Margie Evett v. Desmine Sartain

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Margie Evett, Appellant,

v.

Desmine Sartain, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2025-000703

Appeal From Greenville County
Patrick Cleburne Fant, III, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-280
Submitted May 1, 2026 – Filed June 10, 2026

AFFIRMED

Sheally Venus Poe, of Venus Poe, PA, of Fountain Inn,
for Appellant.

James P. Walsh and John David Solar, both of Clarkson,
Walsh & Coulter, P.A., of Greenville, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Margie Evett appeals the circuit court's order granting Desmine
Sartain's motion for summary judgment as to Evett's causes of action for
negligence, premises liability, and strict liability pursuant to section 47-3-110 of
the South Carolina Code (2017). On appeal, Evett argues the circuit court erred in
finding (1) Sartain was not strictly liable for her dog's actions pursuant to section
47-3-110, (2) Sartain's alleged negligence was not a jury question, and (3) Sartain
did not owe Evett a duty under a simple negligence theory. We affirm pursuant to
Rule 220(b), SCACR.

1. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Evett, we hold the circuit
court did not err in granting Sartain summary judgment regarding the issue of strict
liability because there was not a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Evett's
injuries were the result of a dog attack. See USAA Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Clegg,
377 S.C. 643, 653, 661 S.E.2d 791, 796 (2008) (stating an appellate court reviews
the grant of a motion for summary judgment under "the same standard that governs
the circuit court under Rule 56(c)" of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure);
Rule 56(c), SCRCP (explaining summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law"); Singleton v. Sherer,
377 S.C. 185, 197, 659 S.E.2d 196, 202 (Ct. App. 2008) ("On appeal from an order
granting summary judgment, the appellate court will review all ambiguities,
conclusions, and inferences arising in and from the evidence in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party."); § 47-3-110(A) ("If a person is bitten or
otherwise attacked by a dog while the person is in a public place or is lawfully in a
private place, including the property of the dog owner or person having the dog in
the person's care or keeping, the dog owner or person having the dog in the
person's care or keeping is liable for the damages suffered by the person bitten or
otherwise attacked." (emphasis added)). Evett's injuries did not result from a dog
attack such that section 47-3-110 would be applicable because Evett did not
present any evidence Sartain's dog initiated a struggle or committed any hostile or
offensive action towards her. See Padgett v. Mercado, 341 S.C. 229, 232, 533
S.E.2d 339, 340 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding the plaintiff was required to "prove that
there was an attack" and that the word attack "implie[d] the taking of initiative in a
struggle" or "any hostile offensive action"); id. at 233, 533 S.E.2d at 340
(highlighting the plaintiff admitted the dog never bit or touched her when
reasoning plaintiff's injuries were not the result of an attack). Evett admitted
Sartain's dog did not bite or make physical contact with her person. See id. at
232-33, 533 S.E.2d at 340-41 (affirming the circuit court's holding that the
plaintiff's "injury arose not from [a dog] attack, but from her lifting a large,
struggling dog onto her truck," which did not fall within the purview of section
47-3-110). Furthermore, Evett did not present any evidence Sartain's dog ran
toward her aggressively and directly, nor that the dog directed any action toward
her.
2. We hold the circuit court did not err in granting Sartain summary judgment
regarding Evett's premises liability claim because there was not a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether there were any hidden or latent dangers in Sartain's
residence. See Clegg, 377 S.C. at 653, 661 S.E.2d at 796 (stating an appellate
court reviews the grant of a motion for summary judgment under "the same
standard that governs the circuit court under Rule 56(c)"); Rule 56(c), SCRCP
(explaining summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law"); Singleton, 377 S.C.
at 197, 659 S.E.2d at 202 ("On appeal from an order granting summary judgment,
the appellate court will review all ambiguities, conclusions, and inferences arising
in and from the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.");
Sims v. Giles, 343 S.C. 708, 718, 541 S.E.2d 857, 863 (Ct. App. 2001) ("The
landowner has a duty to warn an invitee only of latent or hidden dangers of which
the landowner has knowledge or should have knowledge."). Evett was familiar
with the layout of Sartain's home and with Sartain's dog; furthermore, Evett
asserted in her deposition she cared for Sartain's dog many times and knew the
dog's propensity to damage blinds and bark at passersby. In addition, we find the
danger of walking a large dog down a flight of brick stairs is a danger that would
be obvious to the reasonable invitee. See id. at 719, 541 S.E.2d at 863 ("A
possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by
any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them,
unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or
obviousness." (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343(A) (1965))).

3. We hold the circuit court did not err in granting Sartain summary judgment
regarding Evett's general negligence claim because there was not a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether Sartain owed Evett a general duty of care to train her
dog, or to train her dog not to run down stairs while on a leash. See Clegg, 377
S.C. at 653, 661 S.E.2d at 796 (stating an appellate court reviews the grant of a
motion for summary judgment under "the same standard that governs the circuit
court under Rule 56(c)"); Rule 56(c), SCRCP (explaining summary judgment is
proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits . . . show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law"); Singleton, 377 S.C. at 197, 659 S.E.2d at 202 ("On appeal from an
order granting summary judgment, the appellate court will review all ambiguities,
conclusions, and inferences arising in and from the evidence in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party."); Vinson v. Hartley, 324 S.C. 389, 399, 477
S.E.2d 715, 720 (Ct. App. 1996) ("To prevail in an action founded in negligence,
the plaintiff must establish three essential elements: (1) a duty of care owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty by a negligent act or omission;
and (3) damage proximately caused by a breach of duty."). Furthermore, Evett did
not present any evidence Sartain's dog had a propensity to run down the stairs, and
did not present evidence Sartain knew or had reason to know of her dog having
such propensity. Evett testified she cared for the dog many times in the past, and
had no knowledge of the dog ever bolting down stairs. See Giles v. Russell, 255
S.C. 513, 515, 180 S.E.2d 201, 202 (1971) ("It is the rule in this [s]tate that
domestic animals are not presumed to be dangerous to persons, and before
recovery of damages may be had against the owner, the injured party must prove
that the particular animal was of a dangerous, or vicious, nature, and that his
dangerous propensity was either known, or should have been known to the
owner.").

AFFIRMED.1

GEATHERS, HEWITT, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.