Elizabeth Heatley v. Mariner's Cay Marina Condo, LLC

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Elizabeth Heatley, Neil B. McCann, Jr., David Neil
Monk, Thomas V. Bessent, and Mariner's Cay Marina
Council of Co-Owners, Inc., Respondents,

v.

Mariner's Cay Marina Condo, LLC, Mariner's Cay Fuel
Dock, LLC, George A. Farmer., Jr., and South Atlantic
Bank, Defendants,

Of which Mariner's Cay Marina Condo, LLC, Mariner's
Cay Fuel Dock, LLC, and George A. Farmer., Jr. are the
Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2022-001479

Appeal From Charleston County
Mikell R. Scarborough, Master-in-Equity

Opinion No. 6131
Heard October 8, 2025 – Filed January 14, 2026

AFFIRMED

George Hamlin O'Kelley, III, of Buist Byars & Taylor,
LLC, of Mt. Pleasant, for Appellants Mariner's Cay
Marina Condo, LLC and Mariner's Cay Fuel Dock, LLC;
and Kevin W. Mims and Whidbee Sale Perrin, Sr., both
of Luzuriaga Mims, LLP, of Charleston, for Appellants
Mariner's Cay Marina Condo, LLC, and George A.
Farmer, Jr.
Capers G. Barr, III, of Barr Unger & McIntosh, LLC, and
David Cooper Cleveland, of Clawson & Staubes, LLC,
both of Charleston, for Respondents.

MCDONALD, J.: Mariner's Cay Marina Condo, LLC, Mariner's Cay Fuel Dock,
LLC, and George A. Farmer, Jr. appeal the master-in-equity's order granting
declaratory relief to the Mariner's Cay Marina Council of Co-Owners (the Council)
and four property owners (Respondents) at Mariner's Cay Marina. Appellants
challenge the master's finding that the 2007 Master Deed for the Mariner's Cay
Horizontal Property Regime is void to the extent it sought to convert common
elements of the regime into individual units without a vote of the property owners.
Appellants contend Respondents acquiesced to these Master Deed amendments
and are judicially estopped from challenging the ownership transfer of the common
element units. We affirm the order of the master.

Facts and Procedural History

In 1982, the Mariner's Cay Racquet and Yacht Club Homeowners' Association,
Inc.1 granted an exclusive alienable easement in perpetuity to Mariner's Cay
Development Corp. to construct the Mariner's Cay Marina along the north shore of
the Folly River. The Mariner's Cay Marina included ninety boat slips, walkways,
piers, a boat landing, and a building commonly known as the "Ship's Store." Two
of the boat slips were used as fuel docks (the Fuel Docks) and housed the marina's
wastewater pump-out station.

From its inception, the Ship's Store—a two-story building constructed on marsh
pilings—served as the headquarters for the marina's dockmaster. An underground
fuel storage tank and the pump for the wastewater pump-out system are located
beneath the Ship's Store. The first level of the Ship's Store contains restrooms to
which unit owners previously had unlimited access. 2

1
The Mariner's Cay Racquet and Yacht Club is a horizontal property regime
consisting of condominiums adjacent to the marina and boat slips at issue here.
Although both entities share the name Mariner's Cay, these are separate regimes.
2
Some of the facilities described here (and throughout the record) were required
by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control's Office of
Coastal Resources Management for the issuance of a marina permit.
In 2006, the marina was converted into a horizontal property regime under the
South Carolina Horizontal Property Act,3 and the Mariner's Cay Horizontal
Property Regime was established by Marina at Mariner's Cay, LLC (the
Declarant). On May 18, 2006, the Master Deed for the Mariner's Cay Marina
Horizontal Property Regime was recorded. The 2006 Master Deed established
each boat slip as a "unit," with a total of eighty-eight units. The 2006 Master Deed
established the Fuel Docks as Commercial Unit No. 2, which was identified as
Dock Units B-21 and B-22. The Ship's Store consisted of two commercial units:
the first floor was identified as Commercial Unit No. 1-A and the second floor as
Commercial Unit No. 1-B. Article VII of the 2006 Master Deed described these
common elements, stating, "NOTE: COMMERCIAL UNITS NO 1-A AND 1-B
AND COMMERCIAL UNIT NO. 2 ARE COMMON ELEMENTS OR LIMITED
COMMON ELEMENT [sic]."

The 2006 Master Deed provided that the common elements would be conveyed to
the Mariner's Cay Marina Council of Co-Owners. Section 10.1, titled "Co-Owners'
Use Rights," further stated, "Subject to this Master Deed and the By-Laws, a Co-
Owner shall have: (i) an undivided ownership interest according to the Unit's
percentage interest in the Common Elements . . . ." Article XVI addressed how the
2006 Master Deed could be amended:

(a) The Master Deed shall be amended, except as
provided in (b) below, only by vote of Co-Owners
owning seventy-five percent (75%) of the Units and only
by and with the consent of Declarant, at any meeting of
the Council of Co-Owners duly called for such purpose,
following written notice to all Co-Owners, except that no
such amendment shall change the rights reserved to
Declarant, the boundaries of any Unit, the basic values of
the Units and the undivided interest in the Common
Elements appertaining thereto, the liability for Common
Expenses appertaining to the Units, or rights to Common
Profits appertaining thereto. No amendment shall be
effective until recorded in the Charleston County RMC
Office.

3
S.C. Code. Ann. § 27-31-10 to -440 (2007 & Supp. 2025).
(b) For so long as the Declarant has the right to appoint
and remove directors of the Council of Co-Owners as
provided in this Master Deed, the Declarant may
unilaterally amend this Declaration for any purpose.
Thereafter, the Declarant may unilaterally amend this
Declaration at any time and from time to time if such
amendment is necessary (i) to bring any provision into
compliance with any applicable governmental statute,
rule, regulation, or judicial determination; (ii) to enable
any reputable title insurance company to issue title
insurance coverage on the Units, (iii) to enable any
institutional or governmental lender, purchaser, insurer or
guarantor of Mortgage loans, including, to make,
purchase, insure or guarantee Mortgage loans on the
Units; or (iv) to satisfy the requirements of any local,
state, or federal government agency. However, any such
amendment shall not adversely affect the title to any Unit
unless the Owner shall consent in writing.

Under the 2006 Master Deed, the Declarant reserved the right to appoint and
remove members of the Association Board of Directors for eighteen months or
until 90% of the Units were sold, whichever occurred first.

On March 19, 2007, an Amended Master Deed was recorded. The 2007 Amended
Master Deed eliminated the Ship's Store and Fuel Docks as common elements and
converted them into individual units. Between the recording of the 2006 Master
Deed and 2007 Amended Master Deed, thirty-nine boat slips were sold.

Two months later, on May 18, 2007, the Declarant conveyed all declarant rights
under the Master Deed to Flint River Capital, Inc. On February 27, 2009, Flint
River Capital conveyed the Ship's Store and Fuel Docks to Tiger River Capital.
On December 22, 2009, Tiger River Capital, LLC took out a construction
mortgage secured by the Ship's Store; the Fuel Docks were also mortgaged.
Despite this purported change in ownership of the Ship's Store and Fuel Docks,
there was no change at this time to the individual unit owners' access to and use of
these common element facilities.

Ultimately, Tiger River Capital defaulted on the mortgages, and the mortgagee
(Emerald Portfolio, LLC) filed a foreclosure action. The Council appeared as a
lienholder. On February 27, 2015, the master-in-equity ordered that the Ship's
Store and Fuel Docks be sold at public auction. Following the foreclosure sale, the
master issued a Master's Deed conveying the Ship's Store and Fuel Docks to
Emerald Portfolio. On November 15, 2015, Emerald Portfolio LLC conveyed the
Ship's Store and Fuel Docks to Emerald McDonough Road Holdings, LLC.

On May 19, 2016, Emerald McDonough Road Holdings, LLC conveyed the Fuel
Docks to Mariners Cay Fuel Dock, LLC and the Ship's Store to Mariners Cay
Marina Condo, LLC. George Farmer is the sole member of both entities
incorporated to hold title to these units.

After Farmer took ownership of the Ship's Store and Fuel Docks, disputes began to
arise with other unit owners over access to Commercial Units 1 and 2. At some
point, the dockmaster vacated the Ship's Store apartment and was no longer
permitted to use the Ship's Store as the dockmaster's headquarters. Farmer also
prohibited individual unit owners from using the wastewater pump-out system on
the Fuel Docks.

On June 16, 2017, Alben Neighbors, Dan Nekola, and the Mariner's Cay Council
of Co-owners filed a lis pendens and action to declare invalid the 2007 Amended
Master Deed. 4 In July 2017, they amended their complaint to add Farmer as a
defendant and to assert additional claims related to a damaged security gate and
access to the wastewater pump. Appellants timely answered and raised
counterclaims for unjust enrichment (related to improvements made to the units),
indemnification, nuisance, and civil conspiracy.

In September 2017, Neighbors, Nekola, and the Council sought temporary
injunctive relief to address a number of access issues. The movants alleged
Appellants had restricted access to the Ship's Store bathrooms, the Fuel Docks, the
wastewater pump-out station, and the wastewater pump parts beneath the Ship's
Store. According to the affidavit of Thomas Bessent, the Marina Council was
"unable to service the wastewater pump-out facility" due to this restricted access,
and this jeopardized the marina permit. Following a hearing, the circuit court
granted in part and denied in part the requests for temporary injunctive relief—
allowing the movants access to the wastewater pump-out station and fuel pumps
but denying their requests for injunctive relief relating to a handicap access ramp
and electrical control panel.

4
The plaintiffs initially sought to file this case as a class action, but the circuit
court denied class certification.
Appellants amended their answer to raise an affirmative defense of judicial
estoppel based upon the Council's pleadings in the foreclosure action. In June
2020, Appellants sought a temporary restraining order and injunction pendente lite,
citing concerns over use of the Ship's Store facilities amidst the pandemic.

Around this same time, Elizabeth Heatley, Neal B. McCann, Jr., David Neil Monk,
Thomas V. Bessent, and the Mariner's Cay Council of Co-Owners filed a fourth
amended complaint. Respondents note this pleading followed the circuit court's
denial of class certification to more succinctly address issues raised in the name of
four "discrete Plaintiffs."5 In December 2020, the circuit court referred the request
for a declaratory judgment and related claims to the master-in-equity.

In March 2021, Appellants moved for summary judgment, asserting Respondents
had acquiesced to the changes in the Master Deed and that judicial estoppel barred
their claims. Respondents filed their own summary judgment motion, arguing
there was no acquiescence to the Master Deed changes and that section 27-31-70
of the South Carolina Code, titled "Common Elements Shall Not be Divided," was
dispositive.

By order dated May 14, 2021, the master granted Appellants' motion for summary
judgment, finding Respondents acquiesced to the Amended Master Deed. The
master further found judicial estoppel applied to prevent Respondents from arguing
they did not acquiesce to this conversion of the common elements to individual
units because the Council filed an answer in the foreclosure action and failed to
object at that time to the sale of the Units. Respondents timely filed a Rule 59(e),
SCRCP, motion, again arguing section 27-31-70 controlled. On July 8, 2021, the
master vacated this summary judgment order and set the case for trial.

In March 2022, the case went to trial. Monk, McCann, Heatley, and Bessent all
testified they were unaware of any attempted amendment of the 2006 Master Deed
until years later and would have opposed any amendment removing the Ship's
Store and Fuel Docks as common elements of the Regime.

The master granted Respondents' motion for declaratory relief, finding Appellants
wrongfully held title to the Ship's Store and Fuel Dock. The master concluded the
2007 Amended Master Deed was void to the extent it sought to divest the
individual unit owners of their vested property interests in the common elements

5
The named plaintiffs have changed throughout the course of this litigation as
certain plaintiffs sold their units.
because the individual owners did not consent to the change—in writing—as
required by the specific terms of the 2006 Master Deed. The master further found
the 2007 Amended Master Deed violated § 27-31-70 because it was a covenant
contravening the principle that such common elements may not unilaterally be
divided. Moreover, § 27-31-60 did not control because this provision addresses
the property interests of unit owners as to each other as well as their relative
percentage ownership interests in common elements. The master also ruled that
even if § 27-31-60 applied, there was no evidence that the all co-owners—or the
individual Respondents—acquiesced to the 2007 Master Deed revisions. Nor did
judicial estoppel bar Respondents from pursuing claims relating to the common
elements because none of the individual unit owners were parties to the foreclosure
action.

Appellants timely filed a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion. Following a hearing, the
master granted in part Appellants' motion to amend the order to state that Heatley,
McCann, Monk, and Bessent own undivided interests in the Ship's Store and Fuel
Docks as tenants in common. Appellants timely appealed.

Standard of Review

"A suit for declaratory judgment is neither legal nor equitable, but is determined by
the nature of the underlying issue." City of Hartsville v. S.C. Mun. Ins. & Risk Fin.
Fund, 382 S.C. 535, 543, 677 S.E.2d 574, 578 (2009) (quoting Felts v. Richland
County, 303 S.C. 354, 356, 400 S.E.2d 781, 782 (1991)). "The interpretation of a
statute is a question of law." Vista Del Mar Condo. Ass'n v. Vista Del Mar
Condos., LLC, 441 S.C. 223, 235, 892 S.E.2d 532, 539 (Ct. App. 2023) (quoting
DomainsNewMedia.com, LLC v. Hilton Head Island-Bluffton Chamber of Com.,
423 S.C. 295, 300, 814 S.E.2d 513, 516 (2018)).

"The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent
of the legislature." Id. (quoting Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d
578, 581 (2000)). When a "statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and
conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not
needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning." Hodges, 341 S.C.
at 85, 533 S.E.2d at 581. "Statutes must be read as a whole and sections which are
part of the same general statutory scheme must be construed together and each
given effect, if it can be done by any reasonable construction." Vista Del Mar
Condo. Ass'n, 441 S.C. at 235, 892 S.E.2d at 539 (quoting Hinton v. S.C. Dep't. of
Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 357 S.C. 327, 333, 592 S.E.2d 335, 339 (Ct. App.
2004)).
Analysis

I. Vested Interests in Common Elements of the Regime

Appellants argue the master misconstrued sections 27-31-60 and 27-31-70 in
finding the 2007 Amended Master Deed was void, asserting § 27-31-60 provides
the procedure for amending a master deed to remove or add common elements.
Appellants propose the common meaning of "acquiescence" should apply because
the General Assembly did not define the term and South Carolina courts have not
addressed its definition. They further contend the evidence shows Respondents
acquiesced to the 2007 Amended Master Deed and its changes to the 2006 Master
Deed. We disagree.

The South Carolina Horizontal Property Act governs horizontal property regimes.
See §§ 27-31-10 to 440. Section 27-31-40 of the South Carolina Code provides
that once property is submitted to a horizontal property regime, individual
"apartments" may be owned, conveyed, and encumbered independently of others,
subject to the same general principles of law governing real property.

"Apartment" means a part of the property intended for
any type of independent use (whether it be for residential,
recreational, storage, or business) including one or more
rooms or enclosed spaces located on one or more floors
(or parts thereof) in a building or if not in a building in a
separately delineated place whether open or enclosed and
whether for the storage of an automobile, moorage of a
boat, or other lawful use, and with a direct exit to a
public street or highway, or to a common area leading to
such street or highway;

§ 27-31-20.

Section 27-31-60 further describes the property rights of owners in a horizontal
property regime:

(a) An apartment owner shall have the exclusive
ownership of his apartment and shall have a common
right to a share, with the other co-owners, in the common
elements of the property, equivalent to the percentage
representing the value of the individual apartment, with
relation to the value of the whole property. . . .

The percentage shall be expressed at the time the
horizontal property regime is constituted, shall have a
permanent character, and shall not be altered without the
acquiescence of the co-owners representing all the
apartments of the property.

....

(b) The owner of any apartment embraced in the master
deed and building plan shall have the right to require
specific performance of any proposed common elements
for recreational purposes set out in the master deed which
are included in the next stage of the development that
applies to recreational facilities in the event the
additional stages of erection do not develop.

"The common elements, both general and limited, shall remain undivided and shall
not be the object of an action for partition or division of the co-ownership. Any
covenant to the contrary shall be void." § 27-31-70. "Each co-owner may use the
elements held in common in accordance with the purpose for which they are
intended, without hindering or encroaching upon the lawful rights of the other
co-owners." § 27-31-80. "[O]nce common elements are set aside and vested in the
co-owners, such co-owners may not be unilaterally deprived of their interests in the
common elements by the actions of the developer." Vista Del Mar Condo. Ass'n,
441 S.C. at 237, 892 S.E.2d at 540 (quoting Reyhani v. Stone Creek Cove Condo.
II Horizontal Prop. Regime, 329 S.C. 206, 211, 494 S.E.2d 465, 468 (Ct. App.
1997)).

Generally, the unit owners in a horizontal property
regime hold the common elements as tenants in common.
Usually when parties share in the co-ownership of
property, they have a right to request partition of the
property. The unit owners in a horizontal property
regime, however, do not have a right to partition the
common elements. Section 27-31-70 of the Act
provides, "The common elements, both general and
limited, shall remain undivided and shall not be the
object of an action for partition or division of the co-
ownership. Any covenant to the contrary shall be void."
Thus, the unit owners cannot partition their interest in
common elements from other apartment owners, nor can
they divide their ownership interest in the common
elements from their ownership interest in their units.

Id. at 236-37, 892 S.E.2d at 539-40.

This court recently addressed unit owners' rights in the common elements of a
horizontal property regime in Vista Del Mar Condominium Ass'n, 441 S.C. at 230,
832 S.E.2d at 536. There, the developer filed a master deed creating a regime to be
developed in multiple phases. Id. at 230-31, 533 S.E.2d at 536. A transition
period began upon the filing of the master deed, during which the developer was
authorized to expand or contract the regime and act on the association's behalf. Id.
After the developer removed certain unimproved property previously designated as
a regime common area, certain unit owners and their owners' association sued,
challenging the removal of the transferred property from the regime. Id. at 232,
892 S.E.2d at 537. The circuit court granted the developer summary judgment,
finding "the Developer had the authority to remove the Property from the Regime
pursuant to the Master Deed and the Act did not prohibit the removal. " Id. The
unit owners appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the circuit court erred in allowing the
Developer to remove the property in contravention of § 27-31-70. Id. at 235, 892
S.E.2d at 539. This court held:

Considering the Act as a whole, we hold Section 27-31-
70's prohibition of partition or division of common
elements concerns the unit owners' rights in the common
elements and does not prohibit a developer from
removing non-recreational common elements from a
regime unless those common elements have vested in the
unit owners pursuant to the terms of the master deed.
Therefore, we look to the terms of the Master Deed to
discern whether Developer's removal of the Property
from the Regime was valid.

Id. at 238, 892 S.E.2d at 540 (emphasis added). The Vista Del Mar master deed
allowed the developer to expand or contract the regime during the transition
period; to subdivide certain portions of the common area from the project; "to
remove the subdivided portion with an amendment" of the master deed; and
designated the developer as "acting on behalf of itself and as attorney-in-fact for all
unit owners." Id. Because the master deed allowed the developer to unilaterally
remove the unimproved non-recreational property from the regime, this court
upheld the grant of summary judgment to the developer. Id.

By contrast, the unit owner Respondents in this case already had a vested interest
in the Ship's Store and Fuel Docks as common elements of the regime. Under the
language of the 2006 Master Deed, each unit owner held an undivided ownership
interest in the common elements upon the acquisition of their individual unit. See
Vested, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining "vested" as "[h]aving
become a completed, consummated right for present or future enjoyment; not
contingent; unconditional; absolute"). Because each unit owner had a vested
property interest in the Ship's Store and the Fuel Docks as common elements, the
Declarant was prohibited from making unilateral changes that would deprive
Respondents of this property. See, e.g., Vista Del Mar, 441 S.C. at 237, 892
S.E.2d at 539-40 ("[O]nce common elements are set aside and vested in the co-
owners, such co-owners may not be unilaterally deprived of their interests in the
common elements by the actions of the developer." (quoting Reyhani, 329 S.C. at
211, 494 S.E.2d at 468)).

The 2006 Master Deed allowed the Declarant to unilaterally amend the master
deed during the period in which it could appoint the directors of the Council. But
the very same section forbids "any such amendment" if it adversely affects the title
"to any Unit" unless the unit owner consented in writing:

For so long as the Declarant has the right to appoint and
remove directors of the Council of Co-Owners as
provided in this Master Deed, the Declarant may
unilaterally amend this Declaration for any purpose . . . .
However, any such amendment shall not adversely affect
the title to any Unit unless the Owner shall consent in
writing.

Appellants properly admit there is no evidence that the individual unit owners
signed anything approving the changes to the 2006 Master Deed. And, we note
that even if the 2006 Master Deed allowed for a unilateral change in the common
elements, such would be void under § 27-31-70 as contrary to the principle that
"common elements, both general and limited, shall remain undivided and shall not
be the object of an action for partition or division of the co-ownership." See § 27-
31-70; Vista Del Mar Condo. Ass'n, 441 S.C. at 238, 892 S.E.2d at 540 (holding §
27-31-70 "does not prohibit a developer from removing non-recreational common
elements from a regime unless those common elements have vested in the unit
owners pursuant to the terms of the master deed.")

Section 27-31-60 does not support a contrary result. By its own language, section
27-31-60(a) provides that "[t]he percentage [of ownership of the common
elements] shall be expressed at the time the horizontal property regime is
constituted, shall have a permanent character, and shall not be altered without the
acquiescence of the co-owners representing all the apartments of the property."
More significantly, the issue here is not one of percentage ownership interests.
Rather, the issue here is that the unit owners were wholly divested of their vested
ownership interests in the marina common elements in contravention of the 2006
Master Deed and § 27-31-70. Section 27-31-60 governs a unit owner's relative
proportional ownership of common elements; it does not serve to allow unit
owners to silently "acquiesce" to the unilateral divestment of that interest.

Even if we could accept Appellants' argument that § 27-31-60 allows unit owners
to acquiesce to an amendment fully divesting them of vested common area
ownership rights, we see no evidence of acquiescence in this record. Appellants
argue the master "should have found that the actions of the Council of Co-owners
show clear acquiescence [to] these Units being changed from Common Elements
to individual Units over the course of dealing from 2007 to the filing of this action.
For ten (10) years no one at the Association thought otherwise." It is Appellants'
position that Respondents acquiesced to the change in ownership because they did
not object to the changes after the 2006 Master Deed was purportedly amended or
when the mortgagee foreclosed. But, as noted above, the common area usage
problems related to the Ship's Store and Fuel Dock began only after Farmer took
possession of the units in 2016 and began to block the property owners' access.

II. Judicial Estoppel

Appellants further argue the master erred in finding Respondents' claims are not
barred by the application of judicial estoppel due to inconsistent positions taken in
this case and in the prior foreclosure action. In Appellants' view, Respondents
should be estopped from pursuing claims over their interests in the common
elements because the Council appeared in the foreclosure action and did not
attempt to object to the sale of the Ship's Store or Fuel Docks. We disagree.

"Judicial estoppel is an equitable concept that prevents a litigant from asserting a
position inconsistent with, or in conflict with, one the litigant has previously
asserted in the same or [a] related proceeding." Cothran v. Brown, 357 S.C. 210,
215, 592 S.E.2d 629, 631 (2004). "The purpose of the doctrine is to ensure the
integrity of the judicial process, not to protect the parties from allegedly dishonest
conduct by their adversary." Id.

For the doctrine of judicial estoppel to apply, the
following elements must be satisfied: (1) two inconsistent
positions taken by the same party or parties in privity with
one another; (2) the positions must be taken in the same or
related proceedings involving the same party or parties in
privity with each other; (3) the party taking the position
must have been successful in maintaining that position
and have received some benefit; (4) the inconsistency
must be part of an intentional effort to mislead the court;
and (5) the two positions must be totally inconsistent.

Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Rhodes, 405 S.C. 584, 598, 748 S.E.2d 781, 788 (2013).
"The doctrine of judicial estoppel is an equitable concept and should be applied
sparingly, with clear regard for the facts of the particular case." Cothran, 357 S.C.
at 216, 592 S.E.2d at 632.

We agree with the master that the elements of judicial estoppel have not been met
here. First, the individual Respondents did not appear in the foreclosure case
and—even if the Council's appearance in the foreclosure action could satisfy this
single element—there is no evidence of any intentional effort by Respondents to
mislead the court. Both sides zealously and appropriately argued their cases before
both the master and this court. The purpose of judicial estoppel "is to ensure the
integrity of the judicial process." Id. at 215, 592 S.E.2d at 631. Here, the record
provides no suggestion that such integrity has been compromised by these parties
seeking to enforce their vested property interests.

Conclusion

For these reasons, the master's order is

AFFIRMED.6

6
As our findings here are dispositive, we decline to address Respondents'
additional sustaining grounds. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown,
WILLIAMS, C.J. and TURNER, J., concur.

Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (declining to address
remaining issues when a prior issue was dispositive).