Kevin White v. St. George Healthcare, LLC

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Kevin White, as Personal Representative of the Estate of
Mary Brisbon, Respondent,

v.

St. George Healthcare, LLC, d/b/a St. George Healthcare
Center and Vicki Sides, Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2024-000914

Appeal From Dorchester County
Heath P. Taylor, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-042
Submitted January 30, 2026 – Filed February 4, 2026

AFFIRMED

Stephen Lynwood Brown, Russell Grainger Hines,
Donald Jay Davis, Jr., Matthew Oliver Riddle, and Ted
Ashton Phillips, III, all of Clement Rivers, LLP, of
Charleston, for Appellants.

Margie Bright Matthews, of Bright Matthews Law Firm,
LLC, of Walterboro; and John Elliott Parker, Jr., and Lee
Deer Cope, both of Parker Law Group, LLP, of
Hampton; all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: St. George Healthcare, LLC, doing business as St. George
Healthcare Center (the Facility), and Vicki Sides (collectively, Appellants) appeal
the circuit court's order denying their motions to compel to arbitration the claims of
Kevin White, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Mary Brisbon (the
Estate). On appeal, Appellants argue the circuit court erred by denying their
motions to compel arbitration. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

First, we hold the circuit court did not err in denying Appellants' motions to
compel arbitration because the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration
Agreement did not merge. See Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 580,
596, 553 S.E.2d 110, 118 (2001) ("The question of the arbitrability of a claim is an
issue for judicial determination, unless the parties provide otherwise."); New Hope
Missionary Baptist Church v. Paragon Builders, 379 S.C. 620, 625, 667 S.E.2d 1,
3 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration is
subject to de novo review."); Stokes v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 351 S.C. 606, 609-10,
571 S.E.2d 711, 713 (Ct. App. 2002) ("However, the circuit court's factual findings
will not be overruled if there is any evidence reasonably supporting them.");
MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Christianson, 377 S.C. 210, 214, 659 S.E.2d 209, 211
(Ct. App. 2008) ("[W]e apply South Carolina law to the initial determination of
arbitrability but look to federal law for additional guidance."); Wilson v. Willis, 426
S.C. 326, 335, 827 S.E.2d 167, 172 (2019) ("Whether an arbitration agreement
may be enforced against a nonsignatory to the agreement is a matter subject to de
novo review by an appellate court."); Est. of Solesbee by Bayne v. Fundamental
Clinical & Operational Servs., LLC, 438 S.C. 638, 648-49, 885 S.E.2d 144, 149
(Ct. App. 2023) (finding the admission agreement and arbitration agreement did
not merge after considering (1) the admission agreement provided it was governed
by South Carolina law and the arbitration agreement provided it was governed by
federal law, (2) the arbitration agreement recognized the two documents were
separate by stating the arbitration agreement "shall survive any termination or
breach of this Agreement or the Admission Agreement," (3) the documents were
separately paginated and had their own signature pages, and (4) signing the
arbitration agreement was not a precondition to admission); Coleman v. Mariner
Health Care, Inc., 407 S.C. 346, 355, 755 S.E.2d 450, 455 (2014) (concluding that
by the documents' own terms, language in the admission agreement that
"recognize[d] the 'separatedness' of the [arbitration agreement] and the admission
agreement" and a clause allowing the arbitration agreement to "be disclaimed
within thirty days of signing while the admission agreement could not" indicated
the parties' intention "that the common law doctrine of merger not apply"); Hodge
v. UniHealth Post-Acute Care of Bamberg, LLC, 422 S.C. 544, 562-63, 813 S.E.2d
292, 302 (Ct. App. 2018) (determining an admissions agreement and arbitration
agreement did not merge because the facts that "the [a]dmissions [a]greement
indicated it was governed by South Carolina law, whereas the [a]rbitration
[a]greement stated it was governed by federal law[,]" "each document was
separately paginated and had its own signature page[,]" and "the [a]rbitration
[a]greement stated signing it was not a precondition to admission" evidenced the
parties' intention that the documents be construed as separate instruments). Here,
as in Solesbee and Hodge, (1) the two agreements were governed by different
bodies of law because the Admission Agreement was governed by state law and
the Arbitration Agreement was governed by federal law; (2) each document was
separately labeled, numbered, and contained its own signature page; (3) the
Arbitration Agreement recognized the two documents were separate, stating the
Arbitration Agreement "shall survive any termination or breach of this Agreement
or the Admission Agreement"; and (4) Appellants acknowledged that signing the
Arbitration Agreement was not a prerequisite to admission to the Facility. Thus,
the Admission Agreement and Arbitration Agreement did not merge.

Second, because we find the agreements did not merge—a controlling
consideration in whether the Arbitration Agreement bound Mary Brisbon—we
decline to reach Appellants' remaining arguments. See Futch v. McAllister Towing
of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (stating an
appellate court need not address remaining issues when its resolution of a prior
issue is dispositive); Est. of Solesbee, 438 S.C. at 649, 885 S.E.2d at 149
(determining that because the admission agreement and arbitration agreement did
not merge, the equitable estoppel argument was properly denied); Coleman, 407
S.C. at 356, 755 S.E.2d at 455 ("Since there was no merger here, appellants'
equitable estoppel argument was properly denied by the circuit court."); Hodge,
422 S.C. at 563, 813 S.E.2d at 302 (concluding "the Admissions Agreement and
Arbitration Agreement did not merge").

AFFIRMED.1

THOMAS, MCDONALD, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.