Brown v. Brown

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Ellen Carver
Brown, Respondent,

v.

Marion Junior
Brown, Appellant.

Appeal From Chesterfield County

 Roger E. Henderson, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2009-UP-384

Submitted May 1, 2009 – Filed July 6, 2009  

AFFIRMED

James C. Cox and Terence A. Quinn, both of Hartsville, for
Appellant.

Jack E. Cohoon, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Marion Junior Brown (Husband) argues the family court
erred in: (1) misapprehending the parties' agreement that provided he would
transfer his interest in certain property to his sons, Douglas and Cory; (2) allowing
either Husband or Ellen Carver Brown (Wife) to purchase the other's interest in
the marital home for $12,500, upon forty-five days notice; and (3) in awarding
Wife $18,571.70 of Husband's workers' compensation settlement.  We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following
authorities:  Ex parte Morris, 367 S.C. 56, 61, 624 S.E.2d 649,
652 (2006) ("In appeals from the family court, the appellate court
has the authority to find the facts in accordance with its own view of the
preponderance of the evidence."); Wooten v. Wooten, 364 S.C. 532,
540, 615 S.E.2d 98, 102 (2005) ("However, this broad scope of review
does not require the appellate court to disregard the findings of the family
court."); Latimer v. Farmer, 360 S.C. 375, 380, 602 S.E.2d 32,
34 (2004) ("Neither is the appellate court required to ignore the
fact that the trial judge, who saw and heard the witnesses, was in a better
position to evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight to their
testimony."); Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 355-56,
461 S.E.2d 388, 392 (1995) (finding alleged inaccuracies in an order are not
preserved for appeal where no post-trial motion was filed raising such an
issue); Woodward v. Woodward, 294 S.C. 210, 215, 363
S.E.2d 413, 416 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding the family court's valuation of
property should be affirmed where it is within the range of evidence); Marsh
v. Marsh, 313 S.C. 42, 44, 437 S.E.2d 34, 35 (1993) (stating that in cases
dealing with the distribution of a workers' compensation settlement, the proper
inquiry is whether the property in question was acquired during the marriage,
and if so, whether the property falls into a statutory exception of the
equitable distribution statute).

AFFIRMED.[1]

HEARN, C.J., and THOMAS, J., and KONDUROS,
J., concur. 

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.