Marc K. Knapp v. James Douglas Jenkins, IV

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Marc K. Knapp, Appellant,

v.

James Douglas Jenkins, IV, Peter Barnwell Jenkins, and
Alicia J. Roy, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000599

Appeal From Charleston County
Mikell R. Scarborough, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-180
Submitted May 15, 2025 – Filed June 4, 2025

AFFIRMED

Frederick Miles Adler, of Pawleys Island, for Appellant.

David K. Haller, of Haller Law Firm, of Charleston, for
Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Marc K. Knapp appeals the master-in-equity's order granting
summary judgment to James Douglas Jenkins, IV, Peter Barnwell Jenkins, and
Alicia J. Roy (collectively, Respondents). On appeal, Knapp argues the master
erred by (1) dismissing the action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the South Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure and (2) granting Respondents' motion for summary
judgment because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
contract's terms were ambiguous. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

1. We find Knapp's first argument is without merit because the master converted
Respondents' Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary judgment after matters
outside the pleadings were presented at the hearing. See Martin v. Companion
Healthcare Corp., 357 S.C. 570, 574, 593 S.E.2d 624, 627 (Ct. App. 2004) ("When
a court is considering a motion to dismiss and matters outside the pleadings are
presented to and not excluded by the court, 'the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56 [of the South Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure], and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.'" (quoting Rule
12(b), SCRCP)). Although the master's original Form 4 order stated it was
granting Respondents' Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it also indicated a formal order was to
follow. See Metts v. Mims, 384 S.C. 491, 499, 682 S.E.2d 813, 817 (2009) (stating
a Form 4 order is not final if it specifies that a formal order will follow). The
master's formal order granted summary judgment to Respondents, and following
Knapp's motion to reconsider, the master clarified it issued the formal order after
motions, affidavits, and arguments converted the motion to dismiss into a motion
for summary judgment. Moreover, Knapp had an opportunity to argue against the
grant of summary judgment before and during the hearing. See Baird v.
Charleston County, 333 S.C. 519, 527, 511 S.E.2d 69, 73 (1999) (stating that
conversion of a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment is proper
when the parties are afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond to such matters).

2. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Knapp, we hold the master
did not err in granting summary judgment to Respondents. See Fleming v. Rose,
350 S.C. 488, 493, 567 S.E.2d 857, 860 (2002) ("When reviewing the grant of
summary judgment, the appellate court applies the same standard applied by the
[circuit] court pursuant to Rule 56(c) [of the South Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure]."); Kitchen Planners, LLC v. Friedman, 440 S.C. 456, 459, 892 S.E.2d
297, 299 (2023) ("[T]he moving party is entitled to summary judgment 'if the
[evidence before the court] show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'"
(alterations in original) (quoting Rule 56(c), SCRCP)); Fleming, 350 S.C. at
493-94, 567 S.E.2d at 860 ("When determining if any triable issues of fact exist,
the evidence and all reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party."); Town of Hollywood v. Floyd, 403 S.C. 466,
477, 744 S.E.2d 161, 166 (2013) ("[I]t is not sufficient for a party to create an
inference that is not reasonable or an issue of fact that is not genuine."); Ingram v.
Kasey's Assocs., 340 S.C. 98, 106, 531 S.E.2d 287, 291 (2000) (holding a party
who seeks to compel specific performance must demonstrate he "has been and
remains able and willing to perform" his part of the contract); Silver v. Aabstract
Pools & Spas, Inc., 376 S.C. 585, 594, 658 S.E.2d 539, 543 (Ct. App. 2008)
("Where a contract is not performed, the party who is guilty of the first breach is
generally the one upon whom all liability for the nonperformance rests." (quoting
Willms Trucking Co. v. JW Constr. Co., 314 S.C. 170, 178, 442 S.E.2d 197, 201
(Ct. App. 1994)); Dargan v. Page, 222 S.C. 520, 527, 73 S.E.2d 705, 708 (1952)
(stating a contractual provision which states time is of the essence "must be strictly
complied with, or relief by way of specific performance will be denied"); Bishop v.
Tolbert, 249 S.C. 289, 298-301, 153 S.E.2d 912, 917-18 (1967) (holding buyers
were not entitled to specific performance because they refused to tender the
purchase price for land within the time specified by the contract, and time was of
the essence).

AFFIRMED. 1

THOMAS, HEWITT, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.