Beverly Taylor v. R. Allan Joy

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Beverly Taylor, Marvin Taylor, and Ada Alvarez,
individually and on behalf of all similarly situated
individuals, Respondents,

v.

Raymond A. Wedlake a/k/a R. Allan Joy, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001889

Appeal From Greenville County
Perry H. Gravely, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-072
Submitted February 3, 2026 – Filed February 18, 2026

AFFIRMED

R. Allan Joy, of Columbia, pro se.

Emily Kate O'Brian, of Campbell Teague LLC, of
Greenville, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: R. Allan Joy appeals the jury's verdict finding him liable for
abuse of judicial process and awarding Beverly Taylor, Marvin Taylor, and Ada
Alvarez individually and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals
(collectively, Respondents) $375,000 in damages. On appeal, Joy argues (1) the
jury "ignore[ed] [his] factual evidence," (2) the trial court improperly charged the
jury, (3) the jury erred "by ignoring aspects of the [trial court's] charge," (4)
exhibits at trial did not support claims from Respondents' counsel or witnesses and
exhibits were misrepresented to "paint [him] in a false light to mislead the [j]ury,"
(5) Respondents "had no standing," and (6) the trial court ignored his request for
voir dire. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.
First, as to Joy's arguments regarding issues one and three—that the jury ignored
his factual evidence and ignored parts of the court's jury charge—we hold that the
court did not abuse its discretion because on appeal Joy failed to present any
evidence of juror misconduct, or any evidence that the alleged misconduct resulted
in prejudice. See State v. Galbreath, 359 S.C. 398, 402, 597 S.E.2d 845, 847 (Ct.
App. 2004) ("A denial of a new trial based on alleged jury misconduct is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion."); id. ("[W]here a defendant seeks a new trial on the
basis of juror misconduct, he is required to prove both the alleged misconduct and
the resulting prejudice."); Foye v. State, 335 S.C. 586, 590 n.1, 518 S.E.2d 265,
267 n.1 (1999) ("A jury is presumed to follow instructions."); id. ("[W]ithout some
showing the jurors disregarded [juror] instructions, [the appellate court] declines to
presume prejudice.").

Second, we hold the court did not abuse its discretion by declining to charge the
jury using Joy's proposed charge. See State v. Commander, 396 S.C. 254, 270, 721
S.E.2d 413, 421-22 (2011) ("An appellate court will not reverse the trial [court's]
decision regarding a jury charge absent an abuse of discretion."); State v. Pittman,
373 S.C. 527, 570, 647 S.E.2d 144, 166 (2007) ("An abuse of discretion occurs
when the trial court's ruling is based on an error of law . . . ."). Joy's proposed jury
charge was not a recitation of the applicable and relevant principles of law but
appeared to be factual allegations combined with a statute pertaining to contract
law, which was not at issue in this case. See Wells v. Halyard, 341 S.C. 234, 237,
533 S.E.2d 341, 343 (Ct. App. 2000) ("A trial court must charge the current and
correct law."). Furthermore, because the court charged the correct law applicable
to abuse of process, which was the only claim at issue in this case, it did not
commit error. See State v. Marin, 404 S.C. 615, 620, 745 S.E.2d 148, 151 (Ct.
App. 2013) ("When a party requests the trial court charge a correct and applicable
principle of law, the court must charge it."), aff'd as modified, 415 S.C. 475, 783
S.E.2d 808 (2016); id. ("However, the court is not required to use any particular
language in explaining the principle.").

Third, we hold the issue of whether Respondents had standing is not preserved for
appellate review because it was raised for the first time on appeal, and the trial
court was not given an opportunity to first rule on the issue. See Wilder Corp. v.
Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("It is axiomatic that an issue
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled
upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review."); James v. Anne's
Inc., 390 S.C. 188, 193, 701 S.E.2d 730, 732-33 (2010) ("[W]hen a party belatedly
attempts to raise the issue of standing, [appellate courts] have applied error
preservation principles and held that the matter was not preserved for review where
the trial court was not given an opportunity to first rule on the issue."). Further, we
also hold this issue is abandoned because Joy failed to cite any supporting
authority or case law to further his argument. See First Sav. Bank v. McLean, 314
S.C. 361, 363, 444 S.E.2d 513, 514 (1994) (holding that when an appellant "fails to
provide arguments or supporting authority," he is "deemed to have abandoned th[e]
issue").

Lastly, we hold the issues of whether the circuit court abused its discretion by
admitting Respondents' exhibits and declining Joy's suggested voir dire questions
are abandoned. See First Sav. Bank, 314 S.C. at 363, 444 S.E.2d at 514 (holding
that when an appellant "fails to provide arguments or supporting authority," he is
"deemed to have abandoned th[e] issue"). Joy failed to include any supporting
authority or case law to further these arguments and merely made multiple
conclusory statements without any legal argument. See Glasscock, Inc. v. U.S. Fid.
& Guar. Co., 348 S.C. 76, 81, 557 S.E.2d 689, 691 (Ct. App. 2001) ("South
Carolina law clearly states that short, conclusory statements made without
supporting authority are deemed abandoned on appeal and therefore not presented
for review.").

AFFIRMED.1

THOMAS, MCDONALD, and TURNER, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.