SCDSS v. Jennifer Smith

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina Department of Social Services,
Respondent,

v.

Jennifer Smith and Kemyel Robinson, Defendants,

v.

Jocelyn and Marco Stephens and Van and Lauren James,
Intervenors,

Of whom Jennifer Smith is the Appellant/Respondent

and

Jocelyn and Marco Stephens are Respondents

and

Van and Lauren James are the Respondents/Appellants.

In the interest of minors under the age of eighteen.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000991

Appeal From Spartanburg County
Angela J. Moss, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-257
Heard May 5, 2026 – Filed May 28, 2026

AFFIRMED

Jonathan Drew Hammond, of David Martin Law Group,
and Bruce Wyche Bannister, of Bannister, Wyatt &
Stalvey, LLC, both of Greenville, for Respondent-
Appellants Van and Lauren James.

John Brandt Rucker and Allyson Sue Rucker, both of
The Rucker Law Firm, LLC, of Greenville, for
Appellant-Respondent Jennifer Smith.

James Fletcher Thompson, of Thompson Dove Law
Group, LLC, of Spartanburg, for Respondents Marcos
and Jocelyn Stephens.

Robert C. Rhoden, III, of Spartanburg, for Respondent
South Carolina Department of Social Services.

Wendy Nicole Griffith, of Griffith Family Law Firm, PC,
of Spartanburg, for the Guardian ad Litem.

PER CURIAM: This appeal concerns the placement of twin children who were
taken into emergency protective custody shortly after birth. The permanency
planning hearing was extensive and involved a substantial record. The family court
carefully considered competing applications from two families who, by all accounts,
demonstrated love for the twins and were willing to provide them with stable homes.
Ultimately, however, the family court was required to determine which placement
would best serve the twins' interests.

In a detailed oral ruling and written order, the family court thoroughly explained
why placement with Uncle and Aunt (Marcos and Jocelyn Stephens) in Florida was
most appropriate. We find no sound basis in this record to disturb the family court's
ruling, especially when the South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS)
recommended this placement. We commend the family court, the parties' excellent
counsel, and the families involved for the professionalism and character displayed
despite the inherent difficulty when there are competing claims of this nature. For
these reasons, and as explained in more detail below, we affirm.

"On appeal from a matter in the family court, [the appellate] [c]ourt reviews factual
and legal issues de novo." S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Smith, 423 S.C. 60, 67, 814
S.E.2d 148, 151 (2018). However, our broad standard of review does not require us
to disregard the family court's superior position to observe the witnesses and assess
their demeanor. Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 385, 709 S.E.2d 650, 652 (2011); see
also Dorchester Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Miller, 324 S.C. 445, 451–52, 477
S.E.2d 476, 480 (Ct. App. 1996) ("Because the appellate court lacks the opportunity
for direct observation of the witnesses, it should accord great deference to trial court
findings where matters of credibility are involved."). Many cases recognize that
credibility determinations play a critical role in family court decisions, particularly
when related to the best interests of children. See Lewis, 392 S.C. at 390, 709 S.E.2d
at 654 (recognizing "life-altering credibility determinations often lie at the heart of
family court" decisions); see also Aiken Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Wilcox, 304
S.C. 90, 93, 403 S.E.2d 142, 144 (Ct App. 1991) (explaining deference to the
findings of the family court is especially appropriate "in cases involving the welfare
and best interests of children").

Precedent also recognizes that de novo review does not relieve an appellant's burden
of establishing error on appeal. Lewis, 392 S.C. at 389, 709 S.E.2d at 654. Instead,
an appealing party must persuade us that the preponderance of the evidence is against
the family court's findings. Id. These principles—our respect for the family court's
superior vantage point and the fact that the appellant bears the burden of
persuasion—operate in tandem with our standard of review, not in tension with it.
See id. (emphasizing the "presence of de novo review and a willingness, after review,
to defer to the fact finder should not be viewed as contradictory positions"); id. at
388, 709 S.E.3d at 653 (explaining our appellate courts' inclination to sustain the
findings of the family court are rooted in two principles: "the superior position of
the trial judge to determine credibility and the appellant's burden to satisfy the
appellate court that the preponderance of the evidence is against the finding of the
trial court").

The competing considerations in this case were substantial and closely balanced.
The family court considered both placement options as "family" placements.
Placement with Foster Parents (Van and Lauren James) would permit the twins to
remain with a sibling on their biological mother's side of the family. Placement with
Uncle and Aunt would place the twins with their biological father's family. Both
families expressed a commitment to facilitate and nurture the twins' relationships
with relatives on both sides of the family, and the DSS caseworker explained she
had no concerns regarding the suitability of either home. However, the family court
identified specific reservations with placing the twins with Foster Parents, and it is
evident that those concerns informed the ultimate placement decision.

Foster Parents contend the findings against them were unsupported by evidence and
unrelated to the best interest of the twins. We respectfully disagree.

One of the family court's concerns involved Foster Father's (Van James)
employment history. On this record, we cannot conclude the family court's findings
lack evidentiary support. Id. at 389, 709 S.E.2d at 654 (explaining an appellant must
demonstrate the challenged finding is against the preponderance of the evidence to
warrant reversal).

Nor do we find the family court erred in considering this evidence as part of the
best-interest analysis, particularly given the undisputed evidence that Foster Father
served as the family's sole provider. See Smith, 423 S.C. at 90–94, 814 S.E.2d at
164–66 (recognizing concerns related to financial stability and employment history
may properly factor into an adoptive placement determination).

The family court also expressed concerns regarding Foster Mother's (Lauren James)
judgment and credibility. Those concerns likewise find support in the record.

Family court proceedings are necessarily fact-intensive, and credibility
determinations frequently assume central importance. See Lewis, 392 S.C. at 390,
790 S.E.2d at 654 ("The highly fact-intensive nature of family court matters lends
itself to a respect for the factual findings of our able and experienced family court
judges who are in a superior position to assess the demeanor and credibility of
witnesses. Indeed, life-altering credibility determinations often lie at the heart of
family court factual findings."). Recognizing the family court's superior position to
evaluate evidence and credibility, we see no basis to disturb the family court's
findings. See Wilcox, 304 S.C. at 93, 403 S.E.2d at 144 ("Sitting as an appellate
court, we are not as able to weigh the testimony and evidence as the trial [court] who
saw and heard the witnesses," and "where the evidence presented in the record
adequately supports the findings of the trial [court], due deference should be given
to [the court's] judgment based on [its] superior position in weighing such
evidence.").

Another central issue in this case was whether the twins had attached to Foster
Parents. The family court heard from several experts and ultimately decided to find
attachment had not occurred. The expert testimony revealed consensus on two
points: (1) time was critical in determining placement; and (2) prevailing research
generally does not support, or approve of, assessing attachment before a child
reaches approximately one year of age.

Foster Parents presented experts who opined the twins had formed attachments to
them and that continued placement with Foster Parents would serve the twins' best
interest. One of these experts (Laura Jean Beauvais) testified she believed
attachment was the pivotal consideration in the best-interest analysis, though she
conceded she was unaware of any research supporting the presence of attachment at
such an early age and acknowledged she did not ordinarily evaluate infants in her
practice. Another expert (Pam Stafford) similarly acknowledged an international
consensus report concluding attachment relationships are typically not observable
until late in a child's first year of life and that assessing attachment quality before
that point is generally inadvisable. She further acknowledged it was possible that
she mistook "comfort seeking behaviors" for attachment when assessing the twins.

Conversely, Uncle and Aunt's expert testified the relevant literature conclusively
establishes attachment cannot reliably be assessed at the twins' age. She explained
that she could definitively opine on the lack of attachment in this case because "the
literature is clear about it." Like the other experts, she also stated she was unaware
of any research supporting a contrary conclusion.

In evaluating the expert testimony, the family court emphasized the consensus
reflected in professional literature about when attachment can be assessed. The
family court also noted the anecdotal evidence supporting Foster Parents' bond with
the twins was not materially different than the evidence offered to establish Uncle
and Aunt's bond with the twins. Finally, the family court noted that its concerns
with Foster Mother's credibility affected the weight given to certain expert testimony
because those opinions relied, in part, on information provided by Foster Mother.
On this record, and especially with the testimony regarding the limitations of
assessing attachment with infants of this age, we are not persuaded the family court
erred in its evaluation of the expert testimony. See Lewis, 392 S.C. at 389, 709
S.E.2d at 654 (emphasizing "de novo review neither relieves an appellant of
demonstrating error nor requires us to ignore the findings of the family court").

The family court also mentioned practical considerations relevant to the best interest
of the twins. Uncle and Aunt have already raised two children to adulthood and
appear to be in a better position to accept the twins because their youngest biological
child is twelve. Foster Parents, by contrast, already have multiple special needs
children under the age of six, which would be challenging for anyone. Foster Parents
also noted that they would have to renovate their home or move to accommodate
bringing the twins into their home. Additionally, the family court noted the twins'
biological father had relinquished his parental rights only in favor of Uncle and Aunt
and would oppose any adoption pursued by Foster Parents, thereby presenting an
additional obstacle to permanency in the event Foster Parents were awarded
placement.

Foster Parents argue the family court impermissibly relied on racial considerations
in making its placement determination. The record does not support this contention.
The family court expressly declined to make findings concerning either family's
ability to nurture the twins' racial, cultural, or ethnic heritage. DSS explained it
slightly favored placement with Uncle and Aunt based upon the totality of the
circumstances and specifically explained race was not considered in its
recommendation. Accordingly, we are unpersuaded that the family court relied on
impermissible considerations or otherwise erred in its ruling.

There was a passing suggestion in the briefing and a more direct request during the
oral argument that, if we affirmed placement with Uncle and Aunt, our judgment
should include some visitation for Foster Parents and their family or that we should
remand the case to the family court for that purpose. The family court's ruling left
room for visitation as long as it was in the twins' best interest and invited any
aggrieved party who disagreed with DSS's assessment of what would be in the twins'
best interest to file a motion. We agree with this ruling and respectfully decline the
request to disturb it.

For these reasons, we affirm the family court's order.

AFFIRMED.

GEATHERS, HEWITT, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.