Tina Patton v. Linda Doty

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Tina Robin Patton, Appellant,

v.

Linda Doty, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2021-001527

Appeal From Richland County
Jocelyn Newman, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-160
Submitted October 1, 2024 – Filed May 7, 2025

AFFIRMED

Chief County Public Defender for Richland County
Elizabeth Fielding Pringle, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Charnell Glenn Peake, of Peake & Fowler Law Firm, PA,
of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Tina Patton appeals the circuit court's order affirming the
magistrate court's finding her in contempt, arguing the contempt finding violated
her due process rights. We affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case began in 2019, when the magistrate court granted a restraining order
against Tina Patton, as sought by Patton's neighbor, Linda Doty. The restraining
order stated in bold print: "[V]iolation of this order is a criminal offense punishable
by thirty days in jail, a fine of five hundred dollars or both." In 2020, the
magistrate court held a rule to show cause hearing on allegations that Patton
violated the restraining order by harassing Doty with obscene hand gestures and
cursing. The rule to show cause issued to Patton stated "[y]ou are herein ordered
to appear before the [magistrate] . . . to show cause, if any you can, why you
should not be held in contempt for violation of the order previously issued by this
court." Doty was represented by a private attorney at the hearing, and a public
defender represented Patton. Patton moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that a prosecutor was necessary for a criminal contempt action. Patton argued
there had been neither an arrest nor criminal charges, and she did not have the
opportunity to conduct discovery under Rule 5 of the South Carolina Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The magistrate court denied the motion and denied Patton's
motion for a jury trial. The magistrate court noted that under DiMarco v.
DiMarco,1 the right to a jury trial exists in criminal contempt cases before a
criminal sentence of more than six months may be imposed.

The magistrate court conducted a bench trial and heard testimony, from Doty and a
witness, that Patton made obscene gestures to Doty and cursed at her. Doty
testified she called the police but Patton was not arrested. The magistrate court
limited the testimony to the face of the complaint and sustained multiple hearsay
objections to Doty's testimony. The magistrate court told Patton's counsel: "I'm
[going to rule] as if this was a criminal case and just like you were the public
defender and this is the defense." The magistrate court noted Patton had the right
not to testify and stated it would not hold that against her. The magistrate court
again said it was "looking at this case as if it is a criminal standard." The
magistrate court found Patton in criminal contempt for violating the restraining
order, extended the restraining order against Patton, and sentenced her to thirty
days' imprisonment suspended on a $500 fine. The magistrate court reminded
Patton that it is "a criminal action to violate a restraining order" but stated she was
not sentenced to a straight thirty days' imprisonment because it was a minimal
violation of the restraining order.

Patton appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the magistrate court's ruling in
a Form 4 order. This appeal followed.

1
393 S.C. 604, 608, 713 S.E.2d 631, 633 (2011).
ISSUE ON APPEAL

Did the circuit court err in affirming the magistrate court's finding of criminal
contempt?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"A decision on contempt rests within the sound discretion of the trial court." McCain
v. Brightharp, 399 S.C. 240, 251, 730 S.E.2d 916, 922 (Ct. App. 2012). "It is within
the [court's] discretion to punish by fine or imprisonment all contempts of authority
before the court." Miller v. Miller, 375 S.C. 443, 454–55, 652 S.E.2d 754, 760 (Ct.
App. 2007). "In a criminal contempt proceeding, the burden of proof is beyond a
reasonable doubt." Poston v. Poston, 331 S.C. 106, 113, 502 S.E.2d 86, 89 (1998).
"On appeal, this court should reverse the contempt decision only if it is without
evidentiary support or the circuit court abused its discretion." Ex parte Cannon, 385
S.C. 643, 660, 685 S.E.2d 814, 823 (Ct. App. 2009).

LAW/ANALYSIS

Patton argues the magistrate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case
because it involved constructive criminal contempt without an arrest. She argues
this matter does not fall under section 22-3-550 of the South Carolina Code (2025)
because it is not a charged criminal "offense" with an attendant arrest, as
contemplated under the statute. We disagree.

"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine cases of the general
class to which the proceedings in question belong." Majors v. S.C. Sec. Comm'n,
373 S.C. 153, 159, 644 S.E.2d 710, 713 (2007). "The jurisdiction of a court over
the subject matter of a proceeding is determined by the Constitution, the laws of
the state, and is fundamental." Peterson v. Peterson, 333 S.C. 538, 547, 510
S.E.2d 426, 431 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Anderson v. Anderson, 299 S.C. 110,
115, 382 S.E.2d 897, 900 (1989)). "[T]he General Assembly establishes the
jurisdiction of [magistrate] courts in a legislative pronouncement." Bayly v. State,
397 S.C. 290, 295, 724 S.E.2d 182, 184 (2012).

Under section 22-3-550(A), "[m]agistrates have jurisdiction of all offenses which
may be subject to the penalties of a fine or forfeiture not exceeding five hundred
dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding thirty days, or both." (emphasis added).
Section 22-3-950 of the South Carolina Code (2025) gives magistrate courts the
power to punish for direct contempt only, which is misconduct that occurs "in the
presence of the court." The restraining order in this case was issued by the
magistrate court, and section 16-3-1770(C)(1) of the South Carolina Code (2015),
states that restraining orders issued by a magistrate court "conspicuously must bear
the following language: 'Violation of this order is a criminal offense punishable by
thirty days in jail, a fine of five hundred dollars, or both.'" While Patton was not
arrested, section 16-3-1800 of the South Carolina Code (2015) states "[l]aw
enforcement officers shall arrest a defendant who is acting in violation of a
restraining order."

All courts have the power to demand "submission to their lawful mandates."
Miller, 375 S.C. at 453, 652 S.E.2d at 759 (quoting In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289
(1888)). "[I]ndirect contempt may never be punished summarily, but rather
requires adherence to more normal adversary procedures." United States v. Neal,
101 F.3d 993, 997 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

We find this matter was properly before the magistrate court pursuant to section
22-3-550, which confers authority on the magistrate court to punish for offenses
subject to a fine of $500 and/or thirty days' imprisonment, as in this case. The
magistrate court previously issued a restraining order, and Patton was summoned
back into magistrate court on a rule to show cause why she should not be held in
contempt for violating the ongoing restraining order. A restraining order issued by
a magistrate court "remains in effect for a fixed period of time of not less than one
year, as determined by the court on a case-by-case basis." S.C. Code Ann.
§ 16-3-1750(E) (2015). Section 22-3-550 conferred jurisdiction on the magistrate
court over the contempt action because it was an offense subject to a fine of $500
or imprisonment not exceeding thirty days, or both. The magistrate court had the
authority to conduct the rule to show cause for a violation of its duly issued
restraining order and to "demand submission to its lawful mandate."

Patton argues she was denied due process by the failure of the magistrate court to
appoint an independent prosecutor because Doty's attorney could not ethically
provide pretrial discovery to Patton. Patton argues the incident reports included in
the record are exculpatory and could have changed the outcome of the trial.
However, the incident reports are from 2014 and 2017 and are not relevant to the
case at hand. Regardless, we find the magistrate court sufficiently protected
Patton's constitutional rights in the bench trial and adhered to normal adversary
procedures such that she was not prejudiced. The magistrate court treated the
proceeding as a criminal trial and kept the testimony to the face of the complaint.
The magistrate court was correct that a jury trial was not mandated in this criminal
contempt case because the potential sentence was not more than six months. See
Curlee v. Howle, 277 S.C. 377, 385, 287 S.E.2d 915, 919 (1982) (holding
"appellant in a criminal contempt case had a constitutional right to a jury trial
before a sentence of more than six months could be imposed"); State v. Passmore,
363 S.C. 568, 572, 611 S.E.2d 273, 275 (Ct. App. 2005) (noting a contemnor was
entitled to jury trial when facing a sentence of more than six months in prison).

Based on the foregoing, the circuit court's order is AFFIRMED. 2

WILLIAMS, C.J., and MCDONALD and TURNER, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.