Paul Roy Osmundson v. School District 5

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Paul Roy Osmundson, Appellant,

v.

School District 5 of Lexington and Richland Counties,
Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000104

Appeal From Richland County
Alison Renee Lee, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 6066
Heard June 4, 2024 – Filed June 26, 2024

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Joel W. Collins, Jr., of Collins & Lacy, PC, and Patrick
Devin Quinn, of Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough,
LLP, both of Columbia, for Appellant.

James Edward Bradley, of Moore Bradley Myers, PA, of
West Columbia, for Respondent.

THOMAS, J.: Paul Roy Osmundson appeals the dismissal of his action under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 1 against School District 5 of Lexington and
Richland Counties (the District), arguing the circuit court erred in (1) granting a
motion to dismiss for failure to request a hearing within ten days of service of the
action, and (2) denying a motion to reconsider. We reverse and remand.

1
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 30-4-10 to -165 (2007 & Supp. 2023).
FACTS

Osmundson, an editor at The State Media Co., filed this action against the District,
alleging violations of the FOIA. The initial complaint was served on July 28,
2021. Osmundson alleged the Board of Trustees of the District refused Laurene
Mensch's prior FOIA request, which requested a list of and details regarding prior
and planned 2021 meetings. The complaint further alleged the Board secretly
voted to terminate the Superintendent; removed from the minutes of the meeting an
opinion of the South Carolina Attorney General that explained the need for
meetings of Board officers to be open to the public; secretly negotiated a
termination agreement with the superintendent, Dr. Christina Melton (the
Superintendent); and deliberately misled the public regarding the Superintendent's
"resignation." The complaint sought a declaratory judgment, including injunctive
relief requiring "all Board of Trustees [meetings] and Meetings of Board Officers
to be conducted openly and in strict compliance with . . . [the FOIA]; a civil fine;
and attorneys' fees and costs." An amended complaint was filed on August 16,
2021. In addition to the allegations in the first complaint, it alleged the Trustees of
the District circumvented the FOIA by creating standing committees that regularly
met without compliance with the FOIA. As additional relief, it sought a
declaration that the District's handling of the Superintendent's termination
was a willful FOIA violation.

The District filed an answer, generally denying the allegations. The District and
Osmundson each filed a motion for summary judgment; the District filed a motion
to dismiss; and the parties filed memoranda in support of and in opposition to the
motions.

During a July 18, 2022 WebEx hearing on the motions, the District argued the
issues were moot; thus, Osmundson was entitled only to attorney's fees. The
District also argued the FOIA requires a plaintiff to request the hearing within ten
days and Osmundson's failure to do so was a ground for dismissal.

Osmundson argued, inter alia, that he requested a hearing within ten days of
service on all parties in the body of the amended complaint. Osmundson noted
"mindful[ness] of the fact that [the court was] operating under the very serious
limitations of the Covid protocols" and argued the burden was not on a plaintiff to
"strong arm the clerk of court or brow beat the judge's law clerk" to insure a
hearing was held within ten days. Osmundson argued the statute imposes the duty
on the court to schedule a hearing without a requirement for the party to do
anything further other than to request it under the statute, which he did.
Furthermore, Osmundson argued a party is incapable of unilaterally scheduling a
hearing.

In a form order filed October 20, 2022, the circuit court found Section 30-4-100(A)
of the FOIA required a hearing to be held within ten days of the service of the
complaint "and a scheduling order to conclude the action [had to] be held within
six months." Because "no hearing was held within the allotted timeframe[,]" the
motion to dismiss was granted. Osmundson moved to reconsider, which the court
denied. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Osmundson's argument raises a legal question, which we review de novo. See
Transp. Ins. Co. v. S.C. Second Injury Fund, 389 S.C. 422, 427, 699 S.E.2d 687,
689 (2010) (holding questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law
which are subject to de novo review); Proctor v. Steedley, 398 S.C. 561, 573, 730
S.E.2d 357, 363 (Ct. App. 2012) (stating an appellate court employing the de novo
standard of review is "is free to decide questions of law with no particular
deference to the trial court").

LAW/ANALYSIS

A. DISMISSAL

Osmundson argues the circuit court erred in dismissing the action. We agree.

The FOIA provision relied upon by the circuit court provides the following:

(A) A citizen of the State may apply to the circuit court
for a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, or both, to
enforce the provisions of this chapter . . . . Upon the
filing of the request for declaratory judgment or
injunctive relief related to provisions of this chapter, the
chief administrative judge of the circuit court must
schedule an initial hearing within ten days of the service
on all parties. If the hearing court is unable to make a
final ruling at the initial hearing, the court shall establish
a scheduling order to conclude actions brought pursuant
to this chapter within six months of initial filing. The
court may extend this time period upon a showing of
good cause.

S.C. Code Ann. § 30-4-100(A) (Supp. 2023) (emphasis added); see Davis v. S.C.
Educ. Credit for Exceptional Needs Child. Fund, 441 S.C. 187, 191 n.2, 893
S.E.2d 330, 332 n.2 (Ct. App. 2023) ("Initial hearings under FOIA are generally
supposed to be scheduled 'within ten days of the service on all parties.'") (quoting
S.C. Code Ann. § 30-4-100 (Supp. 2022))). Neither the circuit court nor the parties
cite law interpreting the ten-day hearing requirement. Thus, we look to the law
regarding statutory interpretation.

"The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the
legislative intent whenever possible." Mitchell v. City of Greenville, 411 S.C. 632,
634, 770 S.E.2d 391, 392 (2015). "[W]e must first attempt to construe a statute
according to its plain language, and if the language of a statute is plain,
unambiguous, and conveys a clear meaning, 'the rules of statutory interpretation
are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.'" Odom v.
Town of McBee Election Comm'n, 427 S.C. 305, 310-11, 831 S.E.2d 429, 432
(2019) (quoting Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000)).

We find the plain meaning of this statute requires the chief administrative judge of
the circuit court to schedule an initial hearing within ten days. The statute states
"the chief administrative judge of the circuit court must schedule an initial hearing
within ten days . . . ." § 30-4-100(A). Both the complaint and the amended
complaint stated Osmundson sought "an initial hearing within ten days of service
on all parties pursuant to § 30-4-100(A)." Our Legislature has not mandated a
requirement that a party filing a FOIA action be the party responsible for
scheduling an initial hearing and we decline to impose such a requirement. See
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. S.C. Second Inj. Fund, 363 S.C. 612, 622, 611 S.E.2d 297,
302 (Ct. App. 2005) ("If a statute's language is unambiguous and clear, there is no
need to employ the rules of statutory construction and [the appellate court] has no
right to look for or impose another meaning.").

Based on the plain language of the statute, we find the circuit court erred in
dismissing the action. However, we also find the legislative intent behind the ten-
day requirement was to benefit FOIA applicants. See State v. Landis, 362 S.C. 97,
102, 606 S.E.2d 503, 505 (Ct. App. 2004) ("All rules of statutory construction are
subservient to the one that legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably
discovered in the language used, and that language must be construed in the light
of the intended purpose of the statute."). A review of the legislative history
indicates the amendments to the FOIA since its enactment have been to expand
rights; thus, we find the purpose of the ten-day requirement was to expedite
resolution, not to erect a procedural barrier. South Carolina's FOIA was enacted in
1978 and provided that a citizen could apply to the circuit court for injunctive
relief if the application was made within sixty days of the alleged violation. 1978
S.C. Act No. 593, §11 (eff. Jul. 18, 1978). In 1987, it was amended to extend the
time for filing to one year; provide additionally for declaratory relief; and state that
violations constituted irreparable injury for which no adequate remedy at law
existed. 1987 S.C. Act No. 118, § 8 (eff. May 26, 1987). In 2017, it was amended
to add the language at issue in this case. 2017 S.C. Act No. 67, §4 (eff. May 19,
2017). We find the legislative history of South Carolina's FOIA indicates
amendments have generally been in favor of, not against, requesters.

We find the circuit court erred in dismissing the action because no hearing was
held within ten days of the date of service of the action; accordingly, we reverse
and remand. 2

B. MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Osmundson argues the circuit court erred in denying his motion to reconsider
based on Rule 59(g) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure because
Osmundson did not provide a copy of the motion to the court, as required by the
rule, within ten days of the filing of the motion. Because we reverse and remand
based on the circuit court's erroneous dismissal of the action, we need not address
this argument. See Futch, 335 S.C. at 613, 518 S.E.2d at 598 (stating an appellate
court need not address remaining issues when the disposition of a prior issue is
dispositive).

C. THE DISTRICT'S ARGUMENTS

2
Osmundson also argues the circuit court's dismissal of his action violates the
spirit of our supreme court's orders addressing the Covid-19 pandemic. Because
we reverse and remand based on the plain language of the statute, we need not
address this argument. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335
S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (stating an appellate court need not
address remaining issues when the disposition of a prior issue is dispositive).
The District raises numerous arguments maintaining this court should affirm based
on additional sustaining grounds. We decline to reach these issues. See Cowburn
v. Leventis, 366 S.C. 20, 35 n.4, 619 S.E.2d 437, 446 n.4 (Ct. App. 2005) ("This
court may review additional sustaining grounds raised by a respondent, and 'if
convinced it is proper and fair to do so, rely on them or any other reason' raised on
appeal and appearing in the record to affirm the lower court's judgment." (quoting
I‘On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 420, 526 S.E.2d 716, 723
(2000))); id. (declining to address additional sustaining grounds where the court
was "not convinced it [was] proper and fair to do so").

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the order on appeal is

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

MCDONALD and VERDIN, JJ., concur.