Timothy B. Smith v. Charleston County Assessor

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Timothy B. Smith, Appellant,

v.

Charleston County Assessor, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2022-000983

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
Robert Lawrence Reibold, Administrative Law Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-410
Submitted November 1, 2024 – Filed December 4, 2024

AFFIRMED

Giampiero Diminich, Felix Chisolm Pelzer, Jr., and
Nicholas Clarence Chapman Stewart, all of Shumaker
Loop & Kendrick, LLP, of Charleston, for Appellant.

Brittney Marie Darnell, of Gordon & Rees LLP, of
Charleston; Kevin Michael DeAntonio and Bernard E.
Ferrara, Jr., both of Charleston County Attorney's Office,
of North Charleston, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Timothy B. Smith appeals an order of the Administrative Law
Court (the ALC) finding his dwellings located on properties neighboring his legal
residence did not qualify for the legal residence special tax assessment of four
percent (the four percent tax rate) pursuant to section 12-43-220(c)(1) of the South
Carolina Code (Supp. 2024). On appeal, Smith argues the ALC erred in (1)
interpreting section 12-43-220(c)(1) as requiring the five contiguous acres to exist
on the same parcel, have the same address, or have the same tax map identification
number; (2) granting summary judgment in favor of the Charleston County
Assessor (the Assessor) because there was an issue of material fact concerning
Sullivan's Island's ordinance against the combination of adjoining property lots; (3)
violating his equal protection rights in its interpretation of section 12-43-220(c)(1);
and (4) finding section 12-43-220(c)(1) was a tax exemption statute instead of a tax
classification statute. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

1. We hold the ALC did not err in interpreting section 12-43-220(c)(1) as
requiring the five contiguous acres to exist on the same parcel, have the same
address, or have the same tax map identification number. See CFRE, LLC v.
Greenville Cnty. Assessor, 395 S.C. 67, 73, 716 S.E.2d 877, 880 (2011) ("Tax
appeals to the ALC are subject to the Administrative Procedures Act (APA)."); id.
at 74, 716 S.E.2d at 881 (explaining the appellate court reviews ALC decisions for
errors of law); id. ("Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law,
which [the appellate court is] free to decide without any deference to the court
below."); Mead v. Beaufort Cnty. Assessor, 419 S.C. 125, 130, 796 S.E.2d 165,
168 (Ct. App. 2016) ("The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite the
disposition of cases not requiring the services of a fact finder."); id. at 131, 796
S.E.2d at 168 (explaining that when cross motions for summary judgment have
been filed, the court assumes there is no evidence to consider which has not
already been filed by the parties); Wiegand v. U.S. Auto. Ass'n, 391 S.C. 159, 163,
705 S.E.2d 432, 434 (2011) ("Where cross motions for summary judgment are
filed, the parties concede the issue before us should be decided as a matter of
law."). This case involved three contiguous parcels located at 2514 Raven Drive
(the 2514 parcel), 2520 Raven Drive (the 2520 parcel), and 2524 Raven Drive (the
2524 parcel). Smith owned the 2520 parcel and the 2524 parcel, and 2514 Raven
Drive, LLC owned the 2514 parcel. The 2520 parcel was Smith's legal residence
and domicile. The three parcels were separate properties with different addresses
and tax map identification numbers. We find the five contiguous acres must have
the same address as the legal residence pursuant to section 12-43-220(c)(2)(i) of
the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2024), because the plain language of the statute
provides that "the owner-occupant must have actually owned and occupied the
residence as his legal residence and been domiciled at that address for some period
during the applicable tax year." (emphasis added). Therefore, additional structures
are not located on the same property as the legal residence and five contiguous
acres if the additional structures do not have the same address as the legal
residence. Accordingly, Smith was not entitled to the four percent tax rate on the
2514 parcel and the 2524 parcel because the properties (1) were not his legal
residence and domicile, and (2) did not share the same address as his legal
residence and domicile. See Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578,
581 (2000) ("The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and
effectuate the intent of the legislature."); id. ("Where the statute's language is plain
and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory
interpretation are not needed and [the appellate] court has no right to impose
another meaning."); S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Jasper Cnty., 368 S.C. 388, 398, 629
S.E.2d 624, 629 (2006) ("In construing statutory language, the statute must be read
as a whole and sections which are a part of the same general statutory law must be
construed together and each one given effect."); CFRE, LLC, 395 S.C. at 74, 716
S.E.2d at 881 ("We therefore should not concentrate on isolated phrases within the
statute. Instead, we read the statute as a whole and in a manner consonant and in
harmony with its purpose."); Se.-Kusan, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 276 S.C. 487,
489, 280 S.E.2d 57, 58 (1981) ("As a general rule, tax exemption statutes are
strictly construed against the taxpayer."); id. ("This rule of strict construction
simply means that constitutional and statutory language will not be strained or
liberally construed in the taxpayer's favor. It does not mean that [the appellate
court] will search for an interpretation in the [Assessor's] favor where the plain and
unambiguous language leaves no room for construction."); id. at 489-90, 280
S.E.2d at 58 ("Only when the literal application of a statute produces an absurd
result will [the appellate court] consider a different meaning."); S.C. Const. art. X,
§ 1(3) ("The legal residence and not more than five acres contiguous thereto shall
be taxed on an assessment equal to four percent of the fair market value of such
property."); § 12-43-220(c)(1) ("The legal residence and not more than five acres
contiguous thereto, when owned totally or in part in fee or by life estate and
occupied by the owner of the interest, and additional dwellings located on the same
property and occupied by immediate family members of the owner of the interest,
are taxed on an assessment equal to four percent of the fair market value of the
property."); § 12-43-220(c)(2)(i) ("To qualify for the special property tax
assessment ratio allowed by this item, the owner-occupant must have actually
owned and occupied the residence as his legal residence and been domiciled at that
address for some period during the applicable tax year.").

2. We hold that whether the ALC erred in granting summary judgment in favor of
the Assessor because there was an issue of material fact concerning Sullivan's
Island's ordinance against the combination of adjoining property lots is not
preserved for appellate review because Smith first raised this issue in his motion to
reconsider. See Stevens & Wilkinson of S.C., Inc. v. City of Columbia, 409 S.C.
563, 567, 762 S.E.2d 693, 695 (2014) (holding an issue is not preserved for
appellate review if it was not raised to and ruled upon by the lower court);
Anderson Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Hagen, 313 S.C. 497, 498, 443 S.E.2d 399, 400 (Ct.
App. 1994) ("A party cannot use a motion to reconsider to present an issue he
could have raised prior to judgment but did not.").

3. We hold the ALC's interpretation of section 12-43-220(c)(1) did not violate
Smith's equal protection rights because he failed to demonstrate an equal protection
violation. See CFRE, LLC, 395 S.C. at 73, 716 S.E.2d at 880 (holding "[t]ax
appeals to the ALC are subject to the [APA]"); id. at 74, 716 S.E.2d at 881
(explaining the appellate court reviews ALC decisions for errors of law); Mead,
419 S.C. at 130, 796 S.E.2d at 168 ("The purpose of summary judgment is to
expedite the disposition of cases not requiring the services of a fact finder."); id. at
131, 796 S.E.2d at 168 (explaining that when cross motions for summary judgment
have been filed, the court assumes there is no evidence to consider which has not
already been filed by the parties to the case); Wiegand, 391 S.C. at 163, 705 S.E.2d
at 434 ("Where cross motions for summary judgment are filed, the parties concede
the issue before us should be decided as a matter of law."); Bodman v. State, 403
S.C. 60, 69, 742 S.E.2d 363, 367 (2013) ("The South Carolina Constitution
provides that no 'person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws.'" (quoting
S.C. Const. art. I, § 3)); see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."). Smith failed to present any specific
evidence that persons in similar situations received disparate treatment, and that
this treatment was not related to a legitimate government purpose. See TNS Mills,
Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 331 S.C. 611, 626, 503 S.E.2d 471, 479 (1998) ("In
order to establish an equal protection violation, a party must show that similarly
situated persons received disparate treatment."); Town of Hollywood v. Floyd, 403
S.C. 466, 480, 744 S.E.2d 161, 168 (2013) ("Where an alleged equal protection
violation does not implicate a suspect class or abridge a fundamental right, the
rational basis test is used."); id. at 480, 744 S.E.2d at 168 ("To prevail under the
rational basis standard, a claimant must show similarly situated persons received
disparate treatment, and that the disparate treatment did not bear a rational
relationship to a legitimate government purpose."); Fraternal Ord. of Police v. S.C.
Dep't of Revenue, 352 S.C. 420, 432, 574 S.E.2d 717, 723 (2002) ("For tax
statutes, 'the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most
explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive
discrimination against particular persons and classes.'" (quoting Madden v.
Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940))); Amazon Servs., LLC v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue,
442 S.C. 313, 340, 898 S.E.2d 194, 208 (Ct. App. 2024) (explaining the party
asserting an equal protection violation must present evidence specifically
identifying other similarly situated persons and their disparate treatment), cert.
granted (Oct. 3, 2024).

4. We hold the ALC did not err in interpreting section 12-43-220(c)(1) as a tax
exemption statute because the South Carolina Supreme Court previously held the
statute was a tax exemption statute and not a tax classification statute. See CFRE,
LLC, 395 S.C. at 73, 716 S.E.2d at 880 (holding "[t]ax appeals to the ALC are
subject to the [APA]"); id. at 74, 716 S.E.2d at 881 ("Questions of statutory
interpretation are questions of law, which [the appellate court is] free to decide
without any deference to the court below."); id. (stating the appellate court reviews
the ALC's decision for errors of law); Mead, 419 S.C. at 130, 796 S.E.2d at 168
("The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite the disposition of cases not
requiring the services of a fact finder."); id. at 131, 796 S.E.2d at 168 (explaining
that when cross motions for summary judgment have been filed, the court assumes
there is no evidence to consider which has not already been filed by the parties to
the case); Wiegand, 391 S.C. at 163, 705 S.E.2d at 434 ("Where cross motions for
summary judgment are filed, the parties concede the issue before us should be
decided as a matter of law."); Ford v. Beaufort Cnty. Assessor, 398 S.C. 508, 515,
730 S.E.2d 335, 339 (Ct. App. 2012) (explaining the South Carolina Supreme
Court has previously held that section 12-43-220 of the South Carolina Code (2014
& Supp. 2024) was a tax exemption statute).

AFFIRMED. 1

THOMAS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.