Glenna Gray v. Larousse Lamur

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Glenna Gray; and Michael W. Gray as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Joseph S. Gray,
Appellants,

v.

Larousse Lamur, Phoenix Grand, LLC, and Lamur
Transportation Services, LLC, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2024-000020

Appeal From Lexington County
Walton J. McLeod, IV, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-069
Submitted February 20, 2025 – Filed February 26, 2025
Withdrawn, Substituted, and Refiled July 30, 2025

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Lane Douglas Jefferies, of Poulin, Willey, Anastopoulo,
LLC, of Charleston, for Appellants.

Phillip Florence, Jr., and Everett Augustus Kendall, II,
both of Murphy & Grantland, PA, of Columbia; and
Richard Cameron Stephenson, of Columbia, all for
Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Michael W. Gray, as personal representative of the Estate of
Joseph S. Gray, and Glenna Gray (collectively, Appellants) appeal the circuit
court's dismissal of their action against Larousse Lamur; Phoenix Grand, LLC; and
Lamur Transportation Services, LLC. On appeal, Appellants argue the circuit
court erred in dismissing their action because the statute of limitations should have
been equitably tolled. We reverse and remand pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

Under the specific facts of this case, we hold the circuit court erred in refusing to
apply the doctrine of equitable tolling. See Hooper v. Ebenezer Sr. Servs. &
Rehab. Ctr., 386 S.C. 108, 115, 687 S.E.2d 29, 32 (2009) (recognizing South
Carolina law provides for statutory tolling mechanisms but also could apply the
equitable tolling doctrine to toll the statute of limitations "[i]n order to serve the
ends of justice where technical forfeitures would unjustifiably prevent a trial on the
merits" (alteration in original) (quoting 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 115
(2005))); id. ("Equitable tolling is a nonstatutory tolling theory which suspends a
limitations period." (quoting Ocana v. Am. Furniture Co., 91 P.3d 58, 66 (N.M.
2004))); id. ("Equitable tolling is judicially created; it stems from the judiciary's
inherent power to formulate rules of procedure where justice demands it."); id.
("Where a statute sets a limitation period for action, courts have invoked the
equitable tolling doctrine to suspend or extend the statutory period 'to ensure
fundamental practicality and fairness.'" (quoting Rodriguez v. Superior Ct., 98 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 728, 736 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009))); id. ("The party claiming the statute of
limitations should be tolled bears the burden of establishing sufficient facts to
justify its use.").

In 2019,1 Glenna and Joseph were involved in a car accident with an
eighteen-wheeler truck driven by Lamur in Lexington County. On March 30,
2021, Glenna timely filed an action in federal court, and on June 22, 2021, Glenna
moved to amend her complaint in order to add Michael W. Gray, as personal
representative of the Estate of Joseph S. Gray, as an additional plaintiff and to
assert causes of action for wrongful death and survival.2 On January 7, 2022, the

1
The record contains inconsistent references to the date of the car accident, with
some references to February 13, 2019, and other references to November 13, 2019.
However, whether the car accident occurred in February or November does not
change the result in this case.
2
In August 2021, Michael W. Gray, as personal representative of the Estate of
Joseph S. Gray, filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas against Respondents.
federal court granted the motion to amend. In 2022, the statute of limitations
expired, and on February 16, 2023, the federal court dismissed the case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Appellants filed this state court action shortly after the
federal court denied their motion for reconsideration.

Although Glenna never alleged a jurisdictional basis in her complaints to be in
federal court, neither Respondents3 nor the federal court raised a question
regarding subject matter jurisdiction until the federal court sua sponte dismissed
the federal court action in February 2023. Between the filing of the complaint in
March 2021 and the dismissal by the federal court in February 2023, the parties
litigated and the federal court exercised jurisdiction on at least one occasion when
the federal court granted the motion to amend. Because Appellants timely filed a
complaint in federal court, which shows they did not sleep on their rights, and
Respondents participated in the litigation, we hold the circuit court erred in
dismissing Appellants' action due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. See
Hooper, 386 S.C. at 116, 687 S.E.2d at 32-33 (stating it "has been observed that
'[e]quitable tolling typically applies in cases where a litigant was prevented from
filing suit because of an extraordinary event beyond his or her control'" but noting
other jurisdictions had considered tolling in other circumstances, including, but not
limited to, when a plaintiff pursued his or her claims through a defective, albeit
timely, pleading and when a plaintiff filed timely but raised a claim in the wrong
forum (alteration in original) (quoting Ocana, 91 P.3d at 66)); id. at 116-17, 687
S.E.2d at 33 ("The equitable power of a court is not bound by cast-iron rules but
exists to do fairness and is flexible and adaptable to particular exigencies so that
relief will be granted when, in view of all the circumstances, to deny it would
permit one party to suffer a gross wrong at the hands of the other." (quoting
Hausman v. Hausman, 199 S.W.3d 38, 42 (Tex. App. 2006))); id. at 117, 687
S.E.2d at 33 ("Equitable tolling may be applied where it is justified under all the
circumstances. . . . [H]owever, . . . equitable tolling is a doctrine that should be
used sparingly and only when the interests of justice compel its use."); see also id.
at 118-19, 687 S.E.2d at 34 (concluding that under the unique circumstances of
that case, the statute of limitations should have been equitably tolled "for the time
Hooper spent in pursuit of Ebenezer's nonexistent agent" because Ebenezer
hindered Hooper's pursuit of service by failing to properly list its registered agent
for service with the South Carolina Secretary of State as required by state law).

However, in February 2022, the action was voluntarily dismissed pursuant to Rule
41(a)(1)(B) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.
3
Respondents admitted the federal court had jurisdiction in their answers.
We find application of the doctrine under the specific facts of this case comports
with the purposes behind statutes of limitations. See id. at 119, 687 S.E.2d at 34
(noting "public policy and the interests of justice weigh[ed] heavily in favor of
allowing Hooper's claim to proceed" and explaining the "statute of limitations'
purpose of protecting defendants from stale claims must give way to the public's
interest in being able to rely on public records required by law"); City of N. Myrtle
Beach v. Lewis-Davis, 360 S.C. 225, 232, 599 S.E.2d 462, 465 (Ct. App. 2004)
(acknowledging purposes of statutes of limitations include relieving "the courts 'of
the burden of trying stale claims when a plaintiff has slept on his rights'" and
protecting "potential defendants from protracted fear of litigation" (quoting Moates
v. Bobb, 322 S.C. 172, 176, 470 S.E.2d 402, 404 (Ct. App. 1996))); Galligan v.
Westfield Ctr. Serv., Inc., 412 A.2d 122, 124 (N.J. 1980) ("It has been recognized
that a mistake in the selection of a court having questionable or defective
jurisdiction should not defeat tolling of the statute when all other purposes of the
statute of limitations have been satisfied."); id. at 125 (applying tolling because
none of the purposes of the statute of limitations were served by dismissing the
case); Burnett v. New York Cent. R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 429-30, (1965) (same).
Thus, we reverse the circuit court's order and remand the case to the circuit court
for further proceedings.4

REVERSED AND REMANDED.5

THOMAS, HEWITT, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

4
We decline to address whether the circuit court applied an incorrect standard
when declining to equitably toll the statute of limitations. See Futch v. McAllister
Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999)
(declining to address remaining issues when resolution of a different issue was
dispositive).
5
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.