Darin Vander Toorn v. Billeter Recruiting

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Darrin Vander Toorn, Respondent,

v.

Billeter Recruiting, LLC, and William Ancar, Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2018-000207

Appeal From Greenville County
Perry H. Gravely, Circuit Court Judge
Edward W. Miller, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-430
Submitted October 1, 2025 – Filed December 23, 2025

AFFIRMED

Howard Walton Anderson, III, of Truluck Thomason,
LLC, of Greenville, for Appellants.

Darrin Vander Toorn, of Cartersville, Georgia, pro se.

PER CURIAM: Billeter Recruiting, LLC and William Ancar (collectively,
Appellants) appeal the circuit court's (1) denial of their motion to set aside the
entry of default and (2) entrance of a default judgment in the amount of $107,061.
On appeal, Appellants argue the circuit court erred in denying their motion to set
aside the entry of default and entering a default judgment in the amount of
$107,061. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

1. We hold the circuit court did not err in denying Appellants' motion to set aside
the entry of default because Appellants failed to show good cause. Because we
hold Appellants failed to show good cause, the court did not err in not considering
the Wham 1 factors. See Sundown Operating Co. v. Intedge Indus., Inc., 383 S.C.
601, 606, 681 S.E.2d 885, 888 (2009) ("The decision of whether to set aside an
entry of default . . . lies solely within the sound discretion of the [circuit court].");
id. ("The [circuit] court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear
showing of an abuse of that discretion."); id. at 607, 681 S.E.2d at 888 ("An abuse
of discretion occurs when the [court] issuing the order was controlled by some
error of law or when the order, based upon factual, as distinguished from legal
conclusions, is without evidentiary support."); Rule 55(a), SCRCP ("When a party
against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or
otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear by
affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter his default upon the calendar (file
book)."); Rule 55(c), SCRCP ("For good cause shown the court may set aside an
entry of default . . . ."); Sundown Operating Co., 383 S.C. at 607, 681 S.E.2d at
888 (stating the good cause "standard requires a party seeking relief from an entry
of default under Rule 55(c) to provide an explanation for the default and give
reasons why vacation of the default entry would serve the interests of justice"); id.
at 607-08, 681 S.E.2d at 888 ("Once a party has put forth a satisfactory explanation
for the default, the [circuit] court must also consider: (1) the timing of the motion
for relief; (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) the degree
of prejudice to the plaintiff if relief is granted."); id. at 608, 681 S.E.2d at 888
("The [circuit] court need not make specific findings of fact for each factor if there
is sufficient evidentiary support on the record for the finding of the lack of good
cause."); Campbell v. City of North Charleston, 431 S.C. 454, 462 n.5, 848 S.E.2d
788, 793 n.5 (Ct. App. 2020) (concluding an appellate court did not need to
address the Wham factors because the City failed to put forth a satisfactory
explanation for the default).

2. We hold the circuit court did not err in entering a default judgment in the
amount of $107,061. The circuit court did not err in awarding the requested
amount for Vander Toorn's May and June 2017 salaries because Vander Toorn
sufficiently pled his entitlement to the salaries; Appellants admitted through
default that the salary payments were owed; and Vander Toorn testified at the

1
Wham v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 298 S.C. 462, 381 S.E.2d 489 (Ct. App.
1989).
damages hearing that he was owed a total of $20,000 in salary for May and June in
accordance with the provisions in the Agreement. The circuit court also did not err
in awarding commissions because Vander Toorn sufficiently requested
commissions in his complaint; Appellants admitted through default that the
commissions were owed; Vander Toorn testified at the damages hearing regarding
the amounts of commissions owed to him; and although Appellants attempted to
contest Vander Toorn's entitlement to commissions through cross-examination at
the damages hearing for various reasons, they conceded the specific monetary
amounts were correct. Finally, the circuit court did not err in awarding treble
damages because in his complaint, Vander Toorn alleged Appellants violated the
South Carolina Payment of Wages Act (the Act);2 their "violations of the Act
[were] willful as set forth [in the complaint], particularly in their various acts of
dishonesty and fraud and in dishonesty to the investigator in the informal
resolution procedure contemplated [in the Act]"; and he was entitled to treble
damages and reasonable attorney's fees as a result of Appellants' "willful violations
of the Act." Appellants admitted these allegations through default. Therefore, we
hold the circuit court properly exercised its discretion and did not err in awarding
treble damages, attorney's fees, and costs. Accordingly, we affirm the entrance of
a default judgment in the amount of $107,061. See Mathis v. Brown & Brown of
S.C., Inc., 389 S.C. 299, 307, 698 S.E.2d 773, 777 (2010) ("[A]ctions for violation
of the . . . Act are actions at law."); id. ("In an action at law tried without a jury, the
[circuit court's] findings have the force and effect of a jury verdict upon the issues
and are conclusive on appeal when supported by competent evidence.");
§ 41-10-10(2) (defining wages as "all amounts at which labor rendered is
recompensed, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, or
commission basis, or other method of calculating the amount and includes
vacation, holiday, and sick leave payments which are due to an employee under
any employer policy or employment contract"); § 41-10-80(C) ("In case of any
failure to pay wages due to an employee as required by [s]ection 41-10-40 or
41-10-50 the employee may recover in a civil action an amount equal to three
times the full amount of the unpaid wages, plus costs and reasonable attorney's fees
as the court may allow."); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Marion Amphitheatre, LLC,
408 S.C. 87, 90, 757 S.E.2d 557, 558 (Ct. App. 2014) ("A defendant in default
admits liability but not the damages . . . ." (quoting Solley v. Navy Fed. Credit
Union, Inc., 397 S.C. 192, 203, 723 S.E.2d 597, 603 (Ct. App. 2012))); id. (stating
a "defaulting defendant has conceded liability" but "does not concede the [a]mount
of liability" (emphasis added) (quoting Solley, 397 S.C. at 203, 723 S.E.2d at
603)); id. ("Even '[i]n a default case, [therefore], the plaintiff must prove . . . the

2
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 41-10-10 to -110 (2021 & Supp. 2025).
amount of his damages, and such proof must be by a preponderance of the
evidence.'" (alterations in original) (quoting Solley, 397 S.C. at 204, 723 S.E.2d at
603)); Limehouse v. Hulsey, 404 S.C. 93, 116, 744 S.E.2d 566, 578-79 (2013) ("If
our courts were to allow a defaulting defendant to fully participate in a post-default
hearing, we believe there would be no consequence of default."); id. at 116, 744
S.E.2d at 579 ("It is well established that the relief granted in a default judgment is
limited to that supported by the allegations in the Complaint and the proof
submitted at the damages hearing."); Roche v. Young Bros., Inc., of Florence, 332
S.C. 75, 81-82, 504 S.E.2d 311, 314 (1998) ("Though a defaulting party may be
entitled to notice of the damages hearing, that party is limited to cross-examining
witnesses and objecting to evidence."); Goodwyn v. Shadowstone Media, Inc., 408
S.C. 93, 98, 757 S.E.2d 560, 563 (Ct. App. 2014) (stating the court "can take its
own view of the facts" when reviewing an award of treble damages (quoting Ross
v. Ligand Pharm., Inc., 371 S.C. 464, 471, 639 S.E.2d 460, 464 (Ct. App. 2006)));
Rice v. Multimedia, Inc., 318 S.C. 95, 98, 456 S.E.2d 381, 383 (1995) (indicating
the award of treble damages is in the court's discretion, which comports with the
purpose of the Act—"to protect employees from the unjustified and wilful
retention of wages by the employer"); see generally id. ("The imposition of treble
damages in those cases where there is a bona fide dispute would be unjust and
harsh."); id. at 99-100, 456 S.E.2d at 384 (finding the circuit court did not abuse its
discretion in declining to award treble damages after determining there was "no
evidence that [employer] acted intentionally or in bad faith"); Temple v. Tec-Fab,
Inc., 381 S.C. 597, 600, 675 S.E.2d 414, 415 (2009) ("A finding that an employee
is entitled to recover unpaid wages is not equivalent to a finding that there existed
no bona fide dispute as to the employee's entitlement to those wages.").

AFFIRMED.3

WILLIAMS, C.J., and THOMAS and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

3
To the extent Appellants requested oral argument in their appellate brief, we
decline to hold oral argument in this case and instead decide the case without oral
argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.