State v. Anijah Yarnell

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Appellant,

v.

Anijah Yarnell, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000571

Appeal From Horry County
J. Mark Hayes, II, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-276
Submitted April 22, 2025 – Filed June 3, 2026

AFFIRMED

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, all of
Columbia; and Solicitor Jimmy A. Richardson, II, of
Conway, all for Appellant.

Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter, of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: The State appeals the circuit court's order granting Anijah
Yarnell immunity from prosecution under the Protections of Persons and Property
Act (the Act). See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-11-410 to -450 (2015). The State argues
the circuit court abused its discretion by (1) finding Yarnell was without fault in
bringing on the difficulty; (2) finding Yarnell was in actual danger of death or
great bodily injury; (3) ruling that Yarnell was entitled to the presumption of
reasonable fear because one of the decedent's fingerprints was found on Yarnell's
car; and (4) finding subsection 16-11-440(B) of the Act did not apply when Yarnell
was engaged in an unlawful activity and that he was in a place he had the right to
be under subsection 16-11-440(C). We affirm.1

FACTS

In May 2020, Yarnell was in a romantic relationship with Remington Hargrove
(Remi). On May 14, 2020, Remi's family was visiting Myrtle Beach from New
York, and the group had plans to go out for dinner together after Yarnell got off
work. When the plans changed, Yarnell got upset and the couple engaged in a
heated argument through text messaging. When Remi told Yarnell she would not
be coming home that night, he demanded that she come home and threatened to
destroy four photographs of her deceased father every thirty minutes she did not
return home. Between around 2:30 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. that day, Yarnell called
Remi over 200 times, sometimes from a blocked number. After the first few calls,
Remi stopped answering and turned off her phone for most of the afternoon and
evening. Around 5:45 that afternoon, Yarnell also began sending text messages to
Remi's mother, Michelle, threatening to throw away Remi's belongings if she did
not come home and collect them because Remi told him she was going to move in
with one of her friends.

Later that night, Yarnell drove to the condo where he knew Remi and her family
were headed after dinner. When Remi and her cousin, Emily Cerio, drove into the
complex, Remi saw Yarnell's car, and she and Cerio got back in their car and left
the complex. Remi and Cerio drove to a gas station. While there, Remi spoke to
Yarnell on the phone and asked him to drop off her things and leave. Cerio and
Remi met Cerio's boyfriend, Michael Pennington, at the gas station and asked him
to come to the apartment complex because Remi was afraid of Yarnell.

When Remi and Cerio returned to the apartment complex parking lot, they passed
by Yarnell as he was driving out of the complex. Remi and Cerio continued
toward the building, parked the car, and went upstairs to the apartment.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
Pennington was already standing in the parking lot talking to Remi's aunt, Jennifer
Tassone, and her boyfriend, Darrin Card, when Cerio and Remi returned.

In the meantime, Yarnell turned around and pulled back into the parking lot. He
drove up close to where Pennington was standing. The record contains conflicting
testimony as to what exactly happened next, but ultimately, Yarnell produced a
handgun, shot Pennington through his partially-lowered window, and drove away.2
Pennington died as a result.

An Horry County Grand Jury indicted Yarnell for murder and possession of a
weapon during the commission of a violent crime. Yarnell claimed he shot
Pennington in self-defense and thus sought immunity from prosecution under the
Act. The circuit court held an immunity hearing. During the hearing, in addition
to his own testimony, Yarnell presented the testimony of eleven witnesses,
including Card, Cerio, and Melissa Cannon, who was on the phone with Yarnell
during his confrontation with Pennington.3 Following the hearing, the circuit court
granted Yarnell's motion for immunity.

Yarnell testified he went to the apartment complex that night for the sole purpose
of dropping off Remi's clothes and belongings to her. He stated he also wanted to
talk to her but he did not want to hurt her. Yarnell explained that he always kept
his gun in his center console and that it was already there, loaded with a round in
the chamber, when he left his home to drive to the apartment complex. He stated
he liked to go to the shooting range from time to time and had been there recently
prior to the altercation.

Yarnell testified that when he spoke to Remi shortly before she arrived at the
apartment complex, she told him to "drop her stuff off then leave" and he
interpreted that to mean to "wait until she got there to give her her stuff and then
leave." He explained he got tired of waiting and had decided to leave but then
Remi passed him on her way into the parking lot and he turned around to "finally
drop her stuff off to her." Yarnell recalled that when he came back into the parking
lot, he saw Card, Pennington, and Cerio standing together. He stated he lowered
his window and asked, "[I]s Remi going to get her stuff or not?" Yarnell explained
that Pennington, who was the only person to respond, reacted by screaming at him

2
The bullet traveled through the window glass.
3
Cannon was friends with Michelle. Michelle had undergone a medical procedure
that day, was disoriented from medication related to the procedure, and was
staying with Cannon in Columbia the night of the shooting.
and telling him to "get the f*** out of the car, get the f*** out of the car so I can
f*** you up." Yarnell testified that when Pennington first approached his car, he
locked his doors. He recalled Pennington's demeanor was "belligerent" and
"aggressive."

Yarnell stated Pennington, who was about the same size as him, "lifted his shirt up
at a point in time and started wrapping something around his hand, [but] it was
dark so [Yarnell] did[ no]t see what it was." He testified Pennington approached
his vehicle and "was forcefully trying to get in [the] vehicle" by pulling on the door
handle. He stated the only way for him to get out of the parking lot was by
backing out. Yarnell stated he tried to back up and leave but Pennington was
moving along with his car and punched him through the lowered window and was
trying to force his way inside. Yarnell testified Pennington was unable to land
good punches because he was punching through the window and Yarnell had his
hand up. He stated that as Pennington was punching him through the window,
Yarnell reached into the center console for his gun and Pennington saw that he had
a gun. Yarnell stated Pennington said "if you pull it out you better use it" and
reached for the gun. Yarnell testified he fired one shot in Pennington's general
direction out of fear for his life. Yarnell clarified that he "had no clue if
[Pennington] had a weapon in his pocket" and "did[ no]t know what his intentions
were." He explained that he was afraid Pennington was going to take his gun from
him and hurt or kill him with it. Yarnell acknowledged he did not see Pennington
with a gun or knife in his hands but stated he could not fully see whether he had
any weapon and did not know what Pennington might have had in his pockets.

The circuit court found Yarnell "was a credible witness." The circuit court further
found that Yarnell proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he shot
Pennington in self-defense. It determined that before Yarnell fired the shot,
"Pennington reached into the vehicle to strike [Yarnell] and to attempt to grab the
gun." The circuit court noted the driver's side window was partially down during
the altercation, and although it could not be determined exactly how far the
window had been lowered, it was low enough that Pennington was able to reach
inside the car to attempt to punch Yarnell and grab the gun. The circuit court
found Pennington grabbed the door handle during the altercation. It held "the
greater weight of the evidence establish[ed] that Pennington was attempting to
open the vehicle's door in order to reach [Yarnell]" and that Yarnell "did not
present the gun into the altercation until after Pennington had approached the
vehicle, [using] threatening words such as 'get out of the car and I will f*** you
up' . . . . before and after he . . . reach[ed] into the vehicle."
The circuit court found that Yarnell did not provoke Pennington's attack and was
not at fault in bringing on the attack; that Yarnell believed he was in imminent
danger of losing his life or sustaining serious bodily injury and was actually in
such danger; and that his fear and belief of imminent danger was real and
reasonable. The circuit court further concluded that under section 16-11-440(A),
Yarnell was entitled to a presumption of reasonable fear of imminent peril of death
or great bodily injury when he used deadly force because Pennington was in the
process of unlawfully and forcefully entering Yarnell's occupied vehicle and had
attempted to remove Yarnell from the car. The circuit court concluded section
16-11-440(B)(1) did not disqualify Yarnell from immunity because Pennington did
not have a right to occupy Yarnell's vehicle.

The circuit court additionally held Yarnell was not engaged in an unlawful activity
or using his vehicle to further an unlawful activity under section 16-11-440(B)(3).
The circuit court noted that although Yarnell's vehicle was located on private
property at the time the shooting occurred, the evidence showed he was not
trespassing because Remi had permitted him to come to the complex to drop off
her belongings and it was undisputed Yarnell was lawfully occupying his vehicle.
The circuit court thus concluded subsections "(B)(1) (Pennington had no right to be
in [Yarnell's] vehicle) and (B)(3) ([Yarnell] was not using his vehicle for an
unlawful purpose)" of the Act did not disqualify Yarnell from immunity. The
circuit court further held that even if Yarnell were trespassing, his occupying the
vehicle was not the proximate cause of the attack against him. The circuit court
further rejected the State's argument that Yarnell brought the gun to harm Remi,
finding that based on the evidence presented during the hearing, it could not
conclude Yarnell had a premeditated motive to inflict serious bodily injury upon or
to kill Remi. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

"A claim of immunity under the Act requires a pretrial determination using a
preponderance of the evidence standard, which [appellate] court[s] review[] under
an abuse of discretion standard of review." State v. Gray, 438 S.C. 130, 141, 882
S.E.2d 469, 475 (Ct. App. 2022) (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Jones,
416 S.C. 283, 290, 786 S.E.2d 132, 136 (2016)). "A circuit court abuses its
discretion when its ruling is based on an error of law or, when grounded in factual
conclusions, is without evidentiary support." State v. Marshall, 428 S.C. 11, 18,
832 S.E.2d 618, 621-22 (Ct. App. 2019).

"To obtain immunity under the Act, a defendant must establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that his use of deadly force was justified." State v. Dennis, 447
S.C. 323, 334, 926 S.E.2d 250, 256 (2026). "There are four elements that must be
established to justify the use of deadly force as self-defense." State v. Scott, 424
S.C. 463, 468, 819 S.E.2d 116, 118 (2018). A claim of self-defense requires that
(1) the defendant is "without fault in bringing on the difficulty"; (2) the defendant
"actually believed he was in imminent danger of losing his life or sustaining
serious bodily injury, or he actually was in such imminent danger"; (3) "if his
defense is based upon his belief of imminent danger, a reasonably prudent man of
ordinary firmness and courage would have entertained the same belief," and "[i]f
the defendant actually was in imminent danger, the circumstances were such as
would warrant a man of ordinary prudence, firmness[,] and courage to strike the
fatal blow in order to save himself from serious bodily harm or losing his own
life"; and (4) "the defendant had no other probable means of avoiding the danger of
losing his own life or sustaining serious bodily injury than to act as he did in this
particular instance." State v. McCarty, 437 S.C. 355, 369, 878 S.E.2d 902, 909-10
(2022) (quoting State v. Curry, 406 S.C. 364, 371 n.4, 752 S.E.2d 263, 266 n.4
(2013)). "If the defendant has failed to meet the elements of reasonable fear or the
duty to retreat, the court should then determine whether section 16-11-440(A) or
(C) is applicable." State v. Glenn, 429 S.C. 108, 118, 838 S.E.2d 491, 496 (2019).

Subsections 16-11-440 of the Act provides,

(A) A person is presumed to have a reasonable fear of
imminent peril of death or great bodily injury to
himself . . . when using deadly force that is intended or
likely to cause death or great bodily injury to another
person if the person:

(1) against whom the deadly force is used is in the
process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or has
unlawfully and forcibly entered . . . [an] occupied
vehicle, or if he removes or is attempting to remove
another person against his will from the . . . occupied
vehicle; and

(2) who uses deadly force knows or has reason to believe
that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and
forcible act is occurring or has occurred.
(B) The presumption provided in subsection (A) does not
apply if the person:

(1) against whom the deadly force is used has the right to
be in . . . [the] occupied vehicle including, but not limited
to, an owner, lessee, or titleholder; or

....

(3) who uses deadly force is engaged in an unlawful
activity or is using the . . . occupied vehicle to further an
unlawful activity; . . . .

....

(C) A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity
and who is attacked in another place where he has a right
to be, including, but not limited to, his place of business,
has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his
ground and meet force with force, including deadly force,
if he reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent death
or great bodily injury to himself . . . .

(D) A person who unlawfully and by force enters or
attempts to enter a person's . . . occupied vehicle is
presumed to be doing so with the intent to commit an
unlawful act involving force or a violent crime . . . .

§ 16-11-440(A)-(D).

The State argues the circuit court abused its discretion by (1) finding Yarnell was
without fault in bringing on the difficulty; (2) finding Yarnell was in actual danger
of death or great bodily injury; (3) ruling that Yarnell was entitled to the
presumption of reasonable fear because the decedent's fingerprints were found on
Yarnell's car; and (4) finding subsection 16-11-440(B) of the Act did not apply
when Yarnell was not engaged in an unlawful activity and was in a place he had
the right to be under subsection 16-11-440(C). We address each issue in turn.

I. Without Fault in Bringing on the Difficulty
We hold the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding Yarnell was
without fault in bringing on the difficulty. See Gray, 438 S.C. at 141, 882 S.E.2d
at 475 ("A claim of immunity under the Act requires a pretrial determination using
a preponderance of the evidence standard, which [appellate] court[s] review[]
under an abuse of discretion standard of review." (alterations in original) (quoting
Jones, 416 S.C. at 290, 786 S.E.2d at 136)); see also Marshall, 428 S.C. at 18, 832
S.E.2d at 621-22 ("A circuit court abuses its discretion when its ruling is based on
an error of law, or when grounded in factual conclusions, is without evidentiary
support."); McCarty, 437 S.C. at 369, 878 S.E.2d at 909 (holding the first element
of self-defense requires the defendant was "without fault in bringing on the
difficulty" (quoting Curry, 406 S.C. at 371 n.4, 752 S.E.2d at 266 n.4)). Yarnell
testified his only reason for being at the apartment complex was to drop Remi's
clothes off to her and that based on the conversation he had with her immediately
prior to his arrival, he thought she wanted him to wait so that he could give them
directly to her. Thus, according to Yarnell, he had been invited to the parking lot
and that permission had never been revoked. Additionally, Yarnell explained that
when he drove up to where Pennington, Card, and Cerio were standing in the
parking lot, he simply asked them collectively if Remi was going to come get her
things. Yarnell stated that is when Pennington approached the car and started
screaming at him to get out of the car so that he could "f*** [him] up." The
evidence conflicts as to whether Yarnell displayed his handgun before or after
Pennington tried to open the car door. Cerio's and Card's testimonies were
inconsistent with Yarnell's account. Cerio testified Pennington never tried to open
the car door or punch Yarnell until after Yarnell presented a gun. Although Card's
testimony was less clear, he did state Pennington stepped back from the car when
he saw that Yarnell had a gun and that is when Yarnell fired. Nevertheless, the
circuit court found Yarnell was a credible witness. Because we cannot say the
circuit court's finding that Yarnell was a credible witness lacked evidentiary
support, we cannot disregard such finding. See State v. Johnson, 413 S.C. 458,
467, 776 S.E.2d 367, 371 (2015) ("Credibility findings are treated as factual
findings, and therefore, the appellate inquiry is limited to reviewing whether the
trial court's factual findings are supported by any evidence in the record."); State v.
Oates, 421 S.C. 1, 13, 803 S.E.2d 911, 918 (Ct. App. 2017) ("In other words, the
abuse of discretion standard of review does not allow this court to reweigh the
evidence or second-guess the [circuit] court's assessment of witness credibility."
(alteration in original) (quoting State v. Douglas, 411 S.C. 307, 316, 768 S.E.2d
232, 237-38 (Ct. App. 2014))); Johnson, 413 S.C. at 467, 776 S.E.2d at 371
("Moreover, . . . credibility determinations are entitled to great deference."); see
also State v. Blackwell, 420 S.C. 127, 143 n.12, 801 S.E.2d 713, 721 n.12 (2017)
(noting that "[a]lthough the dissent may disagree with the trial court's
pre-trial . . . determination, it cannot supplant the role of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses, to weigh their testimony, and to evaluate conflicting
testimony"). Furthermore, Remi was upstairs in the apartment when Yarnell
returned, and no evidence showed he attempted to park or exit his car or that he
expressly threatened any violence against Remi. Thus, we reject the State's
argument that Yarnell brought on the difficulty by showing up when he was
uninvited and that Pennington was acting for Remi's protection. Because the
circuit court found Yarnell to be a credible witness and Yarnell's testimony
provides evidence to support the circuit court's finding that he was without fault in
bringing on the difficulty, we find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in
determining Yarnell established the first element of self-defense.

II. Imminent Danger

We hold the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding Yarnell established
he actually believed he was in imminent danger of losing his life or sustaining
great bodily injury, or that he actually was in such imminent danger. See McCarty,
437 S.C. at 369, 878 S.E.2d at 909-10 (stating the second element of self-defense
requires that the defendant "actually believed he was in imminent danger of losing
his life or sustaining serious bodily injury or he actually was in such imminent
danger" (quoting Curry, 406 S.C. at 371 n.4, 752 S.E.2d at 266 n.4)). Yarnell
testified Pennington was trying to forcefully enter his vehicle and that he was
afraid for his life when he shot at him. Yarnell stated Pennington punched him,
tried to open his car door, and was using threatening language. Fingerprint
analysis showed Pennington's palm print on the driver's side front door of Yarnell's
car, but no forensic evidence showed his prints were on the actual door handle.
However, Card, Cerio, and Yarnell all testified that Pennington tried to open the
car door at some point during the confrontation. Testimony conflicted as to
whether he tried to open the door before or after Yarnell pulled out his handgun,
but according to Yarnell, he only pulled out the gun after Pennington tried to
forcibly enter his vehicle. Yarnell stated Pennington then tried to reach for the gun
and he was afraid Pennington would gain control of the gun and use it to injure or
kill him. Yarnell admitted he did not see a gun or knife in Pennington's hands
when he approached the vehicle but stated he could not see his hands and he did
not know what he might have in his pants. However, because Yarnell testified he
was afraid for his life when he shot Pennington and the circuit court found he was
a credible witness, we hold evidence supports the circuit court's finding that
Yarnell satisfied the second element of self-defense. See Johnson, 413 S.C. at 467,
776 S.E.2d at 371 ("Credibility findings are treated as factual findings, and
therefore, the appellate inquiry is limited to reviewing whether the trial court's
factual findings are supported by any evidence in the record."); id.
("Moreover, . . . credibility determinations are entitled to great deference.").

III. Application of Presumption in Subsection 16-11-440(A)

We hold the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that under
subsection 16-11-440(A), Yarnell was entitled to a presumption of reasonable fear
of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury when he used deadly force
because Pennington was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering
Yarnell's car and had attempted to remove Yarnell from the car. See §
16-11-440(A) ("A person is presumed to have a reasonable fear of imminent peril
of death or great bodily injury to himself . . . when using deadly force that is
intended or likely to cause death or great bodily injury to another person if the
person: (1) against whom the deadly force is used is in the process of unlawfully
and forcefully entering, or has unlawfully and forcibly entered . . . [an] occupied
vehicle, or if he removes or is attempting to remove another person against his will
from the . . . occupied vehicle; and (2) who uses deadly force knows or has reason
to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act is
occurring or has occurred." (emphases added)). "Section 16-11-440(A) may, under
appropriate facts, replace the reasonable fear element of self-defense by providing
a presumption that the person's fear was reasonable under certain
circumstances . . . ." Glenn, 429 S.C. at 118, 838 S.E.2d at 496.

First, we hold subsection (A)(2) was satisfied because evidence showed Yarnell
was in the driver's seat of his locked vehicle when Pennington attempted to open
the driver's side door. Thus, Yarnell knew the forcible act or entry was occurring.

Second, we hold the circuit court did not err by finding Yarnell satisfied subsection
(A)(1) because Yarnell presented evidence that he was sitting in the driver's seat of
his own vehicle while Pennington was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully
entering the vehicle or attempting to remove Yarnell from his car. The State does
not dispute Yarnell was in his vehicle during the entire confrontation with
Pennington, nor does the State contend Yarnell had no right to occupy his own
vehicle. Yarnell testified Pennington approached his car and tried to forcefully
open his car door and then punched him while he was sitting in his vehicle before
he displayed his gun. He also testified Pennington told him several times to get out
of the car so he could "f*** [him] up." Cannon's testimony was also consistent
with this. The circuit court found "[Card] testified that after punching [Yarnell],
Pennington took a step back and said[,] 'You have a gun[,]' and then a shot was
fired." The circuit court found Cerio testified that "[w]hen Pennington let go of the
door handle, she heard the gun shot." The circuit court noted that in her statement
to police, Cerio indicated Yarnell started backing up, she told Pennington to let it
go, and the car door opened and a shot was fired. Thus, even though both Cerio
and Card's testimonies indicated Pennington was not touching the car and was
retreating when Yarnell shot him, Cerio's statement to police undermines that
evidence. Although Cerio and Card's testimonies conflict with Yarnell's account,
they do not outright contradict his version of events. Further, although the only
evidence that Pennington was armed was Yarnell's testimony that "at some point"
he "started wrapping something around his hand," subsection 16-11-440(A)
contains no express requirement that the person attempting to enter or remove
another person against his will from the occupied vehicle be armed. Thus,
Yarnell's testimony supports the circuit court's conclusion that Yarnell was entitled
to the presumption of reasonable fear under subsection 16-11-440(A). See
Johnson, 413 S.C. at 467, 776 S.E.2d at 371 ("Credibility findings are treated as
factual findings, and therefore, the appellate inquiry is limited to reviewing
whether the trial court's factual findings are supported by any evidence in the
record."); id. ("Moreover, . . . credibility determinations are entitled to great
deference."). Accordingly, we hold the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by
determining Yarnell satisfied the reasonable fear requirement for establishing
self-defense.

IV. Application of Subsections 16-11-440(B) and (C)

We hold evidence supports the circuit court's finding that Yarnell was not engaged
in unlawful activity at the time of the shooting. See § 16-11-440(B)(3) ("The
presumption [of reasonable fear] provided in subsection (A) does not apply if the
person: . . . who uses deadly force is engaged in an unlawful activity or is using
the . . . occupied vehicle to further an unlawful activity . . . ."). We acknowledge
Yarnell engaged in questionable behavior by his obsessive attempts to contact
Remi and his demeaning text messages to her. However, no evidence was
presented that Yarnell expressly threatened Remi. Yarnell's carrying of a loaded
gun in his car when he showed up to the apartment complex after arguing with
Remi most of the day could be viewed as demonstrating an intent to harm her,
however, he provided an explanation for the gun and denied he intended to injure
or kill Remi. Further, the evidence is uncontroverted that Yarnell was occupying
his own personal vehicle and that Pennington had no right to be in his vehicle.
Although the property manager testified the apartment complex parking lot was
"private property," she acknowledged the sign did state "no trespassing " and that
anyone could drive a vehicle through the parking lot. She also confirmed that
delivery vehicles were permitted in the parking lot for the purpose of delivering
packages to residents. The property manager further agreed that the complex did
not have a gated entry and there were no fences surrounding the property.
Moreover, Yarnell's testimony provided at least some evidence that he had been
invited to the apartment complex to drop off Remi's belongings and that he had to
wait for her to arrive before he could do so. According to his testimony, that was
his reason for being there. See Johnson, 413 S.C. at 467, 776 S.E.2d at 371
("Credibility findings are treated as factual findings, and therefore, the appellate
inquiry is limited to reviewing whether the trial court's factual findings are
supported by any evidence in the record."). Because the circuit court found
Yarnell was credible, we hold evidence supports its conclusion that he was not
engaged in unlawful activity at the time the confrontation began. Thus, we hold
the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by finding subsection 16-11-440(B)(3)
did not apply.

Finally, as to the State's argument that the circuit court erred by finding Yarnell
was in a place he had the right to be under section 16-11-440(C), we need not
address this issue. See State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693-94
(2003) ("Issues not raised and ruled upon in the trial court will not be considered
on appeal."). The circuit court discussed subsection 16-11-440(C) in a footnote in
considering whether a proximate cause analysis was required under subsection
16-11-440(B), but it did not address whether Yarnell was entitled to immunity
under subsection 16-11-440(C). Rather, in applying subsection 16-11-440(B), the
court considered whether Yarnell was engaged in any unlawful activity by his
presence at the complex. Thus, the question of whether Yarnell was in a place he
had the right to be under subsection 16-11-440(C) is not before us.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court's order granting Yarnell's motion for
immunity under the Act is

AFFIRMED.

KONDUROS, MCDONALD, and VINSON, JJ., concur.