State v. Genari G. McNeil

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Genari Gre'Sean McNeil, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000591

Appeal From Richland County
Robert E. Hood, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-006
Heard November 12, 2025 – Filed January 14, 2026

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Joanna Katherine Delany, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, Assistant
Attorney General Tommy Evans, Jr., and Solicitor Byron
E. Gipson, all of Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Genari McNeil appeals his convictions and sentences for two
counts of murder, armed robbery, first-degree burglary, and possession of a
weapon during the commission of a violent crime. On appeal, he argues the trial
court erred by admitting (1) statements he made to a detective while he was being
treated in the hospital; (2) security video from the hospital despite the State's
failure to properly authenticate it; (3) improper hearsay testimony of statements
made to the detective; (4) graphic images and video footage that should have been
excluded under Rule 403, SCRE; and (5) failing to instruct the jury on mere
presence. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:

1. We hold the trial court correctly found that McNeil was not in custody when he
was questioned at the hospital; thus, Miranda1 warnings were not required. State
v. Easler, 322 S.C. 333, 342, 471 S.E.2d 745, 751 (Ct. App. 1996) ("Our review of
the issue of custody is limited to a determination of whether the ruling by the trial
court is supported by the testimony."), aff'd as modified, 327 S.C. 121, 489 S.E.2d
617 (1997); see State v. Doby, 273 S.C. 704, 707, 258 S.E.2d 896, 899 (1979)
("Miranda applies 'only where there has been such a restriction on a person's
freedom as to render him "in custody."'" (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S.
492, 495 (1977))); State v. Morgan, 282 S.C. 409, 411, 319 S.E.2d 335, 336 (1984)
("Miranda warnings are not required if the defendant is not in custody or
significantly deprived of his freedom."); id. at 411-12, 319 S.E.2d at 336-37
(holding Miranda warnings are not required when statements are made in response
to routine investigation); State v. Lynch, 375 S.C. 628, 633, 654 S.E.2d 292, 295
(Ct. App. 2007) ("Miranda rights attach only if the suspect is subject to custodial
interrogation." (footnote omitted)). Sargeant Simpson went to the hospital twelve
hours after being notified McNeil was there as it is standard procedure to question
gunshot victims. McNeil was unrestrained when he agreed to speak with Simpson,
he was not under arrest, and medical personnel were in and out of the room during
the questioning. McNeil was free to stop the questioning at any time, so this was
neither a custodial nor an involuntary interrogation. Thus, the ruling by the trial
court was supported by the record and was not an abuse of discretion.
2. We hold the circuit court did not err in admitting the hospital security video.
State v. Brown, 424 S.C. 479, 487, 818 S.E.2d 735, 739-40 (2018) ("The admission
or exclusion of evidence is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court and its ruling will not be disturbed in the absence of a manifest abuse of
discretion accompanied by probable prejudice." (quoting State v. Douglas, 369

1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
S.C. 424, 429, 632 S.E.2d 845, 847-48 (2006))); id. at 488, 818 S.E.2d at 740 ("It
is black letter law that evidence must be authenticated or identified in order to be
admissible."). Section 19-5-520(A) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2025)
provides as follows:

In addition to those matters provided by Rule 902, South Carolina Rules
of Evidence, extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent
to admissibility is not required with respect to the following:

(A) The original or a copy of a domestic record that meets the
requirements of Rule 803(6), South Carolina Rules of Evidence, as
shown by a certification of the custodian or another qualified person
that complies with a state statute or a court rule.
Rule 803(6), SCRE, provides that records of a regularly conducted activity are not
excluded by the rule against hearsay if the record is "made at or near the time by,
or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course
of a regularly conducted business activity." We find no abuse of discretion
because the certificate of authenticity was executed by the hospital security
manager who attested that the video was produced and maintained in the regular
course of business and accurately depicted the original record from the time and
date in question. Even if it was error to allow the video, there is no prejudice. See
State v. Collins, 409 S.C. 524, 537, 763 S.E.2d 22, 29 (2014) ("The harmless error
rule generally provides that an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if it did
not contribute to the verdict obtained."). There is no dispute that McNeil was in
the hospital at some point after the shootings. Furthermore, the court admitted a
still shot from the security video into evidence without any objection from McNeil,
and Sargeant Simpson testified that McNeil was the person in the image.

3. We hold the trial court did not err in denying McNeil's request for a jury
instruction on mere presence. State v. Franklin, 299 S.C. 133, 141, 382 S.E.2d
911, 915 (1989) (holding "[a] defendant is entitled to a charge on mere presence"
only "if the evidence supports it"); State v. Dennis, 321 S.C. 413, 420, 468 S.E.2d
674, 678 (Ct. App. 1996) ("'Mere presence' is generally applicable . . . in instances
where there is some doubt over whether a person is guilty of a crime by virtue of
accomplice liability, [in which case] the trial court may be required to instruct the
jury that 'a person must personally commit the crime or be present at the scene of
the crime and intentionally, or through a common design, aid, abet, or assist in the
commission of that crime through some overt act.'" (quoting State v. Austin, 299
S.C. 456, 459, 385 S.E.2d 830, 832 (1989))). McNeil repeatedly told police he
was nowhere near Skyland Drive at the time of the shooting. He only stated one
time in over seven hours of questioning that he may have been in the parking lot at
the time of the murders but offered no other details. See Franklin, 299 S.C. at 141,
382 S.E.2d at 915 (upholding the refusal to give a mere presence instruction when
defendant's "own testimony refute[d] any contention that he was merely present
when the [crime] occurred"). Furthermore, McNeil's blood was found in multiple
places in the apartment, he was wearing what appeared to be the same clothes as
one of the assailants on the Ring camera, the scene of the crime was inside the
apartment, and he never explained how he sustained the gunshot wounds from
merely being in the parking lot during the home invasion. Thus, the evidence did
not support a jury instruction on mere presence.

4. We hold the trial court erred in allowing third party statements to be introduced
through Simpson; however, the error was harmless. State v. Brockmeyer, 406 S.C.
324, 351, 751 S.E.2d 645, 659 (2013) ("Hearsay is a statement, . . . other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at trial, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted." (quoting In re Care & Treatment of Harvey, 355 S.C.
53, 61, 584 S.E.2d 893, 897 (2003))); State v. King, 422 S.C. 47, 67, 810 S.E.2d
18, 29 (2017) ("So-called 'investigative hearsay' is still, fundamentally, hearsay.");
id. ("There is no special kind of evidence known as 'investigative hearsay[.]'"); id.
at 70, 810 S.E.2d at 30 (holding that testimony from an officer based exclusively
on what he was told by witnesses during his investigation was improper hearsay);
Collins, 409 S.C. at 537, 763 S.E.2d at 29 ("The harmless error rule generally
provides that an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if it did not contribute
to the verdict obtained."). Simpson's testimony was based exclusively on what
others told him at the scene and was offered to establish the time McNeil arrived at
the hospital. Therefore, it was hearsay. Despite this, we hold the error was
harmless because McNeil failed to object to other similar statements made by
Simpson regarding the timing of McNeil's arrival at the hospital relative to the
shots fired call. Because of McNeil's failure to object to those statements, the
admission of this statement was merely cumulative. See State v. Jennings, 394
S.C. 473, 478, 716 S.E.2d 91, 93-94 (2011) ("Improperly admitted hearsay which
is merely cumulative to other evidence may be viewed as harmless."). In addition,
we know from Simpson's testimony that he interviewed McNeil at the hospital the
morning after the murders and that McNeil had been shot. Furthermore, there is
other substantial evidence linking McNeil to the crime. State v. Pagan, 369 S.C.
201, 212, 631 S.E.2d 262, 267 (2006) (An insubstantial error that does not affect
the result of the trial is considered harmless "where 'guilt has been conclusively
proven by competent evidence such that no other rational conclusion can be
reached.'"(quoting State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 5, 377 S.E.2d 581, 584 (1989))).
Therefore, we find the admission of the statement could not have contributed to the
verdict.

5. We hold the trial court did not err in admitting images and video footage of one
of the victim's bodies. See Rule 403, SCRE ("[E]vidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."); Brown,
424 S.C. at 487, 818 S.E.2d at 739-40 ("The admission or exclusion of evidence is
a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling will not
be disturbed in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion accompanied by
probable prejudice." (quoting Douglas, 369 S.C. at 429, 632 S.E.2d at 847-48));
State v. Benton, 443 S.C. 1, 9, 901 S.E.2d 701, 705 (2024) ("[T]he pictures here
were relevant as they depicted the crime scene. They drew probative force from
their unique power to make [other] testimony more believable. The pictures gave
important context to the testimony and other evidence about who did what at the
scene."); Collins, 409 S.C. at 536, 763 S.E.2d at 28 ("The law is well settled that
the mere fact that a photograph is gruesome is not a reason for its non admission."
(quoting State v. Ernst, 114 A.2d 369, 373 (1955))); see also State v. Torres, 390
S.C. 618, 623, 703 S.E.2d 226, 229 (2010) (stating it is not an abuse of discretion
for a trial court to admit photographic evidence if it is offered to corroborate
testimony); id. at 623, 703 S.E.2d at 228-29 ("To be classified as unfairly
prejudicial, photographs must have a 'tendency to suggest a decision on an
improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.'" (quoting
State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 55, 456 S.E.2d 357, 361 (1995))). The images and
video footage were offered to show malice as well as to establish the state's theory
of how the crime occurred. State v. Hawes, 423 S.C. 118, 130, 813 S.E.2d 513,
519 (Ct. App. 2018) (finding no abuse of discretion in admitting crime scene
photographs where the "photographs outweighed their prejudicial effect because
these photos showed 'the scene as it occurred' and 'where the body was found in the
house'"); see also S.C. Code Ann § 16-3-10 (2015) (defining murder as "the killing
of any person with malice aforethought, either express or implied"). The trial court
engaged in its Rule 403 analysis on the record and considered the probative value
of the images and video footage against its prejudicial effect. The court ultimately
determined that the images and video footage supported the state's theory of the
case and were not overly gory or gruesome. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by admitting the images and video footage.
AFFIRMED.

MCDONALD, HEWITT, and TURNER, JJ., concur.