Aszane Cruz v. Casa Bahari, LLC

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Aszane Cruz, Respondent/Appellant,

v.

Arete Wyndham Property Owner, LLC d/b/a Wyndham
Palace Apartments; Cases Bahari, LLC; Darlington 48
Unit, LLC; and John Doe, individually and as
Manager/General Manager of Arete Wyndham Property
Owner, LLC d/b/a Wyndham Place Apartments,
Defendents,

of which Casa Bahari, LLC is the Appellant/Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2024-001724

Appeal From Florence County
Michael G. Nettles, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-224
Submitted March 2, 2026 – Filed May 13, 2026

REVERSED

James Atkinson Bruorton, IV, and Mary Harriet Moore,
both of Rosen Hagood, LLC, of Charleston, for
Appellant/Respondent.
Lane Douglas Jefferies, India Dorothy Shaw, and Chase
Harrison Coble, all of Poulin, Willey, Anastopoulo, LLC,
of Charleston, for Respondent/Appellant.

PER CURIAM: This is a cross-appeal from a default judgment entered against
Casa Bahari, LLC (Casa Bahari), one of three defendants in a premises liability
action brought by Aszane Cruz. On one side, Casa Bahari challenges the circuit
court's refusal to set aside the default judgment. On the other, Cruz contends the
amount of the judgment is inadequate.

The circuit court denied Casa Bahari's request for relief from the default judgment
after finding Casa Bahari had notice of the damages hearing. The narrow, dispositive
question before us is whether this finding is supported by evidence; if not, it is an
abuse of discretion. See Fasset v. Evans, 364 S.C. 42, 49, 610 S.E.2d 841, 845 (Ct.
App. 2005) (recognizing the decision to set aside a default judgment lies in the
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion);
see also Ex parte Cap. U-Drive-It, Inc., 369 S.C. 1, 5, 630 S.E.2d 464, 467 (2006)
(finding an abuse of discretion occurs when the circuit court's ruling is based on a
factual conclusion that lacks evidentiary support). The record lacks evidentiary
support for finding that Casa Bahari had notice of the damages hearing. We
therefore reverse.

Our brief recitation of the facts begins with Cruz's complaint alleging several causes
of action arising from injuries she sustained in her apartment. Cruz served Casa
Bahari through its registered agent. Shortly thereafter, counsel for Casa Bahari, who
is based in Atlanta, contacted Cruz's counsel and asked to be dismissed from the
case. The correspondence explained that Casa Bahari did not own the property when
the alleged injury occurred and included a recorded warranty deed reflecting Casa
Bahari acquired the property after the incident occurred. Cruz's counsel never
responded. It is undisputed Casa Bahari never filed a responsive pleading and was
properly put in default.

The circuit court held a damages hearing on March 13, 2024. At the hearing, Cruz's
counsel told the court that notice of the hearing had been mailed to Casa Bahari
earlier that month. Counsel acknowledged she had received "an email from what
was alleged as counsel for Casa Bahari," but nobody had formally appeared or filed
an answer. Cruz presented her testimony, medical bills, and documents relating to
her claim for lost wages. Cruz was awarded $40,686 in actual and punitive damages.
Casa Bahari claims it first learned of the damages hearing on March 14—the day
after the hearing occurred—when it received an undated letter with notice of the
hearing. Casa Bahari then retained local counsel, notified the circuit court it had not
received notice of the hearing, and moved for reconsideration and to set aside the
default judgment. Both motions were denied.

In its order awarding damages, the circuit court found Cruz "served notice of this
hearing upon [Casa Bahari] at [its] last known address and the affidavit of mailing
was filed and made part of the record in this action." However, the referenced
affidavit does not appear in the appellate record or on the public index. See Freeman
v. McBee, 280 S.C. 490, 494, 313 S.E.2d 325, 327 (Ct. App. 1984) (observing a court
may take judicial notice of its own records, files, and proceedings). The circuit
court's subsequent orders did not meaningfully address Casa Bahari's notice
argument beyond reiterating notice was sent. The orders did not explain the basis
for finding Casa Bahari received advance notice of the hearing. The orders also did
not explain the absence of the affidavit of mailing.

Because the record lacks evidence supporting the finding that Casa Bahari received
notice of the damages hearing, we must hold the circuit court abused its discretion
in declining to set the default judgment aside. See Ex parte Capital, 369 S.C. at 5,
630 S.E.2d at 467 (finding the absence of proof supporting a factual finding essential
to the ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion); see also Roche v. Young Bros., Inc.,
of Florence, 318 S.C. 207, 212, 456 S.E.2d 897, 901 (1995) (emphasizing Rule 5(a),
SCRCP, mandates notice of any hearing on unliquidated damages is to be provided
to any defaulting party); Dymon, Inc. v. Hyman, 305 S.C. 170, 172, 406 S.E.2d 388,
389 (Ct. App. 1991) (quoting federal authority for the proposition that the absence
of required notice ordinarily justifies relief from a default judgment).

Our resolution of this issue is dispositive; therefore, we decline to address the
remaining issues. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C.
598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (stating an appellate court does not need to
review remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive).

REVERSED.1

GEATHERS, HEWITT, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.