Timothy Idiaghe v. Diana I. Idiaghe

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Timothy Idiaghe, Respondent,

v.

Diana I. Idiaghe, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2024-000074

Appeal From Lexington County
Huntley S. Crouch, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-207
Heard June 3, 2025 – Filed June 23, 2025

AFFIRMED

Melinda Inman Butler, of The Butler Law Firm, of
Union, for Appellant.

G. Robin Alley, of Isaacs & Alley, LLP, and James B.
Richardson, Jr., both of Columbia, for Respondent.

Rebecca Brown West, of Harling & West, LLC, of
Lexington, for the Guardian ad Litem.

PER CURIAM: In this marital litigation, Diana Idiaghe (Mother) argues the
family court erred in: (1) failing to give proper weight to her allegations of
domestic violence before placing custody with Timothy Idiaghe (Father) and
granting her only supervised visitation; (2) ruling certain testimony regarding her
allegations of domestic abuse was not relevant and/or was inadmissible hearsay;
(3) finding Mother's student loan debt was nonmarital; (4) ordering Mother to pay
a portion of the guardian ad litem's (GAL's) attorney's fees; (5) finding the fees of
the GAL were statutorily proper; (6) failing to strike the GAL's report; and (7)
failing to allow Mother the opportunity to address the substance of her "motion to
correct error" with respect to a pretrial order. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. The family court properly considered the parties' allegations of domestic
violence within the totality of the circumstances applicable to this custody
determination in finding the children's best interests would be served by awarding
custody to Father and keeping Mother's supervised visitation schedule unchanged.1
The family court's thorough and well-reasoned final order includes detailed
findings addressing custody, and our de novo review reveals no error. See Stone v.
Thompson, 428 S.C. 79, 91, 833 S.E.2d 266, 272 (2019) ("Appellate courts review
family court matters de novo, with the exceptions of evidentiary and procedural
rulings."). Mother failed to demonstrate that she is better suited to be named the
children's primary caretaker, or in the alternative, why she should be awarded joint
custody or unsupervised visitation.

Mother chose not to testify at the final hearing and failed to present credible
evidence to suggest the award of custody to Father was contrary to the best
interests of these children. 2 Mother's own father traveled from New Orleans to
Lexington County to testify that Mother is "not going to take care of them because
she's a professional liar, habitual liar. She manipulates people." Moreover,
Mother's behavior toward these highly intelligent children, their studies, and their
extracurricular activities was concerning.

Indeed, a counselor testified that once supervision of Mother's visitation began, the
children were "markedly less stressed." The family court's order cogently analyzes
the concerns expressed by one of the counselors:

[Counselor] described [Father] as the voice of reason and
stabilizer for the children. She described [Mother] as

1
Both parties made claims against the other for physical abuse/cruelty.
2
Although Mother elected not to testify, she presented other witnesses in her case.
explosive based upon her counseling with the eldest
child. She testified that the children do not feel as close
to their [Mother] and are often fearful of what might
happen to them when they visit with their [Mother]. The
children have shown signs of anxiety when visiting with
[Mother]. On several occasions, [Mother] has called law
enforcement based on the children's actions and has
threatened the children that law enforcement could take
action against the children because of their behavior.
This has caused the children to be traumatized by
[Mother's] actions in these instances. Supervision of
visitation makes the children feel more at ease that
[Mother] will behave and her behavior will be
non-confrontational during the visitation. This allows the
children to focus on their relationship with [Mother]
while avoiding any upheaval. [Counselor] stated
[Mother] has shown lack of insight [as] to her
relationship with the children [and explained Mother]
would have to acknowledge her inappropriate behavior in
the past with the children and a willingness to correct that
behavior to be ready to engage with the children in
therapy before [they] could engage in reconciliation
counseling. But based on [Counselor's] testimony,
[Mother] minimally has shown concern but no
acknowledgement of past matters of her treatment of the
children. [Counselor] testified that all the children have
fear of law enforcement and have been concerned that
while they were visiting their [Mother], that their
[Mother] would be calling law enforcement to take them
to jail. As part of the assessments, [Father] is never
identified as an aggressor; however, [Mother] is reported
to be an aggressor on more than one occasion. The
oldest child expressed to [Counselor] her concerns for
[Mother's] Mental Health and inquired about [Mother]
being in counseling. The counselor testified that since
[Mother's] visitation has been supervised, the coping
skills of the children have significantly improved.3

3
The middle child (Son) was more positive about visits with Mother than were his
two sisters. Yet, one document Mother submitted as a trial exhibit demonstrates
By contrast, the record establishes that Father has been supportive of the children's
successes and education, is able to communicate with their educators, and works
well with their medical providers. See Klein v. Barrett, 427 S.C. 74, 80, 828
S.E.2d 773, 776 (Ct. App. 2019) ("In a child custody case, the welfare of the child
and what is in the child's best interest is the primary, paramount, and controlling
consideration of the court." (quoting McComb v. Conard, 394 S.C. 416, 422, 715
S.E.2d 662, 665 (Ct. App. 2011))); Clark v. Clark, 423 S.C. 596, 605, 815 S.E.2d
772, 777 (Ct. App. 2018) ("While numerous prior decisions set forth criteria that
are helpful in such a determination, there exist no hard and fast rules and the
totality of circumstances peculiar to each case constitutes the only scale upon
which the ultimate decision can be weighed." (quoting Davenport v. Davenport,
265 S.C. 524, 527, 220 S.E.2d 228, 230 (1975))); Simcox-Adams v. Adams, 408
S.C. 252, 260, 758 S.E.2d 206, 210 (Ct. App. 2014) ("In determining a child's best
interest in a custody dispute, the family court should consider several factors,
including: who has been the primary caretaker; the conduct, attributes, and fitness
of the parents; the opinions of third parties, including the guardian ad litem, expert
witnesses, and the children; and the age, health, and gender of the children.").

2. The family court did not err in ruling certain testimony Mother sought to
introduce as to her claim of domestic violence was not relevant and/or was
hearsay. Mother attempted to introduce testimony through a babysitter that Father
was arrested at some point during the marriage (in either 2012 or 2020). 4 While
we do not disagree that a criminal record—if Father had one—could under

Son was concerned enough about Mother's behavior to record an incident in which
she became angry and struck his sisters with a cooking utensil. Mother then
attacked Father when he attempted to intervene. This report indicates bruising was
observed on one daughter's left arm, but it was unknown if the other daughter had
"any marks or bruises." Father sustained "bruises on his chest, head and arms."
Although the record contains only a portion of this 2019 report, one stated concern
is that "[Mother] has always been abusive towards her family[,] it's just getting
more intense."
4
Although the transcript reflects a date of 2020, other filings suggest Mother may
have intended to ask about an incident from 2012. In his appellate brief, Father
states Mother is referring to "one of the times that she had [Father] arrested, then
dropped her charge, a typical example of [Mother's] chronic abuse of the
machinery of law enforcement."
appropriate circumstances be relevant, Mother failed to provide a certified copy of
any conviction or proffer the challenged portion of the babysitter's testimony.
Without an understanding of what this proposed testimony might have been, we
are unable to consider Mother's claims of error on this point. See Jamison v. Ford
Motor Co., 373 S.C. 248, 260, 644 S.E.2d 755, 761 (Ct. App. 2007) ("It is well
settled that a reviewing court may not consider error claimed in the exclusion of
testimony unless the record on appeal shows fairly what the rejected testimony
would have been.").

3. The family court did not err in finding Mother's student loan debt was
nonmarital. Mother chose not to testify at the final hearing and failed to present
any credible evidence—documentary or otherwise—to verify such loans or
identify what portion might be deemed marital. Although Mother listed a student
loan obligation on her financial declaration, she presented no evidence as to when
this debt was incurred or for what purpose she used the funds. Thus, we agree with
the family court that there is simply "no way to determine whether the debt is
marital or non-marital based upon the financial declaration filed without additional
evidence." See Schultze v. Schultze, 403 S.C. 1, 7, 741 S.E.2d 593, 597 (Ct. App.
2013) ("In dividing the marital estate, the family court must consider 'existing
debts incurred by the parties or either of them during the course of the marriage.'"
(quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-620(B)(13))); id. ("Marital debt, like marital
property, must be specifically identified and apportioned in equitable
distribution."); Jackson v. Jackson, 432 S.C. 415, 431, 853 S.E.2d 344, 352 (Ct.
App. 2020) ("[A] party cannot sit back at trial without offering proof, then come to
this [c]ourt complaining of the insufficiency of the evidence to support the family
court's findings." (alterations in original) (quoting Honea v. Honea, 292 S.C. 456,
458, 357 S.E.2d 191, 192 (Ct. App. 1987))); Hudson v. Hudson, 294 S.C. 166, 169,
363 S.E.2d 387, 389 (Ct. App. 1987) (noting the party seeking equitable
distribution must present evidence supporting his or her claim).

4. The family court did not err in ordering Mother to pay a portion of the GAL's
attorney's fees.5 In light of Mother's obstructive behavior and serving—without
the knowledge of her attorney—of a three-day deposition notice upon the GAL, the
GAL's decision to hire counsel and seek a protective order was reasonable. The

5
The family court declined to require reimbursement of the full $30,164.20 in
attorney's fees and costs incurred by the GAL, however, the parties were ordered to
repay the costs the GAL's counsel advanced to secure the attendance of trial
witnesses. This was properly ordered on a pro rata basis, with Father to pay
$737.00 and Mother to pay $363.00.
family court found Mother responsible only for her pro rata portion of certain trial
witness fees and the $3,880.90 in attorney's fees and costs related to Mother's
improper noticing of this deposition and the GAL's subsequent motion for a
protective order. And, in the order addressing the GAL's motion for a protective
order, the family court again admonished Mother for filing pleadings without her
counsel's knowledge or approval. See Shirley v. Shirley, 342 S.C. 324, 341, 536
S.E.2d 427, 436 (Ct. App. 2000) ("An award of [GAL] fees lies within the sound
discretion of the [family court] and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse
of discretion.").

5. The family court did not err in finding the fees of the GAL were statutorily
proper or in ordering that Mother pay a pro rata portion of these fees. The parties
were aware that responsibilities for reimbursement would be assigned pro rata and
that Mother would responsible for 33% of the GAL fees incurred. In its allocation,
the family court found both parties had the ability to pay; however, it tasked Father
with the majority of these fees despite Mother's unwillingness to cooperate with
the GAL and other behavior noted throughout this record. See S.C. Code Ann.
§ 63-3-850(B) (2010) ("A guardian appointed by the court is entitled to reasonable
compensation, subject to the review and approval of the court."). The family court
twice granted the GAL's motions to increase the initial fee cap and noted in its
order that the GAL "credibly testified that a majority of issues related to her
investigation were due to [Mother's] conduct and positions." See S.C. Code Ann.
§ 63-3-850(A) (2010) (providing a process if the GAL determines it is necessary to
exceed the fee initially authorized by the court); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-850(B) (In
determining the reasonableness of the guardian's fees and costs, "the court must
take into account: (1) the complexity of the issues before the court; (2) the
contentiousness of the litigation; (3) the time expended by the guardian; (4) the
expenses reasonably incurred by the guardian; (5) the financial ability of each
party to pay fees and costs; and (6) any other factors the court considers
necessary.").

6. Mother sought to strike the report of the GAL and claims her rights to due
process were denied when she was prohibited from taking the improperly noticed
deposition. Mother asserts in her briefing that "she argued extensively to the trial
court that the [GAL] failed to adhere to the rules at S.C. Code Ann. 63-3-830 in
that a party should have the right to cross examine any witness whose testimony
forms the basis of the [GAL's] findings." But our review of the record reveals no
evidence that the GAL "failed to adhere to the rules" (statutory or otherwise).
Mother's refusal to cooperate with the GAL and efforts to obstruct the GAL's
exercise of her duties began almost immediately. To the extent Mother's
arguments on this point are preserved, we find the family court properly exercised
its discretion in handling Mother's deposition notice and the resulting protective
order, in declining to strike the GAL's report, and in permitting Mother to
extensively cross-examine the GAL (and other witnesses) at the merits hearing.
See Stone, 428 S.C. at 91, 833 S.E.2d at 272 ("Appellate courts review family court
matters de novo, with the exceptions of evidentiary and procedural rulings.").

7. Because Mother's argument on this point is conclusory and she failed to include
in the record on appeal her "motion to correct error" alleged with respect to a
pretrial order finding she violated Rule 11, SCRCP, we decline to address this
issue. See Rule 210(h), SCACR ("Except as provided by Rule 212 and Rule
208(b)(1)(C) and (2), the appellate court will not consider any fact which does not
appear in the Record on Appeal."); see also Helms Realty, Inc. v. Gibson-Wall Co.,
363 S.C. 334, 339, 611 S.E.2d 485, 488 (2005) (reiterating that an appellant has the
burden of providing a sufficient record and declining to review a jury charge not
included in the record on appeal).

We commend the family court for its exemplary patience and temperament in this
challenging case.

AFFIRMED.

KONDUROS, MCDONALD, and VINSON, JJ., concur.