East Cherry Grove Co., LLC v. State of South Carolina

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

East Cherry Grove Co., LLC and Ray & Nixon, LLC,
Respondents,

v.

State of South Carolina, South Carolina Department of
Health and Environmental Control, and Matt Leonhard,
Defendants,

Of whom The State of South Carolina is the Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2021-000078

Appeal From Horry County
R. Markley Dennis, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 6068
Heard October 11, 2023 – Filed July 3, 2024

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED IN PART AND
REVERSED IN PART

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Solicitor General J. Emory Smith, Jr., and Solicitor
General Robert D. Cook, all of Columbia, for Appellant.

Gene McCain Connell, Jr., of Kelaher Connell &
Connor, PC, of Surfside Beach, for Respondents.

VINSON, J.: The State of South Carolina appeals the circuit court's order finding
East Cherry Grove Co., LLC and Ray & Nixon, LLC (collectively, Respondents)
owned two respective parcels of real property consisting of tidelands in North
Myrtle Beach. The trial of this case involved two parcels of real property: one
identified as Tax Map Number 145-00-01-001, in the name of East Cherry Grove
(the East Cherry Grove Tract), and the other identified as Tax Map
Number 145-02-25-004, in the name of Ray & Nixon (the Ray & Nixon Tract).
On appeal, the State argues the circuit court erred by (1) misapplying the law of the
case doctrine by applying a decision from an entirely different suit that did not
decide the issues presented in this case; (2) applying the standard of proof of
preponderance of the evidence instead of clear and convincing evidence; (3)
determining Respondents own the entirety of the East Cherry Grove Tract when
they presented no evidence they own the portions of the tract referred to as "the
pig's ears" and "dome of the pig's head"; (4) determining Respondents own the
entirety of the East Cherry Grove Tract when the maps relied upon failed to meet
standards for the specificity of tidelands conveyances; (5) failing to use and apply
the plat of Russell Courtney (the Courtney plat) instead of the overlays
Respondents' expert prepared when the Courtney plat was much more consistent
with the specificity and evidence required to establish tidelands conveyances; (6)
improperly relying on the testimony of the title opinion expert about the general
area included on the tax map of the East Cherry Grove Tract when he was not a
surveyor and could not override the testimony of the two surveyors; and (7) failing
to clarify that only the State controls navigable waterways. We affirm as modified
in part and reverse in part.

FACTS

This case arose when Matt Leonhard applied to the Department of Health and
Environmental Control (DHEC) for a permit to build a dock over tidelands
adjacent to his property. Thereafter, Respondents brought an action pursuant to
section 48-39-220(A) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2023) 1 requesting the
circuit court issue a final decision holding they owned all of the area contained
within the East Cherry Grove Tract and the Ray & Nixon Tract. In addition,
Respondents asserted the decision of another circuit court judge in a 2014 case

1
See § 48-39-220(A) ("Any person claiming an interest in tidelands which, for the
purpose of this section, means all lands except beaches in the Coastal zone
between the mean high-water mark and the mean low-water mark of navigable
waters without regard to the degree of salinity of such waters, may institute an
action against the State of South Carolina for the purpose of determining the
existence of any right, title or interest of such person in and to such tidelands as
against the State.").
involving a permit application submitted by Monty and Melody Teague (the
Teague case)2 supported their claim to the subject property because both East
Cherry Grove and the State were parties to the action.3 The State moved for partial
summary judgment, which the circuit court denied.

The circuit court held a bench trial remotely via WebEx on August 25, 2020. The
circuit court admitted four King's and sovereign grants of real property situated in
the North Myrtle Beach area and their attached hand-drawn plats (the Grants) as
plaintiff's exhibits during trial.4 The following describes the Grants. A December
4, 1735 King's grant to John Morrall included a plat that provided the 453-acre
parcel butted and was bounded to the Northeast by another parcel of land, to the
Southeast by "Creek" and "Marsh," to the Southwest by vacant land and to the
Northwest by the Little River. An August 8, 1767 King's grant to John Alston (the
Alston Grant) included a plat that provided the 300-acre, L-shaped parcel was
bounded on one side by "Swash" and the other side by "The Sea" and on all other
sides by vacant lands. The Alston Grant does not expressly reference marsh or
tidelands on the face of the plat; however, as the State points out in its brief, the
portion of the plat described as "Miners Island" appears to bear markings
indicating marsh grass. A February 25, 1785 sovereign grant to Daniel Morrall
(the 200-Acre Morrall Grant) included a plat showing the 200-acre parcel was
bounded by the Little River on one side and "Creek" and "Sea Shore" on another.
The plat indicated it was bounded by lands laid out to others on all other sides.
The words "Salt Marsh" are printed inside the bounds of the plat. A January 19,
1786 sovereign grant to Daniel Morrall included a plat that provided the 20-acre
tract was bounded by "Marsh laid out to Daniel Morrall," by "Seas," by "Creek,"
and by "Vacant Marsh." The words "Salt Marsh" and "Sand Banks" are printed
inside the bounds of the plat.

Respondents presented the testimony of William Deschamps, Joel Floyd, and
William Fairey, as well as the State's witness, Russell Courtney. Deschamps
testified he practiced real estate law and was a title insurance agent, and the circuit
court allowed him to testify as an expert "in the field of title examination, title

2
East Cherry Grove Realty Co., LLC v. State, No. 2014-CP-26-1412 (Conway,
S.C., Ct. Common Pleas, July 8, 2015).
3
Although Respondents additionally alleged a 1969 settlement agreement between
the parties and quitclaim deeds associated with this settlement supported their
claims, the circuit court did not consider this settlement in reaching its decision.
4
The circuit court admitted the Grants as Plaintiff's Exhibits 6,7, 8, and 9, and they
were also included as part of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.
opinions, and the like." Floyd testified he was a retired registered land surveyor,
and the circuit court allowed him to testify as an expert in the field of surveying
without objection. Fairey testified he was a licensed land surveyor, and the circuit
court allowed him to testify as an expert in the field of surveying without
objection. Finally, Courtney testified he was a professional land surveyor, and
pursuant to the State's request, the circuit court allowed him to testify as an expert
in surveying and applying King's and sovereign grants and plats of property.

Deschamps testified he examined titles by starting with the current owner of
property and tracing title back to its origin. He stated he examined the titles of the
property at issue, and he identified the Grants in evidence. Deschamps testified the
Ray & Nixon Tract could be traced back to a sovereign grant identified in the
survey compilation depicted on the Courtney plat. Deschamps testified based upon
his review of the Grants and the Courtney plat, there were King's or sovereign
grants of the East Cherry Grove and Ray & Nixon Tracts. When asked to compare
an exhibit showing a survey compilation prepared by surveyors Michael Culler, Jr.,
Joel Floyd, and Wendel Powers (the Culler, Floyd, and Powers map) with the
Courtney plat, Deschamps agreed the Grants appeared on both exhibits. He stated
he had no doubt the East Cherry Grove and Ray & Nixon Tracts were "subject to
king[']s grants or sovereign grants based upon all of the survey information and
[his] review of the title all the way back to the 1700s." Deschamps confirmed he
was called as a witness in the Teague case and his testimony was consistent with
the testimony he offered in that case. Upon cross-examination, Deschamps
acknowledged he was not a surveyor. He explained that when completing a title
examination on a property, he relies upon surveys that have been completed but he
does not perform the surveys himself. He clarified that he was not rendering a
surveying opinion but was rendering an opinion as to his title search based upon
reviewing the Grants in conjunction with the surveys.

Joel Floyd testified he had been a registered land surveyor for thirty-two years
prior to his retirement. He stated he was asked to determine whether the tracts at
issue were under King's grants. Floyd explained he obtained an aerial photograph
to scale that was taken in 1929, prior to any development in East Cherry Grove.
He stated he hired two other land surveyors—Mike Culler, Jr., and Wendel
Powers—to help him and they reviewed the Grants and attached plats and
"interpolated where they ought to be on the aerial photograph using the
landmarks." Floyd explained they established a baseline where two parcels of land
joined each other, and starting from that baseline, they reconstructed the King's
grants. Floyd clarified the line between those two parcels was a modern surveyed
property line. Floyd identified a map (the Floyd map) in evidence as the map that
the three surveyors agreed upon as showing a compilation and mapping of the
Grants. He opined that to a reasonable degree of surveying certainty this map was
a true and accurate compilation of the Grants and that the East Cherry Grove and
Ray & Nixon Tracts were all within those grants. Floyd identified two plaintiff's
exhibits—the tax maps—as surveys of the properties that were the subject of this
litigation. When asked if it was his opinion that those property boundaries were
subject to the Grants, Floyd stated, "There's no other place it could come from."

Upon cross-examination, Floyd agreed that when comparing the tax map of the
East Cherry Grove Tract with the Floyd map, the area in the upper left of the East
Cherry Grove Tract that resembled a pig's ears in shape did not appear on the
Floyd map. Floyd confirmed that area was excluded from the Floyd map but stated
that if it was not covered by the Grants, he was not asked to plot it. He averred it
would fall under another King's grant because there were King's grants covering
that entire area; however, he clarified he plotted no such King's grants in this case.

Fairey testified he was a licensed land surveyor. Fairey confirmed he testified in
the Teague case and rendered an opinion that the Teagues' proposed dock was to
traverse property owned by East Cherry Grove. He agreed he determined that
property was subject to a King's grant. As to Leonhard's proposed dock, Fairey
opined it would extend onto property owned by Ray & Nixon. Fairey stated he
reviewed the Floyd map as well as the Courtney plat in rendering his opinion and
confirmed the Courtney plat showed the Ray & Nixon Tract was within a King's
grant. He acknowledged, however, that he did not personally survey either the
East Cherry Grove Tract or the Ray & Nixon Tract.

Courtney identified his compiled map—the Courtney plat—as containing the
Grants. He testified the Ray & Nixon Tract was subject to a King's grant and fell
inside the Alston Grant. Courtney testified the "pig eared area" of the East Cherry
Grove Tract was not contained within the Grants and therefore he was only seventy
percent sure that East Cherry Grove owned the entirety of the East Cherry Grove
Tract. Courtney confirmed he drew the area described as the pig's ears outside of
the Grants because he did not find a King's or sovereign grant that applied to that
area. Courtney compared the Floyd map to the Courtney plat and stated the latter
depicted the 200-Acre Morrall Grant as being much smaller than that depicted in
Floyd's map. Courtney stated the 200-Acre Morrall Grant was inside the East
Cherry Grove Tract. He averred his map showed "a lot more detail . . . and [wa]s a
lot more like the King's grants themselves."
The circuit court ruled in favor of Respondents. It found Respondents met their
burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and that East Cherry Grove
was the owner in fee simple of the East Cherry Grove Tract and Ray & Nixon was
the fee simple owner of the Ray & Nixon Tract. The circuit court further held title
to both of these properties was derived from King's grants or sovereign grants per
the testimony of all the experts at trial. Specifically, the circuit court found
Respondents showed by a preponderance of the evidence that their predecessors in
title possessed a valid grant from the sovereign and that the language of such
grants was sufficient in detail to convey private ownership of tidelands described
to the mean low-water mark in navigable creeks. The circuit court therefore found
the evidence overwhelmingly supported its ruling that the properties were subject
to a King's grant or sovereign grant and that the State could not issue a dock permit
to Leonhard to wharf over property owned by Ray & Nixon unless he obtained
Ray & Nixon's written permission. The circuit court held East Cherry Grove and
Ray & Nixon owned their respective tidelands tracts to the low-water mark in all
navigable creeks and below the low-water mark in all non-navigable creeks, but it
clarified this did not include the bottoms of any navigable waters on these
properties because such waters were public highways "subject to Plaintiffs' [sic]
control." The circuit court additionally held the ruling of Circuit Court Judge
Larry B. Hyman in the Teague case was "not only instructive but [wa]s the law of
the case." The circuit court further found each of the Grants and the Floyd map
along with the Courtney plat all established the existence of a King's or sovereign
grant over the East Cherry Grove and Ray & Nixon Tracts.

The State filed a motion to reconsider, which the circuit court denied. The circuit
court did, however, amend its order by changing the wording that the navigable
waterways were "subject to Plaintiffs' control" to provide that such waterways
were "subject to Defendant's control." This appeal followed.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Did the circuit court err by applying the law of the case doctrine to determine
ownership of the East Cherry Grove Tract?

2. Did the circuit court apply the incorrect burden of proof?

3. Did the circuit court err by determining Respondents owned the entirety of the
East Cherry Grove Tract?
4. Did the circuit court err by failing to apply the Courtney plat instead of the
overlays prepared by Respondents' expert's office?

5. Did the circuit court err by failing to clarify that only the State controls
navigable waterways?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"An action to determine ownership of tidelands pursuant to section 48-39-220 is an
action at law. In an action at law, tried without a jury, our scope of review extends
to the correction of errors of law." Grant v. State, 395 S.C. 225, 228, 717 S.E.2d
96, 98 (Ct. App. 2011) (citation omitted). Therefore, "the trial court's factual
findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless a review of the record discloses that
there is no evidence which reasonably supports the [court's] findings." Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting Barnacle Broad., Inc. v. Baker Broad., Inc., 343
S.C. 140, 146, 538 S.E.2d 672, 675 (Ct. App. 2000)). We decide questions of law
de novo with no particular deference to the trial court. See Hoyler v. State, 428
S.C. 279, 290, 833 S.E.2d 845, 851 (Ct. App. 2019).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I. Burden of Proof

The State argues the circuit court erred by applying a preponderance of the
evidence burden of proof instead of requiring clear and convincing evidence.
Although the State acknowledges no tidelands case appears to directly address this
issue, it argues applicable caselaw nevertheless suggests a clear and convincing
standard applies. We disagree.

"[T]he State holds presumptive title to land below the high water mark." Query v.
Burgess, 371 S.C. 407, 410, 639 S.E.2d 455, 456 (Ct. App. 2006) (alteration in
original) (quoting McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 354 S.C. 142, 149, 580
S.E.2d 116, 119 (2003)). "The State may, however, grant private individuals an
ownership interest in tidelands." Id. at 411, 639 S.E.2d at 456 (quoting
Lowcountry Open Land Tr. v. State, 347 S.C. 96, 102, 552 S.E.2d 778, 781 (Ct.
App. 2001)). "[I]t is well settled that the State comes into court with a
presumption of title, and, if an individual is to prevail, he must recover upon the
strength of his own title, of which he must make proof." State v. Fain, 273 S.C.
748, 752, 259 S.E.2d 606, 608 (1979). "To rebut the State's presumptive title, a
claimant must show (1) its predecessor in title possessed a valid grant, and (2) the
grant's language was sufficient to convey land below the high water mark." Grant,
395 S.C. at 228, 717 S.E.2d at 98.

"A grant from the State purporting to vest title to tidelands in a private party is
construed strictly in favor of the government and against the grantee." Lowcountry
Open Land Tr., 347 S.C. at 103, 552 S.E.2d at 782. "Under English common law,
a grant of tidelands was to be 'construed strictly . . . and it will not be presumed[]
that the King intended to part from any portion of the public domain, unless clear
and special words are used to denote it.'" Grant, 395 S.C. at 231, 717 S.E.2d at 99
(quoting Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 406 (1842)); see also
Lowcountry Open Land Tr., 347 S.C. at 102, 552 S.E.2d at 782 ("Because
tidelands are held in public trust, a grant of private ownership must contain
'specific language, either in the deed or on the plat, showing that [the grant] was
intended to go below high water mark . . . .'" (quoting Hobonny Club, Inc. v.
McEachern, 272 S.C. 392, 396, 252 S.E.2d 133, 135 (1979))); Hoyler, 428 S.C. at
292-93, 833 S.E.2d at 852 ("[O]ne claiming an interest in tidelands pursuant to
section 48-39-220(A) must convince the court that the State intended to include the
tidelands within the boundaries expressed in the deed.").

We hold the circuit court did not err by applying a preponderance of the evidence
burden of proof. Our caselaw provides the State possesses presumptive title of
tidelands property, and the person seeking to establish private ownership must
present sufficient evidence to rebut this presumption. See, e.g., Fain, 273 S.C. at
752, 259 S.E.2d at 608 ("[I]t is well settled that the State comes into court with a
presumption of title, and, if an individual is to prevail, he must recover upon the
strength of his own title, of which he must make proof."); Grant, 395 S.C. at 228,
717 S.E.2d at 98 ("To rebut the State's presumptive title, a claimant must show (1)
its predecessor in title possessed a valid grant, and (2) the grant's language was
sufficient to convey land below the high water mark."). In Query, this court
affirmed the master's order finding a 1786 grant and accompanying plat "was not
sufficiently detailed to rebut the State's presumption of title to land below the high
water mark." 371 S.C. at 412, S.E.2d at 457. This court concluded evidence
supported the master's conclusion when the grant and plat did not contain terms
indicating the granting of property below the high-water mark, such as "marsh,"
"marshland," "high-water mark," or "low-water mark." Id. More recently, in
Grant, this court again considered the 1786 grant and plat at issue in Query and
affirmed the trial court's determination that the grant and plat lacked evidence of
the requisite intent to convey tidelands, finding the evidence in the record
supported the trial court's conclusion. See Grant, 395 S.C. at 236, 717 S.E.2d at
102. In Grant, this court also considered a 1696 grant and determined the "grant
abstract lack[ed] any indication of an intent to convey land below the high water
mark" and therefore found "the trial court's determination [the appellant] failed to
rebut the State's presumptive title [wa]s supported by evidence in the record." Id.
at 232, 717 S.E.2d at 100; see also Fain, 273 S.C. at 752, 259 S.E.2d at 608
(holding the State was entitled to a directed verdict when the grants at issue lacked
"any language disclosing an intent to convey lands below high water mark
and . . . the grants [we]re not supported by plats"). None of the foregoing tidelands
cases expressly sets forth a standard requiring clear and convincing evidence. The
reviewing courts affirmed the trial court's rulings when the record contained
evidence to support its finding as to whether the party seeking to establish title
rebutted the State's presumption of title. Here, the circuit court applied the
presumption and determined, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that the
Grants and accompanying plats Respondents presented contained sufficient detail
to establish Respondents' ownership of the tidelands. We hold the circuit court
applied the correct analysis by requiring Respondents to provide sufficient
evidence to overcome the State's presumption of title and did not err by failing to
require Respondents to establish ownership by clear and convincing evidence.

II. Law of the Case Doctrine

The State argues the circuit court improperly applied the law of the case doctrine in
determining Judge Hyman's ruling in the Teague case settled the question of East
Cherry Grove's ownership of the East Cherry Grove Tract. The State contends the
law of the case doctrine applies only to subsequent proceedings in the same case.
The State further asserts Judge Hyman's ruling in the Teague case determined only
that East Cherry Grove owned the narrow section of marsh under the Teagues'
proposed dock. We agree.

"[T]he doctrine of 'law of the case' is just that—the law of the case in which it was
made, not the law of future cases." Builders Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bob Wire Elec., Inc.,
424 S.C. 161, 165, 817 S.E.2d 807, 809 (Ct. App. 2018). "[T]he law of the case
doctrine . . . applies only to subsequent proceedings in the same litigation
following an appellate decision . . . ." Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc. v. Haynsworth,
Marion, McKay & Guerard, 334 S.C. 244, 245, 513 S.E.2d 96, 96-97 (1999).

We hold the law of the case doctrine does not apply. In the Teague case, Judge
Hyman ruled the Teagues' proposed dock infringed on real property that East
Cherry Grove owned. Judge Hyman made a finding of fact that according to the
testimony of Joel Floyd, "The specific grant applying to the property over which
the dock [wa]s to be built" was the 200-Acre Morrall Grant. Judge Hyman
concluded that pursuant to the 200-Acre Morrall Grant, East Cherry Grove "had a
sovereign grant in its chain of title to the part of the marsh area over which the
proposed dock [wa]s to be built." Although the State and East Cherry Grove were
both parties to the Teague case, this is a different suit rather than a subsequent
proceeding in the same litigation. See Builders Mut. Ins. Co., 424 S.C. at 165, 817
S.E.2d at 809 ("[T]he doctrine of 'law of the case' is just that—the law of the case
in which it was made, not the law of future cases."); Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc.,
334 S.C. at 245, 513 S.E.2d at 96-97 (1999) ("[T]he law of the case
doctrine . . . applies only to subsequent proceedings in the same litigation
following an appellate decision."). Thus, we hold the circuit court misapplied the
law of the case doctrine, and Judge Hyman's ruling is not determinative of whether
the entirety of the East Cherry Grove Tract is contained within a King's or
sovereign grant.

We decline to address Respondent's arguments that the doctrines of collateral
estoppel and res judicata precluded the State from relitigating Judge Hyman's
finding that East Cherry Grove possessed a King's grant in its chain of title as to
the property under the Teagues' proposed dock. See I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt.
Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 419, 526 S.E.2d 716, 723 (2000) ("[A] respondent . . . may
raise on appeal any additional reasons the appellate court should affirm the lower
court's ruling, regardless of whether those reasons have been presented to or ruled
on by the lower court."); id. at 420, 526 S.E.2d at 723 ("It is within the appellate
court's discretion whether to address any additional sustaining grounds."); id. at
420 n.9, 526 S.E.2d at 723 n.9 ("The appellate court may or may not wish to
address such grounds when it reverses the lower court's decision."). Regardless,
Judge Hyman's ruling pertained only to the portion of land over which the Teagues'
proposed dock would have been built; this ruling did not conclude a sovereign
grant covered the entirety of the East Cherry Grove Tract at issue in this case. See
Carolina Renewal, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 385 S.C. 550, 554, 684 S.E.2d
779, 782 (Ct. App. 2009) ("The party asserting collateral estoppel must
demonstrate that the issue in the present lawsuit was: (1) actually litigated in the
prior action; (2) directly determined in the prior action; and (3) necessary to
support the prior judgment."); Plum Creek Dev. Co. v. City of Conway, 334 S.C.
30, 34, 512 S.E.2d 106, 109 (1999) ("To establish res judicata, the [party] must
prove the following three elements: (1) identity of the parties; (2) identity of the
subject matter; and (3) adjudication of the issue in the former suit."). Thus, his
decision did not directly decide the merits of the issue presented in this case.
Accordingly, even if we were to consider Respondents' additional sustaining
grounds, Respondents' arguments would fail on the merits. This does not affect
Judge Hyman's ruling with respect to the narrow strip of land addressed in the
Teague case because the State does not contend the 200-Acre Alston Grant does
not cover this particular portion of the East Cherry Grove Tract.

III. Ownership of East Cherry Grove Tract

As to the East Cherry Grove Tract, the State argues the Courtney plat shows the
areas described as the pig's ears and dome of the pig's head and an adjacent strip
are outside the boundaries of the 200-Acre Morrall Grant to the area. The State
contends the Grants, the Culler, Floyd, and Powers map, and the Floyd map did not
show a grant covering marsh in the northwestern section of the tract in these areas.
The State further asserts Floyd's testimony acknowledged the omission except for a
vague reference to grants not in evidence. The State contends the record therefore
contains no evidence showing East Cherry Grove owns this portion of the tidelands
property. We agree.

"To rebut the State's presumptive title, a claimant must show (1) its predecessor in
title possessed a valid grant, and (2) the grant's language was sufficient to convey
land below the high water mark." Grant, 395 S.C. at 228, 717 S.E.2d at 98.

The State challenges only the circuit court's decision as to portions of the East
Cherry Grove Tract; it does not challenge the circuit court's decision regarding the
Ray & Nixon Tract. According to the testimony at trial, and as the Courtney plat
and the Culler, Floyd, and Powers map demonstrate, the grant that applies to the
East Cherry Grove Tract is the 200-Acre Morrall Grant. The plat associated with
this grant contains the words "Salt Marsh" inside the bounds of the plat. Thus, as a
preliminary matter, we hold evidence supports the circuit court's conclusion that
this grant was sufficient in detail to establish private ownership of tidelands. See
id. at 228, 717 S.E.2d at 98 ("To rebut the State's presumptive title, a claimant must
show (1) its predecessor in title possessed a valid grant, and (2) the grant's
language was sufficient to convey land below the high water mark."). The
question we must answer, then, is whether evidence supports the circuit court's
finding that a King's or sovereign grant covered the entirety of the East Cherry
Grove Tract. We hold the circuit court erred by concluding East Cherry Grove
supplied sufficient evidence to rebut the State's presumptive title to the area
described as the pig's ears and dome of the pig's head because no grant was
identified during trial as covering this area. None of the compiled survey maps
delineating the surveyed boundaries that the Grants described included this portion.
Both Deschamps and Courtney testified this area was not contained in the Grants.
Although the tax map of the East Cherry Grove Tract includes this area, we hold
this is not sufficient to rebut the State's presumption of ownership because
Respondents presented no evidence showing the tax map represented the
boundaries of any of the Grants. Because we find no evidence supports a finding
that this portion of the East Cherry Grove Tract was within any of the four King's
or sovereign grants at issue, we reverse the circuit court's order as it pertains to this
small section of the East Cherry Grove Tract.

IV. The Courtney Plat

Next, the State argues the circuit court should have found the Courtney plat to be
controlling because the tax maps Respondents relied upon lacked the required
specificity. The State argues that only the Courtney plat showed a deed-based
outline of the property and was therefore the only reliable source for determining
the boundary of the claimed property. The State further asserts the Courtney plat
was much more similar to the plat included with the original 200-Acre Morrall
Grant than was the Floyd map. We disagree.

We hold the circuit court did not err in failing to rely solely upon the Courtney plat
in reaching its decision in this case because it was within the circuit court's
province to weigh all the evidence admitted at trial. See Sheek v. Crimestoppers
Alarm Sys., Div. of Glen Curt Consultants, 297 S.C. 375, 377, 377 S.E.2d 132, 133
(Ct. App. 1989) ("In a law case tried without a jury, questions regarding credibility
and weight of evidence are exclusively for the trial judge."); see also Grant, 395
S.C. at 228, 717 S.E.2d at 98 ("[T]he trial court's factual findings will not be
disturbed on appeal unless a review of the record discloses that there is no
evidence which reasonably supports the [court's] findings." (second alteration in
original) (quoting Barnacle Broad., Inc., 343 S.C. at 146, 538 S.E.2d at 675)).
Here, the circuit court stated it relied upon the Floyd map as well as the Courtney
plat in reaching its conclusions. During trial, Floyd, who testified as an expert in
the field of surveying, stated he, Culler, and Powers agreed upon the Floyd map as
showing a compilation and mapping of the Grants. He stated it was his opinion to
a reasonable degree of surveying certainty that this map was a true and accurate
compilation of the Grants and that the East Cherry Grove and Ray & Nixon Tracts
fell within those grants. Fairey, who also testified as an expert in the field of
surveying, stated he relied upon the Courtney plat as well as the Floyd map in
rendering his opinion as to the Ray & Nixon Tract. Based upon the foregoing, we
hold evidence supports the circuit court's conclusion regarding the ownership of
the East Cherry Grove and the Ray & Nixon Tracts, with the exception of the pig's
ears and dome of the pig's head portion, as discussed above. Accordingly, we hold
the circuit court did not err by declining to rely solely upon the Courtney plat in
reaching its conclusion.
V. Control of Navigable Waterways

Finally, the State asserts the circuit court should have specified the navigable
waterways are public highways subject to the State's control as opposed to the
more general "Defendant's" control. Because Respondents concede this point, we
clarify the navigable waterways contained within these tracts remain public
highways subject to the State's control. See S.C. Const. art. XIV, § 4 ("All
navigable waters shall forever remain public highways free to the citizens of the
State and the United States . . . .").

As to the State's remaining argument that the circuit court improperly relied upon
the title expert's opinion when he was not a surveyor and his opinion could not
override the testimony of the two surveyors, the State has failed to address this
issue in the body of its brief. See Wright v. Craft, 372 S.C. 1, 20, 640 S.E.2d 486,
497 (Ct. App. 2006) ("An issue raised on appeal but not argued in the brief is
deemed abandoned and will not be considered by the appellate court." (quoting
Fields v. Melrose Ltd. P'ship, 312 S.C. 102, 106, 439 S.E.2d 283, 284 (Ct. App.
1993))). Thus, we do not consider this issue.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court's ruling is

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.

MCDONALD, J., and BROMELL HOLMES, A.J., concur.