Constance Mayers v. Logan Bird

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Constance Mayers as Personal Representative for the
Estate of Darrius "George" Dreher, Appellant,

v.

Logan Bird, Samuel Bird, James Coleman Hunter, Ayden
Phillips, Kenneth Cole Godley, Dominion Energy South
Carolina, Inc., Mark McMillan, and Kimberly McMillan,
Defendants,

Of whom Ayden Phillips is the Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000143

Appeal From Lexington County
William P. Keesley, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-435
Submitted December 16, 2025 – Filed December 23, 2025

AFFIRMED

Kenneth George Goode, Jr., of Law Office of Kenneth G.
Goode, Jr., LLC, of Charleston; Roy T. Willey, IV, Eric
Marc Poulin, and Chase Harrison Coble, all of Poulin,
Willey, Anastopoulo, LLC, of Charleston; and Joseph E.
Thoensen, of Jeffcoat Law Firm, LLC, of Columbia, all
for Appellant.
Catharine Garbee Griffin, of Baker Ravenel & Bender,
LLP, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Constance Mayers as Personal Representative for the Estate of
Darrius "George" Dreher (Appellant) appeals the circuit court's order granting
summary judgment in favor of Ayden Phillips. On appeal, Appellant argues (1)
the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to Phillips because the record
contains a dispute of material fact as to whether Phillips knowingly served or
provided alcohol to an underaged driver and (2) this court should recognize a "safe
haven" approach to determine whether a social host caused an alcoholic beverage
to be served. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

1. We hold the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment to Phillips
because the record contains no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether
Phillips knowingly and intentionally served, or caused to be served, alcohol to a
minor. See Braden's Folly, LLC v. City of Folly Beach, 439 S.C. 171, 190, 886
S.E.2d 674, 684 (2023) ("In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, [an
appellate c]ourt applies the same standard as the circuit court."); id. ("Summary
judgment is appropriate 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.'" (quoting Rule 56(c), SCRCP)); id. ("The [c]ourt
must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences taken from it in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party."); Marcum v. Bowden, 372 S.C. 452, 455,
643 S.E.2d 85, 86 (2007) ("An adult social host who knowingly and intentionally
serves, or causes to be served, an alcoholic beverage to a person he knows or
reasonably should know is between the ages of [eighteen] and [twenty] is liable to
the person served and to any other person for damages proximately resulting from
the host's service of alcohol."). Appellant contends that Logan Bird's testimony
that she did not bring alcohol to Phillips's home, combined with other witnesses'
observations that she was drinking alcohol at Phillips's home, necessarily supports
an inference that Phillips supplied the alcohol Bird was drinking. However, every
witness, including Bird, testified that Phillips did not provide her with any alcohol;
accordingly, we find the record contains no genuine dispute of material fact. See
Grimsley v. S.C. L. Enf't Div., 415 S.C. 33, 40, 780 S.E.2d 897, 900 (2015) ("Even
though courts are required to view the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, to survive a motion for summary judgment, 'it is not sufficient
for a party to create an inference that is not reasonable or an issue of fact that is not
genuine.'" (quoting Town of Hollywood v. Floyd, 403 S.C. 466, 477, 744 S.E.2d
161, 166 (2013))).

2. We decline to recognize a "safe haven" approach to determine whether a social
host caused an alcoholic beverage to be served. See Marcum, 372 S.C. at 455, 643
S.E.2d at 86 ("An adult social host who knowingly and intentionally serves, or
causes to be served, an alcoholic beverage to a person he knows or reasonably
should know is between the ages of [eighteen] and [twenty] is liable to the person
served and to any other person for damages proximately resulting from the host's
service of alcohol."); id. at 459, 643 S.E.2d at 89 ("[P]olicy concerns militate
against a rule which would hold a social host to a higher standard than that to
which a commercial provider is held."); cf. Norton v. Opening Break of Aiken, Inc.,
313 S.C. 508, 510-11, 443 S.E.2d 406, 407-08 (Ct. App. 1994) (finding that a
licensee of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission may be liable for
knowingly providing a safe haven for underage drinkers, even if it did not furnish
the alcohol, in light of regulations forbidding licensees from knowingly permitting
anyone under twenty-one to consume alcohol on the licensed premises), aff'd, 319
S.C. 469, 462 S.E.2d 861 (1995).

AFFIRMED.1

KONDUROS, GEATHERS, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.