, according to
Ford, only if the company had designed, manufactured, or sold in the
State the particular vehicle involved in the accident. In neither suit
could the plaintiff make that showing. The vehicles were designed and
manufactured elsewhere, and the company had originally sold the cars
at issue outside the forum States. Only later resales and relocations by
consumers had brought the vehicles to Montana and Minnesota. Both
States' supreme courts rejected Ford's argument. Each held that the
company's activities in the State had the needed connection to the plain-
tiff 's allegations that a defective Ford caused in-state injury.
Held: The connection between the plaintiffs' claims and Ford's activities
in the forum States is close enough to support specifc jurisdiction.
Pp. 358–371.
(a) The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause limits a state
court's power to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant. The canonical
decision in this area remains International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U. S. 310. There, the Court held that a tribunal's authority depends on
the defendant's having such “contacts” with the forum State that “the
maintenance of the suit” is “reasonable” and “does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id., at 316–317. In apply-
*Together with No. 19–369, Ford Motor Co. v. Bandemer, on certiorari
to the Supreme Court of Minnesota.

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352 FORD
MOTOR CO. v. MONTANA EIGHTH
JUDICIAL DIST. COURT
Syllabus
ing that formulation, the Court has long focused on the nature and
extent
of “the defendant's relationship to the forum State.” Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty., 582
U. S. 255, 262. That focus has led to the recognition of two types of
personal jurisdiction: general and specifc jurisdiction. A state court
may exercise general jurisdiction only when a defendant is “essentially
at home” in the State. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A v.
Brown, 564 U. S 915, 919. Specifc jurisdiction covers defendants less
intimately connected with a State, but only as to a narrower class of
claims. To be subject to that kind of jurisdiction, the defendant must
take “some act by which [it] purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U. S. 235, 253. And the plaintiff 's claims “must arise out of or relate
to the defendant's contacts” with the forum. Bristol-Myers, 582 U. S.,
at 262. Pp. 358−360.
(b) Ford admits that it has “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privi-
lege of conducting activities” in both States. Hanson, 357 U. S., at 253.
The company's claim is instead that those activities are insuffciently
connected to the suits. In Ford's view, due process requires a causal
link locating jurisdiction only in the State where Ford sold the car in
question, or the States where Ford designed and manufactured the vehi-
cle. And because none of these things occurred in Montana or Minne-
sota, those States' courts have no power over these cases.
Ford's causation-only approach fnds no support in this Court's re-
quirement of a “connection” between a plaintiff 's suit and a defendant's
activities. Bristol-Myers, 582 U. S., at 265. The most common formu-
lation of that rule demands that the suit “arise out of or relate to the
defendant's contacts with the forum.” Id., at 262. The second half of
that formulation, following the word “or,” extends beyond causality. So
the inquiry is not over if a causal test would put jurisdiction elsewhere.
Another State's courts may yet have jurisdiction, because of a non-
causal “affliation between the forum and the underlying controversy,
principally, [an] activity or an occurrence involving the defendant that
takes place within the State's borders.” Ibid.
And this Court has stated that specifc jurisdiction attaches in cases
identical to this one—when a company cultivates a market for a product
in the forum State and the product malfunctions there. See World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286. Here, Ford adver-
tises and markets its vehicles in Montana and Minnesota, including the
two models that allegedly malfunctioned in those States. Apart from
sales, the company works hard to foster ongoing connections to its cars'
owners. All this Montana- and Minnesota-based conduct relates to the
claims in these cases, brought by state residents in the States' courts.
Put slightly differently, because Ford had systematically served a mar-

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 351 (2021)
353
Syllabus
ket in Montana and Minnesota for the very vehicles that the plaintiffs
a
llege malfunctioned and injured them in those States, there is a strong
“relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation”—the
“essential foundation” of specifc jurisdiction. Helicopteros Nacionales
de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U. S. 408, 414. Allowing jurisdic-
tion in these circumstances both treats Ford fairly and serves principles
of “interstate federalism.” World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U. S., 293.
Pp. 361–369.
(c) Bristol-Myers and Walden v. Fiore, 571 U. S. 277, reinforce all
that the Court has said about why Montana's and Minnesota's courts
may decide these cases. In Bristol-Myers, the Court found jurisdiction
improper because the forum State, and the defendant's activities there,
lacked any connection to the plaintiffs' claims. 582 U. S., at 265. That
is not true of these cases, where the plaintiffs are residents of the forum
States, used the allegedly defective products in the forum States, and
suffered injuries when those products malfunctioned there. And Wal-
den does not show, as Ford claims, that a plaintiff 's residence and place
of injury can never support jurisdiction. The defendant in Walden had
never formed any contact with the forum State. Ford, by contrast, has
a host of forum connections. The place of a plaintiff 's injury and resi-
dence may be relevant in assessing the link between those connections
and the plaintiff 's suit. Pp. 369–371.
No. 19–368, 395 Mont. 478, 443 P. 3d 407, and No. 19–369, 931 N. W. 2d
744, affrmed.
Kagan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined. Alito, J., fled
an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 372. Gorsuch, J., fled an
opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined, post,
p. 375. Barrett, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the
cases.
Sean Marotta argued the cause for petitioner in both
cases. With him on the briefs were Neal Kumar Katyal,
Jessica L. Ellsworth, Kirti Datla, Mitchell P. Reich, Reedy
C. Swanson, and Erin R. Chapman.
Deepak Gupta argued the cause for respondents in both
cases. With him on the brief were Gregory A. Beck and
Jennifer Bennett.†
†Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were fled for the
United States by Solicitor General Francisco, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Hunt, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Deputy Assistant Attor-
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354 FORD
MOTOR CO. v. MONTANA EIGHTH
JUDICIAL DIST. COURT
Opinion of the Court
Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court.
In
each of these two cases, a state court held that it had
jurisdiction over Ford Motor Company in a products-liability
suit stemming from a car accident. The accident happened
in the State where suit was brought. The victim was one
ney General Mooppan, Vivek Suri, Michael S. Raab, and Joseph F. Busa;
for the Alliance for Automotive Innovation et al. by Jaime A. Santos and
Darryl M. Woo; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America et al. by Andrew J. Pincus, Archis A. Parasharami, Daniel E.
Jones, and Patrick Hedren; for the Institute of International Bankers
by Elbert Lin; for the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America by Virginia A. Seitz, Jonathan F. Cohn, Allan Rothman, James
C. Stansel, and Melissa B. Kimmel; for the Product Liability Advisory
Council, Inc., by David R. Geiger; and for the Washington Legal Founda-
tion by Amanda K. Rice, Cory L. Andrews, Corbin K. Barthold, and
Beth Heifetz.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance in both cases were fled for the
State of Minnesota et al. by Keith Ellison, Attorney General of Minnesota,
Liz Kramer, Solicitor General, Jason Marisam, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Pete Surdo, Special Assistant Attorney General, Ken Paxton, Attor-
ney General of Texas, Jeffrey C. Mateer, First Assistant Attorney General,
Kyle D. Hawkins, Solicitor General, Bill Davis, Deputy Solicitor General,
Lisa A. Bennett, Assistant Solicitor General, and Abigail M. Frisch, As-
sistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respec-
tive jurisdictions as follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Kevin G. Clark-
son of Alaska, Leslie Rutledge of Arkansas, Xavier Becerra of California,
Phil Weiser of Colorado, William Tong of Connecticut, Kathleen Jennings
of Delaware, Karl A. Racin, Attorney General of the District of Columbia,
Ashley Moody of Florida, Clare E. Connors of Hawaii, Lawrence G. Was-
den of Idaho, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Tom Miller of Iowa, Jeff Landry
of Louisiana, Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Brian E. Frosh of Maryland,
Maura Healey of Massachusetts, Dana Nessel of Michigan, Lynn Fitch of
Mississippi, Timothy C. Fox of Montana, Douglas J. Peterson of Nebraska,
Aaron D. Ford of Nevada, Gurbir S. Grewal of New Jersey, Hector Bald-
eras of New Mexico, Joshua H. Stein of North Carolina, Wayne Steneh jem
of North Dakota, Mike Hunter of Oklahoma, Ellen F. Rosenblum of Ore-
gon, Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania, Peter F. Neronha of Rhode Island,
Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Jason Ravnsborg of South Dakota, Her-
bert H. Slatery III of Tennessee, Sean D. Reyes of Utah, Thomas J. Dono-
van, Jr., of Vermont, Mark R. Herring of Virginia, Robert W. Ferguson of
Washington, and Patrick Morrisey of West Virginia; for the American

Cite
as: 592 U. S. 351 (2021)
355
Opinion of the Court
of the State's residents. And Ford did substantial business
i
n the State—among other things, advertising, selling, and
servicing the model of vehicle the suit claims is defective.
Still, Ford contends that jurisdiction is improper because the
particular car involved in the crash was not frst sold in the
forum State, nor was it designed or manufactured there.
We re jec t that arg ument. W hen a company like Ford
serves a market for a product in a State and that product
causes injury in the State to one of its residents, the State's
courts may entertain the resulting suit.
I
Ford is a global auto company. It is incorporated in Dela-
ware and headquartered in Michigan. But its business is
everywhere. Ford markets, sells, and services its products
across the United States and overseas. In this country
alone, the company annually distributes over 2.5 million new
cars, trucks, and SUVs to over 3,200 licensed dealerships.
See App. 70, 100. Ford also encourages a resale market for
its products: Almost all its dealerships buy and sell used
Fords, as well as selling new ones. To enhance its brand and
increase its sales, Ford engages in wide-ranging promotional
activities, including television, print, online, and direct-mail
advertisements. No matter where you live, you've seen
them: “Have you driven a Ford lately?” or “Built Ford
Tough.” Ford also ensures that consumers can keep their
Association for Justice et al. by Robert S. Peck and Jeffrey R. White;
for Civil Procedure Professors by Alan B. Morrison; for Civil Procedure
Professors by Pamela K. Bookman and D. Theodore Rave, both pro se;
for the Foundation for Moral Law by Martin Wishnatsky; for Main Street
Alliance by Hassan A. Zavareei; for the National Association of Home
Builders by Eric F. Citron, Daniel Woofter, and Erica Oleszczuk Evans;
for Professors of Civil Procedure and Federal Courts by Linda Sandstrom
Simard; for Professors of Jurisdiction by Vincent Levy and Gregory Dubi-
nsky; and for Jonathan R. Nash by Jonathan R. Nash, pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled in both cases for the Center for Auto
Safety by Larry E. Coben and Jason Levine; and for DRI-The Voice of
the Defense Bar by Lisa M. Baird, James C. Martin, and James M. Beck.
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356 FORD
MOTOR CO. v. MONTANA EIGHTH
JUDICIAL DIST. COURT
Opinion of the Court
vehicles running long past the date of sale. The company
prov
ides original parts to auto supply stores and repair
shops across the country. (Goes another slogan: “Keep your
Ford a Ford.”) And Ford's own network of dealers offers
an array of maintenance and repair services, thus fostering
an ongoing relationship between Ford and its customers.
Accidents involving two of Ford's vehicles—a 1996 Ex-
plorer and a 1994 Crown Victoria—are at the heart of the
suits before us. One case comes from Montana. Markkaya
Gullett was driving her Explorer near her home in the State
when the tread separated from a rear tire. The vehicle spun
out, rolled into a ditch, and came to rest upside down. Gul-
lett died at the scene of the crash. The representative of
her estate sued Ford in Montana state court, bringing claims
for a design defect, failure to warn, and negligence. The
second case comes from Minnesota. Adam Bandemer was a
passenger in his friend's Crown Victoria, traveling on a rural
road in the State to a favorite ice-fshing spot. When his
friend rear-ended a snowplow, this car too landed in a
ditch. Bandemer's air bag failed to deploy, and he suffered
serious brain damage. He sued Ford in Minnesota state
court, asserting products-liability, negligence, and breach-of-
warranty claims.
Ford moved to dismiss the two suits for lack of personal
jurisdiction, on basically identical grounds. According to
Ford, the state court (whether in Montana or Minnesota) had
jurisdiction only if the company's conduct in the State had
given rise to the plaintiff's claims. And that causal link ex-
isted, Ford continued, only if the company had designed,
manufactured, or—most likely—sold in the State the particu-
lar vehicle involved in the accident.
1
In neither suit could
the plaintiff make that showing. Ford had designed the Ex-
1
Ford's Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss in Lucero v. Ford Motor
Co., No. DV–18–247 (8th Jud. Dist., Cascade Cty., Mont.), pp. 14−15; Ford
Motor Co.'s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss in No. 77–cv–
16–1025 (7th Jud. Dist., Todd Cty., Minn.), pp. 11−12, and n. 3.
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357
Opinion of the Court
plorer and Crown Victoria in Michigan, and it had manufac-
tured
the cars in (respectively) Kentucky and Canada. Still
more, the company had originally sold the cars at issue out-
side the forum States—the Explorer in Washington, the
Crown Victoria in North Dakota. Only later resales and re-
locations by consumers had brought the vehicles to Montana
and Minnesota. That meant, in Ford's view, that the courts
of those States could not decide the suits.
Both the Montana and the Minnesota Supreme Courts (af-
frming lower court decisions) rejected Ford's argument.
The Montana court began by detailing the varied ways Ford
“purposefully” seeks to “serve the market in Montana.” 395
Mont. 478, 488, 443 P. 3d 407, 414 (2019). The company ad-
vertises in the State; “has thirty-six dealerships” there;
“sells automobiles, specifcally Ford Explorers[,] and parts”
to Montana residents; and provides them with “certifed re-
pair, replacement, and recall services.” Ibid. Next, the
court assessed the relationship between those activities and
the Gullett suit. Ford's conduct, said the court, encourages
“Montana residents to drive Ford vehicles.” Id., at 491, 443
P. 3d, at 416. When that driving causes in-state injury, the
ensuing claims have enough of a tie to Ford's Montana activi-
ties to support jurisdiction. Whether Ford “designed, man-
ufactured, or sold [the] vehicle” in the State, the court con-
cluded, is “immaterial.” Ibid. Minnesota's Supreme Court
agreed. It highlighted how Ford's “marketing and adver-
tisements” infuenced state residents to “purchase and drive
more Ford vehicles.” 931 N. W. 2d 744, 754 (2019). Indeed,
Ford had sold in Minnesota “more than 2,000 1994 Crown
Victoria[s]”—the “very type of car” involved in Bandemer's
suit. Id., at 751, 754. That the “particular vehicle” injur-
ing him was “designed, manufactured, [and frst] sold” else-
where made no difference. Id., at 753 (emphasis in original).
In the court's view, Ford's Minnesota activities still had the
needed connection to Bandemer's allegations that a defective
Crown Victoria caused in-state injury. See id., at 754.

358 FORD
MOTOR CO. v. MONTANA EIGHTH
JUDICIAL DIST. COURT
Opinion of the Court
We granted certiorari to consider if Ford is subject to
jur
isdiction in these cases. 589 U. S. ––– (2020). We hold
that it is.
II
A
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause limits a
state court's power to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant.
The canonical decision in this area remains International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945). There, the
Court held that a tribunal's authority depends on the defend-
ant's having such “contacts” with the forum State that “the
maintenance of the suit” is “reasonable, in the context of our
federal system of government,” and “does not offend tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id., at
316–317 (internal quotation marks omitted). In giving con-
tent to that formulation, the Court has long focused on the
nature and extent of “the defendant's relationship to the
forum State.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court
of Cal., San Francisco Cty., 582 U. S. 255, 262 (2017) (citing
cases). That focus led to our recognizing two kinds of per-
sonal jurisdiction: general (sometimes called all-purpose) ju-
risdiction and specifc (sometimes called case-linked) juris-
diction. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v.
Brown, 564 U. S. 915, 919 (2011).
A state court may exercise general jurisdiction only when
a defendant is “essentially at home” in the State. Ibid.
General jurisdiction, as its name implies, extends to “any
andall claims” brought against a defendant. Ibid. Those
claims need not relate to the forum State or the defendant's
activity there; they may concern events and conduct any-
where in the world. But that breadth imposes a correlative
limit: Only a select “set of affliations with a forum” will ex-
pose a defendant to such sweeping jurisdiction. Daimler
AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. 117, 137 (2014). In what we have
called the “paradigm” case, an individual is subject to gen-
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359
Opinion of the Court
eral jurisdiction in her place of domicile. Ibid. (internal
quot
ation marks omitted). And the “equivalent” forums for
a corporation are its place of incorporation and principal
place of business. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted);
see id., at 139, n. 19 (leaving open “the possibility that in
an exceptional case” a corporation might also be “at home”
elsewhere). So general jurisdiction over Ford (as all parties
agree) attaches in Delaware and Michigan—not in Montana
and Minnesota. See supra, at 355.
Specifc jurisdiction is different: It covers defendants less
intimately connected with a State, but only as to a narrower
class of claims. The contacts needed for this kind of ju-
risdiction often go by the name “purposeful availment.”
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462, 475 (1985).
The defendant, we have said, must take “some act by which
[it] purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U. S. 235, 253 (1958). The contacts must be the defendant's
own choice and not “random, isolated, or fortuitous.” Kee-
ton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U. S. 770, 774 (1984).
They must show that the defendant deliberately “reached
out beyond” its home—by, for example, “exploi[ting] a mar-
ket” in the forum State or entering a contractual relationship
centered there. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U. S. 277, 285 (2014)
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Yet
even then—because the defendant is not “at home”—the
forum State may exercise jurisdiction in only certain cases.
The plaintiff 's claims, we have often stated, “must arise out
of or relate to the defendant's contacts” with the forum.
Bristol-Myers, 582 U. S., at 262 (quoting Daimler, 571 U. S.,
at 127; alterations omitted); see, e. g., Burger King, 471 U. S.,
at 472; Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall,
466 U. S. 408, 414 (1984); International Shoe, 326 U. S., at
319. Or put just a bit differently, “there must be `an afflia-
tion between the forum and the underlying controversy,
principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place
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360 FORD
MOTOR CO. v. MONTANA EIGHTH
JUDICIAL DIST. COURT
Opinion of the Court
in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State's
reg
ulation.' ” Bristol-Myers, 582 U. S., at 262, 264 (quoting
Goodyear, 564 U. S., at 919).
These rules derive from and refect two sets of values—
treating defendants fairly and protecting “interstate federal-
ism.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S.
286, 293 (1980); see id., at 297–298. Our decision in Interna-
tional Shoe founded specifc jurisdiction on an idea of reci-
procity between a defendant and a State: When (but only
when) a company “exercises the privilege of conducting ac-
tivities within a state”—thus “enjoy[ing] the benefts and
protection of [its] laws”—the State may hold the company to
account for related misconduct. 326 U. S., at 319; see Burger
King, 471 U. S., at 475−476. Later decisions have added
that our doctrine similarly provides defendants with “fair
warning ”—knowledge that “a particular activity may sub-
ject [it] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.” Id., at
472 (internal quotation marks omitted); World-Wide Volks-
wagen, 444 U. S., at 297 (likewise referring to “clear notice”).
A defendant can thus “structure [its] primary conduct” to
lessen or avoid exposure to a given State's courts. Id., at
297. And this Court has considered alongside defendants'
interests those of the States in relation to each other. One
State's “sovereign power to try” a suit, we have recognized,
may prevent “sister States” from exercising their like au-
thority. Id., at 293. The law of specifc jurisdiction thus
seeks to ensure that States with “little legitimate interest”
in a suit do not encroach on States more affected by the
controversy. Bristol-Myers, 582 U. S., at 263.
2
2
One of the concurrences here expresses a worry that our International
Shoe-based body of law is not “well suited for the way in which business
is now conducted,” and tentatively suggests a 21st-century rethinking.
Post, at 372 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). Fair enough perhaps,
see in fra, at 366, n. 4, but the concurrence then acknowledges that these
cases have no distinctively modern features, and it decides them on
grounds that (as it agrees) are much the same as ours. See post, at 3−4;
compare ibid. with in fra, at 364–368. The other concurrence proposes
instead a return to the mid-19th century—a replacement of our current
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361
Opinion of the Court
B
F
ord contends that our jurisdictional rules prevent Mon-
tana's and Minnesota's courts from deciding these two suits.
In making that argument, Ford does not contest that it does
substantial business in Montana and Minnesota—that it ac-
tively seeks to serve the market for automobiles and related
products in those States. See Brief for Petitioner 6, 9, 13.
Or to put that concession in more doctrinal terms, Ford
agrees that it has “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privi-
lege of conducting activities” in both places. Hanson, 357
U. S., at 253; see supra, at 359−360. Ford's claim is instead
that those activities do not suffciently connect to the suits,
even though the resident-plaintiffs allege that Ford cars mal-
functioned in the forum States. In Ford's view, the needed
link must be causal in nature: Jurisdiction attaches “only if
the defendant's forum conduct gave rise to the plaintiff 's
claims.” Brief for Petitioner 13 (emphasis in original).
And that rule reduces, Ford thinks, to locating specifc juris-
diction in the State where Ford sold the car in question, or
else the States where Ford designed and manufactured the
vehicle. See id., at 2; Reply Brief 2, 19; supra, at 356 (iden-
tifying those States). On that view, the place of accident
and injury is immaterial. So (Ford says) Montana's and
Minnesota's courts have no power over these cases.
But Ford's causation-only approach fnds no support in this
Court's requirement of a “connection” between a plaintiff 's
suit and a defendant's activities. Bristol-Myers, 582 U. S.,
at 265. That rule indeed serves to narrow the class of claims
doctrine with the Fourteenth Amendment's original meaning respecting
personal jurisdiction. Post, at 383−384 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in judg-
ment). But that opinion never reveals just what the Due Process Clause
as understood at its ratifcation required, and its ground for deciding these
cases is correspondingly spare. Post, at 384. This opinion, by contrast,
resolves these cases by proceeding as the Court has done for the last 75
years—applying the standards set out in International Shoe and its prog-
eny, with attention to their underlying values of ensuring fairness and
protecting interstate federalism.
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362 FORD
MOTOR CO. v. MONTANA EIGHTH
JUDICIAL DIST. COURT
Opinion of the Court
over which a state court may exercise specifc jurisdiction.
But
not quite so far as Ford wants. None of our precedents
has suggested that only a strict causal relationship between
the defendant's in-state activity and the litigation will do.
As just noted, our most common formulation of the rule de-
mands that the suit “arise out of or relate to the defendant's
contacts with the forum.” Id., at 262 (quoting Daimler, 571
U. S., at 127; emphasis added; alterations omitted); see supra,
at 359. The frst half of that standard asks about causation;
but the back half, after the “or,” contemplates that some re-
lationships will support jurisdiction without a causal show-
ing. That does not mean anything goes. In the sphere of
specifc jurisdiction, the phrase “relate to” incorporates real
limits, as it must to adequately protect defendants foreign
to a forum. But again, we have never framed the specifc
jurisdiction inquiry as always requiring proof of causation—
i. e., proof that the plaintiff 's claim came about because of
the defendant's in-state conduct. See also Bristol-Myers,
582 U. S., at 262, 264 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U. S., at 919)
(asking whether there is “an affliation between the forum
and the underlying controversy,” without demanding that
the inquiry focus on cause). So the case is not over even if,
as Ford argues, a causal test would put jurisdiction in only
the States of frst sale, manufacture, and design. A differ-
ent State's courts may yet have jurisdiction, because of
another “activity [or] occurrence” involving the defendant
that takes place in the State. Bristol-Myers, 582 U. S., at
262, 264 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U. S., at 919).
3
3
In thus reiterating this Court's longstanding approach, we reject Jus-
tice Gorsuch's apparent (if oblique) view that a state court should have
jurisdiction over a nationwide corporation like Ford on any claim, no mat-
ter how unrelated to the State or Ford's activities there. See post, at 384.
On that view, for example, a California court could hear a claim against
Ford brought by an Ohio plaintiff based on an accident occurring in Ohio
involving a car purchased in Ohio. Removing the need for any connection
between the case and forum State would transfgure our specifc jurisdic-
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And indeed, this Court has stated that specifc jurisdiction
att
aches in cases identical to the ones here—when a company
like Ford serves a market for a product in the forum State
and the product malfunctions there. In World-Wide Volks-
wagen, the Court held that an Oklahoma court could not as-
sert jurisdiction over a New York car dealer just because a
car it sold later caught fre in Oklahoma. 444 U. S., at 295.
But in so doing, we contrasted the dealer's position to that
of two other defendants—Audi, the car's manufacturer, and
Volkswagen, the car's nationwide importer (neither of which
contested jurisdiction):
“[I]f the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distribu-
tor such as Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an isolated
occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufac-
turer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the
market for its product in [several or all] other States, it
is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those
States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there
been the source of injury to its owner or to others.”
Id., at 297.
Or said another way, if Audi and Volkswagen's business de-
liberately extended into Oklahoma (among other States),
then Oklahoma's courts could hold the companies accountable
for a car's catching fre there—even though the vehicle had
been designed and made overseas and sold in New York.
For, the Court explained, a company thus “purposefully
avail[ing] itself ” of the Oklahoma auto market “has clear no-
tice” of its exposure in that State to suits arising from local
accidents involving its cars. Ibid. And the company could
do something about that exposure: It could “act to alleviate
the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance,
passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks
tion standard as applied to corporations. “Case-linked” jurisdiction, see
supra, at 359–360, would then become not case-linked at all.
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are [still] too great, severing its connection with the State.”
Ib
id.
Our conclusion in World-Wide Volkswagen—though, as
Ford notes, technically “dicta,” Brief for Petitioner 34—has
appeared and reappeared in many cases since. So, for exam-
ple, the Court in Keeton invoked that part of World-Wide
Volkswagen to show that when a corporation has “continu-
ously and deliberately exploited [a State's] market, it must
reasonably anticipate being haled into [that State's] court[s]”
to defend actions “based on” products causing injury there.
465 U. S., at 781 (citing 444 U. S., at 297–298); see Burger
King, 471 U. S., at 472–473 (similarly citing World-Wide
Volkswagen). On two other occasions, we reaffrmed that
rule by reciting the above block-quoted language verbatim.
See Goodyear, 564 U. S., at 927; Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U. S. 102, 110 (1987)
(opinion of O'Connor, J.). And in Daimler, we used the
Audi/Volkswagen scenario as a paradigm case of specifc ju-
risdiction (though now naming Daimler, the maker of Mer-
cedes Benzes). Said the Court, to “illustrate[ ]” specifc ju-
risdiction's “province[ ]”: A California court would exercise
specifc jurisdiction “if a California plaintiff, injured in a Cal-
ifornia accident involving a Daimler-manufactured vehicle,
sued Daimler [in that court] alleging that the vehicle was
defectively designed.” 571 U. S., at 127, n. 5. As in World-
Wide Volkswagen, the Court did not limit jurisdiction to
where the car was designed, manufactured, or frst sold.
Substitute Ford for Daimler, Montana and Minnesota for
California, and the Court's “illustrat[ive]” case becomes . . .
the two cases before us.
To see why Ford is subject to jurisdiction in these cases
(as Audi, Volkswagen, and Daimler were in their analogues),
consider frst the business that the company regularly con-
ducts in Montana and Minnesota. See generally 395 Mont.,
at 488, 443 P. 3d, at 414; 931 N. W. 2d, at 748; supra, at 357.
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Small wonder that Ford has here conceded “purposeful avail-
ment”
of the two States' markets. See supra, at 361. By
every means imaginable—among them, billboards, TV and
radio spots, print ads, and direct mail—Ford urges Montan-
ans and Minnesotans to buy its vehicles, including (at all rele-
vant times) Explorers and Crown Victorias. Ford cars—
again including those two models—are available for sale,
whether new or used, throughout the States, at 36 dealer-
ships in Montana and 84 in Minnesota. And apart from
sales, Ford works hard to foster ongoing connections to its
cars' owners. The company's dealers in Montana and Min-
nesota (as elsewhere) regularly maintain and repair Ford
cars, including those whose warranties have long since ex-
pired. And the company distributes replacement parts both
to its own dealers and to independent auto shops in the two
States. Those activities, too, make Ford money. And by
making it easier to own a Ford, they encourage Montanans
and Minnesotans to become lifelong Ford drivers.
Now turn to how all this Montana- and Minnesota-based
conduct relates to the claims in these cases, brought by state
residents in Montana's and Minnesota's courts. Each plain-
tiff 's suit, of course, arises from a car accident in one of those
States. In each complaint, the resident-plaintiff alleges that
a defective Ford vehicle—an Explorer in one, a Crown Victo-
ria in the other—caused the crash and resulting harm. And
as just described, Ford had advertised, sold, and serviced
those two car models in both States for many years. (Con-
trast a case, which we do not address, in which Ford mar-
keted the models in only a different State or region.) In
other words, Ford had systematically served a market in
Montana and Minnesota for the very vehicles that the plain-
tiffs allege malfunctioned and injured them in those States.
So there is a strong “relationship among the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation”—the “essential foundation” of spe-
cifc jurisdiction. Helicopteros, 466 U. S., at 414 (internal
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quotation marks omitted). That is why this Court has used
th
is exact fact pattern (a resident-plaintiff sues a global car
company, extensively serving the state market in a vehicle,
for an in-state accident) as an illustration—even a paradigm
example—of how specifc jurisdiction works. See Daimler,
571 U. S., at 127, n. 5; supra, at 364.
4
The only complication here, pressed by Ford, is that the
company sold the specifc cars involved in these crashes out-
side the forum States, with consumers later selling them to
the States' residents. Because that is so, Ford argues, the
plaintiffs' claims “would be precisely the same if Ford had
never done anything in Montana and Minnesota.” Brief
for Petitioner 46. Of course, that argument merely restates
Ford's demand for an exclusively causal test of connection—
wh ich we have a lready shown is i nconsistent w ith our
caselaw. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4; supra, at 361−362. And
indeed, a similar assertion could have been made in World-
Wide Volkswagen—yet the Court made clear that systematic
contacts in Oklahoma rendered Audi accountable there for
an in-state accident, even though it involved a car sold in
New York. See supra, at 363−364. So too here, and for the
4
None of this is to say that any person using any means to sell any good
in a State is subject to jurisdiction there if the product malfunctions after
arrival. We have long treated isolated or sporadic transactions differ-
ently from continuous ones. See, e. g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U. S. 286, 297 (1980); supra, at 359. And we do not here
consider internet transactions, which may raise doctrinal questions of
their own. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U. S. 277, 290, n. 9 (2014) (“[T]his
case does not present the very different questions whether and how a
defendant's virtual `presence' and conduct translate into `contacts' with a
particular State”). So consider, for example, a hypothetical offered at oral
argument. “[A] retired guy in a small town” in Maine “carves decoys”
and uses “a site on the Internet” to sell them. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39. “Can
he be sued in any state if some harm arises from the decoy?” Ibid. The
differences between that case and the ones before us virtually list them-
selves. (Just consider all our descriptions of Ford's activities outside its
home bases.) So we agree with the plaintiffs' counsel that resolving these
cases does not also resolve the hypothetical. See id., at 39−40.
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same reasons, see supra, at 364−366—even supposing (as
F
ord does) that without the company's Montana or Minne-
sota contacts the plaintiffs' claims would be just the same.
But in any event, that assumption is far from clear. For
the owners of these cars might never have bought them, and
so these suits might never have arisen, except for Ford's con-
tacts with their home States. Those contacts might turn
any resident of Montana or Minnesota into a Ford owner—
even when he buys his car from out of state. He may make
that purchase because he saw ads for the car in local media.
And he may take into account a raft of Ford's in-state activi-
ties designed to make driving a Ford convenient there: that
Ford dealers stand ready to service the car; that other auto
shops have ample supplies of Ford parts; and that Ford fos-
ters an active resale market for its old models. The plain-
tiffs here did not in fact establish, or even allege, such causal
links. But cf. post, at 373–374 (Alito, J., concurring in judg-
ment) (nonetheless fnding some kind of causation). Nor
should jurisdiction in cases like these ride on the exact rea-
sons for an individual plaintiff 's purchase, or on his ability to
present persuasive evidence about them.
5
But the possibili-
ties listed above—created by the reach of Ford's Montana
and Minnesota contacts—underscore the aptness of fnding
jurisdiction here, even though the cars at issue were frst
sold out of state.
For related reasons, allowing jurisdiction in these cases
treats Ford fairly, as this Court's precedents explain. In
conducting so much business in Montana and Minnesota,
Ford “enjoys the benefts and protection of [their] laws”—
the enforcement of contracts, the defense of property, the
resulting formation of effective markets. International
Shoe, 326 U. S., at 319. All that assistance to Ford's in-state
5
It should, for example, make no difference if a plaintiff had recently
moved to the forum State with his car, and had not made his purchasing
decision with that move in mind—so had not considered any of Ford's
activities in his new home State.
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business creates reciprocal obligations—most relevant here,
that
the car models Ford so extensively markets in Montana
and Minnesota be safe for their citizens to use there. Thus
our repeated conclusion: A state court's enforcement of that
commitment, enmeshed as it is with Ford's government-
protected in-state business, can “hardly be said to be undue.”
Ibid.; see supra, at 363−364. And as World-Wide Volkswa-
gen described, it cannot be thought surprising either. An
automaker regularly marketing a vehicle in a State, the
Court said, has “clear notice” that it will be subject to juris-
diction in the State's courts when the product malfunctions
there (regardless where it was frst sold). 444 U. S., at 297;
see supra, at 363. Precisely because that exercise of juris-
diction is so reasonable, it is also predictable—and thus
allows Ford to “structure [its] primary conduct” to lessen or
even avoid the costs of state-court litigation. World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U. S., at 297.
Finally, principles of “interstate federalism” support ju-
risdiction over these suits in Montana and Minnesota. Id.,
at 293. Those States have signifcant interests at stake—
“providing [their] residents with a convenient forum for re-
dressing injuries inficted by out-of-state actors,” as well as
enforcing their own safety regulations. Burger King, 471
U. S., at 473; see Keeton, 465 U. S., at 776. Consider, next
to those, the interests of the States of frst sale (Washington
and North Dakota)—which Ford's proposed rule would make
the most likely forums. For each of those States, the suit
involves all out-of-state parties, an out-of-state accident, and
out-of-state injuries; the suit's only connection with the State
is that a former owner once (many years earlier) bought the
car there. In other words, there is a less signifcant “rela-
tionship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”
Walden, 571 U. S., at 284 (internal quotation marks omitted).
So by channeling these suits to Washington and North
Dakota, Ford's regime would undermine, rather than pro-
mote, what the company calls the Due Process Clause's
“jurisdiction-allocating function.” Brief for Petitioner 24.
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Opinion of the Court
C
F
ord mainly relies for its rule on two of our recent
decisions—Bristol-Myers and Walden. But those prece-
dents stand for nothing like the principle Ford derives from
them. If anything, they reinforce all we have said about
why Montana's and Minnesota's courts can decide these
cases.
Ford says of Bristol-Myers that it “squarely foreclose[s]”
jurisdiction. Reply Brief 2. In that case, non-resident
plaintiffs brought claims in California state court against
Bristol-Myers Squibb, the manufacturer of a nationally mar-
keted prescription drug called Plavix. The plaintiffs had
not bought Plavix in California; neither had they used or
suffered any harm from the drug there. Still, the California
Supreme Court thought it could exercise jurisdiction because
Bristol-Myers Squibb sold Plavix in California and was de-
fending there against identical claims brought by the State's
residents. This Court disagreed, holding that the exercise
of jurisdiction violated the Fourteenth Amendment. In
Ford's view, the same must be true here. Each of these
plaintiffs, like the plaintiffs in Bristol-Myers, alleged injury
from a particular item (a car, a pill) that the defendant had
sold outside the forum State. Ford reads Bristol-Myers to
preclude jurisdiction when that is true, even if the defendant
regularly sold “the same kind of product” in the State.
Reply Brief 2 (emphasis in original).
But that reading misses the point of our decision. We
found jurisdiction improper in Bristol-Myers because the
forum State, and the defendant's activities there, lacked any
connection to the plaintiffs' claims. See 582 U. S., at 265
(“What is needed—and what is missing here—is a connection
between the forum and the specifc claims at issue”). The
plaintiffs, the Court explained, were not residents of Califor-
nia. They had not been prescribed Plavix in California.
They had not ingested Plavix in California. And they had
not sustained their injuries in California. See id., at
265−266 (emphasizing these points). In short, the plaintiffs
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were engaged in forum-shopping—suing in California be-
cause
it was thought plaintiff-friendly, even though their
cases had no tie to the State. See id., at 266 (distinguishing
the Plavix claims from the litigation in Keeton, see supra, at
364, because they “involv[e] no in-state injury and no injury
to residents of the forum State”). That is not at all true of
the cases before us. Yes, Ford sold the specifc products in
other States, as Bristol-Myers Squibb had. But here, the
plaintiffs are residents of the forum States. They used the
allegedly defective products in the forum States. And they
suffered injuries when those products malfunctioned in the
forum States. In sum, each of the plaintiffs brought suit in
the most natural State—based on an “affliation between the
forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activ-
ity or an occurrence that t[ook] place” there. Bristol-Myers,
582 U. S., at 262, 264 (internal quotation marks omitted). So
Bristol-Myers does not bar jurisdiction.
Ford falls back on Walden as its last resort. In that case,
a Georgia police offcer working at an Atlanta airport
searched, and seized money from, two Nevada residents be-
fore they embarked on a fight to Las Vegas. The victims
of the search sued the offcer in Nevada, arguing that their
alleged injury (their inability to use the seized money) oc-
curred in the State in which they lived. This Court held the
exercise of jurisdiction in Nevada improper even though “the
plaintiff[s] experienced [the] effect[s]” of the offcer's conduct
there. 571 U. S., at 290. According to Ford, our ruling
shows that a plaintiff 's residence and place of injury can
never support jurisdiction. See Brief for Petitioner 32.
And without those facts, Ford concludes, the basis for juris-
diction crumbles here as well.
But Walden has precious little to do with the cases before
us. In Walden, only the plaintiffs had any contacts with the
State of Nevada; the defendant-offcer had never taken any
act to “form[ ] a contact” of his own. 571 U. S., at 290. The
offcer had “never traveled to, conducted activities within,
contacted anyone in, or sent anything or anyone to Nevada.”
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Id., at 289. So to use the language of our doctrinal test: He
had
not “purposefully avail[ed himself] of the privilege of
conducting activities” in the forum State. Hanson, 357
U. S., at 253. Because that was true, the Court had no occa-
sion to address the necessary connection between a defend-
ant's in-state activity and the plaintiff 's claims. But here,
Ford has a veritable truckload of contacts with Montana and
Minnesota, as it admits. See supra, at 364−365. The only
issue is whether those contacts are related enough to the
plaintiffs' suits. As to that issue, so what if (as Walden held)
the place of a plaintiff 's injury and residence cannot create a
defendant's contact with the forum State? Those places still
may be relevant in assessing the link between the defend-
ant's forum contacts and the plaintiff 's suit—including its as-
sertions of who was injured where. And indeed, that rele-
vance is a key part of Bristol-Myers' reasoning. See 582
U. S., at 265−266 (fnding a lack of “connection” in part be-
cause the “plaintiffs are not California residents and do not
claim to have suffered harm in that State”). One of Ford's
own favorite cases thus refutes its appeal to the other.
***
Here, resident-plaintiffs allege that they suffered in-state
injury because of defective products that Ford extensively
promoted, sold, and serviced in Montana and Minnesota.
For all the reasons we have given, the connection between
the plaintiffs' claims and Ford's activities in those States—
or otherwise said, the “relationship among the defendant, the
forum[s], and the litigation”—is close enough to support spe-
cifc jurisdiction. Walden, 571 U. S., at 284 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). The judgments of the Montana and
Minnesota Supreme Courts are therefore affrmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or de-
cision of these cases.

372 FORD
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Alito, J., concurring in judgment
Justice Alito, concurring in the judgment.
These
cases can and should be decided without any alter-
ation or refnement of our case law on specifc personal juris-
diction. To be sure, for the reasons outlined in Justice
Gorsuch's thoughtful opinion, there are grounds for ques-
tioning the standard that the Court adopted in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945). And
there are also reasons to wonder whether the case law we
have developed since that time is well suited for the way
in which business is now conducted. But there is nothing
distinctively 21st century about the question in the cases
now before us, and the answer to that question is settled by
our case law.
Since International Shoe, the rule has been that a state
court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant if
the defendant has “minimum contacts” with the forum—
which means that the contacts must be “such that the main-
tenance of the suit does not offend `traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.' ” Id., at 316 (quoting Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 463 (1940)).
That standard is easily met here. Ford has long had a
heavy presence in Minnesota and Montana. It spends bil-
lions on national advertising. It has many franchises in
both States. Ford dealers in Minnesota and Montana sell
and service Ford vehicles, and Ford ships replacement parts
to both States. In entertaining these suits, Minnesota and
Montana courts have not reached out and grabbed suits in
which they “have little legitimate interest.” Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty.,
582 U. S. 255, 263 (2017). Their residents, while riding in
vehicles purchased within their borders, were killed or in-
jured in accidents on their roads. Can anyone seriously
argue that requiring Ford to litigate these cases in Minne-
sota and Montana would be fundamentally unfair?
Well, Ford makes that argument. It would send the plain-
tiffs packing to the jurisdictions where the vehicles in ques-
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Alito, J., concurring in judgment
tion were assembled (Kentucky and Canada), designed
(Mich
igan), or frst sold (Washington and North Dakota) or
where Ford is incorporated (Delaware) or has its principal
place of business (Michigan).
As might have been predicted, the Court unanimously re-
jects this understanding of “traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.” And in doing so, we merely follow
what we said in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U. S. 286, 297–298 (1980), which was essentially this: If a
car manufacturer makes substantial efforts to sell vehicles
in States A and B (and other States), and a defect in a vehicle
frst sold in State A causes injuries in an accident in State
B, the manufacturer can be sued in State B. That rule de-
cides these cases.
Ford, however, asks us to adopt an unprecedented rule
under which a defendant's contacts with the forum State
must be proven to have been a but-for cause of the tort plain-
tiff 's injury. The Court properly rejects that argument, and
I agree with the main thrust of the Court's opinion. My
only quibble is with the new gloss that the Court puts on our
case law. Several of our opinions have said that a plaintiff 's
claims “ `must arise out of or relate to the defendant's con-
tacts' ” with the forum. See ante, at 359 (citing cases). The
Court parses this phrase “as though we were dealing with
language of a statute,” Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S.
330, 341 (1979), and because this phrase is cast in the disjunc-
tive, the Court recognizes a new category of cases in which
personal jurisdiction is permitted: those in which the claims
do not “arise out of ” (i. e., are not caused by) the defendant's
contacts but nevertheless suffciently “relate to” those con-
tacts in some undefned way, ante, at 361–362.
This innovation is unnecessary and, in my view, unwise.
To say that the Constitution does not require the kind of
proof of causation that Ford would demand—what the major-
ity describes as a “strict causal relationship,” ante, at 362—
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Alito, J., concurring in judgment
here, there is a suffcient link. It is reasonable to infer that
the
vehicles in question here would never have been on the
roads in Minnesota and Montana if they were some totally
unknown brand that had never been advertised in those
States, was not sold in those States, would not be familiar to
mechanics in those States, and could not have been easily
repaired with parts available in those States. See ante, at
367 (describing this relationship between Ford's activities
and these suits). The whole point of those activities was to
put more Fords (including those in question here) on Minne-
sota and Montana roads. The common-sense relationship
between Ford's activities and these suits, in other words, is
causal in a broad sense of the concept, and personal jurisdic-
tion can rest on this type of link without strict proof of the
type Ford would require. When “arise out of ” is understood
in this way, it is apparent that “arise out of ” and “relate to”
overlap and are not really two discrete grounds for jurisdic-
tion. The phrase “arise out of or relate to” is simply a way
of restating the basic “minimum contacts” standard adopted
in International Shoe.
Recognizing “relate to” as an independent basis for speci-
fc jurisdiction risks needless complications. The “ordinary
meani ng ” of the phrase “relate to” “ is a broad one. ”
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374, 383
(1992). Applying that phrase “according to its terms [is] a
project doomed to failure, since, as many a curbstone philoso-
pher has observed, everything is related to everything else.”
California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dil-
lingham Constr., N. A., Inc., 519 U. S. 316, 335 (1997) (Scalia,
J., concurring). To rein in this phrase, limits must be found,
and the Court assures us that “relate to,” as it now uses
the concept, “incorporates real limits.” Ante, at 362. But
without any indication what those limits might be, I doubt
that the lower courts will fnd that observation terribly help-
ful. Instead, what limits the potentially boundless reach of

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Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment
“relate to” is just the sort of rough causal connection I
have
described.
I would leave the law exactly where it stood before we
took these cases, and for that reason, I concur in the
judgment.
Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Thomas joins,
concurring in the judgment.
Since International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310
(1945), this Court's cases have sought to divide the world of
personal jurisdiction in two. A tribunal with “general juris-
diction” may entertain any claim against the defendant.
But to trigger this power, a court usually must ensure the
defendant is “ `at home' ” in the forum State. Daimler AG
v. Bauman, 571 U. S. 117, 137 (2014). Meanwhile, “specifc
jurisdiction” affords a narrower authority. It applies only
when the defendant “ `purposefully avails' ” itself of the op-
portunity to do business in the forum State and the suit
“ `arise[s] out of or relate[s] to' ” the defendant's contacts with
the forum State. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S.
462, 472, 475 (1985).
While our cases have long admonished lower courts to
keep these concepts distinct, some of the old guardrails have
begun to look a little battered. Take general jurisdiction.
If it made sense to speak of a corporation having one or two
“homes” in 1945, it seems almost quaint in 2021 when corpo-
rations with global reach often have massive operations
spread across multiple States. To cope with these changing
economic realities, this Court has begun cautiously expand-
ing the old rule in “ `exceptional case[s].' ” BNSF R. Co. v.
Tyrrell, 581 U. S. 402, 413 (2017).
Today's case tests the old boundaries from another direc-
tion. Until now, many lower courts have proceeded on the
premise that specifc jurisdiction requires two things. First,
the defendant must “purposefully avail” itself of the chance
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to do business in a State. Second, the plaintiff 's suit must
“ar
ise out of or relate to” the defendant's in-state activities.
Typically, courts have read this second phrase as a unit re-
quiring at least a but-for causal link between the defendant's
local activities and the plaintiff 's injuries. E. g., Tamburo v.
Dworkin, 601 F. 3d 693, 708–709 (CA7 2010) (collecting
cases); see also Burger King, 471 U. S., at 475 (discussing
“proximat[e] result[s]”). As every frst year law student
learns, a but-for causation test isn't the most demanding.
At a high level of abstraction, one might say any event in
the world would not have happened “but for” events far and
long removed.
Now, though, the Court pivots away from this understand-
ing. Focusing on the phrase “arise out of or relate to” that
so often appears in our cases, the majority asks us to parse
those words “as though we were dealing with language of a
statute.” Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 341 (1979).
In particular, the majority zeros in on the disjunctive con-
junction “or,” and proceeds to build its entire opinion around
that linguistic feature. Ante, at 362. The majority admits
that “arise out of ” may connote causation. But, it argues,
“relate to” is an independent clause that does not.
Where this leaves us is far from clear. For a case to “re-
late to” the defendant's forum contacts, the majority says, it
is enough if an “affliation” or “relationship” or “connection”
exists between them. Ante, at 359, 365, 369. But what
does this assortment of nouns mean? Loosed from any cau-
sation standard, we are left to guess. The majority prom-
ises that its new test “does not mean anything goes,” but
that hardly tells us what does. Ante, at 362. In some
cases, the new test may prove more forgiving than the old
causation rule. But it's hard not to wonder whether it may
also sometimes turn out to be more demanding. Unclear
too is whether, in cases like that, the majority would treat
causation and “affliation” as alternative routes to specifc
jurisdiction, or whether it would deny jurisdiction outright.
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For a glimpse at the complications invited by today's deci-
si
on, consider its treatment of North Dakota and Washing-
ton. Those are the States where Ford frst sold the alleg-
edly defective cars at issue in the cases before us. The
majority seems to suggest that, if the plaintiffs had sought
to bring their suits in those States, they would have failed.
The majority stresses that the “only connection” between
the plaintiffs' claims and North Dakota and Washington is
the fact that former owners once bought the allegedly defec-
tive cars there. Ante, at 368. But the majority never tells
us why that “connection” isn't enough. Surely, North Da-
kota and Washington would contend they have a strong in-
terest in ensuring they don't become marketplaces for un-
reasonably dangerous products. Nor is it clear why the
majority casts doubt on the availability of specifc jurisdic-
tion in these States without bothering to consider whether
the old causation test might allow it. After all, no one
doubts Ford purposefully availed itself of those markets.
The plaintiffs' injuries, at least arguably, “arose from” (or
were caused by) the sale of defective cars in those places.
Even if the majority's new affliation test isn't satisfed, don't
we still need to ask those causation questions, or are they
now to be abandoned?
Consider, too, a hypothetical the majority offers in a foot-
note. The majority imagines a retiree in Maine who starts
a one-man business, carving and selling wooden duck decoys.
In time, the man sells a defective decoy over the Internet to
a purchaser in another State who is injured. See ante, at
366, n. 4. We aren't told how. (Was the decoy coated in
lead paint?) But put that aside. The majority says this hy-
pothetical supplies a useful study in contrast with our cases.
On the majority's telling, Ford's “continuous” contacts with
Montana and Minnesota are enough to establish an “afflia-
tion” with those States; by comparison, the decoy seller's
contacts may be too “isolated” and “sporadic” to entitle an
injured buyer to sue in his home State. But if this compari-
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son highlights anything, it is only the litigation sure to follow.
F
or between the poles of “continuous” and “isolated” con-
tacts lie a virtually infnite number of “affliations” waiting
to be explored. And when it comes to that vast terrain, the
majority supplies no meaningful guidance about what kind
or how much of an “affliation” will suffce. Nor, once more,
does the majority tell us whether its new affliation test sup-
plants or merely supplements the old causation inquiry.
Not only does the majority's new test risk adding new lay-
ers of confusion to our personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.
The whole project seems unnecessary. Immediately after
disavowing any need for a causal link between the defend-
ant's forum activities and the plaintiffs' injuries, the majority
proceeds to admit that such a link may be present here.
Ante, at 367. The majority stresses that the Montana and
Minnesota plaintiffs before us “might” have purchased their
cars because of Ford's activities in their home States. They
“may” have relied on Ford's local advertising. And they
“may” have depended on Ford's promise to furnish in-state
servicers and dealers. If the majority is right about these
things, that would be more than enough to establish a but-
for causal link between Ford's in-state activities and the
plaintiffs' decisions to purchase their allegedly defective ve-
hicles. Nor should that result come as a surprise: One might
expect such causal links to be easy to prove in suits against
corporate behemoths like Ford. All the new euphemisms—
“affliation,” “relationship,” “connection”—thus seem pretty
pointless.
1
1
The majority says personal jurisdiction should not turn on a plaintiff 's
ability to “allege” or “establish” his or her reasons for doing business with
the defendant. Ante, at 367. But the implicit assumption here—that the
plaintiff bears the burden of proving personal jurisdiction—is often mis-
taken. Perhaps because a lack of personal jurisdiction is a waivable af-
frmative defense, some States place the burden of proving the defense on
the defendant. Even in places where the plaintiff bears the burden, I fail
to see why it would be so terrible (or burdensome) to require an individual
to plead and prove his or her reasons for purchase. Frequently, doing so
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379
Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment
*
W
ith the old International Shoe dichotomy looking in-
creasingly uncertain, it's hard not to ask how we got here
and where we might be headed.
Before International Shoe, it seems due process was usu-
ally understood to guarantee that only a court of competent
jurisdiction could deprive a defendant of his life, liberty, or
property. In turn, a court's competency normally depended
on the defendant's presence in, or consent to, the sovereign's
jurisdiction. But once a plaintiff was able to “tag ” the de-
fendant with process in the jurisdiction, that State's courts
were generally thought competent to render judgment on
any claim against the defendant, whether it involved events
inside or outside the State. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714,
733 (1878); Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County of
Marin, 495 U. S. 604, 610–611 (1990); J. Story, Commentaries
on the Confict of Laws 912–913 (3d ed. 1846); Massie v.
Watts, 6 Cranch 148, 157, 161–162 (1810).
2
International Shoe's emergence may be attributable to
many infuences, but at least part of the story seems to in-
volve the rise of corporations and interstate trade. See
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U. S. 415, 431 (1994). A cor-
poration doing business in its State of incorporation is one
thing; the old physical presence rules for individuals seem
may be simple—far simpler than showing how the defendant's connections
with the jurisdiction satisfy a new and amorphous “affliation” test.
2
Some disagree that due process requires even this much. Recent
scholarship, for example, contends Pennoyer's territorial account of sover-
eign power is mostly right, but the rules it embodies are not “fxed in
constitutional amber”—that is, Congress might be able to change them.
Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 Texas L. Rev. 1249, 1255 (2017). Others
suggest that fghts over personal jurisdiction would be more sensibly
waged under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Jackson, Full Faith and
Credit—The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 3
(1945). Whether these theories are right or wrong, they at least seek to
answer the right question—what the Constitution as originally understood
requires, not what nine judges consider “fair” and “just.”
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MOTOR CO. v. MONTANA EIGHTH
JUDICIAL DIST. COURT
Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment
easily adaptable to them. But what happens when a corpo-
rati
on, created and able to operate thanks to the laws of one
State, seeks the privilege of sending agents or products into
another State?
Early on, many state courts held conduct like that renders
an out-of-state corporation present in the second jurisdiction.
And a present company could be sued for any claim, so long
as the plaintiff served an employee doing corporate business
within the second State. E. g., Pennsylvania Lumbermen's
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U. S. 407, 413–415 (1905).
Other States sought to obviate any potential question about
corporate jurisdiction by requiring an out-of-state corpora-
tion to incorporate under their laws too, or at least designate
an agent for service of process. Either way, the idea was to
secure the out-of-state company's presence or consent to suit.
E. g., Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold
Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93, 95–96 (1917).
Unsurprisingly, corporations soon looked for ways around
rules like these. No one, after all, has ever liked greeting
the process server. For centuries, individuals facing immi-
nent suit sought to avoid it by feeing the court's territorial
jurisdiction. But this tactic proved “too crude for the
American business genius,” and it held some obvious disad-
vantages. See Jackson, What Price “Due Process,” 5 N. Y. L.
Rev. 435, 436 (1927). Corporations wanted to retain the
privilege of sending their personnel and products to other
jurisdictions where they lacked a charter to do business. At
the same time, when confronted with lawsuits in the second
forum, they sought to hide behind their foreign charters and
deny their presence. Really, their strategy was to do busi-
ness without being seen to do business. Id., at 438 (“No
longer is the foreign corporation confronted with the prob-
lem `to be or not to be'—it can both be and not be!”).
Initially and routinely, state courts rejected ploys like
these. See, e. g., Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Lawrence, 74
Miss. 782, 796–799, 22 So. 53, 55–56 (Miss. 1897). But, in a

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381
Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment
series of decisions at the turn of the last century, this Court
e
ventually provided a more receptive audience. On the one
hand, the Court held that an out-of-state corporation often
has a right to do business in another State unencumbered
by that State's registration rules, thanks to the so-called
dormant Commerce Clause. International Textbook Co. v.
Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 107–112 (1910). On the other hand, the
Court began invoking the Due Process Clause to restrict the
circumstances in which an out-of-state corporation could be
deemed present. So, for example, the Court ruled that even
an Oklahoma corporation purchasing a large portion of its
merchandise in New York was not “doing business” there.
Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U. S. 516,
517–518 (1923). Perhaps advocates of this arrangement
thought it promoted national economic growth. See Dodd,
Jurisdiction in Personal Actions, 23 Ill. L. Rev. 427, 444–445
(1929). But critics questioned its fdelity to the Constitution
and traditional jurisdictional principles, noting that it often
left injured parties with no practical forum for their claims
too. Jackson, 5 N. Y. L. Rev., at 436–438.
In many ways, International Shoe sought to start over.
The Court “cast . . . aside” the old concepts of territorial
jurisdiction that its own earlier decisions had seemingly
twisted in favor of out-of-state corporations. Burnham, 495
U. S., at 618. At the same time, the Court also cast doubt on
the idea, once pursued by many state courts, that a company
“consents” to suit when it is forced to incorporate or desig-
nate an agent for receipt of process in a jurisdiction other
than its home State. Ibid.
3
In place of nearly everything
that had come before, the Court sought to build a new test
3
It is unclear what remains of the old “consent” theory after Interna-
tional Shoe's criticism. Some courts read International Shoe and the
cases that follow as effectively foreclosing it, while others insist it remains
viable. Compare Lanham v. BNSF R. Co., 305 124, 130–136, 939 N. W. 2d
363, 368–371 (2020), with Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co., 2019–NMCA–023,
¶12–¶14, 458 P. 3d 569, 575–576.
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focused on “ `traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice
.' ” International Shoe, 326 U. S., at 316 (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 463 (1940)).
It was a heady promise. But it is unclear how far it has
really taken us. Even today, this Court usually considers
corporations “at home” and thus subject to general jurisdic-
tion in only one or two States. All in a world where global
conglomerates boast of their many “headquarters.” The
Court has issued these restrictive rulings, too, even though
individual defendants remain subject to the old “tag ” rule,
allowing them to be sued on any claim anywhere they can be
found. Burnham, 495 U. S., at 610–611.
4
Nearly 80 years
removed from International Shoe, it seems corporations
continue to receive special jurisdictional protections in the
name of the Constitution. Less clear is why.
Maybe, too, International Shoe just doesn't work quite as
well as it once did. For a period, its specifc jurisdiction test
might have seemed a reasonable new substitute for assessing
corporate “presence,” a way to identify those out-of-state
corporations that were simply pretending to be absent from
jurisdictions where they were really transacting business.
When a company “purposefully availed” itself of the benefts
of another State's market in the 1940s, it often involved send-
ing in agents, advertising in local media, or developing a net-
work of on-the-ground dealers, much as Ford did in these
cases. E. g., International Shoe, 326 U. S., at 313–314, 320.
But, today, even an individual retiree carving wooden decoys
in Maine can “purposefully avail” himself of the chance to do
business across the continent after drawing online orders to
his e-Bay “store” thanks to Internet advertising with global
4
Since Burnham, some courts have sought to revive the tag rule for
artifcial entities while others argue that doing so would be inconsistent
with International Shoe. Compare First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse
LLP, 154 F. 3d 16, 20–21 (CA2 1998), with Martinez v. Aero Caribbean,
764 F. 3d 1062, 1067–1069 (CA9 2014).
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reach. Ante, at 366, n. 4. A test once aimed at keeping cor-
porati
ons honest about their out-of-state operations now
seemingly risks hauling individuals to jurisdictions where
they have never set foot.
Perhaps this is the real reason why the majority intro-
duces us to the hypothetical decoy salesman. Yes, he argua-
bly availed himself of a new market. Yes, the plaintiff 's in-
juries arguably arose from (or were caused by) the product
he sold there. Yes, International Shoe's old causation test
would seemingly allow for personal jurisdiction. But maybe
the majority resists that conclusion because the old test no
longer seems as reliable a proxy for determining corporate
presence as it once did. Maybe that's the intuition lying be-
hind the majority's introduction of its new “affliation” rule
and its comparison of the Maine retiree's “sporadic” and “iso-
lated” sales in the plaintiff 's State and Ford's deep “relation-
ships” and “connections” with Montana and Minnesota.
Ante, at 366, n. 4.
If that is the logic at play here, I cannot help but wonder
if we are destined to return where we began. Perhaps all
of this Court's efforts since International Shoe, including
those of today's majority, might be understood as seeking
to recreate in new terms a jurisprudence about corporate
jurisdiction that was developing before this Court's muscular
interventions in the early 20th century. Perhaps it was, is,
and in the end always will be about trying to assess fairly
a corporate defendant's presence or consent. International
Shoe may have sought to move past those questions. But
maybe all we have done since is struggle for new words to
express the old ideas. Perhaps, too, none of this should
come as a surprise. New technologies and new schemes to
evade the process server will always be with us. But if our
concern is with “ `traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice,' ” International Shoe, 326 U. S., at 316 (em-
phasis added), not just our personal and idiosyncratic impres-
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sions of those things, perhaps we will always wind up asking
var
iations of the same questions.
5
None of this is to cast doubt on the outcome of these cases.
The parties have not pointed to anything in the Constitu-
tion's original meaning or its history that might allow Ford
to evade answering the plaintiffs' claims in Montana or Min-
nesota courts. No one seriously questions that the com-
pany, seeking to do business, entered those jurisdictions
through the front door. And I cannot see why, when faced
with the process server, it should be allowed to escape out
the back. Jackson, 5 N. Y. L. Rev., at 439. The real struggle
here isn't with settling on the right outcome in these cases,
but with making sense of our personal jurisdiction jurispru-
dence and International Shoe's increasingly doubtful dichot-
omy. On those scores, I readily admit that I fnish these
cases with even more questions than I had at the start.
Hopefully, future litigants and lower courts will help us face
these tangles and sort out a responsible way to address the
challenges posed by our changing economy in light of the
Constitution's text and the lessons of history.
5
The majority worries that the thoughts expressed here threaten to
“transfgure our specifc jurisdiction standard as applied to corporations”
and “return [us] to the mid-19th century.” Ante, at 360, n. 2; ante, at 362–
363, n. 3. But it has become a tired trope to criticize any reference to the
Constitution's original meaning as (somehow) both radical and antiquated.
Seeking to understand the Constitution's original meaning is part of our
job. What's the majority's real worry anyway—that corporations might
lose special protections? The Constitution has always allowed suits
against individuals on any issue in any State where they set foot. Supra,
at 379–380. Yet the majority seems to recoil at even entertaining the
possibility the Constitution might tolerate similar results for “nationwide
corporation[s],” whose “business is everywhere.” Ante, at 355; ante, at
362, n. 3.
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