Mountain View pointe Owners Assoc. v. Rodney Halsell

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Mountain View Pointe Owners Association, Inc.; Jane P.
Hale; L. Shepard Hamrick, Jr.; Martha Hamrick;
Matthew Williams; Sue Williams; Barry Noffze; Ruth
Noffze; Michael Dorsey; Monica Dorsey; Jack J. Dorsey;
Lucinda Dorsey; Kai Evensen; Lynn Elliot Amos, as
Trustee of the Lynn Elliot Amos Qualified Personal
Residence Trust; Lynn Keith Amos, as Trustee of the
Lynn Keith Amos Qualified Personal Residence Trust;
Charlene Finucan; John Prescott, Jr.; Elizabeth Prescott;
Steven Trojan; Dottie Trojan; Leonard J. Stoecklein;
Patricia Stoecklein; Dale Hill; Rebecca Hill; Larry
Kuykendall, as Trustee of the Larry Kuykendall
Revocable Trust; Larry Kuykendall as Trustee of the Elle
Kuykendall Revocable Trust; Thomas McCaw; Roberta
McCaw; Robert Albergotti; Elaine Albergotti; Frank
Patterson; Frances Patterson; Brian Fox, and Jennifer
Fox, Respondents,

v.

Rodney Halsell; Barbara Halsell; Graham R. Piper;
Christine A. Piper, Michael Newton; Angela Newton;
Gary Hutchinson; Daniel Horner; Lonnie Harper; Elianor
Harper; Christopher Tam; Amie Kerley; Karan Sandhu;
and Gloria Sandhu, Defendants,

Of Whom Rodney Halsell and Barbara Halsell are
Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000918
Appeal From Oconee County
Steven C. Kirven, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-014
Heard October 6, 2025 – Filed January 14, 2026
Withdrawn, Substituted, and Refiled May 13, 2026

AFFIRMED

Sarah P. Spruill, of Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd, P.A., of
Greenville; and Richard Hunt McDuff, of Merrell &
McDuff, of Seneca; all for Appellants.

John S. Nichols, of Bluestein Thompson Sullivan, LLC,
of Columbia; for Respondents

PER CURIAM: Appellants Rodney and Barbara Halsell constructed a driveway
over Respondent Mountain View Pointe Owners' Association's (POA) landscape
easement. Appellants argue the master-in-equity erred in his interpretation of the
landscape easement and in finding Appellants' driveway constituted a nuisance.
We affirm.

1. Appellants argue the master's landscape easement interpretation was too broad
and failed to properly balance the interests of the parties. We disagree. The court
finds that the easement is clearly defined and grants the POA the right to landscape
within the easement area. Therefore, we hold the master did not err in holding the
easement vests the POA with the right to solely manage and control the
beautification, vegetation, landscaping, soil disturbance, and grading in the
landscape easement area. See Jacobs v. Serv. Merch. Co., Inc., 297 S.C. 123, 130,
375 S.E.2d 1, 5 (Ct. App. 1988) ("Easements restricting the use of property must
be created in express terms or by plain and unmistakable implication."); S.C. Pub.
Serv. Auth. v. Ocean Forest, Inc., 275 S.C. 552, 554, 273 S.E.2d 773, 774 (1981)
("Clear and unambiguous language in grants of [an] easement must be construed
according to terms which parties have used, taken, and understood in [the] plain,
ordinary, and popular sense."); Windham v. Riddle, 381 S.C. 192, 201, 672 S.E.2d
578, 582 (2009) (finding the drafter's intention controls "unless that intention
contravenes some well settled rule of law or public policy"). The master properly
balanced the interests of the parties and granted the POA "rights incident or
necessary to its proper enjoyment, but nothing more." Clemson Univ. v. First
Provident Corp., 260 S.C. 640, 650, 197 S.E.2d 914, 919 (1973); see also Rhett v.
Gray, 401 S.C. 478, 493-94, 736 S.E.2d 873, 881 (Ct. App. 2012) ("Although to
the extent of the easement, the rights of the easement owner are paramount to those
of the landowner, the easement owner's rights are not absolute but are limited, so
the owners of the easement and the servient tenement may have reasonable
enjoyment."). We recognize that the POA's exclusive right to landscape the
easement area necessarily results in a significant restriction on Appellants' use of
the easement area. Appellants were, however, on notice of the existence of the
easement prior to purchasing the property. See Harbison Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v.
Mueller, 319 S.C. 99, 103, 459 S.E.2d 860, 863 (Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted)
("A covenant is enforceable against a subsequent grantee, even if not in the
grantee's deed, if the grantee has actual or constructive notice of the covenant. A
homeowner is charged with constructive notice of any restriction properly recorded
within the chain of title."). Appellants constructed the driveway with knowledge
that it was hostile to the easement and would destroy the existing landscaping. We
find no error.

2. Appellants' argument that because the easement is "non-exclusive," they should
have equal rights to the easement area is unpersuasive. The master's order does not
preclude Appellants from using the easement property, only from using it in a way
that interferes with the POA's full use and enjoyment of the landscape easement. If
Appellants' "equal use" of the easement area destroys the landscaping, that use
renders the POA's easement useless and defeats the purpose of the easement.
Mountain View Pointe's recorded covenants and plats clearly define the easement
area, and Appellants' driveway destroyed the existing landscaping as well as the
POA's ability to landscape over the paved portion in the future. See Xanadu
Horizontal Prop. Regime v. Ocean Walk Horizontal Prop. Regime, 306 S.C. 170,
172, 410 S.E.2d 580, 582 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing Onorati v. O'Donnell, 326 N.E.
2d 367 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975)) (finding that Defendant could not construct a
driveway over Plaintiff's ingress and egress easement because "where a description
of an easement is clear, explicit and free from ambiguity, it is inappropriate to
restrict . . . use to less than the full [easement area] granted").

3. We find Appellants' driveway was not necessary to the enjoyment of their land.
In Thomas v. Mitchell, the court found that a servient estate's placement of a locked
cable over an easement area was necessary to the servient estate's use and
enjoyment of their property because it did not impose an unreasonable burden on
the dominant estate. 287 S.C. 35, 39, 336 S.E.2d 154, 156 (1985). The dominant
estate held "a [f]ifty (50) foot easement for an access road." Id. at 37, 336 S.E.2d at
155. The owner of the servient estate built a hunting and fishing lodge and "a road
within the easement from the terminus of the public road to his property." Id.
Trespassers began entering the servient estate's lot and, to remedy that problem, the
servient estate placed "a cable across the easement near its entrance to the public
road" and gave the dominant estate keys to unlock the cable. Id. The servient
estate was later transferred to another owner who added a second cable across the
easement area. Id. The dominant estate owner brought an action against the
servient estate to enjoin them from obstructing the easement. Id. The court held
that "the locked cable is necessary for the [servient estate's] efficient use of their
land and does not impose an unreasonable burden upon [the dominant estate's] use
of the easement." Id. at 39, 336 S.E.2d at 156. In addition, the court found that
"only minimal inconvenience will be suffered by [the dominant estate] having to
unlock and open one more gate before entering his property." Id.

Unlike Thomas, the driveway was not necessary for Appellants' efficient use of the
land. Appellants' property abuts Doug Hollow Road, and Appellants can access
their property by constructing their driveway to intersect this public road.
Furthermore, Appellants were able to purchase the property at a reduced price in
consideration of having to build a longer driveway to Doug Hollow Road. We find
that Appellants' destruction of the landscape easement in this case stands in stark
contrast to the "minimal burden" the court approved in Thomas.

4. Appellants argue the master erred in finding their driveway constituted a
nuisance. We disagree. See Silvester v. Spring Valley Country Club, 344 S.C. 280,
286, 543 S.E.2d 563, 566 (Ct. App. 2001) ("The traditional concept of a nuisance
requires a landowner to demonstrate that the defendant unreasonably interfered
with his ownership or possession of the land."); Id. ("[N]uisance is a substantial
and unreasonable interference with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his
property."); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821E (1979) (finding a party "can
maintain an action . . . only when the particular use or enjoyment of the land to
which his easement or profit entitles him is interfered with"). We find that
Appellants substantially and unreasonably interfered with the POA's specific use
and enjoyment of its landscape easement. Appellants were on notice of the
easement, knew the POA denied their request to build the driveway, and completed
construction of the driveway over the POA's objection during litigation.
Appellants argue that the POA's easement rights do not constitute exclusive
possession of the non-exclusive landscape easement. We disagree. See 58 Am.
Jur. 2d Nuisances § 192 (finding "owners of easements" may bring an action for
private nuisance). We find the POA's easement rights allow them to bring an
action for nuisance and that the POA does not need to maintain exclusive
possession of the property to bring a nuisance claim. See Brooks v. Council of Co-
Owners of Stones Throw Horizontal Prop. Regime I, 315 S.C. 474, 477, 445 S.E.2d
630, 632 (1994) (holding "any person who has a sufficient interest in the land may
bring a nuisance action.").

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and THOMAS and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Mountain View Pointe Owners Association, Inc.; Jane P.
Hale; L. Shepard Hamrick, Jr.; Martha Hamrick;
Matthew Williams; Sue Williams; Barry Noffze; Ruth
Noffze; Michael Dorsey; Monica Dorsey; Jack J. Dorsey;
Lucinda Dorsey; Kai Evensen; Lynn Elliot Amos, as
Trustee of the Lynn Elliot Amos Qualified Personal
Residence Trust; Lynn Keith Amos, as Trustee of the
Lynn Keith Amos Qualified Personal Residence Trust;
Charlene Finucan; John Prescott, Jr.; Elizabeth Prescott;
Steven Trojan; Dottie Trojan; Leonard J. Stoecklein;
Patricia Stoecklein; Dale Hill; Rebecca Hill; Larry
Kuykendall, as Trustee of the Larry Kuykendall
Revocable Trust; Larry Kuykendall as Trustee of the Elle
Kuykendall Revocable Trust; Thomas McCaw; Roberta
McCaw; Robert Albergotti; Elaine Albergotti; Frank
Patterson; Frances Patterson; Brian Fox, and Jennifer
Fox, Respondents,

v.

Rodney Halsell; Barbara Halsell; Graham R. Piper;
Christine A. Piper, Michael Newton; Angela Newton;
Gary Hutchinson; Daniel Horner; Lonnie Harper; Elianor
Harper; Christopher Tam; Amie Kerley; Karan Sandhu;
and Gloria Sandhu, Defendants,

Of Whom Rodney Halsell and Barbara Halsell are
Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000918
Appeal From Oconee County
Steven C. Kirven, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-014
Heard October 6, 2025 – Filed January 14, 2026

AFFIRMED

Sarah P. Spruill, of Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd, P.A., of
Greenville; and Richard Hunt McDuff, of Merrell &
McDuff, of Seneca; all for Appellants.

John S. Nichols, of Bluestein Thompson Sullivan, LLC,
of Columbia; for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Appellants Rodney and Barbara Halsell constructed a driveway
over Respondent Mountain View Pointe Owners' Association's (POA) landscape
easement. Appellants argue the master-in-equity erred in his interpretation of the
landscape easement and in finding Appellants' driveway constituted a nuisance.
We affirm.

1. Appellants argue the master's landscape easement interpretation was too broad
and failed to properly balance the interests of the parties. We disagree. The court
finds that the easement is clearly defined and grants the POA the right to landscape
within the easement area. Therefore, we hold the master did not err in holding the
easement vests the POA with the right to solely manage and control the
beautification, vegetation, landscaping, soil disturbance, and grading in the
landscape easement area. See Jacobs v. Serv. Merch. Co., Inc., 297 S.C. 123, 130,
375 S.E.2d 1, 5 (Ct. App. 1988) ("Easements restricting the use of property must
be created in express terms or by plain and unmistakable implication."); S.C. Pub.
Serv. Auth. v. Ocean Forest, Inc., 275 S.C. 552, 554, 273 S.E.2d 773, 774 (1981)
("Clear and unambiguous language in grants of [an] easement must be construed
according to terms which parties have used, taken, and understood in [the] plain,
ordinary, and popular sense."); Windham v. Riddle, 381 S.C. 192, 201, 672 S.E.2d
578, 582 (2009) (finding the drafter's intention controls "unless that intention
contravenes some well settled rule of law or public policy"). The master properly
balanced the interests of the parties and granted the POA "rights incident or
necessary to its proper enjoyment, but nothing more." Clemson Univ. v. First
Provident Corp., 260 S.C. 640, 650, 197 S.E.2d 914, 919 (1973); see also Rhett v.
Gray, 401 S.C. 478, 493-94, 736 S.E.2d 873, 881 (Ct. App. 2012) ("Although to
the extent of the easement, the rights of the easement owner are paramount to those
of the landowner, the easement owner's rights are not absolute but are limited, so
the owners of the easement and the servient tenement may have reasonable
enjoyment."). We recognize that the POA's exclusive right to landscape the
easement area necessarily results in a significant restriction on Appellants' use of
the easement area. Appellants were, however, on notice of the existence of the
easement prior to purchasing the property. See Harbison Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v.
Mueller, 319 S.C. 99, 103, 459 S.E.2d 860, 863 (Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted)
("A covenant is enforceable against a subsequent grantee, even if not in the
grantee's deed, if the grantee has actual or constructive notice of the covenant. A
homeowner is charged with constructive notice of any restriction properly recorded
within the chain of title."). Appellants constructed the driveway with knowledge
that it was hostile to the POA's easement and would destroy the existing
landscaping. We find no error.

2. Appellants' argument that because the easement is "non-exclusive," they should
have equal rights to the easement area is unpersuasive. The master's order does not
preclude Appellants from using the easement property, only from using it in a way
that interferes with the POA's full use and enjoyment of the landscape easement. If
Appellants' "equal use" of the easement area destroys the landscaping, that use
renders the POA's easement useless and defeats the purpose of the easement.
Mountain View Pointe's recorded covenants and plats clearly define the easement
area, and Appellants' driveway destroyed the existing landscaping as well as the
POA's ability to landscape over the paved portion in the future. See Xanadu
Horizontal Prop. Regime v. Ocean Walk Horizontal Prop. Regime, 306 S.C. 170,
172, 410 S.E.2d 580, 582 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing Onorati v. O'Donnell, 326 N.E.
2d 367 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975)) (finding that Defendant could not construct a
driveway over Plaintiff's ingress and egress easement because "where a description
of an easement is clear, explicit and free from ambiguity, it is inappropriate to
restrict . . . use to less than the full [easement area] granted").

3. We find Appellants have not met their burden of proving an easement by
necessity. In Thomas v. Mitchell, the court found that a servient estate's placement
of a locked cable over an easement area was necessary to the servient estate's use
and enjoyment of their property because it did not impose an unreasonable burden
on the dominant estate. 287 S.C. 35, 39, 336 S.E.2d 154, 156 (1985). The
dominant estate held "a [f]ifty (50) foot easement for an access road." Id. at 37, 336
S.E.2d at 155. The owner of the servient estate built a hunting and fishing lodge
and "a road within the easement from the terminus of the public road to his
property." Id. Trespassers began entering the servient estate's lot and, to remedy
that problem, the servient estate placed "a cable across the easement near its
entrance to the public road" and gave the dominant estate keys to unlock the cable.
Id. The servient estate was later transferred to another owner who added a second
cable across the easement area. Id. The dominant estate owner brought an action
against the servient estate to enjoin them from obstructing the easement. Id. The
court held that "the locked cable is necessary for the [servient estate's] efficient use
of their land and does not impose an unreasonable burden upon [the dominant
estate's] use of the easement." Id. at 39, 336 S.E.2d at 156. In addition, the court
found that "only minimal inconvenience will be suffered by [the dominant estate]
having to unlock and open one more gate before entering his property." Id.

Unlike Thomas, the driveway was not necessary for Appellants' efficient use of the
land. Appellants' property abuts Doug Hollow Road, and Appellants can access
their property by constructing their driveway to intersect this public road.
Furthermore, Appellants were able to purchase the property at a reduced price in
consideration of having to build a longer driveway to Doug Hollow Road. We find
that Appellants' destruction of the landscape easement in this case stands in stark
contrast to the "minimal burden" the court approved in Thomas.

4. Appellants argue the master erred in finding their driveway constituted a
nuisance. We disagree. See Silvester v. Spring Valley Country Club, 344 S.C. 280,
286, 543 S.E.2d 563, 566 (Ct. App. 2001) ("The traditional concept of a nuisance
requires a landowner to demonstrate that the defendant unreasonably interfered
with his ownership or possession of the land."); Id. ("[N]uisance is a substantial
and unreasonable interference with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his
property."); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821E (1979) (finding a party "can
maintain an action . . . only when the particular use or enjoyment of the land to
which his easement or profit entitles him is interfered with"). We find that
Appellants substantially and unreasonably interfered with the POA's specific use
and enjoyment of its landscape easement. Appellants were on notice of the
easement, knew the POA denied their request to build the driveway, and completed
construction of the driveway over the POA's objection during litigation.
Appellants argue that the POA's easement rights do not constitute exclusive
possession of the non-exclusive landscape easement. We disagree. See 58 Am.
Jur. 2d Nuisances § 192 (finding "owners of easements" may bring an action for
private nuisance). We find the POA's easement rights allow them to bring an
action for nuisance and that the POA does not need to maintain exclusive
possession of the property to bring a nuisance claim. See Brooks v. Council of Co-
Owners of Stones Throw Horizontal Prop. Regime I, 315 S.C. 474, 477, 445 S.E.2d
630, 632 (1994) (holding "any person who has a sufficient interest in the land may
bring a nuisance action.").

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and THOMAS and CURTIS, JJ., concur.