Mia Anderson v. Richard Thompson

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Mia Anderson, on behalf of the Estate of Jessie Heyward
a/k/a Jessie Bell Anderson, Appellant,

v.

Richard Miles Thompson, M.D. and ACS Primary Care
Physicians - Southeast, P.C., Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001703

Appeal From Berkeley County
Thomas L. Hughston, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-307
Submitted May 1, 2026 – Filed June 24, 2026

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Brooks Roberts Fudenberg, of Law Office of Brooks R.
Fudenberg, LLC, of Charleston, for Appellant.

Robert P. Wood, of Rogers Townsend, LLC, of
Columbia; and Chilton Grace Simmons and Elizabeth
Ballentine Mason, both of Rogers Townsend, LLC, of
Charleston, all for Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Mia Anderson (Anderson), on Behalf of the Estate of Jessie
Heyward a/k/a Jessie Bell Anderson, appeals the jury verdict in favor of Richard
Miles Thompson, M.D. and ACS Primary Care Physicians - Southeast, P.C.
(collectively, Respondents) on her causes of action for negligence by medical
malpractice, wrongful death, and survival and the circuit court's order denying her
motion for a new trial. On appeal, Anderson argues the circuit court erred by
failing to either remove or question a juror despite evidence of juror hostility and
premature deliberations. We reverse and remand pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR.

Initially, we hold Anderson's motion for a new trial stayed the thirty-day
requirement to serve the notice of appeal. See Rule 203(b)(1), SCACR ("A notice
of appeal shall be served on all respondents within thirty . . . days after receipt of
written notice of entry of the order or judgment."); id. ("When a timely . . . motion
for a new trial . . . has been made, the time for appeal for all parties shall be stayed
and shall run from receipt of written notice of entry of the order granting or
denying such motion."). Anderson filed her motion on the tenth day after the
discharge of the jury as the circuit court allowed her to do. See Rule 59(b),
SCRCP ("The motion for a new trial shall be made promptly after the jury is
discharged, or in the discretion of the court not later than [ten] days thereafter.").
We hold Anderson timely filed her motion, despite the clerk of court's rejection for
unredacted information in an exhibit. Clerks of court are not responsible for
reviewing filings for redactions and if they discover unredacted material, they
should request an amended filing instead of rejecting it. See Rule 41.2(c), SCRCP
("The clerks of court and their staff will not review filings for redaction . . . . The
responsibility for ensuring that information is redacted or sealed rests with counsel
and the parties."); In re S.C. Elec. Filing Pol'ys & Guidelines, 415 S.C. 1, 16, 780
S.E.2d 600, 607-08 (2015) ("The [c]lerks of [c]ourt and their staff are not
responsible for reviewing filings to determine if materials should be redacted."); id.
("If the [c]lerk of [c]ourt discovers unredacted personal identifying information in
an E-Filed document, the [c]lerk may require that the party E-File an amended
document that properly redacts personal identifying information."); see also
Barnes v. State, 433 S.C. 399, 402, 859 S.E.2d 260, 261 (2021) ("[A] clerk of court
does not have the authority to reject a filing based on ostensible or perceived
failures, including whether the document is contained on the proper form."); id. at
403, 859 S.E.2d at 262 ("Instead, the clerk shall accept the filing, thereby
permitting the court to decide any issues the parties may have with it.").
Next, contrary to Respondents' contention, we hold Anderson's statement of issue
on appeal was sufficiently concise and direct.1 See Rule 208(b)(1)(B), SCACR
("The statement [of issues on appeal] shall be concise and direct as to each
issue . . . . Broad general statements may be disregarded by the appellate court.
Ordinarily, no point will be considered which is not set forth in the statement of the
issues on appeal.").

We also hold, contrary to Respondents' argument, that Anderson's issue is
preserved for appellate review. See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497
S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial [court] to
be preserved for appellate review."). Anderson first raised her concerns regarding
the foreperson's and the unknown juror's conduct as soon as the statements were
discovered and Respondents joined in this objection. Anderson objected a second
time after a witness finished testifying, and Respondents echoed Anderson's
concern that further misconduct by the foreperson occurred after the court
reinstructed the jury not to engage in preliminary deliberations. Anderson
specifically requested the circuit court "check in" with or remove the foreperson,
which the court denied. We hold these requests were sufficiently specific and
contemporaneous to raise this issue to the circuit court and preserve the issue on
appeal. See Herron, 395 S.C. at 466, 719 S.E.2d at 642 ("[A] party is not required
to use the exact name of a legal doctrine in order to preserve the issue."); State v.
Aldret, 333 S.C. 307, 315 n.6, 509 S.E.2d 811, 815 n.6 (1999) ("[A]llegations [of
premature jury deliberations] must be raised at the first opportunity in order to be
preserved for review."); State v. Hurd, 325 S.C. 384, 389-90, 480 S.E.2d 94, 97
(Ct. App. 1996) (determining the request to remove a juror or "bring him in and
question him" was sufficient to require the trial court to determine whether the
juror was unqualified). Although the circuit court noted it was "not making a final
decision" after Anderson's second objection and Anderson did not explicitly join
the third objection, made by Respondents, we hold it would have been futile for
Anderson to make the exact same—just denied—request as Respondents for what
would have been the fourth time. See Staubes v. City of Folly Beach, 339 S.C.
406, 415, 529 S.E.2d 543, 547 (2000) ("[An appellate c]ourt does not require

1
Nevertheless, the issue was reasonably clear from her brief. See Herron v.
Century BMW, 395 S.C. 461, 466, 719 S.E.2d 640, 642 (2011) ("When an issue is
not specifically set out in the statements of issues, the appellate court may
nevertheless consider the issue if it is reasonably clear from an appellant's
arguments.").
parties to engage in futile actions in order to preserve issues for appellate
review."); see also Herron, 395 S.C. at 470, 719 S.E.2d at 644 ("We are mindful of
the need to approach issue preservation rules with a practical eye and not in a rigid,
hyper-technical manner."); Staubes, 339 S.C. at 412, 529 S.E.2d at 546 ("Error
preservation requirements are intended 'to enable the lower court to rule properly
after it has considered all relevant facts, law, and arguments.'" (quoting I'On v.
Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 422, 526 S.E.2d 716, 724 (2000))).

Finally, we hold the circuit court abused its discretion by failing to question the
foreperson regarding the alleged juror misconduct when the foreperson allegedly
used an expletive towards the court and an unknown juror allegedly stated behind a
closed door that he or she would "discuss [the] case, if [he or she] want[ed] to."
See Hassell v. City of Columbia, 430 S.C. 620, 626, 846 S.E.2d 373, 376 (Ct. App.
2020) ("A denial of a new trial based on alleged jury misconduct is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion." (quoting State v. Galbreath, 359 S.C. 398, 402, 597 S.E.2d
845, 847 (Ct. App. 2004))). A juror exhibiting hostile behavior and explicitly
pronouncing that he or she would not follow the court's instructions would make
that juror unqualified to render a verdict and the circuit court was therefore
required to "conduct a probing and tactful inquiry" to determine whether the juror
was unqualified. See Hurd, 325 S.C. at 389-90, 480 S.E.2d at 97 ("'[I]t is
incumbent upon the trial court to conduct a probing and tactful inquiry to
determine whether a sworn juror is unqualified,' and 'the court must not
speculate . . . but must ascertain the juror's state of mind and must place its reasons
for excusing or retaining the juror on the record.'" (quoting People v. Valerio, 529
N.Y.S.2d 350, 351 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (omission in original))); id. at 389, 480
S.E.2d at 97 (determining a sleeping juror "who ha[d] not heard all the evidence in
the case or the court's instructions as to the applicable principles of law [was]
grossly unqualified to render a verdict" (quoting Valerio, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 351));
State v. Zeigler, 364 S.C. 94, 109, 610 S.E.2d 859, 867 (Ct. App. 2005) ("[A] trial
[court] must make a factual determination as to whether juror misconduct has
occurred."); Keene v. CAN Holdings, LLC, 426 S.C. 357, 377-78, 827 S.E.2d 183,
194 (Ct. App. 2019) ("When an allegation of premature jury deliberations arises
during trial, the circuit court should conduct a hearing to ascertain if, in fact, such
premature deliberations occurred, and if the deliberations were prejudicial."
(quoting Aldret, 333 S.C. at 315, 509 S.E.2d at 815)). The circuit court abused its
discretion when it failed to conduct this inquiry, and we reverse and remand for a
new trial. See Hurd, 325 S.C. at 390, 480 S.E.2d at 97 (holding the court
committed "reversible error by refusing defense counsel's request to question the
juror as to whether he heard all of the charge").
REVERSED AND REMANDED.2

WILLIAMS, C.J., and KONDUROS and VINSON, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.