Roschy v. Roschy

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Ann Roschy, Appellant,

v.

Rob Roschy, Respondent.

Appeal From Horry County

 H.E. Bonnoitt, Jr., Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2009-UP-151

Submitted March 2, 2009 – Filed March 30,
2009   

AFFIRMED

Ann Roschy, of Conway, as Appellant, acting pro se.

Rob Roschy, of Nashville Tennessee, as Respondent, acting pro se.

PER CURIAM:  Ann Roschy (Wife) appeals the family
court’s final order equitably dividing marital assets and debts, ordering
alimony and contributions for child care expenses, and denying Wife’s request
to resume use of her maiden name.  She argues the family court erred in:  1) finding
a $66,500 bank loan obtained to pay her criminal restitution was a moral debt
and not a marital debt, 2) holding her solely responsible for payment of debt
from a Dell computer account, 3) failing to grant her a credit for the
after-school care of her children, 4) denying her request for name change due
to a criminal conviction, 5) ordering her to pay $137.75 a month to supplement
the mortgage payment on the marital home, 6) failing to grant her a credit for
the medical expenses of her son, and 7) failing to recalculate Rob Roschy’s
(Husband) child support payments after he disclosed he received income of the
form of employment bonuses.  We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the
following authorities:

1. 
As to Wife’s arguments that the trial court erred in: (1) ordering her to pay
$137.75 a month to supplement the mortgage payment on the marital home, (2)
failing to grant her a credit for the medical expenses of her son, and (3) failing
to recalculate Husband’s child support payments after he disclosed he received
income of the form of employment bonuses: McDavid v. McDavid, 333 S.C.
490, 497, 511 S.E.2d 365, 368-69 (1999) (holding any matter not raised and
ruled upon by the family court cannot be considered by this court on appeal).    

2. 
As to Wife’s argument that the trial court erred in finding a $66,500 bank loan
obtained to pay her criminal restitution was a moral debt and not a marital
debt:  Wooten v. Wooten, 364 S.C. 532, 546, 615 S.E.2d 98, 105 (2005) (“For
purposes of equitable distribution, a marital debt is debt incurred for the
joint benefit of the parties regardless of whether the parties are legally
liable or whether one party is individually liable.”).  

3.  As
to Wife’s argument that the trial court erred in holding her solely responsible
for payment of debt from a Dell computer account: Hardy v. Hardy, 311
S.C. 433, 437, 429 S.E.2d 811, 814 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding if the family court
finds that a spouse’s debt was not made for marital purposes, it may not be
factored in the court’s equitable apportionment of the marital estate and the family
court may require payment by the spouse who created the debt for non-marital purposes).

4.  As to Wife’s
argument that the trial court erred in failing to grant her a credit for the
after-school care of her children: Engle v. Engle, 343 S.C. 444, 448 539
S.E.2d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2000) (“Child support awards are addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial judge and, absent an abuse of discretion, will not be
disturbed on appeal.”).

5.  As to Wife’s
argument that the trial court erred in denying her request for name change due
to a criminal conviction:  S.C. Ann. § 15-49-20(c) (Supp. 2008) (“Following the
hearing and upon considering the petition, the reason contained in the
petition, and other documentation before the court, the judge must determine
and grant or refuse the name change as the judge considers proper, having a due
regard to the true interest of the petitioner and protection of the public.”);
S.C. Ann. § 15-49-20(j) (Supp. 2008) (giving the family court discretion to
authorize a name change for a person wishing to resume her maiden name). 

AFFIRMED.[1]

HEARN,
C.J., PIEPER and LOCKEMY, concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.