State v. Dashawn C. Hurley

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Dashawn Chazz Hurley, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2022-001441

Appeal From Greenwood County
Frank R. Addy, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-234
Submitted March 3, 2025 – Filed July 16, 2025

AFFIRMED

E. Charles Grose, Jr., of Grose Law Firm, of Greenwood,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Joshua Abraham Edwards, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor David Matthew Stumbo, of
Greenwood, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: This is a direct appeal stemming from a shooting at an apartment
complex in Greenwood. The State claimed Dashawn Chazz Hurley drove three
people to the area and that some or all of Hurley's passengers got out of the vehicle
and shot at two individuals on a porch or balcony while Hurley waited nearby as the
getaway driver. The two alleged targets suffered gunshot wounds but survived. Two
of the alleged shooters also sustained gunshot wounds, and one of them died.

The State theorized the shooting was retaliation for a murder that occurred about one
month prior. The State attempted to introduce evidence of gang affiliation to support
this theory, but the trial court found gang-related evidence would be unfairly
prejudicial and excluded it. The jury acquitted Hurley of the murder charge tied to
the death of his alleged accomplice, but convicted him of attempted murder and
criminal conspiracy as to the two targets. The trial judge sentenced Hurley to ten
years for attempted murder and five years for criminal conspiracy, set to run
concurrently.

Hurley raises eight issues on appeal, including questions about certain evidentiary
rulings; whether a mistrial, directed verdict, or new trial were warranted; and certain
sentencing considerations. We respectfully disagree with his arguments. For the
reasons outlined below, we affirm his convictions and sentences.

TIMELINESS OF DISCOVERY

Hurley claims the State did not timely disclose evidence supporting its theory that
he and his codefendants conspired to murder the alleged targets in response to a
previous murder. Hurley argues the trial court erred in not suppressing all evidence
relating to this retaliation theory that was produced on or after a date roughly two
weeks before trial. He alleges violations of Rule 5, SCRCrimP, and his right to due
process. We find no error in the trial court's decision.

Even if there was a Rule 5 violation, "reversal is required only where the defendant
suffered prejudice from the violation." State v. Kennerly, 331 S.C. 442, 453–54, 503
S.E.2d 214, 220 (Ct. App. 1998), aff'd, 337 S.C. 617, 524 S.E.2d 837 (1999). We
find no prejudice here. The trial court significantly limited the State's ability to
present evidence on its gang retaliation theory. In fact, all evidence relating to gang
affiliations was completely excluded. It appears the only evidence actually
presented to the jury that could fall within Hurley's "late notice" category was
pictures, or screenshots of posts, from the defendants' own social media pages.
These posts and pictures, which were in the public domain, were introduced to
establish friendships between the defendants, their deceased alleged accomplice, and
the victim of the previous murder, as well as friendships between the targets in this
case and the person convicted of the previous murder. Hurley confirmed these
friendships during his testimony, as did one of his codefendants, Narkevious Reid.
The two targets in this shooting confirmed the friendships as well. See, e.g., State v.
Kerr, 330 S.C. 132, 150, 498 S.E.2d 212, 221 (Ct. App. 1998) (finding no prejudice
where "the pictures in question [were] merely depictions of the damage to [the] truck
[the appellant collided with]," and the appellant himself admitted to the collision);
cf. State v. Lawton, 382 S.C. 122, 127–28, 675 S.E.2d 454, 457 (Ct. App. 2009)
(finding clear prejudice where the State failed to disclose a letter written by the
defendant and instead surprised the defendant with the letter by using it during the
State's cross-examination of him as impeachment evidence). Thus, we find no
prejudicial error in the trial court's decision to not exclude all evidence disclosed
within two weeks of trial.

Because we do not see how these social media posts and photos could be considered
exculpatory, an analysis under Brady is not necessary. See Lawton, 382 S.C. at 126
n.4, 675 S.E.2d at 456 n.4 ("As there is no evidence indicating Lawton's statement
was in anyway exculpatory, the Brady rule is not at issue in this case."); see also
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding "the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment").

GANG-RELATED EVIDENCE

Hurley next argues the trial court erred in failing to require the State to produce a
copy of the Greenwood Police Department's internal "gang book" because the book
was material to guilt or innocence and sentencing, and it was "necessary for
preparation of [his] defense." It appears this argument is also based on Rule 5,
SCRCrimP. Hurley asks this court to order a new trial and require the gang book be
disclosed, or in the alternative, a new sentencing hearing.

Pretrial, the State proffered testimony from a detective about the alleged gang
affiliations of the defendants and victims. The detective provided two ways the
Greenwood Police Department tracks gang members: through "Gang Net," a
statewide system, and by updating lists in the internal Greenwood gang book. The
detective produced certain lists showing Hurley, his codefendants, their deceased
alleged accomplice, and the prior murder victim were "Contraband Gang" members,
and the two targets of this shooting and the individual convicted of the previous
murder were "Southside" gang members. The detective testified the list of
Contraband Gang members came from the gang book.
It appears that defense counsel wanted the State to produce a paper copy of the gang
book. The trial court delayed ruling on that request to first determine if the book
was material.

As noted before, the trial court excluded evidence of anyone's alleged gang
affiliation. In light of that, we do not see how Hurley can plausibly claim prejudice
from not having a copy of the book, and we find no error in the trial court's decision
to not order the book's production. See Kennerly, 331 S.C. at 453–54, 503 S.E.2d at
220 (requiring reversal for a Rule 5 violation "only where the defendant suffered
prejudice from the violation"); see also id. at 454, 503 S.E.2d at 220 (stating the
purpose of Rule 5 is to ensure a criminal defendant receives a "fair trial" by requiring
production of documents that are material to the preparation of his or her defense);
id. at 453, 503 S.E.2d at 220 ("[E]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985))); id. (stating evidence "is not
deemed 'material' if the defense discovers the information in time to adequately use
it at trial").

Hurley argues the gang book played a factor in his sentencing. As discussed more
thoroughly at the end of this opinion, the trial court considered gang affiliations
during sentencing, but any files or lists apparently coming from the gang book were
produced in open court. The trial court was aware that Hurley was not added to any
list of potential gang members until very close to trial. This was part of the court's
reasoning for excluding gang evidence from the jury's consideration. Again, because
Hurley failed to establish any prejudice from not receiving a physical copy of the
entire gang book, we find no error in failing to order the book's production.

GUNSHOT RESIDUE EVIDENCE

Hurley contends a forensic analyst's testimony should have been excluded because
the testimony "[did] not assist the jurors and was unreliable" based on South Carolina
Law Enforcement Division's (SLED) new policy to not test gunshot victims for
gunshot residue. Hurley contends the testimony was prejudicial because the jurors
could have erroneously concluded that one of his codefendants, Xayvion Hill, and
their deceased alleged accomplice, Trivoriaye Alston, fired the handguns police
discovered near the scene of this shooting. Hurley claims this "could lead to the
erroneous conclusion that Mr. Hill and Mr. Alston conspired with Mr. Reid and Mr.
Hurley."
"A court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be reversed on appeal
absent an abuse of discretion or the commission of legal error, which results in
prejudice to the defendant." State v. Gleaton, 444 S.C. 394, 408, 906 S.E.2d 630,
637 (Ct. App. 2024) (quoting State v. Torres, 390 S.C. 618, 625, 703 S.E.2d 226,
230 (2010)). It follows that "[a] defendant seeking reversal based on error in the
admission of evidence has the burden of showing that the evidence was prejudicial."
State v. Jolly, 304 S.C. 34, 37, 402 S.E.2d 895, 897 (Ct. App. 1991). Hurley has not
met this burden. The forensic analyst's testimony fully addressed SLED's new policy
and even explicitly informed the jury that she could not definitively say Hill shot a
gun, largely based on the rationale of the new policy. The jury had all of the
information that defense counsel used to counter the expert's testimony. The
weighing of that evidence was properly left to the jury.

Even if it was error to allow this forensic analyst to testify, "[e]rrors are harmless
where they could not reasonably have affected the result of the trial." Id. Though
evidence of gunshot residue may be considered strong evidence in certain
circumstances, in light of the fact that the analyst's testimony was not definitive and
there was other evidence to support the State's theory of the case (such as eye witness
testimony and DNA evidence), we cannot say the admission of the testimony
regarding gunshot residue prejudicially affected the outcome in this case.
Consequently, we affirm the admission of the analyst's testimony.

MISTRIAL

Hurley argues he was allegedly prejudiced and a mistrial was warranted when the
State asked one of the witnesses, a detective, whether he had seen a social media
post that gave him concern of "retaliation" for the murder that occurred one month
before this shooting. Hurley contends the trial judge's curative instruction was not
sufficient to cure this prejudice.

"The decision to grant or deny a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial
court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion amounting
to an error of law." State v. Bantan, 387 S.C. 412, 417, 692 S.E.2d 201, 203
(Ct. App. 2010). "The granting of a motion for mistrial is an extreme measure that
should be taken only when the incident is so grievous the prejudicial effect can be
removed in no other way." Id. "The trial court should exhaust other methods to cure
possible prejudice before aborting a trial." Id. at 417, 692 S.E.2d at 203–04.
We find no error in the trial court's decision to not grant a mistrial. We cannot
conclude the unanswered question was "so grievous" that any potential prejudicial
effect was not cleansed by the curative instruction that the court gave twice. Id. at
417, 692 S.E.2d at 203; see also id. at 420, 692 S.E.2d at 205 ("[A] curative
instruction is generally deemed to have cured any alleged error."); State v. George,
323 S.C. 496, 510, 476 S.E.2d 903, 911–12 (1996) ("If the trial judge sustains a
timely objection to testimony and gives the jury a curative instruction to disregard
the testimony, the error is deemed to be cured."); State v. Walker, 366 S.C. 643,
659–60, 623 S.E.2d 122, 130 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding a mistrial motion was
properly denied when "the judge gave [multiple] curative instruction[s] to the
members of the jury," including during the general jury instructions, and "[e]ach
time, the curative instruction was timely and complete"). Further, as mentioned, no
testimony was actually given in response to the question, and the State had already
laid a foundation for its retaliation theory, even without previously using the word
"retaliation." Thus, the trial court properly denied the motion for a mistrial.

DIRECTED VERDICT

The trial court granted Hurley's motion for a directed verdict on the firearm charge
but allowed the remaining charges to go to the jury. Hurley contends the trial court
should have directed verdicts of acquittal on all charges. We respectfully disagree.

"A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the State fails to produce evidence
of the offense charged." State v. Walker, 349 S.C. 49, 53, 562 S.E.2d 313, 315
(2002). "In reviewing a motion for directed verdict, the trial judge is concerned with
the existence of the evidence, not with its weight." Id. "If there is any direct
evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt
of the accused, the appellate court must find the case was properly submitted to the
jury." State v. Rosemond, 356 S.C. 426, 429–30, 589 S.E.2d 757, 758 (2003). On
appeal, this court "view[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the State."
Walker, 349 S.C. at 53, 562 S.E.2d at 315. "Unless there is a total failure of
competent evidence as to the charges alleged, refusal by the trial judge to direct a
verdict of acquittal is not error." State v. Arnold, 361 S.C. 386, 389, 605 S.E.2d 529,
531 (2004); see also State v. Cherry, 361 S.C. 588, 594, 606 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004)
("[A] trial judge is not required to find that the evidence infers guilt to the exclusion
of any other reasonable hypothesis.").

The trial court granted Hurley's directed verdict motion on the charge for possession
of a weapon during a violent crime but denied the motion as to murder, attempted
murder, and criminal conspiracy. The jury acquitted Hurley and his codefendants
of murder. The State's entire theory of culpability for Hurley on the other charges
rested on accomplice liability or "the hand of one, hand of all." "Under this theory,
one who joins with another to accomplish an illegal purpose is liable criminally for
everything done by his confederate incidental to the execution of the common design
and purpose." State v. Reid, 408 S.C. 461, 472, 758 S.E.2d 904, 910 (2014). "[T]he
State need not prove [knowledge of the criminal conduct through] a formal
expressed agreement, but rather can prove the same by circumstantial evidence and
the conduct of the parties." State v. Gibson, 390 S.C. 347, 354, 701 S.E.2d 766, 770
(Ct. App. 2010).

A summary of the evidence before the jury prior to the directed verdict motions and
in the light most favorable to the State is as follows. The State presented evidence
that a black Toyota Camry was driving "suspicious[ly]" around this group of
apartment complexes immediately prior to the shooting. The State also presented
evidence that there were multiple people in that car, and at least one of those people
got out of the car immediately prior to the shooting and took the direct path from
Gardens at Parkway (where a black car resembling a Camry appeared to be parked
and waiting) to Hillcrest (where the shooting occurred). The person seen exiting the
black vehicle moments before the gunfire was wearing a shirt resembling the shirt
worn by Hill, one of Hurley's codefendants. Another witness identified three men
at the shooting, one of whom was shirtless and holding a gun.

The Camry was again identified near the scene at Gardens at Parkway when another
witness saw a person (later identified as Alston, an alleged accomplice) hanging out
of the vehicle as the car sped away. Codefendant Hill was arriving at this same
location as the Camry left. Within minutes, the Camry pulled up to the nearby
hospital, Hurley was captured on video coming out of the driver's side, and
codefendant Reid was seen shirtless assisting Alston into a wheelchair. Reid and
Hurley immediately left the hospital without speaking to hospital staff or law
enforcement.

Two guns were found at the scene: one was left where the Camry was parked at
Gardens at Parkway, and the other was left much closer to the scene of the shooting.
Alston and Hill both tested positive for gunshot residue, and it was deemed highly
likely Alston's DNA was on the gun left in the parking lot.

While the State's retaliation theory could not be clearly spelled out due to the court's
exclusion of gang evidence, there was evidence that Hurley, Reid, Hill, and the prior
murder victim were friends, as well as evidence that the two targets of this shooting
and the individual convicted of the prior murder were friends. The State elicited
testimony about the previous murder primarily through a police detective.

Defense counsel argued there was no direct evidence that Hurley's car was the black
car driving around the apartment complexes prior to the shots being fired and that
there was no evidence that all three codefendants were together the day this shooting
occurred. Notably, Hurley's and Reid's testimonies placed both of them at the
apartment complexes prior to and during the shots being fired. See State v. Phillips,
416 S.C. 184, 192 n.7, 785 S.E.2d 448, 452 n.7 (2016) ("Under the waiver rule, a
defendant who presents evidence in his own defense waives the right to have the
court review the denial of directed verdict based solely on the evidence presented in
the State's case-in-chief."); State v. Hepburn, 406 S.C. 416, 437, 753 S.E.2d 402,
413 (2013) (providing the waiver rule applies to "gap-filling evidence"). And though
this case is largely based on circumstantial evidence, we find the evidence sufficient
for a reasonable juror to "fairly and logically deduce[]" guilt. State v. Bennett, 415
S.C. 232, 236–37, 781 S.E.2d 352, 354 (2016) (distinguishing, in a circumstantial
case, the jury's inquiry, which requires "that every circumstance relied upon by the
state be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and that all of the circumstances so
proven be consistent with each other and, taken together, point conclusively to the
guilt of the accused to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis" from the
court's directed verdict analysis, where the court "must submit the case to the jury if
there is 'any substantial evidence which reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the
accused, or from which his guilt may be fairly and logically deduced'").

Hurley urges us to define "substantial circumstantial evidence" and contends that the
trial court erred in failing to do so. We are not aware of a standardized definition of
what constitutes substantial circumstantial evidence beyond the familiar language
from precedent we provided above. We suspect that is because the application of
these principles relies on the facts of each case. The trial court seemed to express
the same sentiment, and the record shows the trial court thoroughly considered the
evidence in deciding the directed verdict motions. Accordingly, we affirm the denial
of the directed verdict motion.

NEW TRIAL

Hurley argues for a new trial based on cumulative error, relying on all of the above
alleged errors and his belief that the trial judge improperly "rushed the trial."
Because we find no errors in the trial judge's rulings, the cumulative error doctrine
is inapplicable. See State v. Beekman, 405 S.C. 225, 237, 746 S.E.2d 483, 490 (Ct.
App. 2013) ("The cumulative error doctrine provides relief to a party when a
combination of errors, insignificant by themselves, has the effect of preventing the
party from receiving a fair trial, and the cumulative effect of the errors affects the
outcome of the trial. An appellant must demonstrate more than error in order to
qualify for reversal pursuant to the cumulative error doctrine; rather, he must show
the errors adversely affected his right to a fair trial to qualify for reversal on this
ground." (citation omitted)), aff'd, 415 S.C. 632, 785 S.E.2d 202 (2016).

We see no merit to Hurley's additional claim that the trial court rushed the trial. First,
Hurley does not cite any caselaw in support of his allegation that it was "legal error"
for the trial judge to allegedly rush the case. Second, while the record is certainly
not a perfect window into the climate of a case's trial, our view of the instances where
Hurley's counsel expressed concern about the trial being rushed is that they primarily
occurred when the trial court was trying to be both diligent and efficient. Defense
counsel presented numerous arguments throughout the trial, and the record indicates
nothing other than the trial court fully hearing and acting on all arguments and
motions. As this case was drawing to a close, and even though it had been lengthy,
the trial court refrained from having the jury begin deliberations at the end of the day
to avoid a rushed or "tired" verdict. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Hurley's
new trial motion.

SENTENCING

Finally, Hurley contends the trial court erred in allegedly enhancing his sentence
based on gang affiliation when there was no finding by the jury that he was a gang
member and thus it was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Hurley relies on the line of cases that involve the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in
Apprendi v. New Jersey: "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. 466, 490
(2000); see also Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92, 97 (2016) (reiterating the Apprendi
Court's holding that any fact that "expose[s] the defendant to a greater punishment
than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict" is an "element" that must be
submitted to a jury" (alteration in original)); id. at 94 (declaring a Florida law
unconstitutional because it "required the judge to hold a [hearing] separate [from the
jury] . . . [to] determine whether sufficient aggravating circumstances existed to
justify imposing the death penalty"); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (same as
Hurst); State v. Simuel, 357 S.C. 378, 593 S.E.2d 178 (Ct. App. 2004) (following
Apprendi's holding where a prison escapee's maximum sentence was enhanced from
two years to three years).
We respectfully disagree that this line of cases applies here. The jury convicted
Hurley of attempted murder (maximum sentence of thirty years per S.C. Code Ann.
§ 16-3-29 (2015)) and criminal conspiracy (maximum sentence of five years per
S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-410 (2015)). There were no formal enhancements applied
when the trial court considered gang affiliations during sentencing; instead, the court
used this information when considering the proper sentence to impose within the
statutory ranges. See Hayden v. State, 283 S.C. 121, 123, 322 S.E.2d 14, 15 (1984)
("A sentencing judge 'may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely
unlimited as to either the kind of information he may consider, or the source from
which it may come.'" (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972)));
cf. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." (emphasis added)). In
fact, Hurley's sentence for attempted murder (ten years) was well-below the
maximum, and though he received the maximum sentence for criminal conspiracy
(five years), the important point is that the court did not enhance the maximum
sentence permitted by statute. Thus, we find no error in the trial court's consideration
of gang affiliations during sentencing.

AFFIRMED. 1

THOMAS, HEWITT, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.